Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic ( 2021 )


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    CHRISTOPHER BARKER v. ALL
    ROOFS BY DOMINIC ET AL.
    (SC 20196)
    Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, Kahn,
    Ecker, Vertefeuille and Elgo, Js.*
    Syllabus
    Pursuant to a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 31-291),
    ‘‘[w]hen any principal employer procures any work to be done wholly
    or in part for him by a contractor, or through him by a subcontractor,
    and the work so procured to be done is a part or process in the trade
    or business of such principal employer, and is performed in, on or about
    premises under his control, such principal employer shall be liable to
    pay all compensation . . . to the same extent as if the work were done
    without the intervention of such contractor or subcontractor.’’
    The defendants city of Bridgeport and its insurer, P Co., appealed from
    the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the
    decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner, who had found
    that the city was the plaintiff’s principal employer and, therefore, liable
    for the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation benefits. The plaintiff had been
    employed by H Co., an uninsured subcontractor of the city, when he
    was injured while doing repair work to the roof of the city’s transfer
    facility. The plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits, and, fol-
    lowing a hearing, the commissioner found that, because he was an
    employee of an uninsured subcontractor when he suffered his compensa-
    ble injury, the Second Injury Fund was statutorily (§ 31-355) required
    to pay his workers’ compensation benefits. The Second Injury Fund
    subsequently contested liability on the ground that, pursuant to § 31-
    291, the city was the plaintiff’s principal employer when he suffered his
    injury and, therefore, was required to pay the workers’ compensation
    benefits owed to him. Following additional hearings, the commissioner
    determined that, under Massolini v. Driscoll (
    114 Conn. 546
    ), a munici-
    pality can be held liable as a principal employer under § 31-291, that
    the city had a statutory (§ 7-148) duty to manage, maintain, and repair
    its property, including the transfer facility, and that repairing the transfer
    facility’s roof was a part or process in the city’s trade or business within
    the meaning of § 31-291. Accordingly, the commissioner found that the
    city was the plaintiff’s principal employer and ordered the city and P
    Co. to pay his workers’ compensation benefits. The city and P Co.
    appealed to the board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision.
    Thereafter, the city and P Co. appealed to the Appellate Court, which
    upheld the board’s decision. On the granting of certification, the city
    and P Co. appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly
    concluded that, under § 31-291, the city was liable as the plaintiff’s
    principal employer for workers’ compensation benefits to which he was
    entitled as a result of the injuries he sustained repairing the roof of the
    city’s transfer facility while employed by the city’s uninsured subcontrac-
    tor: whether an uninsured contractor’s or subcontractor’s work is a part
    or process in the trade or business of the principal employer under
    § 31-291 is a fact specific determination to be made in light of certain
    nondispositive factors, including the employer’s legally defined powers
    and obligations, the complexity of the work being performed and the
    degree of specialization required, whether the employer supplied the
    tools or materials or oversaw the work, and whether the work was of
    such a character that it ordinarily would be performed by the employer’s
    own employees or was an otherwise essential part in the maintenance
    or operation of the employer’s business; considering the relevant factors
    in light of the record, as well as § 31-291’s broader remedial purpose of
    preventing employers from denying workers full protection under the
    workers’ compensation scheme by simply hiring uninsured contractors
    or subcontractors, this court concluded that the commissioner reason-
    ably determined that the repair of the transfer facility’s roof was a part
    or process in the city’s trade or business, as it was undisputed that the
    city was responsible pursuant to § 7-148 to maintain and repair its public
    buildings, the roof repairs at issue were not especially complex and did
    not demand specialized skills, and, although the city did not employ its
    own roofers for financial reasons despite employing a variety of other
    tradespeople to maintain and repair city property, the roof repair fell
    within the nature and scope of the maintenance and repair work ordi-
    narily performed by city employees; moreover, this court declined the
    city and P Co.’s invitation to overrule Massolini insofar as it applies
    principal employer liability to municipalities, as that case’s holding has,
    over the past eighty years, become embedded in Connecticut worker’s
    compensation law, and the city and P Co. did not identify any ambiguity
    in the statutory scheme or any legislative history suggesting that the
    legislature intended to abrogate this court’s holding in Massolini or to
    change the standards of principal employer liability through the creation
    of the Second Injury Fund, a primary purpose of which is, instead, to
    act as a payer of last resort when an employer is unable to pay.
    (Three justices dissenting in one opinion)
    Argued October 22, 2019—officially released August 13, 2020**
    Procedural History
    Appeal from the decision of the Workers’ Compensa-
    tion Commissioner for the Third District determining
    that the defendant city of Bridgeport was the plaintiff’s
    principal employer, brought to the Compensation Review
    Board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision;
    thereafter, the defendant city of Bridgeport et al.
    appealed to the Appellate Court, Sheldon, Bright and
    Harper, Js., which affirmed the board’s decision, and
    the defendant city of Bridgeport et al., on the granting
    of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Joseph J. Passaretti, Jr., with whom, on the brief,
    was Amanda A. Hakala, for the appellants (defendant
    city of Bridgeport et al.).
    Lisa Guttenberg Weiss, assistant attorney general,
    with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney
    general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney gen-
    eral, for the appellee (Second Injury Fund).
    Opinion
    ECKER, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal is
    whether, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Gen-
    eral Statutes § 31-291,1 a municipality is the ‘‘principal
    employer’’ of an employee of an uninsured roofing sub-
    contractor injured while repairing a municipal building.
    The defendants city of Bridgeport (city) and PMA Insur-
    ance Company2 contend that the city is not a principal
    employer under the statute because it is not in the
    ‘‘trade or business’’ of roof repair. The Second Injury
    Fund (fund) responds that the city is in the ‘‘trade or
    business’’ of maintaining and repairing municipal build-
    ings and facilities, and, therefore, the Appellate Court
    properly affirmed the judgment of the Compensation
    Review Board (board), which found that the city was
    liable for the payment of the workers’ compensation
    benefits of the plaintiff, Christopher Barker, as his prin-
    cipal employer. We agree with the fund and affirm the
    judgment of the Appellate Court.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are not in
    dispute. In March, 2000, the city hired the defendant
    All Roofs by Dominic (All Roofs) to do repair work on
    the roof of the city’s transfer facility located at 475
    Asylum Street. All Roofs hired the defendant Howard
    Adams d/b/a Howie’s Roofing (Howie’s Roofing) as a
    subcontractor. On June 29, 2000, the plaintiff, an employee
    of Howie’s Roofing, was injured in the course and scope
    of his employment when he fell from the roof under
    repair. After his fall, the plaintiff sought workers’ com-
    pensation benefits from Howie’s Roofing, All Roofs,
    and the city. Neither Howie’s Roofing nor All Roofs
    carried a valid workers’ compensation insurance policy.
    A formal hearing was held before the Workers’ Com-
    pensation Commission. On January 5, 2005, the Work-
    ers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Fourth Dis-
    trict determined that the plaintiff was an employee of
    Howie’s Roofing when he suffered his work-related
    injury. Because Howie’s Roofing was uninsured, that
    finding required the fund to pay the workers’ compensa-
    tion benefits owed to the plaintiff pursuant to General
    Statutes § 31-355.3 The fund subsequently contested lia-
    bility on the ground that, under § 31-291, the city was
    the principal employer of the plaintiff and, therefore,
    was required to pay the workers’ compensation benefits
    owed to him.
    Additional hearings were conducted before the Work-
    ers’ Compensation Commission on November 19, 2015,
    and February 23, 2016, to determine the city’s principal
    employer liability. The city conceded that it had hired
    All Roofs to perform work on the transfer facility and
    that the plaintiff’s injury took place on municipal prop-
    erty under the city’s control. The city denied, however,
    that the roofing work performed by All Roofs was a
    part or process in the city’s trade or business, which
    is a prerequisite to establish principal employer liability
    under § 31-291. John F. Cottell, Jr., Deputy Director of
    Public Facilities for the city, testified that it was the
    responsibility of the public facilities department to
    maintain city-owned buildings, but he also testified that
    the city did not employ a roofer because the need was
    not extensive enough to justify the cost of employing
    one on a full-time basis.
    In his written finding and orders, the Workers’ Com-
    pensation Commissioner for the Third District (commis-
    sioner) determined that, under Massolini v. Driscoll,
    
    114 Conn. 546
    , 551–52, 
    159 A. 480
     (1932), a municipal-
    ity can be liable as a principal employer under § 31-291.
    The commissioner also determined that, pursuant to
    General Statutes § 7-148,4 the city has a statutory duty
    to manage, maintain, repair, and control its property,
    including its transfer facility. In addition, the commis-
    sioner concluded that the work of repairing the roof of
    the transfer facility was a part or process in the city’s
    trade or business. The commissioner found that the city
    was the plaintiff’s principal employer and ordered the
    defendants to pay the workers’ compensation benefits
    to which the plaintiff was entitled. The defendants filed
    a motion to correct and a motion for articulation, both
    of which the commissioner denied.
    The defendants appealed to the board, which affirmed
    the commissioner’s decision. The defendants timely
    appealed from the board’s decision to the Appellate
    Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the
    board. Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic, 
    183 Conn. App. 612
    , 623, 
    193 A.3d 693
     (2018). We granted the defen-
    dants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the
    following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court [correctly]
    conclude that, under . . . § 31-291, as construed by
    Massolini v. Driscoll, 
    [supra,
     
    114 Conn. 546
    ], the . . .
    city . . . was liable for workers’ compensation bene-
    fits as the principal employer of a worker hired by an
    uninsured subcontractor to repair the roof of a building
    owned by the city?’’ Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic,
    
    330 Conn. 925
    , 926, 
    194 A.3d 292
     (2018).
    The defendants contend that roof repair is not a part
    or process in the city’s trade or business under § 31-
    291, as construed by Massolini. Alternatively, the defen-
    dants argue that Massolini is no longer good law
    because (1) it utilizes an outdated definition of ‘‘busi-
    ness’’ under the principal employer statute, and (2) the
    subsequent creation of the fund has ‘‘displaced’’ Massol-
    ini by providing a ‘‘logical alternative’’ to the holding
    in that case. Lastly, the defendants argue that the impo-
    sition of principal employer liability against a municipal-
    ity violates General Statutes § 31-286a (c).5 In response,
    the fund argues that (1) Massolini remains controlling
    law, notwithstanding the subsequent creation of the
    fund, (2) pursuant to § 31-291, as construed by Massol-
    ini, the city is liable for the payment of workers’ com-
    pensation benefits to the plaintiff as his principal
    employer, and (3) § 31-286a (c) has no application on
    this record.
    Our standard of review applicable to workers’ com-
    pensation appeals is well-settled. ‘‘The conclusions
    drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must
    stand unless they result from an incorrect application
    of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference
    illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . It is
    well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we
    accord great weight to the construction given to the
    workers’ compensation statutes by the commissioner
    and [the] board.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 
    294 Conn. 564
    ,
    572, 
    986 A.2d 1023
     (2010). ‘‘Our Workers’ Compensation
    Act indisputably is a remedial statute that should be
    construed generously to accomplish its purpose.’’ Dris-
    coll v. General Nutrition Corp., 
    252 Conn. 215
    , 220, 
    752 A.2d 1069
     (2000).
    The principal employer statute provides in relevant
    part: ‘‘When any principal employer procures any work
    to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor,
    or through him by a subcontractor, and the work so
    procured to be done is a part or process in the trade
    or business of such principal employer, and is per-
    formed in, on or about premises under his control, such
    principal employer shall be liable to pay all compensa-
    tion under this chapter to the same extent as if the
    work were done without the intervention of such con-
    tractor or subcontractor. . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-
    291. The ‘‘underlying purpose’’ of the statute is to
    impose liability in ‘‘those situations [in which injurious]
    conditions might be assumed to be largely within the
    control or observation of the principal employer.’’ Wil-
    son v. Largay Brewing Co., 
    125 Conn. 109
    , 112, 
    3 A.2d 668
     (1939). Because ‘‘[m]ost compensable injuries are
    due to conditions of employment the danger from which
    could be prevented or minimized by sufficient oversight
    or control’’; id.; the statute provides an incentive for
    the principal employer to provide a safe working envi-
    ronment for the contractors and subcontractors that
    carry out any part or process in its trade or business.
    See Sgueglia v. Milne Construction Co., 
    212 Conn. 427
    ,
    433, 
    562 A.2d 505
     (1989) (‘‘[t]he purpose of § 31-291 is
    to protect employees of minor contractors against the
    possible irresponsibility of their immediate employers,
    by making the principal employer who has general con-
    trol of the business in hand liable as if he had directly
    employed all who work [in] any part of the business
    [that] he has undertaken to carry on’’ (internal quotation
    marks omitted)); Johnson v. Mortenson, 
    110 Conn. 221
    ,
    225, 
    147 A. 705
     (1929) (principal employer statute
    ‘‘afford[s] full protection to work[ers], by preventing
    the possibility of defeating the [Workers’ Compensation
    Act] by hiring irresponsible contractors or subcontrac-
    tors to carry on a part of the employer’s work’’).
    The relevant portion of the principal employer statute
    has remained unchanged since the enactment of our
    original Workers’ Compensation Act in 1913. See Public
    Acts 1913, c. 138, pt. B, § 5. The controlling decisional
    law is similarly long-standing. Since 1927, we consis-
    tently have applied a three-part test to determine princi-
    pal employer liability under the Workers’ Compensation
    Act. ‘‘To render a principal employer liable, it is clear
    [that] this statute requires (1) that the relation of princi-
    pal employer and contractor must exist in work wholly
    or in part for the former, (2) that the work must be
    in, on or about premises controlled by the principal
    employer, and (3) that the work be a part or process
    in the trade or business of the principal employer.’’
    Crane v. Peach Bros., 
    106 Conn. 110
    , 113, 
    137 A. 15
    (1927). The third prong of this test—the only one at
    issue in the present case—frequently is the most diffi-
    cult to apply. See, e.g., Fox v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 
    107 Conn. 189
    , 192–95, 
    139 A. 778
     (1928). The question of
    whether the work at issue is included within an employ-
    er’s trade or business largely is one ‘‘of degree and fact.’’
    Grenier v. Grenier, 
    138 Conn. 569
    , 571, 
    87 A.2d 148
    (1952). Fortunately, however, our precedent supplies
    ‘‘a number of cases [in which] we have been called [on]
    to decide whether . . . [on] their particular facts they
    fall within the provisions of the statute, and they afford
    a valuable basis for arriving at a general conception of
    its application.’’ King v. Palmer, 
    129 Conn. 636
    , 639–40,
    
    30 A.2d 549
     (1943).
    Massolini v. Driscoll, 
    supra,
     
    114 Conn. 546
    , is one
    such case, and it featured prominently in the present
    dispute to help guide the analysis of the commissioner,
    the board, and the Appellate Court, as well as in the
    parties’ arguments before this court. In Massolini, the
    city of Hartford hired a contractor to provide a team
    of horses and a driver to collect ashes and rubbish
    left out by the public for removal. 
    Id., 548
    . The driver
    employed by the contractor was fatally injured while
    tending to the horses’ shoes, precipitating a workers’
    compensation claim. 
    Id., 549
    . As in the present case,
    the issue in Massolini was whether the municipality
    was the employee’s principal employer under the stat-
    ute, and, as here, this question hinged on whether the
    work performed by the employee was a part or process
    in the city’s trade or business. We held that, for a munici-
    pal corporation, the term ‘‘business’’ means ‘‘the con-
    duct of the usual affairs of the corporation, and such
    as commonly engage the attention of its officers.’’ 
    Id., 552
    . We noted that Hartford was authorized to remove
    ashes and rubbish as part of its police powers; 
    id.,
    551–52; and held that such work was a ‘‘business’’ of
    the city within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensa-
    tion Act. 
    Id., 552
    . Because the driver’s work on the
    horses’ shoes was ‘‘incidental to and in furtherance of
    the operations involved in [that] business of [Hartford],
    a valid claim for compensation [had] been established
    against [Hartford].’’ 
    Id., 553
    .6
    We agree with the Appellate Court, the board, and
    the commissioner that Massolini provides useful guid-
    ance in the present case. The plaintiff in the present case
    was employed by one of the city’s subcontractors to dis-
    charge an obligation imposed by law on the city itself,
    namely, the maintenance and repair of municipal build-
    ings. As the commissioner found, and as no party dis-
    putes, the city had a responsibility to manage, maintain,
    and repair its public buildings, including its transfer
    facility, pursuant to § 7-148 (c) (6) (A) (i). See footnote
    4 of this opinion. This conclusion is further supported
    by Cottell’s testimony that it was the responsibility of
    the public facilities department to maintain city-owned
    buildings. The commissioner reasonably determined
    that maintenance of the transfer facility, including the
    repair of the facility’s roof, was among ‘‘the usual affairs
    of the corporation, and such as commonly engage the
    attention of its officers’’ and, therefore, is a part or
    process in the city’s business. Massolini v. Driscoll, 
    114 Conn. 552
    . Other states with similar ‘‘trade or business’’
    language in their principal employer statutes have reached
    the same conclusion. See Rodriquez v. John Russell Con-
    struction, 
    16 Kan. App. 2d 269
    , 275, 
    826 P.2d 515
     (1991)
    (‘‘[r]oof repair was essential to protect the [public hous-
    ing complex] and ensure that it remained habitable,’’
    and worker injured while doing so was statutory employee
    of municipality under workers’ compensation statute);
    Ford v. Richmond, 
    239 Va. 664
    , 665, 669, 
    391 S.E.2d 270
     (1990) (worker injured while repairing roof on city
    reservoir was statutory employee7 of city under work-
    ers’ compensation statute).8
    We do not agree with the dissent’s prediction that
    continuing9 to give consideration to the legally defined
    powers and obligations of a city in determining its trade
    or business would ‘‘render a municipality the workers’
    compensation guarantor of virtually every employee of
    an independent contractor engaged by the city.’’ As we
    explain elsewhere in this opinion, other factors, such
    as the complexity of the work in question; Battistelli
    v. Connohio, Inc., 
    138 Conn. 646
    , 649, 
    88 A.2d 372
    (1952); or the scale of the undertaking, as in Grenier
    v. Grenier, 
    supra,
     
    138 Conn. 569
    ; see footnote 12 of
    this opinion; may place work outside of the trade or
    business of a municipality, even if that work falls gener-
    ally within the city’s legally defined powers and obliga-
    tions. Importantly, a city may protect itself against the
    financial loss of a determination that it is the principal
    employer of an injured worker by taking the simple
    step of ensuring that any independent contractor it hires
    carries workers’ compensation insurance, as the city is
    mandated to do by § 31-286a (a). See footnote 5 of this
    opinion. If a city takes that precaution, and if it is found
    liable to pay workers’ compensation benefits as a princi-
    pal employer, it may recover any sums that it pays as
    a result from the independent contractor. See Sgueglia
    v. Milne Construction Co., supra, 
    212 Conn. 433
    –34
    (between principal employer and subcontractor, latter
    is primarily liable); Johnson v. Mortenson, 
    supra,
     
    110 Conn. 228
     (because liability of immediate employers is
    primary and liability of principal employers is second-
    ary, principal employer may recover sums paid to
    injured worker from immediate employer).
    The defendants contend that roof repair is not a part
    or process in the city’s business because the city did
    not employ any roofers. Although relevant to the deter-
    mination of an employer’s trade or business, this factor
    is not dispositive. We have held that, ‘‘[i]f the work is
    of such a character that it ordinarily or appropriately
    would be performed by the principal employer’s own
    employees in the prosecution of its business, or as an
    essential part in the maintenance thereof, it is a part
    or process of his work.’’ King v. Palmer, 
    supra,
     
    129 Conn. 641
    . We have made it clear that ‘‘no one exclusive
    test can be set up and that each case must be determined
    on its own facts . . . .’’ Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing
    Co., 
    136 Conn. 529
    , 532, 
    72 A.2d 655
     (1950). A finding
    that the work in question ordinarily or appropriately is
    performed by the principal employer’s own employees
    is sufficient to establish principal employer liability;
    see, e.g., Kasowitz v. Mutual Construction Co., 
    154 Conn. 607
    , 613–14, 
    228 A.2d 149
     (1967); but it is not a
    prerequisite to that liability. See Mancini v. Bureau of
    Public Works, 
    167 Conn. 189
    , 196, 
    355 A.2d 32
     (1974)
    (observing that ‘‘this test is not necessarily conclusive’’).
    Pacileo v. Morganti, Inc., 
    10 Conn. App. 261
    , 
    522 A.2d 841
     (1987), is instructive on this point. In Pacileo,
    the Appellate Court considered whether the defendant,
    a general contractor hired to oversee the city of New
    Haven’s city hall and library construction project, was
    the principal employer of the plaintiff, an ironworker
    injured on the work site. Id., 262. The Appellate Court
    noted that ‘‘the defendant’s business, as the general
    contractor, was to oversee and implement the construc-
    tion of the city hall library complex. . . . A necessary
    and expected part of that construction was the laying
    of steel rods for the pouring of concrete. Ironworkers
    generally lay steel rods. Since none of the individuals
    directly employed by [the defendant was] qualified to
    perform the job of ironworker . . . the utilization of
    ironworkers such as the plaintiff was a part or process
    of the defendant’s trade or business.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Id., 264; see also Adams v. Jodar
    Blasting, Inc., No. 1943, CRB 2-93-12 (January 17, 1996)
    (home construction business was principal employer
    of employee of contractor who was hired to blast rock
    at construction site, even though principal employer
    did not have any employees qualified to perform such
    work). Therefore, the defendant general contractor was
    the employee’s principal employer under § 31-291, even
    though it ‘‘did not directly employ any [ironworkers]’’
    or ‘‘any . . . employees qualified to perform the job of
    [ironworkers].’’ Pacileo v. Morganti, Inc., supra, 263;
    see also Kasowitz v. Mutual Construction Co., supra,
    
    154 Conn. 608
    –609, 614 (The court held that the defen-
    dant general contractor was the primary employer of
    the plaintiff, who was an employee of a glass company
    hired to install windows, because the defendant was
    obligated by contract to ‘‘complete . . . construction
    . . . in all respects, including the glass work. All of
    this was part of its business. It chose to enter into
    subcontracts for certain phases of the work, including
    the glass work, instead of hiring glaziers to do the work
    at the appropriate time.’’).
    The analogy to a general contractor is apt.10 Just as
    the defendant’s business in Pacileo was to ‘‘oversee and
    implement’’ a construction project; Pacileo v. Morganti,
    Inc., supra, 
    10 Conn. App. 264
    ; in the present case,
    the city’s business includes, among other things, the
    maintenance and repair of its buildings and facilities,
    including the transfer facility. See General Statutes § 7-
    148 (c) (6) (A) (i). We do not say that all such repairs,
    regardless of their complexity and the level of special-
    ization required, automatically must be considered to
    be part of the business of a large municipality such as
    Bridgeport. Indeed, we have explained that the com-
    plexity of the work in question is a relevant factor for
    determining principal employer liability under § 31-291.
    See Battistelli v. Connohio, Inc., supra, 
    138 Conn. 649
    (‘‘it is obvious that the intricate character of the job
    and the special skill required put it well outside of the
    capabilities of the defendants’ ordinary employees’’).
    On the present record, however, we have no reason to
    disagree with the conclusion of the commissioner that
    roof repair is a ‘‘necessary and expected part’’ of the
    routine building maintenance of the city’s transfer facil-
    ity. Pacileo v. Morganti, Inc., supra, 264. It does not
    appear that the roof repairs at issue were so complex
    or demanded such specialized skills that they fell out-
    side of the business of the city, which employs a variety
    of tradespeople—including electricians, carpenters,
    plumbers, painters, and masons—but which elected not
    to employ its own roofers for financial reasons.11
    Because the city chose not to employ roofers of its
    own, it was required to contract for roofing services,
    making the utilization of roofers, such as the plaintiff,
    a part or process in the city’s business of maintaining
    and repairing the transfer facility.
    Predicating principal employer liability on the actual
    employment of workers who perform the type of work
    at issue also would be inconsistent with the remedial
    purpose of § 31-291. As we previously have stated, ‘‘the
    purpose of the principal employer provision in § 31-291
    is to afford full protection to work[ers], by preventing
    the possibility of defeating the [Workers’ Compensation
    Act] by hiring irresponsible contractors or subcontrac-
    tors to carry on a part of the [principal] employer’s
    work.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez
    v. O & G Industries, Inc., 
    322 Conn. 291
    , 307, 
    140 A.3d 950
     (2016). The statute ‘‘protect[s] employees of minor
    contractors against the possible irresponsibility of their
    immediate employers. . . . Otherwise, [§ 31-291], and,
    indeed, the whole policy of the [Workers’] Compensa-
    tion Act, might be evaded by the device of the owner
    parceling out the work of construction among a number
    of separate [uninsured] contractors . . . .’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Mortenson,
    
    supra,
     
    110 Conn. 226
    . The defendants’ interpretation of
    the statute would allow employers to do precisely what
    the statute was enacted to prohibit—avoid liability
    under the Workers’ Compensation Act by choosing to
    hire contractors rather than employees to perform cer-
    tain tasks.
    The defendants contend that their position finds sup-
    port in Fox v. Fafnir Bearing Co., supra, 
    107 Conn. 189
    , the holding of which they say implies that the
    ‘‘repair or alteration’’ of a building is not a part or
    process in an employer’s trade or business. The defen-
    dants construe our holding in Fox too broadly. In that
    case, the plaintiff, Richard Fox, was an employee of a
    window washing company that the defendant, Fafnir
    Bearing Company (Fafnir), had hired to wash the win-
    dows in its factory. 
    Id., 190
    . Fafnir was ‘‘in the business
    of manufacturing ball bearings,’’ but ‘‘it was necessary
    to have the windows washed, as a clean and attractive
    condition of the factory was an advertising asset of the
    corporation.’’ 
    Id., 191
    . On appeal, Fafnir claimed that
    it was not Fox’ principal employer because ‘‘the wash-
    ing of windows by [Fox] was not ‘a part or process in
    [its] trade or business . . . .’ ’’ 
    Id., 192
    . We disagreed,
    reasoning that ‘‘[a]ny work which was an essential part
    of the maintenance and operation of its factory was a
    part of its ‘trade or business,’ though not a process in
    the actual work of manufacturing ball bearings. . . .
    [Fox’] work of window-washing was work which had
    to do with the maintenance of the factory buildings in
    good condition for the manufacturing processes there
    conducted, and which could fairly be said to be essential
    for that purpose—work similar in character to that of
    scrubbing the floors, cleaning the offices and ordinary
    janitor work. Such work is customarily done by regular
    employees in the daily routine of their duties in the
    factory. It is clearly distinguishable from work done in
    connection with the repair or alteration of the factory
    buildings. It is a part of the work of keeping the employ-
    er’s factory in running condition, and therefore a part
    of its ‘trade or business’ though not directly connected
    with any manufacturing process. To limit the applica-
    tion of [the principal employer statute] to work done
    in the actual process of manufacture would be to adopt
    a construction not required or permitted by the lan-
    guage of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act, and entirely
    at variance with our settled policy of construing the
    [Workers’] Compensation Act broadly in order to effec-
    tuate its purpose.’’ 
    Id.,
     195–96.
    Although the thrust of the analysis in Fox supports
    the conclusion we reach here, the defendants contend
    that the language distinguishing ordinary maintenance
    work, such as washing windows, from ‘‘work done in
    connection with the repair or alteration of the factory
    buildings’’; 
    id., 195
    ; requires a different outcome in the
    present case because it involves a roof repair. The
    defendants’ position, however, overlooks the most fun-
    damental observation made in Fox, which is that ‘‘[n]o
    general rule [for determining the scope of the employ-
    er’s trade or business for purposes of principal
    employer liability] is deducible from the authorities,
    and it is often a matter of extreme difficulty to decide
    whether the work in a given case falls with the designa-
    tion of the statute. It is in each case largely a question
    of degree and of fact . . . .’’ 
    Id., 194
    . A categorical
    distinction between maintenance and repair is not help-
    ful in this context, and we do not read Fox to establish
    such a distinction as a doctrinal matter. The determina-
    tion in any particular case as to whether the nature and
    extent of the work being performed by the plaintiff
    should be deemed a part of the defendant’s business
    operations or outside of those business operations will
    depend on the specific facts of the case viewed in light
    of the factors previously discussed in this opinion. In the
    present case, the commissioner reasonably concluded
    that the repair of the transfer facility’s roof was a part
    or process in the city’s business on the basis of the
    evidence concerning the city’s business operations, its
    statutory responsibilities, and the nature and scope of
    the maintenance and repair work ordinarily performed
    by city employees.12
    The defendants contend, in a similar vein, that roof
    repair is not a part or process in the city’s trade or
    business because the city did not supply the plaintiff
    with tools or materials or oversee the plaintiff’s work.
    This argument suffers from the same defect as the previ-
    ous one. Like the hiring of employees, the source of
    the tools or materials used for the work, although rele-
    vant to the principal employer inquiry, is not a disposi-
    tive consideration. We have upheld findings of principal
    employer liability without making reference to which
    party supplied tools and materials or oversaw the work
    in question. See Mancini v. Bureau of Public Works,
    
    supra,
     
    167 Conn. 193
    , 196–97 (finding no error in trial
    court’s directions to jury on part or process element
    without making reference to whether defendant sup-
    plied tools or materials or directly oversaw work); Fox
    v. Fafnir Bearing Co., supra, 
    107 Conn. 194
    –96 (uphold-
    ing commissioner’s conclusion that defendant was prin-
    cipal employer without making reference to whether
    defendant supplied tools or materials or directly over-
    saw work); see also Hebert v. RWA, Inc., 
    48 Conn. App. 449
    , 454–55, 
    709 A.2d 1149
     (upholding commissioner’s
    finding that work was part or process in trade or busi-
    ness of principal employer without making reference
    to whether principal employer supplied tools and mate-
    rials or directly oversaw work), cert. denied, 
    246 Conn. 901
    , 
    717 A.2d 239
     (1998); Pacileo v. Morganti, Inc.,
    supra, 
    10 Conn. App. 264
    –65 (no genuine issue of mate-
    rial fact as to whether defendant was principal
    employer, although no reference was made to whether
    defendant supplied tools or materials or directly over-
    saw work).13
    In the alternative, the defendants ask us to overrule
    Massolini insofar as it applies principal employer liabil-
    ity to municipalities. The defendants argue that the defi-
    nition of ‘‘business’’ in Massolini is outdated and cite
    a 2003 dictionary to support their claim that the term
    ‘‘business’’ means a ‘‘commercial or mercantile activity
    engaged in as a means of livelihood: trade, line,’’ a
    ‘‘commercial or sometimes an industrial enterprise,’’ or
    ‘‘dealings or transactions [especially] of an economic
    nature . . . .’’ Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diction-
    ary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 167. We decline to overrule Mas-
    solini for two reasons. First, ‘‘[w]hen a term is not
    defined in a statute, we begin with the assumption that
    the legislature intended the word to carry its ordinary
    meaning, as evidenced in dictionaries in print at the
    time the statute was enacted.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission,
    
    326 Conn. 160
    , 176, 
    162 A.3d 706
     (2017); see also San-
    difer v. United States Steel Corp., 
    571 U.S. 220
    , 227, 
    134 S. Ct. 870
    , 
    187 L. Ed. 2d 729
     (2014) (‘‘[i]t is a fundamental
    canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise
    defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordi-
    nary, contemporary, common meaning’’ (emphasis
    added; internal quotation marks omitted)).14 We attri-
    bute no persuasive value to the defendants’ preferred
    definition of business, taken from a dictionary pub-
    lished ninety years after the enactment of the principal
    employer statute.
    Second, our adherence to this court’s holding in Mas-
    solini gains additional force from the doctrine of stare
    decisis. ‘‘This court has repeatedly acknowledged the
    significance of stare decisis to our system of jurispru-
    dence because it gives stability and continuity to our
    case law. . . . The doctrine of stare decisis counsels
    that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions
    unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic
    require it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Salamon, 
    287 Conn. 509
    , 519, 
    949 A.2d 1092
     (2008). ‘‘Moreover, [i]n evaluating the force
    of stare decisis, our case law dictates that we should
    be especially wary of overturning a decision that
    involves the construction of a statute. . . . When we
    construe a statute, we act not as plenary lawgivers but
    as surrogates for another policy maker, [that is] the
    legislature. In our role as surrogates, our only responsi-
    bility is to determine what the legislature, within consti-
    tutional limits, intended to do.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
     519–20. The Workers’ Compensa-
    tion Act includes municipalities within the definition of
    employer; General Statutes § 31-275 (10) (‘‘ ‘[e]mployer’
    means any person, corporation, limited liability com-
    pany, firm, partnership, voluntary association, joint
    stock association, the state and any public corporation
    within the state using the services of one or more
    employees for pay’’ (emphasis added)); and the term
    ‘‘principal employer’’ has been construed to encompass
    municipalities for more than eighty years.15 The holding
    and implications of Massolini and its progeny have by
    now become embedded as part of our workers’ compen-
    sation law, and we are unwilling to overturn established
    doctrine and upset settled expectations under these
    circumstances.
    The defendants seek to strengthen their argument in
    favor of doctrinal modification by asserting that the
    1959 expansion of the fund has ‘‘displaced’’ Massolini
    because the availability of the fund has eliminated the
    need to hold municipalities liable as principal employ-
    ers. The defendants point out that the fund did not
    exist when Massolini was decided and suggest that
    Massolini would have been decided differently if the
    fund had existed at the time. They hypothesize that,
    because the existence of the fund means that the injured
    worker is no longer left uncompensated in these circum-
    stances—that is, the fund would be obligated to pay
    the plaintiff’s compensation award if the city is not
    found to be the plaintiff’s principal employer—it is no
    longer necessary to apply the principal employer statute
    to the city under Massolini. We are not persuaded.
    To begin with, nothing in the language of the statute
    establishing the fund suggests a legislative intent to
    abrogate Massolini or to alter the standards of principal
    employer liability. The legislature created the fund in
    1945 to encourage employers to hire employees with
    preexisting disabilities or injuries. See Public Acts 1945,
    No. 188; Cece v. Felix Industries, Inc., 
    248 Conn. 457
    ,
    462–63, 
    728 A.2d 505
     (1999). In 1959, the legislature
    expanded the role of the fund by requiring it to pay an
    award of compensation whenever an injured employ-
    ee’s employer or the employer’s insurer did not pay.
    See Public Acts 1959, No. 580, § 13. Today, this provision
    is codified at § 31-355.16 Section 31-355 is silent on the
    matter of principal employer liability. The defendants
    have failed to identify any ambiguity in the relevant
    statutes or statutory scheme that would prompt us to
    consider their argument for modification; nor have they
    provided any evidence suggesting that the legislature
    contemplated making any change to the meaning or
    scope of principal employer liability or otherwise reliev-
    ing municipalities of principal employer liability
    through the fund.
    The defendants’ argument also misapprehends the
    role of the fund in our workers’ compensation scheme.
    A primary purpose of the fund is to act as a backstop,
    ensuring that injured workers receive compensation
    when the employer has ‘‘failed, neglected, refused, or
    is unable to pay . . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-155 (b).
    The fund is a payer of last resort; its existence does
    not relieve employers or principal employers of their
    obligations to pay under the Workers’ Compensation
    Act. See General Statutes § 31-355 (c) (‘‘[t]he employer
    and the insurer, if any, shall be liable to the state for
    any payments made out of the fund’’).
    Finally, the defendants argue that the commissioner
    violated § 31-286a (c) by finding the city liable as the
    plaintiff’s principal employer ‘‘solely because’’ it had
    not met its statutory obligation under § 31-286a (a) to
    ensure that its contractors were in compliance with
    the workers’ compensation insurance requirements. We
    declined to grant certification on this issue and do not
    address the claim. See, e.g., Bellemare v. Wachovia
    Mortgage Corp., 
    284 Conn. 193
    , 195 n.2, 
    931 A.2d 916
    (2007).
    The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
    In this opinion PALMER, McDONALD and VERTE-
    FEUILLE, Js., concurred.
    * The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of
    the date of oral argument.
    This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this
    court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices Palmer, McDonald,
    Kahn and Ecker. Thereafter, Justice Vertefeuille and Judge Elgo were added
    to the panel and have read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a
    recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision.
    ** August 13, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip
    opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
    1
    General Statutes § 31-291 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When any principal
    employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a
    contractor, or through him by a subcontractor, and the work so procured
    to be done is a part or process in the trade or business of such principal
    employer, and is performed in, on or about premises under his control, such
    principal employer shall be liable to pay all compensation under this chapter
    to the same extent as if the work were done without the intervention of
    such contractor or subcontractor. . . .’’
    2
    The defendants in the matter before the Workers’ Compensation Commis-
    sion were (1) the city, (2) the city’s insurer, PMA Insurance Company, (3)
    the city’s contractor, All Roofs by Dominic, and (4) Howard Adams d/b/a
    Howie’s Roofing, the city’s subcontractor and the employer of the plaintiff,
    Christopher Barker. After the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner deter-
    mined that the plaintiff’s claim was compensable under the Workers’ Com-
    pensation Act and that the plaintiff’s employer was uninsured, the Second
    Injury Fund (fund) became obligated to compensate the plaintiff for his
    injuries under General Statutes § 31-355 (h). See footnote 3 of this opinion.
    The plaintiff did not participate in the proceedings before the Compensa-
    tion Review Board or the Appellate Court, but the fund participated in
    those proceedings as the appellee to defend the decision of the Workers’
    Compensation Commissioner that the city, rather than the fund, was liable
    for the payment of the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation benefits. The plain-
    tiff likewise is not a party to the present appeal, and the fund is the appellee.
    All Roofs by Dominic did not seek review of the decision of the Workers’
    Compensation Commissioner and is not a party to the present appeal. All
    references to the defendants hereinafter are to the city and its insurer, PMA
    Insurance Company.
    3
    General Statutes § 31-355 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) When an award
    of compensation has been made under the provisions of this chapter against
    an employer who failed, neglected, refused or is unable to pay any type of
    benefit coming due as a consequence of such award or any adjustment in
    compensation required by this chapter, and whose insurer failed, neglected,
    refused or is unable to pay the compensation, such compensation shall be
    paid from the Second Injury Fund. . . .
    ***
    ‘‘(h) When a finding and award of compensation [have] been made against
    an uninsured employer who fails to pay it, that compensation shall be paid
    from the Second Injury Fund . . . .’’
    4
    General Statutes § 7-148 (c) (6) (A) (i) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any
    municipality shall have the power to do any of the following . . . [e]stablish,
    lay out, construct, reconstruct, alter, maintain, repair, control and operate
    . . . garbage and refuse disposal facilities . . . and any and all buildings
    or facilities necessary or convenient for carrying on the government of the
    municipality . . . .’’
    5
    General Statutes § 31-286a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) . . . [N]either
    the state, or its agents, nor any political subdivision of the state, or its
    agents, may enter into any contract on or after October 1, 1986, for the
    construction, remodeling, refinishing, refurbishing, rehabilitation, alteration
    or repair of any public works project before receiving from each of the
    other parties to such contract [inter alia] sufficient evidence of compliance
    with the workers’ compensation insurance and self-insurance requirements
    of subsection (b) of section 31-284 . . . .
    ***
    ‘‘(c) This section shall not be construed to create any liability on the part
    of the state or any political subdivision thereof to pay workers’ compensation
    benefits or to indemnify the Second Injury Fund, any employer or any insurer
    who pays workers’ compensation benefits. . . .’’
    6
    The dissent ‘‘find[s] most significant the fact that the driver in Massolini
    was working alongside Hartford’s own employees at the time of his fatal
    injury.’’ We respectfully disagree with this reading of Massolini. The factor
    identified by the dissent was not mentioned by the court in its application
    of the principal employer statute to the facts of that case. The primary factor
    determining the outcome in Massolini was that ‘‘Hartford was engaged in
    the removal of ashes and refuse in the exercise of its police powers’’;
    Massolini v. Driscoll, 
    supra,
     
    114 Conn. 551
    –52; thus making ‘‘the disposal
    of ashes and rubbish . . . a ‘business’ in which . . . Hartford was engaged
    at the time of [the] accident . . . .’’ Id., 553.
    7
    The terms ‘‘statutory employee’’ and ‘‘statutory employer’’ often are used
    in other states to refer to what our Workers’ Compensation Act calls the
    ‘‘principal employer’’ relationship. See, e.g., 
    Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302
     (2017).
    8
    The dissent notes that the Virginia courts’ approach, which looks only
    to the ‘‘duties, obligations, and responsibilities imposed [on governmental
    entities] by statute, regulation, or other means’’ for purposes of determining
    principal employer status; (internal quotation marks omitted) footnote 6 of
    the dissenting opinion, quoting Ford v. Richmond, 
    supra,
     
    239 Va. 667
    ; was
    criticized as ‘‘out of step’’ with other state courts in a two-sentence concur-
    ring opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Best v.
    Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 
    822 F.2d 1198
    , 1202 (D.C.
    Cir.1987) (Mikva, J., concurring). Judge Mikva provided no analysis to
    accompany that criticism, but it appears that he would prefer an approach
    that determines principal employer status on the basis of whether the
    employer normally carries on a given activity through its own employees
    rather than through independent contractors. See 
    id.,
     1200–1201 (describing
    ‘‘normal work’’ test rejected by Virginia Supreme Court in context of govern-
    mental entities (internal quotation marks omitted)). We, of course, agree
    with the dissent that an approach to determining principal employer status
    for governmental entities that looks only to their legal duties and obligations
    would be overly restrictive. But this court has long considered the powers
    and duties of public entities as a relevant factor in determining principal
    employer status. See footnote 9 of this opinion. The question of whether an
    employer ordinarily would perform certain work through its own employees
    rather than through contractors is likewise relevant to the principal employer
    inquiry; it simply is ‘‘not necessarily conclusive.’’ Mancini v. Bureau of
    Public Works, 
    167 Conn. 189
    , 196, 
    355 A.2d 32
     (1974); accord Fox v. Fafnir
    Bearing Co., supra, 
    107 Conn. 195
    . Our approach is in accordance with the
    principle that ‘‘ ‘no one exclusive test can be set up’ ’’ for determining princi-
    pal employer status. Battistelli v. Connohio, Inc., 
    138 Conn. 646
    , 652, 
    88 A.2d 372
     (1952) (Inglis, J., concurring), quoting Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing
    Co., 
    136 Conn. 529
    , 532, 
    72 A.2d 655
     (1950).
    9
    The dissent is correct that the legally defined powers and obligations
    of a municipality ordinarily should not be dispositive in determining its
    ‘‘trade or business,’’ but the nature and scope of those legally prescribed
    duties are relevant to the inquiry, and looking to those legal prescriptions
    for guidance is consistent with our decisions regarding principal employer
    liability for municipal corporations. For example, in Massolini, it was signifi-
    cant that Hartford was collecting rubbish and ashes pursuant to its police
    powers. See Massolini v. Driscoll, 
    supra,
     
    114 Conn. 551
    –52; see also Mancini
    v. Bureau of Public Works, 
    167 Conn. 189
    , 196, 
    355 A.2d 32
     (1974) (it was
    significant that public entity’s charter authorized it to engage in work that
    plaintiffs had been performing when they were injured). Courts in states
    with similar ‘‘trade or business’’ language in their principal employer statutes
    have often looked to the powers, duties, and obligations of municipal corpo-
    rations to determine the ‘‘business’’ of the corporation. See Wright v. Hono-
    lulu, 
    41 Haw. 603
    , 606 (1957) (tunnel construction was ‘‘properly a part
    of [the municipality’s] business’’ under workers’ compensation law when
    municipality was authorized by law to finance and fund project); Klohn v.
    Louisiana Power & Light, 
    406 So. 2d 577
    , 580–82 (La. 1981) (when city
    bond resolution required city to retain ownership of power plant system,
    city was in business of providing electric service, notwithstanding operating
    agreement that transferred all operations of plant to contractor); Roberts
    v. Alexandria, 
    246 Va. 17
    , 20, 
    431 S.E.2d 275
     (1993) (‘‘because the [c]ity is
    authorized and empowered [by state statute and the city charter] to operate
    the jail, and to provide medical services there, the delivery of those medical
    services are within the [c]ity’s trade, business, or occupation’’); see also
    Leigh v. National Aeronautics & Space Administration, 
    860 F.2d 652
    , 653
    (5th Cir. 1988) (when federal statute authorized agency to develop, construct,
    test, and operate aeronautical and space vehicles, worker injured while
    performing test on external tank of space shuttle ‘‘was performing work
    that was part of the United States’ business’’ for purposes of state workers’
    compensation law).
    10
    The dissent argues that Pacileo is distinguishable on the grounds that
    ‘‘[a] general construction contractor, who voluntarily undertakes the organi-
    zation of a major construction project as a commercial venture, is situated
    differently from a municipality that has broad statutory powers in a variety
    of areas . . . .’’ Footnote 7 of the dissenting opinion. We agree that a munici-
    pality’s business activity will generally be broader than that of a commercial
    enterprise focused on providing a particular product or service, but we do
    not see how this should be a limiting consideration when determining a
    municipality’s trade or business. A municipality like Bridgeport has been
    conferred broad operational responsibilities. With those responsibilities
    come correspondingly broad obligations. In this regard, we repeat our obser-
    vation that the legislature has seen fit to treat public and private employers
    without distinction or differentiation for purposes of determining principal
    employer status. We respectfully disagree that a consideration deemed rele-
    vant to determining the principal employer status of a private business in
    Pacileo should be excluded from consideration as part of the same inquiry
    for a public employer.
    11
    The range of skilled tradespeople employed by the city reveals the flaw
    in the city’s argument that it cannot be the plaintiff’s principal employer
    because it is not in the business of roofing. The city also is not ‘‘in the
    business’’ of masonry, plumbing, carpentry, painting, or electrical work, yet
    it employs individuals skilled in each of these trades because the business
    of the city requires it to manage, maintain, and repair a wide range of public
    facilities, including its transfer facility.
    12
    The defendants also point to our decision in Grenier v. Grenier, 
    supra,
    138 Conn. 569
    , in support of their argument that roof repairs cannot be a
    part or process in the city’s business. In Grenier, the plaintiff was injured
    while working for a contractor hired to install weatherproofing material on
    a new roof being constructed by another contractor as part of a major
    renovation of a three-story building owned by a car dealership. 
    Id., 570
    . We
    upheld the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff’s work was not a part
    or process in the trade or business of the dealership. 
    Id., 572
    . We reject the
    defendants’ contention that there is ‘‘no distinction’’ between Grenier and
    the present case. To the contrary, we believe that the commissioner in the
    present case was entitled to see a substantial difference between the major
    capital improvement undertaken by the automobile dealership in Grenier
    and the repair of an existing roof on the city’s transfer station at issue here.
    13
    In Mancini and Hebert, the court made reference to supervision of the
    work site by the principal employer when discussing control of the premises.
    See Mancini v. Bureau of Public Works, 
    supra,
     
    167 Conn. 200
    ; Hebert v.
    RWA, Inc., supra, 
    48 Conn. App. 454
    . Control of the premises is a separate
    element of the principal employer analysis, distinct from the trade or busi-
    ness inquiry. See Crane v. Peach Bros., supra, 
    106 Conn. 113
     (‘‘[t]o render
    a principal employer liable, it is clear [that] this statute requires (1) that
    the relation of principal employer and contractor must exist in work wholly
    or in part for the former, (2) that the work must be in, on or about premises
    controlled by the principal employer, and (3) that the work be a part or
    process in the trade or business of the principal employer’’).
    14
    In doing so, we also acknowledge the wisdom found in Judge Learned
    Hand’s cautionary note that a dictionary will not always provide the very
    best resource for determining the meaning of a word at any particular time.
    See Cabell v. Markham, 
    148 F.2d 737
    , 739 (2d Cir.) (‘‘it is one of the surest
    [indices] of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress
    out of the dictionary’’), aff’d, 
    324 U.S. 404
    , 
    66 S. Ct. 193
    , 90 L. Ed. 2d (1945);
    see also United States v. Costello, 
    666 F.3d 1040
    , 1043–44 (7th Cir. 2012).
    15
    ‘‘Public corporations have always been included within the scope of
    our [Workers’ Compensation Act], no doubt because there is no substantial
    reason why their employees should be treated differently than employees
    in private industry. . . . [P]ublic corporation as used in § 31-275 (10) . . .
    signifies corporations organized for a public purpose such as municipalities
    and counties. . . . [T]his interpretation is consistent with the legislative
    history . . . . During the committee hearings on the bill that became chap-
    ter 138 of the 1913 Public Acts, [P]rofessor Willard C. Fisher, an economist
    at Wesleyan University who had been engaged by the standing committees
    on judiciary and labor to assist in drafting the act, remarked that the law
    ought to be as wide as possible in its scope; there ought to be no employment
    left out that can practicably be included. . . . Fisher stated further that
    there is no good reason for excluding employment of public corporations
    . . . truly public corporations, the state, the city and the like.’’ (Citations
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopa v. Brinker International,
    Inc., 
    296 Conn. 426
    , 431–32, 
    994 A.2d 1265
     (2010).
    16
    See footnote 3 of this opinion.