Said v. Magdy , 2024 COA 109 ( 2024 )

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<div>SUMMARY </div>
<div>October 3, 2024 </div>
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<div>2024COA109<span> </span>
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<div>No. 24CA0451, <span>Said v. Magdy</span> <span>—</span> No. 24CA0451, <span>Said v. Magdy</span> </div>
<div>—<span> Courts and Court Procedure </span>—<span> Action Involving Exercise of </span>
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<div>Constitutional Rights <span>—</span> Anti-SLAPP <span>—</span> Special Motion to </div>
<div>Dismiss; Civil Procedure <span>—</span> Motion for Reconsideration <span>—</span> </div>
<div>Motions for Post-Trial Relief; Appeals <span>—</span> Time for Filing Notice<span></span> </div>
<div>of Appeal <span>—</span> Tolling </div>
<div>A division of the court of appeals holds that, if timely <span></span>filed, a </div>
<div>motion for reconsideration of an order denying a special moti<span></span>on to </div>
<div>dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, section 13-<span>20</span>-1101, C.R.S. </div>
<div>2024, is properly construed as a C.R.C.P. 59 motion <span></span>that tolls the </div>
<div>time for filing a notice of appeal because the trial court’s o<span></span>rder, </div>
<div>though not final, is nevertheless appealable as required by C.R.C.P. </div>
<div>54, 58, and 59. </div>
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<div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div>
<div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div>
<div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div>
<div>cited or relied upon as they are not the <span>official language of the division. </span> </div>
<div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div>
<div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div>
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<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA109</span> </div>
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<div>Court of Appeals No. 24CA0451 </div>
<div>Arapahoe County District Court No. 23CV31428 </div>
<div>Honorable Thomas W. Henderson, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Said M. Said, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellee, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Mohamed Magdy, M.D., </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>MOTION DENIED </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division A </div>
<div>O<span>rder</span><span> by JUDGE HARRIS </span>
</div>
<div>Schutz and <span>Lum, JJ., concur</span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Conduit Law, <span>LLC,</span> <span>Elliot</span> A. Singer, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
<div>The Paul Wilkinson Law Firm <span>LLC, </span>Nelson Boyle, Denver, Colorado, for </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant </div>
</div>
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<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Section 13-<span>20</span>-1101, C.R.S. 2024, colloquially known as the </span>
</div>
<div>anti-<span>SLAPP statute (“SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic laws<span></span>uit </span>
</div>
<div>against public participation,<span>”</span> <span>Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst.</span>, 2022 CO<span></span>A </div>
<div>109M, ¶ 1 n.1), requires early dismissal of any claim arising from </div>
<div>conduct protected by the First Amendment that involves a p<span></span>ublic </div>
<div>issue, unless the plaintiff establishes a reasonable likelihood of </div>
<div>prevailing on the claim. § 13-<span>20</span>-1101(3)(a). An order granting or </div>
<div>denying <span>a statutory “special motion to dismiss” </span>is immediately </div>
<div>appealable to the court of appeals. § 13-<span>20</span><span>-1101(7)</span><span>; </span><span>see also</span> § 13-</div>
<div>4-102.2, C.R.S. 2024.<span> </span>The notice of appeal must be filed within<span></span> </div>
<div>forty-nine days after entry of the order <span>on</span> the special motion t<span></span>o </div>
<div>dismiss. <span>See </span>C.A.R. 4(a)(1). </div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>As a preliminary jurisdictional matter, we must resolve </span>
</div>
<div>whether a motion for reconsideration of <span>an</span> order denying a special </div>
<div>motion to dismiss, which did not cite either C.R.C.P. 59 or C.R.C.<span></span>P. </div>
<div>121, section 1-<span>15</span>(11), toll<span>ed</span> the time for filing a notice of appeal.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>We conclude that the motion for reconsideration is properly </span>
</div>
<div>construed as a Rule 59 motion that tolls the deadline for filing a </div>
<div>notice of appeal under the anti-SLAPP statute<span>. </span>And because the </div>
<div>notice of appeal was filed within forty-nine days after entry of <span></span>the </div>
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<div>2 </div>
<div>order denying the motion for reconsideration, the notice of appeal </div>
<div>was timely<span>. </span> Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss this ap<span></span>peal. </div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background <span> </span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>Plaintiff, Said M. Said, filed <span>a </span>defamation action against his </span>
</div>
<div>wife’s ex<span>-husband, defendant, Mohamed Magdy, alleging that </span>
</div>
<div>Magdy had falsely accused him of committing criminal con<span></span>duct. </div>
<div>Magdy denied the allegations and filed a special motion to dismiss </div>
<div>the complaint under section <span>13</span><span>-<span>20</span>-1101</span><span>. </span>The district court denied </div>
<div>the motion on December 29, 2023<span>. </span>Fourteen days later, Magdy filed </div>
<div>a motion for reconsideration. The district court denied that motion, </div>
<div>too, and thirty days later, on March 20, 2024, Magdy filed a notice </div>
<div>of appeal in this court, seeking review of the order denying his </div>
<div>special motion to dismiss. </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Said moves to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing that </span>
</div>
<div>the notice of appeal was not filed within forty-nine days of the </div>
<div>denial of the motion to dismiss. </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>In response, Magdy argues that the motion for reconsideration </span>
</div>
<div>was effectively a Rule 59 motion that tolled the time for filing <span></span>the </div>
<div>notice of appeal. And, he asserts, because the notice was filed </div>
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<div>3 </div>
<div>within forty-nine days of the order denying his motion for </div>
<div>reconsideration, it was timely.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>Alternatively<span>, <span>Magdy argues that even if the notice was </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>untimely, the late filing was attributable to excusable neglect, and, </div>
<div>therefore, we should accept the notice out of time. <span>See</span> C.A.R. </div>
<div>4(a)(4) (“U<span>pon a showing of excusable neglect, the appellate c<span></span>ourt </span>
</div>
<div>may extend the time to file the notice of appeal for a period not <span></span>to </div>
<div>exceed 35 days . . . .<span>”</span><span>).</span> </div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>As noted, subject to an exception inapplicable here, a notice of </span>
</div>
<div>appeal in a civil case must be filed “within 49 days after entry of <span></span>the </div>
<div>judgment, decree, or order being appealed.” <span>C.A.R. 4(a)(1). <span>But</span> <span>as </span></span>
</div>
<div>Said acknowledges, a timely filed Rule 59 motion (i.e., one f<span></span>iled </div>
<div>within fourteen days of the order or judgment) tolls the deadline for </div>
<div>filing a notice of appeal. <span>See <span>C.A.R. 4(a)(4) (“</span></span>The running of the <span></span>time </div>
<div>for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as to all parties w<span></span>hen any </div>
<div>party timely files a motion in the lower court pursuant t<span></span>o C.R.C.P. </div>
<div>59<span>” and recommences on entry of a timely order disp<span></span>osing of the </span>
</div>
<div>motion or the expiration of the time for ruling on the motion <span></span>under </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>4 </div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 59(j).); C.R.C.P. 59(j) (after sixty-three days of its filin<span></span>g, any </div>
<div>post-trial motion that has not been decided is deemed denied). </div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Said argues, though, <span>that Magdy’s motion for reconsideration</span><span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>while <span>filed within fourteen days of the court’s order</span> denying the </div>
<div>motion to dismiss, cannot properly be construed as a Rule 59 </div>
<div>motion. <span>According to Said, Rule 59 applies only to “post</span><span>-</span><span>trial” </span>
</div>
<div>motions for relief from a final judgment, and here, b<span></span>ecause no trial </div>
<div>has yet occurred, the order is nonfinal and therefore not subject to </div>
<div>a <span>Rule 59 motion. We disagree. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>As an initial matter, our case law makes clear that a motion </span>
</div>
<div>for reconsideration can qualify as a Rule 59 motion even if <span>it</span> does </div>
<div>not cite Rule 59, <span>Cuevas v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.</span>, 2023 COA 64M, </div>
<div>¶ <span>13 (“[M]otions to reconsider need not cite or reference C.R.C.<span></span>P. 59 </span>
</div>
<div>to be recognized as falling within its purview.”) (<span>cert. granted on </span>
</div>
<div>other grounds<span> July 1, 2024), and even if no trial is held<span>, </span></span><span>see, e.g.<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>Spiremedia Inc. v. Wozniak<span>, 2020 COA 10, ¶ 18 (concluding that <span>a </span></span>
</div>
<div>“motion to reconsider” <span>an order dismissing a case without prej<span></span>udice </span>
</div>
<div>was a Rule 59 motion); <span>Bowlen v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.</span>, 815 P.2<span></span>d </div>
<div>1013, 1015 (Colo. App. 1991) (concluding that a motion to </div>
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<div> </div>
<div>5 </div>
<div>reconsider an order granting summary judgment was a Rule <span></span>59 </div>
<div>motion). </div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>And contrary to <span>Said’s </span>position, we conclude that Rule <span>59 </span></span>
</div>
<div>applies to motions seeking relief from orders that<span>, while not “final” </span>
</div>
<div>in the sense that they resolve all claims as to all parties<span>, </span><span>see Wilson </span>
</div>
<div>v. Kennedy<span>, 2020 COA 122, ¶ 7 (explaining finality of<span></span> judgments), </span>
</div>
<div>are nevertheless appealable pursuant to <span>a </span>statute or rule<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>Rule 59(a) provides<span>, </span>in relevant part, <span>that “[w]ithin 14 days of </span></span>
</div>
<div>entry of judgment as provided in C.R.C.P. 58 . . . <span></span>a party may move </div>
<div>for post-<span>trial relief.” </span>Thus, the rule authorizes a post-trial motion </div>
<div>whe<span>never <span>a </span><span>“judgment” is entered </span>under Rule 58. <span>A </span><span>“judgment” </span>for </span>
</div>
<div>purposes of <span>Rule 58 “includes an appealable decree or or<span></span>der as set </span>
</div>
<div>forth in C.R.C.P. 54(a).<span>”</span><span> </span>Rule 54(a), in turn, <span>defines a “judgment” </span>to </div>
<div>include <span>“a decree and order to or from which an appeal lies.” </span> </div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>So a <span>“judgment” </span>need not be <span>“final” to be subject to a post</span>-trial </span>
</div>
<div>motion. Instead, Rules 54, 58, and 59 require that an order or </div>
<div>judgment <span>be</span> <span>“appealable<span>.”</span></span><span> </span>And while finality is generally a </div>
<div>prerequisite to appealability, <span>see Ditirro v. Sando</span>, 2022 COA 94, </div>
<div>¶ 24, <span>th</span>e rule is subject to various exceptions<span>, </span><span>see, e.g.</span>, § 13-<span>22</span>-</div>
<div>228(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2024 (authorizing an appeal of an order </div>
</div></div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPSHGJIAO5&amp;Expires=1728648202&amp;Signature=WlYK7A%2FF5ynJnwVo99zkI2va5KQ%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEDMaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQDRHWlfkSqFSLztniU7MurG2s4Vwws7AaQVxwX66VC5hgIhAKAD52nTz4zJjXKC1ux6igckNH5p6E4xkcDBbI0Yci2AKrkFCIz%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEQABoMOTI2MDQxMjAzOTM1IgzguUR3hJUGXVM1M0AqjQUha1vOjH7a2%2BAq7wIgIrEsuOlpCOpbfvkJWdCllE0dfWA3YTiWC2R1iJbtEch7Ql%2F%2FvHD5SO86xh8FRw4z3O%2FgVkdGVuOvyJPDV5fyzkb6GWVc7KvVZbzEmQtzgt6IfSL3jooViB5nZ0%2FdVxA8FBVeJE5kGSXR8FS1oSB%2Fid%2FEy1RJv%2Bmex%2BjbI5SnabP9y%2FkIgmap4P3Y62UxyBDp3K3tk%2BsHL14muGMdflrFh72Mr7STVbMUg6lKeg9TTxjphCyQKQaZcxI%2BMwjIopRhcBgTWQXNEvkwYVJEUEq53YANXVNDmKkt9Sj1xL4RAR3VDKHeftAGYsmV1fmu5sm734zVgVhJiodx722VZvLc9NdDjoG1n5cQlHYqkgK8Bi3oWNeS9hYBZHuAA%2BbEEEmAghUAJ%2FTKZwDgPHLfcPzIA6IuxWdlf5ZyUjvK4ylIAbtqOWKw2AllOfJHCeuFhzpKw%2BMt1O08hQmdrqbqaBx9byfl4nHNb8CSZL%2BaLQ0IpeufA%2FNvG0BFKlAVXtv91dS4zDXTkUxHBovHDBFemxL892xYGGUwZtV6ScY4vfEPEh%2FdehpwjJ9AHelckrsV9VTzGJEvznLRjps980WItxXstwagky842XJHWnzPLusji9BV9IH%2BGZCubqy7IgT5Ewle9J0HB0NoNJ1DZSPi99RDlWfRSXvIuy%2B504KasXOWSWs4vZhyC%2FlqhFhpsFnjBRxZBN46FR8N3FwHMo6886tmWsm9ZC38cBEGnYSBAbmNam1BCJ2ZzOVdHOYy0PYjsNHnChfJQ6v4X1itWiXzDU5dPdMadqNotJ1OrspoDL83o6xaDXXLoJqSak2dHkRucPapaZcWzd3RF0f7oPRgSuUmejCy%2FqO4BjqwAdccjAM8calY0TkxcDK8ZpMR0QMTzaQiv%2BJvHZEzjcFxOu9IYeHD8Vm1RAPOoiBrGOgd7Ndon9gXzZK%2BnjowgKtcQaZMAANGfQNv%2Ff0xhmpvChyRRLumZppqu9AHFWvLinu9pLIdr6iN%2FcmaE2m54PGZVt%2FxvJrIBFOhs8z8BuFmwIw0wb3bhGmm3yS8rjGuKCGDQf67XjiXWW0oRs%2FHOPbenSjRFWz%2Br9pncbHQ6c83"><div>
<div> </div>
<div>6 </div>
<div>denying a motion to compel arbitration or an order g<span></span>ranting a </div>
<div>motion to stay arbitration); § 24-<span>10</span>-108, C.R.S. 2024 (authorizing </div>
<div>an appeal of <span>an order denying a public entity’s motion t<span></span>o dismiss </span>
</div>
<div>based on sovereign immunity); C.A.R. 1(a)(3) (authori<span></span>zing an appeal </div>
<div>of an order granting or denying a temporary injunction); <span>Feigin v. </span>
</div>
<div>Alexa Grp., Ltd.<span>, 19 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. 2001) (authori<span></span>zing an appeal </span>
</div>
<div>of an order denying a motion to intervene as a matter of right <span></span>under </div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 24(a)).</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>Section <span>13</span><span>-<span>20</span></span>-1101(7) creates such an exception </span>
</div>
<div>in this case, allowing an appeal from an otherwise nonfinal <span></span>order </div>
<div>denying a special motion to dismiss. </div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>Moreover, the relief requested in Magdy<span>’s </span>motion for </span>
</div>
<div>reconsideration <span>“</span>fits squarely within<span>”</span> Rule 59. <span>Spiremedia</span><span>, </span>¶ 18<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>The motion sought amendment of the <span>district court’s</span> findings and </div>
<div>of the judgment. <span>See</span> C.R.C.P. 59(a)(3), (4).<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>For these reasons, we disagree that the motion for </span>
</div>
<div>reconsideration constituted a motion under C.R.C.P. 121, section </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>In</span> <span>Przekurat v. Torres</span>, 2016 COA 177, ¶ 53, <span>aff’d</span><span>, </span>2018 CO 69, the </div>
<div>division determined that a C.R.C.P. 59 motion may be filed <span></span>only in </div>
<div>response to a “final order or judgment, not a non<span>-final or </span>
</div>
<div>interlocutory order or judgment.”<span> </span>But we understand the division’s </div>
<div>statement, when read in context, to mean that Rule 59 applies <span></span>only </div>
<div>to appealable orders. <span> </span> </div>
</div>
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<div> </div>
<div>7 </div>
<div>1-15(11), which does not toll the time for filing a notice of <span></span>appeal.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Rule 121, section 1-15(11) applies to <span>“[m]otions to reconsider </span>
</div>
<div>interlocutory orders of the court . . . other than those <span></span>governed by </div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 59 or 60.” <span>Because Magdy sought relief from an </span>
</div>
<div>appealable<span> interlocutory order, the motion to reconsider was </span>
</div>
<div>properly “governed by C.R.C.P. 59<span>.</span><span>”</span><span> <span>Id. </span></span>
</div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Disposition </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span> </span>
</div>
<div>JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUDGE <span>LUM</span> concur.<span> </span> </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>In light of our disposition, we need not consider Magdy’s </span>
</div>
<div>alternative request that we extend the time for filing the <span></span>notice of </div>
<div>appeal based on excusable neglect. </div>
</div>
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