People v. Hernandez-Escajeda , 2024 COA 111 ( 2024 )

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<div>SUMMARY </div>
<div>October 10, 2024 </div>
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<div>202<span>4COA111<span> </span></span>
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<div>No. 23CA0521, <span>People v. Hernandez-Escajeda</span> <span>—</span> Criminal </div>
<div>Law<span> <span>—</span><span> Appeals <span>—</span> Resentencing on Remand<span> </span></span></span>
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<div>A division of the court of appeals holds that a district <span></span>court </div>
<div>generally has the inherent authority to resentence on a defendant’s </div>
<div>remaining convictions on remand following the vacat<span></span>ur of a </div>
<div>conviction that resulted in a reduced aggregate sentence. <span></span>The </div>
<div>division also concludes that a district court has the authorit<span></span>y to </div>
<div>take actions on remand that are not specifically directed by t<span></span>he </div>
<div>appellate mandate but do not contravene the mandate. </div>
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<div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div>
<div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div>
<div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div>
<div>cited or <span>relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. </span>
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<div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div>
<div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div>
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<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA111</span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 23CA0521 </div>
<div>Jefferson<span> County District Court No. 17CR2800 </span>
</div>
<div>Honorable <span>Russell Klein</span>, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>The People of the State of Colorado, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellant, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Octavio Hernandez-<span>Escajeda</span>, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellee. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>ORDER REVERSED AND CASE </div>
<div>REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division III </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO </div>
<div>Dunn and Gomez, JJ., concur </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Announced October 10, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Alexis King, District Attorney, <span>Rebecca </span>A. Adams, Senior Appellate Deputy </div>
<div>District Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, <span>Kamela Maktabi</span>, Deputy State </div>
<div>Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
</div>
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<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>The prosecution appeals <span>the district court’s</span> order concluding </span>
</div>
<div>that <span>it</span> lacked authority to resentence defendant, Octavio </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda<span>, <span>because of the remand instructions in <span>People </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>v. Hernandez-Escajeda<span>, (Colo. App. No. 19CA1519, July 7, 2<span></span>022) </span>
</div>
<div>(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (<span>Hernandez-Escajeda I</span><span>).</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>We disagree with the district court and, in doing so, address a </div>
<div>district court’s inherent authority to resentence <span>on remand absent </span>
</div>
<div>contrary directions from an appellate court. Therefore, w<span>e </span>reverse </div>
<div>the order and remand for further proceedings consistent <span></span>with this </div>
<div>opinion.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>The prosecution initially charged Hernandez-Escajeda with </span>
</div>
<div>twenty-four counts <span>—</span> including burglary, kidnapping, and </div>
<div>assault <span>—</span> involving three victims. <span> </span>The prosecution lat<span></span>er added two </div>
<div>sexual assault charges.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>In exchange for the dismissal of all <span>th</span>ose counts, Hernandez-</span>
</div>
<div>Escajeda pleaded guilty to added counts of first degree burglary, </div>
<div>first degree assault, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer that<span></span> </div>
<div>applied to both the burglary and assault counts.<span> </span><span>Hernandez-</span>
</div>
<div>Escajeda affirmed that, among other things, he understood t<span></span>hat </div>
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<div>2 </div>
<div>(1) the sentencing range for each of the two substantive counts w<span></span>as </div>
<div>ten to thirty-two years in the custody of the Department of </div>
<div>Corrections (DOC), and (2) those two sentences would run </div>
<div>consecutively.<span> <span>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span>, slip op. at ¶ 2.<span> </span></span></span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>The district court sentenced Hernandez-Escajeda to two </span>
</div>
<div>consecutive DOC sentences of twenty-two years each, for an </div>
<div>aggregate sentence of forty-four years.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Hernandez-Escajeda did not direct<span>ly</span> appeal the judgment of </span>
</div>
<div>conviction.<span> <span>Instead, he filed a Crim. P. 35(b) motion for sentenc<span></span>e </span></span>
</div>
<div>reconsideration, which the court denied, explaining that </div>
<div>“<span>sentencing decisions are made very carefully after full </span>
</div>
<div>consideration of all relevant circumstances. The [c]ourt finds that </div>
<div>circumstances have not changed sufficiently since the time of </div>
<div>sentencing until the present date to warrant this [c]ourt to </div>
<div>reconsider the previously imposed sentence.<span>”</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>Later, Hernandez-Escajeda filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion </span>
</div>
<div>for postconviction relief.<span> </span>The district court appointed counsel f<span></span>or </div>
<div>him, and postconviction counsel filed two supplemental </div>
<div>postconviction motions on his behalf. As relevant here<span>, </span><span>Hernandez-</span>
</div>
<div>Escajeda claimed that (1) his convictions and consecutive senten<span></span>ces </div>
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<div>3 </div>
<div>for first degree burglary and first degree assault violated his </div>
<div>constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy, and (2) his </div>
<div>convictions and sentences on those two counts were illegal because </div>
<div>they were supported by identical facts.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>The district court summarily denied the postconviction </span>
</div>
<div>motion. <span> </span>But on appeal, a division of this court conclud<span>ed</span> that </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda<span>’s convictions for first degree burglary and <span></span>first </span>
</div>
<div>degree assault must merge. <span>Hernandez-Escajeda</span>, <span>¶¶</span> <span>37</span>-4<span></span>1. </div>
<div>Consequently, the division affirmed in part, reversed in <span></span>part, and </div>
<div>remanded with directions. <span> </span>In the portion of the opinion containing </div>
<div>the remand instructions, <span>the division “</span>remanded to the district </div>
<div>court with directions to vacate Hernandez-<span>Escajeda’s conviction fo<span></span>r </span>
</div>
<div>first degree assault and correct the mittimus accordingly.<span></span>”<span> </span><span>Id.</span><span> at </span>
</div>
<div>¶ <span>42</span>. </div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>On remand, the district court set a hearing to consider the </span>
</div>
<div>division’s opinion and mandate. <span>In response (and before that </span>
</div>
<div>hearing), the prosecution requested resentencing in accordanc<span></span>e </div>
<div>with <span>People v. Johnson</span>, 2015 CO 70. <span> </span>Hernandez-Escajeda objected, </div>
<div>asserting that the court could not resentence him on the remaining </div>
<div>substantive count (first degree burglary) but could only perform t<span></span>he </div>
</div></div>
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<div>4 </div>
<div>actions specifically mentioned in the remand language in </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span>.</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>At <span>a </span>hearing on the issue<span>, </span>the district court discussed <span>Johnson</span> </span>
</div>
<div>but ultimately <span>agreed with the defense’s position</span><span>. <span> </span></span>Specifically, t<span></span>he </div>
<div>court emphasized that the division in <span>Hernandez-Escajeda<span></span> I<span> did not </span></span>
</div>
<div>remand for “<span>resentencing</span><span>”</span><span> but instead remand<span>ed</span> with directions to </span>
</div>
<div>vacate the first degree assault conviction and “correct<span></span> the mittimus </div>
<div>accordingly<span>.”</span><span> <span> </span>Therefore, the court believed that the <span>only</span> action it </span>
</div>
<div>could take on remand was to correct the mittimus by vacating the </div>
<div>first degree assault conviction.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>The court then issued an amended mittimus merging </span>
</div>
<div>Hernandez-<span>Escajeda’s <span>first degree assault conviction into his first </span></span>
</div>
<div>degree burglary conviction<span>. <span> </span></span>So all that remains on the mittimus <span>is</span> </div>
<div>the first degree burglary conviction, the crime of violence sentenc<span></span>e </div>
<div>enhancer, and the twenty-two-year DOC sentence on the <span></span>first </div>
<div>degree burglary conviction.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>We<span> have jurisdiction to hear the <span>prosecution’s</span> appeal because<span>, </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>as both parties recognize, whether the district court had authority </div>
<div>to resentence Hernandez-Escajeda on remand from </div>
</div></div>
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<div>5 </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span> presents a question of law. </span><span>See</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>§ <span>16<span>-<span>12</span></span></span>-102(1), C.R.S. 2024; <span>People v. Madrid</span>, 2023 CO 12, ¶ <span>37.<span></span><span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>We review questions of law de novo.<span> </span><span>Madrid</span><span>, </span>¶ <span>37.</span><span> </span><span>W</span><span>e </span></span>
</div>
<div>conclude that reversal is warranted.<span> </span>In our analysis, we address </div>
<div>the following issues: (1) whether, as a rule, a district court has the </div>
<div>inherent authority to resentence a defendant under circumstance<span></span>s </div>
<div>similar to those here<span>; (2) if so, whether the court’s aut<span></span>hority was </span>
</div>
<div>limited by the fact that the successful appeal in </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span> occurred in the postconviction context; <span></span>and </span>
</div>
<div>(3) the impact of the particular remand instructions in </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>A.<span> <span>The <span>District Court’s </span>Inherent Authority </span></span>
</div>
<div>to<span> Resentence On Remand </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>When moving for resentencing, the prosecution relied on the </span>
</div>
<div>supreme court<span>’s</span> decision in <span>Johnson</span>, which addressed a district </div>
<div>court’s resentencing authority following an appellate remand. <span></span> </div>
<div>There, a jury found the defendant guilty of sexual assault, first </div>
<div>degree kidnapping, and possession of a controlled substance. <span></span> </div>
<div>Johnson<span>, ¶<span> 4. He was sentenced to concurrent DOC sentences of</span>, </span>
</div>
<div>respectively, twenty years to life, twenty years, and six years (for an </div>
</div></div>
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<div>6 </div>
<div>aggregate sentence of twenty years to life)<span>. </span><span>Id.</span> On direct appeal, a </div>
<div>division of this court conclud<span>ed</span> that the district court had erred <span>by</span> </div>
<div>rejecting, after first accepting, a plea agreement under which t<span>he</span> </div>
<div>defendant had pleaded guilty to <span>only</span> the possession charge. <span>I<span></span>d.<span> at </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 5. The division reversed the convictions, vacated the sentence<span></span>s, </div>
<div>and remanded for the district court to reinstate <span>the defendant’s </span>
</div>
<div>guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance and <span>to</span> sentence </div>
<div>him on that conviction. <span>Id.</span> at ¶¶ 1, 5. </div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of twelve </span>
</div>
<div>years for possession of a controlled substance <span>—</span> doubl<span>e </span>the original </div>
<div>sentence on that conviction. <span>Id.</span> at ¶ 6. The defendant appealed </div>
<div>again, claiming, among other things, that the increased sentence </div>
<div>violated his due process rights. <span>Id.</span> at ¶ 7. Agreeing with him,<span></span> a </div>
<div>division of this court applied a presumption of vindict<span></span>iveness to the </div>
<div>increased sentence and (because no new information justifie<span></span>d the </div>
<div>new sentence) concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood </div>
<div>that the sentence was the result of actu<span>al</span> vindictiveness for the </div>
<div>defendant’s <span>successful first appeal. <span>Id.</span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>The supreme court granted review to address the scope of the </span>
</div>
<div>district court’s resentencing authority under these circumstan<span></span>ces<span> </span><span>—</span><span> </span>
</div>
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<div>7 </div>
<div>that is, to consider <span>“</span>whether the [district] court violated [the </div>
<div>defendant’s]<span> statutory and constitutional rights by increasing his </span>
</div>
<div>sentence on the remaining conviction on remand following <span></span>his </div>
<div>successful appeal on his other convictions.<span>”</span><span> </span><span>Id.</span> at ¶ 1.<span> </span>The </div>
<div>supreme court pointed out <span>that, “[a]s a</span> general matter, [district] </div>
<div>court judges possess significant discretion in determinin<span></span>g an </div>
<div>appropriate sentence<span>,” including “</span>during a resentencing on </div>
<div>remand.<span>” <span>Id.</span><span> at ¶ <span>21.</span><span> </span>Therefore, to protect a district court</span><span>’s</span><span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>discretion during a resentencing on remand, <span>“</span>the presumption of<span></span> </div>
<div>vindictiveness is a narrow one.<span>” <span>Id.</span></span> </div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>The supreme court <span>adopted the “aggregate approach</span><span>,<span>”</span></span> under </span>
</div>
<div>which the presumpti<span>on</span> of vindictiveness applies <span>“</span>where changes <span></span>to </div>
<div>the defendant’s sentence on remand<span> cause the <span>aggregat<span></span>e<span> total </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>sentence to increase as compared to the original <span>aggregate</span> </div>
<div>sentence.<span>”</span><span> </span><span>Id.</span><span> at ¶ <span>25</span> (emphasis added)<span>. </span> <span>See generally id.</span> at ¶¶ <span>24</span>-</span>
</div>
<div>37.<span> <span>In approving that approach, the supreme court relied in part on<span></span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>People v. Woellhaf<span>, <span>199 P.3d 27 (Colo. App. 2007)</span>, <span>a case where the </span></span>
</div>
<div>supreme court had <span>concluded that some of the defendant’s </span>
</div>
<div>convictions must merge and remanded for resentencing, aft<span></span>er which </div>
<div>the defendant argued in a second appeal that the new sentence </div>
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<div>8 </div>
<div>violated his due process rights. <span>See Johnson</span><span>, ¶</span>¶ <span>27</span><span>-<span>28</span></span><span>. A</span> division </div>
<div>of this court held that the presumption of vindictiveness di<span></span>d not </div>
<div>apply to the new sentence because the aggregate period of </div>
<div>incarceration did not increase from the original sentence to the <span></span>new </div>
<div>sentence on remand.<span> </span><span>See Woellhaf</span>, 199 P.3d at 31-32.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>The supreme court also discussed with approval an opinion </span>
</div>
<div>from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which that court said, </div>
<div>“<span>the aggregate approach best reflects the realities faced by distri<span></span>ct </span>
</div>
<div>court judges who sentence a defendant on related counts <span></span>of an </div>
<div>indictment<span>. <span> Sentencing is a fact-sensitive exercise that requires </span></span>
</div>
<div>district [court] judges to consider a wide array of factors when </div>
<div>putting together a ‘sentencing package<span>.’<span>”</span><span> </span></span><span>Johnson</span><span>, ¶ <span>28</span> (quoting </span>
</div>
<div>United States v. Campbell<span>, 106 F.3d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1997<span>))</span>. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>The supreme court explained that the presumption of </span>
</div>
<div>vindictiveness did not apply in <span>Johnson</span> <span>because the defendant<span></span>’s </span>
</div>
<div>aggregate sentence after resentencing did not exceed his original </div>
<div>aggregate sentence. <span>I<span>d.</span></span> at ¶ 39. The court then concluded that <span></span>the </div>
<div>defendant failed to prove that the district court acted out of actual </div>
<div>vindictiveness. <span>I<span>d.</span></span> at ¶¶ <span>42</span><span>-<span>43.</span></span><span> </span>
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<div>9 </div>
<div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>Although the supreme court ultimately resolved a due pr<span></span>ocess </span>
</div>
<div>claim alleging vindictive resentencing, we conclude that it<span></span>s </div>
<div>reasoning recognizes that, <span>following a defendant’s “</span>successful </div>
<div>appeal on his other convictions,<span>”</span> a district court has the inh<span></span>erent </div>
<div>authority to resentence the defendant on convictions that remain <span>on<span></span><span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>remand<span>, at least where the defendant’s initial appeal results in <span></span>a </span>
</div>
<div>reduced aggregate sentence.<span> </span><span>I<span>d.</span></span> at ¶¶ 1, 37.<span> </span>True, the remand </div>
<div>instructions at issue in <span>Johnson</span> had directed the district court to </div>
<div>resentence, but <span>we see nothing in the supreme court’s analysis t<span></span>hat </span>
</div>
<div>makes this fact essential to a district court’s resentencing </div>
<div>authority.</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>(We say more on this point below in Part II.B</span>.) </div>
<div>Consistent with our view, a division of this court has cited <span>Johnson</span> </div>
<div>for the proposition that, <span>“[i]n multicount cases, judges typically </span>
</div>
<div>craft sentences on the various counts as part of an overall </div>
<div>sentencing scheme, but when a count is vacated and that<span></span> scheme </div>
<div>unravels, they should have the discretion to reevaluate t<span></span>he </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> We note that resentencing was necessary in <span>People v. Johnson</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>2015 CO 70, because the first division of this court had revers<span></span>ed </div>
<div>and vacated the entire judgment arising from the jury verdicts, </div>
<div>including all the sentences. For this reason, we presume, t<span></span>he </div>
<div>division explicitly addressed resentencing. </div>
</div>
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<div><div>
<div>10 </div>
<div>underlying facts and sentences on the remaining counts.” <span>Peop<span></span>le v. </span>
</div>
<div>Johnson<span>, 2016 COA 15, ¶ 25 (involving a different defendant with </span>
</div>
<div>the surname Johnson). </div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>We are not persuaded otherwise by Hernandez-Escajeda<span>’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>suggestion that, absent a successful postconviction proceeding<span></span>, <span>a </span>
</div>
<div>district court’s resentencing authority <span>is</span><span> necessarily extinguished </span>
</div>
<div>after a conviction and sentence have become final. He says his </div>
<div>sentence for first degree burglary is “not subject to re<span></span>sentencing on </div>
<div>remand” because it is<span> final and valid, and <span>he</span> cites <span>People v. Heredia</span> </span>
</div>
<div>for the proposition that <span>“</span>a [district] court loses jurisdiction upon </div>
<div>imposition of a valid sentence except under circumstances s<span></span>pecified </div>
<div>in Crim. P. 35<span>.”</span> 122 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Colo. App. 2005) (alteration </div>
<div>omitted) (quoting <span>People v. Mortensen</span>, 856 P.2d 45, 47 (Colo. <span></span>App. </div>
<div>1993)). This proposition is consistent with the general rule that<span></span> a </div>
<div>judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final (1) if a </div>
<div>defendant does not pursue a direct appeal or (2) on the conclusi<span></span>on </div>
<div>of a direct appeal affirming the judgment. <span>See Hunsaker v. People</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>2021 CO 83, ¶¶ 28, <span>36</span>. </div>
<div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>As <span>Heredia</span> recognizes, however, a Rule 35 motion may disturb </span>
</div>
<div>the finality of a judgment, and <span>it</span> did so here. When the division in </div>
</div></div>
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<div>11 </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span> vacated one of Hernandez-<span>Escajeda’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>convictions and remanded for correction of the mittimus, the </div>
<div>mittimus reflecting the original judgment of conviction could no </div>
<div>longer stand.<span> </span><span>See Woellhaf</span>, 199 P.3d <span>at</span> <span>31</span> <span>(“</span>Where, as here, a </div>
<div>defendant challenges his or her judgment of conviction and enti<span></span>re </div>
<div>sentencing plan, the defendant loses any expectation of f<span></span>inality of </div>
<div>his or her sentences.<span>”).</span><span> </span>As part of the remand proceedings, the </div>
<div>prosecution requested resentencing on the remaining substantive </div>
<div>conviction, and the district court addressed this request <span></span>before </div>
<div>amending the mittimus.<span> </span><span>In other words, the prosecution’s request </span>
</div>
<div>was part and parcel of the postconviction proceedings, the related </div>
<div>appeal, and the remand.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>Our conclusion is supported by federal case law in<span></span>dicating </span>
</div>
<div>that, in the context of a successful postconviction motion to vacate </div>
<div>a conviction, a district court retains the discretion to resent<span></span>ence the </div>
<div>defendant on any remaining convictions. <span>See United Stat<span></span>es v. </span>
</div>
<div>Mixon<span>, 115 F.3d 900, 901-03 (11th Cir. 1997)<span>; </span><span>United Stat<span></span>es v. </span></span>
</div>
<div>Harrison<span>, 113 F.3d 135, 137 (8th Cir. 1997); <span>United Stat<span></span>es v. Davis<span>, </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>112 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 1997)<span>; </span><span>United States v. Hillary</span>, 106 F.3d </div>
<div>1170, 1171-73 (4th Cir. 1997). </div>
</div></div>
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<div>12 </div>
<div>B.<span> <span>The Remand Instructions in <span>Hernandez-Escajeda I</span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>Having concluded that a district court generally <span>ha</span>s inherent </span>
</div>
<div>authority to resentence on remaining convictions after an appellate </div>
<div>mandate vacat<span>es</span> a conviction, we now address whether, in t<span></span>his </div>
<div>case, the district court<span>’s</span> authority on remand was limited <span>solely</span> to </div>
<div>taking the actions specifically directed by the <span>Hernandez-Escajeda<span></span> I<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>division <span>—</span> namely, correcting the mittimus by vacating the <span></span>first </div>
<div>degree assault conviction. We conclude that it was not<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 24<span> <span>The division’s direction in <span>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span> to perform a </span></span></span></span>
</div>
<div>particular action did not amount to a prohibition <span>on</span> any<span></span> other </div>
<div>action that the district court had the authority to perform on </div>
<div>remand, provided that such other action did not conf<span></span>lict with the </div>
<div>remand instructions.<span> </span><span>See Oster v. Baack</span>, 2015 COA 39, ¶ 15 </div>
<div>(“Although a district court must follow the appellate court man<span></span>date </div>
<div>in subsequent proceedings on remand, it may entertain additi<span></span>onal </div>
<div>motions that do not, expressly or by necessary implication, </div>
<div>contravene the mandate.<span>”</span>) (citation omitted).<span> </span>That the division in </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span> did not express<span>ly</span> direct the district co<span>urt</span> to </span>
</div>
<div>resentence Hernandez-Escajeda<span> </span>on the remaining substantive <span>co</span>unt </div>
<div>did not limit the court<span>’s</span> authority to do so.<span> </span>Based on the reasoning </div>
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<div>13 </div>
<div>in<span> <span>Johnson</span>, 2015 CO 70, we conclude that the district court had </span>
</div>
<div>that inherent authority.<span> </span>Moreover, federal cases support our </div>
<div>conclusion. <span>See United States v. Hicks</span>, 146 F.3d 1198, 1202 (<span></span>10th </div>
<div>Cir. 1998) (“[A]fter we vacate a count of conviction t<span></span>hat is part of a </div>
<div>multi-<span>count indictment, a district court ‘possesses the inh<span></span>erent </span>
</div>
<div>discretionary power’ to resentence a defendant on the rem<span></span>aining </div>
<div>counts <span>de novo</span> unless we impose specific limits on the court<span>’</span><span>s </span>
</div>
<div>authority to resentence<span>.”</span>) (citation omitted)<span>; </span><span>United States v. Shue</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>825 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[D]espite<span> </span>the previous panel’s </div>
<div>failure to vacate explicitly the sentencing package and reman<span></span>d for </div>
<div>resentencing, we hold that the district court had the autho<span></span>rity to </div>
<div>reevaluate the sentencing package in light of the changed </div>
<div>circumstances and resentence the defendant . . . <span>.”).</span> </div>
<div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>In arguing to the contrary, Hernandez-Escajeda relies on other </span>
</div>
<div>cases<span>, <span>like <span>Hernandez-Escajeda I</span><span>, </span>in which Colorado appellate </span></span>
</div>
<div>courts (1) concluded that merger was required on certain </div>
<div>convictions and (2) remanded for correction of the mit<span></span>timus without </div>
<div>mentioning the possibility of resentencing. For two reasons, <span></span>we </div>
<div>think his reliance on those cases is misplaced. </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>14 </div>
<div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>First, the question whether resentencing on the remaining </span>
</div>
<div>convictions could occur on remand was neither asked nor answe<span></span>red </div>
<div>in those cases. Hence, those cases do not inform our resolution <span></span>of </div>
<div>the issue here. </div>
<div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>Second, in those cases, the merger did not affect the </span>
</div>
<div>defendant’s <span>total aggregate sentence<span>. <span> </span></span>See, e.g.<span>, </span>Whiteaker v. Peo<span></span>ple<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>2024 CO 25, ¶¶ <span>4,</span> <span>30</span> (reversing and remanding for the <span></span>district </div>
<div>court to amend the mittimus to reflect the merger of<span></span> two </div>
<div>convictions, without mentioning resentencing, where the three-year </div>
<div>probationary sentences on each count were imposed <span>concurrent<span></span>ly<span>); </span></span>
</div>
<div>Friend v. People<span>, 2018 CO 90, ¶¶ 7-8, <span>49</span> (reversing and remanding </span>
</div>
<div>for the district court to amend the mittimus to reflect<span></span> the merger of </div>
<div>convictions, without mentioning resentencing, where the merger did </div>
<div>not affect the <span>defendant’s operative sentence of life in prison </span>
</div>
<div>without the possibility of parole). </div>
<div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>In this case, however, the district court imposed two </span>
</div>
<div>consecutive<span> <span>DOC </span>sentences of twenty-two years each, resulting <span></span>in </span>
</div>
<div>an aggregate sentence of forty-four years. The result in </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span> affected Hernandez-Escajeda<span>’s aggregate </span></span>
</div>
<div>sentence because he now has only one conviction with a </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>15 </div>
<div>twenty-two-year sentence. We conclude that the district court has </div>
<div>the discretion to resentence Hernandez-Escajeda on the remaining </div>
<div>conviction if it deems resentencing appropriate. </div>
<div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>On the last point, we disagree with the prosecution that the </span>
</div>
<div>district court on remand i<span>s </span><span>required</span> to resentence </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda.<span> <span>The prosecution relies <span>on</span> <span>People v. La<span></span>callo<span>, </span></span></span></span>
</div>
<div>2014 COA 78, <span>overruled on other grounds by McCoy v. People</span>, 2<span></span>019 </div>
<div>CO 44, but there, the division vacated <span>the defendant’s “entire </span>
</div>
<div>sentence” on numerous counts and remanded for resentencing. <span></span> <span>Id.</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>at ¶¶ <span>39</span>-43. <span>So the defendant’s convictions remained</span>, but </div>
<div>resentencing was required on those convictions. Here<span>, i</span>n contrast, </div>
<div>the division i<span>n </span><span>Hernandez-Escajeda I</span> vacated only one of </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda<span>’s <span>convictions and sentences<span>. </span>On his </span></span>
</div>
<div>conviction for first degree burglary, he still has <span>a </span>legal sentence. So </div>
<div>resentencing on that count is not required. Instead, the district </div>
<div>court <span>ha</span>s the discretion to decide whether to resentence </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda on that count. </div>
<div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>The prosecution also cites language from <span>Johnson</span> that, </span>
</div>
<div>according to the prosecution, holds that a district court is requi<span></span>red </div>
<div>to reassess the sentence and exercise its sentencing discretion </div>
</div></div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTP7FTEVMAI&amp;Expires=1728759774&amp;Signature=nQ4uyBNqdaiSeWWcTZ3sQiETugo%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFIaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQCBQlR6jI0SZstd4NWH5SckJSB%2Bnp5iN60gQasLwp71%2FgIhAIMaKKuoDNEgttGXZsfeHRyzOPy%2FQ%2F%2FFNY%2Fz8bZKjdRjKrsFCKr%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEQABoMOTI2MDQxMjAzOTM1IgzhUMcZanf%2BrrJqkccqjwW3Gz2dJ5nrF%2Ff3JedxvF75q7HX7zIQcuNxdl0F%2B9ZAaW%2BFVPw%2BO%2FOI7hhbA6h86ewQM6wMzY7PaUyXrtJpza2IwPwvWBukexYNceskiy4EerSl3tayxmepTjCfQaG7ATQRyh7Qbw40QsqOE2zVlnBR2c6azW8%2BphspTUFYdGVUAu%2FFQQDIAtohHSNPO652rjXI33KI4sBukGCSIDTcWNMV4O0X8r1TAfE2xNLLCIJLMl5mZP8TDXZ3pWj1zZMau0PIDHe5Xt04HS6Q41IhQllMp7SlkWyw8aC1EUxEDJ2J7oapOx1ELkZO2MRn8NVtEugMAeiCCiemLmaG2mkf86ETsJhd3WzoZzjxSno2rGqeMYmvR8NaxDQb7KAJvqc9LGA6rvhr5tvxEbbc1AJ7nxksdTZ8lRjAyjvb56I9AcMDQPHVEWzSwBWWgIDtdZtLidU8F0lRHtzcO9AKJTsymUJNWF%2Bp%2Bi1frFt5yN8S0nZj8lBnWDv2%2FpCTkEResHCRiieoVnAzsQqeVggIlgSTeG4f%2BZQZQ6CVX2HKe9ovFceDjnxAw5WrjtgtnXPRXc8%2FXgMfobcGntgT2X5ugvY897j3PV1mvhMPYEKPBoAlvMotiBSfpUqDwbBUF26lyw2xqdKBvvvfLlc9%2BBNQMeZoJUYbPVzxtP3c2EYSkyFOmyS2aJ0GJZ%2FS%2BtKZ%2Byh3yWQtWy6xkRIKlisG5buKD49FG6PpGbYOuLHbu50xEIq9HHts4GFPoRHuFVDe6y6yqMrwos7hE8HRYm1pIzarXNiSMxuuSfVQh%2Fj3WHWKTdP9kEQs2PrAGGxsUCby2D9jjWIVrcy0l8%2FVPETaTs5s5SHKUwznUVwKDwA1Pm70jGcnPli2MOXdqrgGOrABnPGIfuqN1V3SsEgm4%2BawjmpoZeCoA5Io%2Fdp9nSjafqvUm2WaPw4fF4Vp5m3aXF1PFQ1ND7rSaMCMOfC5qT0oDq%2Bi2Q%2FrD2RV8UWBdhECvhCbViPk%2BJ9PC6aRt8XBuOwRa1%2FTIOUSdOslLzGWvOQrKjGZ9FpO9t9LV01fFbg1JQwLpwW2aeWos8gdhxPpmQyo%2F2m1MfEvmmHxAE0%2BEehiuW724aLOaSZOwHaEWvpH6lI%3D"><div>
<div>16 </div>
<div>following a reversal of one of multiple convictions. <span>See Johnson</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>20<span>15 CO 70, ¶ </span>42<span> (recognizing that the reversal of some con<span></span>victions </span>
</div>
<div>“<span>caused th[e] sentencing scheme to unravel, thus requiring the </span>
</div>
<div>[district] <span>court to reassess Johnson’s sentence and exercise it<span></span>s </span>
</div>
<div>sentencing discretion under new and different circumstances<span>”)</span>. In </div>
<div>that discussion, however, the supreme court simply concluded that </div>
<div>the district court’s reasoning<span> for imposing a longer sentence on </span>
</div>
<div>remand did not show actual vindictiveness: </div>
<div>The [district] <span>court’s statements explaining </span>
</div>
<div>why it did not initially consider the facts </div>
<div>pertaining to the sexual assault when </div>
<div>sentencing Johnson on the possession of a </div>
<div>controlled substance conviction, and <span>why </span><span>it felt </span>
</div>
<div>it necessary<span> to consider those facts after the </span>
</div>
<div>court of appeals vacated the kidnapping and </div>
<div>sexual assault convictions evidence a non-</div>
<div>vindictive reason to modify Johnson’s sentence </div>
<div>and increase the possession of a controlled </div>
<div>substance sentence from six years to twelve </div>
<div>years. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Id.<span> (emphasis added).</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>The supreme court did not hold that </span>
</div>
<div>resentencing is required every time a conviction <span>is</span> vacated in a </div>
<div>multi-count case.<span> </span><span>Indeed, adopting the prosecution’s position </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> In addition, recall that resentencing was necessary in <span>Johnson</span> </div>
<div>because the first division of this court had vacated the original </div>
<div>judgment entirely. </div>
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<div><div>
<div>17 </div>
<div>would clash with a dominant theme of the <span>Johnson</span> decision <span>—</span> the </div>
<div>district court has wide discretion in sentencing matters.<span> </span><span>See</span> 2015 </div>
<div>CO 70, ¶¶ 16, 21-22, 26, 37. </div>
<div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>Given all this, we conclude that nothing in </span>
</div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda I<span> precluded the district court from </span>
</div>
<div>resentencing Hernandez-Escajeda on his first degree burglary </div>
<div>conviction and associated crime of violence conviction. On reman<span></span>d </div>
<div>from this appeal, the district court has the discretion to resentence </div>
<div>Hernandez-Escajeda if it so chooses.<span> </span>The court also has the </div>
<div>discretion to decide whether to hold a resentencing hearing. </div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Conclusion </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further </span>
</div>
<div>proceedings consistent with this opinion. </div>
<div>JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE GOMEZ concur. </div>
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