Norton v. Ruebel , 2024 COA 108 ( 2024 )

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<div>SUMMARY </div>
<div>October 3, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div>2024COA108<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>No. 23CA1030, Norton v. Ruebel <span>—</span> Attorneys and Clients <span>—</span> </div>
<div>Retaining Liens <span>—</span> Other Property to Which Lien Attaches <span>—</span> </div>
<div>Papers in Attorney’s Possession<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>A division of the court of appeals interprets section 1<span></span>3-<span>93</span>-115, </div>
<div>C.R.S. 2024, which grants an attorney a retaining lien on a </div>
<div>nonpaying client’s papers <span>that have come into </span>the attorney’s<span> </span>
</div>
<div>“<span>possession in the course of his or her professional empl<span></span>oyment<span>”</span> </span>
</div>
<div>and <span>“upon </span>money due to his or her client in the hands of the </div>
<div>adverse party in an action or proceeding in which the attorney wa<span></span>s </div>
<div>employed<span>.” The division holds that an attorney’s release of <span></span>certain, </span>
</div>
<div>but not all, of the documents covered by a retaining lien do<span></span>es not </div>
<div>result in a waiver of the entire lien. The division also holds t<span></span>hat the </div>
<div>public policy grounds for not enforcing a retaining lien <span></span>noted in </div>
<div>federal case law and Colorado Bar Association Ethic<span></span>s Committee </div>
</div>
<div>
<div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div>
<div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div>
<div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div>
<div>cited or relied upon as they are not the <span>official language of the division. </span> </div>
<div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div>
<div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div>
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<div>Formal Opinion 82 are not inconsistent with the retaining lien </div>
<div>statute. </div>
<div>The division reverses the <span>district court’s grant of summary </span>
</div>
<div>judgment to the defendant attorney and remands the <span></span>case for </div>
<div>reconsideration of the plaintiffs’ requests for files that <span></span>the attorney </div>
<div>contends are covered by a retaining lien. </div>
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<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA108</span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 23CA1030 </div>
<div>Adams County District Court No. 21CV31338 </div>
<div>Honorable Teri L. Vasquez, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Michelle Norton and Brandon Thompson, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiffs-Appellants, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Jeffrey Clay Ruebel, Esq. and Ruebel &amp; Quillen, LLC, a Colorado limited </div>
<div>liability <span>company, </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendants-Appellees. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE <span> </span>
</div>
<div>REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division VI </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE <span>LIPINSKY</span> </div>
<div>Freyre<span> and Schutz, JJ., concur </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Preeo Silverman Green &amp; Egle, P.C., <span>Eldon E. Silverman</span>, Centennial, Colorado; </div>
<div>Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh &amp; Jardine, P.C., D. Dean Batchelder, </div>
<div>Englewood<span>, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>McConnell Van Pelt, LLC, Michael T. McConnell, <span>Kellsey A. Hansen</span>, Denver, </div>
<div>Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
</div>
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<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Attorneys are generally entitled to receive payment for their </span>
</div>
<div>services. Abraham Lincoln, a legendary litigator as well as one of </div>
<div>our country’s <span>great<span>est</span><span> presidents<span>, </span>acknowledged that there <span>is</span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>nothing <span>cr</span>ass or dishonorable in <span>an attorney’s </span>efforts <span>to</span> receive </div>
<div>payment for services rendered<span>: </span><span>“</span>The matter of fees is important, . . . </div>
<div>far beyond the mere question of bread and butter involved. </div>
<div>Properly attended to, fuller justice is done to both lawyer an<span></span>d </div>
<div>client.<span>”</span><span> <span>Harry E. Pratt, <span>Personal Finances of Abraham Lincoln</span>, at <span>25 </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>(1943), https://perma.cc/KW8Q. </div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>But payment of an attorney<span>’s</span> <span>fees is not always “[p]roper</span><span>l</span><span>y </span></span>
</div>
<div>attended to.” <span>Id.</span><span> <span>For this reason, the Colorado General A<span></span>ssembly </span></span>
</div>
<div>enacted two statutes that authorize lawyers to place liens on <span>a </span>
</div>
<div>nonpaying client’s property, files, and <span>funds, sections <span>13<span>-<span>93</span></span></span>-114 </span>
</div>
<div>and -115, C.R.S. 2024. This case concerns the latter statute<span>, </span>which </div>
<div>grants a lawyer a retaining lien on <span>“</span>any papers of his or her client<span></span> </div>
<div>that have come into his or her possession in the course of <span></span>his or her </div>
<div>professional employment<span>”</span> and <span>“</span>upon money due to his or he<span></span>r client </div>
<div>in the hands of the adverse party in an action or proceeding in </div>
<div>which the attorney was employed<span>.” § 13</span><span>-<span>93</span></span>-115. </div>
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<div>2 </div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>Few published cases have interpret<span>ed</span> the Colorado retaining </span>
</div>
<div>lien statute, however. </div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>In this case, we explore various issues relating to retaining </span>
</div>
<div>liens and, among other holdings, decide that the release of certain,<span></span> </div>
<div>but not all, of the documents covered by such a lien does not res<span></span>ult </div>
<div>in a waiver of the entire lien.<span> </span>In addition, we provide guidance to </div>
<div>the district court in determining the enforceability of the <span></span>retaining </div>
<div>lien that is the principal subject of this appeal. </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Plaintiffs, Michelle Norton and Brandon Thompson (jointly, <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>Norton parties), appeal the district <span>court’s order granting <span></span>summary </span>
</div>
<div>judgment in favor of defendants, Jeffrey Clay Ruebel, Esq., and </div>
<div>Ruebel &amp; Quillen, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company </div>
<div>engaged in the practice of law (jointly, Ruebel). In addition to </div>
<div>challenging the grant of summary judgment to Ruebel, t<span></span>he Norton </div>
<div>parties argue that the court erred by denying their requests for </div>
<div>production of Ruebel’s files <span>(the subject files) regarding One Stop </span>
</div>
<div>Construction and Landscapes, Inc.<span> </span>Ruebel contends that he had </div>
<div>the right to withhold production of the subject files to the <span></span>Norton </div>
<div>parties because he had placed a retaining lien on them. </div>
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<div>3 </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>We reverse the grant of summary judgment to Ruebel and </span>
</div>
<div>remand for further proceedings consistent with t<span></span>his opinion. </div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background and Procedural History </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>Although the Norton parties pleaded detailed facts regarding </span>
</div>
<div>several related transactions, we set forth here only those allegati<span></span>ons </div>
<div>relevant to our analysis. </div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>The Norton parties purchased stock in One Stop, a corpo<span></span>ration </span>
</div>
<div>that Ruebel represented and that Jesse Alfaro owned. <span></span> The Norton </div>
<div>parties subsequently became the controlling shareholders, off<span></span>icers, </div>
<div>and directors of One Stop. One Stop defaulted on a $2.<span></span>5 million </div>
<div>line of credit from Bank of Colorado, which the Norton parties an<span></span>d </div>
<div>Alfaro had guaranteed. One Stop and the guarantors entered into <span></span>a </div>
<div>forbearance agreement that, among other provisions, increased the </div>
<div>interest rate on the amount due to Bank of Colorado.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Counsel for Bank of Colorado subsequently informe<span></span>d Ruebel </span>
</div>
<div>that One Stop was in default of the line of credit. The attorney </div>
<div>asked Ruebel which borrowers and guarantors he represente<span></span>d.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Ruebel informed counsel for Bank of Colorado that he re<span></span>presented </div>
<div>One Stop, Alfaro, and the Norton parties, and he negotiated on their </div>
<div>behalf an addendum to the forbearance agreement. </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>4 </div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>Pursuant to the addendum, an entity known as SALMAC LLC </span>
</div>
<div>and Robert McAllister purchased the assets of One Stop in </div>
<div>exchange for a $2.6 million promissory note payable to One Stop.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>The note was endorsed to Bank of Colorado. SALMAC and </div>
<div>McAllister agreed to pay $900,000 to Bank of Colorado in mont<span></span>hly </div>
<div>installments and endorsed the note secondarily to OSC Holdings, </div>
<div>LLC<span>, which would receive SALMAC and McAllister’s month</span><span>ly<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>payments after Bank of Colorado had been paid in full. </div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>After SALMAC and McAllister stopped making payments on </span>
</div>
<div>the note, Bank of Colorado filed a lawsuit seeking replevin and </div>
<div>money judgments against, among other defendants, One Stop, OSC </div>
<div>Holdings, and Alfaro. The Norton parties were not parties t<span></span>o Bank </div>
<div>of Colorado’s lawsuit<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>In that lawsuit, Bank of Colorado obtained a money judgment </span>
</div>
<div>against One Stop (as well as against certain of the other defend<span></span>ants) </div>
<div>in the amount of $912,213.82. According to the Norton <span></span>parties, </div>
<div>after Bank of Colorado took steps to enforce its judgment<span></span>, One Stop </div>
<div>was left with no assets and was dissolved. </div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>The Norton parties, in their individual capacities, brought a </span>
</div>
<div>legal malpractice action against Ruebel, asserting negligence an<span></span>d </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>5 </div>
<div>breach of fiduciary duty claims. In their complaint, the Norton </div>
<div>parties asserted<span>, </span>as relevant here, that </div>
<div>•<span> <span>Ruebel had acted as their attorney; </span></span>
</div>
<div>•<span> <span>in response to the Norton parties’ inquiries, Ruebel </span></span>
</div>
<div>misrepresented One Stop’s financial condition; <span> </span>
</div>
<div>•<span> <span>Ruebel failed to protect the Norton parties’ interests; <span> </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>•<span> <span>Ruebel represented both Alfaro as seller and the Nort<span></span>on </span></span>
</div>
<div>parties as buyers in connection with the Norton parties’ </div>
<div>purchase of stock in One Stop; and </div>
<div>•<span> <span>the Norton parties lost nearly their entire investment in </span></span>
</div>
<div>One Stop as a consequence of Ruebel’s misconduct. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>The Norton parties sought a judgment in the amount of </span>
</div>
<div>approximately $1.4 million <span>—</span> representing the sum they allegedly </div>
<div>lost through their investment in One Stop. </div>
<div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>During the litigation, the Norton parties requested that <span></span>Ruebel </span>
</div>
<div>produce the subject files. Ruebel refused to do so. In a letter from </div>
<div>Ruebel’s counsel to counsel for the Norton parties, Ruebel as<span></span>serted </div>
<div>a retaining lien against the subject files under section 13-<span>93</span>-115 on </div>
<div>the grounds <span>that “One Stop owes [Ruebel] approximately<span></span> $100,000 </span>
</div>
<div>in unpaid legal fees.” Notably, Ruebel’s counsel stated in the lett<span></span>er </div>
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<div> </div>
<div>6 </div>
<div>that the Norton parties did not have an attorney-client relationshi<span></span>p </div>
<div>with Ruebel but, rather, were “constituents”<span> (i.e., officers and </span>
</div>
<div>directors) of One Stop, <span>Ruebel’s client. Ruebel’s counsel did not <span></span>say </span>
</div>
<div>in the letter that the Norton parties owed Ruebel any attorney f<span></span>ees. </div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>The Norton parties filed a notice of discovery dispute in wh<span></span>ich </span>
</div>
<div>they moved for a determination of the effect of the retaining <span></span>lien on </div>
<div>the<span>ir</span><span> request for the subject files. The Norton parties argued t<span></span>hat </span>
</div>
<div>Ruebel “waived any claim to a retaining lien” in August 2020 wh<span></span>en, </div>
<div>at Michelle Norton’s request, Ruebel provided her with a porti<span></span>on of </div>
<div>the subject files <span>—</span> <span>“289 emails with voluminous attachments </span>
</div>
<div>covering a [s<span>ix</span>-month period] during pivotal periods of joint </div>
<div>representation” (the 2020 documents) —<span> without claiming that the </span>
</div>
<div>2020 documents were subject to a retaining lien. Th<span></span>e Norton </div>
<div>parties also argued that Ruebel should “otherwise be <span></span>prohibited </div>
<div>from asserting the lien” as a “sword” to “frustrate the discov<span></span>ery </div>
<div>process.<span>” <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>At a hearing on the discovery dispute, the Norton parties al<span></span>so </span>
</div>
<div>argued that, even in the absence of a waiver, the court should n<span></span>ot </div>
<div>enforce Ruebel’s retaining lien because they and One St<span></span>op were </div>
<div>financially unable to pay Ruebel’s unpaid fees. The Norton <span></span>par<span>ties </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>7 </div>
<div>requested an evidentiary hearing to address the factual basis for </div>
<div>their asserted inability to pay the outstanding fees. </div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>Ruebel responded that he had not waived the retaining lien </span>
</div>
<div>when he provided the 2020 documents to Michelle Norton be<span></span>cause </div>
<div>he disclosed those documents to her in her capacity as h<span></span>is </div>
<div>“corporate client’s officer[] during the course of representation<span></span>” </div>
<div>before t<span>he fee dispute arose and that the Norton parties’ “sw<span></span>ord” </span>
</div>
<div>argument fail<span>ed</span> because the court never found that Ruebel had </div>
<div>engaged in any misconduct. </div>
<div>¶ 19<span> <span>At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found “there <span>[w<span>a]<span>s </span></span></span></span></span>
</div>
<div>an appropriate and valid retaining lien on the files of One St<span></span>op held </div>
<div>by [Ruebel]”; that the lien had “not been waived or lost ba<span></span>sed on </div>
<div>any of the arguments asserted by [the Norton parties]”; and <span></span>that, if </div>
<div>Ruebel would not produce the subject files, “then<span> no part of that<span></span> file </span>
</div>
<div>w[ould] be permitted usable by either party in this case, <span></span>either in </div>
<div>pursuit or defense of their claims.” The court also denied t<span></span>he </div>
<div>Norton parties’ request for an evidentiar<span>y hearing. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>The Norton parties later filed a second notice of discovery </span>
</div>
<div>dispute regarding their request for production of the <span></span>subject files, in </div>
<div>which they argued that “two recent developments provide[d] </div>
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<div> </div>
<div>8 </div>
<div>grounds for an order requiring” Ruebel to produce the su<span></span>bject files. </div>
<div>The Norton parties argued that, even if Ruebel had a valid retaining<span></span> </div>
<div>lien at one time, he “waived it by designating [Jeffrey Clay Ruebel] </div>
<div>as an expert for trial” and by “disclosing a document from the f<span></span>ile,” </div>
<div>thus opening the door to production of the subject files to t<span></span>he </div>
<div>Norton parties. Ruebel responded that he was not relying on the </div>
<div>subject files for Jeffrey Clay Ruebel’s expert testimony and that<span></span> </div>
<div>Ruebel had received the document to which the Norton parties </div>
<div>referred only after the inception of the case. The court con<span></span>ducted </div>
<div>another hearing on the retaining lien issue and again found in f<span></span>avor </div>
<div>of Ruebel. Thus, the Norton parties were unable to obtain t<span></span>he </div>
<div>subject files. </div>
<div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>Ruebel filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>Norton parties’ claims failed as a matter of law because t<span></span>hey could </div>
<div>not establish that Ruebel’s conduct caused them damages.<span> <span>The </span></span>
</div>
<div>court granted the motion and entered summary judgment against<span></span> </div>
<div>the Norton parties. </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>9 </div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>A.<span> <span>The Retaining Lien </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 22<span> <span>We first address the Norton parties’ arguments regarding </span></span>
</div>
<div>Ruebel’s retaining lien and <span>the subject files. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>The Norton parties contend that the court erred by </span>
</div>
<div>“concluding that Ruebel’s assertion of a retaining lien against <span></span>One </div>
<div>Stop preempts all <span>discovery” regarding the subject files. <span></span> The Norton </span>
</div>
<div>parties ask us to reverse the court’s orders denying t<span></span>heir request<span>s </span>
</div>
<div>for production of the subject files and to remand for <span></span>further </div>
<div>proceedings. </div>
<div>¶ 24<span> </span><span>We hold that the court did not apply the correct legal standard </span>
</div>
<div>when analyzing whether Ruebel’s retaining lien precluded </div>
<div>production of the subject files to the Norton parties<span>. B</span>ecause </div>
<div>documents contained in the subject files may be relevant t<span></span>o the </div>
<div>issue of causation (as well as <span>to the Norton parties’ cross</span>-</div>
<div>examination of Jeffrey Clay Ruebel in his capacity as an expert), we </div>
<div>reverse the grant of summary judgment to Ruebel, a<span></span>s we discuss </div>
<div>further <span>infra</span> Part II.B, and remand for further consideration of the </div>
<div>No<span>rton parties’ request<span>s for the subject files, consistent<span></span> with this </span></span>
</div>
<div>opinion<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div>10 </div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Standard of Review </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 25<span> <span>We review the court’s interpretation and application of t<span></span>he </span></span>
</div>
<div>retaining lien statute and case law de novo. <span>See Gallegos v. Colo. </span>
</div>
<div>Ground Water Comm<span>’</span><span>n</span><span>, 147 P.3d 20, 28 (Colo. 2006)<span></span>. We review </span>
</div>
<div>discovery rulings <span>—</span> including decisions about production of <span></span>files </div>
<div>subject to a retaining lien <span>—</span> for an abuse of discretion.<span></span> <span>See In re </span>
</div>
<div>People in Interest of J.P.<span>, 2023 CO 57, ¶ 17, 538 P.3d 337, <span></span>343; </span>
</div>
<div>Jenkins v. Dist. Ct.<span>, 676 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Colo. 1984). A court </span>
</div>
<div>abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, </div>
<div>unreasonable, or unfair or when it misapplies or misconst<span></span>rues the </div>
<div>law. <span>J.P.</span><span>, ¶</span> 17, 538 P.3d at 343. </div>
<div>2.<span> <span>The Law Governing Retaining Liens </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 26<span> <span>An attorney has a statutory right to retain “any papers” <span></span>of his </span></span>
</div>
<div>client that come into his possession in the course of his </div>
<div>professional employment until compensation is paid. <span></span> § <span>13</span><span>-<span>93</span></span>-115. </div>
<div>This retaining lien attaches once the attorney “has complete<span></span>d </div>
<div>compe<span>nsable work.” <span>People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Hart<span></span>hun<span>, 581 P.2d </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>716, 718 (Colo. 1978). It allows the attorney to retain <span></span>the client’s </div>
<div>“papers, books, documents, securities, and money” unt<span></span>il “the </div>
<div>general balance due him for legal services is paid, whether s<span></span>uch </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>11 </div>
<div>services grew out of the special matters then in his hands, o<span></span>r other </div>
<div>legal matters.” <span>Collins v. Thuringer<span>, 21 P.2d 709, 710 (Colo. 19<span></span>33). </span></span>
</div>
<div>The purpose of the retaining lien is to aid the attorney in <span></span>recovering </div>
<div>the fees and costs due him for the services performed <span></span>for the client. </div>
<div>See In re <span>Att’y G.<span>, 2013 CO 27, ¶ 16, 302 P.3d 248, 251; </span></span><span>accord</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>Pomerantz v. Schandler<span>, 704 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 198<span></span>3) (“The </span>
</div>
<div>purpose of the lien is to assist the attorney in prevent<span></span>ing a client </div>
<div>from refusing or failing to pay ch<span>arges justly due.”).</span> </div>
<div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>Although section 13-<span>93</span>-115 does not address circumstances </span>
</div>
<div>under which a court will not enforce a retaining lien<span>, </span>the Tenth </div>
<div>Circuit Court of Appeals and the Ethics Committee of the Colora<span></span>do </div>
<div>Bar Association noted that courts will not enforce retaining liens for </div>
<div>reasons <span>“grounded on public policy.” <span>Jenkins v. Weinshienk</span></span>, 670 </div>
<div>F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1982); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm.,<span></span> </div>
<div>Formal Op. 82 (1989) (hereinafter, <span>CBA Formal Op. 82) (“A lawyer’<span></span>s </span>
</div>
<div>right to assert a retaining lien is not absolute. The right may be </div>
<div>limited by legal and ethical considerations.”).<span> <span>We are not bound by </span></span>
</div>
<div>these authorities<span>. </span> <span>S<span>ee <span>Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC</span></span></span>, 2023 COA 109, </div>
<div>¶ 14, 543 P.3d 1054, 1056 (<span>cert. granted</span> Aug. 19, 2024) (Although <span></span>a </div>
<div>state court can consider federal decisions “<span>as <span>persuasive aut<span></span>hority, </span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>12 </div>
<div>we are not bound by them when interpreting state statutes.<span>”); </span>
</div>
<div>Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor &amp; Assocs.<span>, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 411 (Ct. </span>
</div>
<div>App. 2002) (holding that courts are not bound by a state et<span></span>hics </div>
<div>opinion). Nonetheless, <span>Weinshienk</span> and CBA Formal Op. 82 are </div>
<div>persuasive authorities that we may consider.<span> </span>Ruebel does not cite </div>
<div>any authority, from any jurisdiction, indicating that courts rigidly </div>
<div>apply retaining lien statutes, such as section 13-<span>93</span>-115, when </div>
<div>application of the statute would result in an unjust or inequitable </div>
<div>outcome. </div>
<div>¶ 28<span> <span>Contrary to Ruebel’s argument, we perceive no inconsistency </span></span>
</div>
<div>between the language of section 13-<span>93</span>-115 and <span>a court’s deci<span></span>sion </span>
</div>
<div>not to enforce a retaining lien to avoid this type of outcome. The </div>
<div>statute merely addresses how a retaining lien is created and <span></span>the </div>
<div>papers and moneys covered by such a lien: </div>
<div>An attorney has a lien for a general balance of </div>
<div>compensation upon any papers of his or her </div>
<div>client that have come into his or her </div>
<div>possession in the course of his or her </div>
<div>professional employment and upon money due </div>
<div>to his or her client in the hands of the adverse </div>
<div>party in an action or proceeding in which the </div>
<div>attorney was employed from the time of giving </div>
<div>notice of the lien to that party. </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>13 </div>
<div>§ 13-<span>93</span>-115. It does not speak to the circumstances under <span></span>which a </div>
<div>retaining lien may, or may not, be enforced and does not sugge<span></span>st </div>
<div>that a retaining lien is absolute. <span>See</span> <span>Antero Treatment LLC v.<span></span> Veolia </span>
</div>
<div>Water Techs., Inc.<span>, 2023 CO 59, ¶ 16, 546 P.3d 1140, <span></span>1146 </span>
</div>
<div>(explaining that, to determine whether a statute and a court rule </div>
<div>are inconsistent, the court must first “<span>determine whether the rule </span>
</div>
<div>and statute irreconcilably conflict<span>”).</span> </div>
<div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>Accordingly, we agree with the Tenth Circuit that, after a court </span>
</div>
<div>determines that an attorney has a retaining lien, the court mu<span></span>st </div>
<div>also determine whether assertion of the lien is “in such c<span></span>onflict with </div>
<div>important principles that it must be relinquished when balan<span></span>ced </div>
<div>against considerations of public policy.” <span> <span>Weinshienk</span>, 670 F.2d at </span>
</div>
<div>919; <span>cf. Jenkins</span><span>, <span>676 P.2d <span>at</span></span></span> 1205 <span>(weighing the att<span></span>orney’s interest </span>
</div>
<div>in his retaining lien against other interests, such as “<span>the highly </span>
</div>
<div>material nature of the subject of the lien, the implications of a </div>
<div>lawyer<span>’</span><span>s duties toward his client, and the importance of prom<span></span>oting </span>
</div>
<div>the truth-seeking functions of discovery rules<span>”). </span> </div>
<div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>For example, as CBA Formal Opinion 82 notes, a court will not </span>
</div>
<div>en<span>force an attorney<span>’s</span> retaining lien if (1) there is no legal basis f<span></span>or </span>
</div>
<div>asserting the lien; (2) the client who owes the fees furnishes </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>14 </div>
<div>adequate security or posts an adequate bond; (3) <span>the client’s papers </span>
</div>
<div>are essential to preserve an important personal libert<span></span>y interest of </div>
<div>the client; or (4) the client is financially unable to post a bond or </div>
<div>pay the attorney. <span>See</span> CBA Formal Op. 82; <span>Weinshienk</span>, 670 F.2d at </div>
<div>920. The Ethics Committee opined that, while a “lawyer may </div>
<div>ethically assert a retaining lien on a client’s papers .<span> . . when <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>client is financially able to pay outstanding fees, but f<span></span>ails or refuses </div>
<div>to do so,” a <span>lawyer may <span>not </span>assert a retaining lien </span>if “the client is </div>
<div>financially <span>unable</span> <span>to post a bond or pay the fees, unl<span></span>ess the client’s </span>
</div>
<div>inability to pay or post bond is a result of fraud or gross im<span></span>position </div>
<div>by the client.” CBA Formal Op. 82 (emphasis added); <span>see also<span> ABA </span></span>
</div>
<div>Comm. on Ethics &amp; Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1461 (1980) </div>
<div>(hereinafter, ABA Informal Op. 1461), <span>withdrawn</span><span>,</span><span> </span>ABA Comm. on </div>
<div>Ethics &amp; Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 86-1520 (1986). </div>
<div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>But even more fundamental questions are presented when an </span>
</div>
<div>attorney seeks to enforce a retaining lien: Is the party seeking t<span></span>he </div>
<div>documents covered by the lien a client, a former client, <span></span>or a third </div>
<div>party? Relatedly, does the requesting party owe fees to t<span></span>he </div>
<div>attorney? Thus, in deciding whether to enforce a retaining lien, <span></span>a </div>
<div>court should first determine the relationship between the party </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>15 </div>
<div>seeking the documents and the attorney and whether the party </div>
<div>against whom the lien is asserted owes any fees to the att<span></span>orney<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>Different considerations apply in determining whether a client<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>or a third party is entitled to documents covered by a retaining lien. <span></span> </div>
<div>See, e.g.<span>,</span> Weinshienk<span>, 670 F.2d at 920 (“If the only interests at </span>
</div>
<div>stake . . . were those of the attorney and his . . . former clients, t<span></span>he </div>
<div>case would present no problem; the lien would be allowe<span></span>d to stand. </div>
<div>But also involved is [the third party’s] interest .<span> . . in a speedy </span>
</div>
<div>re<span>solution of his claims.”); <span>Shaffer v. Charleston Area<span></span> Med. Ctr., Inc.<span>, </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>485 S.E.2d 12, 16 (W. Va. 199<span>7)</span> (noting that <span>an “</span><span>attorney<span>’</span></span>s lien <span></span>for </div>
<div>professional services may not be enforced in equity against a </div>
<div>stranger<span>” to the matter in which the lawyer’s services were </span>
</div>
<div>rendered). </div>
<div>¶ 33<span> </span><span>While the broad wording of section 13-<span>93</span>-115 suggests that a </span>
</div>
<div>retaining lien generally follows the files, and not the client,<span></span> under </div>
<div>certain circumstances, it would be inequitable to deny a t<span></span>hird party </div>
<div>access to the papers covered by the retaining lien. <span>Cf. Weinshienk</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>670 F.2d at 920 <span>(“If [the third party] needs something in t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>[attorney’s] file to prove his case [<span>against the debtor client], he can </span>
</div>
<div>get it by discovery or subpoena notwithstanding the att<span></span>orney’s </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>16 </div>
<div>retaining lien.”); <span>In re Garcia<span>, 69 B.R. 522, 525 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.) </span></span>
</div>
<div>(comparing situations where courts have allowed attorneys t<span></span>o assert </div>
<div>retaining liens against third parties with situations where it wo<span></span>uld </div>
<div>be inequitable to do so), <span>aff’d</span>, 76 B.R. 68 (E.D. Pa. 1987), <span>a<span></span>ff’d<span>, 838 </span></span>
</div>
<div>F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision);<span></span> CBA Formal </div>
<div>Op. 82 (“[A]n attorney who has asserted a lien may be c<span></span>ompelled to </div>
<div>produce documents to the client’s adversary, since it<span></span> would be </div>
<div>inequitable to deny a litigant access to relevant and perhaps </div>
<div>essential proof, merely because the opposing party had faile<span></span>d to pay </div>
<div>attorney’s fees.”). <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>In addition, we agree with the Norton parties that an </span>
</div>
<div>“attorney’s ability to assert his lien can be waived or lost.” </div>
<div>MacFarlane<span>, 581 P.2d at 718. Waiver is “the intentional </span>
</div>
<div>relinquishment of a known right.” <span>In re Marriage of Ka<span></span>nn<span>, 2017 </span></span>
</div>
<div>COA 94, ¶ 55, 488 P.3d 245, 254. An attorney exp<span></span>ressly waives a </div>
<div>retaining lien by, for example, giving the former client<span></span> </div>
<div>“unconditional assurances that the documents would be <span></span>returned.” </div>
<div>People v. Brown<span>, 840 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Colo. 1992).<span></span> A waiver may </span>
</div>
<div>also “be implied from a party’s conduct if the conduct is free of </div>
<div>ambiguity and clearly manifests the intent not to assert the <span></span>right.” </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>17 </div>
<div>Kann<span>, ¶<span> 55, 488 P.3d at 254. Further, an attorney may implicitly </span></span>
</div>
<div>waive a retaining lien by surrendering possession of files cove<span></span>red by </div>
<div>the lien because the lien “depends upon possession and attache<span></span>s </div>
<div>only to papers actually in [the attorney’s] possession.” <span>Reynolds v. </span>
</div>
<div>Warner<span>, 258 N.W. 462, 464 (Neb. 1935) (applying Colorado law).<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>3.<span> <span>The Court Did Not Consider All Relevant Factors in <span></span>Deciding </span></span>
</div>
<div>that the Norton Parties Were Not Entitled to the Subject Files </div>
<div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>The Norton parties contend that the court erred by concluding </span>
</div>
<div>that Ruebel’s retaining lien “barred all discovery of [the subject </div>
<div>files], that the lien was effective even though neither One Stop no<span></span>r </div>
<div>[the Norton parties] could pay the lien amount, and that Ruebel did </div>
<div>not waive his right to the lien when he produced documents from </div>
<div>the file without mention of the lien.”<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 36<span> </span><span>We first note that the court did not determine the threshold </span>
</div>
<div>issue of whether the Norton parties were clients or former clients of </div>
<div>Ruebel who owed attorney fees to him. At oral argument,<span></span> counsel </div>
<div>for the Norton parties suggested there <span>is</span> an ongoing dispute as to </div>
<div>whether they <span>were Ruebel’s clients, while counsel for Ruebel said </span>
</div>
<div>that the Norton parties became Ruebel’s clients <span>at the time of the </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>18 </div>
<div>negotiations regarding the forbearance agreement following <span></span>One </div>
<div>Stop’s default on the Bank of Colorado <span>line of credit. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 37<span> </span><span>But e<span>ven if the Norton parties were Ruebel’s clients at one </span></span>
</div>
<div>time, we cannot determine from the record whether they are lia<span></span>ble </div>
<div>for any of Ruebel’s unpaid fees or whether One Stop alone i<span></span>s liable </div>
<div>for those fees.<span> </span>Similarly, we cannot tell from the record whether </div>
<div>any of Ruebel’s clients<span> (or former clients) in this case are financially </span>
</div>
<div>unable to pay Ruebel’s outstanding attorney fees<span> or post a bond or </span>
</div>
<div>whether their inability to pay or post <span>a </span>bond is a result of f<span></span>raud or </div>
<div>gross imposition.<span> </span>Without knowing these key facts, we cannot </div>
<div>adjudicate whether the Norton parties are entitled to production <span></span>of </div>
<div>the subject files, even if Ruebel placed a retaining lien on them. </div>
<div>¶ 38<span> </span><span>Second, w<span>e dispense with the Norton parties’ waiver argument. <span></span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>They provide no authority suggesting that a waiver of a retainin<span></span>g </div>
<div>lien as to some papers covered by the lien results in a waiver of <span></span>the </div>
<div>lien as to the remaining papers. </div>
<div>¶ 39<span> <span>Because a retaining lien “depends upon possession,” </span></span>
</div>
<div>Reynolds<span>, 258 N.W. at 464, we hold that an attorney does not waive </span>
</div>
<div>a retaining lien in its entirety by releasing a portion of the f<span></span>iles </div>
<div>covered by the lien to a client or a third party.<span> </span>Thus, Ruebel did not </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>19 </div>
<div>waive his retaining lien on those portions of the subject files t<span></span>hat he </div>
<div>did not produce to Michelle Norton <span>—</span> even if Ruebel waived the </div>
<div>retaining lien as to the 2020 documents by providing t<span></span>hem to her<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 40<span> <span>Additionally, Ruebel’s <span>designation of Jeffrey Clay Ruebel as a </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>non-<span>retained expert did not amount to conduct “free of ambiguity </span>
</div>
<div>and clearly manifest[ing]” Ruebel’s intent not to assert his <span></span>right to </div>
<div>retain the subject files. <span>Kann</span><span>, ¶</span> 55, 488 P.3d at 254. For this </div>
<div>reason, Ruebel did not waive his right to assert a retaining <span></span>lien on </div>
<div>the subject files by designating Jeffrey Clay Ruebel as an expert. </div>
<div>¶ 41<span> </span><span>In sum, we agree with the Norton parties that the court </span>
</div>
<div>misinterpreted the law when it analyzed the scope and applic<span></span>ability </div>
<div>of Ruebel’s retaining lien. Specifically, the court construed the </div>
<div>following language in <span>Weinshienk <span>too narrowly: “An exception is <span></span>also </span></span>
</div>
<div>recognized when the client is financially unable to post a b<span></span>ond or </div>
<div>pay <span>—</span> <span>in such cases the client’s failure is not deliberate <span>and </span></span>
</div>
<div>requiring the client to pay may hinder its ability to secure ot<span></span>her </div>
<div>representation<span>.” </span>Weinshienk<span>, 670 F.2d at 920 (emphasis a<span></span>dded). </span>
</div>
<div>Because the court found that the Norton parties did not ma<span></span>ke an </div>
<div>“adequate representation” that “the inability to post a bond may </div>
<div>hinder [their] ability to secure other representation,” <span></span>the court </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>20 </div>
<div>concluded that none of the exceptions discussed in <span>Weinshienk </span>
</div>
<div>applied. </div>
<div>¶ 42<span> </span><span>We do not read this dict<span>um</span> in <span>Weinshienk</span> to suggest that a </span>
</div>
<div>client’s inability to pay <span>can defeat a retaining lien only when it<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>hinders the client’s ability to secure other representation. <span></span> Neither </div>
<div>of the authorities that <span>Weinshienk </span>cites for the inability-<span>to</span>-pay </div>
<div>exception involved a situation where the lien impeded an </div>
<div>impecunious client from securing substitute representation. <span></span> <span>See </span>
</div>
<div>generally Hernandez v. Nierenberg<span>, 179 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324-<span>25</span> (Sup. </span>
</div>
<div>Ct. 1958); ABA Informal Op. 1461. Rather, the <span>Weinshienk</span> </div>
<div>language illustrates but one non-exhaustive example of prejudice t<span></span>o </div>
<div>a client that could result from the assertion <span>of</span> a retaining lien <span></span>if the </div>
<div>client’s inability to pay the outstanding fees is not deliberate. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 43<span> </span><span>Our reading of <span>Weinshienk</span> is consistent with <span>CBA </span>Formal Op. </span>
</div>
<div>82, which does not mention the client’s ability to secure other </div>
<div>representation when describing the inability-<span>to</span>-pay exception. </div>
<div>Rather, it says only that an attorney may not ethically assert <span></span>a </div>
<div>retaining lien when “the client is financially unable to post a<span> bond </span>
</div>
<div>or pay, unless the client’s inability to pay or post bond is a result<span></span> of </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>21 </div>
<div>fraud or gross imposition by the client.” CBA Formal Op. <span></span>82 </div>
<div>(quoting <span>Weinshienk</span>, 670 F.2d at 920)<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 44<span> </span><span>Because the court misinterpreted <span>Weinshienk</span>, the court did </span>
</div>
<div>not fully consider or weigh the competing interests, ethical </div>
<div>considerations, and considerations of public policy when it </div>
<div>concluded that no exception to the retaining lien applie<span></span>d. <span>See </span>
</div>
<div>Weinshienk<span>, 670 F.2d at 919; </span>Jenkins<span>, <span>676 P.2d <span>at</span><span> <span></span>1205; CBA </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>Formal Op. 82. Those considerations include wheth<span></span>er the retaining </div>
<div>lien is unenforceable <span>—</span> even if the Norton parties owe attorney fee<span></span>s </div>
<div>to Ruebel <span>—</span> to avoid undue prejudice to the Norton parties in their </div>
<div>litigation against Ruebel. <span>See Marsh, Day &amp; Calhoun v. Solomon</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>529 A.2d 702, 706 (Conn. 1987) <span>(“[B]</span>arring unusual circumstance<span></span>s, </div>
<div>such as prejudice to the rights of a client<span>, an attorney is under n<span></span>o </span>
</div>
<div>obligation to release the files of a client unless there has been </div>
<div>payment, the furnishing of adequate security or, of course, <span></span>a </div>
<div>mutually acceptable arrangement between the parties.<span>”) (emphasis </span>
</div>
<div>added);<span> <span>CBA Formal Op. 82 (noting that a withdrawing att<span></span>orney </span></span>
</div>
<div>should protect the welfare of the client by endeavoring to minimize </div>
<div>the possibility of harm to the client); <span>see also Weinshienk</span>, 670 F.<span></span>2d </div>
<div>at 920 (explaining that inconvenience to the former clients “is t<span></span>he </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>22 </div>
<div>essence <span>—</span> the power and the bite <span>—</span> <span>of the attorney’s retaining lien” </span>
</div>
<div>and that requiring a retaining lien to give way “because it ham<span></span>pers </div>
<div>the clients’ defense of their suit .<span> . . would emasculate the <span></span>retaining </span>
</div>
<div>lien as it applies to general balances owed att<span>orneys”).</span><span> </span>There is <span>a </span>
</div>
<div>material distinction between an action that materially prejudice<span></span>s a </div>
<div>former client and one that merely caus<span>es</span> inconvenience or ham<span></span>pers </div>
<div>the former <span>client’s defense</span><span>.</span><span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 45<span> </span><span>The factual findings and inquiries pertinent to this analysis </span>
</div>
<div>include </div>
<div>•<span> <span>whether the Norton parties, in their individual capacities </span></span>
</div>
<div>(the capacities in which they filed this action), were </div>
<div>clients of Ruebel for purposes of the retaining lien </div>
<div>analysis; </div>
<div>•<span> <span>whether the Norton parties, or only One Stop, owe Ruebel </span></span>
</div>
<div>the attorney fees that are the subject of the retaining lien; </div>
<div>•<span> <span>whether Ruebel’s assertion of the retaining lien against </span></span>
</div>
<div>the Norton parties is necessary to protect Ruebel’s </div>
<div>interest in receiving payment for the outstanding legal </div>
<div>fees; </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>23 </div>
<div>•<span> <span>the value of Ruebel’s interest in the lien and whether </span></span>
</div>
<div>whichever clients or former clients of Ruebel owe the </div>
<div>subject attorney fees are able to pay them or to post a </div>
<div>bond that would adequately secure Ruebel’s interest<span></span> in </div>
<div>payment; </div>
<div>•<span> <span>whether enforcing the retaining lien against the Nort<span>on</span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>parties would materially prejudice their ability to litigate </div>
<div>against Ruebel in this action; and </div>
<div>•<span> <span>whether doing so may materially prejudi<span>ce</span> the Norton </span></span>
</div>
<div>parties’ ability to cross<span>-examine Jeffrey Clay Ruebel in </span>
</div>
<div>his capacity as an expert witness. </div>
<div>See Jenkins<span>, 676 P.2d at 1204 (requiring production<span></span> of documents </span>
</div>
<div>in the attorney’s file <span>notwithstanding a retaining lien covering <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>documents in an action involving an attorney fees dispute). </div>
<div>¶ 46<span> </span><span>While Ruebel bears the burden of establishing the existence of </span>
</div>
<div>the retaining lien, <span>see <span>In re Marriage of Mitchell</span></span>, 55 P.3d 183, 185 </div>
<div>(Colo. App. 2002), the Norton parties bear the burden <span></span>of showing </div>
<div>that <span>assertion of the lien is “in such conflict with important </span>
</div>
<div>principles that it must be relinquished when balanced against </div>
<div>considerations of public policy.” <span>Weinshienk</span><span>, 670 F.2d at 91<span></span>9; <span>cf. </span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>24 </div>
<div>Pomerantz<span>, 704 F.2d at 683 (requiring the client t<span></span>o make a clear </span>
</div>
<div>showing of “his inability to pay the legal fees or post a rea<span></span>sonable </div>
<div>bond”).<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 47<span> </span><span>Thus, on remand, the court must reconsider the Norton </span>
</div>
<div>parties’ requests for the subject files<span>, consistent with this opinion<span>. </span></span>
</div>
<div>The court may, in its discretion, order supplemental briefing,<span></span> </div>
<div>conduct an evidentiary hearing, or take such other steps that <span></span>would </div>
<div>aid the court in determining whether Ruebel’s retaining lien <span></span>bars </div>
<div>production of the subject files to the Norton parties. </div>
<div>B.<span> <span>The Grant of Summary Judgment to Ruebel </span></span>
</div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Standard of Review and the Law Governing Grants of </span></span>
</div>
<div>Summary Judgment </div>
<div>¶ 48<span> </span><span>We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. <span>Rocky </span></span>
</div>
<div>Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. <span>v.</span> Wagner<span>, 2020 CO 51, ¶ 42,<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>467 P.3d 287, 295. <span>Summary judgment is proper “if <span></span>the <span>pleadings, </span></span>
</div>
<div>depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,<span></span> </div>
<div>together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuin<span></span>e </div>
<div>issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is <span></span>entitled to </div>
<div>a judgment as a matter of law.”<span> C.R.C.P. 56(c). </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>25 </div>
<div>¶ 49<span> <span>“The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine </span></span>
</div>
<div>issue of material fact is on the moving party.”<span> <span>Cont’l Air Lines, </span></span>
</div>
<div>Inc. v. Keenan<span>, 731 P.2d 708, 712 (Colo. 1987). <span>“In a case where a </span></span>
</div>
<div>party moves for summary judgment on an issue on which <span></span>[it] would </div>
<div>not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, [its] initial burden <span></span>of </div>
<div>production may be satisfied by showing the court that <span></span>there is an </div>
<div>absence of evidence in the record to s<span>upport the nonmoving pa<span></span>rty’s </span>
</div>
<div>case.”<span> <span>Id. </span> <span>“Once the moving party has met this init</span>ial burden of<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>production, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to <span></span>establish </div>
<div>that there is a triable issue of fact.”<span> <span>Id.</span> at 713. </span>“If the nonmoving </div>
<div>party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out a t<span></span>riable issue </div>
<div>of fact on his claim, a trial would be useless and the moving <span></span>party is </div>
<div>entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.”<span> <span>Id.</span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 50<span> <span>“In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, a </span></span>
</div>
<div>court grants the nonmoving party the benefit of all favora<span></span>ble </div>
<div>inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the undis<span></span>puted facts </div>
<div>and resolves all doubts against the moving party.”<span> <span>Rocky Mounta<span></span>in </span></span>
</div>
<div>Planned Parenthood, Inc.<span>, ¶ 20, 467 P.3d at 291. </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>26 </div>
<div>2.<span> <span>We Reverse the Grant of Summary Judgment to Ruebel </span></span>
</div>
<div>Because We Are Remanding the Case for </div>
<div>a Redetermination of Whether the Norton Parties Are Ent<span></span>itled </div>
<div>to the Subject Files </div>
<div>¶ 51<span> </span><span>Because we are remanding the case for further proceedings on </span>
</div>
<div>whether Ruebel is entitled to withhold the subject files from the </div>
<div>Norton parties, we cannot say there are no disputed issues of </div>
<div>material fact regarding whether Ruebel’s actions caused the </div>
<div>damages that the Norton parties seek to recover in this action.<span> </span>If, </div>
<div>after conducting the analysis of Ruebel’s retaining lien <span>outlined </span>
</div>
<div>above, the court concludes that the Norton parties are entitled t<span></span>o </div>
<div>obtain the subject files, the Norton parties will be able to <span></span>scour the </div>
<div>subject files for documents that may support their causation <span></span>theory </div>
<div>or any of the other elements of their claims against Ruebel. Any </div>
<div>su<span>ch documents may be relevant to <span>th</span><span>e merit of the Norton parties’ </span></span>
</div>
<div>claims. </div>
<div>¶ 52<span> </span><span>Alternatively, the court may determine that, even after </span>
</div>
<div>undertaking the proper analysis, the Norton parties are not ent<span></span>itled </div>
<div>to any of the subject files. And even if the court decides that the </div>
<div>Norton parties are entitled to the subject files, no document<span></span>s in </div>
<div>those files may <span>support the Norton parties’ claims. </span>If so, Ruebel </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>27 </div>
<div>could refile his motion for summary judgment or such other </div>
<div>dispositive motion he believes is appropriate. We express no </div>
<div>opinion on the merits of any such motion. </div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Disposition </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 53<span> </span><span>We reverse the grant of summary judgment to Ruebel and </span>
</div>
<div>remand to the court for reconsideration of <span>the Norton parties’ </span>
</div>
<div>requests for the subject files, consistent with this opinion. </div>
<div>JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.<span> </span> </div>
</div></div>
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