Peo v. Herrera ( 2024 )

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<div>22CA0979 Peo v Herrera 10-10-2024 </div>
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<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS </div>
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<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 22CA0979 </div>
<div>Mesa County District Court No. 21CR1583 </div>
<div>Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>The People of the State of Colorado, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellee, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Johnny Ralph Herrera, Sr.<span>, </span>
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<div> </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>ORDER AFFIRMED </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division VII </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR </div>
<div>Tow and Schutz, JJ., concur </div>
<div> </div>
<div>NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) </div>
<div>Announced October 10, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, <span>Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney </span>
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<div>General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, <span>Kamela Maktabi</span>, Deputy State </div>
<div>Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant </div>
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<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Defendant, Johnny Ralph Herrera, Sr., appeals the trial </span>
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<div>court’s <span>order imposing restitution. He contends that the order m<span></span>ust </span>
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<div>be vacated because the prosecution did not comply with its </div>
<div>statutory obligation regarding restitution and the prosecution <span></span>failed </div>
<div>to sufficiently prove that he proximately caused the damages </div>
<div>sustained. We affirm. </div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>On October 15, 2021<span>, </span>Deputy Pratt tried <span>to</span> conduct a traffic </span>
</div>
<div>stop of Herrera’s vehicle<span>, but Herrera refused to stop for the <span></span>officer.<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>During the ensuing pursuit<span>, </span>Deputy Pratt, Deputy Rolbiecki, and </div>
<div>Deputy Davidson each attempted <span>a <span>“</span></span>PIT maneuver<span>”</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> to stop the </div>
<div>vehicle. <span> </span>The maneuver involved <span>contacting the back of Herrera’s </span>
</div>
<div>car with the front of the patrol car. Ultimately, Davidson </div>
<div>successfully stopped Herrera’s car by using a PIT <span>maneuver and </span>
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<div>Herrera was taken into custody. </div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>Herrera was charged with vehicular eluding, attempted second </span>
</div>
<div>degree assault, driving under restraint, reckless endangerm<span></span>ent, </div>
<div>violation of a traffic control signal, eluding a police off<span></span>icer, speeding, </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>PIT is short for “precision immobilization technique.<span></span> <span>People v. </span></span>
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<div>McMinn<span>, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 5. </span>
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<div>2 </div>
<div>and possession of drug paraphernalia. He pleaded guilty to </div>
<div>vehicular eluding and an added count of attempted third degree </div>
<div>assault in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. <span></span> The </div>
<div>plea agreement stated that the dismissed charges could be </div>
<div>considered for restitution purposes. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>At<span> the January 25, 2022, sentencing hearing<span>, </span>the prosecutor </span></span>
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<div>asked that restitution be imposed and that he be affo<span></span>rded </div>
<div>additional time to submit a request for a restitution amount.<span> </span>The </div>
<div>trial court imposed a prison sentence<span>, </span>ordered Herrera to pay </div>
<div>restitution, and granted the prosecution twenty-one days from </div>
<div>sentencing to submit a restitution amount request<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>On February 3, 2022, the prosecutor filed a motion for </span>
</div>
<div>restitution in the amount of $12,885.74 to repair the damage </div>
<div>caused to the patrol cars.<span> </span>The motion included <span>a </span>victim impact </div>
<div>statement and invoices in support of the requested amount. The </div>
<div>victim impact statement indicated that the repair costs for one of </div>
<div>the patrol cars was not final because the needed repairs had not yet </div>
<div>been completed<span>. </span>Herrera objected to the requested restitution </div>
<div>amount, and the court set a hearing. <span> </span> </div>
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<div>3 </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>At the March 2, 2022, restitution hearing, the prosecutor </span>
</div>
<div>elicited testimony that the remaining repairs were completed a wee<span></span>k </div>
<div>or two prior to the hearing and that the final amount paid to r<span></span>epair </div>
<div>the three vehicles was $23,549.22.<span> </span>The trial court ordered Herre<span></span>ra </div>
<div>to pay <span>th<span>at</span></span> amount<span>. </span> </div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Statutory Violation </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>Herrer<span>a <span>asserts that the restitution order must be vacated </span></span></span>
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<div>because the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecuti<span></span>on to </div>
<div>submit its restitution information after sentencing without </div>
<div>demonstrating that the information was not available at or before </div>
<div>sentencing.<span> <span>He claims that he <span>is</span> prejudiced by the error because he </span></span>
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<div>owes $23,549.22 in restitution.<span> </span>We are not persuaded.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>The restitution statute requires every order of conviction <span></span>to </span>
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<div>include one of four types of restitution orders. § 18-1.3-603(1), </div>
<div>C.R.S. 2024<span>; </span><span>People v. Weeks</span>, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 3. As relevant here, </div>
<div>section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires an order of conviction t<span></span>o include </div>
<div>“[a]n order that the defendant is <span>obligated to pay restitution, but </span>
</div>
<div>that the specific amount of restitution shall be determined within<span></span> </div>
<div>the ninety-one days immediately following the order of <span></span>conviction, </div>
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<div>4 </div>
<div>unless good cause is shown for extending the time period <span></span>by which </div>
<div>the restitution amount shall be determined.”<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 9<span> <span>“The court shall base its order for restitution upon informati<span></span>on </span></span>
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<div>presented to the court by the prosecuting attorney, who shall </div>
<div>compile such information through victim impact statements o<span></span>r </div>
<div>other means to determine the amount of restitution and the </div>
<div>identitie<span>s of the victims.” § 18</span>-1.3-<span>603(2)(a). “[T]he prosecut<span></span>ing </span>
</div>
<div>attorney shall present this information to the court prior t<span></span>o the </div>
<div>order of conviction or within ninety-one days, if it is not available </div>
<div>prior to the order of conviction.” <span>Id.</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>A division of this court concluded that section 18-1.3-603(2)(a) </span>
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<div>imposes an obligation on the prosecution to use reasonable </div>
<div>diligence in determining the amount of restitution it wi<span></span>ll request </div>
<div>prior to the entry of the order of conviction.<span> </span><span>People v. Brassill</span>, 2024 </div>
<div>COA 19<span>, </span>¶¶ 1, 30, 45. Another division further held t<span></span>hat a trial </div>
<div>court errs when it extends the prosecutor’s deadline to <span></span>present </div>
<div>restitution information until after sentencing in the absence <span></span>of a </div>
<div>demonstration that the restitution information was unavailable </div>
<div>before the sentencing hearing.<span> </span><span>People v. Martinez Rubier</span>, 2024 COA </div>
<div>67<span>, ¶¶ 3-4, 21, 39, 41. </span>
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<div>5 </div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>Initially, w<span>e reject Herrera’s assertion that the</span> restitution order </span>
</div>
<div>must be vacated because the <span>prosecution’s failure to submit t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>restitution information at or before sentencing divested t<span></span>he trial </div>
<div>court of authority to enter the order<span>. </span><span>See id. </span>at ¶¶ 46-47 (despite </div>
<div>the prosecution’s noncompliance with section 18<span>-1.3-603(2), the </span>
</div>
<div>trial court entered a restitution order within section 18-1.3-</div>
<div>603(1)(b)’s ninety<span>-one-day deadline and, therefore, was n<span></span>ot deprived </span>
</div>
<div>of authority to act on restitution); <span>Brassill</span>, ¶¶ 57-<span>58.</span> </div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>W<span>e <span>further conclude that the trial court did not err by f<span></span>inding </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>that the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated that it<span></span> exercised </div>
<div>reasonable diligence in obtaining the restitution information befo<span></span>re </div>
<div>sentencing and that the information was not available at </div>
<div>sentencing.<span> <span>The prosecutor represented at the sentencing hearing </span></span>
</div>
<div>that the patrol cars had sustained damaged and that<span>, “</span>although the </div>
<div>Victim Impact Statement has been requested, it has not yet been </div>
<div>received.<span>”</span><span> <span>The prosecutor said that he needed additional time to </span></span>
</div>
<div>“<span>secure the itemized group of the damages suffered by . . . [t<span></span>he] </span>
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<div>Mesa County Sheriff<span>’</span>s Department . . <span>. </span>and figure out if we <span></span>can have </div>
<div>a[n] agreement or if we need to request a hearing<span>.”</span><span> </span><span> </span>
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<div>6 </div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>Because the prosecut<span>or</span> asked for an extension of time t<span></span>o file </span>
</div>
<div>the restitution information and represented that, despite his <span>office’s </span>
</div>
<div>efforts,</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> complete information had not yet been received, we </div>
<div>conclude that the trial court<span>’s decision to allow the prosecutor to f<span></span>ile </span>
</div>
<div>the restitution information after sentencing was not error.<span> </span> </div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Proximate Causation </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>Herrera next contends that the prosecution failed to establish </span>
</div>
<div>that he proximate<span>ly</span> <span>cau</span>sed the damage to the three patrol ca<span></span>rs.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Specifically, he argues that <span>“the deputies’ intentional decision to </span>
</div>
<div>repeatedly crash their patrol <span>cars into Mr. Herrera’s car was gr<span></span>ossly </span>
</div>
<div>negligent, unforeseeable, and constituted an independent </div>
<div>intervening cause<span>.” We disagree.</span> </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> As discussed, we find no error in the <span>trial court’s reliance on the </span>
</div>
<div>prosecutor<span>’s representation that itemized damages were not </span>
</div>
<div>complete (and therefore unavailable to the prosecution). But we </div>
<div>also note from our review of the record that the cover<span></span> letter from the </div>
<div>District Attorney’s office indicates the victim impact statement <span></span>form </div>
<div>was not sent to the Mesa County Sheriff’s Risk Management Of<span></span>fice </div>
<div>until January 26, 2022 <span>—</span> one day <span>after</span> the sentencing hearing. </div>
<div>Though that raises concern in light of the <span>prosecutor’s</span> </div>
<div>representation that “although the <span>Victim Impact Statement has </span>
</div>
<div>been requested, it has not yet been received,<span>”</span> it does not alter ou<span></span>r </div>
<div>ultimate conclusion.<span> </span>It is undisputed that the repairs had not been </div>
<div>completed at the time of sentencing so complete information was </div>
<div>not available to the prosecution at that time. </div>
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<div>7 </div>
<div>¶ 15<span> <span>A trial court may order restitution for “any pecuniary<span></span> loss </span></span>
</div>
<div>suffered by a victim,” which includes, as relevant here, “lo<span></span>sses or </div>
<div>injuries proximately caused by an offender’s conduc<span></span>t and that can </div>
<div>be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” § 18<span>-1.3-</span>
</div>
<div>602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024<span>; </span><span>see also </span>§ 18-1.3-603(1)(a). </div>
<div>¶ 16<span> <span>“<span>The prosecution bears the burden of proving, by a </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>preponderance of the evidence, both the amount of restit<span></span>ution owed </div>
<div>and that the victim’s losses were proximately caused by the </div>
<div>defendant.” <span>People v. Perez<span>, 2017 COA 52, ¶ 10</span></span>. “A fact is </div>
<div>established by a preponderance of the evidence when,<span></span> upon </div>
<div>consideration of all the evidence, the existence of tha<span></span>t fact is more </div>
<div>probable than its nonexistence.” <span>People v. Garner<span>, 806 P.2d 3<span></span>66, </span></span>
</div>
<div>370 (Colo. 1991). In the restitution context, proxima<span></span>te causation is </div>
<div>defined as a cause which in natural and probable sequence </div>
<div>produced the claimed injury and without which the claime<span></span>d injury </div>
<div>would not have been sustained. <span>People v. Dyson</span>, 2021 COA 5<span></span>7, </div>
<div>¶ <span>13.</span> </div>
<div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>However, unlawful conduct that is broken by an independent </span>
</div>
<div>intervening cause cannot be the proximate cause of damages to </div>
<div>another. <span>Martinez v. People</span>, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 13. To qualify as an </div>
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<div>8 </div>
<div>intervening cause, an event must be unforeseeable and one in </div>
<div>which the accused does not participate. <span>Id.</span><span> <span>“</span></span>Simple negli<span></span>gence is </div>
<div>foreseeable and does not constitute an independent intervening </div>
<div>cause; gross negligence is not foreseeable and thus may serve as an<span></span> </div>
<div>independent intervening cause.<span>” <span>People v. Sieck</span></span>, 2014 COA 2<span></span>3, ¶ 9<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>Gross negligence is willful and wanton conduct, such as actions </div>
<div>committed recklessly with conscious disregard for the safety <span></span>of </div>
<div>others.<span> </span><span>Martinez</span><span>, ¶ 14. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>We<span> will not disturb a <span>trial court’s determination of proximate </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>cause for restitution purposes unless it is clearly erroneous.<span> </span><span>Id.</span> at </div>
<div>¶¶ 3, 32.<span> </span>Under the clear error standard, we must affirm the </div>
<div>court’s findings unless they are without support in the record. <span>I<span></span>d.<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>at ¶ 34. </div>
<div>¶ 19<span> <span>In its order, the trial court found that Herrera’s “<span>criminal </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>actions of eluding law enforcement and placing the publi<span></span>c in danger </div>
<div>proximately caused the damages to the three patrol vehicles.<span>” Th<span></span>e </span>
</div>
<div>court noted that, when a person is eluding law enforcement,<span></span> “it is </div>
<div>within the natural and probable sequence of events that<span></span> law </div>
<div>enforcement will attempt to halt the eluder.” <span> </span>
</div>
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<div>9 </div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>The record supports <span>the trial court’s finding that Herrera’s</span> </span>
</div>
<div>criminal conduct proximately caused the damage to the patrol cars. </div>
<div>The trial court heard testimony from the Mesa County Risk </div>
<div>Administrator and Deputy Pratt. </div>
<div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>The Mesa County Risk Administrator testified that during t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>underlying incident, the three patrol cars driven by Pratt<span></span>, Rolbiecki, </div>
<div>and Davidson sustained damage. He said that he was not awa<span></span>re of </div>
<div>any record of unrelated damage to the vehicles that predated the </div>
<div>incident. </div>
<div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>Pratt testified that all three patrol cars sustained damage as a </span>
</div>
<div>result of the PIT maneuvers used to stop <span>Herrera’s vehicle</span> and the </div>
<div>attempts to pin the vehicle to prevent Herrera from fleeing. Pratt </div>
<div>offered extensive <span>detail about Herrera’s initial </span><span>fail<span>ure</span></span> to stop and </div>
<div>subsequent erratic driving. He explained that Herrera posed a </div>
<div>safety risk to other drivers and described his attempt <span></span>to stop </div>
<div>Herrera by way of a PIT maneuver before the pursuit<span></span> entered a busy </div>
<div>intersection. Pratt testified that Herrera was able to drive away </div>
<div>after Pratt attempted to pin Herrera’s car, <span>causing a second deputy </span>
</div>
<div>(Rolb<span>ie</span><span>cki) to attempt a PIT maneuver, which was again </span>
</div>
<div>unsuccessful<span>. <span> Pratt explained that Herrera eluded again</span>, <span>drove </span></span>
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<div>10 </div>
<div>down a large embankment onto another road, and was ultimately </div>
<div>stopped by a third deputy (Davidson), who successfully executed a </div>
<div>PIT maneuver. </div>
<div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>This testimony provides ample record support <span>that the officers’ </span></span>
</div>
<div>PIT maneuvers and attempts to pin Herrera’s vehicle w<span></span>ere </div>
<div>foreseeable and that any negligent conduct did not rise to the lev<span></span>el </div>
<div>of gross negligence. Indeed, Pratt testified that a PIT maneuver was </div>
<div>the preferred technique used by law enforcement to stop an elu<span></span>ding </div>
<div>vehicle and that the PIT maneuver was the safest way to stop a<span>n </span>
</div>
<div>eluding vehicle and to ensure the safety of others. Pratt also </div>
<div>testified that Rolb<span>ie<span>c</span></span><span>ki’s </span>final strike <span>to pin Herrera’s vehicle after <span></span>it </span>
</div>
<div>was stopped by <span>Davidson’s </span><span>PI</span>T maneuver w<span>as</span> necessary because </div>
<div>Herrera demonstrated an intent to continue eluding the <span></span>officers.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 24<span> </span><span>The court acknowledged Pratt<span>’s</span> incorrect statements to the </span>
</div>
<div>other deputies that Herrera had struck his patrol car when in fact </div>
<div>Herrera had swerved toward him but made no contact<span>. </span> But it </div>
<div>nevertheless found that, in light of <span>Herrera’s </span>observed reckless </div>
<div>driving, the misrepresentation did not lessen its determination of </div>
<div>proximate cause. <span> </span>
</div>
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<div>11 </div>
<div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>To the extent Herrera argues that he was not the proximate </span>
</div>
<div>cause of the damage because he did not participate in <span></span>the event, he </div>
<div>fails to adequate<span>ly</span> explain this assertion. <span>People v. Houser</span>, 2020 </div>
<div>COA 128, ¶ 24 (we will not consider a bald legal proposition </div>
<div>presented without argument or development). </div>
<div>IV.<span> </span><span>Disposition </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>The order is affirmed. </span>
</div>
<div>JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur. </div>
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