People v. Ramcharan , 2024 COA 110 ( 2024 )

<div><div><div><div id="pdf-container" style="width: 782px">
<div id="pf1" data-page-no="1">
<div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>SUMMARY </div>
<div>October 10, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div>2024COA110 </div>
<div> </div>
<div>No. 22CA0534, <span>People v. Ramcharan</span><span> </span><span>—</span> Crimes <span>—</span> Unlawful </div>
<div>Sexual Behavior <span>—</span><span> </span><span>Victim’s and Witness’s Prior History —</span> </div>
<div>Evidence of History of False Reporting <span>—</span> Offer of Proof of </div>
<div>Relevancy and Materiality<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Under Colorado’s rape shield statute, a party who seeks to </div>
<div>introduce evidence of a victim’s “history of false reporting<span></span> of sexual </div>
<div>assaults” must file a written motion setting forth “an offer of p<span></span>roof </div>
<div>of the relevancy and materiality” of the evidence. § 18<span>-3-407(2), </span>
</div>
<div>C.R.S. 2023. A division of the court of appeals considers the </div>
<div>sufficiency of an offer of proof consisting of a summary of </div>
<div>statements of witnesses, with whom defense counsel apparently </div>
<div>never spoke, that lacks any explanation of whether the statements </div>
<div>are admissible. The division holds that such an offer of pr<span></span>oof is </div>
<div>insufficient because the proponent did not establish that <span></span>the </div>
<div>witnesses’ statements were admissible.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div>
<div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div>
<div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div>
<div>cited or <span>relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. </span>
</div>
<div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div>
<div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div>
</div>
</div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf2" data-page-no="2">
<div>
<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMI/Rmr/MMIRmrLXztDTaQE4J%2BTuAgumZr5OM5qTtid06pbTlMYNg%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPZZJAGDL3&amp;Expires=1728615779&amp;Signature=Pk8Rn%2FUd2kjZNp8wg8w8yszHqOQ%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjECoaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIBuTrc0D1q5v3%2Fxo1XO5Cvnb2WsO0NJzJz9gCJn1xCXhAiAH9dZE%2F74a0kT883%2FGDAVXr8WNl74JMNsL1uyp9xLPTSq7BQiD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM3YvMu4tzWwqJB9BDKo8Fpd5ctZw56jELCOpesvWdLX4f0p7ip153J1H5coUyO65XZszz5nn3tgEPRrv6iWlh5uIAd29muxP9kyacaLxIpoIR3OxwPSCZt3K5qQajGeCNLdstsK4JPn1jmzm8LgqmfTApqd0n%2F%2BIh4A7w75a9tWONEfgwV%2BoLa9Gzbx7KvIRJB2pLVfSnTHbUFceetj7osbBbtpyfGLYVCoYnN0KVRlN8bRIge3hDYsz92AnPqVCJH%2F7oHzR1Y5AlzE4ptQCK%2BoujjCsRVfLV6mg5rHxZDwKhkpERiX2R%2FoPQId6Dp1zl%2FQYZvyJDZLmHCjxPQ2OJDVyI5dY6YFB6jdmtkKVLXWnt8bRl47mxnmW%2Bb1LENPxD4MRXbYkEenRkO6YN%2B0bSbp2GQI0y4SCiDrzPYKUgr1RYLzi%2BZ4NmJVBrff9f9jKIaobG16zymX3YLAF0%2BZL%2BOlHxqjO9VKw102jl%2B%2F0wM4zg8RiAJ50BTbfvGh5VBt9crEVR6dlv2IIEThzqo1GSA9yzHGab2DsPwORiiBcPy8qpi%2B1jujg2ZKHT14HzG%2FnUviZ3yLPjQVAxw3EcooUUSQ3FMYBOTAu7Fg4DgFo78wVgBtZ5cDu0ncBMD6ocmeHbTMRBCYiZmU92ZChekkhAtY5O6TBahZu4GZFTWZMfXJtqUUQtPZF%2F8SokHp4KHfmHE4RNuBYtSSs3lSz468G4oouWpn6JcVNLkWBgH2xMtveB8JdMtaDdMmGKL7nIx5TnAFTeW%2BZLMJo5iKlD3e8e8oZHNEpXe97t9SU8dNKfUmpMfG5ZyV1DoNWuoxqmPxCaxMzgaodapfzRD3P7lvfjmtnZoaHsieYyW%2BqWRZRdAsOkE%2Bg2QIbtID2IftfJYjDvgaK4BjqyAQ8fV5AHFocs1hdAr5cp0j7mqNZfvSdhM%2F%2Bq%2Bp1%2FS6nmVfRGe5852cz1fGG0z0t8GTctURYSkXycT57xxJv8eBibxMYVscH3pFtTqH9Gy3l2X3YO0cWtwjayIIYZ8u1TP0lcqZspsO56jE7AMzqUNNNetOcHW0MeVsE4U6eSYMgIJVs7Sgjwy6H85tub6ZhylgrRdqzNhpd62BHmUrdu7r8qPKaiWhZcR1Y%2B1DAZcEEXI7c%3D"><div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA110</span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 22CA0534 </div>
<div>Jefferson<span> County District Court No. 20CR1024 </span>
</div>
<div>Honorable Jason Carrithers, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>The People of the State of Colorado, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellee, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Reynold Ramcharan<span>, </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>JUDGMENT AFFIRMED<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division VI </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE <span>LIPINSKY</span> </div>
<div>Schutz and Martinez*, <span>JJ.</span> concur </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Announced October 10, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General, </div>
<div>Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Casey J. Mulligan, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. </div>
<div>VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
</div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf3" data-page-no="3">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>1<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>The General Assembly enacted Colorado<span>’s</span> rape shield statute<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>section 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2023, to protect victims of sexual assault </div>
<div>from <span>“</span>humiliating and embarrassing public fishing expediti<span></span>ons into </div>
<div>their past sexual conduct.”<span> </span><span>People v. Weiss<span>, 133 P.3d 1180, 1185 </span></span>
</div>
<div>(Colo. 2006) (quoting <span>People v. McKenna</span>, 585 P.2d 275, 27<span></span>8 (Colo. </div>
<div>1978)). </div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>To accomplish this goal, the statute limits the introduction of </span>
</div>
<div>“<span>evidence of specific instances of the victim</span><span>’<span>s <span>. . .<span> prior or </span></span></span></span>
</div>
<div>subsequent sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim<span>’</span><span>s <span>. . . </span></span>
</div>
<div>sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim<span>’</span><span>s <span>. . .</span></span> sexual </div>
<div>conduct.<span>”</span><span> <span>§ <span>18<span>-3-407(1), C.R.S. 2023</span></span></span>. <span>(We cite the version of the </span></span>
</div>
<div>rape shield statute in effect at the time of the trial in this case.) <span></span> </div>
<div>Such evidence is presumed irrelevant, with only a few excepti<span></span>ons.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 3<span> <span>One of those exceptions is evidence that “<span>the victim . . . has a </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>history of false reporting of sexual assaults<span>.” § </span><span>18</span>-3-407(2), C.R.S. </div>
<div>2023<span>. <span>But this type of evidence may only be admitted at trial if<span></span> the </span></span>
</div>
<div>party seeking to introduce <span>it</span> follows the procedure specified in </div>
<div>section <span>18<span>-3-<span>407</span></span></span><span>(2)(a)-<span>(g)</span></span>, C.R.S. 2023<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>As part of that procedure, the party seeking to introduce the </span>
</div>
<div>evidence must file a written motion setting forth an <span>“</span>offer of proof of </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf4" data-page-no="4">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>2<span> </span>
</div>
<div>the relevancy and materiality of . . . evidence that the victim <span></span>or </div>
<div>witness has a history of false reporting of sexual assaults that<span></span> is </div>
<div>proposed to be presented.<span>” § </span><span>18</span><span>-3-407(2)(a)</span><span>, </span>C.R.S. 2023<span>. </span>The </div>
<div>written motion <span>“</span>shall be accompanied by an affidavit in <span></span>which the </div>
<div>offer of proof shall be stated.<span>”</span><span> <span>§ <span>18</span></span></span>-3-407(2)(b), C.R.S. 2023. </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>In this appeal, we consider the sufficiency of an offer of proof </span>
</div>
<div>consisting of a summary of statements of witness<span>es,</span> with <span></span>whom </div>
<div>defense counsel apparently never spoke, that lacks any explanat<span></span>ion </div>
<div>of whether the statements are admissible. We hold that such an </div>
<div>offer of proof fails because it does not establish that the witness<span>es’</span> </div>
<div>statements were admissible. </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>Reynold Ramcharan appeals his judgment of conviction </span>
</div>
<div>entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of sexual assault on a </div>
<div>child and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. <span>We</span> affirm.<span> </span> </div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 7<span> <span>The evidence introduced at Ramcharan’s trial established the </span></span>
</div>
<div>following facts. </div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>Ramcharan met A.M., a fourteen-year-old girl, at a public </span>
</div>
<div>location after she ran away from the Tennyson Center for Child<span></span>ren<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>After A.M. told Ramcharan she had nowhere to live, he said he </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf5" data-page-no="5">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>3<span> </span>
</div>
<div>might have a place where she could stay, and they walked to his </div>
<div>apartment. </div>
<div>¶ 9<span> <span>Once they reached Ramcharan’s apartment, <span>A.M. lay down, </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>fully clothed, in a bedroom. A.M. testified that Ramcharan entered </div>
<div>the bedroom a few minutes later, got into bed with her, removed her </div>
<div>pants, held her down, and sexually assaulted her<span>. </span>She specified </div>
<div>that Ramacharan put his penis in her vagina<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>A.M. further testified that, either before they enter<span>ed</span> the </span>
</div>
<div>apartment or while Ramcharan was holding her down, <span></span>he told her </div>
<div>to smoke methamphetamine using a white pipe. When she refused, </div>
<div>he<span> threatened to hurt her if she would not comply. A.M. smoked </span>
</div>
<div>from the pipe<span>. </span>She later reported that the pipe had a black residue. </div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>She then <span>“got enough strength to push [Ramcharan] off,” </span></span>
</div>
<div>walked out of the bedroom, told two women who were in t<span></span>he </div>
<div>apartment that she needed fresh air, left the apartment, and asked </div>
<div>people in neighboring houses to call 911<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>A <span>crimes against children detective<span>, </span>Kim Collins, later </span></span>
</div>
<div>interrogated Ramcharan<span>. H</span>e denied assaulting A.M.<span>, </span>saying that </div>
<div>“<span>everything that happened here was completely </span><span>consensual.”</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>Significantly, however, <span>in response to Detective Collins’s q<span></span>uestion, </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf6" data-page-no="6">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>4<span> </span>
</div>
<div>“<span>Is [A.M.] telling the truth <span>. . .</span> <span>that you had sex,” Ramcharan said, </span></span>
</div>
<div>“<span>We started <span>to and that’s when I asked” A.M. her age. </span>He said, </span>
</div>
<div>“<span>[T]</span><span>hat’s when she got <span>uncomfortable</span>, so I stopped.” <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>In addition, Ramcharan <span>“denied having a white pipe” and </span>told </span>
</div>
<div>the detective that <span>“</span>he did not give [A.M.] <span>meth to smoke.” But a </span>
</div>
<div>police officer later discovered a white pipe containing black residue<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>as A.M. had described it, in the jacket Ramcharan had worn <span>on</span> the </div>
<div>day of the alleged sexual assault<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>A <span>DNA test <span>of</span> swabs from <span>A.M.’s vagina, cervi</span>x, and external </span></span>
</div>
<div>genitalia did not detect semen, but <span>it</span> did contain a male Y-STR </div>
<div>profile that was consistent with Ramcharan<span>’s </span>genetic material<span>. </span><span>See </span>
</div>
<div>State v. Bander<span>, 208 P.3d 1242, 1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) </span>
</div>
<div>(<span>“</span><span>Based on PCR-YSTR typing, a forensic analyst may determine </span>
</div>
<div>whether a known source and all of his paternal relatives can <span></span>be </div>
<div>excluded as possible contributors to an unknown DNA s<span></span>ample.<span>”</span><span>).</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>The <span>prosecution’s expert witness on DNA analysis testified </span><span>that,</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>“<span>based on the results of a search of a current population data<span></span>base, </span>
</div>
<div>the expected frequency of <span>[Ramcharan’</span><span>s]</span> Y-STR profile is </div>
<div>approximately 1 in 2,007<span>.” </span> </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf7" data-page-no="7">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>5<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>Ramcharan was charged with sexual assault on a child wit<span></span>h <span>a </span></span>
</div>
<div>use of force enhancer, in violation of section 18-3-405(1)<span>, </span>(2)(a), </div>
<div>C.R.S. 2024, and contributing to the delinquency of a mino<span></span>r, in </div>
<div>violation of section 18-6-701(1)(a)<span>, </span>(2)(a), C.R.S. 2024<span>. </span>A jury found </div>
<div>Ramcharan guilty of both crimes, but without the use of force </div>
<div>sentence enhancer<span>. </span> Ramcharan appeals his judgment of </div>
<div>conviction<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>Ramcharan contends that the court reversibly erred <span>by</span> </span>
</div>
<div>(1)<span> </span><span>denying his request to introduce evidence of A.M.<span>’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>alleged history of false reporting of sexual assaults; </div>
<div>(2)<span> </span><span>instructing the jury on the mens rea </span><span>“knowingly”</span><span> in a </span>
</div>
<div>manner that <span>“</span>deviated from the statutory definition<span>”</span>; and </div>
<div>(3)<span> <span>denying Ramcharan’s requests for substitution of </span></span>
</div>
<div>appointed counsel. </div>
<div>A.<span> <span>Prior False Reports of Sexual Assault </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>Ramcharan contends that the court reversibly erred by </span>
</div>
<div>denying his request to introduce <span>“evidence of A.M.’s multiple p<span></span>rior </span>
</div>
<div>instances of false reports of being sexually assaulted.” <span> </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf8" data-page-no="8">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>6<span> </span>
</div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Additional Facts </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>Defense counsel filed a pretrial notice of intent to admit </span>
</div>
<div>evidence <span>of “</span>prior false reports of sexual assault.<span>”</span><span> </span>In support of the </div>
<div>notice<span>, defense counsel submitted a document entitled “affid<span></span>avit” </span>
</div>
<div>bearing his signature<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>In t<span>he “affidavit</span><span>,</span><span>” </span>defense counsel asserted that he found, in </span>
</div>
<div>his review of discovery from <span>the district attorney’s office</span>, t<span></span>hat A.M. </div>
<div>“has made previous false accusations of sexual assault.” <span></span>Defense </div>
<div>counsel then summarized statements <span>of</span> witnesses that he f<span></span>ound in </div>
<div>the discovery materials.<span> </span><span>(<span>Not</span></span>hing in the record suggests that </div>
<div>defense counsel ever spoke with any of the witnesses<span>.) </span>Those </div>
<div>statements purport<span>ed</span> to refer to instances in which A.M. alleged<span>ly </span>
</div>
<div>made false reports of sexual assault. In addition, defense counsel </div>
<div>stated <span>in the “affidavit”</span> <span>that he found “two cases had been filed fo<span></span>r </span>
</div>
<div>reporting a false crime,<span>” </span>although defense counsel did not say that<span></span> </div>
<div>A.M. had been charged in those cases with falsely reporting a </div>
<div>sexual assault or that A.M. had been convicted in either case. </div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>More importantly, <span>defense counsel’s “affidavit” </span><span>d<span>id</span></span> not indicate </span>
</div>
<div>whether <span>the witnesses’ statements </span>were admissible. <span>See Wei<span></span>ss<span>, 133 </span></span>
</div>
<div>P.3d at 1187. For example, defense counsel did not state wheth<span></span>er </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf9" data-page-no="9">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>7<span> </span>
</div>
<div>the witnesses possessed firsthand knowledge of <span>A.M.’s</span> alleged false </div>
<div>reports of sexual assault or whether their assertions were <span></span>premised </div>
<div>on hearsay or on speculation<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 21<span> <span>At the initial hearing on the defense’s request to introduce </span></span>
</div>
<div>evidence of A.M.’s alleged prior false reports of sexual assa<span></span>ult, the </div>
<div>court said it was unsure how the allegations in the “affidavit” <span></span>fit “<span>in </span>
</div>
<div>the exception of rape shield” and<span> directed defense counsel to file <span></span>an </span>
</div>
<div>addendum to the request. Defense counsel did not file such an </div>
<div>addendum. </div>
<div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>At a status conference conducted one month later, the court </span>
</div>
<div>invited the prosecutor to respond to the defense’s notice. <span></span> The </div>
<div>prosecutor challenged the notice for four reasons. First, he <span></span>argued </div>
<div>that the supporting <span>“affidavit” was insufficient because “it’s not a </span>
</div>
<div>signed record given under oath.” He noted that the “affidavit” <span></span>was </div>
<div>not notarized and did not satisfy the statutory requirements fo<span></span>r </div>
<div>unsworn declarations. Second, he contended that the witnesses </div>
<div>named in the affidavit “would be testifying to hearsay<span> . . . and would </span>
</div>
<div>have no personal knowledge.” <span>Third, he challenged whether the </span>
</div>
<div>“affidavit” referenced more than one incident of false reporting<span>. </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfa" data-page-no="a">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>8<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Fourth, he noted that the false reporting charges filed against A.M. </div>
<div>had been dismissed. </div>
<div>¶ 23<span> <span>In response, defense counsel told the court he could <span></span>“re<span>-file </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>that with . . . having a notary sign it. I could fix that defect <span></span>quite </div>
<div>easily.” Defense counsel further argued that the “affidavit” </div>
<div>described more than one occasion on which A.M. had falsely </div>
<div>reported that she had been sexually assaulted. </div>
<div>¶ 24<span> <span>The court said it was “debatable” whether the document<span></span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>satisfied the affidavit requirement but added that <span>“an attorney’s </span>
</div>
<div>signature [may be] sufficient” under C.R.C.P. 11 and <span>the prosecuto<span></span>r </span>
</div>
<div>was making <span>a “form over substance sort of argument.” <span></span> <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>Turning to the merits of <span>the prosecutor’s argument</span>, the court </span>
</div>
<div>concluded that the defense’s <span>offer of proof was insufficient, saying </span>
</div>
<div>that, although defense counsel “assert[s] there’s two instances <span></span>of </div>
<div>false reporting,” there is “only one regarding a sexual act.<span></span>” <span>The </span>
</div>
<div>court also concluded that the offer of proof improperly rested on </div>
<div>hearsay. Accordingly, the court denied, without prejudice, the </div>
<div>defense’s request <span>for an evidentiary hearing to determine the </span>
</div>
<div>admissibility of <span>evidence of A.M.’s </span>alleged history of false reporting </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfb" data-page-no="b">
<div>
<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMH/ITp/MMHITpSqSZY5n5MOS/Ale1SyHQLP9sB/524pxnA/Zymqw%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPZZJAGDL3&amp;Expires=1728615779&amp;Signature=W2OLzYO9Yk%2FpoRGmukeqs3WEsMI%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjECoaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIBuTrc0D1q5v3%2Fxo1XO5Cvnb2WsO0NJzJz9gCJn1xCXhAiAH9dZE%2F74a0kT883%2FGDAVXr8WNl74JMNsL1uyp9xLPTSq7BQiD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM3YvMu4tzWwqJB9BDKo8Fpd5ctZw56jELCOpesvWdLX4f0p7ip153J1H5coUyO65XZszz5nn3tgEPRrv6iWlh5uIAd29muxP9kyacaLxIpoIR3OxwPSCZt3K5qQajGeCNLdstsK4JPn1jmzm8LgqmfTApqd0n%2F%2BIh4A7w75a9tWONEfgwV%2BoLa9Gzbx7KvIRJB2pLVfSnTHbUFceetj7osbBbtpyfGLYVCoYnN0KVRlN8bRIge3hDYsz92AnPqVCJH%2F7oHzR1Y5AlzE4ptQCK%2BoujjCsRVfLV6mg5rHxZDwKhkpERiX2R%2FoPQId6Dp1zl%2FQYZvyJDZLmHCjxPQ2OJDVyI5dY6YFB6jdmtkKVLXWnt8bRl47mxnmW%2Bb1LENPxD4MRXbYkEenRkO6YN%2B0bSbp2GQI0y4SCiDrzPYKUgr1RYLzi%2BZ4NmJVBrff9f9jKIaobG16zymX3YLAF0%2BZL%2BOlHxqjO9VKw102jl%2B%2F0wM4zg8RiAJ50BTbfvGh5VBt9crEVR6dlv2IIEThzqo1GSA9yzHGab2DsPwORiiBcPy8qpi%2B1jujg2ZKHT14HzG%2FnUviZ3yLPjQVAxw3EcooUUSQ3FMYBOTAu7Fg4DgFo78wVgBtZ5cDu0ncBMD6ocmeHbTMRBCYiZmU92ZChekkhAtY5O6TBahZu4GZFTWZMfXJtqUUQtPZF%2F8SokHp4KHfmHE4RNuBYtSSs3lSz468G4oouWpn6JcVNLkWBgH2xMtveB8JdMtaDdMmGKL7nIx5TnAFTeW%2BZLMJo5iKlD3e8e8oZHNEpXe97t9SU8dNKfUmpMfG5ZyV1DoNWuoxqmPxCaxMzgaodapfzRD3P7lvfjmtnZoaHsieYyW%2BqWRZRdAsOkE%2Bg2QIbtID2IftfJYjDvgaK4BjqyAQ8fV5AHFocs1hdAr5cp0j7mqNZfvSdhM%2F%2Bq%2Bp1%2FS6nmVfRGe5852cz1fGG0z0t8GTctURYSkXycT57xxJv8eBibxMYVscH3pFtTqH9Gy3l2X3YO0cWtwjayIIYZ8u1TP0lcqZspsO56jE7AMzqUNNNetOcHW0MeVsE4U6eSYMgIJVs7Sgjwy6H85tub6ZhylgrRdqzNhpd62BHmUrdu7r8qPKaiWhZcR1Y%2B1DAZcEEXI7c%3D"><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>9<span> </span>
</div>
<div>of sexual assaults. Although the court said that defense counsel </div>
<div>could refile the request, the defense did not do so<span>. </span> <span> </span> </div>
<div>2.<span> <span>Standard of Review </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 26<span> <span>We review the construction and interpretation of Colorado’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>rape shield statute de novo. <span>See Weiss</span>, 133 P.3d <span>at</span> 1184<span>. <span>“</span></span>Our </div>
<div>objective is to effectuate the intent and purpose of the Gene<span></span>ral </div>
<div>Assembly<span>. <span>We read the statute as a whole, giving sensible effect to </span></span>
</div>
<div>all of its parts whenever possible. If the statutory language is cl<span></span>ear, </div>
<div>we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision.<span>”</span> <span>I<span></span>d.<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>(citations omitted). </div>
<div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>In addition<span>, “[w]</span>e review a trial court<span>’</span>s determination of the </span>
</div>
<div>admissibility of evidence under the rape shield statute for an abuse </div>
<div>of discretion<span>.” <span>People v. Buckner</span></span>, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 63, 509 <span></span>P.3d 452, </div>
<div>464.<span> <span>“</span></span><span>A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly </span>
</div>
<div>arbitrary, unreasonable, <span>or</span> unfair, <span>or</span> is based on an erroneous view </div>
<div>of the law<span>.” <span>Id. </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>The parties disagree whether <span>the court’s denial of the defense’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>request to introduce evidence of <span>A.M.’s </span>alleged prior false reports of </div>
<div>sexual assault could have violated <span>Ramcharan’s </span>constitutional </div>
</div>
</div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfc" data-page-no="c">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>10<span> </span>
</div>
<div>rights to confront the witnesses against him and to present <span></span>a </div>
<div>complete defense<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 29<span> <span>“<span>An erroneous evidentiary ruling may rise to the level <span></span>of </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>constitutional error if it deprived the defendant of any<span></span> meaningful </div>
<div>opportunity to present a complete defense.<span>” <span>People v. Conyac</span></span><span>, <span></span>2014 </span>
</div>
<div>COA 8M, ¶ 93, 361 P.3d 1005, <span>1024</span>. But a defendant<span>’</span>s right to </div>
<div>present a defense is violated only when <span>“</span>the defendant was denie<span></span>d </div>
<div>virtually his only means of effectively testing significant <span></span>prosecution </div>
<div>evidence.<span>” <span>Id.</span><span>; </span><span>see also Krutsinger v. People<span>, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>(Colo. 2009) (holding that an evidentiary ruling amounts to </div>
<div>constitutional error if it “effectively barred the defendant<span></span> from </div>
<div>meaningfully testing evidence central to establishing his guilt”<span>).</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>3.<span> <span>The Law </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>Under the rape shield statute, a party can introduce evidence </span>
</div>
<div>that the victim “has a history of false reporting of sexual assault<span></span>s” </div>
<div>only by adhering to the procedure specified in section 18-3-407(2), </div>
<div>C.R.S. 2023: </div>
<div>(a) A written motion shall be made . . . to the </div>
<div>court and to the opposing parties stating that </div>
<div>the moving party has an offer of proof of the </div>
<div>relevancy and materiality of . . . evidence that </div>
<div>the victim or witness has a history of false </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfd" data-page-no="d">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>11<span> </span>
</div>
<div>reporting of sexual assaults that is proposed to </div>
<div>be presented. </div>
<div>(b) The written motion shall be accompanied </div>
<div>by an affidavit in which the offer of proof shall </div>
<div>be stated. </div>
<div>§ <span>18</span><span>-3-407(2)(a)-(<span>b)</span></span><span>, </span>C.R.S. 2023<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>Because section 18-3-407(2)(b), C.R.S. 2023, <span>refers to “an </span></span>
</div>
<div>affidavit,” the document in which “the offer of proof shall be st<span></span>ated” </div>
<div>must satisfy the legal requirements for affidavits<span>, </span><span>see </span>C.R.C.P. 108 </div>
<div>(<span>“</span><span>An affidavit may be sworn to either within or without <span></span>this state </span>
</div>
<div>before any officer authorized by law to take and certify <span></span>the </div>
<div>acknowledgment of deeds conveying lands.<span>”); <span>Otani v. Dist<span></span>. Ct.<span>, 662 </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>P.2d 1088, 1090 (Colo. 1983) (“<span>An affidavit is a signed, written </span>
</div>
<div>statement, made under oath before an authorized officer, in wh<span></span>ich </div>
<div>the affiant vouches that what is said is true<span>.”).</span><span> </span>(We look to C.R.C.P.<span></span> </div>
<div>108 for guidance in the absence of a Rule of Criminal Procedure </div>
<div>that address<span>es</span> affidavits. <span>See </span>Crim. P. 57(b).) An unsworn </div>
<div>declaration that complies with section 13-<span>27</span>-106, C.R.S. <span></span>2024, can </div>
<div>be used in place of an affidavit. C.R.C.P. 108.<span> </span>Section 13-<span>27</span>-106 </div>
<div>specifies that unsworn declarations must include the statement, <span>“I </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfe" data-page-no="e">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>12<span> </span>
</div>
<div>declare under penalty of perjury under the law of Colorado that <span></span>the </div>
<div>foregoing is true and correct.”<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, <span>it</span> <span>“shall </span></span>
</div>
<div>notify the other party of such.” §<span> <span>18</span>-3-407(2)(c), C.R.S. 2023. If t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>prosecution disputes the facts described in the offer of proof, t<span></span>he </div>
<div>court shall set a pretrial in camera evidentiary hearing, at wh<span></span>ich </div>
<div>“<span>the court may allow the questioning of the victim or wit<span></span>ness </span>
</div>
<div>regarding the offer of proof made by the moving party or othe<span></span>rwise </div>
<div>allow a presentation of the offer of proof, including b<span></span>ut not limited </div>
<div>to the presentation of witnesses.” <span>Id.<span> </span></span><span>“</span><span>Only if the prosecution </span>
</div>
<div>stipulates to the facts contained in the offer of proof<span>”</span> may the cou<span></span>rt </div>
<div>rule on the request to introduce evidence otherwise barred <span></span>under </div>
<div>the rape shield statute without an evidentiary hearing<span>. </span><span>Weiss</span>, <span>133 </span>
</div>
<div>P.3d at 1187. </div>
<div>¶ 33<span> </span><span>An offer of proof <span>is a “preview of the evidence a party is </span></span>
</div>
<div>prepared to introduce at an evidentiary hearing” and “consists <span></span>of </div>
<div>allegations that the party<span>’</span>s attorney represents would be proven <span></span>if </div>
<div>the court granted the hearing.” <span> <span>People v. Marx</span>, 2019 COA 138, </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 46, 467 P.3d 1196, 1206. An offer of proof <span>“</span>typically states: </div>
<div>(1) what the anticipated testimony of the witness would be if<span></span> the </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pff" data-page-no="f">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>13<span> </span>
</div>
<div>witness were permitted to testify concerning the matter at <span></span>issue; </div>
<div>(2) the purpose and relevance of the testimony sought to be </div>
<div>introduced; and (3) all the facts necessary to establish the </div>
<div>testimony<span>’</span><span>s admissibility<span>.” <span>Weiss</span></span>, 133 P.3d at 1186-87.<span> </span></span><span>“[T]</span><span>he </span>
</div>
<div>affidavit accompanying the defendant’s offer of proof must a<span></span>rticulate </div>
<div>facts which, if demonstrated at the evidentiary hearing by a </div>
<div>preponderance of the evidence, would show that the <span></span>alleged victim </div>
<div>made multiple prior or subsequent reports of sexual assault that<span></span> </div>
<div>were in fact false.” <span>Id.</span><span> at 1184<span>. </span> </span>
</div>
<div>4.<span> <span>Defense <span>Counsel’s “Affidavit”</span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>The division requested supplemental briefing on whether </span>
</div>
<div>defense counsel’s<span> </span><span>“affidavit”</span><span> containing </span>Ramcharan’s <span>offer of proof </span>
</div>
<div>satisfied the legal requirements for affidavits or unsworn </div>
<div>declarations.<span> <span>The document was neither notarized nor did it </span></span>
</div>
<div>expressly say that it was made <span>“</span>under penalty of perjury under t<span></span>he </div>
<div>law of Colorado.<span>”</span><span> </span>Although the prosecution argued before trial that, </div>
<div>for this reason, <span>defense counsel’s submission</span> did not satisfy section </div>
<div>18<span>-3-407(2)(b), C.R.S. 2023, the court did not decide <span></span>the issue but, </span>
</div>
<div>instead, concluded that defense counsel had failed to make <span>a </span>
</div>
<div>sufficient offer of proof under section <span>18</span>-3-407(2)(a), C.R.S. 2023. </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf10" data-page-no="10">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>14<span> </span>
</div>
<div>The People did not challenge the form of the <span>“affidavit”</span> in their </div>
<div>answer brief. </div>
<div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>We need not decide whether the document satisfied the </span>
</div>
<div>affidavit requirement set forth in section <span>18</span>-3-407(2)(b), C.R.S. </div>
<div>2023, however, because, like the court, we hold that defense </div>
<div>counsel failed to make a sufficient offer of proof<span>. </span><span>See infra </span>Part </div>
<div>II.A.5.<span> <span>Nonetheless, we are troubled by the deficiencies in the form </span></span>
</div>
<div>of <span>defense counsel’s “affidavit</span><span>.<span>”</span></span> </div>
<div>5.<span> <span>Ramcharan Did Not Make a Sufficient Offer of Proof </span></span>
</div>
<div>Under Section 18-3-407(2)(a), C.R.S. 2023 </div>
<div>¶ 36<span> </span><span>Next, w<span>e hold that Ramcharan’s offer of proof </span>was insufficient </span>
</div>
<div>under section 18-3-407(2)(a), C.R.S. 2023, because he did not </div>
<div>provide facts establishing that the witness<span>es’</span> statements referenc<span></span>ed </div>
<div>in his “affidavit”<span> were admissible. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 37<span> <span>As noted above, the “affidavit” consist<span>ed</span><span> of witness statements </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>that defense counsel obtain<span>ed</span> from discovery materials, as well as </div>
<div>his review of two court files in which A.M. was charged with f<span></span>alse </div>
<div>reporting.<span> <span>Defense counsel did not say he had spoken wit<span></span>h any of </span></span>
</div>
<div>the witnesses named in the “affidavit.”<span> <span> </span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf11" data-page-no="11">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>15<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 38<span> </span><span>N<span>othing in the “affidavit” indicate<span>d </span>the basis for the witnesses’ </span></span>
</div>
<div>alleged knowledge that A.M. had made false reports of sexual </div>
<div>assault or established that <span>the witnesses’ statements were </span>
</div>
<div>admissible evidence<span>. </span><span>Specifically</span><span>, t</span>he <span>“</span><span>affidavit</span><span>” </span>stated that Steve </div>
<div>Bailey<span>, A.M.’s guardian ad litem,<span> told Detective Collins that<span></span> A.M. </span></span>
</div>
<div>“had a history of false reporting,” including an “instance where </div>
<div>[A.M.<span>] had made allegations of sexual assault ‘that she said </span>
</div>
<div>happened in one place when it was known she was somewhere </div>
<div>else.’” <span>Defense counsel did not indicate how Bailey became aware of </span>
</div>
<div>this incident, whether Bailey was merely repeating information he </div>
<div>obtained from others, <span>or</span> whether Bailey could provide admissible </div>
<div>testimony regarding the incident. </div>
<div>¶ 39<span> </span><span>T<span>he “affidavit” also report</span><span>ed</span><span> information that Mallory Scott, a </span></span>
</div>
<div>“social worker with Teller County DHS<span>,</span>” provided to Detective </div>
<div>Collins, a deputy district attorney, and an investigator with <span></span>the </div>
<div>district attorney’s office. <span> According to defense counsel, Scott<span></span> said </span>
</div>
<div>that A.M. <span>“had been charged in Teller County for false re<span></span>porting of </span>
</div>
<div>sexual assault.” <span>But the </span>“affidavit” <span>did not indicate how Scott </span>
</div>
<div>learned of the charge<span>, </span>whether she possessed any firsthand </div>
<div>knowledge of the facts supporting the charge, or whether A.M. was </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf12" data-page-no="12">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>16<span> </span>
</div>
<div>convicted in the case.<span> </span><span>The “affidavit” </span>quoted Scott as saying that </div>
<div>A.M. was sexual<span>ly</span> assault<span>ed</span> in 2018; <span>“reported other incident<span></span>s of </span>
</div>
<div>sexual assault allegations, including the incident in which she w<span></span>as </div>
<div>charged with <span>‘</span>reporting a false crime<span>’”; and</span> <span>“continued to make false </span>
</div>
<div>reports up until December 2019.<span>”</span><span> </span>Notably, <span>the “affidavit” did not </span>
</div>
<div>quote Scott as saying that A.M. falsely reported a sexual assault in </div>
<div>2018 <span>or that the “continued .</span> <span>. . false reports” include</span>d false re<span></span>ports </div>
<div>of sexual assault.<span> </span>According to defense counsel, Scott said that </div>
<div>A.M. <span>would “sometimes tell Ms. Scott that a particular assault </span>
</div>
<div>didn’t actua<span>lly happen</span>,” but the “affidavit” <span>did not say that any </span>
</div>
<div>such <span>“particular </span><span>assault<span>”</span></span> was a sexual assault or how many times </div>
<div>A.M. allegedly told Scott that “a particular assault didn’t <span></span>actually </div>
<div>happen.<span>”</span><span> <span>More importantly, the “affidavit” <span>did not indicate how </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>Scott knew that A.M. false<span>ly</span> reported any sexual assault<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 40<span> <span>The “affidavit” <span>further said that Scott provided an example </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>where A.M. <span>“went running down a trail near the police stati<span></span>on<span> and </span></span>
</div>
<div>reported to the first person she saw that she had been sexually </div>
<div>assaulted.” According to the “affidavit,” Scott said that off<span></span>icers </div>
<div>found a threatening note in A.M.<span>’s backpack and that </span>A.M. </div>
<div>“allegedly admitted that she was the one who wrote that<span></span> note.” But </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf13" data-page-no="13">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>17<span> </span>
</div>
<div>the “affidavit” <span>did not say that A.M. falsely reported the sexual </span>
</div>
<div>assault or that Scott possessed personal knowledge of the <span></span>incident. </div>
<div>¶ 41<span> <span>Further, the “affidavit” <span>said that, according to Scott, A.M. </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>made a report that <span>“police were able to determine was false by </span>
</div>
<div>checking surveillance camera footage.” The “affidavit” <span>did not </span>
</div>
<div>explain how Scott knew of the alleged<span>ly</span> false report, however.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 42<span> </span><span>Finally, t<span>he reference to the two court cases in the “affidavit” </span></span>
</div>
<div>did not indicate whether either case arose from <span>a </span>false report of </div>
<div>sexual assault, whether the false reporting charges filed against </div>
<div>A.M. were meritorious, or how evidence of any false reports of </div>
<div>sexual assault underlying those cases could be admitted int<span></span>o </div>
<div>evidence<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 43<span> </span><span>The offer of proof specified in section 18-3-407(2)(a), C.R.S. </span>
</div>
<div>2023, requires more than mere allegations that the victim has a </div>
<div>history of false reporting of sexual assaults<span>. </span><span>See Weiss</span>, 133 P.3d at </div>
<div>1184. Rather, the offer of proof and the hearing discussed in </div>
<div>section 18-3-407(2)(c), C.R.S. 2023, are intended to screen <span>“</span>the </div>
<div>evidence proposed to be offered regarding the sexual conduct <span></span>of the </div>
<div>victim.<span>”</span><span> <span>§ 18-3-407(2)(e), C.R.S. 2023. The procedures set forth in </span></span>
</div>
<div>section <span>18</span>-3-407(2)(a), (b), and (c), C.R.S. 2023, would <span></span>be <span>a </span>futile </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf14" data-page-no="14">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>18<span> </span>
</div>
<div>exercise if <span>an</span> offer of proof consist<span>ed</span> of inadmissible evidence.<span> </span>For </div>
<div>this reason, the offer of <span>proof must state “</span>all the facts necessary <span></span>to </div>
<div>establish the testimony<span>’</span>s admissibility<span>.” <span>Weiss</span></span>, 133 P.3d at 118<span></span>6-</div>
<div>87.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 44<span> <span>Defense counsel’s “offer of proof” <span>fell far short of explaining </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>how any of the allegations of false reporting of sexual assault </div>
<div>contained in the “affidavit” <span>were admissible.<span> </span>Although there is no </span>
</div>
<div>requirement that the affiant who executes the affidavit required </div>
<div>pursuant to section <span>18</span>-3-407(2)(b), C.R.S. 2023, speak with the </div>
<div>witnesses whose statements appear in the affidavit, <span>an affiant’s </span>sole </div>
<div>reliance on third-party documents to obtain <span>th<span>os</span></span>e statements </div>
<div>increases the likelihood that a court will determine that the <span></span>offer of </div>
<div>proof fails to establish the statements<span>’</span> admissibility. </div>
<div>¶ 45<span> <span>The “affidavit”<span> </span>that Ramcharan’s counsel tendered to the court<span> </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>does not state that the specified individuals have firsthand </div>
<div>knowledge of the allegations <span>or</span>, if not, the basis for their knowledge.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>If the individuals were merely recounting hearsay <span>—</span> <span>“</span>a statement </div>
<div>other than one made by the declarant while testifying at t<span></span>he trial or </div>
<div>hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matt<span></span>er </div>
<div>asserted,<span>”</span><span> CRE 801(c) </span><span>—</span><span> the individuals<span>’ statements </span>regarding </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf15" data-page-no="15">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>19<span> </span>
</div>
<div>A.M.<span>’s alleged <span>history of false reporting of sexual assaults would be </span></span>
</div>
<div>inadmissible.<span> <span>See <span>CRE 802 (</span></span></span><span>“</span><span>Hearsay is not admissible except as </span>
</div>
<div>provided by these rules or by the civil and criminal p<span></span>rocedural rules </div>
<div>applicable to the courts of Colorado or by any statut<span></span>es of the State </div>
<div>of Colorado.<span>”</span><span>)</span><span>; </span><span>see also</span> CRE 804, 805, 807 (setting forth vari<span></span>ous </div>
<div>exceptions to the general bar against hearsay testimony). </div>
<div>¶ 46<span> </span><span>Defense counsel was required to explain in his offer of proof </span>
</div>
<div>why the witnesses’ statements were admissible. Defense counsel’s </div>
<div>offer of proof failed absent such an explanation. </div>
<div>¶ 47<span> </span><span>For these reasons, we conclude that the court did not abuse </span>
</div>
<div>its discretion by denying <span>Ramcharan’s </span>request to introduce </div>
<div>evidence of A.M.’s <span>history of false reports of sexual assaults. </span>
</div>
<div>B.<span> <span>Instructional Error </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 48<span> </span><span>Ramcharan contends that the court reversibly erred <span>by</span> </span>
</div>
<div>instructing the jury on the word “knowingly”<span> in a way that </span>
</div>
<div>“<span>substantially deviated from the statutory definition, was </span>
</div>
<div>misleading, inaccurately stated the law, and lowered the </div>
<div>prosecution<span>’</span><span>s burden to prove every element </span><span>—</span><span> including the men<span></span>s </span>
</div>
<div>rea <span>—</span> of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.<span>” </span> </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf16" data-page-no="16">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>20<span> </span>
</div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Preservation and Standard of Review </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 49<span> </span><span>The People contend that defense counsel only objected to the </span>
</div>
<div>inclusion of the word “well<span>-</span>being” in the <span>instructions and therefore </span>
</div>
<div>did not preserve <span>Ramcharan’s challenge to the court’s instruction </span>
</div>
<div>defining the word “knowingly<span>.</span><span>”<span> <span> </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 50<span> <span>Objections must be “specific enough to draw the trial court’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>attention to the asserted error.” <span>People v. Tallent<span>, 2021 CO 68, </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 12, 495 P.3d 944, 948 (quoting <span>Martinez v. People</span>, 2015 CO 16, </div>
<div>¶ 14, 344 P.3d 862, 868)<span>. </span>The record confirms that defense counsel </div>
<div>did not specifically draw attention to the asserted error in the </div>
<div>court’s <span>definition </span>of “knowingly”<span> because he only objected to the </span>
</div>
<div>inclusion of <span>“well<span>-being</span><span>”</span></span> in the definition. In contrast to his </div>
<div>counsel’s <span>objection at trial, on appeal Ramcharan contends that <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>trial court’s definition<span> </span>of “knowingly”<span> is inconsistent with the </span>
</div>
<div>statutory definition. § <span>18</span>-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2024. </div>
<div>¶ 51<span> <span>“<span>We review de novo whether the jury instructions as a w<span></span>hole </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>accurately informed the jury of the governing law.<span>” </span> <span>People v. </span>
</div>
<div>Manyik<span>, 2016 COA 42, ¶ 65<span>, </span>383 P.3d 77, 89.<span> <span>“</span></span>However, we review </span>
</div>
<div>the trial court<span>’</span>s decision regarding whether to give a particul<span></span>ar jury </div>
<div>instruction for an abuse of discretion<span>.” <span>Id<span>.</span></span></span><span> <span>“</span></span>A jury instruction </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf17" data-page-no="17">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>21<span> </span>
</div>
<div>should substantially track the language of the statute desc<span></span>ribing </div>
<div>the crime; a material deviation from the statute can result in </div>
<div>reversible plain error, depending on the facts of the case.” <span> <span>People v. </span></span>
</div>
<div>Weinreich<span>, 119 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Colo. 2005).<span> </span>We review not only </span>
</div>
<div>whether the jury instructions faithfully track<span>ed</span> the law but also </div>
<div>whether they <span>we</span>re confusing or may have misled the jury. <span>Garcia<span></span> v. </span>
</div>
<div>People<span>, 2022 CO 6, ¶ 16, 503 P.3d 135, 140<span> </span>(citing <span>People v. Ja<span></span>nes<span>, </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>982 P.2d 300, 303-04 (Colo. 1999)). </div>
<div>¶ 52<span> </span><span>We review all unpreserved nonstructural errors, including </span>
</div>
<div>errors in jury instructions, for plain error.<span> </span><span>See Hagos <span>v. People</span></span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>2012 CO 63, ¶ 14, 288 P.3d 116, 120. We reverse under the plain </div>
<div>error standard of review only if the error was obvious and </div>
<div>substantial, meaning it “so undermined the fundamental fairness of<span></span> </div>
<div>the [proceeding] itself as to cast serious doubt on the relia<span></span>bility” of </div>
<div>the outcome.<span> </span><span>People v. Crabtree</span>, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 43, 550 P.3d </div>
<div>656, 667 (quoting <span>Wilson v. People</span><span>, </span>743 <span>P.2<span>d </span></span><span>415</span><span>, <span>420</span></span> (Colo. 1987)<span>).</span> </div>
<div>2.<span> <span>Ramcharan Did Not Waive His Challenge <span>to</span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>the Instructional Error </div>
<div>¶ 53<span> </span><span>As a threshold matter, the People argue that Ramcharan </span>
</div>
<div>waived his instructional error argument because defense counsel </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf18" data-page-no="18">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>22<span> </span>
</div>
<div>“agreed to the ‘substance’ of the proposed instructions as a <span></span>whole” </div>
<div>and <span>“his objection was limited to a singular request that t<span></span>he word </span>
</div>
<div>‘well<span>-</span><span>being’ be removed.” <span>We disagree that such actions constit<span></span>uted </span></span>
</div>
<div>a <span>waiver</span><span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 54<span> </span><span>Whether a party waived an argument is a question of law that </span>
</div>
<div>we review de novo. <span>Richardson <span>v. People</span></span>, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 21, 481 </div>
<div>P.3d 1, 5. Waiver <span>is the “<span>intentional</span></span> relinquishment of a <span>know<span></span>n<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>right or privilege.<span>” <span>People v. Rediger</span></span>, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39, 416 P.3d </div>
<div>893, 902 (quoting <span>Dep’t of Health v. Donahue</span>, 690 P.2d 243, 2<span></span>47 </div>
<div>(Colo. 1984)). <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 55<span> </span><span>As Ramcharan asserts<span>, “there is no evidence in the record that </span></span>
</div>
<div>[counsel] intentionally relinquished his right to have the jury </div>
<div>correctly instructed on the definition of ‘knowingly,’” even if<span></span> <span>his </span>
</div>
<div>counsel did not specifically object to that definitional instruction<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>The facts in this <span>case </span>are similar to those in <span>Rediger</span>, where defens<span></span>e </div>
<div>counsel not only did not specifically object to the challenged </div>
<div>instruction but <span>confirmed he was “satisfied with the instructions</span><span>,</span><span>” </span>
</div>
<div>and the record did not indicate that <span>“</span>the court or the parties </div>
<div>discussed that instruction.” <span>Rediger</span><span>, ¶<span> <span>10</span>, 416 P.3d at 898.</span> <span>The </span></span>
</div>
<div>supreme court held that, on such <span>facts, there was “</span>no evidence, </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf19" data-page-no="19">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>23<span> </span>
</div>
<div>either express or implied, that Rediger intended to re<span></span>linquish his </div>
<div>right<span>.” <span>Id.</span><span> </span>at ¶ 42, 416 P.3d at 902. “For <span>example, the record </span></span>
</div>
<div>contains no evidence that Rediger considered objecting t<span></span>o the </div>
<div>erroneous instruction but then, <span>‘</span>for some tactical or other reason, </div>
<div>rejected the idea.<span>’” <span>Id. </span></span>(citation omitted). So, too, in this case. </div>
<div>¶ 56<span> </span><span>Th<span>erefore<span>, <span>Ramcharan did not waive his instructional error </span></span></span></span>
</div>
<div>argument<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>3.<span> <span>The Court Erred by Providing an Instruction with an </span></span>
</div>
<div>Incorrect Definition of <span>“Knowingly”</span> </div>
<div>¶ 57<span> </span><span>We agree with Ramcharan that the <span>court’s </span>instruction </span>
</div>
<div>incorrectly defined “knowingly<span>.</span><span>” </span><span> (The People concede that <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>instruction “did not wholly track the statutory definition of<span></span> </div>
<div>‘knowingly’ or the pattern jury instruction<span>.</span>”) <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 58<span> </span><span>To prove both sexual assault on a child and contribu<span></span>ting to </span>
</div>
<div>the delinquency of a minor, a prosecutor must prove bey<span></span>ond a </div>
<div>reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingl<span></span>y. <span>See </span>
</div>
<div>§ <span>18</span><span>-3-405(1</span><span>) (“</span>Any actor who <span>knowingly</span> subjects another not <span></span>his </div>
<div>or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a </div>
<div>child if the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the acto<span></span>r is at </div>
<div>least four years older than the victim.<span>”</span>) (emphasis added); <span>see a<span></span>lso </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf1a" data-page-no="1a">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>24<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Gorman v. People<span>, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000) <span>(“[T]</span>he culpable </span>
</div>
<div>mental state of<span> knowingly</span> applies to the act of contributing t<span></span>o the </div>
<div>delinquency<span>”</span><span> of a minor.) (emphasis added)<span>. </span><span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 59<span> </span><span>Section 18-1-<span>501(6) defines “knowingly” as when a person “is </span></span>
</div>
<div>aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circ<span></span>umstance </div>
<div>exists . . . [and] when he is aware that his conduct is practically </div>
<div>certain to cause the result.”<span> </span><span>See also <span>COLJI-Crim. F:195 (2023) </span></span>
</div>
<div>(pattern jury instruction F:195 <span>defines “knowingly” as “when he </span>
</div>
<div>[she] is aware that his [her] conduct is of such nature or t<span></span>hat such </div>
<div>a circumstance exists . <span>. . </span>[and] when he [she] is aware that his [her] </div>
<div>conduct is practically certain to cause the result”<span>).</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 60<span> </span><span>The court<span>’s </span>definition of <span>“knowing</span><span>ly</span><span>,<span>”</span></span> however, did not </span>
</div>
<div>“substantially track the language of the statute” or <span>that of the </span>
</div>
<div>pattern instruction. <span>Weinreich</span>, 119 P.3d at 1076. While section </div>
<div>18<span>-1-501(6) refers to <span>“aware[ness] that [the defendant<span></span>’s]<span> conduct is </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>of such nature or that such circumstance exists,” the court’s </div>
<div>instruction said <span>that “knowing</span><span>ly</span><span>” </span>referred <span>to “the actor’s <span>genera<span></span>l </span></span>
</div>
<div>awareness of the nature of his conduct <span>in relation to the chi<span></span>ld<span> <span>or</span> his </span></span>
</div>
<div>awareness of the circumstances <span>in which he commits an a<span></span>ct against </span>
</div>
<div>the well-being of the child<span>.”<span> <span>(Emphasis added.)</span> <span>The court added the </span></span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf1b" data-page-no="1b">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>25<span> </span>
</div>
<div>qualifier “general” <span>before </span>“awareness” <span>and materially deviated from </span>
</div>
<div>the statutory definition by specifying that the subject conduct <span></span>must </div>
<div>be<span> <span>in relation</span><span> <span>to</span></span> the child or the <span>defendant’s awareness of the</span> </span>
</div>
<div>circumstances in which his act impacts the <span>child’s</span> well-being.<span> </span><span>See </span>
</div>
<div>People v. Mendez<span>, 897 P.2d 868, 871 (Colo. App. 1995) <span>(“</span>The </span>
</div>
<div>modification, expansion, or clarification of the definition <span></span>of a term </div>
<div>defined by statute is not recommended, especially when the </div>
<div>definitions have been approved by the supreme court for use in </div>
<div>criminal proceedings.<span>”). <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 61<span> </span><span>In addition, the <span>court’s </span>instruction lacked the statutory </span>
</div>
<div>language that the person is “aware that his conduct is practically </div>
<div>certain to cause the result.” <span>§ <span>18</span>-1-501(6). This is a material </span><span>—</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>and significant <span>—</span> omission from the language the General Assem<span></span>bly </div>
<div>chose to include in the definition<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 62<span> </span><span>For these reasons, the court erred by incorrectly defining </span>
</div>
<div>“knowing<span>ly</span><span>” </span>—<span> the mens rea element for both of the charged </span>
</div>
<div>offenses<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>4.<span> <span>The Instructional Error Was Obvious </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 63<span> </span><span>An error is obvious if it is <span>“</span>so clear-cut<span>” that “</span>a trial judge </span>
</div>
<div>should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection.<span></span>”<span> </span><span>Crabtree</span><span>, </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf1c" data-page-no="1c">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>26<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 42, 550 P.3d at 667 (quoting <span>Romero v. People</span>, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, </div>
<div>393 P.3d 973, 976). Consequently, an error is obvious if it </div>
<div>“<span>contravene[d] a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal </span>
</div>
<div>principle, or established Colorado case law.<span>” <span>Id.</span></span> We agree wit<span></span>h </div>
<div>Ramcharan that the error here was obvious. </div>
<div>¶ 64<span> </span><span>First, as described in Part II.B<span>.3</span> above, the instruction </span>
</div>
<div>contravened the clear language <span>of</span> section 18-1-501(6).<span></span> </div>
<div>¶ 65<span> </span><span>Second<span>, as the People note, “[i]t appears that the instruction’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>language derived from <span>People v. Noble</span>, 635 P.2d 203 (Colo. 19<span></span>81), a </div>
<div>felony child abuse case applying a former version of the child abuse </div>
<div>statute<span>.” <span>But t<span>he</span> General Assembly enacted material amendments </span></span>
</div>
<div>to the child abuse statutes after the supreme court decided <span>Nob<span></span>le<span>. </span></span>
</div>
<div>Compare <span>§ <span>18</span>-6-401(1), C.R.S. 1978<span>, </span></span>with <span>§ <span>18</span><span>-3-405(1)</span><span>, </span>(2)(a),<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>C.R.S. 2024<span>. </span>Thus, the instructional error contravened a clear </div>
<div>statutory command and Colorado case law, and was therefore </div>
<div>obvious<span>. <span> <span>See Crabtree</span></span>, <span>¶ <span>42, 550 P.3d at 667.</span></span> <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>5.<span> <span>The Instructional Error Was Not Substantial </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 66<span> </span><span>An error is substantial if, as noted above, <span>it “</span>so undermined </span>
</div>
<div>the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious d<span></span>oubt </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf1d" data-page-no="1d">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>27<span> </span>
</div>
<div>on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” <span>Id.</span><span> <span>at</span></span><span> <span>¶ 43<span>, </span>550 </span></span>
</div>
<div>P.3d at 667 (quoting <span>Wilson</span><span>, </span>743 <span>P.2<span>d <span>at</span></span></span> 420).<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 67<span> <span>“[A]<span>n erroneous jury instruction does not normally constitute </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>plain error <span>. . .</span> where the record contains overwhelming evidence of </div>
<div>the defendant<span>’s guilt.”</span><span> </span><span>Thompson v. People</span>, 2020 CO 72, ¶ 54, 4<span></span>71 </div>
<div>P.3d 1045, 1057 (quoting <span>People v. Miller</span>, 113 P.3d 743, <span>750</span> (Colo. </div>
<div>2005))<span>; <span>see also Espinoza v. People<span>, 712 P.2d 476, 478-79 (Colo. </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>1985). </div>
<div>¶ 68<span> </span><span>The People contend that the error was not substantial because </span>
</div>
<div>the evidence against Ramcharan was overwhelming. We agree. </div>
<div>¶ 69<span> </span><span>Turning first to the charge of sexual assault on a child, no </span>
</div>
<div>evidence contradicted A.M.<span>’s</span> testimony that Ramacharan put his </div>
<div>penis in her vagina. Indeed, in his interview with Detective Collins, </div>
<div>Ramcharan admitted that he <span>“</span>started to<span>”</span> have sex with A.M. The </div>
<div>jury watched the video of <span>Ramcharan’s interview with Detective </span>
</div>
<div>Collins and the prosecutor showed the jury <span>a </span>transcript of the </div>
<div>interview. </div>
<div>¶ 70<span> </span><span>Furthermore, the nurse who examined A.M. following the </span>
</div>
<div>alleged sexual assault testified at trial <span>that A.M.’s genitalia were </span>
</div>
<div>inflamed and torn, consistent with sexual activity. Although the </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf1e" data-page-no="1e">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>28<span> </span>
</div>
<div>nurse agreed on cross-examination that such injuries could occu<span></span>r </div>
<div>through consensual sex, and Ramcharan told Detective Collins that<span></span> </div>
<div>“everything that happened [with A.M.] was completely <span></span>consensual,” </div>
<div>Ramcharan could not avoid conviction by arguing that A.<span></span>M. <span>—</span> <span>a </span>
</div>
<div>fourteen-year-old girl <span>—</span> consented to engage in sex with him<span>. </span><span>See </span>
</div>
<div>People v. Hodge<span>, 2018 COA 155, ¶ 16, 488 P.3d 436, 43<span></span>9-<span>40 </span></span>
</div>
<div>(“[C]hild<span> sexual assault . . . recognizes that a child cannot legally </span>
</div>
<div>consent to sexual contact or to any conduct that facilitates that </div>
<div>sexual contact.<span>”).</span> </div>
<div>¶ 71<span> </span><span>Lastly<span>, <span>the male Y-STR profile was consistent with </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>Ramcharan<span>’s genetic material,<span> </span>with an expected frequency of <span></span>“<span>1 in </span></span>
</div>
<div>2,007 individuals<span>.”</span><span> </span><span>Cf. People v. Brown</span>, 2014 COA 155M-2, ¶¶ <span>7,</span> </div>
<div>13,<span> 360 P.3d 167, 170-</span>71<span> (holding there was no reve<span></span>rsible error </span>
</div>
<div>when an “expert testified that certain Y<span>-STR profiles obtained from </span>
</div>
<div>the crime scene matched defendant<span>’</span>s profile<span>”</span><span>).</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 72<span> <span>Overwhelming evidence also supported Ramcharan’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor premised </div>
<div>on his act of forcing A.M. to smoke methamphetamine<span>. </span>As noted </div>
<div>above, officers found in the jacket Ramcharan had been wearing <span></span>on </div>
<div>the day of the sexual assault the white pipe that A.M. said </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf1f" data-page-no="1f">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>29<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Ramcharan forced her to smoke<span>, </span>containing the very type of residue </div>
<div>that A.M. had described<span>. </span>At trial, the prosecutor introduced into </div>
<div>evidence a photograph of the pipe, containing residue, on top of t<span></span>he </div>
<div>jacket and next to Ramcharan’s driver’s license. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 73<span> </span><span>Ramcharan disagrees that the evidence against him was </span>
</div>
<div>overwhelming<span>. H<span>e argues that his <span>admission that he “started to” </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>have sex with A.M. was vague and could encompass conduct that </div>
<div>did not constitute sexual assault on a child. In addition, he </div>
<div>challenges the <span>People’s</span> contention that the DNA analysis <span>“</span>strongly </div>
<div>tied<span>”</span><span> Ramcharan to the crime because an expert witness <span>who</span> </span>
</div>
<div>testified for the prosecution opined that the analysis showed only </div>
<div>that Ramcharan “could not be excluded from” the profile.<span> </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 74<span> </span><span>But<span> Ramcharan does not demonstrate how the erroneous </span></span>
</div>
<div>definition of “knowingly” undermined<span> </span><span>“</span><span>the fundamental fairness</span><span>”</span><span> of<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>his trial<span>, </span>particularly as his theory of defense was a general denial </div>
<div>of the charges. <span>Crabtree</span>, ¶ 43, 550 P.3d <span>at</span> <span>667</span> (quoting <span>Wilson</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>743 <span>P.2<span>d <span>at</span></span></span> 420). Although Ramcharan conten<span></span>ds that the </div>
<div>instructional error <span>“relieved the prosecution of its burden of<span></span> proving </span>
</div>
<div>each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt,<span>” </span>such </div>
<div>argument is conclusory and does not overcome the undisputed, </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf20" data-page-no="20">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>30<span> </span>
</div>
<div>overwhelming evidence in the record. <span>See People v. Wa<span></span>llin<span>, 167 P.3d </span></span>
</div>
<div>183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to address arg<span></span>uments </div>
<div>presented in a perfunctory or conclusory manner). <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 75<span> </span><span>For these reasons, we hold t<span>hat the court’s instructional error </span></span>
</div>
<div>was not plain and, therefore, does not warrant reversal<span>. </span> </div>
<div>C.<span> <span>Requests for Substitute Counsel </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 76<span> </span><span>Ramcharan contends that the court reversibly erred by </span>
</div>
<div>denying his multiple requests for substitute counsel because he </div>
<div>and his counsel had an irreconcilable conflict. We disagree. </div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Additional Facts </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 77<span> </span><span>A public defender initially represented Ramcharan; he was </span>
</div>
<div>later represented by alternate defense counsel. Ramcharan aske<span></span>d </div>
<div>the court twice to discharge his public defender and thrice to </div>
<div>discharge alternate defense counsel. The court conducte<span></span>d five ex </div>
<div>parte hearings across a two-year period, over which four judicial </div>
<div>officers presided, to consider Ramcharan’s requests.<span> <span>(A court must </span></span>
</div>
<div>conduct a hearing, at which both attorney and client may testify,<span></span> to </div>
<div>adjudicate a defendant’s assertion that his appointed att<span>orney </span>
</div>
<div>cannot or will not completely represent him. <span>People v. Bergerud</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>223 P.3d 686, 694-<span>95</span> (Colo. 2010)<span>.)</span> </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf21" data-page-no="21">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>31<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 78<span> </span><span>In his first motion for new counsel, Ramcharan complained </span>
</div>
<div>that his public defender was not communicative and that t<span></span>here was </div>
<div>a <span>“</span><span>lack of trust<span>”</span> between them. The public defender responded that </span>
</div>
<div>Ramcharan did not want her honest assessment of his case. </div>
<div>Ramcharan further asserted that he disagreed with the direction </div>
<div>she was taking in developing a defense strategy<span>. </span> Specifically, he </div>
<div>told the court he wanted to pursue defenses resting on his </div>
<div>ignorance of <span>A.M.’s age, </span>which he attributed, in part, to <span>a </span>recent eye </div>
<div>injury<span>. <span>The public defender had told him <span>“several times”</span> that his </span></span>
</div>
<div>assertions would not support a defense<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 79<span> </span><span>At a <span>Bergerud</span> hearing in November 2020, the court found t<span></span>hat </span>
</div>
<div>these facts did not establish a breakdown in communication </div>
<div>between Ramcharan and his public defender. The court explaine<span></span>d </div>
<div>to<span> Ramcharan that, <span>“whether or not you agree with the way </span>[your </span>
</div>
<div>lawyer] is formulating this case . . <span>. </span>, she gets to make the decision.<span>”</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>(Ramcharan later apparently wanted his lawyer to argue that t<span></span>he </div>
<div>eye injury rendered his statements to the officers involuntary<span>.) </span> </div>
<div>¶ 80<span> </span><span>Two months later, Ramcharan filed a second motion for new </span>
</div>
<div>counsel that rehashed the arguments in his first motion<span>. </span> But </div>
<div>following the <span>Bergerud </span>hearing on the second motion, the court </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf22" data-page-no="22">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>32<span> </span>
</div>
<div>found that there had been a breakdown in communication between </div>
<div>the public defender and Ramcharan, discharged the public </div>
<div>defender, and appointed alternate defense counsel for him. </div>
<div>¶ 81<span> </span><span>Five months later, Ramcharan moved to dismiss his new </span>
</div>
<div>counsel. Ramcharan complained that his new lawyer, like his </div>
<div>former lawyer, was not pursuing a defense relating to his <span></span>eye injury, </div>
<div>which he said demonstrated that he <span>had “unknowingly” had se<span></span>x </span>
</div>
<div>with a child. Ramcharan also told the court that his new counsel </div>
<div>did not believe he had a defense and <span>“causes doubt” and </span>trust </div>
<div>issues, and that, as a result, <span>Ramcharan “didn’t want to spea<span></span>k to </span>
</div>
<div>him.”<span> <span>Counsel responded that, because Ramcharan was refusing to </span></span>
</div>
<div>speak to him, <span>“</span>his ability to communicate with Ramcharan had </div>
<div>deteriorated to the point that he couldn<span>’</span>t effectively represent <span>him.”</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>Following another <span>Bergerud</span> hearing, the court found that <span>“</span>this <span></span>is </div>
<div>largely a situation where there is a significant difference in . . . </div>
<div>defense strategy,<span>”</span> which is not grounds to appoint new counsel, and </div>
<div>denied Ramcharan<span>’</span>s request. </div>
<div>¶ 82<span> </span><span>Less than two weeks later, Ramcharan again told the court </span>
</div>
<div>that he and his new counsel had a complete breakdown in </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf23" data-page-no="23">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>33<span> </span>
</div>
<div>communication and that the court should appoint a new lawyer for </div>
<div>him. The court conducted a fourth <span>Bergerud</span> hearing. </div>
<div>¶ 83<span> </span><span>At the hearing<span>, counsel “</span>conceded that he missed an </span>
</div>
<div>appointment he had scheduled with Ramcharan to get a relea<span></span>se for </div>
<div>hospital records<span>”</span> relating to the eye injury. Ramcharan said he had </div>
<div>lost trust in the lawyer as a consequence. Nevertheless, the court </div>
<div>again denied Ramcharan<span>’</span>s request for new counsel.<span> </span>During the </div>
<div>hearing, the court advised Ramcharan of his right to repre<span></span>sent </div>
<div>himself. Ramcharan said he did not want to do so. </div>
<div>¶ 84<span> </span><span>In November 2021, the court held a fifth <span>Bergerud</span> hearing </span>
</div>
<div>after Ramcharan again requested new counsel. Ramcharan and his </div>
<div>counsel both told the court that their communications had br<span></span>oken </div>
<div>down. In addition, Ramcharan continued to emphasize his belief </div>
<div>that the eye injury was critical to his defense<span>, <span>as </span></span>he claimed <span>it</span> </div>
<div>impacted the voluntariness of his statements to the officers<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>Defense counsel told the court that he disagreed with Ramacharan </div>
<div>regarding the relevance of the eye injury and said that Ramcha<span></span>ran </div>
<div>would not accept his explanation that mistake as to the <span>victim’s</span> age </div>
<div>is<span> not a defense to <span>a </span>sexual assault on a child charge. The court </span>
</div>
<div>observed <span>that “[t]he problem for me is that no matter who tells h<span></span>im </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf24" data-page-no="24">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>34<span> </span>
</div>
<div>that his defense is not viable, he’s not going to believe it<span></span>.” The court<span> </span>
</div>
<div>again <span>denied Ramcharan’s </span>request to appoint new counsel. </div>
<div>2.<span> <span>Standard of Review and </span></span>
</div>
<div>the Law Governing a Defendant’s Request<span> </span>
</div>
<div>to Discharge Counsel </div>
<div>¶ 85<span> <span>“A defendant’s motion to discharge an attorney is addressed t<span></span>o </span></span>
</div>
<div>the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling <span></span>will not be </div>
<div>disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion.” <span>People v. </span>
</div>
<div>Bostic<span>, 148 P.3d 250, 259 (Colo. App. 2006).<span> <span>“</span></span>Before change of </span>
</div>
<div>counsel is warranted the trial court must verify that the defend<span></span>ant </div>
<div>has <span>‘</span>some well founded reason for believing that the <span></span>appointed </div>
<div>attorney cannot or will not completely represent him.<span>’”</span><span> People v. </span>
</div>
<div>Arguello<span>, 772 P.2d 87, 94 (Colo. 1989) (quoting 2 Wayne R.<span></span> LaFave </span>
</div>
<div>&amp; Jerold H. Israel, <span>Criminal Procedure</span> 37 (1984)).<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 86<span> <span>“When an indigent criminal defendant voices objections to </span></span>
</div>
<div>court-appointed counsel, the trial court must inquire int<span></span>o the </div>
<div>reasons for dissatisfaction. If the defendant establishes good c<span></span>ause, </div>
<div>such as a conflict of interest or a complete breakdown<span></span> of </div>
<div>commun<span>ication, the court must appoint substitute counsel.” <span>Peop<span></span>le </span></span>
</div>
<div>v. Apodaca<span>, 998 P.2d 25, 28 (Colo. App. 1999). <span></span>“Conversely, if the </span>
</div>
<div>court has a reasonable basis for concluding that the att<span></span>orney-client </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf25" data-page-no="25">
<div>
<div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>35<span> </span>
</div>
<div>relationship has not deteriorated to the point where <span></span>counsel is </div>
<div>unable to give effective assistance, the court is justified in ref<span></span>using </div>
<div>to appoint new counsel.” <span>Id.</span><span> <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>3.<span> <span>The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion </span></span>
</div>
<div>by Denying Ramcharan’s Requests for New Counsel<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 87<span> </span><span>The transcripts of the five <span>Bergerud</span> hearings demonstrate that </span>
</div>
<div>the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting all but one of </div>
<div>Ramcharan<span>’s <span>requests to discharge his lawyer and appoint new </span></span>
</div>
<div>counsel for him.<span> </span>Rather, the record underscores that the court </div>
<div>correctly found that the difficulty in the communications between </div>
<div>Ramcharan and his lawyers primarily rested on their disagreements </div>
<div>regarding the <span>relevance of Ramcharan’s eye injury. As the cou<span></span>rt </span>
</div>
<div>noted, case strategy is a matter left to counsel. <span>Bergerud</span>, 223 P.3<span></span>d </div>
<div>at 693 <span>(“On issues of trial strategy, defense counsel is ‘</span>captain of </div>
<div>the ship.<span>’”</span> (quoting <span>Arko v. People</span>, 183 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. <span></span>2008))). </div>
<div>¶ 88<span> </span><span>Further, because a <span>“</span>source of limitations on an attorney<span>’</span><span>s </span></span>
</div>
<div>actions is that these decisions of trial strategy are held to a </div>
<div>standard of professional reasonableness<span>,” <span>id.</span></span> at 694, the court </div>
<div>correctly found <span>that Ramcharan’s </span>lawyers did not pursue </div>
</div>
<a href="https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&amp;serNum=2015993001&amp;pubNum=0004645&amp;originatingDoc=I17b6bbbffeb911dea7e0c40c26bf1b92&amp;refType=RP&amp;fi=co_pp_sp_4645_558&amp;originationContext=document&amp;transitionType=DocumentItem&amp;ppcid=24c3964b373540b68289cd5f048aa9ce&amp;contextData=(sc.DocLink)#co_pp_sp_4645_558"><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:260.130000px;bottom:314.077778px;width:321.730000px;height:32.890000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a>
</div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf26" data-page-no="26">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>36<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Ramcharan’s desired strategy<span> regarding the eye injury because </span>
</div>
<div>such strategy could not support a valid defense. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 89<span> </span><span>Because the purported conflict primarily arose from </span>
</div>
<div>Ramcharan’s mistaken belief that he could <span>dictate the legal strategy </span>
</div>
<div>his lawyers pursued and his resulting refusal to cooperate with </div>
<div>them, there was no basis for appointment of new counsel<span>. </span><span>See </span>
</div>
<div>People v. Kelling<span>, 151 P.3d 650, 653 (Colo. App. 200<span></span>6) </span>
</div>
<div>(“<span>Disagreements pertaining to matters of trial preparation, strategy, </span>
</div>
<div>and tactics do not establish good cause for substitut<span></span>ion of </div>
<div>counsel<span>.”); <span>s<span>ee</span></span><span> </span><span>also People v. Hodges<span>, 134 P.3d 419, 425 (C<span></span>olo. App. </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>2005) <span>(“</span>Neither the existence of animosity between defendant an<span></span>d </div>
<div>[the lawyer] nor <span>[the lawyer’s]</span> asserted disagreement with defendant </div>
<div>regarding the strength of defendant<span>’</span>s case constitutes an actual </div>
<div>conflict of interest requiring the appointment of substit<span></span>ute </div>
<div>counsel.<span>”)</span><span>, </span><span>aff<span>’</span><span>d on other grounds<span>, 158 P.3d 922 (Colo. 200<span></span>7)<span>. </span> </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 90<span> </span><span>For these reasons, we hold that the court did not abuse its </span>
</div>
<div>discretion by denying Ramcharan’s requests that the court </div>
<div>discharge his lawyers and appoint new counsel for him. </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf27" data-page-no="27">
<div><div>
<div> <span> </span> </div>
<div>37<span> </span>
</div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Disposition </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 91<span> </span><span>The judgment of conviction is affirmed. </span>
</div>
<div>JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur. </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
</div></div></div></div>