777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commission ( 2021 )


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    777 RESIDENTIAL, LLC v. THE METROPOLITAN
    DISTRICT COMMISSION
    (SC 20339)
    Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, D’Auria,
    Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*
    Syllabus
    Pursuant to statute (§ 7-249), after the acquisition or construction of a
    sewerage system, a municipality’s water pollution control authority may
    levy benefit assessments on the owners of properties and buildings
    that are benefited thereby, and ‘‘[b]enefits to buildings or structures
    constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed
    as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the
    time of the initial assessment.’’
    The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, challenging a supplemental sewerage
    benefit assessment levied pursuant to § 7-249 by the defendant, the
    Metropolitan District Commission, against certain real property owned
    by the plaintiff after the plaintiff converted a commercial office building
    on the property into a 285 unit residential condominium community.
    The plaintiff claimed that the defendant lacked authority to levy the
    supplemental assessment, reasoning that, since the initial assessment
    against the owners of the property when it was a two-story building in
    1849, there had been no new construction or expansion of the building
    or structures on the property, as required by § 7-249 for the levying
    of a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff further claimed that the
    defendant violated § 7-249 by using a different method for calculating
    the supplemental assessment than was used for calculating the initial
    assessment. The parties filed motions for summary judgment with
    respect to the issue of whether the defendant had authority to levy the
    challenged assessment. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for
    summary judgment and granted the defendant’s motion, agreeing with
    the defendant that the creation of the residential units constituted the
    construction of structures within the meaning of § 7-249, thereby author-
    izing it to levy a supplemental assessment. After a trial to the court,
    however, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, concluding that
    the defendant’s calculation of the supplemental assessment violated § 7-
    249 because the defendant did not use the street frontage method in
    calculating the supplemental assessment, which was the method used
    to calculate the initial assessment. The court ordered the defendant to
    recalculate the assessment in accordance with the foregoing method
    and to return the amount paid by the plaintiff if the property’s street
    frontage remained unchanged since the initial assessment or, if the street
    frontage had changed, to assess accordingly. Thereafter, the defendant
    appealed, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that it
    was required to use the same method to calculate the amount of the
    supplemental assessment as the method that had been used to calculate
    the initial assessment in 1849. The plaintiff cross appealed, claiming that
    the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary
    judgment because the conversion of the building into residential units
    did not constitute the construction of structures within the meaning of
    § 7-249. Held:
    1. The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary
    judgment, as there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect
    to the defendant’s authority’s to levy the supplemental assessment
    against the plaintiff’s property: having reviewed dictionary definitions
    of the term ‘‘structure’’ and the treatment of that term in prior case law,
    this court determined that the term ‘‘structure,’’ as used in § 7-249, is
    broader than the term ‘‘building,’’ and that the trial court correctly
    concluded, under the broad definition of ‘‘structure,’’ that the interior
    renovations to the existing building on the plaintiff’s property, namely,
    the creation of 285 residential units, constituted the construction of
    structures within the meaning of § 7-249, as new units were constructed
    on each floor of the existing building with each unit containing a new
    kitchen, bathroom, bedroom and living area, such that each unit was
    artificially built up or composed of parts joined together to create sepa-
    rate residences inside the existing building; moreover, there was no
    merit to the plaintiff’s claim that the broad definition of ‘‘structure’’
    should not apply because that term had acquired a peculiar meaning in
    real property law that was coextensive with the term ‘‘building,’’ as the
    statutes governing real property on which the plaintiff relied did not
    have a consistent definition of ‘‘structure’’ or consistently define those
    terms as being coextensive, thereby indicating that the term ‘‘structure’’
    had not acquired a peculiar meaning in real property law.
    2. The trial court incorrectly determined that § 7-249 required the defendant
    to use the same method to calculate the supplemental assessment as
    was used to calculate the initial assessment: the plaintiff could not
    prevail on its claim that this court’s analysis of § 7-249 in Tower Business
    Park Associates Number One Ltd. Partnership v. Water Pollution Con-
    trol Authority (
    213 Conn. 112
    ) required that the method used to calculate
    the initial assessment be the same one used for calculating the supple-
    mental assessment, as that case never addressed whether new or
    expanded buildings or structures could be assessed using a different
    method of calculation than that used for the initial assessment; more-
    over, a review of the language of § 7-249 led this court to conclude
    that § 7-249 must grant water pollution control authorities discretion in
    deciding the method to apply in assessing supplemental benefits, and
    that method may be different from the one utilized for the initial assess-
    ment, provided that that method would have been authorized under the
    rules applicable at the time of the initial assessment; furthermore, the
    plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to indicate that the defendant used
    a method that would not have been authorized under the rules governing
    such assessments in 1849, when the initial assessment was levied.
    Argued April 29—officially released September 4, 2020**
    Procedural History
    Appeal from a supplemental sewer assessment levied
    against certain of the plaintiff’s real property, and for
    other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
    district of Hartford, where the court, Noble, J., granted
    the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and ren-
    dered judgment thereon; thereafter, the court granted
    the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, vacated the
    judgment in part and restored the case to the trial
    docket; subsequently, the case was tried to the court,
    Budzik, J.; judgment for the plaintiff, from which the
    defendant appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed.
    Reversed in part; further proceedings.
    John W. Cerreta, with whom, on the brief, were Carl
    R. Nasto, assistant district counsel, and William J.
    Sweeney, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant).
    Joseph E. Faughnan, with whom were Philip G. Kent
    and, on the brief, Caleb F. Hamel and Jason L. Steven-
    son, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    D’AURIA, J. In this appeal and cross appeal, we must
    construe General Statutes § 7-249 to determine whether
    the defendant, The Metropolitan District Commission,
    had authority to levy a supplemental sewerage benefit
    assessment (supplemental assessment) against the
    property at 777 Main Street, Hartford, owned by the
    plaintiff, 777 Residential, LLC, and, if so, whether it used
    a proper methodology in calculating that assessment.
    Since at least 1849, there has been a property located
    at 777 Main Street. In 1849, a two-story building used
    as a bank was at that address. At that time, a new
    sewerage line was constructed under Main Street, con-
    necting the property to the Hartford sewerage system.
    As a result of that construction, a predecessor of the
    defendant levied a sewerage benefit assessment against
    the owners of this property in the amount of $215,
    calculated on the basis of the street frontage1 of the
    two-story building. The assessment was paid in a one-
    time lump sum payment. In 1966, this building was
    demolished, and a new twenty-six story commercial
    office building was constructed at 777 Main Street. No
    supplemental assessment was levied as a result of this
    construction.
    In 2012, the plaintiff purchased the property at 777
    Main Street. After receiving the necessary building per-
    mits and approvals, the plaintiff converted the property
    from a commercial office building into a 285 unit resi-
    dential condominium community. For each residential
    unit, the plaintiff constructed a kitchen, bathroom, bed-
    room, and living area, creating 285 separate residences
    inside the already existing building. In 2015, after con-
    struction had begun, the defendant notified the plaintiff
    that it was levying a supplemental assessment on the
    property in the amount of $473,330, calculated on the
    basis of the schedule of flat rates the defendant had
    adopted in 1995, setting a flat rate of $1655 per residen-
    tial unit. The defendant arrived at the $473,330 figure
    by multiplying this flat rate by the number of residential
    units, which it set at 286 units, rather than 285 units.
    After the supplemental assessment was approved fol-
    lowing a public hearing, the plaintiff paid the supple-
    mental assessment under protest in a single lump sum
    and appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General
    Statutes § 7-250.2 In its appeal, the plaintiff challenged
    the defendant’s authority to levy the supplemental
    assessment on the ground that, after the initial assess-
    ment, there had been no ‘‘new construction or expan-
    sion of the buildings or structures on the property,’’ as
    required under § 7-249 for the levying of a supplemental
    assessment. The plaintiff also claimed that the defen-
    dant had improperly used a different method for calcu-
    lating the assessment than was used for calculating the
    initial assessment in violation of § 7-249. It is these
    arguments that the parties present to us on appeal.3
    The parties filed motions for summary judgment as
    to the plaintiff’s claim regarding the defendant’s author-
    ity to levy the supplemental assessment, with both par-
    ties arguing that there was no genuine issue of material
    fact as to whether the defendant had authority to levy
    the supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argued that
    the defendant had no authority to levy the supplemental
    assessment because conversion of the property from a
    commercial space to residential units did not constitute
    construction or expansion of a building or structure
    under § 7-249, as the size of the building remained
    unchanged. The defendant argued to the contrary that
    it had authority because creation of 285 residential units
    constituted construction of new ‘‘structures,’’ namely,
    the residential units. Interpreting the term ‘‘structures’’
    to have a ‘‘wide meaning,’’4 the trial court agreed with
    the defendant that the creation of the residential units
    constituted construction of structures, thereby author-
    izing the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment.
    Thus, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for
    summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion
    for summary judgment on this issue.5 A bench trial was
    set to determine all remaining claims.
    After trial, the trial court concluded that the defen-
    dant’s supplemental assessment calculation violated
    § 7-249 because it should have been calculated on the
    basis of street frontage, as was the initial assessment.
    The trial court therefore invalidated the assessment and
    ordered the defendant to recalculate the supplemental
    assessment using the proper method. The court further
    ordered that, ‘‘[i]f the street frontage associated with
    777 Main Street has remained unchanged since the ini-
    tial assessment, the [defendant] is directed to return
    the amount paid by [the plaintiff] . . . [and, if] the
    street frontage . . . has changed since the initial
    assessment, [the defendant] is directed to make the
    appropriate calculation in compliance with this memo-
    randum of decision.’’
    The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,
    claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that
    it had to use the same method to calculate the supple-
    mental assessment as had been used to calculate the
    initial assessment in 1849. The plaintiff cross appealed,
    claiming that the trial court improperly rendered sum-
    mary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground
    that the defendant had authority to levy the supplemen-
    tal assessment because the plaintiff argued that conver-
    sion of the building into residential units did not consti-
    tute construction of structures under § 7-249. The
    appeal and cross appeal were transferred to this court
    pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice
    Book § 65-1.
    We agree with the defendant both that the trial court
    correctly determined that the defendant had authority
    to levy the supplemental assessment and that the trial
    court incorrectly determined that it used an improper
    method in calculating the supplemental assessment.
    Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s decision to
    render summary judgment in favor of the defendant
    and reverse the trial court’s judgment regarding the
    claim of improper methodology. Additional facts will
    be set forth as required.
    I
    The claims raised by both parties center on the proper
    interpretation of § 7-2496—whether the creation of the
    residential units constituted construction of ‘‘struc-
    tures,’’ and, if so, what method was required to calculate
    the supplemental assessment. We are therefore faced
    with ‘‘an issue of statutory construction requiring a
    conclusion of law. When construing a statute, we adhere
    to fundamental principles of statutory construction
    . . . over which our review is plenary.’’ (Citations omit-
    ted; footnote omitted.) Forest Walk, LLC v. Water Pollu-
    tion Control Authority, 
    291 Conn. 271
    , 281, 
    968 A.2d 345
     (2009).
    In construing § 7-249, our analysis is guided by Gen-
    eral Statutes § 1-2z, the plain meaning rule, which
    requires that we ‘‘first . . . consider the text of the
    statute itself and its relationship to the broader statu-
    tory scheme. If, after examining such text and consider-
    ing such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain
    and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unwork-
    able results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of
    the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to
    determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read
    in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable
    interpretation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Dudley, 
    332 Conn. 639
    , 645,
    
    212 A.3d 1268
     (2019).
    In determining whether statutory language contains
    ambiguity, ‘‘we must carefully examine the entire text
    of the statute. . . . [I]t is a basic tenet of statutory
    construction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole
    and read its subsections concurrently in order to reach
    a reasonable overall interpretation . . . .’’ (Citation
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 647.
    ‘‘[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created
    a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construc-
    tion, Inc. v. Eder, 
    280 Conn. 672
    , 678, 
    911 A.2d 300
    (2006).7
    ‘‘Although we generally begin with the text of the
    statute, we note that we are not writing on a clean slate
    . . . .’’ Stiffler v. Continental Ins. Co., 
    288 Conn. 38
    ,
    43, 
    950 A.2d 1270
     (2008). Although this court has not
    addressed either of the claims raised by the parties, we
    have construed § 7-249 for other purposes, which we
    briefly review prior to addressing the parties’ claims.
    The defendant ‘‘is a municipal corporation created
    in 1929 by a special act of the General Assembly. 20
    Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511 [1929]. It was given broad
    powers relating to sewage disposal, water supply and
    regional planning as well as powers limited to certain
    highways.’’ Rocky Hill Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v.
    Metropolitan District, 
    160 Conn. 446
    , 450, 
    280 A.2d 344
    (1971). The defendant has been designated the water
    pollution control authority for the metropolitan district,
    which includes ‘‘eight member and five nonmember
    towns in the greater Hartford area . . . .’’ Glastonbury
    v. Metropolitan District Commission, 
    328 Conn. 326
    ,
    327, 
    179 A.3d 201
     (2018); see General Statutes § 7-246.
    The defendant’s authority is limited to ‘‘those powers
    that have been expressly granted to it by the state or
    that are necessary for it to discharge its duties and to
    carry out its objects and purposes.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Wright v. Woodridge Lake Sewer Dis-
    trict, 
    218 Conn. 144
    , 148, 
    588 A.2d 176
     (1991).
    Section 7-249 authorizes the defendant, like any other
    water pollution control authority, to levy special benefit
    assessments—including supplemental assessments—
    against the property benefited by the sewerage system.
    ‘‘The benefit to a property owner is measured solely
    according to the amount by which the improvement
    causes the property to increase in market value. . . .
    Under § 7-249, [t]he monetary value of the special bene-
    fit conferred upon a piece of property by the presence of
    a sewerage system must be calculated by the difference
    between the market value of the realty with and without
    the sewerage system . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Shoreline Care Ltd. Part-
    nership v. North Branford, 
    231 Conn. 344
    , 351, 
    650 A.2d 142
     (1994).8
    II
    The plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly
    concluded that the defendant had authority to levy the
    supplemental assessment because creation of the resi-
    dential units did not constitute construction of struc-
    tures under § 7-249. It argues that, although the term
    ‘‘structure’’ may have a broad definition in other areas
    of the law, it has acquired a particular meaning within
    the context of property law, which the trial court and
    the defendant ignored. Specifically, the plaintiff submits
    that the term ‘‘structure’’ is equivalent to the term
    ‘‘building’’ under this state’s property laws and should
    be so defined under § 7-249. We disagree.
    ‘‘The party seeking summary judgment has the bur-
    den of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of]
    material facts which, under applicable principles of sub-
    stantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of
    law . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty
    Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 
    290 Conn. 767
    , 787, 
    967 A.2d 1
     (2009). Our review of a trial court’s
    decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is
    plenary. See, e.g., Grimm v. Fox, 
    303 Conn. 322
    , 329,
    
    33 A.3d 205
     (2012). More particularly, in the present
    case, because the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court
    erroneously rendered summary judgment in favor of
    the defendant distills to an issue of statutory interpreta-
    tion—whether the alterations to the property consti-
    tuted construction of ‘‘structures’’ under § 7-249—our
    review is limited to that legal conclusion. See, e.g., Mort-
    gage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. White,
    
    278 Conn. 219
    , 226, 
    896 A.2d 797
     (2006).
    Section 7-249 authorizes a water pollution control
    authority to levy a supplemental assessment for benefits
    to ‘‘buildings or structures constructed or expanded’’
    after the initial assessment. See Tower Business Park
    Associates Number One Ltd. Partnership v. Water Pol-
    lution Control Authority, 
    213 Conn. 112
    , 121, 
    566 A.2d 696
     (1989) (Tower Business). The parties agree that
    the interior renovations to the property at issue—the
    creation of 285 residential units—did not constitute
    construction or expansion of the building and did not
    constitute expansion of the existing structures. The
    issue is whether these renovations constituted con-
    struction of ‘‘structures.’’
    The term ‘‘structures’’ is not defined in § 7-249, and
    this court never has interpreted this term in the context
    of § 7-249. When a statute does not define a term, ‘‘Gen-
    eral Statutes § 1-1 (a) directs that we construe the term
    according to its commonly approved usage, mindful of
    any peculiar or technical meaning it may have assumed
    in the law. We may find evidence of such usage, and
    technical meaning, in dictionary definitions, as well as
    by reading the statutory language within the context of
    the broader legislative scheme.’’ State v. Menditto, 
    315 Conn. 861
    , 866, 
    110 A.3d 410
     (2015). Additionally, we
    may look to prior case law defining the term at issue.
    See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, 
    327 Conn. 225
    , 246, 
    173 A.3d 888
     (2017) (looking to case law to
    construe phrase ‘‘arising out of’’ to determine whether
    insurer was obligated to indemnify business owner for
    tortious conduct committed against employee); Stan-
    dard Oil of Connecticut, Inc. v. Administrator, Unem-
    ployment Compensation Act, 
    320 Conn. 611
    , 635–36,
    
    134 A.3d 581
     (2016) (looking to case law when constru-
    ing ‘‘invoice’’ in context of payments to contractors).
    Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term ‘‘structure’’
    as ‘‘[a]ny construction, production, or piece of work
    artificially built up or composed of parts purposefully
    joined together . . . .’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
    Ed. 2019) p. 1721. This definition is consistent with the
    definition of this term contained in dictionaries at and
    near the time that § 7-249 was amended in 1973 to
    include the phrase ‘‘building or structures.’’9 See Black’s
    Law Dictionary (4th Ed. 1968) p. 1592 (‘‘[a]ny construc-
    tion, or any production or piece of work artificially
    built up or composed of parts joined together in some
    definite manner’’); The American College Dictionary
    (1962) (‘‘anything composed of parts arranged together
    in some way’’); see Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.
    1979) p. 1276 (‘‘Any construction, or any production or
    piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts
    joined together in some definite manner. That which is
    built or constructed; an edifice or building of any kind.
    A combination of materials to form a construction for
    occupancy, use or ornamentation whether installed on,
    above, or below the surface of a parcel of land.’’); see
    also Andrew B. Hendryx Co. v. New Haven, 
    104 Conn. 632
    , 639–40, 
    134 A. 77
     (1926) (noting that dictionaries
    in 1920s defined ‘‘structure’’ as ‘‘ ‘something con-
    structed or built, as a building, a dam, a bridge’ ’’ or
    ‘‘ ‘any production or piece of work artificially built up, or
    composed of parts and joined together in some definite
    manner’ ’’); cf. State v. Menditto, supra, 
    315 Conn. 866
    (‘‘dictionaries in print at [the] time [of enactment] are
    especially instructive’’).
    Our appellate courts consistently have applied this
    dictionary definition in other contexts, such as zoning,
    insurance coverage, and criminal cases, and, in doing
    so, explained that this definition encompasses, but is
    not confined to, buildings. See Andrew B. Hendryx Co.
    v. New Haven, 
    supra,
     
    104 Conn. 640
     (defining ‘‘struc-
    ture,’’ in context of assessment for taxation, as ‘‘not
    confined to an independent building but . . . to
    include anything which is built or constructed, an edi-
    fice or building of any kind, any piece of work artificially
    built up or composed of parts joined together in some
    definite manner’’); see also Alderman v. Hanover Ins.
    Group, 
    169 Conn. 603
    , 608–609, 
    363 A.2d 1102
     (1975)
    (defining ‘‘structure’’ for insurance coverage purposes
    to include buildings, certain freestanding constructions,
    and ‘‘devices which are not in any strict sense indepen-
    dent buildings’’ but not pieces of equipment (internal
    quotation marks omitted)); State v. Perez, 
    78 Conn. App. 610
    , 644–45, 
    828 A.2d 626
     (2003) (defining ‘‘structure’’
    for purposes of burglary statute consistent with defini-
    tion in sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary), cert.
    denied, 
    271 Conn. 901
    , 
    859 A.2d 565
     (2004).
    In contrast, the term ‘‘building’’ has been defined
    more narrowly as ‘‘a fabric or edifice, framed or con-
    structed, designed to stand more or less permanently,
    and covering a space of land, for use as a dwelling,
    storehouse, factory, shelter for beasts, or some other
    useful purpose.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Katsoff v. Lucertini, 
    141 Conn. 74
    , 77, 
    103 A.2d 812
    (1954); see also Tine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 
    308 Conn. 300
    , 307, 
    63 A.3d 910
     (2013) (defining ‘‘building’’
    as ‘‘a constructed edifice designed to stand more or
    less permanently, covering a space of land, [usually]
    covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed
    by walls . . . distinguished from structures not
    designed for occupancy’’ (internal quotation marks
    omitted)); State v. Ruocco, 
    151 Conn. App. 732
    , 753, 
    95 A.3d 573
     (2014) (‘‘[a] structure with walls and a roof,
    esp[ecially] a permanent structure’’), aff’d, 
    322 Conn. 796
    , 
    144 A.3d 354
     (2016). As this court has explained,
    ‘‘while a building is always a structure, all structures
    are not buildings.’’ Katsoff v. Lucertini, 
    supra, 78
    ;
    Andrew B. Hendryx Co. v. New Haven, 
    supra,
     
    104 Conn. 640
     (same). Thus, this court has recognized that, on the
    basis of its dictionary definition, the term ‘‘structure’’
    is broader than the term ‘‘building.’’
    The trial court, under this broad definition of ‘‘struc-
    ture,’’ correctly concluded that the interior renovations
    to the property in the present case—the creation of 285
    residential units—constituted construction of struc-
    tures under § 7-249. There is no genuine issue of mate-
    rial fact that creation of the residential units was ‘‘con-
    struction, production, or piece[s] of work artificially
    built up or composed of parts purposefully joined
    together . . . .’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019)
    p. 1721. The exhibits attached to the plaintiff’s appeal
    to the Superior Court, upon which the defendant relied
    in support of its motion for summary judgment, showed
    that new units were constructed on each floor of the
    building, with each unit containing a new kitchen, bath-
    room, bedroom, and living area so that each unit was
    ‘‘artificially built up or composed of parts joined
    together’’ to create separate residences inside the
    already existing building. Andrew B. Hendryx Co. v.
    New Haven, 
    supra,
     
    104 Conn. 640
    .
    Notably, the plaintiff does not argue that, if this dic-
    tionary definition applies, there is a genuine issue of
    fact regarding whether the construction of the residen-
    tial units constitutes construction of structures. Rather,
    the plaintiff contends that this broad definition should
    not apply at all because dictionary definitions are not
    applicable when a term is accorded a peculiar meaning
    under the law and ‘‘where the context indicates that a
    different meaning was intended.’’10 (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) The plaintiff asserts that the term
    ‘‘structure’’ has acquired a peculiar meaning in real
    property law that trumps the common dictionary defini-
    tion and that real property law and benefit assessments
    are intertwined so that the definition of ‘‘structure’’
    under real property law must govern benefit assess-
    ments. The plaintiff asserts that the term ‘‘structure’’ is
    defined under real property statutes to be ‘‘somewhat
    coextensive’’ with the term ‘‘building’’ and, thus, is lim-
    ited to ‘‘those things that are built upon the vacant land,
    such as buildings, landmarks, historical sites or other
    historic structures.’’
    It is true that, if a term acquires a unique meaning
    within the confines of a certain statutory scheme, that
    definition will control over the general dictionary defini-
    tion or a definition found in case law involving other
    unrelated statutes. See, e.g., State v. Vickers, 
    260 Conn. 219
    , 224, 
    796 A.2d 502
     (2002) (‘‘[w]ords in a statute must
    be given their plain and ordinary meaning . . . unless
    the context indicates that a different meaning was
    intended’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
    Dattco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation, 
    324 Conn. 39
    , 48, 
    151 A.3d 823
     (2016) (‘‘[i]n addition to
    considering the dictionary definition of the term [at
    issue] we must consider its meaning also in the context
    that it is used in the provision at issue and in related
    provisions’’).
    Even if we assume that the definition of ‘‘structure’’
    under real property law governs benefit assessments,
    the plaintiff is wrong that the statutes governing real
    property require limiting the definition of the term
    ‘‘structure’’ so that it is coextensive with the term ‘‘build-
    ing’’ in all statutes that involve real property. In fact,
    the statutes the plaintiff cites do not explicitly define
    ‘‘structure’’ as coextensive with ‘‘building.’’ Rather, the
    statutes either provide no definition at all or merely
    provide that a building is a certain kind of structure,
    or that a structure includes buildings, which is consis-
    tent with the recognized principle that, while all build-
    ings are structures, not all structures are buildings. See
    General Statutes § 47-18a (using term ‘‘structure’’ in
    regulating ‘‘any historic structure or landmark’’ without
    defining this term); General Statutes § 47-35 (‘‘[t]obacco
    poles used in any structure utilized for the curing of
    tobacco in the leaf shall be deemed for all purposes an
    integral part of such structure’’); General Statutes § 47-
    42a (b) (using phrase ‘‘historically significant structures
    or sites’’ without any definition); General Statutes § 47-
    68a (p) (‘‘‘[b]uilding’ means a structure or structures
    containing one or more units and comprising a part of
    the property’’); General Statutes § 47-202 (28) (defining
    ‘‘real property’’ as ‘‘any leasehold or other estate or
    interest in, over, or under land, including structures,
    fixtures, and other improvements’’).
    General Statutes § 47-300 (1) is the only statute the
    plaintiff cites requiring that the term ‘‘structure’’ be
    limited to structures used as a residence, which shows
    that this limitation of the term ‘‘structure’’ is unique to
    this statute and is not generally applicable to all statutes
    involving real property. See General Statutes § 47-300
    (1) (defining ‘‘[e]ligible housing’’ as ‘‘any building, struc-
    ture or portion thereof which is used or occupied, or
    intended, arranged or designed to be used or occupied,
    as the home, residence or sleeping place of one or more
    persons or families of very low income, low income or
    moderate income’’). This also shows that the legislature
    knew how to limit the definition of the term ‘‘structure’’
    but chose not to do so in the context of § 7-249.
    Even if some statutes relating to real property treat
    the terms ‘‘building’’ and ‘‘structure’’ synonymously,
    other real property statutes list them as separate and
    distinct terms. See General Statutes § 4b-133 (a)
    (regarding security audits for ‘‘any building or struc-
    ture’’); General Statutes § 4b-135 (security requirements
    for leasing of ‘‘any building or structure’’). The fact
    that statutes governing real property do not have a
    consistent definition of ‘‘structure’’ shows that this term
    has not acquired a unique meaning in real property law.
    To the extent that the statutes cited by the plaintiff
    treat the terms ‘‘building’’ and ‘‘structure’’ equivalently,
    these statutes are distinguishable. None of these stat-
    utes uses the disjunctive, ‘‘or,’’ as used in § 7-249. When
    a statute has used the phrase, ‘‘building or structure,’’
    this court has interpreted the term ‘‘structure’’ as
    broader than ‘‘building.’’ See Andrew B. Hendryx Co.
    v. New Haven, 
    supra,
     
    104 Conn. 642
     (disjunctive refer-
    ence to ‘‘building or structure’’ in provision at issue
    signaled intent to reach both independent buildings
    affixed to land and other structures artificially built up).
    This court has explained that ‘‘[o]ther provisions in our
    statutes demonstrate that the legislature is aware that
    there is a difference between a building and other types
    of structures, and that it knows how to make specific
    reference to all structures [for broader applicability or
    to just buildings for more narrow applicability] when
    it intends to do so.’’ Tine v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
    supra, 
    308 Conn. 307
    ; see 
    id.,
     307–308 (listing statutes
    in which both terms, ‘‘structure’’ and ‘‘building’’ are
    used, showing intent that these terms are to have sepa-
    rate meanings). When the legislature has intended to
    limit a statute’s applicability to buildings, and not to
    the broader category of structures, the legislature has
    done so by using only the term ‘‘building.’’ Id., 308
    (explaining that statutes show that legislature knows
    how to extend applicability to all structures and use of
    only term ‘‘building’’ shows intent for narrower applica-
    bility).
    The plaintiff counters that the term ‘‘or’’ may be con-
    strued in the conjunctive, not the disjunctive. Ordi-
    narily, ‘‘[t]he use of the disjunctive ‘or’ between the two
    parts of the statute indicates a clear legislative intent
    of separability.’’ State v. Dennis, 
    150 Conn. 245
    , 248,
    
    188 A.2d 65
     (1963). Nevertheless, the plaintiff is correct
    that ‘‘[t]he disjunctive ‘or’ can be construed as ‘and’
    where such construction clearly appears to have been
    the legislative intent.’’ D’Occhio v. Connecticut Real
    Estate Commission, 
    189 Conn. 162
    , 170, 
    455 A.2d 833
    (1983). The present case, however, is distinguishable
    from cases in which we have interpreted ‘‘or’’ to mean
    ‘‘and,’’ because, in those cases, the words separated
    by the term ‘‘or’’ in the statute at issue were defined
    synonymously, which clearly is not the case here. See
    State v. Allen, 
    216 Conn. 367
    , 380, 
    579 A.2d 1066
     (1990)
    (clear intent for term ‘‘or’’ in phrase, ‘‘licensed or privi-
    leged,’’ in certain criminal statutes is to be construed
    in conjunctive due to definition of term ‘‘licensed’’ as
    ‘‘a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege’’
    (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Finally, the plaintiff counters that, if construction of
    structures includes interior improvements, renovations,
    or remodeling, like the creation of residential units, a
    supplemental assessment could be levied for any
    improvement made to a property, which would improp-
    erly expand the scope of the statute. We disagree.
    As explained previously, § 7-249 prohibits the total
    amount of the assessments—including both the initial
    and any supplemental assessments—from exceeding
    the value of the benefit to the property from accessing
    the sewerage system. See Tower Business, supra, 
    213 Conn. 117
     (‘‘[t]he sum of initial and subsequent assess-
    ments shall not exceed the special benefit accruing to
    the property’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). A
    supplemental assessment is limited to the value of the
    ‘‘[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or
    expanded after the initial assessment . . . .’’ (Empha-
    sis added.) General Statutes § 7-249; Tower Business,
    supra, 121. Thus, the new or expanded building or struc-
    tures must increase the benefit to the property before
    the defendant can levy a supplemental assessment. If
    the altered property receives the same benefit from
    accessing the sewerage system as did the initial prop-
    erty, then § 7-249 prohibits a supplemental assessment
    because the benefit already has been paid for through
    the initial assessment, and any additional assessment
    would cause the total amount of the assessments to
    exceed the benefit accruing to the property. Not all
    interior improvements and renovations will increase
    the ‘‘benefit’’ the property receives from the sewerage
    system. As a result, not all interior improvements made
    to a property will justify a supplemental assessment,
    and, thus, our definition of the term ‘‘structure’’ does
    not impermissibly expand the scope of § 7-249.
    Therefore, the trial court correctly interpreted the
    term ‘‘structures’’ in § 7-249 to include any ‘‘construc-
    tion, production, or piece of work artificially built up or
    composed of parts purposefully joined together . . . .’’
    Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 1721. Accord-
    ingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted
    the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because
    there was no genuine issue of material fact that the
    defendant had authority to levy the supplemental
    assessment on the ground that the creation of the 285
    residential units constituted construction of structures
    under this statute, properly construed.
    III
    Having determined, with respect to the plaintiff’s
    cross appeal, that the defendant had authority to levy
    the supplemental assessment, we turn to the defen-
    dant’s challenge on appeal to the trial court’s determina-
    tion that the defendant incorrectly calculated the sup-
    plemental assessment by failing to use the same method
    as was used for the initial assessment because the bene-
    fit to new structures may only be ‘‘assessed as if the new
    . . . structures had existed at the time of the initial
    assessment’’; General Statutes § 7-249; if the same
    method was used. The defendant argues that § 7-249
    clearly and unambiguously provides it with discretion
    to determine the proper method to apply in calculating
    both initial and supplemental assessments. We agree
    with the defendant.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are necessary to our review of this claim. At trial, the
    plaintiff offered the testimony of Allen King, a real estate
    administrator employed by the defendant, who testified
    that, in 1849, the property at 777 Main Street was
    assessed by the predecessor to the defendant, which
    did not exist in 1849, using the street frontage method,
    although King did not know why this method was used
    and was uncertain as to whether the taxing authority
    at the time used or permitted the use of any other
    method besides street frontage or lateral charge. King
    explained that a lateral charge is the fee that the defen-
    dant assesses when it brings the street line to the sewer
    line after the building owner has brought a sewer line
    from its building to the street line. King further testified
    that the supplemental assessment was levied in 2015
    because the use of the building had changed from com-
    mercial to residential. He testified that the supplemental
    assessment was calculated using the schedule of flat
    rates the defendant adopted in 1995. This schedule con-
    siders three components: the frontage charge, the lat-
    eral charge, and the area charge, with the area charge
    broken into three additional categories—acreage, num-
    ber of dwelling units, and number of rooms. Only certain
    categories apply to certain kinds of buildings. For exam-
    ple, the number of dwelling units is only a factor in
    determining the amount of the assessment for single
    unit and multiunit dwellings; the number of rooms is
    only a factor in determining the amount of the assess-
    ment for hospitals, hotels, motels, and convalescent
    homes; and acreage is only a factor in determining the
    amount of the assessment for commercial buildings,
    schools, and churches.
    King also testified that the defendant had incurred
    no costs from the plaintiff’s conversion of the property
    into residential units. There had, however, been sys-
    temwide upgrades, changes, and improvements to the
    Hartford sewerage system, although he was unaware
    of any new construction to the Main Street sewerage
    line connecting the property to the Hartford sewerage
    system since 1849.
    The plaintiff offered no evidence regarding the mar-
    ket value of the property, originally or as altered, from
    any time period. Nor did the plaintiff offer any evidence,
    expert or otherwise, showing that the amount of the
    supplemental assessment exceeded the benefit to the
    property from accessing the sewerage system.
    The defendant presented the testimony of Richard
    Michaud, a real estate appraiser, who valued the prop-
    erty as altered at $53 million. Michaud testified that,
    without access to the sewerage system, the property
    could not function as a residential building, so it would
    be worthless. Additionally, he testified that the use of
    any other type of system, such as a septic system or a
    storage tank system, was more expensive than the price
    of the assessment.
    In its decision, the trial court determined that it did
    not need to decide whether the supplemental assess-
    ment was excessive11 because it concluded that the
    defendant had incorrectly calculated the supplemental
    assessment, which should have been calculated on the
    basis of street frontage, as was the 1849 assessment. The
    crux of the trial court’s decision regarding methodology
    was that, if § 7-249 required improvements or alter-
    ations to properties to be ‘‘assessed as if the new . . .
    structures had existed at the time of the initial assess-
    ment,’’ the only way to do so would be to use the same
    method that was used during the initial assessment.
    The trial court relied on this court’s decision in Tower
    Business, supra, 
    213 Conn. 112
    , in support of its ratio-
    nale. Specifically, the trial court reasoned that, in Tower
    Business, this court characterized the use of the same
    method in calculating both the initial and supplemental
    assessments as the ‘‘prescribed method for calculating
    the amount of a special assessment . . . .’’ 
    Id., 118
    .
    The trial court explained that, given that the frontal
    footage may not have changed since 1849—an issue
    on which it made no finding—its decision was not
    unreasonable or absurd, even if it prevented the defen-
    dant from levying a supplemental assessment at all
    because there was no evidence that, since 1849, there
    had been any improvements to the sewerage line con-
    necting the property at 777 Main Street to the sewerage
    system, and, thus, there were no costs for the defendant
    to recoup through the supplemental assessment.
    Although there was evidence that the defendant had
    made improvements to the Hartford sewerage system
    generally, the trial court determined that there was no
    evidence of how these improvements affected or bene-
    fited the subject property.
    To resolve this claim, we begin with the text of § 7-
    249 and apply the principles of statutory construction
    that we previously discussed. See footnote 7 of this
    opinion and accompanying text. The parties dispute
    whether the statute’s second sentence, governing sup-
    plemental assessments, regulates the method to be used
    in calculating supplemental assessments: ‘‘Benefits to
    buildings or structures constructed or expanded after
    the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or
    expanded buildings or structures had existed at the
    time of the initial assessment.’’ General Statutes § 7-249.
    This language does not explicitly refer to any particular
    method for arriving at such an assessment.
    Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that, in Tower Busi-
    ness, this court construed this language to require use
    of the same method in calculating both the initial and
    supplemental assessment. See Tower Business, supra,
    
    213 Conn. 116
    . In Tower Business, a one-story factory
    building initially had been assessed in 1974 using the
    grand list valuation method. 
    Id.
     Subsequently, in the
    1980s, the plaintiff converted this one-story factory
    building into a two-story commercial office building.
    
    Id.
     As a result of the renovations, the defendant levied
    a supplemental assessment that was calculated by using
    the same grand list valuation method that was in effect
    in 1974. 
    Id.
    The plaintiff in Tower Business appealed the supple-
    mental assessment, claiming that it was excessive
    because the volume of sewage generated by the two-
    story office building was less than when the former
    one-story factory building was in operation. 
    Id.,
     118–19.
    In determining whether the supplemental assessment
    was excessive, this court examined the same second
    sentence of the statute at issue in the present case and
    explained: ‘‘The evident purpose of this provision of § 7-
    249 is to allow a municipality to impose a supplemental
    assessment for new or improved buildings in an amount
    that, together with the initial assessment, will equal
    the assessment that would have been made if these
    improvements had existed at the time of the initial
    assessment. In order to defeat the supplemental assess-
    ment that has been imposed on its property, therefore,
    the plaintiff must prove that, together with the initial
    assessment, it exceeds the benefit that access to the
    sewers would have conferred upon the property as a
    whole at the time of the initial assessment if the present
    office building had then been erected [with the benefit
    being] . . . calculated by the difference between the
    market value of the realty with and without the sewer-
    age system . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Id., 118.
    In evaluating the plaintiff’s claim in Tower Business,
    this court noted that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff [did] not claim that
    this prescribed method for calculating the amount of
    a special assessment [had] not been followed by the
    defendant.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Rather, the plaintiff’s
    claim in Tower Business was premised on the argument
    that a supplemental assessment may not be imposed if
    there is no evidence that the changes to the property
    will cause additional use of the sewerage system. Id.,
    119–20. This court rejected that argument. Id.
    The plaintiff in the present case, however, makes an
    altogether different argument than the argument raised
    in Tower Business. As stated, Tower Business involved
    whether sewerage use factored into whether a supple-
    mental assessment was proper, not whether the defen-
    dant had to use the same method to calculate both the
    initial and supplemental assessments. Nonetheless, the
    plaintiff in the present case argues that, although meth-
    odology was not at issue in Tower Business, this court’s
    analysis of § 7-249 in Tower Business requires the same
    method to be used for the supplemental assessment as
    was used for the initial assessment because that prac-
    tice occurred in Tower Business and we described it
    as the ‘‘prescribed method for calculating the amount
    of a special assessment . . . .’’ Id., 118.
    Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, however, this
    court did not characterize the use of the same method
    for calculating the initial and supplemental assessments
    as the ‘‘prescribed method’’ but, rather, the phrase, ‘‘this
    prescribed method for calculating the amount of a spe-
    cial assessment,’’ referred to the court’s statement that
    § 7-249 requires the defendant to value the altered prop-
    erty as if it existed at the time of the initial assessment.
    Specifically, this court was referring to its determina-
    tion that supplemental assessments of ‘‘new or
    improved buildings [or structures] [cannot exceed] an
    amount that, together with the initial assessment, will
    equal the assessment that would have been made if
    these improvements had existed at the time of the initial
    assessment.’’ Id. The ‘‘method’’ that Tower Business
    referred to is the method for calculating the date of
    valuation, not the factors the defendant considers in
    calculating the assessments, such as street frontage,
    acreage, lateral charge, grand list valuation, and use.
    The defendant in Tower Business assessed the expan-
    sion of the building as if the expanded building had
    existed in 1974; id., 116; in conformance with this ‘‘pre-
    scribed method’’ regarding the date of valuation. There
    is no reference, however, in Tower Business about
    whether the defendant must consider the same factors
    in calculating the initial and supplemental assessments.
    Because this issue was not raised in Tower Business,
    the court never addressed whether new or expanded
    buildings or structures could be assessed using a differ-
    ent method, as if they existed at the time of the initial
    assessment.12
    Therefore, we are not convinced that our decision in
    Tower Business compels a conclusion that the second
    sentence of § 7-249 requires that a certain method apply
    to supplemental assessments. In the absence of any
    controlling interpretation of the second sentence of the
    statute, we turn back to the language of the statute,
    examined as a whole, to determine whether it clearly
    and unambiguously addresses the proper method that
    a water pollution control authority must employ in cal-
    culating a supplemental assessment. See, e.g., Vibert v.
    Board of Education, 
    260 Conn. 167
    , 176, 
    793 A.2d 1076
    (2002). Because § 7-249 is a lengthy statute (fourteen
    sentences) packed with content, an examination of the
    statute sentence by sentence is both unavoidable and
    useful.
    The statute begins with a general grant of power to
    water pollution control authorities to levy assessments,
    so long as the property is benefited by the sewerage
    system and the assessment conforms to the rules
    adopted by the water pollution control authority.13 The
    statute then specifies certain circumstances in which
    the water pollution control authority may levy specific
    kinds of assessments, such as supplemental assess-
    ments,14 as is principally at issue in the present case,
    and deferred assessments for land not yet developed.15
    After explaining the different types of assessments,
    § 7-249 sets forth a limitation on the total amount of
    the assessment levied on a property, including ‘‘[t]he
    sum of initial and subsequent assessments . . . .’’16 The
    next three sentences of the statute then set forth costs
    that may be considered in determining the amount of
    the assessment, stating that ‘‘[s]uch assessment’’—
    referring to the use of the phrase, ‘‘sum of initial and
    subsequent assessments,’’ in the previous sentence—
    may include a variety of costs, such as ‘‘a proportionate
    share of the cost of any part of the sewerage system
    . . . .’’17 The plain and unambiguous language of the
    statute therefore makes clear that, in these three senten-
    ces of the statute regarding costs to be considered in
    determining the amount of the assessments, the phrase
    ‘‘[s]uch assessment’’ includes all of the types of assess-
    ments previously set forth, including the initial assess-
    ments, any supplemental assessment, and any deferred
    assessment.
    Only after these three sentences does § 7-249 estab-
    lish the required method for calculating assessments.
    The statute’s tenth sentence provides: ‘‘In assessing
    benefits and apportioning the amount to be raised
    thereby among the properties benefited, the water pol-
    lution control authority may give consideration to the
    area, frontage, grand list valuation and to present or
    permitted use or classification of benefited properties
    and to any other relevant factors.’’ We have described
    this portion of the statute as ‘‘broad,’’ granting water
    pollution control authorities discretion to determine
    the method to apply in calculating initial assessments.
    Gaynor-Stafford Industries, Inc. v. Water Pollution
    Control Authority, 
    192 Conn. 638
    , 645, 
    474 A.2d 752
    (‘‘§ 7-249 contains broad provisions, permitting the
    [water pollution control authority] to ‘give consider-
    ation to the area, frontage, grand list valuation and to
    present or permitted use or classification of benefited
    properties and to any other relevant factors’ ’’), cert.
    denied, 
    469 U.S. 932
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 328
    , 
    83 L. Ed. 2d 265
    (1984). Unless we conclude that a certain method is
    unreasonable, we defer to the water pollution control
    authority’s discretion in setting the method. See id.,
    646 (‘‘where the formula adopted bears a reasonable
    relationship to the benefits conferred the method of
    assessment would be upheld’’). We have not, however,
    determined whether this discretion extends to the
    method employed in calculating supplemental assess-
    ments, as opposed to initial assessments.
    The plaintiff argues that the clause, ‘‘assessing bene-
    fits,’’ ‘‘pertains to the method by which initial assess-
    ments are formulated,’’ not to supplemental assessments,
    because of the distance between the two sentences.
    This argument, however, ignores the statute’s context.
    First, the term ‘‘assessing’’ is not limited in any way.
    Second, we note that, if textual proximity were relevant
    or determinative, the portion of the statute regarding
    initial assessments is located even farther from this
    section on methodology—it is the first sentence of the
    statute. Third, as we have explained, immediately prior
    to this portion on methodology, the phrase, ‘‘[s]uch
    assessments,’’ refers to both ‘‘initial and subsequent
    assessments’’ in regard to the costs that may be consid-
    ered in calculating assessments. The statute then sets
    forth how ‘‘[s]uch assessments’’ may be calculated. In
    context, the phrase, ‘‘[i]n assessing benefits,’’ is reason-
    ably susceptible to only one interpretation—it means
    ‘‘in assessing benefits for such assessments, including
    both initial and subsequent assessments.’’ As a result,
    we conclude that § 7-249 must grant water pollution
    control authorities discretion in deciding the method
    to apply in assessing supplemental benefits. Thus, in
    the present case, although the total amount of the initial
    and supplemental assessments could not exceed the
    value of the benefit that access to the sewerage system
    would have conferred on the altered property if it had
    existed in 1849, the defendant retained discretion to
    determine the method to apply in calculating the supple-
    mental assessment. The plaintiff, which bears the bur-
    den in this case, however, has not maintained any claims
    before this court or the trial court18 that either the assess-
    ment exceeded the benefit to the property or that the
    method was unreasonable.
    The plaintiff counters that, even if the portion of § 7-
    249 regarding methodology is not explicitly limited to
    calculating the initial assessment, other portions of § 7-
    249 require use of the same method for calculating
    the initial and supplemental assessments. The plaintiff
    contends that § 7-249 requires the defendant to adopt
    rules regarding levying assessments and to comply with
    those rules, and interprets this portion of the statute
    to prevent the defendant from changing the rules appli-
    cable to a certain property once it levies the initial
    assessment, thereby requiring the defendant to apply
    the same rules to the supplemental assessment as
    existed at the time of the initial assessment. Specifically,
    the plaintiff argues that, because the method used has
    to conform with the rules adopted by the defendant,
    and because the supplemental assessment has to be
    based on the benefit to the property as of the time of
    the initial assessment, the method used for calculating
    the supplemental assessment must be a method author-
    ized at the time of the initial assessment and not a
    method authorized by rules adopted after 1849. The
    plaintiff contends that the only methods authorized in
    1849 were street frontage and lateral charge, and, thus,
    the defendant was limited to those methods in calculat-
    ing the supplemental assessment because, as the trial
    court determined, it would be impossible to assess the
    altered property as if it existed in 1849 by using a
    method that did not exist at that time.
    The plaintiff is correct that the first sentence in § 7-
    249 requires the defendant to set rules regarding benefit
    assessments and to comply with those rules. See Gen-
    eral Statutes § 7-249 (‘‘the water pollution control
    authority may levy benefit assessments upon the lands
    and buildings in the municipality which, in its judgment,
    are especially benefited thereby . . . according to
    such rule as the water pollution control authority
    adopts’’). Even if this sentence prevents the defendant
    from changing the rules applicable to a particular prop-
    erty once it levies the initial assessment, and thus limits
    the defendant’s choice in method to the same extent
    limited in 1849, nothing in the statute prevents the
    defendant from using a different method for calculating
    the initial and supplemental assessments, as long as
    that method was authorized under the rules applicable
    at the time of the initial assessment. The plaintiff has
    failed to offer any evidence that the defendant used a
    method not authorized under the rules governing bene-
    fit assessments in 1849. Evidence at trial showed that,
    at the time of the initial assessment, which predated
    § 7-249, a predecessor to the defendant was in charge of
    levying sewerage benefit assessments, and no evidence
    was offered as to the extent of its authority. Although
    there is evidence in the record that the initial assess-
    ment was calculated on the basis of street frontage,
    there is no evidence that the authority of the defendant’s
    predecessor was limited to considering only street
    frontage and no other factors, such as present use.
    Rather, the testimony at trial resulted in uncertainty
    as to which methods were permitted to be used in
    calculating sewerage benefit assessments in 1849. It
    was the plaintiff’s burden to establish that a particular
    method was improper. See Gaynor-Stafford Indus-
    tries, Inc. v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra,
    
    192 Conn. 646
    .
    Moreover, to interpret § 7-249 as the plaintiff argues
    would be unworkable and absurd. See, e.g., Tappin v.
    Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., 
    265 Conn. 741
    ,
    758–59, 
    830 A.2d 711
     (2003) (‘‘[w]e will not construe a
    statute so as to effect an absurd result’’). Because water
    pollution control authorities have discretion to consider
    a variety of factors, only some of which apply to certain
    kinds of property, the method used for calculating an
    initial assessment may not apply for calculating a sup-
    plemental assessment if the use of the property has
    changed. For example, if a property used for multiunit
    residential dwellings is initially assessed on the basis
    of the number of residential units, and the property is
    later converted into a single, large commercial building
    (the opposite of what happened at 777 Main Street),
    the initial methodology might not apply for purposes
    of calculating the supplemental assessment. Under the
    plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute, in these kinds
    of circumstances, § 7-249 prohibits the levying of a sup-
    plemental assessment.
    The plaintiff argues that this court has recognized
    that, under § 7-249, the defendant may not recoup all
    of its costs for construction of the sewerage system
    through benefit assessments, so that interpreting the
    statute as it contends would not be unworkable even
    if such an interpretation would prevent the levying of
    a supplemental assessment in this case or in other cases.
    Although this court has explained that § 7-249 limits
    the defendant’s ability to recoup its costs for sewerage
    system construction in that an assessment cannot
    exceed the benefit to the property; Shoreline Care Ltd.
    Partnership v. North Branford, supra, 
    231 Conn. 352
    ;
    we never have interpreted this portion of § 7-249 as
    limiting the method that may be used to calculate sup-
    plemental assessments. If levying a supplemental
    assessment would lead to the total amount of assess-
    ments to exceed the benefit to the property, the supple-
    mental assessment is prohibited. Nevertheless, that
    does not require this court to interpret other portions
    of § 7-249 to prevent the defendant from levying a sup-
    plemental assessment, even if the assessment is not
    excessive. The statute imposes a limitation, not on the
    method used, but on the result of its calculation.
    In sum, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly
    determined that § 7-249 required the defendant to use
    the same method to calculate the supplemental assess-
    ment as was used to calculate the initial assessment.19
    Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as
    to this issue and direct the trial court on remand to
    decide any remaining claims.
    The judgment is reversed only as to the trial court’s
    determination of the defendant’s method of calculating
    the supplemental assessment and the case is remanded
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion;
    the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    * The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of
    the date of oral argument.
    ** September 4, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip
    opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
    1
    Testimony at trial established that, to calculate an assessment on the
    basis of street frontage, the number of feet that the property occupies on
    the public street is multiplied by a set rate. Evidence admitted at trial
    showed that, since 1968, the defendant had adopted schedules of flat rate
    assessments. In 1968, the defendant calculated assessments that were based
    on flat rates for street frontage, area charge, and acreage. The schedule of
    flat rate assessments was amended in 1995 and again in 2017. The record,
    however, does not establish what methods other than street frontage, if
    any, were authorized or used in 1849, or the flat rates, if any were adopted,
    for calculating assessments under those methods. Additionally, although
    the plaintiff offered some evidence that the property occupied the same
    number of feet on the public street in 1849 as it does today, the trial court
    made no finding in this regard.
    2
    General Statutes § 7-250 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) . . . [A]ny person
    aggrieved by any assessment may appeal to the superior court for the judicial
    district wherein the property is located and shall bring any such appeal to
    a return day of said court not less than twelve nor more than thirty days
    after service thereof and such appeal shall be privileged in respect to its
    assignment for trial. . . .’’
    3
    In addition to challenging the defendant’s authority to levy the supple-
    mental assessment, the plaintiff claimed in its original appeal to the Superior
    Court that the supplemental assessment (1) was excessive, as it was calcu-
    lated on the basis of 286 dwelling units, not 285 dwelling units, and (2)
    violated the fair and reasonable standard under General Statutes § 7-255,
    which governs sewerage connection and use charges. Although the plaintiff,
    in its initial pleading on appeal to the Superior Court, did not challenge the
    propriety of the method used by the defendant to calculate the supplemental
    assessment, the plaintiff argued at trial that the supplemental assessment
    was improper because it was calculated through the use of an incorrect
    method. Following the close of evidence and closing argument, the plaintiff
    requested permission to amend its appeal to conform the allegations to the
    evidence presented at trial. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s request over
    the defendant’s objection. The plaintiff then added a new count, claiming
    that the supplemental assessment ‘‘was improperly calculated using the
    incorrect methodology in violation of the requirements of [§ 7-249].’’ It is
    this count on which the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff
    and that is the subject of the defendant’s appeal to this court. The trial court
    found in the defendant’s favor on the ‘‘fair and reasonable’’ issue under § 7-
    255, an issue the plaintiff has not challenged on appeal. Although the trial
    court found that the proper number of residential units was 285, it deter-
    mined that it did not need to decide whether the supplemental assessment
    was excessive because it determined that the defendant used an improper
    method to calculate the supplemental assessment.
    4
    Because § 7-249 does not define the term ‘‘structure,’’ the trial court
    looked to both the dictionary definition of the term and this court’s prior
    case law defining the term, concluding that the term ‘‘structure’’ is broadly
    defined as ‘‘[a]ny construction, production, or piece of work artificially
    built up or composed of parts purposefully joined together . . . .’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.)
    5
    Subsequent to its rulings on the parties’ motions for summary judgment,
    the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reargument or reconsidera-
    tion and vacated only that portion of its summary judgment ruling as to the
    amount of the supplemental assessment. The court stated that its ruling as
    to the amount was based on a misapprehension of fact. The court thus
    restored the case to the trial docket for a hearing on the issue of whether
    the assessment was fair and reasonable, as required by General Statutes
    § 7-255.
    6
    General Statutes § 7-249 provides in relevant part: ‘‘At any time after
    a municipality, by its water pollution control authority, has acquired or
    constructed, a sewerage system or portion thereof, the water pollution
    control authority may levy benefit assessments upon the lands and buildings
    in the municipality which, in its judgment, are especially benefited thereby,
    whether they abut on such sewerage system or not, and upon the owners
    of such land and buildings, according to such rule as the water pollution
    control authority adopts, subject to the right of appeal as hereinafter pro-
    vided. Benefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the
    initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or
    structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment. Such benefits and
    benefits to anticipated development of land zoned for other than business,
    commercial or industrial purposes or land classified as farm land, forest
    land or open space land on the last completed grand list of the municipality
    in which such land is located, pursuant to the provisions of sections 12-
    107a to 12-107e, inclusive, shall not be assessed until such construction or
    expansion or development is approved or occurs. . . . The sum of initial
    and subsequent assessments shall not exceed the special benefit accruing
    to the property. Such assessment may include a proportionate share of the
    cost of any part of the sewerage system, including the cost of preliminary
    studies and surveys, detailed working plans and specifications, acquiring
    necessary land or property or any interest therein, damage awards, construc-
    tion costs, interest charges during construction, legal and other fees, or any
    other expense incidental to the completion of the work. The water pollution
    control authority may divide the total territory to be benefited by a sewerage
    system into districts and may levy assessments against the property bene-
    fited in each district separately. In assessing benefits against property in
    any district the water pollution control authority may add to the cost of the
    part of the sewerage system located in the district a proportionate share
    of the cost of any part of the sewerage system located outside the district
    but deemed by the water pollution control authority to be necessary or
    desirable for the operation of the part of the system within the district. In
    assessing benefits and apportioning the amount to be raised thereby among
    the properties benefited, the water pollution control authority may give
    consideration to the area, frontage, grand list valuation and to present or
    permitted use or classification of benefited properties and to any other
    relevant factors. . . . Revenue from the assessment of benefits shall be
    used solely for the acquisition or construction of the sewerage system
    providing such benefits or for the payment of principal of and interest
    on bonds or notes issued to finance such acquisition or construction. No
    assessment shall be made against any property in excess of the special
    benefit to accrue to such property. . . .’’
    7
    The plaintiff argues that, to the extent § 7-249 is ambiguous, the statute
    should be strictly construed in its favor because a supplemental assessment
    is a tax. See, e.g., Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp. v. Stamford, 
    156 Conn. 33
    , 36, 
    238 A.2d 410
     (1968) (‘‘[w]hen a taxing statute is being considered,
    ambiguities are resolved in favor of the taxpayer’’). In light of our determina-
    tion, however, that the statute, when read as a whole, is plain and unambigu-
    ous, we do not need to address whether this canon of interpretation applies
    in this circumstance. See, e.g., Key Air, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue
    Services, 
    294 Conn. 225
    , 241, 
    983 A.2d 1
     (2009) (presumption of strict con-
    struction in favor of taxpayer does not apply when statute is not ambiguous).
    8
    Although a special benefit assessment is not at issue in the present case,
    we note that, when a property owner appeals a special benefit assessment,
    ‘‘there is a presumption as to the regularity, validity and correctness of a
    special benefit assessment that imposes the burden of proof on the property
    owner challenging the assessment.’’ Shoreline Care Ltd. Partnership v.
    North Branford, supra, 
    231 Conn. 350
    . ‘‘[T]o overcome the presumption of
    validity of the benefit assessment, a property owner must introduce compe-
    tent evidence that the assessment is greater than the increase in market
    value to the property caused by the improvement.’’ Id., 353. When the special
    benefit assessment is supplemental, ‘‘[t]he sum of initial and subsequent
    assessments shall not exceed the special benefit accruing to the property.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tower Business Park Associates Num-
    ber One Ltd. Partnership v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 
    213 Conn. 112
    , 117, 
    566 A.2d 696
     (1989).
    9
    In 1971, § 7-249 was amended to include the portion of the statute at
    issue, although with some variations: ‘‘Benefits to buildings constructed or
    expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or
    expanded structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment.’’
    (Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1971, No. 699. In 1973, this portion of the
    statute was amended to read as it does today: ‘‘Benefits to buildings or
    structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be
    assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at
    the time of the initial assessment.’’ (Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1973, No.
    73-523, § 1.
    10
    The plaintiff also looks to the legislative history of § 7-249 to show that
    ‘‘context indicate[d] that a different meaning was intended.’’ The plaintiff
    relies on a single statement that the purpose of the 1973 amendment; see
    footnote 9 of this opinion; was to ‘‘clarify the definition of a building in
    this act,’’ which, it argues, proves that the legislature intended the terms
    ‘‘building’’ and ‘‘structure’’ to be coextensive. 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1973
    Sess., p. 5401, remarks of Representative Morton J. Blumenthal. Section 1-
    2z, however, prohibits this court from looking to legislative history in the
    absence of a finding of ambiguity in a statute. See, e.g., Stone-Krete Construc-
    tion, Inc. v. Eder, 
    supra,
     
    280 Conn. 677
    –78 (court may not consider legislative
    history in construing statute unless it first establishes that statute is ambigu-
    ous). Nevertheless, we note that the legislative history does not support the
    plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute. Although this statement shows that
    the amendment was attempting to clarify the term ‘‘buildings,’’ it does not
    shed light on whether these two terms should be defined synonymously.
    Rather, the fact that the two terms appeared to originally be used inter-
    changeably in No. 699 of the 1971 Public Acts, after which this language
    was amended in No. 73-523, § 1, of the 1973 Public Acts, shows an intent
    for these two terms to be separate and distinct. See footnote 9 of this opinion.
    11
    Nevertheless, as to the plaintiff’s claim that the supplemental assessment
    was excessive because it was based on 286 residential units, not 285, the
    trial court found that the proper number of residential units was 285. Addi-
    tionally, the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence
    establishing that the sum of the initial and supplemental assessments
    exceeded the benefit to the property.
    12
    We note that, although the plaintiff relies on this language in support
    of its argument that the defendant was required to use the same method
    as was used at the time of the initial assessment, the plaintiff never has
    raised a claim that the supplemental assessment was invalid because it was
    not assessed as if the altered property existed in 1849. The defendant
    assessed the altered property using the flat rate schedule adopted in 1995.
    The only testimony as to the proper date of valuation was testimony from
    Patrick J. Wellspeak, a commercial real estate appraiser and consultant,
    that valuation of the altered property as if it existed in 1849 was nearly
    impossible because high-rise condominium complexes did not exist in 1849.
    Nevertheless, we note that not only was this claim not raised, but also that
    it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that the amount of the combined initial
    and supplemental assessments exceeds the benefit to the altered property
    as if it existed in 1849.
    13
    The first sentence of § 7-249 provides: ‘‘At any time after a municipality,
    by its water pollution control authority, has acquired or constructed, a
    sewerage system or portion thereof, the water pollution control authority
    may levy benefit assessments upon the lands and buildings in the municipal-
    ity which, in its judgment, are especially benefited thereby, whether they
    abut on such sewerage system or not, and upon the owners of such land
    and buildings, according to such rule as the water pollution control authority
    adopts, subject to the right of appeal as hereinafter provided.’’
    14
    The second sentence of § 7-249 provides: ‘‘Benefits to buildings or struc-
    tures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed
    as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time
    of the initial assessment.’’
    15
    The third, fourth and fifth sentences of § 7-249 provide: ‘‘Such benefits
    and benefits to anticipated development of land zoned for other than busi-
    ness, commercial or industrial purposes or land classified as farm land,
    forest land or open space land on the last completed grand list of the
    municipality in which such land is located, pursuant to the provisions of
    sections 12-107a to 12-107e, inclusive, shall not be assessed until such con-
    struction or expansion or development is approved or occurs. In case of a
    property so zoned or classified which exceeds by more than one hundred
    per cent the size of the smallest lot permitted in the lowest density residential
    zone allowed under zoning regulations or, in the case of a town having no
    zoning regulations, a lot size of one acre in area and one hundred fifty feet
    in frontage, assessment of such excess land shall be deferred until such
    time as such excess land shall be built upon or a building permit issued
    therefor or until approval of a subdivision plan of such excess property by
    the planning commission having jurisdiction, whichever event occurs first
    at which time assessment may be made as provided herein. No lien securing
    payment shall be filed until the property is assessed.’’
    16
    The sixth sentence of § 7-249 provides: ‘‘The sum of initial and subse-
    quent assessments shall not exceed the special benefit accruing to the prop-
    erty.’’
    17
    The seventh, eighth, and ninth sentences of § 7-249 provide: ‘‘Such
    assessment may include a proportionate share of the cost of any part of
    the sewerage system, including the cost of preliminary studies and surveys,
    detailed working plans and specifications, acquiring necessary land or prop-
    erty or any interest therein, damage awards, construction costs, interest
    charges during construction, legal and other fees, or any other expense
    incidental to the completion of the work. The water pollution control author-
    ity may divide the total territory to be benefited by a sewerage system into
    districts and may levy assessments against the property benefited in each
    district separately. In assessing benefits against property in any district the
    water pollution control authority may add to the cost of the part of the
    sewerage system located in the district a proportionate share of the cost
    of any part of the sewerage system located outside the district but deemed
    by the water pollution control authority to be necessary or desirable for
    the operation of the part of the system within the district.’’
    18
    Although the plaintiff did claim in its appeal to the trial court that the
    supplemental assessment was excessive because it was based on 286 units,
    not 285, the plaintiff never claimed that the total of the initial and supplemen-
    tal assessments exceeded the value of the benefit to the altered property
    as if it existed in 1849. The defendant never had notice that it had to
    rebut any evidence that the assessment amount exceeded the benefit to the
    property. Moreover, the parties and the trial court concede that the plaintiff
    never attempted to meet its burden in this regard.
    19
    The plaintiff contends that, even if the supplemental assessment was
    calculated using a proper method, because the defendant has not challenged
    the trial court’s finding that improvements to the Hartford sewerage system
    since 1849 have not benefited or affected the property, the supplemental
    assessment was unlawful ab initio. Specifically, the trial court found:
    ‘‘[T]here is no evidence of any improvements to the [sewerage line] serving
    777 Main Street. [The defendant] did present evidence that it made improve-
    ments to the Hartford [sewerage] system generally over the years, and the
    court credit[ed] that evidence, but there is no evidence as to how those
    improvements may have affected [the property].’’
    The plaintiff’s argument does not relate to the plaintiff’s claim regarding
    methodology but is relevant to whether the supplemental assessment
    exceeds the benefit to the property—an issue not raised by the plaintiff in
    its appeal to the Superior Court, not decided by the trial court, and not
    supported by any evidence presented by the plaintiff, which ‘‘did not present
    any evidence that the sum of the initial and supplemental assessments
    exceeded the special benefit accruing to the property.’’ Thus, we do not
    address this issue.
    Nevertheless, we note that the trial court relied on this lack of evidence
    not to show that the supplemental assessment was excessive, but to show
    that its interpretation of § 7-249 did not place an undue hardship on the
    defendant because the defendant had not incurred any new construction
    costs since 1849, which it assumed had ‘‘long since been paid.’’ Even if that
    is true, this court consistently has stated that it is not the cost to the defendant
    but the benefit to the property that matters for determining whether a
    sewerage benefit assessment may be levied. See, e.g., Shoreline Care Ltd.
    Partnership v. North Branford, supra, 
    231 Conn. 352
    –54.
    Additionally, the plaintiff argues that this finding invalidates the supple-
    mental assessment because it shows that the defendant did not incur any
    additional costs for constructing the Main Street sewerage line connecting
    the property to the sewerage system after 1849. According to the plaintiff,
    a lack of costs incurred by the defendant invalidates the supplemental
    assessment because § 7-249 requires revenue from sewerage benefit assess-
    ments to be used only to recoup the cost of construction of the sewer;
    therefore, according to the plaintiff, if there are no costs to recoup, there
    is no authority to levy an assessment. See General Statutes § 7-249 (‘‘[r]eve-
    nue from the assessment of benefits shall be used solely for the acquisition
    or construction of the sewerage system providing such benefits or for the
    payment of principal of and interest on bonds or notes issued to finance
    such acquisition or construction’’). Again, this is an issue that does not
    involve methodology but is an unraised, unpreserved issue that the trial
    court did not address. The defendant had no notice of this issue, and, if it
    had, it may have presented different evidence at trial regarding subsequent
    construction to the Hartford sewerage system and whether any construction
    affected the sewerage line to the property, assuming that the plaintiff’s
    argument is correct. Thus, we also do not address this issue. Nevertheless,
    we note that, although there was no evidence of construction to the Main
    Street sewerage line since 1849, there was evidence of construction to
    the Hartford sewerage system since 1849, and § 7-249 permits assessment
    revenue to be used to recoup costs for construction of the sewerage system
    benefiting the property.