No Pipe Dream v. Larimer County ( 2024 )


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    <div>23CA1799 No Pipe Dream v Larimer County 10-03-2024 </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Court of Appeals No. 23CA1799 </div>
    <div>Larimer County District Court No. 20CV30800<span> </span>
    </div>
    <div>Honorable Laurie K. Dean, Judge </div>
    <div>Honorable Gregory M. Lammons, Judge </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>No Pipe Dream Corporation, Save the Poudre, and Barry Feldman, </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>v. </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Larimer County Board of County Commissioners; Commissioner Tom Donnelly, </div>
    <div>in his official capacity as a Larimer County Commissioner; and <span>Commissioner </span>
    </div>
    <div>Steve Johson, in his official capacity as a Larimer County Commissioner, </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Defendants-Appellees,  </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>and </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Northern Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enterprise,  </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>JUDGMENT AFFIRMED<span> </span>
    </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Division VII </div>
    <div>Opinion by JUDGE TOW </div>
    <div>Kuhn and Taubman*, JJ., concur<span> </span>
    </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) </div>
    <div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Foote Law Firm LLC, Michael Foote, <span>L</span>ouisville, Colorado, for Plaintiff<span>-Appellant </span>
    </div>
    <div>and Cross-Appellee No Pipe Dream Corporation  </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>John M. Barth, Hygiene, Colorado, for Plaintiff<span>s-Appellants and Cross-</span>
    </div>
    <div>Appellees Save the Poudre and Barry Feldman </div>
    </div></div>
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    <div> </div>
    <div>William G. Ressue, County Attorney, Frank Haug, Assistant County Attorney, </div>
    <div>Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendants<span>-Appellees  </span>
    </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Trout Raley, Bennett W. Raley, Peggy E. Montaño, William Davis Wert, Vanya </div>
    <div>P. Akraboff, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant  </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Daniel L. Money, Windsor, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Town of Windsor </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>Vranesh and Raisch, LLP, Peter C. Johnson, Andrea A. Kehrl, <span>Robyn L. </span>Smith, </div>
    <div>Boulder, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Town of Erie </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. </div>
    <div>VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.</div>
    </div></div>
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    <div>1 </div>
    <div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs, No Pipe Dream Corporation, Save the Poudre, and </span>
    </div>
    <div>Barry Feldman, appeal the district court<span>’</span>s judgment entered in </div>
    <div>favor of defendants, Larimer County Board of County </div>
    <div>Commissioners (the Board), Commissioners Tom Donnelly and </div>
    <div>Steve Johnson, and Northern Integrated Supply Proj<span></span>ect Water </div>
    <div>Activity Enterprise (the Enterprise), affirming the Board<span>’</span>s approval </div>
    <div>of <span>the Enterprise’s</span> permit application for a water storage reservoir </div>
    <div>and transmission pipelines.  We affirm the judgment. </div>
    <div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>In section 24-65.1-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, the General </span>
    </div>
    <div>Assembly declared that “[t]he protection of the utility,<span></span> value, and </div>
    <div>future of all lands within the state . . . is a matter of public </div>
    <div>interest.”  Local governments are thereby empowered to “designate </div>
    <div>[certain] areas and activities of state int<span>erest” and, after such </span>
    </div>
    <div>designation, regulate such areas and activities.  § <span>24</span>-65.1-101(2)(b).  </div>
    <div>One such activity is the “[s]ite selection and construction of majo<span></span>r </div>
    <div>new domestic water . . <span>. systems.”  </span>§ <span>24</span>-65.1-203(1)(a), C.R.S.<span></span> 2024. </div>
    <div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>Consistent with section 24-65.1-404, C.R.S. 2024, Larimer </span>
    </div>
    <div>County designated as a matter of state interest the “[s]iting<span> and </span>
    </div>
    <div>development of new or extended domestic water or sewe<span></span>r </div>
    </div></div>
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    <div>2 </div>
    <div>transmission lines which are contained within new permanent<span></span> </div>
    <div>easements greater than 30 feet<span>.”  Larimer Cnty</span>. Land Use Code </div>
    <div>§ 14.4(J) (effective until Mar. 31, 2021) (Land Use Code).</div>
    </div>
    <div><div>1</div></div>
    <div>
    <div>  <span>An entity </span>
    </div>
    <div>that seeks to develop such a project must obtain Board ap<span></span>proval.   </div>
    <div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>One way of securing Board approval is to obtain a permit, </span>
    </div>
    <div>known as a “1041 permit<span>.</span><span>” </span><span> A 1041 permit applicant<span></span> must show </span>
    </div>
    <div>that the project satisfies twelve review criteria delineated in section </div>
    <div>14.10(D) of the Land Use Code<span>.  </span>Relevant to this appeal, the second </div>
    <div>criterion is that “[t]<span>he applicant has presented reasonable siting an<span></span>d </span>
    </div>
    <div>design alternatives or explained why no reasonable a<span></span>lternatives are </div>
    <div>available.<span>”</span><span>  <span>Land Use Code §<span> </span></span></span>14.10(D)(2).<span>  <span>In lieu of the 1041 permit </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>process, the Land Use Code also allows for an intergovernmental </div>
    <div>agreement between the County and an applicant proposing to </div>
    <div>engage in an area or activity of state interest.  Land Use Code </div>
    <div>§ <span>14.</span><span>8(A<span>).</span></span><span>  </span> </div>
    <div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>The Enterprise sought to develop a water storage reservoi<span></span>r, </span>
    </div>
    <div>transmission water pipelines, and associated features, known a<span></span>s </div>
    <div> </div>
    </div>
    <div><div>1</div></div>
    <div>
    <div> All citations to the Land Use Code will be to the version effective </div>
    <div>until March 31, 2021, as that was the version in effect at the t<span></span>ime of </div>
    <div>the Board’s action.  <span> </span>
    </div>
    </div>
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    <div>3 </div>
    <div>the Northern Integrated Supply Project (NISP).  In 2016, the County </div>
    <div>and the Enterprise signed a memorandum of understanding </div>
    <div>pursuant to section 14.8(A<span>)(</span>5) of the Land Use Code prior to </div>
    <div>engaging in the process of negotiating an intergovernmental </div>
    <div>agreement authorizing the NISP.  On November 14, 201<span></span>9, the </div>
    <div>Enterprise notified the Board that it wished to switch <span></span>from the </div>
    <div>intergovernmental agreement process to the 1041 permit </div>
    <div>application process because the Enterprise felt it would pr<span></span>ovide </div>
    <div>greater transparency and allow for more robust public particip<span></span>ation<span>.  </span> </div>
    <div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>On February 21, 2020, the Enterprise submitted a </span>
    </div>
    <div>1041 permit application for the development of the NISP.  The two </div>
    <div>main components of <span>the Enterprise’s </span>NISP 1041 permit application </div>
    <div>were the pipeline routes through Larimer County and the location of </div>
    <div>the Glade Reservoir.  The application contained multiple </div>
    <div>memoranda, including sections applying generally to NISP, as well </div>
    <div>as <span>some sections applying only to the pipelines and others applying </span>
    </div>
    <div>only to Glade Reservoir. </div>
    <div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>In Technical Memorandum No. 1 <span>–</span> Project Description, the </span>
    </div>
    <div>Enterprise addressed the reasonable alternatives criterion as </div>
    <div>follows: </div>
    </div></div>
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    <div>4 </div>
    <div>After many years of federal scientific studies </div>
    <div>and required environmental compliance with </div>
    <div>substantial public input, including input from </div>
    <div>Larimer County, approvals by the agencies of </div>
    <div>the State of Colorado and the permits issuing </div>
    <div>for the current project configuration, which is </div>
    <div>the subject of this permit application, <span>it is not </span>
    </div>
    <div>possible at this juncture for the Applicant to </div>
    <div>submit a permit request for another Project </div>
    <div>configuration or alternative<span>.  Having </span>
    </div>
    <div>incongruent permit applications at various </div>
    <div>agencies is not a viable option, <span>therefore no </span>
    </div>
    <div>reasonable alternatives are possible<span> at this </span>
    </div>
    <div>time as the other state and federal permitting </div>
    <div>agencies have acted. </div>
    <div>(Emphasis added.)   </div>
    <div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>In Technical Memorandum No. 2 <span>–</span> Larimer County 1041 </span>
    </div>
    <div>Evaluation Criteria, the Enterprise addressed <span>th</span>e reasonable </div>
    <div>alternatives criterion for the pipelines specifically, saying <span>“[a]</span>fter </div>
    <div>further discussion with the County, the pipeline routing ident<span></span>ified </div>
    <div>in the latest Technical Memorandum No. 3 is the final alignment, </div>
    <div>recognizing that minor adjustments may be necessary in specific </div>
    <div>locations.”  In Technical Memorandum No. 3<span> </span><span>–</span><span> Conveyance Pipelin<span></span>e </span>
    </div>
    <div>Route Study &amp; Analysis<span>, </span>the Enterprise <span>presented its “preferred” </span>
    </div>
    <div>pipeline route, as well <span>as </span>its prior analysis that supported selecting </div>
    <div>that route over several alternative routes.<span>  </span> </div>
    </div></div>
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    <div>5 </div>
    <div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Ultimately, the Board approved the permit by a vote of two t<span></span>o </span>
    </div>
    <div>one, finding, as pertinent here, that the Enterprise had met section </div>
    <div>14.10(D)(2) of the Land Use Code<span>.  </span>Specifically, the Board found </div>
    <div>that </div>
    <div>[the <span>Enterprise’s] </span>application presents a </div>
    <div>lengthy review of over 200 alternatives to NISP </div>
    <div>including alternative reservoir locations, </div>
    <div>expansion of existing reservoirs, use of ground </div>
    <div>aquifers in lieu of NISP, and a “No Action” plan </div>
    <div>where NISP would not be developed.  Per the </div>
    <div>Army Corp of Engineers in the [Final </div>
    <div>Environmental Impact Statement], the </div>
    <div>proposed Glade Reservoir is the most </div>
    <div>appropriate and least impactful option when </div>
    <div>considering the mitigation plans imposed.  </div>
    <div>Many alternative pipeline routes for each </div>
    <div>segment were studied and presented in the </div>
    <div>application.<span>  <span>These route alternatives were </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>along a specific line which allowed for </div>
    <div>evaluation of actual impacts.  Numerous </div>
    <div>factors for the route combinations were </div>
    <div>evaluated, including disruption to surrounding </div>
    <div>property, existing development and utilities, </div>
    <div>the number of properties impacted, residential </div>
    <div>and urbanized areas, natural hazards, and </div>
    <div>environmental and wildlife impacts. </div>
    <div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Larimer County District </span>
    </div>
    <div>Court challenging the Board’s approval.  <span>They sought district cou<span></span>rt </span>
    </div>
    <div>review of <span>the Board’s decision</span> under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), contending </div>
    <div>that the Board had abused its discretion or exceeded its juris<span></span>diction </div>
    </div></div>
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    <div><div>
    <div>6 </div>
    <div>by<span> approving <span>the Enterprise’s</span> 1041 permit application<span>.  </span>They also </span>
    </div>
    <div>sought a declaration under C.R.C.P. 57 (or, in the alternative, </div>
    <div>C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)) that the participation of two of the count<span></span>y </div>
    <div>commissioners in the approval of the 1041 permit application </div>
    <div>violated plaintiffs<span>’</span> due process rights because the commissione<span></span>rs </div>
    <div>were biased and should have recused themselves.  The district </div>
    <div>court dismissed the due process claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) <span></span>and </div>
    <div>affirmed the Board’s approval of the 1041 permit applicati<span></span>on.<span> </span>
    </div>
    <div>II.<span> <span>Dismissal of the Due Process Claim </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>We first reject <span>plaintiffs’ </span>contention that the district court erred<span></span> </span>
    </div>
    <div>by granting defendants<span>’</span> motion to dismiss the due process bias </div>
    <div>claim. </div>
    <div>A.<span> <span>Standard of Review and Applicable Law </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>We review de novo <span>a district court’s order granting a C.R.C.P. </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.  <span>Williams v. Rock-Tenn Servs., I<span></span>nc.<span>, 2016 </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>COA 18, ¶ <span>9.</span><span>  </span>We accept all factual averments in the complaint <span></span>as </div>
    <div>true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintif<span></span>f.<span>  </span><span>Pub. </span>
    </div>
    <div>Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk<span>, 
    27 P.3d 377
    , 386 (Colo. <span></span>2001<span>).</span><span>  </span>We </span>
    </div>
    <div>also review de novo a claim that a party’s due proce<span></span>ss rights were </div>
    <div>violated.  <span>Black v. Black</span>, 
    2020 COA 64M
     ¶ 103.   </div>
    </div></div>
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    <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMb/aZu/MMbaZubGMqbfwEvU0dCQwXs%2Bohqd%2BpSWpkifa7Poen1e4%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTP43FBXT2P&amp;Expires=1728738257&amp;Signature=hQXYQCGXzVv9J6fIOcAPkhNeULs%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEEwaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQCL8gj99x5rT5wz3V%2F8rksQYdIbTDxbO23b%2B%2F5X1AFV6QIgNV%2BMQVedpHopEdwSRBoAvOYmlqmAqqBBUzdZNe%2BrLkUqugUIpf%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDLGziNiImAqfeA%2Bk4iqOBV4ANll5fjZbhzyqSbPHiZT9VHQiO0JYKCHK%2Bwm9eZIblfhk2pceDgHVWRWF%2F5h13B7uTSp8QDwU6wQTe7qbIOnDIJQgcAWQAgBsXCdCGsykjQchoIc3OSS7Hrubs143LW8LnK3ERAhpwmIaQh32xtLcJZ%2FYiT2NHJhUokyxkeuIB0kbdtq2NLIRNyQ%2B9BSqYsYF2oqxnRq%2FJjuiFN2%2BAZYzjWgLaopDBP1RUVd3mCdKs6dbkvUO2ztqwDr%2Bpo82RUeomDABEOsACL9xHZOD2aVj5gANoUOY8Q53MWeSCnaS0Pbv1qrEVG0Y4NH4N73%2FDNS%2Be7qG6CVawAo%2BQl30MQZ8E6ajquMbeU3Pui%2BqoegalPLO3n31LsGahpUNXl6bhRawu66WXcN2RfjGvqW2afomIP1lJueKkSZTk8Jfn%2BPwHioUVfvZAoVuuuuGRD7wcU3cy4fT%2FOz5HoDRPkewfcq84D75DwsuxZSObXbj3RC60%2BaNRfwzeOtMtXOTTL5bC35vmPdAKI0yLvI15ONfqhBgD7whqp%2BX7LyOSUBuK7dqdtmCYbuZLAtEnYs6pMGNfpazSfI4sFS6vi%2BRcVc%2Bw4WpHw1Wi25acfZuVgGKWRfE2gykYJ62JZzckT2ySPoJnKExrIg%2BdUqt0oKzbTpjag09FJfczqgfvmnMOG0QCKJCWS2n8NcMe1wAPk8UYi%2FpLmJPWF8l3pRq6knlJ%2F1mQR3cZDDee%2BcJheq7oHYAWWMJZPlkEq3kSvypI2ohuzXbcx33pfgbCmj9Ucda%2FLgzufrTeWEBxiVvkjappYzNX2eM4WKVUiIAoWkUXP49jWXB8BpH6MYcrbJQibZHEmMOK4lyvxAP8Xl7q1bji0a4ajCcwam4BjqxAVYIuZHrf%2FDl7LNCUsSfrxEJDfA1lJkVv98jxzis5M6p%2FKoe6%2F%2BJy6kw5YeSDhsYh%2Fafl5589KcYavX5gzS0iuOzekdoFg%2B5O3KWetKGRN38W7AnaXeg7pQBSEVH6XbTvZtd04ftoSHxeHiNDbc3m4HJnqzTjwR62FM%2Fm8Ad08ec%2BjIgqKxllZID5tsg44HAAPAeJURldo7wzZzwR2fsrx0tmfJ2XVb7MVSe9yJ62IH4Qw%3D%3D"><div>
    <div>7 </div>
    <div>¶ 13<span> <span>“The due process requirement of neutrality in adjudicative </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>proceedings entitles a person to an impartial decision-<span>maker.”  <span>No</span><span> </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>Laporte Gravel Corp. <span>v.</span> Bd. <span>of</span> Cnty. <span>Comm’rs</span><span>, 
    2022 COA 6M
    , ¶ 41.  </span>
    </div>
    <div>“An impartial adjudication requires ‘the absence of a personal,<span></span> </div>
    <div>financial, or official stake in the decision evidencing a conflict of </div>
    <div>interest on the part of a decision-maker.<span>’<span>” </span></span><span> </span><span>Id.</span> (quoting<span></span> <span>Scott v. City </span>
    </div>
    <div>of Englewood<span>, 
    672 P.2d 225
    , 228 (Colo. App. 1983)).<span></span>  “<span>This concept </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>encompasses both the absence of actual bias and the risk of actual </div>
    <div>bias.<span>”  <span>Id.</span><span> </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 14<span> <span>“<span>These due process mandates are not limited to judicial </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>officers.<span>”  <span>Id.</span><span> at ¶ <span>44.</span> </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>[W]hen decision-making by nonjudicial officers </div>
    <div>bears sufficient similarities to the adjudicatory </div>
    <div>function performed by courts, we consider it </div>
    <div>“<span>quasi-judicial</span>”<span> and thereby subject to the </span>
    </div>
    <div>basic requirements of due process.  While such </div>
    <div>actors must ensure the fundamental fairness </div>
    <div>of the proceeding, they are not held to the </div>
    <div>more rigorous disqualification standards </div>
    <div>applicable to judicial officers through ethical </div>
    <div>codes or local rules of procedure.  Rather, the </div>
    <div>inquiry is simply whether actual bias or a risk </div>
    <div>of actual bias exists so as to compromise the </div>
    <div>neutrality of the quasi-judicial actor. </div>
    <div>Id.<span> (citations omitted).<span>  </span> </span>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pfa" data-page-no="a">
    <div>
    <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTP43FBXT2P&amp;Expires=1728738257&amp;Signature=2ZSbtK8nSk4zYjeUlEyZOTRJbFY%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEEwaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQCL8gj99x5rT5wz3V%2F8rksQYdIbTDxbO23b%2B%2F5X1AFV6QIgNV%2BMQVedpHopEdwSRBoAvOYmlqmAqqBBUzdZNe%2BrLkUqugUIpf%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDLGziNiImAqfeA%2Bk4iqOBV4ANll5fjZbhzyqSbPHiZT9VHQiO0JYKCHK%2Bwm9eZIblfhk2pceDgHVWRWF%2F5h13B7uTSp8QDwU6wQTe7qbIOnDIJQgcAWQAgBsXCdCGsykjQchoIc3OSS7Hrubs143LW8LnK3ERAhpwmIaQh32xtLcJZ%2FYiT2NHJhUokyxkeuIB0kbdtq2NLIRNyQ%2B9BSqYsYF2oqxnRq%2FJjuiFN2%2BAZYzjWgLaopDBP1RUVd3mCdKs6dbkvUO2ztqwDr%2Bpo82RUeomDABEOsACL9xHZOD2aVj5gANoUOY8Q53MWeSCnaS0Pbv1qrEVG0Y4NH4N73%2FDNS%2Be7qG6CVawAo%2BQl30MQZ8E6ajquMbeU3Pui%2BqoegalPLO3n31LsGahpUNXl6bhRawu66WXcN2RfjGvqW2afomIP1lJueKkSZTk8Jfn%2BPwHioUVfvZAoVuuuuGRD7wcU3cy4fT%2FOz5HoDRPkewfcq84D75DwsuxZSObXbj3RC60%2BaNRfwzeOtMtXOTTL5bC35vmPdAKI0yLvI15ONfqhBgD7whqp%2BX7LyOSUBuK7dqdtmCYbuZLAtEnYs6pMGNfpazSfI4sFS6vi%2BRcVc%2Bw4WpHw1Wi25acfZuVgGKWRfE2gykYJ62JZzckT2ySPoJnKExrIg%2BdUqt0oKzbTpjag09FJfczqgfvmnMOG0QCKJCWS2n8NcMe1wAPk8UYi%2FpLmJPWF8l3pRq6knlJ%2F1mQR3cZDDee%2BcJheq7oHYAWWMJZPlkEq3kSvypI2ohuzXbcx33pfgbCmj9Ucda%2FLgzufrTeWEBxiVvkjappYzNX2eM4WKVUiIAoWkUXP49jWXB8BpH6MYcrbJQibZHEmMOK4lyvxAP8Xl7q1bji0a4ajCcwam4BjqxAVYIuZHrf%2FDl7LNCUsSfrxEJDfA1lJkVv98jxzis5M6p%2FKoe6%2F%2BJy6kw5YeSDhsYh%2Fafl5589KcYavX5gzS0iuOzekdoFg%2B5O3KWetKGRN38W7AnaXeg7pQBSEVH6XbTvZtd04ftoSHxeHiNDbc3m4HJnqzTjwR62FM%2Fm8Ad08ec%2BjIgqKxllZID5tsg44HAAPAeJURldo7wzZzwR2fsrx0tmfJ2XVb7MVSe9yJ62IH4Qw%3D%3D"><div>
    <div>8 </div>
    <div>¶ 15<span> <span>“[T]hose serving in quasi<span>-judicial capacities are presumed to </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>act with ‘integrity, honesty, and impartiality<span> . . . .</span>’”  <span>Id.</span><span> at ¶ <span></span><span>45<span> </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>(quoting <span>Scott</span>, 672 P.2d <span>at</span> 228).  To overcome this presumption an<span></span>d </div>
    <div>invalidate an agency action<span>, <span>a </span></span><span>plaintiff must show “substantial </span>
    </div>
    <div>prejudice.”  <span>Whitelaw v. Denver City Council<span>, 
    2017 COA 47
    , ¶ <span>11</span><span>; </span></span><span>No </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>Laporte Gravel Corp.<span>, ¶<span> <span>45</span>.  In this regard, <span>a </span>plaintiff must show </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>that the conflict, if any, had an impact “on the outcome of the </div>
    <div>proceeding.”  <span>Id.</span><span> at ¶ <span>12.</span> </span>
    </div>
    <div>B.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs contend that the complaint sufficiently plead<span>ed</span> a due </span>
    </div>
    <div>process bias claim.  In support of this contention, they point to </div>
    <div>allegations in the complaint regarding Donnelly<span>’s</span> <span>and Johnson’s </span>
    </div>
    <div>decade-long public advocacy in support of NISP, a text message </div>
    <div>sent by Donnelly, and an email sent by Johnson.  These allegati<span></span>ons </div>
    <div>are insufficient to state a due process bias claim.</div>
    </div>
    <div><div>2</div></div>
    <div>
    <div> </div>
    <div> </div>
    </div>
    <div><div>2</div></div>
    <div>
    <div> <span>It</span> is immaterial whether plaintiffs brought the due process </div>
    <div>violation claim pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 or 106(a)(4) beca<span></span>use either </div>
    <div>way, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be </div>
    <div>granted.<span>  <span>Thus, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute over </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>whether an as-applied constitutional challenge is cognizable <span></span>under </div>
    <div>C.R.C.P. 57.   </div>
    </div>
    <a href="#pfa" data-dest-detail='[10,"XYZ",69,170,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:518.062222px;bottom:293.071111px;width:10.080000px;height:32.860000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a>
    </div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pfb" data-page-no="b">
    <div><div>
    <div>9 </div>
    <div>1.<span> <span>Public Advocacy for a Decade </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs highlight allegations in the complaint that both </span>
    </div>
    <div>commissioners had publicly advocated for NISP for a decade<span>, </span>
    </div>
    <div>including that they met with the Enterprise to discuss NISP; </div>
    <div>advocat<span>ed</span><span>, publicly support<span>ed</span>, and endors<span>ed</span> NISP; attended and </span>
    </div>
    <div>spoke at multiple rallies organized by the Enterprise and </div>
    <div>support<span>ed</span><span>/endorsed NISP at such events; made public statements </span>
    </div>
    <div>supporting/endorsing NISP in their official capacities as </div>
    <div>commissioners; and allow<span>ed</span> the Enterprise to list their names as </div>
    <div>supporting/endorsing NISP.  They also point to allegations in the </div>
    <div>complaint that (1) the Enterprise prepared a document stating<span></span> that </div>
    <div>its strategy was to meet with key people including Johnson and </div>
    <div>Donnelly to obtain their support/endorsement; and (2) the </div>
    <div>Enterprise thank<span>ed</span> Johnson for his support in an email, and </div>
    <div>Johnson replied that he appreciated being mentioned in an article </div>
    <div>stating that all three commissioners supported NISP<span>.  </span> </div>
    <div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>Reading these allegations in the light most favorable to </span>
    </div>
    <div>plaintiffs and taking them as true, they do not allege that <span></span>either </div>
    <div>commissioner had a personal, financial, or official stake in t<span></span>he </div>
    <div>decision of the Enterprise<span>’s</span> 1041 permit application eviden<span></span>cing a </div>
    </div></div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pfc" data-page-no="c">
    <div><div>
    <div>10 </div>
    <div>conflict of interest<span>.  </span>At most, these communications demonstrate <span>a </span>
    </div>
    <div>public expression of opinion or the taking of a political stance on <span>a </span>
    </div>
    <div>policy matter before deciding a particular issue<span>.  “</span>The taking of a </div>
    <div>public stance on a policy issue related to the upcoming <span></span>hearing, </div>
    <div>however, ‘does not, in the absence of a showing of bias, disqualify </div>
    <div>the decision-maker.<span>’”  <span>Meyerstein v. City of Aspen</span></span>, 
    282 P.3d 4
    <span></span>56, </div>
    <div>468 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting <span>Scott</span><span>, 672 P.2d <span>at<span></span><span> 228).  Indeed, we </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>agree with the district court that the public expects elected officials </div>
    <div>to make public comments on policy matters and that doing s<span></span>o </div>
    <div>before an election allows for greater transparency.  Such conduct, </div>
    <div>without more, does not disqualify officials from their quasi-judicial </div>
    <div>role.<span>  <span>See id.</span>  <span> </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>Further, plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to rebut the </span>
    </div>
    <div>“presumption of integrity, honesty, and impartiality”<span> because they </span>
    </div>
    <div>have not alleged how these public comments had any impact <span></span>on the </div>
    <div>outcome of the proceeding.<span>  </span><span>Whitelaw</span>, ¶ 11 (quoting <span>Scott</span><span>, 672 P.<span></span>2d </span>
    </div>
    <div>at 227)<span>.  </span>Plaintiffs did <span>no</span>t allege in the<span>ir</span> complaint that either </div>
    <div>commissioner stated how he would vote on the Enterprise<span>’s</span> 1041 </div>
    <div>permit application irrespective of what the quasi-judicial process </div>
    <div>revealed<span>.  <span>See City of Manassa v. Ruff<span>, 
    235 P.3d 1051
    , 1058 (Colo. </span></span></span>
    </div>
    </div></div>
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    </div>
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    <div>
    <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTP43FBXT2P&amp;Expires=1728738257&amp;Signature=wymlq1pbFRAozECygGWNdIhFdFc%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEEwaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQCL8gj99x5rT5wz3V%2F8rksQYdIbTDxbO23b%2B%2F5X1AFV6QIgNV%2BMQVedpHopEdwSRBoAvOYmlqmAqqBBUzdZNe%2BrLkUqugUIpf%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDLGziNiImAqfeA%2Bk4iqOBV4ANll5fjZbhzyqSbPHiZT9VHQiO0JYKCHK%2Bwm9eZIblfhk2pceDgHVWRWF%2F5h13B7uTSp8QDwU6wQTe7qbIOnDIJQgcAWQAgBsXCdCGsykjQchoIc3OSS7Hrubs143LW8LnK3ERAhpwmIaQh32xtLcJZ%2FYiT2NHJhUokyxkeuIB0kbdtq2NLIRNyQ%2B9BSqYsYF2oqxnRq%2FJjuiFN2%2BAZYzjWgLaopDBP1RUVd3mCdKs6dbkvUO2ztqwDr%2Bpo82RUeomDABEOsACL9xHZOD2aVj5gANoUOY8Q53MWeSCnaS0Pbv1qrEVG0Y4NH4N73%2FDNS%2Be7qG6CVawAo%2BQl30MQZ8E6ajquMbeU3Pui%2BqoegalPLO3n31LsGahpUNXl6bhRawu66WXcN2RfjGvqW2afomIP1lJueKkSZTk8Jfn%2BPwHioUVfvZAoVuuuuGRD7wcU3cy4fT%2FOz5HoDRPkewfcq84D75DwsuxZSObXbj3RC60%2BaNRfwzeOtMtXOTTL5bC35vmPdAKI0yLvI15ONfqhBgD7whqp%2BX7LyOSUBuK7dqdtmCYbuZLAtEnYs6pMGNfpazSfI4sFS6vi%2BRcVc%2Bw4WpHw1Wi25acfZuVgGKWRfE2gykYJ62JZzckT2ySPoJnKExrIg%2BdUqt0oKzbTpjag09FJfczqgfvmnMOG0QCKJCWS2n8NcMe1wAPk8UYi%2FpLmJPWF8l3pRq6knlJ%2F1mQR3cZDDee%2BcJheq7oHYAWWMJZPlkEq3kSvypI2ohuzXbcx33pfgbCmj9Ucda%2FLgzufrTeWEBxiVvkjappYzNX2eM4WKVUiIAoWkUXP49jWXB8BpH6MYcrbJQibZHEmMOK4lyvxAP8Xl7q1bji0a4ajCcwam4BjqxAVYIuZHrf%2FDl7LNCUsSfrxEJDfA1lJkVv98jxzis5M6p%2FKoe6%2F%2BJy6kw5YeSDhsYh%2Fafl5589KcYavX5gzS0iuOzekdoFg%2B5O3KWetKGRN38W7AnaXeg7pQBSEVH6XbTvZtd04ftoSHxeHiNDbc3m4HJnqzTjwR62FM%2Fm8Ad08ec%2BjIgqKxllZID5tsg44HAAPAeJURldo7wzZzwR2fsrx0tmfJ2XVb7MVSe9yJ62IH4Qw%3D%3D"><div>
    <div>11 </div>
    <div>2010) (“[I]n the absence of evidence .<span> . </span>. the mere possibility” of </div>
    <div>prejudice “simply poses too remote and insubstantial a risk <span></span>of </div>
    <div>actual bias” to implicate the guarantee of due process.).<span>  <span>Thus, </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>these statements do not evince actual bias or a risk of actual bias.</div>
    </div>
    <div><div>3</div></div>
    <div>
    <div> </div>
    <div>2.<span> <span>Text Message </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs also point to an allegation in the<span>ir</span> complaint </span>
    </div>
    <div>regarding an August 2019 text message exchange between D<span></span>onnelly </div>
    <div>and the Enterprise<span>’s </span>Public Information Officer, in which Donnelly </div>
    <div>sa<span>id<span>, “You guys are getting ready to blow this deal<span>,</span>” and “Northern </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>has no idea what is in store for them if they let this slide into the </div>
    <div>next boards [sic] <span>term.”  </span>But Donnelly sent this text message when </div>
    <div>the Enterprise and the county were negotiating an </div>
    <div>intergovernmental agreement, as opposed to during the 1041 </div>
    <div>permit process.  It was not until approximately three months aft<span></span>er </div>
    <div> </div>
    </div>
    <div><div>3</div></div>
    <div>
    <div> <span>We decline to address plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion <span></span>that </span>
    </div>
    <div>Donnelly<span>’s</span><span> <span>and Johnson’s “</span>public advocacy also violated [a]rticle </span>
    </div>
    <div>XXIX[, section ](1)(c) of the Colorado Constitution by creating <span>‘</span><span>a </span>
    </div>
    <div>justifiable impression among members of the public that<span></span> such </div>
    <div>[public] trust is being violated<span>’</span> by their refusal to recuse </div>
    <div>themselves<span>.”  <span>See Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. I<span></span>ns. Co.<span>, 2015 COA </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>57, ¶ 18 (“We generally decline to address arguments present<span></span>ed to </div>
    <div>us in a conclusory manner that are lacking citations to any </div>
    <div>supporting authority.”)<span>, </span><span>aff’d</span><span>, 
    2018 CO 39
    . </span>
    </div>
    </div>
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    </div>
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    </div>
    <div id="pfe" data-page-no="e">
    <div><div>
    <div>12 </div>
    <div>this text message was sent that the Enterprise notified the Board </div>
    <div>that it wanted to switch from the intergovernmental agreement </div>
    <div>process to the 1041 permit process and approximately six mont<span></span>hs </div>
    <div>after this text message was sent that the Enterprise submitted its </div>
    <div>1041 permit application<span>.  </span> </div>
    <div>3.<span> <span>Email </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>Finally, plaintiffs point to an email Johnson sent to someone </span>
    </div>
    <div>named Mandy <span>—</span> who is not otherwise identified.<span>  </span>In this email to </div>
    <div>Mandy, which appears to be a reply to a previous email (that is not </div>
    <div>in the record), Johnson said<span>, “No it’s not a bad joke.  It’s the <span></span>result </span>
    </div>
    <div>of a disgusting and disingenuous email blast by Save the <span></span>Poudre[,] </div>
    <div>slanted and missing a lot of the facts designed to make the <span></span>County </div>
    <div>look bad.  Needless to say the<span>[y]</span> <span>have lost ALL credibility with me.” <span></span> </span>
    </div>
    <div>Johnson then discuss<span>ed</span> the time requirements for when 1041 </div>
    <div>permit hearings need<span>ed</span> to take place under the law, that<span></span> the Board </div>
    <div>had scheduled the hearing as late as possible, and that the <span></span>Board </div>
    <div>and an attorney were looking into whether the Board could delay </div>
    <div>the hearings.  This email postdated the Enterprise<span>’s</span> submission of </div>
    <div>its 1041 permit application but concern<span>ed</span> the timing of <span></span>the hearing </div>
    <div>rather than the substance of the Enterprise<span>’s</span> 1041 permit </div>
    </div></div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pff" data-page-no="f">
    <div><div>
    <div>13 </div>
    <div>application.  Moreover, it does not follow that Johnson would </div>
    <div>approve the Enterprise<span>’s</span> 1041 permit application simply because </div>
    <div>Save the Poudre lost credibility with him.<span>  </span>Therefore, this email </div>
    <div>exchange does not evince actual bias or a risk of actual bias wit<span></span>h </div>
    <div>respect to the 1041 permit process. </div>
    <div>¶ 22<span> <span>In sum, plaintiffs’ complaint <span>failed to sufficiently allege a due </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>process violation.  Thus, the district court did not err by di<span></span>smissing </div>
    <div>th<span>is<span> claim. </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>III.<span> <span>Reasonable Siting and Design Alternatives </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 23<span> <span>We turn, then, to the merits of plaintiffs’ challenge to the </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>Board’s approval of the 1041 permit.  <span>Plaintiffs contend that<span></span> the </span>
    </div>
    <div>Board abused its discretion by finding that the Enterprise’s 1<span></span>041 </div>
    <div>permit application satisfied section 14.10(D)(2) of the Land Use </div>
    <div>Code.  We discern no reversible error. </div>
    <div>A.<span> <span>Standard of Review and Applicable Law </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 24<span> <span>“Review of a governmental body’<span>s decision pursuant to Rule </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>106(a)(4) requires an appellate court to review the decisi<span></span>on of the </div>
    <div>governmental body itself rather than the district court<span>’</span><span>s </span>
    </div>
    <div>determination regarding the governmental body<span>’s decision.”  <span>No </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>Laporte Gravel Corp.<span>, <span>¶ 23 (quoting </span></span>Bd. of Cnty. Comm<span>’</span>rs v. O<span>’</span><span>Dell</span><span>, </span>
    </div>
    </div></div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pf10" data-page-no="10">
    <div><div>
    <div>14 </div>
    <div>
    920 P.2d 48
    , 50 (Colo. 1996)).  <span>“</span>Our review is limited t<span></span>o deciding </div>
    <div>whether the governmental body<span>’</span>s decision was an abuse of </div>
    <div>discretion, based on the evidence in the record before it,<span></span> or was </div>
    <div>made in excess of its jurisdiction.<span>”  <span>Id.</span></span><span>  <span>“</span></span>A governmental body </div>
    <div>abuses its discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies t<span></span>he law or if no </div>
    <div>competent record evidence supports its decision.<span>”  <span>Id.</span></span> at ¶ 2<span>4.</span> </div>
    <div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>We review and interpret the Land Use Code de novo and apply </span>
    </div>
    <div>ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.  <span>Id. </span><span>at</span> ¶ 26. </div>
    <div>B.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>The Enterprise argues that it satisfied the criterion in section </span>
    </div>
    <div>14.10(D)(2) both for the proposed reservoir and fo<span></span>r the proposed </div>
    <div>pipelines<span>.  <span> </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>As to the siting of the reservoir, the Enterprise contends that<span></span> it </span>
    </div>
    <div>explained that no alternatives could be presented because <span></span>of the </div>
    <div>yearslong process that had already taken place to obtain <span></span>federal </div>
    <div>approval of the reservoir location.   </div>
    <div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs argue that this explanation fails to comply with t<span></span>he </span>
    </div>
    <div>requirements of section 14.10(D)(2) of the Land Use Code bec<span></span>ause it </div>
    <div>does not “provide any legal or technical support for why<span></span> no </div>
    <div>reasonable siting and design alternatives were available.”  <span>They </span>
    </div>
    </div></div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pf11" data-page-no="11">
    <div><div>
    <div>15 </div>
    <div>further contend that to allow the federal approval process t<span></span>o take </div>
    <div>precedence “renders meaningless the County’s authority ove<span></span>r site </div>
    <div>selection and design of major water projects<span>” and is inconsistent </span>
    </div>
    <div>with section 14.6(B) of the Land Use Code, which provides that<span></span> </div>
    <div>“[r]eview or approval of a project by a federal or state <span></span>agency does </div>
    <div>not obviate, and will not substitute for, the need to obtain a <span></span>1041 </div>
    <div>permit for that project.”<span> </span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>As for the pipeline component of its application, the Enterprise </span>
    </div>
    <div>contends that <span>it</span> elected to comply with section 14.10(D)(2) <span></span>of the </div>
    <div>Land Use Code by <span>“presenting reasonable siting and design </span>
    </div>
    <div>alternatives.<span>” </span><span> Specifically, the Enterprise submitted Technic<span></span>al </span>
    </div>
    <div>Memorandum No. 3, which provid<span>ed</span> <span>a <span>“‘</span></span>site analysis process and </div>
    <div>specific review criteria’ for alternative pipeline routes<span>.</span><span>”<span>  <span>  </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs counter that the alternatives discussed in Technical </span>
    </div>
    <div>Memorandum No. 3 were nothing more than options that <span>t<span></span>he </span>
    </div>
    <div>Enterprise<span> had considered and rejected.  The permit applicati<span></span>on, on </span>
    </div>
    <div>the other hand, only presented to the Board the Enterprise’<span></span>s <span>single </span>
    </div>
    <div>preferred<span> pipeline route.  Plaintiffs argue that the generally </span>
    </div>
    <div>applicable statement in Technical Memorandum No. 1 <span>—</span> that<span></span> it was </div>
    <div>not possible to present an alternative configuration for the </div>
    </div></div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pf12" data-page-no="12">
    <div>
    <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTP43FBXT2P&amp;Expires=1728738257&amp;Signature=wymlq1pbFRAozECygGWNdIhFdFc%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEEwaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQCL8gj99x5rT5wz3V%2F8rksQYdIbTDxbO23b%2B%2F5X1AFV6QIgNV%2BMQVedpHopEdwSRBoAvOYmlqmAqqBBUzdZNe%2BrLkUqugUIpf%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDLGziNiImAqfeA%2Bk4iqOBV4ANll5fjZbhzyqSbPHiZT9VHQiO0JYKCHK%2Bwm9eZIblfhk2pceDgHVWRWF%2F5h13B7uTSp8QDwU6wQTe7qbIOnDIJQgcAWQAgBsXCdCGsykjQchoIc3OSS7Hrubs143LW8LnK3ERAhpwmIaQh32xtLcJZ%2FYiT2NHJhUokyxkeuIB0kbdtq2NLIRNyQ%2B9BSqYsYF2oqxnRq%2FJjuiFN2%2BAZYzjWgLaopDBP1RUVd3mCdKs6dbkvUO2ztqwDr%2Bpo82RUeomDABEOsACL9xHZOD2aVj5gANoUOY8Q53MWeSCnaS0Pbv1qrEVG0Y4NH4N73%2FDNS%2Be7qG6CVawAo%2BQl30MQZ8E6ajquMbeU3Pui%2BqoegalPLO3n31LsGahpUNXl6bhRawu66WXcN2RfjGvqW2afomIP1lJueKkSZTk8Jfn%2BPwHioUVfvZAoVuuuuGRD7wcU3cy4fT%2FOz5HoDRPkewfcq84D75DwsuxZSObXbj3RC60%2BaNRfwzeOtMtXOTTL5bC35vmPdAKI0yLvI15ONfqhBgD7whqp%2BX7LyOSUBuK7dqdtmCYbuZLAtEnYs6pMGNfpazSfI4sFS6vi%2BRcVc%2Bw4WpHw1Wi25acfZuVgGKWRfE2gykYJ62JZzckT2ySPoJnKExrIg%2BdUqt0oKzbTpjag09FJfczqgfvmnMOG0QCKJCWS2n8NcMe1wAPk8UYi%2FpLmJPWF8l3pRq6knlJ%2F1mQR3cZDDee%2BcJheq7oHYAWWMJZPlkEq3kSvypI2ohuzXbcx33pfgbCmj9Ucda%2FLgzufrTeWEBxiVvkjappYzNX2eM4WKVUiIAoWkUXP49jWXB8BpH6MYcrbJQibZHEmMOK4lyvxAP8Xl7q1bji0a4ajCcwam4BjqxAVYIuZHrf%2FDl7LNCUsSfrxEJDfA1lJkVv98jxzis5M6p%2FKoe6%2F%2BJy6kw5YeSDhsYh%2Fafl5589KcYavX5gzS0iuOzekdoFg%2B5O3KWetKGRN38W7AnaXeg7pQBSEVH6XbTvZtd04ftoSHxeHiNDbc3m4HJnqzTjwR62FM%2Fm8Ad08ec%2BjIgqKxllZID5tsg44HAAPAeJURldo7wzZzwR2fsrx0tmfJ2XVb7MVSe9yJ62IH4Qw%3D%3D"><div>
    <div>16 </div>
    <div>project <span>—</span> makes it clear that Technical Memorandum No. <span></span>3 did not </div>
    <div>present alternatives for <span>the Board’s</span> consideration but, <span></span>rather, </div>
    <div>simply discussed options that the Enterprise had already rule<span></span>d out.   </div>
    <div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>Given <span>the Board’s language in its finding</span>, it is not entirely </span>
    </div>
    <div>clear whether the Board determined that the Enterprise ha<span></span>d </div>
    <div>satisfied section 14.10(D)(2) by providing alternatives o<span></span>r by </div>
    <div>explaining that none could be provided.  While the Board <span></span>observed </div>
    <div>that the application “present[ed] a lengthy review of over 20<span></span>0 </div>
    <div>alternatives” for the reservoi<span>r location, it did not say <span>the Boa<span></span>rd<span> </span></span></span>
    </div>
    <div>considered these alternatives; rather, it explained that <span></span>the Army </div>
    <div>Corps of Engineers had concluded that the proposed <span></span>reservoir </div>
    <div>locati<span>on was the “most appropriate and least impactful o<span></span>ption.”  As </span>
    </div>
    <div>for the pipelines<span>, </span>the Board described, in passive language, that </div>
    <div>“[m]any alternative pipeline routes for each segment were studied </div>
    <div>and presented in the application” and that numerous factors <span></span>“were </div>
    <div>evaluated” —<span> not saying whether the Board evaluated these </span>
    </div>
    <div>alternatives or factors.</div>
    </div>
    <div><div>4</div></div>
    <div>
    <div>  <span> </span>
    </div>
    <div> </div>
    </div>
    <div><div>4</div></div>
    <div>
    <div> Notably, the record reflects that county representatives had </div>
    <div>provided input during the discussions with the federal gove<span></span>rnment </div>
    <div>as well <span>—</span> even before the 1041 permit application was f<span></span>iled.   </div>
    </div>
    <a href="#pf12" data-dest-detail='[18,"XYZ",69,121,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:285.532222px;bottom:206.016111px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a>
    </div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pf13" data-page-no="13">
    <div>
    <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTP43FBXT2P&amp;Expires=1728738257&amp;Signature=2ZSbtK8nSk4zYjeUlEyZOTRJbFY%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEEwaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQCL8gj99x5rT5wz3V%2F8rksQYdIbTDxbO23b%2B%2F5X1AFV6QIgNV%2BMQVedpHopEdwSRBoAvOYmlqmAqqBBUzdZNe%2BrLkUqugUIpf%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDLGziNiImAqfeA%2Bk4iqOBV4ANll5fjZbhzyqSbPHiZT9VHQiO0JYKCHK%2Bwm9eZIblfhk2pceDgHVWRWF%2F5h13B7uTSp8QDwU6wQTe7qbIOnDIJQgcAWQAgBsXCdCGsykjQchoIc3OSS7Hrubs143LW8LnK3ERAhpwmIaQh32xtLcJZ%2FYiT2NHJhUokyxkeuIB0kbdtq2NLIRNyQ%2B9BSqYsYF2oqxnRq%2FJjuiFN2%2BAZYzjWgLaopDBP1RUVd3mCdKs6dbkvUO2ztqwDr%2Bpo82RUeomDABEOsACL9xHZOD2aVj5gANoUOY8Q53MWeSCnaS0Pbv1qrEVG0Y4NH4N73%2FDNS%2Be7qG6CVawAo%2BQl30MQZ8E6ajquMbeU3Pui%2BqoegalPLO3n31LsGahpUNXl6bhRawu66WXcN2RfjGvqW2afomIP1lJueKkSZTk8Jfn%2BPwHioUVfvZAoVuuuuGRD7wcU3cy4fT%2FOz5HoDRPkewfcq84D75DwsuxZSObXbj3RC60%2BaNRfwzeOtMtXOTTL5bC35vmPdAKI0yLvI15ONfqhBgD7whqp%2BX7LyOSUBuK7dqdtmCYbuZLAtEnYs6pMGNfpazSfI4sFS6vi%2BRcVc%2Bw4WpHw1Wi25acfZuVgGKWRfE2gykYJ62JZzckT2ySPoJnKExrIg%2BdUqt0oKzbTpjag09FJfczqgfvmnMOG0QCKJCWS2n8NcMe1wAPk8UYi%2FpLmJPWF8l3pRq6knlJ%2F1mQR3cZDDee%2BcJheq7oHYAWWMJZPlkEq3kSvypI2ohuzXbcx33pfgbCmj9Ucda%2FLgzufrTeWEBxiVvkjappYzNX2eM4WKVUiIAoWkUXP49jWXB8BpH6MYcrbJQibZHEmMOK4lyvxAP8Xl7q1bji0a4ajCcwam4BjqxAVYIuZHrf%2FDl7LNCUsSfrxEJDfA1lJkVv98jxzis5M6p%2FKoe6%2F%2BJy6kw5YeSDhsYh%2Fafl5589KcYavX5gzS0iuOzekdoFg%2B5O3KWetKGRN38W7AnaXeg7pQBSEVH6XbTvZtd04ftoSHxeHiNDbc3m4HJnqzTjwR62FM%2Fm8Ad08ec%2BjIgqKxllZID5tsg44HAAPAeJURldo7wzZzwR2fsrx0tmfJ2XVb7MVSe9yJ62IH4Qw%3D%3D"><div>
    <div>17 </div>
    <div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>But w<span>e </span>need not resolve whether the Board considered </span>
    </div>
    <div>alternatives or, instead, accepted the assertion that no alternatives </div>
    <div>were viable.  The requirement of section 14.10(D)(2) is <span></span>stated in the </div>
    <div>disjunctive <span>—</span> <span>“[t]he applicant has presented reasonable siting an<span></span>d </span>
    </div>
    <div>design alternatives <span>or</span> explained why no reasonable alternative<span></span>s are </div>
    <div>available.” <span> (Emphasis added.)<span>  </span>There is record support for eithe<span></span>r </span>
    </div>
    <div>conclusion.</div>
    </div>
    <div><div>5</div></div>
    <div>
    <div>  <span>Thus, regardless of which path the Board took in </span>
    </div>
    <div>finding that this criterion was met, we cannot say it abused its </div>
    <div>discretion.  <span>See No Laporte Gravel Corp.</span>, ¶ 24.   </div>
    <div>¶ 33<span> <span>Nor do we agree with plaintiffs’ objection that the Board’s </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>action essentially abdicated its authority over site selection an<span></span>d </div>
    <div>design.  It was certainly within the Board’s power to agree wit<span></span>h the </div>
    <div>federal government’s determination.  Similarly, we reject plaintif<span></span>fs’ </div>
    <div>contention that the Board’s action runs afoul of <span>section 14.6(B) of </span>
    </div>
    <div>the Land Use Code.  That provision means only that, </div>
    <div> </div>
    </div>
    <div><div>5</div></div>
    <div>
    <div> <span>Plaintiffs’ contention that there is no record support <span></span>is unavailing.  </span>
    </div>
    <div>Their arguments simply ask us to reweigh the evidence, which <span></span>we </div>
    <div>cannot do.  <span>See No Laporte Gravel Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm<span>’</span><span>rs</span></span><span>, </span>
    </div>
    <div>
    2022 COA 6M
    , ¶ 25 (“<span>Because we are not the fact finder, we </span><span>‘</span><span>cannot </span>
    </div>
    <div>weigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that<span></span> of the </div>
    <div>[administrative body].<span>’”</span> (quoting <span>Kruse v. Town of Cast<span></span>le Rock<span>, 192 </span></span>
    </div>
    <div>P.3d 591, 601 (Colo. App. 2008))) (alteration in original). </div>
    </div>
    <a href="#pf13" data-dest-detail='[19,"XYZ",69,187,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:189.302778px;bottom:626.008889px;width:10.080000px;height:32.860000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a>
    </div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    <div id="pf14" data-page-no="14">
    <div><div>
    <div>18 </div>
    <div>notwithstanding receiving the approval of the federal government<span></span>, </div>
    <div>the Enterprise had to seek the Board’s approval of a 1041 <span></span>permit.  </div>
    <div>It did so.   </div>
    <div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>Because the Board did not abuse its discretion, we affirm t<span></span>he </span>
    </div>
    <div>district court’s judgment.  <span> </span>
    </div>
    <div>IV.<span> </span><span>Disposition </span>
    </div>
    <div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>The judgment is affirmed.   </span>
    </div>
    <div>JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur. </div>
    </div></div>
    <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
    </div>
    </div></div></div></div>
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23CA1799

Filed Date: 10/3/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/12/2024