Peo v. Avila ( 2024 )

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<div>22CA0875 Peo v Avila 10-03-2024 <span> </span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 22CA0875 </div>
<div>Adams County District Court No. 18CR3756 </div>
<div>Honorable Patrick H. Pugh, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>The People of the State of Colorado, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellee, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Deshawn Anthoney Avila, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>JUDGMENT AFFIRMED<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division II </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE <span>FOX</span> </div>
<div>Johnson<span> and Schock, JJ., concur </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) </div>
<div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant </div>
<div>Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Tanja Heggins, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-</div>
<div>Appellant </div>
<div> </div>
</div></div>
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<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Defendant, Deshawn Anthoney Avila, appeals the judgment of </span>
</div>
<div>conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of attempted </div>
<div>second degree murder, attempted sexual assault, and first degre<span></span>e </div>
<div>assault.<span> <span>We affirm</span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>The victim, A.V., testified that Avila was her ex-<span>husband’s first </span></span>
</div>
<div>cousin, and before the assault, he was her close friend. On the </div>
<div>evening in question, the victim invited Avila to go to a nightclub </div>
<div>with some friends. Avila and the victim returned to her apartment </div>
<div>around 2 a.m., and she offered that Avila could sleep in her <span></span>bed and </div>
<div>that she would sleep in her son’s bedroom. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>The victim testified that she awoke to Avila attacking her on </span>
</div>
<div>her son’s bedroom floor. She testified that she had <span></span>a <span>head wound </span>
</div>
<div>that was bleeding profusely, that one of her eyes was swollen sh<span></span>ut<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>and that Avila strangled her until <span>“everything was black.” </span> A frying </div>
<div>pan <span>was later determined to be the weapon used to hit<span></span> the victim’s </span>
</div>
<div>head. </div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>The victim also testified that her pants were unbuttoned and </span>
</div>
<div>pulled down partially, although she had no memory of a sexual </div>
<div>assault occurring. The victim eventually fought Avila off,<span></span> and he </div>
</div></div>
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<div>2 </div>
<div>fled the scene. She called 911, and an ambulance transported her </div>
<div>to the emergency room. </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>The prosecution charged Avila with attempted first degre<span></span>e </span>
</div>
<div>murder, three counts of sexual assault, two counts of first degree </div>
<div>assault, and two crime of violence sentence enhancers. The </div>
<div>prosecution later amended the sexual assault counts to attempted </div>
<div>sexual assault. </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>At trial, Avila did not dispute that the victim was brutally </span>
</div>
<div>attacked but argued that he was not the perpetrator. To s<span></span>upport </div>
<div>the victim’s testimony that Avila committed the assault, the </div>
<div>prosecution presented evidence that (1) <span>Avila’s DNA was </span>found on </div>
<div>the handle of the frying pan; (2) Avila left his phone <span>at the victim’s </span>
</div>
<div>apartment when he fled; (3) there were no signs of forced entry in </div>
<div>the victim’s apartment<span>; and (4) Avila had scratches and bruises <span></span>on </span>
</div>
<div>his body consistent with defensive wounds. </div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>A jury found Avila guilty of the lesser included offense of </span>
</div>
<div>attempted second degree murder, attempted sexual assault, and </div>
<div>first degree assault. The court sentenced Avila to twenty-five years </div>
<div>to life in the Department <span>of Corrections’ custody</span>. It imposed a </div>
<div>determinate sentence of twenty-five years on the attempted mur<span></span>der </div>
</div></div>
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<div>3 </div>
<div>count, ten- and twelve-year terms on the assault counts, and </div>
<div>indeterminate sentences of ten years to life on the sexual a<span></span>ssault </div>
<div>counts, all to run concurrently. </div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Trial Errors </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 8<span> <span>On appeal, Avila challenges two of the trial court’s evidentiary </span></span>
</div>
<div>rulings that he claims individually or cumulatively require <span></span>reversal. </div>
<div>He first asserts that the trial court erroneously excluded evi<span></span>dence <span>of</span> </div>
<div>another ma<span>le</span><span>’s DNA on the victim’s body under the rape shield </span>
</div>
<div>statute. He then asserts that the court admitted photograph<span>s </span>of the </div>
<div>victim’s injuries that were unnecessarily cumulative <span>and prejudicial </span>
</div>
<div>under CRE 403. </div>
<div>A.<span> <span>Standard of Review </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Avila asserts that his challenges are of constitutional </span>
</div>
<div>dimension.<span> <span>“Only those errors ‘that specifically and directly offend </span></span>
</div>
<div>a defendant’s constitutional rights are “constitutional” in nat<span></span>ure.’” </div>
<div>People v. Flockhart<span>, 2013 CO 42, ¶ 20 (quoting </span>Wend v. People<span>, 235 </span>
</div>
<div>P.3d 1089, 1097 (Colo. 2010)). </div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>Trial courts retain broad discretion in determining the </span>
</div>
<div>admissibility of evidence and the extent and type of cross-</div>
<div>examination they will allow. <span>People v. Lopez</span>, 2016 COA 179, <span></span>¶ 43. </div>
</div></div>
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<div>4 </div>
<div>But “[a]n erroneous evidentiary ruling may rise to the level of </div>
<div>constitutional error if it deprived the defendant of any<span></span> meaningful </div>
<div>opportunity to present a complete defense.” <span>People v. Conyac<span>, <span></span>2014 </span></span>
</div>
<div>COA 8M, ¶ 93. Possible confrontation clause violations are </div>
<div>reviewed de novo, <span>People v. Houser</span>, 2013 COA 11, ¶ 57, and </div>
<div>warrant reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, </div>
<div>People v.<span> </span><span>Johnson</span><span>, 2021 CO 35, ¶ 17.<span> </span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>The first claimed error did not deprive Avila of his only means </span>
</div>
<div>of testing prosecution evidence<span>. </span><span>See</span> <span>Conyac</span>, ¶¶ 93-<span>94<span>. I</span></span>ndeed, </div>
<div>Avila was afforded the opportunity to highlight the absence of his </div>
<div>own DNA on the victim’s body, <span>impeach the </span>victim’s credibility,<span></span> </div>
<div>cross-examine prosecution witnesses, present witnesses in his </div>
<div>defense, and make an opening statement and closing argument. <span></span> </div>
<div>See People In Interest of D.F.A.E.<span>, 2020 COA 89M, ¶ 58<span>; </span></span>see also </div>
<div>Conyac<span>, ¶ 109 (“Colorado courts have repeatedly con<span></span>cluded that <span>the </span></span>
</div>
<div>rape shield statute does not violate a defendant’s right t<span></span>o </div>
<div>confrontation or cross-<span>examination.”)</span><span>. </span>Neither did the evidentiary </div>
<div>claim invoking CRE 403 specifically and directly offend a </div>
<div>constitutional right. <span>See Flockhart</span>, ¶ 20. Thus, w<span>e </span>review these </div>
<div>issues like any other evidentiary claim of error. </div>
</div></div>
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<div>5 </div>
<div>¶ 12<span> <span>We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of </span></span>
</div>
<div>discretion. <span>Rojas v. People</span>, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 16; <span>see also People v. </span>
</div>
<div>Hood<span>, 2024 COA 27, ¶ 6 <span>(“We review a trial court’s . . .<span></span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>determination of evidence’s admissibility under the rape shield </div>
<div>statute[] for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted); <span>Johnson</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>¶ <span>16</span> <span>(“[W]e review a trial court’s determination of wh<span></span>ether a party </span>
</div>
<div>opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence f<span></span>or an abuse of </div>
<div>discretion.”). <span>A court abuses its discretion when its decision is </span>
</div>
<div>manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or wher<span></span>e it applies an </div>
<div>incorrect legal standard. <span>People v. Rodriguez</span>, 2022 COA 98, <span></span>¶ <span>12<span>. </span></span> </div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>We review preserved evidentiary errors under the harmless </span>
</div>
<div>error standard of reversal. <span>See Hagos v. People</span>, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12. </div>
<div>B.<span> <span>Rape Shield Statute </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>Avila contends that the trial court violated his right to present </span>
</div>
<div>a complete defense by prohibiting him from cross-examining a DNA </div>
<div>expert about the presence of another ma<span>le</span><span>’s DNA on the victim’s </span>
</div>
<div>external genitalia and breasts under the rape shield statute. He </div>
<div>further contends that even if the evidence was inadmissibl<span></span>e under </div>
<div>that statute, the prosecution opened the door to its admissi<span></span>on. </div>
</div></div>
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<div>6 </div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Additional Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>Anticipating <span>the prosecution’s DNA expert witness,</span> defense </span>
</div>
<div>counsel informed the court that an unknown male DNA profile, </div>
<div>from which Avila was excluded, was developed from swab<span></span>s of the </div>
<div>victim’s breasts and external genitalia. <span>The DNA evidence was not </span>
</div>
<div>drawn from a specific biological fluid such as semen or sali<span></span>va; the </div>
<div>prosecutor explained it was “likely touch DNA coming from s<span></span>kin </div>
<div>cells.<span>”</span><span> <span>Defense counsel wanted to use the information to suggest </span></span>
</div>
<div>that someone else committed the sexual assault. </div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>In its ruling, the district court concluded that the DNA was not </span>
</div>
<div>evidence of a specific instance of sexual conduct under the rape </div>
<div>shield statute because there was no proof as to how the <span></span>DNA got </div>
<div>there, how long it had been there, or who it came from.<span></span> But the </div>
<div>court, somewhat perplexingly, further concluded that the evidence </div>
<div>fell within the purpose of the rape shield statute and t<span></span>hat no </div>
<div>exception applied to allow its admission. </div>
<div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>Regarding opening the door, the court ruled that there was n<span></span>o </span>
</div>
<div>viable evidence of an alternate suspect, so the prosecution <span></span>did not </div>
<div>open the door to the <span>DNA’s admission. </span>Importantly, the court </div>
<div>limited its evidentiary ruling to the unknown DNA profile; <span></span>Avila was </div>
</div></div>
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<div>7 </div>
<div>allowed to, and did, introduce testimony that his ow<span></span>n DNA was not </div>
<div>found on the victim’s body. <span> </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>2.<span> <span>Applicable Law and Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>Under the rape shield statute<span>, </span>evidence of specific instances of </span>
</div>
<div>a victim’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct<span> is presumptively </span>
</div>
<div>irrelevant. § 18-3-407(1), C.R.S. 2024. <span>We interpret “sexual </span>
</div>
<div>conduct,” as used in the statute, broadly. <span>People v. Williamson<span>, 249 </span></span>
</div>
<div>P.3d 801, 803 (Colo. 2011). But evidence does not fall <span></span>within the </div>
<div>rape shield statute’s purview “simply because it might <span></span>indirectly </div>
<div>cause the finder of fact to make an inference concerning t<span></span>he victim’s </div>
<div>prior sexual conduct.” <span>People v. Cobb<span>, 962 P.2d 944, 951 (Colo. </span></span>
</div>
<div>1998). </div>
<div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>The presumption of irrelevance does not apply to <span>“</span>evidence of </span>
</div>
<div>specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin <span></span>of </div>
<div>semen, pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual </div>
<div>intercourse<span>”</span><span> offered to show that <span>“</span>the act or acts charged <span></span>were or </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div>8 </div>
<div>were not committed by the defendant<span>.”</span><span> </span>§ 18-3-407(1).</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>Evidence </span>
</div>
<div>offered under an exception to the rape shield statute must still </div>
<div>comply with the standard evidentiary rules. <span>Hood</span><span>, ¶</span> 18. <span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>In <span>Hood</span>, ¶¶ 13, 15, a division of this court recently held that </span>
</div>
<div>“the mere presence of someone else’s DNA on a person’s ext<span></span>ernal </div>
<div>genitalia, standing alone,” does not amount to evidence of <span></span>a specific </div>
<div>instance of prior or subsequent sexual conduct within <span></span>the meaning </div>
<div>of the rape shield statute. In that case, the DNA evidence w<span></span>as not </div>
<div>offered to prove an alternate suspect theory or that the <span></span>victim </div>
<div>engaged in sexual conduct. <span>Id.</span> at ¶ 13. Instead, it was offered to </div>
<div>show that DNA evidence remained <span>on the victim’s</span> body after she </div>
<div>showered, undercutting <span>the prosecution’s theory that the </span>
</div>
<div>defendant’s DNA must have been washed away. <span>Id.</span><span> at ¶ 14. The </span>
</div>
<div>division in <span>Hood</span> rejected a broad holding that only DNA d<span></span>rawn from </div>
<div>sexual biological fluids can implicate the rape shield statute, <span></span>leaving </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>Th</span>is statutory subsection used to appear at section <span></span>18-3-</div>
<div>407(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023. In 2024, the General Assembly passed <span></span>H.B. </div>
<div>24<span>-1072, <span>“</span>Protection of Victims of Sexual Offenses,<span>”</span> wherein the </span>
</div>
<div>subsection was moved to section 18-3-407(1), C.R.S. 2024. <span>See</span> Ch. </div>
<div>123, sec. 2, § <span>18</span>-3-407, 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 408. Because H.B. </div>
<div>24<span>-1072 did not substantive<span>ly</span> change the portions of the statute </span>
</div>
<div>relevant here, we elect to cite the current version. </div>
</div>
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<div>9 </div>
<div>room for cases where unspecified DNA evidence could im<span></span>plicate the </div>
<div>rape shield statute on different facts. <span>See id.</span> at ¶ 15.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 21<span> <span>“[A] trial court may exclude evidence of an alternate suspect </span></span>
</div>
<div>that ‘has only the most minimal probative value, and which </div>
<div>requires a jury to engage in undue speculation as to the pr<span></span>obative </div>
<div>value of that evidence.’” <span>People v. Cook<span>, 2014 COA 33, ¶ 39 </span></span>
</div>
<div>(quoting <span>People v. Salazar</span>, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 17). </div>
<div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>But even assuming the DNA evidence fell under one of the </span>
</div>
<div>exceptions of the rape shield statute, or that the statute was </div>
<div>completely inapplicable, the evidence was nonetheless inadmissi<span></span>ble </div>
<div>because it was irrelevant<span>, </span>CRE 401, and prejudicial, CRE 403<span>. </span><span>See </span>
</div>
<div>People v. Aarness<span>, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006) (we may <span></span>affirm </span>
</div>
<div>on any ground supported by the record)<span>; </span><span>Hood</span><span>, </span>¶ 18 (DNA evidence </div>
<div>must still be admissible under standard evidentiary rules).<span> </span>Thus, </div>
<div>we affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, albeit on <span></span>d<span>ifferent </span>
</div>
<div>grounds. </div>
<div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>First, the DNA evidence had minimal probative value. </span>
</div>
<div>Testimony established that touch DNA is developed from skin <span></span>cells </div>
<div>that people shed, and it can often be found in places where people </div>
<div>spend a lot of time, such as in their own home. Touch DNA can <span></span>be </div>
</div></div>
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<div>10 </div>
<div>transferred from object to object and from person to person, <span></span>making </div>
<div>it difficult to determine its origin<span>. </span>The prosecutor represented to t<span></span>he </div>
<div>court, via offer of proof, that the DNA expert would testify t<span></span>hat </div>
<div>“t<span>ouch DNA of the sort identified in her report could . . . be around </span>
</div>
<div>indefinitely<span>”</span><span> depending <span>on</span> numerous factors.<span> </span>Defense counsel </span>
</div>
<div>admitted that there was no way to prove how long the DN<span></span>A had </div>
<div>been present<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 24<span> </span><span>Given the innumerable ways that the DNA could have ended </span>
</div>
<div>up on the victim’s body<span> </span><span>—</span><span> whether from her clothes<span>, </span>hands, or </span>
</div>
<div>otherwise <span>—</span> <span>the presence of male DNA on the victim’s external </span>
</div>
<div>genitalia and breasts had minimal probative value<span>, </span>especially where </div>
<div>evidence showed that the victim lived with her son and slept <span></span>in his </div>
<div>bed before the attack<span>. </span><span>See People v. Young</span>, 2014 COA 169, ¶ 73 </div>
<div>(recognizing the low probative value of touch DNA)<span>; </span><span>see also People </span>
</div>
<div>v. Harris<span>, 43 P.3d 221, 226 (Colo. 2002) (rejecting ad<span></span>missibility of a </span>
</div>
<div>prior sexual encounter offered to explain that someone <span></span>else caused </div>
<div>the victim’s vaginal abrasion)<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>This evidence was not probative in the same manner as </span>
</div>
<div>analyzed in <span>Hood</span>. That case involved a different theory of </div>
<div>relevance; rather than being offered to prove that an unkn<span></span>own, </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfc" data-page-no="c">
<div><div>
<div>11 </div>
<div>alternate suspect committed the assault, the DNA was offered to </div>
<div>rebut the prosecution’s theory that the defendant’s DNA was n<span></span>ot </div>
<div>found on that victim because she showered after the assault.<span></span> <span>Hood</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 14. <span>Another person’s DNA on the victim’s body, which surviv<span></span>ed </span>
</div>
<div>showering, directly rebutted that theory. <span>Id.</span><span> </span>Here, the evidence </div>
<div>was offered to prove sexual conduct, and because touch D<span></span>NA is not </div>
<div>terribly probative of a sexual act, the evidence here was far less </div>
<div>useful than in <span>Hood</span><span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>The most probative aspect of the DNA <span>expert’s report was that<span></span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>none of <span>Avila’s DNA</span> <span>was found on the victim’s external genitalia and </span>
</div>
<div>breasts. This evidence most directly rebutted the prose<span></span>cution’s </div>
<div>theory that Avila sexually assaulted the victim, and Avila had the </div>
<div>opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine the expert on that f<span></span>act. </div>
<div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>Second, the prejudice that could have resulted from the touch </span>
</div>
<div>DNA’s<span> admission was substantial.<span> </span></span><span>“</span><span>The purpose of Colorado</span><span>’</span><span>s rape </span>
</div>
<div>shield statute is <span>‘</span>to protect sexual assault victims from humiliating<span></span> </div>
<div>public fishing expeditions into their past sexual conduct.<span>’<span>” </span></span><span> </span><span>I<span></span>d.<span> <span>at</span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 12 (quoting <span>Cook</span>, ¶ 36); <span>see also People v. Melillo</span>, 25 P.3<span></span>d 769, </div>
<div>777 (Colo. 2001) <span>(“[I]n weighing the relevance of such evidence </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfd" data-page-no="d">
<div><div>
<div>12 </div>
<div>against its potentially prejudicial effect, a trial court may consider </div>
<div>the policy concerns underlying the rape shield statute.”). <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>In <span>Hood</span>, ¶ 22, the division reasoned that the DNA evidence </span>
</div>
<div>was not highly prejudicial because there were nonsexual </div>
<div>explanations for how the DNA could have been transferred t<span></span>o the </div>
<div>victim. Here, however, the evidence was offered to prove the sexual </div>
<div>inference. Thus, it was designed to probe the victim’s sexual </div>
<div>history, a purpose that our case law largely discourages precisely </div>
<div>because of its irrelevance, regardless of the rote applicability of the </div>
<div>rape shield statute. <span>See Williamson</span>, 249 P.3d at 802. </div>
<div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>For these reasons, the trial court correctly excluded the </span>
</div>
<div>evidence of another <span>male’s</span> <span>DNA on the victim’s external genitalia </span>
</div>
<div>and breasts. We perceive no violation of the victim’s substant<span></span>ial </div>
<div>rights on these facts. <span>See Harris</span>, 43 P.3d at 227 (rejecting <span></span>Fifth and </div>
<div>Sixth Amendment challenges in the rape shield context when <span></span>the </div>
<div>proffered evidence was irrelevant because those rights “requi<span></span>re only </div>
<div>that the accused be permitted to introduce all relevant<span></span> and </div>
<div>admissible evidence”); <span>People v. Villa<span>, 240 P.3d 343, 355 (Colo. <span></span>App. </span></span>
</div>
<div>2009) (same). </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pfe" data-page-no="e">
<div><div>
<div>13 </div>
<div>3.<span> <span>Opening the Door </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>Avila argues that even if the evidence was inadmissible, the </span>
</div>
<div>prosecution opened the door to its admission in two ways.<span> </span>First, </div>
<div>the prosecution opened the door by eliciting the victim’s testim<span></span>ony </div>
<div>that nobody else was in her home on the night in question (to t<span></span>he </div>
<div>best of her knowledge). Second, the prosecution opened the doo<span></span>r by </div>
<div>eliciting testimony that other male DNA was found on the f<span></span>rying pan </div>
<div>handle. </div>
<div>¶ 31<span> <span>“[A]lthough the Rape Shield Statute bars evidence of a rape </span></span>
</div>
<div>victim’s . . . past sexual conduct, the defense may still int<span></span>roduce </div>
<div>such evidence if the prosecution makes the evidence relevant <span></span>by </div>
<div>‘opening the door’ to the evidence.” <span>People v. Murphy<span>, 919 P.2d 191,<span></span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>195 (Colo. 1996). The “opening the door” concept represent<span></span>s an </div>
<div>effort by courts to prevent one party from “gaining and maintainin<span></span>g </div>
<div>an unfair advantage” at trial through “selective presentation of f<span></span>acts </div>
<div>that, without being elaborated or placed in context, create an </div>
<div>incorrect or misleading impression.” <span>Id.</span><span> <span>But application of the </span></span>
</div>
<div>opening the door concept is nevertheless subject to conside<span></span>rations </div>
<div>of relevance, CRE 401, and prejudice<span>, </span>CRE 403. <span>See also</span> <span>Ha<span></span>rris<span>, 43 </span></span>
</div>
<div>P.3d at 227; <span>Melillo</span>, 25 P.3d at 775. </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pff" data-page-no="f">
<div><div>
<div>14 </div>
<div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>Neither piece of testimony opened the door to evidence of </span>
</div>
<div>another male<span>’s</span> <span>DNA on the victim’s external genitalia</span> and breasts<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>The first statement, that nobody else was in the victim’s home to </div>
<div>the best of her knowledge, did not create an incomplete or </div>
<div>misleading impression requiring admission of the DNA evidence. </div>
<div>The defense’s theory seems to be that the victim was not <span></span>allowed to </div>
<div>testify to the absence of others in her home without opening t<span></span>he </div>
<div>door to the fact that another man’s DNA was found on her bec<span></span>ause<span> </span>
</div>
<div>the DNA was probative of an alternate suspect in the home at t<span></span>he </div>
<div>time of the assault. The foregoing analysis explains why <span></span>that theory </div>
<div>fails. </div>
<div>¶ 33<span> </span><span>Similarly, the presence of another male<span>’s</span> DNA profile on the </span>
</div>
<div>weapon did not leave an incorrect or misleading impressi<span></span>on </div>
<div>requiring admission of the DNA on the victim’s body. There wa<span></span>s no </div>
<div>evidence that the male DNA present on the frying pan matched t<span></span>he </div>
<div>DNA on the victim’s body. Nor <span>was any concrete evidence present<span></span>ed </span>
</div>
<div>that support<span>ed</span> an alternate suspect theory.<span> </span>To the contrary, the </div>
<div>evidence showed that touch DNA can come from innumerable </div>
<div>sources and that the victim’s son<span> </span><span>—</span><span> a male depositing touch DNA </span><span>—</span><span> </span>
</div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf10" data-page-no="10">
<div><div>
<div>15 </div>
<div>lived in the home. For these reasons, the court acted within<span></span> its </div>
<div>discretion in rejecting the defense’s opening the door theory. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>C.<span> <span>Injury Photographs </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>Avila next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in </span>
</div>
<div>admitting numerous <span>photographs of the victim’s injuries that<span></span> were </span>
</div>
<div>needlessly cumulative. We disagree. </div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Additional Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>At the emergency room, the treating physician concluded that </span>
</div>
<div>the victim sustained a serious bodily injury. Based on the <span>victim’s </span>
</div>
<div>representations about the assault, the treating physician refe<span></span>rred </div>
<div>her to a forensic nurse examiner for a sexual assault <span></span>examination. </div>
<div>A forensic nurse later testified about the <span>victim’s</span> injuries. </div>
<div>¶ 36<span> </span><span>During a bench conference, the prosecutor expressed her </span>
</div>
<div>intention to introduce seventy-nine <span>photographs of the victim’s </span>
</div>
<div>injuries. Defense counsel objected under CRE 403, arg<span></span>uing that </div>
<div>the photographs were cumulative and prejudicial<span>. </span>The court invited </div>
<div>defense counsel to review each exhibit and object to the ones that<span></span> </div>
<div>were cumulative. </div>
<div>¶ 37<span> </span><span>Defense counsel did not object to every exhibit the prosecution </span>
</div>
<div>offered. Instead, he raised groups of exhibits containin<span></span>g what he </div>
</div></div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf11" data-page-no="11">
<div>
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<div>16 </div>
<div>believed were duplicates, arguing that approximately forty of the </div>
<div>seventy-nine total exhibits were inadmissible<span>. </span>Defense counsel </div>
<div>surveyed the exhibits injury by injury <span>—</span> generally stipulating t<span></span>o the </div>
<div>prosecution’s admission of one photograph per injury. <span></span> <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 38<span> </span><span>The court then surveyed each group that defense counsel </span>
</div>
<div>challenged, and <span>it</span> excluded some cumulative photographs. <span></span> It </div>
<div>excluded nine of the forty objected-<span>to</span> exhibits, admitting a total of </div>
<div>seventy exhibits of the seventy-nine offered. The below chart </div>
<div>documents the groups defense counsel challenged<span>, and the court’s </span>
</div>
<div>admission or exclusion of exhibits within those cate<span></span>gories. </div>
</div>
<div><div>Injury </div></div>
<div><div>Exhibit #’s<span> </span>
</div></div>
<div><div>Total </div></div>
<div><div>Admitted </div></div>
<div><div>Excluded </div></div>
<div>
<div>Forehead cut </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>14<span>-<span>18<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>5 </div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Black eye, right </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div>
<div>19<span>-23, 25-</span>
</div>
<div>26<span>, 32, 40-</span>
</div>
<div>41<span> </span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>10<span> </span>
</div></div>
<div><div>8 </div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Hairline cut </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>27<span>-<span>29<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>1 </div></div>
<div><div>Neck, front </div></div>
<div><div>34<span>-<span>35<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
</div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf12" data-page-no="12">
<div>
<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMa/8I9/MMa8I9rvezVKTbR/DJF5tbGjWtix8glGfVtlP9PptcOlI%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPY5C7ELUL&amp;Expires=1728788589&amp;Signature=UHXl1nGgij6s1dLF2uzDppO%2FzNo%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFoaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIGh9E685Tg7VaADwvr%2B0Q6XkRo28A9uRI%2FjGtUYc1fvBAiEAgb5gyoHl64iFIRf4nstAEN4nCRW%2FYow5rhIkD1VDFL0quwUIs%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDA%2BdH32XaX1p83q%2FmyqPBa1fDY9DdM%2BHiOkInYD3bgp5O8WHVfr1RRuYwbXWQw6m3kSUfPZFVLBk0ljAGrxe3BCGnkV1JEn%2BfvzAbxjC%2B%2FBnKGZpx0V9s%2BpOXlCQHP9kMjek1wvXcWUptdfS6wt%2FR%2BjmhVf2pAJSfiiY9gbWdlpVUvgC7JRCxvtWz7QW1mKut9PUZKlCBqAOgFjTr7MxiKqLFN1UAKkm%2Bpe5S0ou2X2UvJH0cslYXulVfnavd3%2F2IkJP9aGUPpt91sdWM9ejRb137s9bbOC9qxftIj1cYKlodGdjD8bb%2BnbCH8RhtLEfrBLFRIFnlWoQpbb%2BS374EvHDPp2Wj8BEYvXa8loWad9n%2FHpVqOY4MG5LBuf2MNwASo0y1wTyEoNorLvuGZ3CArRe9KKZCe%2Be3aKqPHOYSegwJDan0GxGgpln0B19N8YF5xxPBqjQG4bhZtHWvHTkswzYaU0IYzuBXDj8R%2BUYLCpwGACJnAeq80rENJ%2B%2B2jUY7B5Fs7wpGgE2ss7JHx8orStH5%2FGntXxo6YksEoJNQybd5AOB7sJXwXXaAXCmMjZmNIBS9T7lVzDO6W99WeckyXenxkmhD3AEbQGpo%2FjSSVMK8RibHuLRadXb9jL66uac8Ga3vegnJxlH1%2Bo9B%2BK7qtpvXLa7khFHVXq8E66fq32DmEJ9duGfZoV2EuQtD1fMVGWM8lldxcG9m6c7ULdnFHwSC5uH03qDrA8yHcA5lI9gxyUquiP%2FiqtBr%2FMJUvJAMZSK0MCbf6Crhg5mXBx0PinBWQRfqEOe9Yxlv3MN8g660GYj9quTheWVxbrxIyfwszr27Q5wBKWoWsj%2Bxmh8yGEjd0GWuVkuDTCNAHctzaMwv3oj633W1%2FbJDyWWBEAw8cWsuAY6sQGRQWZiAG6MEDhjdVR4KTH8PiItj824B3XtVhtmzxA2jAg9%2FrSO6ob%2B0DgnJDh%2FJnsZrcILFaTB9cJWT2EWtTnP9CDy7EJ7avwaifPEXX%2BDIt%2FiV3jSbcqN7n9VlJENAYECVpvap3ynPS0U0D%2FULr60QOM7jojyqF%2F7dMVKw8f4T30oakzEn8YHItt5DBzE6yjio3QEaCg9PE5RBKs2xrA%2Bv7x%2BzTRsblh2MK8lCOWzSYM%3D"><div><div>17 </div></div>
<div><div> </div></div>
<div>
<div>Neck, side </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>36<span>-<span>38<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Shoulder bruises </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>42<span>-<span>46<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>5 </div></div>
<div><div>4 </div></div>
<div><div>1 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Left arm </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>47<span>-<span>49<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Wrist bruises, left </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>50<span>-<span>53<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>4 </div></div>
<div><div>4 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Hand bruises, left </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>56<span>-<span>57<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Back abrasions </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>58<span>-<span>60<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Bicep bruise, right </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>63<span>-<span>65<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Forearm bruise, right </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>67<span>-<span>72<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>6 </div></div>
<div><div>5 </div></div>
<div><div>1 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Wrist bruise, right </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>75<span>-<span>77<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>3 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
</div>
<div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div>
</div>
<div id="pf13" data-page-no="13">
<div>
<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMw/sYb/MMwsYbZZR/rZ4JlMIbGfoZsGG4YChBaqhneymZCIkpqvE%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPY5C7ELUL&amp;Expires=1728788589&amp;Signature=oeMicVMCYQiCYJiOV%2BXvqV3b%2FfQ%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFoaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIGh9E685Tg7VaADwvr%2B0Q6XkRo28A9uRI%2FjGtUYc1fvBAiEAgb5gyoHl64iFIRf4nstAEN4nCRW%2FYow5rhIkD1VDFL0quwUIs%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDA%2BdH32XaX1p83q%2FmyqPBa1fDY9DdM%2BHiOkInYD3bgp5O8WHVfr1RRuYwbXWQw6m3kSUfPZFVLBk0ljAGrxe3BCGnkV1JEn%2BfvzAbxjC%2B%2FBnKGZpx0V9s%2BpOXlCQHP9kMjek1wvXcWUptdfS6wt%2FR%2BjmhVf2pAJSfiiY9gbWdlpVUvgC7JRCxvtWz7QW1mKut9PUZKlCBqAOgFjTr7MxiKqLFN1UAKkm%2Bpe5S0ou2X2UvJH0cslYXulVfnavd3%2F2IkJP9aGUPpt91sdWM9ejRb137s9bbOC9qxftIj1cYKlodGdjD8bb%2BnbCH8RhtLEfrBLFRIFnlWoQpbb%2BS374EvHDPp2Wj8BEYvXa8loWad9n%2FHpVqOY4MG5LBuf2MNwASo0y1wTyEoNorLvuGZ3CArRe9KKZCe%2Be3aKqPHOYSegwJDan0GxGgpln0B19N8YF5xxPBqjQG4bhZtHWvHTkswzYaU0IYzuBXDj8R%2BUYLCpwGACJnAeq80rENJ%2B%2B2jUY7B5Fs7wpGgE2ss7JHx8orStH5%2FGntXxo6YksEoJNQybd5AOB7sJXwXXaAXCmMjZmNIBS9T7lVzDO6W99WeckyXenxkmhD3AEbQGpo%2FjSSVMK8RibHuLRadXb9jL66uac8Ga3vegnJxlH1%2Bo9B%2BK7qtpvXLa7khFHVXq8E66fq32DmEJ9duGfZoV2EuQtD1fMVGWM8lldxcG9m6c7ULdnFHwSC5uH03qDrA8yHcA5lI9gxyUquiP%2FiqtBr%2FMJUvJAMZSK0MCbf6Crhg5mXBx0PinBWQRfqEOe9Yxlv3MN8g660GYj9quTheWVxbrxIyfwszr27Q5wBKWoWsj%2Bxmh8yGEjd0GWuVkuDTCNAHctzaMwv3oj633W1%2FbJDyWWBEAw8cWsuAY6sQGRQWZiAG6MEDhjdVR4KTH8PiItj824B3XtVhtmzxA2jAg9%2FrSO6ob%2B0DgnJDh%2FJnsZrcILFaTB9cJWT2EWtTnP9CDy7EJ7avwaifPEXX%2BDIt%2FiV3jSbcqN7n9VlJENAYECVpvap3ynPS0U0D%2FULr60QOM7jojyqF%2F7dMVKw8f4T30oakzEn8YHItt5DBzE6yjio3QEaCg9PE5RBKs2xrA%2Bv7x%2BzTRsblh2MK8lCOWzSYM%3D"><div><div>18 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Palm, left </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>78<span>-<span>82<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>5 </div></div>
<div><div>4 </div></div>
<div><div>1 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Lower back abrasion </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>86<span>-<span>87<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>1 </div></div>
<div><div>1 </div></div>
<div>
<div>Mouth petechiae </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>95<span>-<span>96<span> </span></span></span>
</div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>2 </div></div>
<div><div>0 </div></div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<div>The prosecutor referenced some, but not all, of the admitted </div>
<div>photographs during the forensic nurse’s <span>subsequent testimony. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>2.<span> <span>Applicable Law and Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 39<span> </span><span>CRE 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its </span>
</div>
<div>probative value is substantially outweighed by, as relevant here, the </div>
<div>danger of needless presentation of cumulative evidence.<span> </span><span>“Evidence </span>
</div>
<div>that is ‘decidedly different in character and impact’ is not </div>
<div>cumulative.” <span>People v. Vanderpauye<span>, 2021 COA 121, ¶ 47 (quoting </span></span>
</div>
<div>People v. Genrich<span>, 2019 COA 132M, ¶ <span>117)</span> (Berger, J.<span></span>, specially </span>
</div>
<div>concurring)<span>, </span><span>aff’d</span><span>, 2023 CO 42. <span> </span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 40<span> <span>Photographs of a victim’s injuries are generally relevant </span></span>
</div>
<div>because they show “whether and how the offenses were committ<span></span>ed.” </div>
<div>People v. Herrera<span>, 2012 COA 13, ¶ 34. Photographs are not </span>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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</div>
<div id="pf14" data-page-no="14">
<div><div>
<div>19 </div>
<div>inadmissible merely because they visually depict testimony alrea<span></span>dy </div>
<div>given. <span>People v. Maass</span>, 981 P.2d 177, 187 (Colo. App. 19<span></span>98)<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>Otherwise relevant photographs are not rendered inadmissi<span></span>ble </div>
<div>solely because they reveal shocking details of the crime. <span>Id.</span><span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 41<span> <span>“<span>Courts are given broad discretion in performing the CRE <span></span>403 </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>balancing test, and a trial court’s balancing decision wi<span></span>ll not be </div>
<div>disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.<span>”</span><span> </span><span>People v. Garrison</span>, 2012 </div>
<div>COA 132M, ¶ 16. </div>
<div>¶ 42<span> </span><span>We perceive nothing manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, o<span></span>r </span>
</div>
<div>unfair about the trial court’s evidentiary ruling here. <span>See People v. </span>
</div>
<div>Pahlavan<span>, 83 P.3d 1138, 1140 (Colo. App. 2003) <span>(“The fact t<span></span>hat </span></span>
</div>
<div>evidence is cumulative does not, by itself, render the evidence </div>
<div>inadmissible. Instead, admission of cumulative testimony is an </div>
<div>abuse of discretion only if it is manifestly arbitrary, unreas<span></span>onable, </div>
<div>or unfair under the circumstances.”). <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 43<span> </span><span>The prosecution had the burden to prove, as relevant <span></span>here, </span>
</div>
<div>that the victim was assaulted and sustained serious bodily inju<span></span>ry. </div>
<div>Bearing that in mind, the trial court carefully reviewed the </div>
<div>challenged photographs to determine whether they depicted the </div>
<div>same image or whether they showed a different angle, a dif<span></span>ferent </div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pf15" data-page-no="15">
<div><div>
<div>20 </div>
<div>scale, or a measurement of the injury using a ruler.<span></span> It ruled that </div>
<div>the admitted photographs were decidedly different in character </div>
<div>based on those features<span>. </span><span>See Vanderpauye</span>, ¶ 47. Careful not to </div>
<div>needlessly present cumulative prejudicial evidence, the court </div>
<div>excluded exhibits that were substantially similar.<span> </span>Having done that </div>
<div>balancing, and reaching a reasonable result, we do not belie<span></span>ve the </div>
<div>trial court abused its discretion. <span>See Vigil v. People</span>, 2019 CO 105, </div>
<div>¶ <span>14</span> (<span>“</span>[R]eviewing courts have . . . been admonished from </div>
<div>considering merely whether they would have reached the same </div>
<div>conclusion and, instead, must affirm as long as the trial cou<span></span>rt’s </div>
<div>decision fell within a range of reasonable options.”<span>)<span>. <span> </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 44<span> </span><span>Further, even if some of the admitted exhibits bordered on t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>cumulative side, that was not necessarily a basis to exclu<span></span>de them </div>
<div>because they corroborated the victim’s testimony about her ass<span></span>ault </div>
<div>and the forensic nurse’s testimony about the victim’s docume<span>nted </span>
</div>
<div>injuries. <span>See Maass</span>, 981 P.2d at 187. </div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Cumulative Error </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 45<span> </span><span>Avila argues that together the alleged foregoing errors, even if </span>
</div>
<div>harmless individually, constitute cumulative error requiring<span></span> </div>
<div>reversal. “For reversal to occur based on cumulative error, <span></span>a </div>
</div></div>
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<div id="pf16" data-page-no="16">
<div><div>
<div>21 </div>
<div>reviewing court must identify multiple errors that collectively </div>
<div>prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant, even if<span></span> any single </div>
<div>error does not.” <span>Howard-Walker v. People<span>, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. <span></span>But </span></span>
</div>
<div>the claimed errors here do not merit reversal, alone or cumulat<span></span>ively, </div>
<div>because we conclude that no error occurred. <span>See People v. Da<span></span>ley<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>2021 COA 85, ¶ 141 (“The doctrine of cumulative error <span></span>requires </div>
<div>that numerous errors occurred, not merely that they were alleg<span></span>ed.”). <span> </span>
</div>
<div>IV.<span> </span><span>Disposition </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 46<span> </span><span>The judgment is affirmed. </span>
</div>
<div>JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur. </div>
</div></div>
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