Marriage of Ziebinski ( 2024 )

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<div>24CA0498 Marriage of Ziebinski 10-10-2024 </div>
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<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 24CA0498 </div>
<div>Larimer<span> County District Court No. 21DR30034 </span>
</div>
<div>Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>In re the Marriage of </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Danielle Ziebinski n/k/a Danielle Curry, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Appellee, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>and </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Marek Ziebinski, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>ORDER AFFIRMED </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division VII </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE TOW </div>
<div>Pawar and Schutz, JJ., concur </div>
<div> </div>
<div>NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) </div>
<div>Announced October 10, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>No Appearance for Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Marek Ziebinski, Pro Se </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
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<div>1<span> </span>
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<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>In this post-dissolution of marriage case, Marek Ziebinski </span>
</div>
<div>(father) appeals the district court’s order resolving the parties’ </div>
<div>dispute over <span>where the parties’ children would attend sch<span></span>ool. <span>We </span></span>
</div>
<div>affirm. </div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>In 2021, the district court dissolved the marriage between </span>
</div>
<div>father and Danielle Ziebinski, now known as Danielle Curry </div>
<div>(mother), <span>and entered a permanent order concerning <span></span>the parties’ </span>
</div>
<div>two children <span>—</span> then-two-year-old C.Z. and then-five-year-old L.Z. </div>
<div>In doing so, the court allocated joint decision-making responsibility </div>
<div>to the parties <span>concerning the children’s education. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>For the 2023-2024 school year, C.Z. attended preschool and </span>
</div>
<div>L.Z. attended a charter school in Larimer County<span>. </span>Before the 2024-</div>
<div>2025 school year <span>—</span> <span>C.Z.’s kindergarten year and L.Z.’s third gr<span></span>ade </span>
</div>
<div>year <span>—</span> a dispute arose concerning where the children <span></span>would attend </div>
<div>school. </div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>Father filed a motion requesting that the court resolve the </span>
</div>
<div>dispute. In his motion, he alleged that the parties had agree<span></span>d in </div>
<div>writing that both children would move to new schools f<span></span>or the </div>
<div>upcoming school year. He asserted that the charter school L.Z. </div>
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<div>2<span> </span>
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<div>currently attended <span>“lack[s] in academic merit.” Father also </span>
</div>
<div>explained that mother lived in Fort Collins while <span>he</span> had relocated to </div>
<div>Loveland, and he wanted the children to attend a school that was </div>
<div>roughly equidistant from the parties. Mother opposed the motion<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>denying the existence of a written agreement to change schools an<span></span>d </div>
<div>asserting that any issues with distance from school were of f<span></span>ather’s </div>
<div>own making. </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> <span>After the parties’ <span>unsuccessful attempt to mediate, <span>a </span>district </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>court magistrate held a hearing. By the time the matter was hea<span></span>rd, </div>
<div>however, both parties had changed their positions regarding the </div>
<div>children<span>’</span><span>s school. Father now wanted both children to att<span></span>end the </span>
</div>
<div>charter school L.Z. was already attending. Mother wanted the </div>
<div>children to attend her neighborhood school. </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>After the hearing, the magistrate determined that it was in the </span>
</div>
<div>children’s best interests for them to attend mother’s neighborhood </div>
<div>school<span>. <span>Father requested review by the district court, which </span></span>
</div>
<div>declined to disturb the magistrate’s order<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>Father appeals. </span>
</div>
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<div>3<span> </span>
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<div>II.<span> <span>Applicable Law and Standard of Review </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>When parents share educational decision-making </span>
</div>
<div>responsibility and they are unable to agree on the school for their </div>
<div>children, the district court may break the parental deadl<span></span>ock. <span>In re </span>
</div>
<div>Marriage of Thomas<span>,</span> <span>2021 COA 123,</span> <span>¶¶ <span>36<span>-<span>38</span></span></span><span>; </span></span>see also In re </div>
<div>Marriage of Dauwe<span>, 148 P.3d 282, 285 (Colo. App. 2006) <span></span>(noting </span>
</div>
<div>that there is “no authority that prohibits the court from re<span></span>solving a </div>
<div>dispute between joint decision makers”)<span>.<span> <span>When exercising this </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>authority, the court is governed by the best interests of <span></span>the child. </div>
<div>Thomas<span>, <span>¶</span><span>¶ <span>17, 38 n.7. </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>We will uphold a district <span>court’s </span>factual findings if the record </span>
</div>
<div>supports them. <span> Dauwe</span>, 148 P.3d at 286.<span> </span>And because the </div>
<div>ultimate determination <span>of what is in the children’s best interest<span></span> <span>is a </span></span>
</div>
<div>matter within the district court’s discretion, we will not distu<span></span>rb <span>its </span>
</div>
<div>judgment absent a showing that the court abused that disc<span></span>retion. </div>
<div>Cf. In re Marriage of Ciesluk<span>, 113 P.3d 135, 148 (Colo.<span></span> 2005). A </span>
</div>
<div>court abuses its discretion when its decision is manif<span></span>estly arbitrary, </div>
<div>unreasonable, or unfair or is based on a misapplication of the <span></span>law. </div>
<div>In re Marriage of Bochner<span>, 2023 COA 63, ¶ 12.<span> </span>We exercise every </span>
</div>
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<div>4<span> </span>
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<div>presumption in favor of upholding its decision. <span>See In re Marria<span></span>ge </span>
</div>
<div>of Hatton<span>, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). </span>
</div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>As father frames the issue, the district court erred by ordering </span>
</div>
<div>the children to <span>attend mother’s neighborhood school </span>because the </div>
<div>evidence showed that “the child” (presumably meaning L.<span></span>Z.<span>, since </span>
</div>
<div>C.Z. was going to be starting kindergarten at a new school </div>
<div>regardless) was thriving at the charter school, the charter school </div>
<div>meets accreditation standards, and there was no evidence of abus<span></span>e </div>
<div>or neglect at the charter school. Father contends that, before the </div>
<div>court was <span>allowed to change the children’s school, it was</span> required t<span></span>o </div>
<div>find that the children were being denied a competent education or </div>
<div>subjected to abuse or neglect. Essentially, father argues for the </div>
<div>imposition of something akin to an endangerment standard before a </div>
<div>child’s school can be changed. <span>We reject this contention. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>There is no Colorado statute or case law that imposes a </span>
</div>
<div>heightened standard to judicial decisions resolving parental </div>
<div>disagreements concerning where the children attend sch<span></span>ool<span>. </span>To the </div>
<div>contrary, when a district court engages in its impasse-breaking </div>
<div>authority, it must make its decision in the best interests of <span></span>the </div>
</div></div>
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<div>5<span> </span>
</div>
<div>child. <span>Thomas</span><span>, </span>¶¶ 17, 38 n.7; <span>see also </span>§ <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-124(1.7), C.R.S. </div>
<div>2024 <span>(“[C]hildren have the right to have the determination of </span>
</div>
<div>matters relating to parental responsibilities based upon the <span></span>best </div>
<div>interests of the child.”)<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>While father continues to acknowledge that <span>Thomas</span> recognized </span>
</div>
<div>the district court’s authority to resolve an impasse betw<span></span>een joint </div>
<div>decision-makers, he argues that the case is distinguishable. <span></span>In </div>
<div>particular, father argues that a key fact in <span>Thomas</span> was that the </div>
<div>child was moving from middle school to high school and, <span></span>thus, was </div>
<div>changing schools in any event. Notably, father does not appear to </div>
<div>acknowledge that C.Z. was moving from preschool to <span></span>kindergarten </div>
<div>and, thus, like the child in <span>Thomas</span> was changing schools no matte<span></span>r </div>
<div>what. </div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>In any event, nothing in the <span>Thomas</span> decision suggests that the </span>
</div>
<div>division placed any weight at all on th<span>e </span>fact that the child was </div>
<div>necessarily changing schools. Rather, <span>Thomas</span> stands for the </div>
<div>simple proposition that where two parents who share </div>
<div>decision-making authority cannot come to an agreement on <span></span>a </div>
<div>particular decision, the district court has the authority <span></span>to break the </div>
<div>impasse by deciding what is in the best interests of the child. </div>
</div></div>
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<div>6<span> </span>
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<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>Because father reads <span>Thomas </span>too narrowly, he argues that <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>court is significantly restricted in exercising its tie-breaking </div>
<div>authority, at least where the decision would entail moving a chil<span></span>d </div>
<div>from their established school. Relying entirely on decades-old </div>
<div>out<span>-</span>of<span>-state case law, father attempts to craft his end<span></span>angerment-like </span>
</div>
<div>standard. </div>
<div>¶ 15<span> <span>He first argues that, because L.Z. was in a “stable </span></span>
</div>
<div>environment” with respect to her schooling, there must be s<span></span>ome </div>
<div>showing of endangerment before disrupting that stability. <span></span> Quoting </div>
<div>Ex parte McLendon<span>, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984), he arg<span></span>ues that </span>
</div>
<div>“[t]he positive good brought about by the modification must more </div>
<div>than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by up<span></span>rooting the </div>
<div>child.” <span>Beyond the fact that we are not bound by out-<span>of</span>-state </span>
</div>
<div>authority, this case does not support father<span>’s</span> position. The </div>
<div>uprooting referenced in <span>Mc<span>Lendon</span></span> did not involve a simple change </div>
<div>of schools; rather, that case involved uprooting a child from her </div>
<div>established home with her grandparents and moving her ac<span></span>ross the </div>
<div>country to live with her mother, who had previously voluntarily </div>
<div>surrendered custody. <span>Id.</span> at 864. In short, the case is wholly </div>
<div>inapposite. </div>
</div></div>
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<div>7<span> </span>
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<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>Father next invokes a sixty-year-old case from the Missouri </span>
</div>
<div>Court of Appeals for the proposition that once parties have been </div>
<div>allocated joint decision-<span>making, “no further decision shoul<span></span>d be </span>
</div>
<div>required of the court save to prevent the abuse of the <span></span>child or the </div>
<div>neglect of his essential interests.” <span>Jenks v. Jenks<span>, <span>385 S.W.2d 370, </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). Father asserts that the division in <span>Thoma<span></span>s<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>referenced <span>Jenks</span>, and thus appears to argue the division adopted </div>
<div>its standards. Father is wrong on both counts. </div>
<div>¶ 17<span> <span>First, contrary to father’s assertion, the <span>Thomas</span><span> division never </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>mentioned <span>Jenks</span>. The division did address <span>Griffin v. Griffi<span></span>n<span>, 699 </span></span>
</div>
<div>P.2d 407, 409-10 (Colo. 1985), in which the Colorado Supreme </div>
<div>Court discussed <span>Jenks</span>. But, as noted in <span>Thomas</span><span>, </span><span>Griffin</span><span>’s </span>
</div>
<div>interpretation of the district court’s statutory authorit<span></span>y to be the </div>
<div>decision-maker of last resort has been superseded b<span></span>y intervening </div>
<div>amendments to the relevant statute, section 14-<span>10</span>-130, C.R.S. </div>
<div>2024<span>. </span><span>Thomas</span><span>, ¶¶ <span>33</span>-34. Thus, to the extent <span>Griffin</span><span>’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>interpretation of the statute may have embraced <span>Jenks</span>, we cannot </div>
<div>say the case has any continuing vitality. </div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>Second, nothing in <span>Thomas</span> suggests that the division intended </span>
</div>
<div>to incorporate the standards discussed in <span>Jenks</span>. To the contra<span></span>ry, </div>
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<div>8<span> </span>
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<div>as noted, the division applied a best interests of the <span></span>child standard. </div>
<div>Thomas<span>, <span>¶¶ 17, 38 n.7. </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>Here, the magistrate explicitly followed <span>Thomas</span> and properly </span>
</div>
<div>applied the best interests standard. In reaching her decision, t<span></span>he </div>
<div>magistrate found that <span>mother’s </span>neighborhood school has a st<span></span>rong </div>
<div>academic program; it <span>is an “IB school”;</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>the school’s teachings </span>
</div>
<div>incorporate the use of technology, which will benefit the children; </div>
<div>and it has a gifted and talented program. The court f<span></span>ound that </div>
<div>there was little evidence that the charter school had any advantag<span></span>es </div>
<div>over mother’s neighborhood school <span>and that, although fath<span></span>er later </span>
</div>
<div>changed his mind about the charter <span>school’s academic strengths, </span>
</div>
<div>his motion stated that L<span>.Z.’s</span> education was clearly lacking at the </div>
<div>charter school. </div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>Further, the court found that the children have friends who </span>
</div>
<div>attend both schools and that this was therefore not a defining </div>
<div>issue. The court also found that, although the charter school may </div>
<div>have students who live closer to father’s home, there was no </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>An “IB school” means an international baccalaureate school. </span>
</div>
<div>Mother testified that this meant that the school had an </div>
<div>academically rigorous environment. </div>
</div>
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<div>9<span> </span>
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<div>evidence that the children had socialized with any such stu<span></span>dents </div>
<div>outside of school during father’s parenting time.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 21<span> <span>Regarding the schools’ locations, the court found that fath<span></span>er’s </span></span>
</div>
<div>opposition to <span>the location of mother’s </span>neighborhood school was </div>
<div>disingenuous because the schools were only five minutes fr<span></span>om each </div>
<div>other.</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>And though father touted the availability of a carpooling </span>
</div>
<div>program at the charter school, the magistrate observed that<span></span> there </div>
<div>was no evidence he had ever used the program in the past. </div>
<div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>Finally, the magistrate noted that there was no credible </span>
</div>
<div>evidence to show that father would be prevented from <span></span>being </div>
<div>involved in the children’s schooling or extracurricular activit<span></span>ies if </div>
<div>they attend<span>ed</span> <span>mother’s </span>neighborhood school<span>. </span> The magistrate also </div>
<div>observed <span>that father’s concern over </span>driving distance was an issue of<span></span> </div>
<div>father’s <span>convenience </span><span>—</span><span> <span>no</span>t a concern about what is in the best </span>
</div>
<div>interests of the children. Ultimately, the court concluded that it </div>
<div>was in the children<span>’s</span> best interests that they attend <span>mother’s </span>
</div>
<div>neighborhood school for the 2024-2025 school year. </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>Indeed, based on the father’s hearing exhibits, mother’s </span>
</div>
<div>neighborhood school appears to be several minutes <span>closer</span> <span>to fath<span></span>er’s </span>
</div>
<div>home. </div>
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<div>10<span> </span>
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<div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>To the extent that father points to contrary evidence, it was for </span>
</div>
<div>the magistrate <span>—</span> not us <span>—</span> to resolve any factual conflicts. <span></span> It was </div>
<div>the <span>magistrate’s </span>responsibility to determine the credibility of </div>
<div>witnesses, the weight to give the testimony, and the inferences t<span></span>o be </div>
<div>drawn from the evidence. <span>See In re Estate of Owens</span>, 2017 COA 5<span></span>3, </div>
<div>¶ 22; <span>see also In re Marriage of Udis</span>, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (C<span></span>olo. 1989) </div>
<div>(presuming that the district court considered all the evidence in<span></span> </div>
<div>reaching its decision). We cannot reweigh <span>the court’s factual </span>
</div>
<div>determinations when, as here, the record supports them. <span></span> <span>See </span>
</div>
<div>Owens<span>, <span>¶ 22; <span>see also Hatton</span>, 160 P.3d at 330. </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 24<span> <span>Finally, we reject father’s objection to the magistrate </span></span>
</div>
<div>considering his statements in his motion that the charter school </div>
<div>was not up to academic standards. Despite father later changing<span></span> </div>
<div>course, which the magistrate acknowledged, the fact remains he </div>
<div>made the statements <span>—</span> indeed, he made them under oath because </div>
<div>the motion was a verified motion. Father points to no Colorad<span></span>o </div>
<div>case law, nor are we aware of any, suggesting that this was an </div>
<div>improper consideration. </div>
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<div>11<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>Because the record supports the <span>magistrate’s</span> findings, we will </span>
</div>
<div>not disturb them. <span>See Owens</span>, ¶ 22.<span> </span>And in light of those findings, </div>
<div>we cannot say the magistrate abused her discretion. </div>
<div>IV.<span> </span><span>Disposition </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>The order is affirmed. </span>
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<div>JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur. </div>
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