State v. Joseph V. ( 2023 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH V.*
    (SC 20504)
    McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.
    Syllabus
    A criminal information is duplicitous when it charges a defendant in a single
    count with two or more distinct and separate criminal offenses, thereby
    implicating the defendant’s constitutional right to a unanimous jury
    verdict.
    In the companion case of State v. Douglas C. (
    345 Conn. 421
    ), this court
    recognized that a duplicitous information may raise two distinct and
    separate kinds of issues regarding a defendant’s right to jury unanimity:
    unanimity as to the elements of a crime, which arises when a defendant
    is charged in a single count with having violated multiple statutory
    provisions, subsections, or clauses, requiring the court to determine
    whether the statutory provisions, subsections, or clauses constitute sep-
    arate elements of the statute, thereby requiring jury unanimity, or alterna-
    tive means of committing a single element, which do not require jury
    unanimity; and unanimity as to instances of conduct, which arises when
    a defendant is charged in a single count with having violated a single
    statutory provision, subsection, or clause on multiple, separate
    occasions.
    Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, risk of injury
    to a child, and conspiracy to commit risk of injury to a child in connection
    with his sexual abuse of the victim, the defendant appealed to the
    Appellate Court. T, the victim’s half brother, began sexually abusing the
    victim when the victim was four or five years old. In 2006, T moved to
    a new residence with his and the victim’s father, where the victim
    would periodically have overnight visits. T’s sexual abuse of the victim
    continued at the father’s residence. The defendant, who is a first cousin
    of the victim and T, also began to sexually abuse the victim at that time.
    The defendant and T often abused the victim simultaneously, and the
    abuse occurred until 2010, when the victim was ten years old. In the
    risk of injury count, the state alleged that, on ‘‘diverse dates’’ between
    2006 and 2010, at the residence of the victim’s father, the defendant had
    contact with the victim’s intimate parts and subjected the victim to
    contact with the defendant’s intimate parts, in violation of the risk of
    injury to a child statute (§ 53-21 (a) (2)). In the sexual assault count,
    the state alleged that the defendant had violated the first degree sexual
    assault statute (§ 53a-70 (a) (2)) by engaging in fellatio and anal inter-
    course with the victim, also on diverse dates between 2006 and 2010 at
    the father’s residence. Prior to trial, defense counsel sought a bill of
    particulars, claiming that the information was duplicitous in that the
    evidence at trial would show multiple, separate incidents of abuse, each
    of which could constitute a separate violation of the statutes at issue,
    giving rise to the risk that the defendant would not be afforded a unani-
    mous verdict because the jurors could reach a guilty verdict on the
    same count on the basis of findings as to different incidents of sexual
    abuse. The trial court denied counsel’s motion for a bill of particulars,
    and, at trial, the state offered testimony from the victim and T about
    four separate incidents of abuse that occurred on distinct dates, as well
    as the victim’s testimony that additional incidents of abuse had occurred
    but had ‘‘blurred together’’ in his memory. Thereafter, the trial court
    denied defense counsel’s request that the jury be given a specific unanim-
    ity instruction as to each count. The Appellate Court affirmed the judg-
    ment of conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certification,
    appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court had violated his
    constitutional right to jury unanimity as to instances of conduct by
    denying defense counsel’s requests for a bill of particulars and a specific
    unanimity instruction insofar as each count was premised on multiple,
    separate incidents of unlawful conduct, each of which could establish
    a separate violation of the same statute. In the alternative, the defendant
    claimed that the counts pertaining to risk of injury and conspiracy to
    commit risk of injury violated his right to jury unanimity as to the
    elements of those crimes because each count was premised on multiple
    violations of the alternative types of conduct prohibited by § 53-21 (a)
    (2), namely, the defendant’s having contact with the victim’s intimate
    parts, on the one hand, or the defendant’s subjecting the victim to
    contact with the defendant’s intimate parts, on the other. Held:
    1. Applying the three-pronged test that this court adopted in Douglas C. for
    claims of jury unanimity as to instances of conduct, this court concluded
    that, although the risk of injury to a child and conspiracy to commit
    risk of injury counts were not duplicitous and did not violate the defen-
    dant’s right to unanimity, the first degree sexual assault count was
    duplicitous, the trial court’s denial of counsel’s request for a specific
    unanimity instruction or a bill of particulars with respect to that count
    violated the defendant’s right to unanimity, the defendant suffered preju-
    dice as a result of that violation, and, accordingly, this court reversed the
    Appellate Court’s judgment insofar as that court affirmed the defendant’s
    conviction of sexual assault in the first degree and remanded the case
    for a new trial with respect to that offense only:
    a. The count of the information charging the defendant with risk of
    injury to a child was not duplicitous because, although the state had the
    discretion to charge him with violating § 53-21 (a) (2) for each incident
    of conduct that had occurred, the state properly charged and presented
    the case to the jury as a continuing course of conduct:
    Although the risk of injury count was premised on multiple, separate
    incidents of conduct, insofar as it alleged that the sexual abuse occurred
    on diverse dates over the span of four years and as the testimony at
    trial concerned four separate instances of sexual intercourse on distinct
    dates, the defendant’s claim failed under the second prong of the test
    applicable to unanimity as to instances of conduct for the reasons set
    forth in the companion case of Douglas C., in which this court held that
    § 53-21 (a) (2) criminalizes both a single incident of conduct and an
    ongoing course of conduct such that, when a defendant commits multiple,
    separate acts of having contact with the intimate parts of the same
    alleged victim as part of a continuing course of conduct, the state has
    discretion to charge the defendant either with multiple counts of having
    violated § 53- 21 (a) (2), with each count premised on a single incident,
    or with a single count of having violated § 53-21 (a) (2) premised on a
    continuing course of conduct.
    In the present case, the trial court’s denial of defense counsel’s requests
    for a bill of particulars and a specific unanimity instruction did not
    violate the defendant’s constitutional right to jury unanimity, as the risk
    of injury count contemplated an ongoing course of conduct, the state
    charged the defendant with a continuing course of conduct and argued
    to the jury that multiple incidents of unlawful conduct had occurred,
    and the jury reasonably could have found that the incidents at issue
    involved a single victim and furthered a single, continuing objective to
    touch the victim in a sexual and indecent manner.
    b. The count of the information charging the defendant with sexual
    assault in the first degree, in which multiple, separate instances of assault
    were alleged, was duplicitous, and the trial court’s failure to provide the
    jury with the requested specific unanimity instruction on that count
    violated his right to jury unanimity by creating the possibility that the
    jury found him guilty of that offense without having agreed on which
    of the multiple instances of conduct he committed:
    In view of the allegations in the sexual assault count, as well as the
    evidence admitted at trial in support of that charge, including the testi-
    mony concerning the four specific instances of sexual intercourse, each
    of which occurred on different dates, at different times, and in different
    locations in the father’s residence, this court concluded that the present
    case, as presented to the jury, did not involve multiple acts of sexual
    intercourse committed in the course of a single incident of brief temporal
    duration but, rather, involved multiple, separate incidents.
    The language of § 53a-70 (a) (2), as well as this court’s case law interpre-
    ting that language, indicated that the legislature intended to criminalize
    only single acts of sexual intercourse and not a continuous course of
    conduct, this court has not recognized a common-law exception for a
    continuing course of sexual assault, even in cases involving children,
    and, accordingly, in the absence of a unanimity instruction to the jury,
    the information charging the defendant with one count of sexual assault
    premised on multiple, separate instances of conduct, each of which could
    have supported a separate offense, was duplicitous and violated the
    defendant’s constitutional right to jury unanimity.
    Moreover, the duplicitous nature of the sexual assault count prejudiced
    the defendant, as it created the potential for the jury to be confused or
    to disagree about which of the various, alleged acts of sexual intercourse
    the defendant committed, as the jury reasonably could have interpreted
    the trial court’s instruction that it must unanimously agree that at least
    one violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2) occurred by either fellatio or anal inter-
    course to mean that it had to agree that an instance of sexual intercourse
    had occurred but not which specific instance had occurred.
    c. The count of the information charging the defendant with conspiracy
    to commit risk of injury to a child was not duplicitous:
    Although there was testimony that the defendant and T gave each other
    a look before the first, specific instance of sexual assault occurred and
    that T was present when the defendant sexually assaulted the victim
    during the third specific instance, it is well established that a conspiracy
    may be alleged as a continuing course of conduct, and, therefore, a single
    count of conspiracy premised on a continuous course of conduct is
    not duplicitous.
    In the present case, the information and the prosecutor’s closing argu-
    ment to the jury clearly showed that the conspiracy count was premised
    not on two separate conspiracies but, rather, on a single, ongoing conspir-
    acy, with the evidence of the look that T and the defendant exchanged
    and T’s presence during the third incident merely constituting separate
    proof of their ongoing agreement to commit the crime of risk of injury
    against the victim through contact with intimate parts.
    2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the risk of injury to a
    child and conspiracy to commit risk of injury counts were duplicitous
    on the ground that they violated his right to jury unanimity as to the
    elements of the crime, as the language in § 53-21 (a) (2) created two
    ways to satisfy the element of contact with intimate parts, that is, the
    defendant’s having contact with the victim’s intimate parts and the
    defendant’s forcing the victim to have contact with the defendant’s
    intimate parts:
    Upon review of this state’s precedent and federal case law, this court
    concluded that the appellate courts of this state have been applying the
    wrong test to claims regarding jury unanimity as to the elements and
    adopted the test applied by the majority of federal courts of appeals to
    determine whether multiple statutes, statutory provisions, or statutory
    clauses constitute separate elements or alternative means of committing
    a single element, pursuant to which courts consider the statutory lan-
    guage, relevant legal traditions and practices, the overall structure of
    the statute at issue, its legislative history, moral and practical equivalence
    between the alternative actus rei or mentes reae, and any other implica-
    tions for unfairness associated with the absence of a specific unanim-
    ity instruction.
    This court’s case law suggested that the language in § 53-21 (a) (2)
    prohibiting any person from ‘‘[having] contact with the intimate parts
    . . . of a child under the age of sixteen years or subject[ing] a child
    under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such
    person’’ established alternative means of violating the statute rather
    than separate elements, and, to the extent the statutory language was
    ambiguous, the legislative history indicated that subsection (a) (2) of
    § 53-21 was created to distinguish sexual contact from the nonsexual
    contact prohibited under subsection (a) (1), and this court was not
    aware of any moral or practical distinction between a defendant’s having
    contact with a child’s intimate parts and a defendant’s forcing of a child
    to have contact with the defendant’s intimate parts.
    (Two justices concurring in part and dissenting in part)
    Argued November 15, 2021—officially released December 13, 2022**
    Procedural History
    Substitute information charging the defendant with
    the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, risk of
    injury to a child and conspiracy to commit risk of injury
    to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
    district of Waterbury, where the court, K. Murphy, J.,
    denied the defendant’s motions for a bill of particulars
    and to preclude certain evidence; thereafter, the case
    was tried to the jury; verdict and judgment of guilty,
    from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate
    Court, Keller, Bright and Flynn, Js., which affirmed
    the trial court’s judgment, and the defendant, on the grant-
    ing of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed in
    part; new trial.
    Megan L. Wade, assigned counsel, with whom was
    James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant
    (defendant).
    Timothy F. Costello, senior assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s
    attorney, Amy L. Sedensky and Don E. Therkildsen, Jr.,
    senior assistant state’s attorneys, and Jennifer F. Miller,
    former assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    D’AURIA, J. Today, in State v. Douglas C., 
    345 Conn. 421
    ,      A.3d      (2022), we held that a single count
    of an information that charges a defendant with a single
    statutory violation is duplicitous when evidence at trial
    supports multiple, separate incidents of conduct, each
    of which could independently establish a violation of
    the charged statute. In the absence of a specific unanim-
    ity instruction to the jury or a bill of particulars, such
    a count violates a defendant’s constitutional right to
    jury unanimity and requires the reversal of the judgment
    of conviction if it creates the risk that the defendant’s
    conviction occurred as the result of different jurors
    concluding that the defendant committed different
    criminal acts.
    We now must apply our holding in Douglas C. to the
    present case in which the defendant, Joseph V., appeals
    from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which
    affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, ren-
    dered following a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first
    degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2),1
    risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes
    § 53-21 (a) (2),2 and conspiracy to commit risk of injury
    to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2) and General
    Statutes § 53a-48 (a). The defendant claims that each
    count was duplicitous because each count charged him
    with a single violation of the underlying statute despite
    evidence at trial of multiple, separate incidents of con-
    duct, each of which could establish a violation of the
    statute, thus creating the possibility that the jury found
    him guilty without having unanimously agreed on which
    incident occurred. As a result, he argues that the trial
    court’s failure to either grant his request for a bill of
    particulars or a specific unanimity instruction violated
    his federal constitutional right to jury unanimity. We
    agree with the defendant as to the sexual assault count
    but disagree with him as to the risk of injury and conspir-
    acy counts. Accordingly, we reverse in part the Appellate
    Court’s judgment and remand the case to that court
    with direction to remand the case to the trial court for
    a new trial on the sexual assault count.
    The Appellate Court’s opinion contains a detailed
    discussion of the facts that the jury reasonably could
    have found, along with the procedural history of this
    case, which we summarize briefly. When the victim was
    four or five years of age, his half brother, T, began
    frequently abusing him in a sexual manner. State v.
    Joseph V., 
    196 Conn. App. 712
    , 716, 
    230 A.3d 644
     (2020).
    In 2006, after the abuse by T had begun, T and the
    victim’s father moved to a new residence, while the
    victim and his mother continued to reside together,
    although the victim would have overnight visits at his
    father’s new residence. 
    Id.
     T’s abuse of the victim con-
    tinued at the father’s new residence. 
    Id.
     Both prior to
    and following the time that the victim’s father and T
    moved to the new residence, the defendant, a first
    cousin of both T and the victim, had a close relationship
    with T, including an ongoing sexual relationship. Id.,
    715, 717. After the victim’s father and T moved to the
    new residence, the defendant, when he was fifteen years
    old, began to sexually assault the victim. Id., 717. This
    abuse often involved simultaneous sexual abuse of the
    victim by T and occurred until the victim was ten years
    old. Id.
    When the victim was thirteen, he revealed the sexual
    abuse in digital correspondence to The Trevor Project,
    a California based organization. Id., 719. After he did
    not receive an immediate response, the victim used an
    instant messaging feature on The Trevor Project’s web-
    site to speak with a counselor. Id. During this instant
    messaging conversation, the victim again revealed the
    sexual abuse by T and the defendant. Id.
    The counselor at The Trevor Project, as required by
    law, reported the victim’s allegations of sexual assault
    to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
    Family Services, which, in turn, contacted the police in
    the Connecticut municipality in which the victim resided.
    Id., 720. In response, the police visited the residence
    of the victim and his mother. Id. The victim told the
    police about the alleged sexual assault by T and the
    defendant, and the defendant was then arrested.3 Id.
    The state initially charged the defendant with two
    counts of sexual assault in the first degree, one count
    of risk of injury to a child, and one count of conspiracy
    to commit risk of injury to a child. Id., 721 and n.9. The
    defendant’s criminal trial on these four counts ended
    in a mistrial. See id., 721 n.8. After the mistrial, the
    defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars, seeking
    to compel the state to allege within the charging instru-
    ment additional information with respect to each
    charge. Id., 721–22. In response, the state filed a substi-
    tute information (the operative information at the time
    of the defendant’s second trial), limited to one count
    of sexual assault in the first degree, one count of risk
    of injury to a child, and one count of conspiracy to
    commit risk of injury to a child. Id., 722 and n.12.
    The trial court then heard argument on the defen-
    dant’s motion for a bill of particulars. Id., 722. Defense
    counsel argued that, based on the evidence offered at
    the prior trial, the defense anticipated that there would
    be testimony regarding multiple, separate incidents of
    abuse, each of which could constitute a separate viola-
    tion of the statutes at issue. Id., 722–23. As a result, she
    asserted, there was the potential ‘‘risk that one or more
    jurors could reach a guilty verdict with respect to a
    count on the basis of their findings with respect to an
    incident of abuse proven by the state, and one or more
    jurors could reach a guilty verdict on the same count,
    but on the basis of their findings with respect to a different
    incident of abuse proven by the state.’’ (Emphasis omit-
    ted.) Id., 723. Defense counsel stated that, if the trial
    court denied the motion for a bill of particulars, she
    would request that the court give the jury a specific
    unanimity instruction. Id., 724. The prosecutor responded
    that no concern about unanimity existed because he
    expected the defense to argue generally that the victim
    was not credible and, therefore, that the state had not
    met its burden of proof. Id. The trial court agreed with
    the prosecutor and denied the defendant’s motion, rul-
    ing that, before returning a guilty verdict, the jury was
    required only to unanimously agree on whether the
    defendant had engaged in the type of conduct proscribed
    by the statutes during the time frame alleged. Id.,
    724–25.
    At trial, the victim testified about three distinct inci-
    dents of abuse by the defendant. See id., 717 n.3. T
    testified about an additional distinct incident of abuse
    of the victim by the defendant during which T was
    present but did not participate. Id., 718 and n.5. ‘‘The
    victimalso testifiedthat,beyondtheincidentshedescribed,
    many other incidents of sexual abuse involving the
    defendant and T had ‘blurred together because there [were]
    too many to count and distinguish between.’ These inci-
    dents, which always occurred at the home of the vic-
    tim’s father, involved the touching of intimate parts,
    oral sex, and anal sex. The victim recalled that the
    defendant and T abused him simultaneously and would
    frequently take turns or ‘trade off’ in terms of the sexual
    acts that they committed against him.’’4 Id., 717 n.3.
    As a result of this testimony, defense counsel
    requested that the trial court give the jury a specific
    unanimity instruction as to the charge of sexual assault
    in the first degree, arguing that, without this instruction,
    the count was duplicitous and, thus, infringed on the
    defendant’s right to jury unanimity. Id., 724–25. Relying
    on the rationale set forth in its prior ruling, the trial
    court declined defense counsel’s request. Id., 726–27.
    The following day, outside the presence of the jury,
    defense counsel renewed her request for a specific una-
    nimity instruction, clarifying that the request applied
    to all three counts. Id., 727. The trial court declined to
    give the requested charge. Id., 728.
    The jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts.
    Id., 715. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a
    total effective term of twenty years of incarceration,
    execution suspended after ten years, followed by ten
    years of probation with special conditions, including
    lifetime inclusion on the state’s sex offender registry.
    Id., 715 n.1.
    The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,
    claiming that the trial court improperly had denied his
    request for a bill of particulars and/or a specific unanim-
    ity jury instruction because the three counts were
    duplicitous, thereby violating his federal constitutional
    right to jury unanimity. Id., 730–31. The Appellate Court
    affirmed the trial court’s judgment; id., 763; explaining
    that ‘‘whether the state’s substitute information posed
    a risk that the jurors may not have been unanimous
    . . . comes down to whether the defendant’s criminal
    liability for each offense was premised on his having
    violated one of multiple statutory subsections or ele-
    ments.’’ Id., 740. The court then examined the statutory
    language underlying each count to determine whether
    multiple statutory subsections or elements were at
    issue. Id., 744–47. As to count one, which charged the
    defendant with sexual assault in the first degree, the
    Appellate Court held that there were no unanimity con-
    cerns because the defendant was charged with violating
    only one statutory subsection, which prohibited only a
    single type of conduct. See id., 744–45. As to counts
    two and three, which charged the defendant with risk
    of injury to a child and conspiracy to commit risk of
    injury to a child, respectively, the court held that,
    because § 53-21 (a) (2) contemplates a violation prem-
    ised on two alternative types of conduct—namely, the
    defendant’s making contact with the victim’s intimate
    parts or, in the alternative, the defendant’s subjecting
    the victim to contact with his intimate parts—these
    counts rested on alternative bases of criminal liability,
    and, thus, it was possible that the jury was not unani-
    mous with respect to the specific type of statutorily
    prohibited conduct that occurred. See id., 746. The court
    held, however, that, because the trial court did not
    expressly sanction a nonunanimous verdict, no specific
    unanimity instruction was required. Id., 747–48. We
    granted certification to appeal.5 Additional facts and
    procedural history will be provided as necessary.
    I
    As he did in the trial court, the defendant claims that
    all three counts that the state charged—sexual assault,
    risk of injury, and conspiracy to commit risk of injury—
    were improperly duplicitous, creating the possibility
    that the jury was not unanimous as to the specific inci-
    dent of criminal conduct he committed. Thus, he con-
    tends that the trial court’s denial of his requests for a
    bill of particulars or a specific unanimity instruction
    deprived him of his constitutionally guaranteed right
    to a unanimous verdict. Specifically, he argues that the
    information charged him with only one count each of
    sexual assault, risk of injury to a child, and conspiracy
    to commit risk of injury to a child but that testimony at
    trial described multiple, separate incidents of conduct,
    each of which could constitute a separate violation of
    the statutes at issue. As a result, he maintains that either
    a bill of particulars or a specific unanimity instruction
    was required because of the potential that the jury could
    find him guilty without agreeing on which criminal act
    he committed.
    Applying the test detailed in Douglas C., we agree
    with the defendant that count one alleging first degree
    sexual assault was duplicitous, and thus the trial court’s
    denial of his request for a specific unanimity instruction
    or a bill of particulars violated his constitutional right
    to jury unanimity. Finding as we do that the defendant
    suffered prejudice as a result of this violation, we must
    reverse the judgment of conviction in part and remand
    the case for a new trial on that count. We disagree,
    however, with the defendant’s claim that counts two
    and three were duplicitous, thereby violating his right
    to unanimity as to instances of conduct and, thus, affirm
    his conviction of risk of injury to a child and conspiracy
    to commit risk of injury to a child.
    ‘‘Although we generally review the denial of a motion
    for a bill of particulars for abuse of discretion . . .
    because this claim is premised on an alleged infringe-
    ment of the defendant’s constitutional rights, our review
    is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Douglas C.,
    supra, 
    345 Conn. 435
    . ‘‘Duplicity occurs when two or
    more offenses are charged in a single count of the
    accusatory instrument. . . . [A] single count is not
    duplicitous merely because it contains several allega-
    tions that could have been stated as separate offenses.
    . . . Rather, such a count is . . . duplicitous [only
    when] the policy considerations underlying the doctrine
    are implicated. . . . These [considerations] include
    avoiding the uncertainty of whether a general verdict
    of guilty conceals a finding of guilty as to one crime
    and a finding of not guilty as to another, avoiding the
    risk that the jurors may not have been unanimous as
    to any one of the crimes charged, assuring the defendant
    adequate notice, providing the basis for appropriate
    sentencing, and protecting against double jeopardy in
    a subsequent prosecution. . . . A duplicitous informa-
    tion [implicating a defendant’s right to jury unanimity],
    however, may be cured either by a bill of particulars
    or a specific unanimity instruction.’’ (Citations omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
     433–34.
    The defendant argues only that the allegedly duplici-
    tous counts implicated his right to a unanimous verdict,
    and thus we limit our analysis to that issue. The defen-
    dant’s right to jury unanimity under the sixth amend-
    ment to the United States constitution ensures that a jury
    ‘‘cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the
    [g]overnment has proved each element’’ of the charged
    crime. Richardson v. United States, 
    526 U.S. 813
    , 817,
    
    119 S. Ct. 1707
    , 
    143 L. Ed. 2d 985
     (1999). Nevertheless,
    ‘‘different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces
    of evidence, even when they agree [on] the bottom line.
    Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury
    reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues
    which underlie the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Schad v. Arizona, 
    501 U.S. 624
    , 631–32, 
    111 S. Ct. 2491
    , 
    115 L. Ed. 2d 555
     (1991) (opinion announcing
    judgment). In other words, ‘‘a jury must come to agree-
    ment on the principal facts underlying its verdict—what
    courts have tended to call the elements of the offense.
    But that requirement does not extend to subsidiary
    facts—what the [Supreme] Court has called ‘brute facts.’ ’’
    United States v. Lee, 
    317 F.3d 26
    , 36 (1st Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    538 U.S. 1048
    , 
    123 S. Ct. 2112
    , 
    155 L. Ed. 2d 1089
     (2003). ‘‘In the routine case, a general unanimity
    instruction will ensure that the jury is unanimous on
    the factual basis for a conviction, even where an [infor-
    mation] alleges numerous factual bases for criminal
    liability.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United
    States v. Holley, 
    942 F.2d 916
    , 925–26 (5th Cir. 1991),
    quoting United States v. Beros, 
    833 F.2d 455
    , 460 (3d
    Cir. 1987).
    In Douglas C., this court for the first time recognized
    that a duplicitous information may raise two distinct
    and separate kinds of unanimity claims: (1) unanimity
    as to a crime’s elements, which occurs when a defen-
    dant is charged in a single count with having violated
    multiple statutory provisions, subsections, or clauses,
    and thus the court must determine whether the statu-
    tory provisions, subsections, or clauses constitute sepa-
    rate elements of the statute, thereby requiring jury
    unanimity, or alternative means of committing a single
    element, which do not require jury unanimity; and (2)
    unanimity as to instances of conduct, also known as a
    multiple acts or multiple offense claim, which occurs
    when a defendant is charged in a single count with
    having violated a single statutory provision, subsection,
    or clause on multiple, separate occasions. See State v.
    Douglas C., 
    supra,
     
    345 Conn. 432
    –33, 441. Previously,
    our appellate courts have not distinguished between
    these two distinct unanimity claims. In Douglas C., how-
    ever, we explained that different tests apply to a claim
    of unanimity as to elements and a claim of unanimity
    as to instances of conduct. 
    Id., 441
    .
    In the present case, the defendant argues that all three
    counts were duplicitous because each was premised on
    multiple, separate instances of conduct, each of which
    could establish a separate violation of the same statute.
    In other words, he claims that his right to unanimity
    as to instances of conduct was violated, not his right
    to unanimity as to elements. As to a claim of unanimity
    as to instances of conduct, in Douglas C., we adopted
    and applied the three-pronged test applied by a majority
    of federal courts of appeals:6 ‘‘(1) Considering the alle-
    gations in the information and the evidence admitted
    at trial, does a single count charge the defendant with
    violating a single statute in multiple, separate instances?
    (2) If so, then does each instance of conduct establish
    a separate violation of the statute? If the statute contem-
    plates criminalizing a continuing course of conduct,
    then each instance of conduct is not a separate violation
    of the statute but a single, continuing violation. To deter-
    mine whether the statute contemplates criminalizing
    a continuing course of conduct, we employ our well
    established principles of statutory interpretation. Only
    if each instance of conduct constitutes a separate viola-
    tion of the statute is a count duplicitous. And (3) if
    duplicitous, was the duplicity cured by a bill of particu-
    lars or a specific unanimity instruction? If yes, then
    there is no unanimity issue. If not, then a duplicitous
    count violates a defendant’s right to jury unanimity but
    reversal of the defendant’s conviction is required only
    if the defendant establishes prejudice [namely, that the
    duplicity created the genuine possibility that the convic-
    tion occurred as the result of different jurors concluding
    that the defendant committed different acts].’’ 
    Id., 448
    .
    As to the second prong, to the extent we must interpret
    applicable statutes, well established principles directed
    by General Statutes § 1-2z guide our inquiry. See, e.g.,
    State v. Bischoff, 
    337 Conn. 739
    , 746, 
    258 A.3d 14
     (2021).
    In interpreting the statutes at issue to determine if the
    legislature criminalized a continuous course of conduct,
    we have explained that, ‘‘[a]t times, it may be easy to
    make this second determination. That is because, [i]n
    some cases the standard for individuating crimes is
    obvious—we count murders, for instance, by counting
    bodies. But in other cases, determining how many
    crimes were committed is much less clear. . . . In
    these more difficult cases, courts have examined the
    statute’s language, its legislative history, and [other]
    case law regarding similar statutes . . . .’’ (Citation
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Douglas C., 
    supra,
     
    345 Conn. 442
    .
    ‘‘In examining the statutory language at issue . . . if
    the underlying criminal statute contemplates crimi-
    nalizing a continuing course of conduct and the defen-
    dant has been charged with violating the statute by a
    continuing course of conduct, a single count premised
    on multiple, separate instances of conduct is not duplic-
    itous when the multiple instances of conduct constitute
    ‘a continuing course of conduct, during a discrete
    period of time7 . . . .’ To determine if a statute crimi-
    nalizes only a single act, a continuous course of con-
    duct, or both, courts must interpret the statute’s
    language in the manner directed by . . . § 1-2z. . . .
    If a statute does criminalize a continuing course of
    conduct, then the court must determine whether the
    multiple instances of conduct alleged in fact constitute
    a continuous course of conduct by examining, among
    other things, whether the acts occurred within a rela-
    tively short period of time, were committed by one
    defendant, involved a single victim, and furthered a
    single, continuing objective.’’ (Citations omitted; foot-
    note added; footnotes omitted.) Id., 442–45.
    A
    We begin by addressing count two of the information,
    which charged the defendant with risk of injury to a
    child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2), because we already
    have addressed a similar claim in relation to this statute
    in Douglas C. We conclude that the defendant’s claim
    fails under the second prong of the test applicable to
    claims of unanimity as to instances of conduct and,
    therefore, that count two did not violate his constitu-
    tional right to jury unanimity.
    Count two of the information charged the defendant
    with committing risk of injury to a child ‘‘in that on
    or about diverse dates between August 23, 2006, and
    December 25, 2010,’’ at the residence of the victim’s
    father, the defendant had contact with the victim’s inti-
    mate parts and subjected the victim to ‘‘contact with
    [the defendant’s] intimate parts . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. Joseph V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 722
     n.12. At trial, as evidence of this unlawful
    contact, the state relied on testimony from the victim
    and T about the four specific, separate incidents of
    conduct discussed in footnote 4 of this opinion. As we
    previously noted, defense counsel cross-examined both
    the victim and T about these four incidents.
    In closing argument to the jury, as to the element of
    contact with intimate parts, the prosecutor argued that
    the state had ‘‘to prove the defendant had contact with
    the intimate parts of the minor, [the victim], or the
    defendant—or the defendant subjected [the victim] to
    contact with the defendant’s intimate parts; either way.
    . . . So, any of the sexual assaults that I just talked
    about, that counts; any one of those incidents counts—
    the oral sex, the anal sex—any of that counts for the
    sexual contact.’’ In response, as previously discussed,
    defense counsel challenged the credibility of the victim
    and T both generally and specifically as to each of the
    four separate incidents.
    After closing arguments, with regard to the element
    of intimate contact in the risk of injury charge in count
    two, the trial court instructed the jury: ‘‘The state must
    prove either that the defendant had contact with the
    child’s intimate parts, [or] the defendant subjected the
    child to contact with the defendant’s intimate parts.
    There need not be a touching of all the intimate parts. It
    is sufficient if any one of the intimate parts is touched.’’
    Similar to the instruction on sexual assault, the court
    concluded: ‘‘In order to convict the defendant on this
    count, you must be unanimous that at least one violation
    of this statute occurred between the defendant and [the
    victim] during the time frame indicated.’’
    Section 53-21 (a) prohibits ‘‘[a]ny person . . . (2)
    [from having] contact with the intimate parts, as defined
    in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen
    years or subject[ing] a child under sixteen years of age
    to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a
    sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health
    or morals of such child . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-
    65 (8) defines ‘‘intimate parts’’ as ‘‘the genital area or
    any substance emitted therefrom, groin, anus or any
    substance emitted therefrom, inner thighs, buttocks
    or breasts.’’8
    First, we must determine whether count two was
    premised on multiple, separate incidents of conduct.
    Count two of the information alleged that the defendant
    committed risk of injury to a child on ‘‘diverse dates’’
    over the course of more than four years, and this allega-
    tion was supported by testimony concerning four spe-
    cific, separate instances of conduct. This evidence
    shows that, as the case was presented to the jury, there
    was evidence of multiple, separate incidents of conduct,
    not a single incident.
    Because count two was premised on multiple, sepa-
    rate incidents of conduct, we next must determine
    under prong two of the applicable test whether each
    incident could establish an independent violation of
    § 53-21 (a) (2). We hold that, although the state had
    discretion to charge the defendant with violating § 53-
    21 (a) (2) for each incident of conduct that occurred, the
    state properly charged and presented these incidents
    to the jury as a continuing course of conduct.
    In Douglas C., we held that § 53-21 (a) (2) criminalizes
    both a single incident of conduct and an ongoing course
    of conduct. See State v. Douglas C., 
    supra,
     
    345 Conn. 464
    . Specifically, we explained that, under our prior
    case law interpreting this statute, risk of injury to a
    child may be charged under a continuing course of
    conduct theory. 
    Id., 465
    . We explained that both the
    structure of the statute as a whole and its legislative
    history support this interpretation of § 53-21 (a) (2). See
    id., 466–69. Thus, when a defendant commits multiple,
    separate acts of having contact with the intimate parts
    of the same alleged victim as part of a continuing course
    of conduct, the state has discretion to charge the defen-
    dant either with multiple counts of having violated § 53-
    21 (a) (2), with each count premised on a single incident,
    or with a single count of having violated § 53-21 (a) (2)
    premised on a continuing course of conduct.
    In the present case, the language of count two shows
    that the state charged the defendant with a continuing
    course of conduct in that, ‘‘on or about diverse dates
    between August 23, 2006, and December 25, 2010,’’ he
    had contact with the victim’s intimate parts and that
    the victim had contact with the defendant’s intimate
    parts. State v. Joseph V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 722
     n.12.
    This language clearly contemplates more than a single
    instance of contact; it contemplates an ongoing course
    of conduct during this time period. Additionally,
    although the trial court noted that only one violation
    of the statute had to occur and the state argued that
    proof of only one alleged act was necessary to find the
    defendant guilty under count two, the state argued that
    multiple instances of contact occurred continuously
    between August 23, 2006, and December 25, 2010. Thus,
    § 53-21 (a) (2) criminalizes a continuing course of con-
    duct, and the state charged the defendant with a contin-
    uing course of conduct.
    Moreover, as to count two, the jury reasonably could
    have found that the multiple, separate incidents of con-
    duct constituted a continuing course of conduct. The
    testimony regarding the four specific instances of con-
    duct showed that, although the multiple incidents of
    sexual and indecent touching of intimate parts occurred
    over a prolonged period of time, these acts occurred
    with sufficient frequency to be considered a continuous
    course of conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Root, 
    585 F.3d 145
    , 154–55 (3d Cir. 2009) (multiple acts may be
    considered part of continuous course of conduct, even
    if conduct spanned years). Additionally, these incidents
    were committed by the same perpetrators—the defen-
    dant and T—involved a single victim, and furthered a
    single, continuing objective to touch the victim in a
    sexual and indecent manner.
    As a result, although count two was premised on
    multiple, separate instances of conduct, these instances
    were properly alleged and presented to the jury as a
    continuous course of conduct, and not as independent
    violations of § 53-21 (a) (2). Accordingly, we conclude
    that count two, charging the defendant with a single
    violation of § 53-21 (a) (2), was not duplicitous, and
    thus the trial court’s failure to grant the defendant’s
    request for a specific unanimity instruction or a bill of
    particulars as to that count did not violate his constitu-
    tional right to jury unanimity.
    B
    Count one of the information charged the defendant
    with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
    § 53a-70 (a) (2). Because there was trial testimony
    regarding four separate, specific instances of conduct,
    each of which could have constituted a violation of
    the statute, the defendant argues that this count was
    duplicitous. In turn, he argues that, because the trial
    court did not provide the jury with a specific unanimity
    instruction as defense counsel requested,9 the jury ver-
    dict violated his right to jury unanimity and created the
    possibility that the jury found him guilty without having
    agreed on which instance of conduct he committed.
    We agree with the defendant.
    The following additional procedural history is rele-
    vant to our consideration of the defendant’s claim with
    respect to this count. Count one of the operative infor-
    mation charged the defendant with committing sexual
    assault in the first degree ‘‘on or about diverse dates
    between August 23, 2006, and December 25, 2010,’’ by
    engaging in sexual intercourse (fellatio and anal inter-
    course) with the victim at the residence of the victim’s
    father. State v. Joseph V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 722
     n.12.
    At trial, as evidence that the defendant had engaged in
    sexual intercourse with the victim, the state offered
    the testimony of both the victim and T regarding four
    distinct incidents of abuse, as well as the victim’s gen-
    eral testimony that he recalled that other incidents of
    sexual abuse had occurred but that they had ‘‘ ‘blurred
    together’ ’’ in his memory. 
    Id.,
     717 n.3. Defense counsel
    cross-examined both the victim and T about the specific
    details regarding each of the four specific incidents of
    sexual abuse.
    In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that ‘‘a
    plethora of evidence’’ supported the element of sexual
    intercourse, summarizing the four specific instances of
    sexual abuse and noting that ‘‘these same types of acts
    happened between [the victim] and the defendant alone,
    and [the victim] and the defendant and [T] . . . too
    many times to count.’’ The prosecutor then argued that
    the jury only had ‘‘to believe it happened once. Any one
    time is enough to satisfy the element of sexual inter-
    course.’’
    In response, defense counsel argued generally that
    the state’s witnesses, including the victim and T, lacked
    credibility. Counsel walked the jury through the three
    alleged incidents about which the victim had testified,
    discussing inconsistencies in his testimony as to each
    particular incident. Defense counsel specifically chal-
    lenged T’s testimony regarding these incidents, arguing
    that T had admitted to having tailored his testimony to
    the victim’s allegations.
    After closing arguments, the trial court’s jury charge
    included a general instruction regarding unanimity:
    ‘‘Remember that your verdict as to each count must be
    unanimous; all six jurors must agree as to the verdict
    as to each separate count.’’ As to count one, charging
    sexual assault, the trial court instructed in relevant part:
    ‘‘In order to convict the defendant on this count you
    must be unanimous that at least one violation of this
    statute by one of the methods alleged occurred between
    the defendant and [the victim] during the time frame
    indicated. . . . [T]he state must prove each element of
    each offense, including identification of the defendant,
    beyond a reasonable doubt. If you unanimously find
    that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
    each of the elements of the crime of sexual assault in the
    first degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty.’’
    (Emphasis added.)
    Addressing the defendant’s unanimity claim in the
    present case, we must first determine if count one was
    premised on multiple, separate acts and, if so, whether
    each act established a separate violation of the sexual
    assault statute.10 We recognize that this may be a diffi-
    cult task, as ‘‘[t]he line between multiple offenses and
    multiple means to the commission of a single continuing
    offense is often a difficult one to draw.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) United States v. Davis, 
    471 F.3d 783
    , 791 (7th Cir. 2006). One example of a multiple
    means case (i.e., claim of unanimity as to elements) is
    State v. Anderson, 
    211 Conn. 18
    , 
    557 A.2d 917
     (1989),
    in which the state charged the defendant with two
    counts of sexual assault in the first degree premised
    on multiple kinds of sexual intercourse—four instances
    of vaginal intercourse and two instances of fellatio—
    alleged to have been committed during a single criminal
    episode of relatively brief, temporal duration (approxi-
    mately one hour). 
    Id.,
     20–23. This court held that the
    multiple acts of sexual intercourse constituted alterna-
    tive means of committing the element of sexual inter-
    course, and, thus, the jury did not have to unanimously
    agree as to which means occurred. 
    Id.,
     34–35; see id.,
    35 (‘‘[t]he several ways in which sexual intercourse
    may be committed under . . . § 53a-65 (2) are only one
    conceptual offense’’); see also United States v. Gordon,
    
    713 Fed. Appx. 424
    , 430 (6th Cir. 2017) (types of prohib-
    ited sexual conduct constitute alternative means of
    committing that conduct and do not constitute elements
    about which jury must be unanimous). Thus, in Ander-
    son, the jury could, consistent with constitutional prin-
    ciples, find the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the
    first degree if the jurors were unanimous in finding,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that some form of sexual
    intercourse occurred during the alleged incident.
    Anderson did not address whether unanimity issues
    arise when the state charges only one count of sexual
    assault, but the record contains evidence of multiple,
    separate incidents of sexual intercourse. The line between
    a single incident comprised of various alternative means
    of committing sexual intercourse, on the one hand, and
    multiple, separate incidents of sexual intercourse, on
    the other, may be unclear at times and must be decided
    on a case-by-case basis based on the language of the
    count at issue, the evidence admitted in support of that
    count, and the kind of conduct the legislature intended
    to criminalize (single instance of conduct or continuing
    course of conduct).
    In the present case, under the first prong of the test
    adopted in Douglas C., we must first look at the allega-
    tions in the charge and the evidence admitted in support
    thereof to determine if count one was premised on
    multiple, separate incidents of conduct. See State v.
    Douglas C., 
    supra,
     
    345 Conn. 448
    . Unlike the situation
    in Anderson, the information in the present case alleged
    that the defendant committed sexual assault on ‘‘diverse
    dates’’ over the course of more than four years. There
    was testimony concerning four specific instances of
    sexual intercourse, each of which occurred on different
    dates, at different times, and in different locations
    within the residence of the victim’s father. From this
    testimony, it is clear that the present case does not
    involve multiple acts of sexual intercourse committed
    in the course of a single incident of brief, temporal
    duration. Rather, this evidence shows that, as the case
    was presented to the jury, there were multiple, sepa-
    rate incidents.
    Additionally, unlike our risk of injury statute, under
    the second prong of the test announced in Douglas
    C., the language of § 53a-70 (a) (2) and our case law
    interpreting that language show that the legislature
    intended for each of these separate, specific incidents
    to be charged as separate violations of § 53a-70 (a)
    (2). Specifically, under § 53a-70 (a) (2), the state was
    required to establish that the defendant ‘‘engage[d] in
    sexual intercourse . . . .’’11 The statutory scheme does
    not define the term ‘‘engages,’’ and thus we turn to the
    common dictionary definition of this term. See Black’s
    Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 669 (defining ‘‘engage’’
    as ‘‘[t]o employ or involve oneself; to take part in; to
    embark on’’); Webster’s Third New International Dic-
    tionary (2002) p. 751 (defining ‘‘engage’’ as ‘‘to employ
    or involve oneself . . . to take part . . . participate’’).
    These definitions of ‘‘engage’’ do not provide any clarifi-
    cation as to whether the statute criminalizes a continu-
    ing course of conduct.12 The concurring and dissenting
    justice (dissent) contends that, under these definitions
    of ‘‘engage,’’ this term is ‘‘suggestive of ongoing conduct
    . . . .’’ This is true, but this merely creates ambiguity
    because the definitions also are suggestive of singular
    conduct. This ambiguity, however, is clarified when the
    term ‘‘engaged’’ is interpreted in its context, specifically,
    in relation to the phrase ‘‘sexual intercourse.’’ The statu-
    tory scheme defines ‘‘sexual intercourse’’ as ‘‘vaginal
    intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or cunnilingus
    between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, how-
    ever slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse,
    anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emis-
    sion of semen.’’ General Statutes § 53a-65 (2). This defi-
    nition suggests that the statute intended to criminalize
    each single act of sexual intercourse, which is defined
    in singular terms. This kind of language consistently
    has been interpreted as criminalizing only single acts.
    See Cooksey v. State, 
    359 Md. 1
    , 19–21, 
    752 A.2d 606
    (2000) (reviewing case law from various states with
    similarly worded sexual assault statutes, all of which
    have been interpreted as not criminalizing continuous
    course of conduct). Thus, this language does not con-
    template an ongoing, continuous course of conduct but,
    rather, penalizes a single instanceof sexual intercourse.
    Interpreting § 53a-70 to criminalize each separate act
    of sexual intercourse and not a continuous course of
    conduct is also supported by our ‘‘well settled principle
    of statutory construction that the legislature knows how
    to convey its intent expressly . . . or to use broader
    or limiting terms when it chooses to do so.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruiz-Pacheco, 
    336 Conn. 219
    , 235, 
    244 A.3d 908
     (2020). Specifically, we
    can infer from the legislature’s use in other statutes of
    the phrase ‘‘course of conduct,’’13 as well as other
    phrases that connote more than one act,14 that the legis-
    lature knows how to criminalize a course of conduct
    when it wants to do so. From the fact that the legislature
    did not do so in § 53a-70, we may infer that it did not
    intend to criminalize a continuous course of conduct.
    Our long-standing precedent interpreting § 53a-70
    lends further support to this interpretation. It is well
    established that, in determining the plain meaning of a
    statute, we look to prior case law defining the statute.
    See, e.g., Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 
    331 Conn. 711
    , 719, 
    207 A.3d 493
     (2019) (‘‘we must construe the
    statute in conformity with prior case law interpreting
    it’’); State v. Moreno-Hernandez, 
    317 Conn. 292
    , 299,
    
    118 A.3d 26
     (2015) (‘‘[i]n interpreting the [statutory]
    language . . . [we] are bound by our previous judicial
    interpretations of the language and the purpose of the
    statute’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). General
    Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-72 (a), which was repealed
    in 1975; see Public Acts 1975, No. 75-619, § 7; crimi-
    nalized rape, and was a precursor to our current sexual
    assault statute, used the same phrase at issue in the
    present case: ‘‘A male is guilty of rape in the first degree
    when he engages in sexual intercourse with a female
    . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In State v. Frazier, 
    185 Conn. 211
    , 
    440 A.2d 916
     (1981), cert. denied, 
    458 U.S. 1112
    ,
    
    102 S. Ct. 3496
    , 
    73 L. Ed. 2d 1375
     (1982), this court, in
    interpreting General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-72,
    followed the lead of the Oklahoma courts and explained
    that ‘‘rape is not a continuous offense. . . . There is
    ample authority holding that each separate act of forc-
    ible sexual intercourse constitutes a separate crime.
    . . . A different view would allow a person who has
    committed one sexual assault [on] a victim to commit
    with impunity many other such acts during the same
    encounter. The classic test of multiplicity is whether
    the legislative intent is to punish individual acts sepa-
    rately or to punish only the course of action which they
    constitute. . . . [W]e believe the legislative intention
    was that each assault should be deemed an additional
    offense.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 229–30. Since Frazier,
    and after the repeal of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975)
    § 53a-72, this interpretation of the phrase ‘‘engages in
    sexual intercourse’’ has been applied to § 53a-70. See
    State v. Anderson, 
    supra,
     
    211 Conn. 26
     (The court
    quoted Frazier in explaining that, ‘‘[i]n addressing legis-
    lative intent with regard to multiple punishments for
    sexual assaults, we have stated that each separate act
    of forcible sexual intercourse constitutes a separate
    crime. . . . Thus, each act of sexual assault is punish-
    able separately.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.)); see also State v. Snook, 
    210 Conn. 244
    , 262, 
    555 A.2d 390
     (same), cert. denied, 
    492 U.S. 924
    , 
    109 S. Ct. 3258
    , 
    106 L. Ed. 2d 603
     (1989);15 State v.
    Ayala, 
    154 Conn. App. 631
    , 654, 
    106 A.3d 941
     (2015)
    (same), aff’d, 
    324 Conn. 571
    , 
    153 A.3d 588
     (2017); State
    v. Giannotti, 
    7 Conn. App. 701
    , 709, 
    510 A.2d 451
     (citing
    Frazier in holding that each individual act or attempted
    act of forcible sexual intercourse constitutes separate
    crime), cert. denied, 
    201 Conn. 804
    , 
    513 A.2d 700
     (1986).
    For approximately forty years, the Appellate Court
    has rejected the dissent’s interpretation of § 53a-70.16
    Specifically, in State v. Cassidy, 
    3 Conn. App. 374
    , 
    489 A.2d 386
     (Borden, J.), cert. denied, 
    196 Conn. 803
    , 
    492 A.2d 1239
     (1985), the defendant, who had been charged
    with and convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault
    under § 53a-70, argued ‘‘that he should . . . have been
    tried on [only] one count of sexual assault, on the theory
    that only one act of sexual assault was alleged, albeit
    one involving several acts of sexual intercourse.’’ Id.,
    388. In rejecting this argument, the Appellate Court
    cited to Frazier and noted that ‘‘[t]his argument was
    rejected under the predecessor to . . . § 53a-70. . . .
    We reject it under . . . § 53a-70 as well.’’ (Citation
    omitted.) Id. In so holding, the court was not persuaded
    by the defendant’s contention that, ‘‘while the legislative
    intent of the repealed statute [§ 53a-72] was to punish
    each individual act of assault separately, the legislature,
    by enacting the current statute, intended only to punish
    the total course of conduct as one offense. As under
    the prior statute, however, each assault [on] the victim
    involved a separate act of will on the part of the defen-
    dant and a separate indignity [on] the victim. . . . [T]he
    legislative intention was that each assault should be
    deemed an additional offense. . . . To interpret the
    statute otherwise would be to strip it of all its sense.
    [T]he application of common sense to the language of
    a penal law is not to be excluded in a way which would
    involve absurdity or frustrate the evident design of the
    lawgiver. . . . There is ample authority holding that
    each separate act of forcible sexual intercourse consti-
    tutes a separate crime. . . . A different view would
    allow a person who has committed one sexual assault
    [on] a victim to commit with impunity many other such
    acts during the same encounter.’’ (Citations omitted;
    footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id., 388–89.
    The dissent argues that our reliance on Frazier and
    Cassidy is misplaced because they involved multiplic-
    ity, not duplicity, which, in his view, ‘‘present[s] a funda-
    mentally different question.’’ But it does not. Not for
    these purposes. Both the test for multiplicity in the
    double jeopardy context and the test for duplicity in
    the unanimity context require that we construe the lan-
    guage of our sexual assault statute to arrive at the
    legislature’s intent in enacting it. How we interpret stat-
    utory language does not change based on the claim at
    issue. We reject the dissent’s conclusion that the most
    reasonable reading of our sexual assault statute and
    cases interpreting its language is that prosecutors, in
    their discretion, can choose to charge crimes either
    way—as a course of conduct or as a single act—based
    on a tradition of prosecutorial discretion that is not
    supported by our criminal statutes and in which the
    legislature has not acquiesced. If acquiescence were
    important to determining a statute’s meaning, the legis-
    lature’s acquiescence in how our appellate courts have
    interpreted the statute is a more compelling case.17
    Accordingly, guided by § 1-2z and our prior case law
    interpreting § 53a-70, we conclude that the plain and
    unambiguous language of § 53a-70 shows that the legis-
    lature intended to criminalize only single acts of sexual
    intercourse and not a continuing course of conduct.
    This court, therefore, should not consider legislative
    history.18 As a result, when we apply the well established
    legal principles regarding statutory construction, we
    find that our sexual assault statute does not criminalize
    a continuing course of conduct.
    Moreover, even if this court were allowed to create
    and apply common-law exceptions in determining the
    meaning of a statute; see footnote 7 of this opinion;
    this court has not recognized a common-law exception
    for a continuing course of sexual assault, even in cases
    involving children. Cf. Gilson v. State, 
    8 P.3d 883
    , 899
    (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 962
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 1496
    , 
    149 L. Ed. 2d 381
     (2001). Accordingly, we
    conclude that the information charging the defendant
    with a single count of sexual assault premised on multi-
    ple, separate instances of conduct, each of which could
    have supported a separate offense, was duplicitous and
    violated the defendant’s right to jury unanimity. This is
    consistent with decisions of other state courts that have
    applied the majority test to this issue. See, e.g., State
    v. Arceo, 
    84 Haw. 1
    , 30, 
    928 P.2d 843
     (1996); Cooksey
    v. State, supra, 
    359 Md. 19
    –21.
    As a result, in the absence of a unanimity instruction,
    the state was required to either charge the defendant
    with multiple counts of sexual assault in the first degree,
    each premised on a separate instance of conduct, or
    limit the single count it did charge to a single instance
    of conduct. Alternatively, the state could have charged
    as it did, as long as a specific unanimity instruction
    was given. The state, however, using similar language
    as contained in count two, attempted to charge count
    one under a continuing course of conduct theory, and
    the trial court did not give a specific unanimity instruc-
    tion.19 The state was not permitted to do so under the
    plain language of § 53a-70, and thus the state’s manner
    of charging under count one does not cure the
    count’s duplicity.
    Nevertheless, the dissent relies on prior case law from
    the Appellate Court to argue that our courts have recog-
    nized a policy in favor of affording the prosecutor dis-
    cretion in charging in cases involving sexual assault of
    a child. Although this court has not recognized a com-
    mon-law exception for a continuing course of sexual
    assault, we are aware that this state’s case law regarding
    unanimity and ongoing sexual assault of children has
    created some confusion on this issue, likely owing both
    to our belated recognition of persuasive federal case
    law, as well as to an understandable motivation to
    accommodate the difficulties inherent in prosecuting
    such cases involving children, particularly traumatized
    children. For example, the Appellate Court has distin-
    guished between sexual assault cases in which there
    is specific testimony regarding multiple, separate inci-
    dents of sexual assault, and cases in which there is
    only general testimony that multiple incidents of sexual
    assault occurred but precise details regarding time and
    location are unknown. This occurs commonly in cases
    involving the ongoing sexual assault of children. This
    line of cases has caused confusion in the Appellate
    Court, including in the present case, over whether an
    information is duplicitous or whether any duplicity cre-
    ates a risk of a nonunanimous verdict when a sexual
    assault case involves only general testimony about mul-
    tiple incidents of sexual assault. See State v. Joseph V.,
    supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 737
    –38 (citing cases). To the
    extent the defendant relies on this case law to argue
    that the Appellate Court has held that a single count
    of sexual assault premised on specific testimony of
    multiple, separate incidents of conduct may be alleged
    under a continuing course of conduct theory, we dis-
    agree. Rather, these cases show that, when there is only
    general testimony regarding the ongoing sexual assault
    of a child, a defendant more likely than not will not be
    prejudiced by a single count of sexual assault premised
    on multiple incidents of conduct.
    This issue first arose in State v. Saraceno, 
    15 Conn. App. 222
    , 229, 
    545 A.2d 1116
    , cert. denied, 
    209 Conn. 823
    , 
    552 A.2d 431
     (1988), and cert. denied, 
    209 Conn. 824
    , 
    552 A.2d 432
     (1988), in which the defendant claimed
    that the information was duplicitous because the two
    counts of sexual assault of which he was convicted
    each alleged the commission of a single crime based
    on multiple, separate incidents of sexual intercourse.
    
    Id.,
     227–28. In resolving this claim, the court addressed
    the five policy considerations underlying the doctrine
    of duplicity. See 
    id.,
     229–32. As to the possible lack of
    jury unanimity, the Appellate Court concluded ‘‘that
    with regard to the evidence adduced . . . it was not
    possible for the jury to return a verdict [that] was not
    unanimous. Given the complainant’s age and her rela-
    tive inability to recall with specificity the details of
    separate assaults, the jury was not presented with the
    type of detail laden evidence [that] would engender
    differences of opinion on fragments of her testimony.
    In other words, the bulk of the state’s case rested on
    the credibility of the young complainant. When she testi-
    fied . . . that on many occasions the defendant forced
    her to engage in fellatio while in a motor vehicle parked
    on the banks of the Connecticut River, the jury was
    left, primarily, only with the decision of whether she
    should be believed. With such general testimony, the
    spectre of lack of unanimity cannot arise. . . . Under
    the specific circumstances . . . [the court] con-
    clude[d] that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
    potential lack of jury unanimity.’’ 
    Id.,
     230–31.
    In so holding, the court clearly focused on whether
    the defendant was prejudiced by the potential lack of
    unanimity, specifically, whether the jury possibly was
    confused. See 
    id.,
     229–31. The court concluded that, in
    light of the nature of the general testimony, there was
    no possibility that the jury had a difference of opinion
    as to which acts the defendant had committed because
    the nature of the testimony did not allow the jury to
    be divided as to which instance of conduct occurred
    but, rather, required the jury to credit all or none of
    the victim’s testimony. See id., 230. In other words, the
    court determined that any potential duplicity, assuming
    it existed, was not harmful. Saraceno did not hold that
    a single count of sexual assault premised on specific
    testimony of multiple separate instances of conduct
    may be alleged under a continuing course of conduct
    theory. Thus, under neither the statutory scheme at
    issue nor our state’s common law may first degree sex-
    ual assault be charged as a continuing course of conduct
    crime when premised on specific testimony of multiple,
    separate incidents of conduct.20 As a result, in the absence
    of a unanimity instruction, the state was required either
    to charge the defendant with four counts of sexual
    assault in the first degree, each premised on a separate
    instance of conduct, or to limit the single count it did
    charge to a single instance of conduct. Alternatively,
    the state could have charged as it did without offending
    the defendant’s right to jury unanimity if the trial court
    had given a specific unanimity instruction. Accordingly,
    because count one is premised on multiple, separate
    incidents of conduct, each of which could indepen-
    dently establish a violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2), that count
    was rendered duplicitous.
    Because we hold that a single count of sexual assault
    premised on specific testimony of multiple separate
    acts, committed other than in the course of a single
    criminal episode of relatively brief, temporal duration,
    is duplicitous and violates a defendant’s right to jury
    unanimity when no specific unanimity instruction is
    given, we must determine whether this duplicity preju-
    diced the defendant. In light of the evidence of multiple,
    separate instances of sexual intercourse, we conclude
    that the jury reasonably could have interpreted the trial
    court’s instruction that it ‘‘must be unanimous that at
    least one violation of this statute by one of the methods
    alleged occurred between the defendant and [the vic-
    tim] during the time frame indicated’’ to require it to
    be unanimous as to whether an instance of sexual inter-
    course occurred but not to require it to be unanimous
    as to which instance of sexual intercourse occurred.
    This is especially so in light of the specific nature of
    the testimony and defense counsel’s extensive cross-
    examination and closing argument directed at unique
    credibility concerns related to each incident, as well as
    the prosecutor’s closing argument that any of the
    alleged incidents would establish the element of sexual
    intercourse.21 As a result, the state’s concession of harm
    if we find any error is prudent. The duplicitous nature
    of count one created the potential for the jury to be
    confused or to disagree about which of the various acts
    of sexual intercourse the defendant committed, thereby
    prejudicing him. Accordingly, we reverse the defen-
    dant’s conviction of sexual assault in the first degree
    and remand the case for a new trial as to that count.
    C
    We next apply the Douglas C. test to count three,
    which charged the defendant with conspiracy to com-
    mit risk of injury to a child in violation of §§ 53-21 (a)
    (2) and 53a-48 (a). The defendant argues that he was
    charged only with a single violation of § 53a-48 (a) but
    that there was testimony showing that he and T had
    agreed to commit two separate conspiracies: (1) when
    the defendant and T exchanged a ‘‘look’’ before the first
    incident; and (2) when the defendant touched the victim
    in the living room while T watched. See footnote 4 of
    this opinion. We disagree.
    Count three of the information alleged ‘‘[t]hat the
    said [defendant] did commit the crime of conspiracy
    to commit risk of injury to a child in violation of [§§]
    53a-48 (a) and 53-21 (a) (2) in that on or about diverse
    dates between August 23, 2006, and December 25, 2010,
    at or near [the new residence of the victim’s father],
    the said [defendant], with intent that conduct constitut-
    ing the crime of risk of injury to a child be performed,
    did agree with one or more persons, namely, [T], to
    engage in and cause the performance of such conduct,
    and any one of them committed an overt act in pursu-
    ance of such conspiracy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) State v. Joseph V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 722
     n.12.
    At trial, to show that the defendant and T had agreed
    to enter into a conspiracy, the state presented testimony
    that, immediately prior to the first specific incident of
    abuse, the defendant and T shared a ‘‘look.’’ Addition-
    ally, there was testimony that, during the third specific
    incident of abuse, the defendant sexually abused the
    victim while T was in the room and watched the abuse
    occur. See footnote 4 of this opinion.
    In closing argument as to this count, the prosecutor
    discussed the first specific incident of abuse. As evi-
    dence of an agreement, he pointed to T’s testimony
    that T and the defendant, who were best friends, first
    cousins, and in a sexual relationship, shared a look
    before the defendant began touching the victim. The
    prosecutor also argued that ‘‘[t]here’s other incidents
    where [T] and [the] defendant would do this to [the
    victim]. [The victim] can’t remember all of them and
    the details because it happened too many times.’’ He
    then referred to the incident in which T watched the
    defendant sexually assault the victim: ‘‘I submit to you
    there’s an agreement if there’s—if one person’s sexually
    assaulting a child and the other person, the defendant, is
    awaiting his turn, or vice-versa, the defendant’s sexually
    assaulting a child and the other person is awaiting their
    turn, that’s evidence of an agreement. . . . [T]he ongo-
    ing course of conduct and sexual assaults done together
    [show] they entered into a conspiracy to sexually
    assault [the victim], not on an infrequent basis; they
    kept sexually assaulting him; that’s all those times of
    the conspiracy.’’
    A person is guilty of conspiracy under § 53a-48 ‘‘when,
    with intent that conduct constituting a crime be per-
    formed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage
    in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any
    one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such
    conspiracy.’’ General Statutes § 53a-48 (a); see State v.
    Pond, 
    315 Conn. 451
    , 467, 
    108 A.3d 1083
     (2015). The
    defendant argues that a single count of conspiracy may
    be premised on only an agreement to commit a single
    conspiracy but that there was evidence of two separate
    agreements to commit two separate conspiracies to
    commit risk of injury to a child. To determine whether
    count three was premised on multiple, separate acts
    requires that we review our case law interpreting § 53a-
    48 (a). This court continuously has interpreted the plain
    language of § 53a-48 (a) as criminalizing an agreement
    to commit a single conspiracy: ‘‘Whether the object of
    a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes,
    it is in either case that agreement which constitutes
    the conspiracy which the statute punishes. The one
    agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements
    and hence several conspiracies because it envisages
    the violation of several statutes rather than one. . . .
    The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and
    however diverse its objects it violates but a single stat-
    ute . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Ortiz, 
    252 Conn. 533
    , 559, 
    747 A.2d 487
     (2000). As a
    result, for double jeopardy purposes, ‘‘[a] single agree-
    ment to commit several crimes constitutes one conspir-
    acy. . . . [M]ultiple agreements to commit separate
    crimes constitute multiple conspiracies. . . . We con-
    sider several factors in determining whether multiple
    prosecutions are permitted for [multiple] conspiracies,
    including . . . the participants, the time period, simi-
    larity of the crimes, and the existence of common acts,
    objectives and a common location.’’ (Citations omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guerrera,
    
    167 Conn. App. 74
    , 110, 
    142 A.3d 447
     (2016), aff’d, 
    331 Conn. 628
    , 
    206 A.3d 160
     (2019).
    As a result, a single count of conspiracy may be prem-
    ised on an agreement to commit only a single conspir-
    acy. Only if the evidence offered at trial shows the
    existence of two separate conspiracies is a single count
    of conspiracy duplicitous. See United States v. Lapier,
    
    796 F.3d 1090
    , 1096 (9th Cir. 2015) (‘‘[J]urors must still
    unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of partici-
    pating in a particular conspiracy . . . . [T]he evidence
    at trial tended to show at least two separate conspirac-
    ies—one between [the defendant] and his first [drug]
    supplier . . . and a later one between [the defendant]
    and his second [drug] supplier . . . but not a single
    overarching conspiracy.’’ (Citations omitted.)).
    In support of his argument of two separate conspirac-
    ies, the defendant contends that the testimony regard-
    ing the ‘‘look’’ that he and T shared was evidence of
    an agreement to commit the first, and only the first,
    incident of abuse. He further argues that the testimony
    regarding T’s presence during the third specific incident
    showed an agreement to commit that, and only that,
    particular incident of abuse. It is well established, how-
    ever, that a conspiracy may be alleged as a continuing
    offense. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 
    127 Conn. 543
    , 605–
    606, 
    18 A.2d 895
     (1941); see also 
    id., 606
     (‘‘ ‘[b]ut when
    the plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous
    result which will not continue without continuous coop-
    eration of the conspirators to keep it up, and there is
    such continuous cooperation, it is a perversion of natu-
    ral thought and of natural language to call such continu-
    ous cooperation a cinematographic series of distinct
    conspiracies, rather than to call it a single one’ ’’). This
    is consistent with precedent from other states holding
    that a conspiracy may be alleged as a continuous course
    of conduct crime, and thus a single count of conspiracy
    premised on a continuous course of conduct is not
    duplicitous. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Albert, 51 Mass.
    App. 377, 385, 
    745 N.E.2d 990
     (‘‘[n]o unanimity instruc-
    tion was required because a conspiracy refers to a con-
    tinuing course of conduct, rather than a succession of
    clearly detached incidents’’), appeal denied, 
    434 Mass. 1104
    , 
    752 N.E.2d 240
     (2001); see also People v. Davis,
    
    488 P.3d 186
    , 192 (Colo. App. 2017) (‘‘A single crime of
    conspiracy can be defined this broadly. . . . No una-
    nimity instruction was required because a conspiracy
    refers to a continuing course of conduct, rather than
    a succession of clearly detached incidents.’’ (Citation
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
    denied, Colorado Supreme Court, Docket No. 17SC386
    (April 9, 2018).
    The defendant’s claim then comes down to whether
    count three was premised on an agreement between the
    defendant and T to commit two separate conspiracies
    or a single, ongoing conspiracy. The information and
    the prosecutor’s closing argument clearly show that
    count three was premised on a single, ongoing conspir-
    acy, not on two separate conspiracies. Evidence that
    the defendant and T shared a ‘‘look’’ and later, during a
    separate incident, that T was present for the defendant’s
    abuse of the victim merely constituted separate proof
    of their ongoing agreement to commit the crime of
    risk of injury against the victim through contact with
    intimate parts. As charged, argued and proven, this was
    not evidence of two separate conspiracies.
    Our conclusion that count three was premised on a
    single, ongoing conspiracy is supported by the fact that
    these two incidents involved the same participants and
    similar conduct (contact with intimate parts), occurred
    in various areas of a single location (the residence of
    the victim’s father), and had the same objective (contact
    with intimate parts between the defendant and the vic-
    tim). Accordingly, we conclude that count three was
    not premised on multiple, separate acts and, thus, was
    not duplicitous.
    II
    Alternatively, the defendant claims that, if the second
    and third counts alleging risk of injury and conspiracy
    did not violate his right to jury unanimity as to instances
    of conduct, these counts nonetheless violate his right to
    jury unanimity as to elements because, as the Appellate
    Court held, each count was premised on multiple viola-
    tions of the alternative types of conduct prohibited by
    § 53-21 (a) (2). Specifically, the defendant argues that
    the statutory requirement that the state prove that either
    he had contact with the victim’s intimate parts or sub-
    jected the victim to contact with his intimate parts are
    historically separate offenses constituting separate ele-
    ments, and thus are facially duplicitous. Because the
    trial court denied his request for a bill of particulars or
    a specific unanimity instruction, the defendant argues,
    this duplicity violated his right to a unanimous jury
    verdict. He argues that the Appellate Court properly
    held that counts two and three created a risk of a non-
    unanimous verdict but committed error by applying the
    wrong test, and thus improperly held that his constitu-
    tional right to jury unanimity was not violated. We agree
    with the defendant that this court and the Appellate
    Court have been applying the wrong test to claims of
    unanimity as to elements, but we disagree that, under
    the proper test, the statutory language at issue created
    two separate elements, thereby violating the defen-
    dant’s right to jury unanimity.
    Initially, we must determine what test to apply to
    claims of unanimity as to elements. As discussed in
    part I of this opinion, these claims require a court to
    determine whether the statutory language at issue cre-
    ates alternative means of committing a single element
    or, instead, creates separate elements, thereby consti-
    tuting separate crimes that must be charged in separate
    counts. Understandably, as to the defendant’s claim of
    unanimity as to elements, the Appellate Court applied
    the test this court announced in State v. Famiglietti,
    
    219 Conn. 605
    , 619–20, 
    595 A.2d 306
     (1991), and held
    that, under this test, because counts two and three were
    premised on the violation of multiple statutory clauses,
    counts two and three were duplicitous but that, because
    the trial court did not specifically sanction a nonunani-
    mous verdict, this error was harmless. See State v.
    Joseph V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 745
    –48.
    In Famiglietti, this court applied a multifactor test
    to determine whether alternative statutes, statutory
    subsections, or statutory clauses constituted separate
    elements or alternative means: ‘‘We first review the
    instruction that was given to determine whether the
    trial court has sanctioned a nonunanimous verdict. If
    such an instruction has not been given, that ends the
    matter. Even if the instructions at trial can be read to
    have sanctioned such a nonunanimous verdict, how-
    ever, we will remand for a new trial only if (1) there
    is a conceptual distinction between the alternative acts
    with which the defendant has been charged, and (2) the
    state has presented evidence to support each alternative
    act with which the defendant has been charged.’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reddick, 
    224 Conn. 445
    , 453, 
    619 A.2d 453
     (1993), quoting State v.
    Famiglietti, 
    supra,
     
    219 Conn. 619
    –20. This test, at times
    referred to as the Famiglietti test, is consistent with
    the test the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
    Circuit applied in United States v. Gipson, 
    553 F.2d 453
    (5th Cir. 1977), which this court consistently has applied
    in unanimity cases both prior to and after deciding
    Famiglietti. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 
    226 Conn. 618
    ,
    644–48, 
    629 A.2d 1067
     (1993); State v. Anderson, 
    supra,
    211 Conn. 34
    –35.
    Approximately one month before this court issued
    its decision in Famiglietti, however, the United States
    Supreme Court rejected the Gipson test for determining
    whether alternative statutes, statutory subsections, or
    statutory clauses constitute alternative elements, requir-
    ing jury unanimity, or alternative means of committing
    a single element, not requiring jury unanimity. Specifi-
    cally, in Schad, the defendant claimed that Arizona’s
    first degree murder statute violated his sixth amend-
    ment right to unanimity because it did not require the
    jury to be unanimous as to one of the statute’s two
    alternative theories of committing first degree murder
    —premeditated murder or felony murder. Schad v. Ari-
    zona, 
    supra,
     
    501 U.S. 630
     (opinion announcing judg-
    ment). The court reframed the defendant’s claim as a
    due process challenge ‘‘to Arizona’s characterization of
    [first degree] murder as a single crime as to which a
    verdict need not be limited to any one statutory alterna-
    tive, as against which he argue[d] that premeditated
    murder and felony murder are separate crimes as to
    which the jury must return separate verdicts.’’ 
    Id.,
    630–31 (opinion announcing judgment); see State v.
    Douglas C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 437
     n.10. In other words,
    the court was tasked with deciding whether the two
    mental states—‘‘the one being premeditation, the other
    the intent required for murder combined with the com-
    mission of an independently culpable felony’’—consti-
    tuted either alternative means of satisfying the mens
    rea element, or separate elements, requiring separate
    verdicts or a specific unanimity instruction. Schad v.
    Arizona, 
    supra, 632
     (opinion announcing judgment);
    see State v. Douglas C., supra, 437 n.10.
    The court in Schad acknowledged that it is difficult
    to discern when alternative mentes reae or actus rei
    constitute alternative means of committing the element
    at issue, and when the ‘‘differences between means
    become so important that they may not reasonably be
    viewed as alternatives to a common end, but must be
    treated as differentiating what the [c]onstitution
    requires to be treated as separate offenses.’’ Schad v.
    Arizona, 
    supra,
     
    501 U.S. 633
     (opinion announcing judg-
    ment). The court noted that the Fifth Circuit in Gipson
    had ‘‘attempted to define what constitutes an immate-
    rial difference as to mere means and what constitutes
    a material difference requiring separate theories of
    crime to be treated as separate offenses subject to sepa-
    rate jury findings . . . .’’ 
    Id.,
     633–34 (opinion announc-
    ing judgment).
    In Gipson, the defendant was charged with and con-
    victed of a single count of violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 2313
    (1976), which prohibited knowingly ‘‘receiv[ing], con-
    ceal[ing], stor[ing], barter[ing], sell[ing] or dispos[ing]
    of’’ any stolen motor vehicle or aircraft moving in inter-
    state commerce. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    United States v. Gipson, 
    supra,
     
    553 F.2d 455
     n.1. The
    District Court instructed the jury that it did not have
    to agree on which of the enumerated acts the defendant
    had committed. 
    Id.,
     455–56. Applying the two-pronged
    test discussed previously, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
    District Court’s judgment, reasoning that the defen-
    dant’s right to jury unanimity was violated by the join-
    der, in a single count, of ‘‘two distinct conceptual
    groupings,’’ receiving, concealing, and storing forming
    the first grouping (referred to by the court as ‘‘hous-
    ing’’), and bartering, selling, and disposing (‘‘market-
    ing’’) constituting the second grouping. 
    Id.,
     458–59.
    Specifically, the court in Gipson held that the alterna-
    tive acts of selling and receiving a stolen vehicle were
    conceptually distinct such that they constituted alterna-
    tive elements, not alternative means of committing a
    single element. See 
    id., 458
    .
    In reviewing Gipson, the court in Schad stated that
    it was ‘‘not persuaded that the Gipson approach really
    answers the question, however. Although the classifica-
    tion of alternatives into ‘distinct conceptual groupings’
    is a way to express a judgment about the limits of
    permissible alternatives, the notion is too indeterminate
    to provide concrete guidance to courts faced with ver-
    dict specificity questions. . . . This is so because con-
    ceptual groupings may be identified at various levels
    of generality, and we have no a priori standard to deter-
    mine what level of generality is appropriate.’’ (Citations
    omitted.) Schad v. Arizona, 
    supra,
     
    501 U.S. 635
     (opinion
    announcing judgment).
    Rather than follow Gipson, the court in Schad held
    that, to determine whether the legislature intended
    either to enumerate alternative means of satisfying a
    single element or to define separate elements, ‘‘our
    sense of appropriate specificity is a distillate of the
    concept of due process with its demands for fundamen-
    tal fairness . . . and for the rationality that is an essen-
    tial component of that fairness. In translating these
    demands for fairness and rationality into concrete judg-
    ments about the adequacy of legislative determinations,
    we look both to history and wide practice as guides to
    fundamental values, as well as to narrower analytical
    methods of testing the moral and practical equivalence
    of the different mental states that may satisfy the mens
    rea element of a single offense. The [i]nquiry is under-
    taken with a threshold presumption of legislative com-
    petence to determinethe appropriate relationship between
    means and ends in defining the elements of a crime.’’
    (Citation omitted.) 
    Id.,
     637–38 (opinion announcing
    judgment).
    Federal courts of appeals have explained that, ‘‘[e]ven
    though this rule [under Schad] speaks in terms of a mens
    rea analysis, it rejects the Gipson model for analyzing
    unanimity problems. Thus the Schad rule should apply
    equally to analysis of multiple [actus reus] elements as
    well as analysis of multiple mens rea elements.’’ United
    States v. Sanderson, 
    966 F.2d 184
    , 188 (6th Cir. 1992).
    As a result, in analyzing both multiple actus reus ele-
    ments and multiple mens rea elements, federal courts
    of appeals have taken their cues from Schad and consid-
    ered the statutory language, relevant legal traditions
    and practices, the overall structure of the statute at
    issue, its legislative history, moral and practical equiva-
    lence between the alternative actus rei or mentes reae,
    and any other implications for unfairness associated
    with the absence of a specific unanimity instruction.
    See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 
    supra,
     
    317 F.3d 37
    ; United
    States v. Sanderson, supra, 188.
    This court never has addressed the effect of the
    Supreme Court’s analytical framework in Schad on our
    adoption of the Gipson test as applied in Famiglietti.22
    Federal appellate courts, however, including the Fifth
    Circuit, specifically have held that Schad overruled and
    replaced the Gipson test. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Thaler,
    
    350 Fed. Appx. 854
    , 857 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Schad,
    not Gipson), cert. denied, 
    559 U.S. 978
    , 
    130 S. Ct. 1698
    ,
    
    176 L. Ed. 2d 191
     (2010); Reed v. Quarterman, 
    504 F.3d 465
    , 481–82 (5th Cir. 2007) (referring to Gipson test as
    ‘‘former test’’ and applying Schad test); United States
    v. Verbitskaya, 
    406 F.3d 1324
    , 1334 (11th Cir. 2005) (Schad
    rejected Gipson analysis), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1096
    ,
    
    126 S. Ct. 1095
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 864
     (2006); see also United
    States v. Sanderson, supra, 
    966 F.2d 188
     (‘‘we interpret
    Schad to hold that there must be a commonsense deter-
    mination of a subject statute’s application and purpose
    in light of traditional notions of due process and funda-
    mental fairness’’).
    Since Schad, a majority of federal courts of appeals,
    including the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, have applied the Schad test to deter-
    mine whether multiple statutes, statutory provisions,
    or statutory clauses constitute separate elements or
    alternative means of committing a single element. See,
    e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 
    905 F.3d 165
    , 185 (3d
    Cir. 2018), cert. denied,     U.S.     , 
    139 S. Ct. 2727
    ,
    
    204 L. Ed. 2d 1120
     (2019); United States v. Mickey,
    
    897 F.3d 1173
    , 1181 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v.
    McIntosh, 
    753 F.3d 388
    , 392–93 (2d Cir. 2014); United
    States v. Allen, 
    603 F.3d 1202
    , 1213 (10th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    562 U.S. 1076
    , 
    131 S. Ct. 680
    , 
    178 L. Ed. 2d 505
    (2010); United States v. Hurt, 
    527 F.3d 1347
    , 1355 (D.C.
    Cir. 2008); Reed v. Quarterman, 
    supra,
     
    504 F.3d 481
    ;
    United States v. Verbitskaya, 
    supra,
     
    406 F.3d 1334
    ;
    United States v. Lee, 
    supra,
     
    317 F.3d 37
    ; United States
    v. Sanderson, supra, 
    966 F.2d 188
    . In light of the court’s
    holding in Schad and its progeny, we agree with the
    defendant that the Gipson test, as adopted in Famig-
    lietti, has been replaced by the Schad test,23 and thus
    we apply the latter in the present case to analyze the
    defendant’s claim.
    We begin with the text of § 53-21 (a): ‘‘Any person
    who . . . (2) has contact with the intimate parts, as
    defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of
    sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years
    of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person,
    in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the
    health or morals of such child . . . shall be guilty of
    . . . a class B felony for a violation of subdivision (2)
    of this subsection, except that, if the violation is of
    subdivision (2) of this subsection and the victim of the
    offense is under thirteen years of age, such person shall
    be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five
    years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended
    or reduced by the court.’’24 It is not clear from the plain
    language of § 53-21 (a) (2) whether the phrase, ‘‘has
    contact with the intimate parts . . . of a child under
    the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen
    years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such
    person,’’ creates two separate elements or alternative
    means of having contact with intimate parts. Our case
    law regarding § 53-21 (a) (2),25 however, suggests that
    this statutory language creates alternative means, not
    elements. Specifically, under Gipson, we previously
    have held that these two statutory requirements are
    not conceptually distinct; rather, the only distinction
    between the two forms of contact is whether the defen-
    dant subjects the victim ‘‘to either active or passive
    participation in sexual activity . . . .’’ State v. Spigar-
    olo, 
    210 Conn. 359
    , 391–92, 
    556 A.2d 112
    , cert. denied,
    
    493 U.S. 933
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 322
    , 
    107 L. Ed. 2d 312
     (1989).
    Although we hold today that the Gipson test is no longer
    applicable to claims of unanimity as to elements, our
    analysis in Spigarolo is relevant to our analysis under
    the Schad test to the extent it shows our legal traditions
    and practices regarding our interpretation of this statu-
    tory language. See United States v. Lee, 
    supra,
     
    317 F.3d 37
    . Additionally, to the extent the statutory language is
    ambiguous, the legislative history shows that subsec-
    tion (a) (2) was created to distinguish sexual contact
    from the nonsexual conduct prohibited under subsec-
    tion (a) (1). Thus, the purpose of subsection (a) (2) is
    to criminalize sexual contact with a child that would
    likely impair the health or morals of that child. The
    statutory language merely establishes two alternative
    ways of having sexual contact with a child. This con-
    struction is supported by the fact that this court is
    unaware of any moral or practical distinction between
    subjecting a child to passive participation in sexual
    activity (the defendant’s having contact with the child’s
    intimate parts) and active participation in sexual activ-
    ity (the defendant’s forcing the child to have contact
    with the defendant’s intimate parts). Accordingly, we
    conclude that the language of § 53-21 (a) (2) creates
    two alternative ways of satisfying the element of contact
    with intimate parts, and thus counts two and three were
    not duplicitous.
    The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed inso-
    far as that court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of
    sexual assault in the first degree and the case is remanded
    to that court with direction to reverse the defendant’s
    conviction of that offense and to remand the case to the
    trial court for a new trial with respect to that offense
    only; the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed
    insofar as that court affirmed the defendant’s conviction
    of risk of injury to a child and conspiracy to commit risk
    of injury to a child.
    In this opinion McDONALD and ECKER, Js., con-
    curred.
    * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of
    victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the
    defendant’s full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the
    victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
    Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 
    18 U.S.C. § 2265
     (d) (3)
    (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
    Act of 2022, 
    Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106
    , 
    136 Stat. 49
    , 851; we decline to
    identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
    order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
    for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
    ** December 13, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip
    opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
    1
    Although § 53a-70 has been amended since the events at issue in this
    appeal; see Public Acts 2015, No. 15-211, § 16; that amendment has no bearing
    on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the
    current revision of § 53a-70.
    2
    Although § 53-21 has been amended several times since the events at
    issue in this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2015, No. 15-205, § 11; Public Acts
    2013, No. 13-297, § 1; and Public Acts 2007, No. 07-143, § 4; those amendments
    have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity,
    we refer to the current revision of § 53-21.
    3
    T also was arrested, but, prior to his criminal trial, he entered into a
    written plea deal with the state in which he agreed to cooperate fully and
    truthfully with respect to the investigation and the charges brought against
    the defendant. State v. Joseph V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 716
     n.2. In exchange
    for T’s testimony and cooperation, the state agreed to limit the charges
    against him to risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) and
    sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
    73a (a) (1) (A), and to recommend a total effective sentence of five years
    of incarceration, execution suspended after eighteen months, followed by
    five years of probation, including sex offender registration. Id.
    4
    Both the victim and T testified as to the first incident of abuse, although
    their testimony conflicted regarding who initiated the abuse. State v. Joseph
    V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 717
     and n.4. From this testimony, the jury reason-
    ably could have found that ‘‘[t]he first time that the defendant sexually
    abused the victim occurred in T’s bedroom after the defendant, T, and the
    victim had been playing video games. . . . The defendant and T exchanged
    a knowing glance just before the defendant put his hand on the victim’s
    hand and made the victim stroke his penis. Thereafter, T and the defendant
    took turns rubbing their penises between the victim’s legs, near his buttocks.
    At one point during this incident, T attempted to anally penetrate the victim
    with his penis while the defendant made the victim perform oral sex on
    him.’’ (Footnote omitted.) 
    Id.
    The victim also testified regarding ‘‘[a]nother incident involving the defen-
    dant [that] occurred when he and the victim were watching television in
    the bedroom of the victim’s father. While the defendant and the victim were
    lying in bed, the defendant took the victim’s hand and made the victim
    stroke his penis. Then, the defendant made the victim, who was fully clothed,
    perform oral sex on him.’’ Id., 718.
    As to the third incident, T alone testified that ‘‘[t]he defendant sexually
    abused the victim during another incident that occurred in T’s presence,
    although T did not participate. This incident occurred at night . . . in the
    living room, which was downstairs at the residence of the victim’s father.
    The defendant partially undressed himself and partially undressed the victim
    before making the victim perform oral sex on him. The defendant also
    rubbed his penis between the victim’s legs.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id.
    As to the fourth incident, the victim testified that, ‘‘when [he] was ten years
    of age, [he and] the defendant . . . were alone together at the residence
    of the victim’s father after other family members had left to purchase food.
    The defendant, who was on the couch in the living room with the victim,
    partially removed his pants and the victim’s pants and anally penetrated
    the victim with his penis. Thereafter, the defendant made the victim perform
    oral sex on him.’’ Id.
    5
    We granted the defendant certification to appeal, limited to the following
    issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court’s denial
    of the defendant’s request for a specific unanimity charge and correctly
    conclude that, under State v. Mancinone, 
    15 Conn. App. 251
    , 274, 
    545 A.2d 1131
    , cert. denied, 
    209 Conn. 818
    , 
    551 A.2d 757
     (1988), cert. denied, 
    489 U.S. 1017
    , 
    109 S. Ct. 1132
    , 
    103 L. Ed. 2d 194
     (1989), a specific unanimity charge
    is required only when the defendant has been charged with violating multiple
    subsections or multiple ‘statutory elements’ of a statute?’’ And (2) ‘‘[i]f a
    specific unanimity charge is required when there is evidence presented at
    trial of more than one separate and distinct criminal act that could serve
    as the basis for a single count, did the Appellate Court correctly conclude
    that the state’s information was not duplicitous where the state presented
    evidence of more than one separate and distinct incident that could have
    served as the basis of conviction on each of the three counts?’’ State v.
    Joseph V., 
    335 Conn. 945
    , 945–46, 
    238 A.3d 17
     (2020).
    6
    For the same reasons stated in the majority opinion in Douglas C., we
    reject the argument of the concurring and dissenting justice (hereinafter,
    the dissent) that this court should adopt the test used by the United States
    Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for determining if a single count
    of an information violates a defendant’s right to jury unanimity as to
    instances of conduct. Specifically, we reject the dissent’s argument that,
    like the Second Circuit, we should adopt and apply a presumption that our
    legislature intends that prosecutors have discretion to charge a defendant
    with either a single crime or an ongoing course of conduct crime if the
    legislature has not made its intent clear in this regard, as determined by
    the statute’s plain language, related statutes, and relevant legislative history.
    See State v. Douglas C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 448
    –60. As explained at length in
    Douglas C., not only do we disagree with the dissent that our case law
    supports this presumption, but we also need not reach this issue, as we
    determine that the legislature’s intent regarding the various statutes at issue
    is clear based on the statutory language, relevant case law, and/or legislative
    history. See 
    id.,
     444 n.12.
    7
    In Douglas C., we recognized that ‘‘some federal courts have noted that
    some state courts have relied on their own common law to hold that a
    statute encompasses a continuing course of conduct. See Dyer v. Farris,
    
    787 Fed. Appx. 485
    , 495 (10th Cir. 2019) (Under Oklahoma law, the general
    rule requiring the [s]tate to elect which offense it will prosecute is not in
    force when separate acts are treated as one transaction. . . . [W]hen a
    child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for
    a definite and certain period of time and submits to sexual acts at that
    parent’s demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction within
    the meaning of this rule. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.)), cert. denied,      U.S.      , 
    140 S. Ct. 1157
    , 
    206 L. Ed. 2d 207
     (2020);
    
    id.
     (citing Gilson v. State, 
    8 P.3d 883
    , 899 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), cert.
    denied, 
    532 U.S. 962
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 1496
    , 
    149 L. Ed. 2d 381
     (2001), which stated
    that, generally, under Oklahoma law, rape was not considered continuing
    offense, but that, under Oklahoma’s common law, court had recognized
    exception for ongoing sexual abuse of minors under certain circumstances).
    Because neither party [in Douglas C.] argue[d] that any common-law excep-
    tion applie[d], we [did] not decide . . . whether creating or applying com-
    mon-law exceptions in interpreting statutes is proper.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Douglas C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 443
    –44 n.11.
    8
    Although § 53a-65 (8) has been amended since the defendant’s commis-
    sion of the crimes that formed the basis of his conviction; see Public Acts
    2006, No. 06-11, § 1; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this
    appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of § 53a-
    65 (8).
    9
    Defense counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury as follows:
    ‘‘The state has alleged that the defendant . . . has committed the offense
    of sexual assault in the first degree. The state alleges in the first count the
    act of sexual assault in the first degree by way of fellatio and anal intercourse.
    ‘‘You may find the defendant guilty of the offense of sexual assault in the
    first degree only if you all unanimously agree on the manner in which the
    state alleges the defendant committed the offense and that it occurred during
    the time and place alleged by the state.
    ‘‘This means you may not find the defendant guilty on the first count of
    sexual assault in the first degree unless you all agree that the state has
    proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendant] did engage in sexual
    intercourse by fellatio and anal intercourse with [the victim] and [the victim]
    was under [thirteen] years of age and [the defendant] was more than [two]
    years older than [the victim]. The state alleges these crimes were committed
    between August 23, 2006, and December 25, 2010, at or near [the new
    residence of the victim’s father]. If the state has not met its burden of proving
    sexual assault in the first degree by way of fellatio and anal intercourse at
    said time and place, you must return a verdict of not guilty. As I have
    instructed you, when you reach a verdict, it must be unanimous on all
    elements of the offense.’’
    We note that, in the proposed instruction, it is not clear whether defense
    counsel was asking the court to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous
    that a single, specific act occurred, or that that it must be unanimous that
    all alleged acts occurred.
    10
    The defendant does not claim that count one violated his constitutional
    right to jury unanimity as to elements but only as to instances of conduct.
    This is because it is clear that count one alleges only a single violation of
    a single statute, statutory provision, or statutory clause. Specifically, § 53a-
    70 (a) (2) provides only a single actus reus: engaging in sexual intercourse.
    See General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (‘‘[a] person is guilty of sexual assault in
    the first degree when such person . . . (2) engages in sexual intercourse
    with another person and such other person is under thirteen years of age
    and the actor is more than two years older than such person’’).
    ‘‘Sexual intercourse’’ is defined as ‘‘vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse,
    fellatio or cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, how-
    ever slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse
    or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be
    committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal
    opening of the victim’s body.’’ General Statutes § 53a-65 (2).
    Count one, therefore, does not allege the violation of multiple statutes,
    statutory provisions, or statutory clauses.
    11
    The concurring and dissenting justice (dissent) argues that, because the
    plain language of the statute does not specifically prohibit charging sexual
    assault as a continuing course of conduct crime, the proposed presumption
    in favor of prosecutorial discretion applies. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
    The problem with this analysis, however, is twofold. First, as we stated in
    Douglas C., there is no support in our case law for this presumption. State
    v. Douglas C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 453
    . Second, even if such a presumption
    existed, it would not apply in the present case because, as we explain, the
    language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. As we explained in Douglas
    C., ‘‘[c]ontrary to the [dissent’s] assertion, a full and complete analysis
    pursuant to § 1-2z does not end in silence on this issue, thereby requiring
    this court to resort to any kind of presumption. What the [dissent] calls
    silence is not silence but the absence of explicit language specifically stating
    that the statute criminalizes only a continuous course of conduct or only
    single acts. Rather than conduct a full analysis pursuant to § 1-2z and come
    to a conclusion about the statute’s meaning, as we are obliged to do, the
    [dissent’s] rule would hold that, if the statute is ‘facially silent’—in other
    words, if explicit language is not used, such as the phrase ‘course of con-
    duct’—then a criminal statute is silent regarding whether it criminalizes a
    single act, a continuous course of conduct, or both, and a prosecutor can
    choose which charging method to apply.’’ Id., 451. However, ‘‘[t]he fact
    that the legislature did not explicitly use the phrase ‘continuous course of
    conduct’ or ‘each single act’ does not end our analysis. Such talismanic
    phrases are not required. Rather, we must look to the definitions of the
    terms used.’’ Id., 465.
    12
    As the dissent observes, the language of § 53a-70 (a) (2) does not signifi-
    cantly differ from the language § 53-21 (a) (2), the risk of injury statute.
    One might be tempted to contend, although the state does not, that the two
    statutes should be interpreted similarly—either as both permitting the state
    to charge a continuing course of conduct, in addition to a singular act, or
    as neither permitting a continuing course of conduct. We note, however,
    that it is not only the statutory language that distinguishes § 53-21 (a) (2)
    from § 53a-70 (a) (2). As discussed at length in Douglas C., our interpretation
    of the language in § 53-21 (a) (2) is premised in no small part on our prior
    interpretation of this statute and its legislative history—specifically, that
    prior to an amendment to § 53-21 in 1995, this court interpreted the language
    of the statute, which criminalized both acts and ‘‘situations,’’ as criminalizing
    both single acts and continuing courses of conduct. See State v. Douglas
    C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 468
    –69. The legislative history demonstrates that, when
    it amended § 53-21, the legislature did not intend to create a new crime or
    to alter the substance of the preexisting crime but, rather, intended merely
    to distinguish between crimes involving sexual contact and nonsexual con-
    tact. In contrast to § 53-21, § 53a-70 (a) (2) has no such legislative history;
    rather, this court consistently has interpreted the language at issue as crimi-
    nalizing only single acts and not a continuing course of conduct. In fact, a
    stronger argument could be made under the plain language of both statutes
    that neither the risk of injury statute nor the sexual assault statute contem-
    plates a continuing course of conduct. As in Douglas C., the defendant in
    the present case does not make this argument either, although in Douglas
    C., we already have rejected it.
    13
    For example, as we explained in Douglas C., ‘‘under our second degree
    stalking statute, [General Statutes] § 53a-181d, the legislature specifically
    proscribed certain continuous courses of conduct; see General Statutes
    § 53a-181d (b) (1), as amended by Public Acts 2021, No. 21-56, § 2 (‘knowingly
    engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person
    that would cause a reasonable person to (A) fear for such specific person’s
    physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; (B) suffer emotional
    distress; or (C) fear injury to or the death of an animal owned by or in
    possession and control of such specific person’ . . .); as well as certain
    kinds of single acts. See General Statutes § 53a-181d (b) (3) (‘[s]uch person,
    for no legitimate purpose and with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, by
    means of electronic communication, including, but not limited to, electronic
    or social media, discloses a specific person’s personally identifiable informa-
    tion without consent of the person’). Similarly, under subsection (a) (1) of
    our risk of injury statute, the legislature specifically criminalized both a
    single act and a continuous course of conduct through the use of the terms
    ‘act’ and ‘situation,’ respectively. See General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1) (‘wil-
    fully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen
    years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is
    endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals
    of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the
    health or morals of any such child’ . . .). Thus . . . these statutes show
    that, when the legislature intends to explicitly criminalize both an act and
    a continuous course of conduct, it knows how to do so. That does not mean
    that such explicit statutory language is required to interpret a statute as
    criminalizing both an act and a continuous course of conduct. . . . [W]e
    by no means are adopting a presumption against such charging when the
    plain language of a statute is not explicit in this regard. Rather, courts must
    closely analyze the language of the statute, case law interpreting the statute,
    the statutory scheme and, if needed, the legislative history to determine if
    a statute criminalizes both an act and a continuous course of conduct.’’
    (Emphasis in original.) State v. Douglas C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 458
    –60.
    14
    See, e.g., General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (‘‘[a]ny person who (1) wilfully
    or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to
    be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered,
    the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child
    are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or
    morals of any such child’’); General Statutes § 53-142k (b) (1) (larceny by
    shoplifting of retail property, the value of which exceeds $2000, during 180
    day period constitutes organized retail theft); General Statutes § 53a-119 (3)
    (‘‘[a] person obtains property by false promise . . . pursuant to a scheme to
    defraud’’); General Statutes § 53a-196e (a) (‘‘[a] person is guilty of possessing
    child pornography in the second degree when such person knowingly pos-
    sesses (1) twenty or more but fewer than fifty visual depictions of child
    pornography, or (2) a series of images in electronic, digital or other format,
    which is intended to be displayed continuously, consisting of twenty or
    more frames, or a film or videotape, consisting of twenty or more frames,
    that depicts a single act of sexually explicit conduct by one child’’); General
    Statutes § 53a-215 (a) (‘‘[a] person is guilty of insurance fraud when the
    person, with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurance company
    . . . (2) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to prepare or
    make any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any
    insurance company’’).
    15
    The dissent’s contrary take on Snook is mistaken. Although the state
    in Snook charged the defendant with sexual assault in the second degree
    as a continuing course of conduct crime, the defendant never challenged
    this method of charging as improper. Instead, he raised a double jeopardy
    claim, challenging his conviction of both sexual assault in the second degree
    and sexual assault in the third degree. See State v. Snook, 
    supra,
     
    210 Conn. 260
    .
    16
    Nevertheless, the dissent contends that this state has a history of prose-
    cutors charging sexual assault as a continuing course of conduct offense
    for almost one century and that this court has ‘‘approved prosecutors’ deci-
    sions to charge repeated sexual assaults as a single course of conduct.’’ As
    we explained in Douglas C., however, ‘‘the fact that we have cases that
    merely state that a prosecutor charged a defendant under a single count
    based on a continuous course of conduct but the nature of the charging
    was not challenged on appeal does not support the [dissent’s] proposed
    presumption. . . . That is not the same as this court holding that such an
    interpretation is proper or that a presumption of prosecutorial discretion
    exists. Most important, for purposes of determining legislative intent, of
    course, the past practice of prosecutors is not a relevant factor under § 1-
    2z in ascertaining whether a statute criminalizes a continuing course of
    conduct.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Douglas C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 454
    –55.
    Moreover, although ‘‘[i]t is true that a handful of Appellate Court cases have
    held that there is no unanimity violation when a defendant has been charged
    in a single count with violating the same statute based on multiple acts,
    especially in the context of ongoing sexual assault of children. . . . These
    cases do not support adopting the [dissent’s] proposed presumption, as they
    do not apply a presumption. Rather, these cases were decided under the
    test set forth in [United States v. Gipson, 
    553 F.2d 453
     (5th Cir. 1977)] and
    before this court recognized claims of unanimity as to instances of conduct.
    As we explained, the Gipson test did not require that a court analyze whether
    the statute at issue criminalizes a continuous course of conduct and is not
    the proper test for determining claims of unanimity regarding instances of
    conduct.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Douglas C., supra, 457–58.
    17
    In response to the defendant’s assertion in the present case that a
    different test should apply to claims of unanimity regarding multiple inci-
    dents of conduct, the state has not argued that there should be a continuing
    course of conduct exception that includes and relies on the dissent’s pro-
    posed presumption. In fact, as recently as this court’s decision in State v.
    Cody M., 
    337 Conn. 92
    , 
    259 A.3d 576
     (2020), in arguing that each incident
    of violation of a standing criminal protective order constituted a separate
    offense and thus could not be charged in one count under a continuous
    course of conduct theory, the state specifically asserted that ‘‘a violation
    of a protective order is more analogous to sexual assault, which is a separate
    act crime, than kidnapping, which is a continuous act crime.’’ Id., 101. We
    make this observation not because we question whether the argument has
    been preserved in these cases. Rather, we find it illuminating that the consti-
    tutional officer whose discretion the dissent suggests the law presumes and
    the legislature necessarily acknowledges, has not made the argument the
    dissent makes.
    18
    Even if we were to go on to examine the applicable legislative history,
    we disagree with the dissent that it shows that the legislature intended to
    criminalize a continuing course of conduct. Specifically, the dissent argues
    that the legislative history shows that ‘‘the intent was to allow the prosecu-
    tion not only of individual sexual assaults but also of ongoing sexual relation-
    ships between adults and minors, which at least implies a continuing course
    of conduct.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Text accompanying footnote 13 of the
    concurring and dissenting opinion. The use of the terms ‘‘relationship’’ and
    ‘‘relations’’ by one legislator in the legislative history does not show that
    the legislature intended to criminalize a continuing course of conduct. First,
    nowhere in the legislative history is the issue of criminalizing a single act
    or an ongoing course of conduct explicitly mentioned. Second, in context,
    it is just as reasonable to construe that legislator’s use of the terms ‘‘relation-
    ship’’ and ‘‘relations’’ as euphemisms for sexual intercourse, as it is to
    construe them as referring to criminalizing a continuing course of conduct.
    Thus, at most, this legislative history creates ambiguity and is of little use.
    19
    Specifically, count one alleged in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he . . . [defendant]
    did commit the crime of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of [§]
    53a-70 (a) (2) in that on or about diverse dates between August 23, 2006,
    and December 25, 2010 . . . [he] did engage in sexual intercourse (fellatio
    and anal intercourse) with . . . [the victim] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Joseph V., supra, 
    196 Conn. App. 722
     n.12.
    20
    We are sympathetic ‘‘to the plight of both the young victims, often unable
    to state except in the most general terms when the acts were committed,
    and of prosecutors, either hampered by the lack of specific information or,
    when it is reported that the conduct occurred dozens or hundreds of times
    over a significant period, faced with the practical problem of how to deal
    with such a multitude of offenses.’’ Cooksey v. State, supra, 
    359 Md. 18
    .
    Sympathies aside, however, we have only the words of our sexual assault
    statute to interpret and apply to the federal case law.
    We note the observation of Saraceno and its progeny that a defendant is
    not prejudiced when a single count of sexual assault is premised on only
    general testimony that the defendant continuously sexually assaulted the
    minor victim over a period of time if this general testimony did not allow
    the jury to be divided as to which instance of conduct occurred but, rather,
    required the jury to credit all or none of the victim’s testimony. This is
    consistent with how other state courts have treated general testimony regard-
    ing multiple instances of sexual assault of a child when applying federal
    law. See State v. Voyles, 
    284 Kan. 239
    , 253–55, 
    160 P.3d 794
     (2007) (consider-
    ing general nature of victims’ testimony and general nature of defendant’s
    defense challenging victims’ credibility in determining harm of duplicitous
    indictment in multiple acts case); State v. Ashkins, 
    357 Or. 642
    , 654, 
    357 P.3d 490
     (2015) (in addressing harm, explaining that, ‘‘in the context of
    nonspecific and undifferentiated evidence of multiple occurrences of a single
    charged offense, a jury concurrence instruction may have been unnecessary
    because there would have been no basis for the jurors to choose any particu-
    lar occurrence as the one proven’’); State v. Fitzgerald, Docket No. 38347-
    7-I, 
    1997 WL 327421
    , *2 (Wn. App. June 16, 1997) (decision without published
    opinion, 
    86 Wn. App. 1059
    ) (in multiple acts case in which defendant entered
    only general denial and proof of crime was solely dependent on victim’s
    credibility versus that of defendant, court’s failure to give jury unanimity
    instruction may be harmless when rational trier of fact would have no
    reasonable doubt about other indistinguishable incidents).
    The state may argue that, if these kind of general testimony cases do not
    prejudice a defendant, it might be that there exists a common-law exception
    to the right to jury unanimity for a continuing course of conduct of sexual
    assault of children when there is only general testimony. Because the state
    has not raised this issue, however, and because the present case does not
    involve only general testimony, we do not address it. We do note, however,
    that federal courts have held that a defendant is not prejudiced, even if a
    single count of an information is premised on multiple, separate incidents
    of conduct if the jury is charged with having to agree that all alleged acts
    occurred. See State v. Douglas C., supra, 
    345 Conn. 446
     n.14. Some state
    courts have followed suit in sexual assault cases involving children. See
    People v. Jones, 
    51 Cal. 3d 294
    , 322, 
    792 P.2d 643
    , 
    270 Cal. Rptr. 611
     (1990)
    (modified August 15, 1990); Baker v. State, 
    948 N.E.2d 1169
    , 1177 (Ind. 2011).
    We also note that several state legislatures have amended their sexual
    assault statutes to criminalize a continuing course of sexual assault against
    children. See Cooksey v. State, supra, 
    359 Md. 27
    . Our legislature might wish
    to consider similar legislation. Cf. 
    Cal. Penal Code § 288.5
     (Deering 2008)
    (prohibiting continuous sexual abuse of children); 
    N.Y. Penal Law § 130.75
    (McKinney 2020) (‘‘[1] [a] person is guilty of a course of sexual conduct
    against a child . . . when, over a period of time not less than three months
    in duration: (a) he or she engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct,
    which includes at least one act of sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct,
    anal sexual conduct or aggravated sexual contact, with a child less than
    eleven years old’’). This is a more prudent course of action than adopting
    the dissent’s proposed presumption, which would apply not only to sexual
    assault cases involving children but to all criminal statutes.
    Finally, we recognize that sexual assault prosecutions are most often
    played out in state courts, not federal courts, and, thus, in defining the test
    applicable to claims of unanimity as to instances of conduct, federal courts
    perhaps did not consider the unique problems associated with charges of
    ongoing sexual assault of children. We do not believe, however, that we are
    at liberty to adopt a different constitutional test for different statutes or
    different kinds of crimes. Rather, we apply a single test and leave it to the
    legislature to craft or amend statutes as it sees fit in light of this test.
    21
    Even if we were to agree with the dissent that § 53a-70 (a) (2) is ambigu-
    ous and that this court should adopt and apply the dissent’s proposed
    presumption; see footnote 6 of this opinion; the application of this presump-
    tion to the facts and circumstances of this case still would establish a
    violation of the defendant’s right to jury unanimity as to instances of conduct.
    The dissent argues that it is not impossible to know whether the jury unani-
    mously agreed that the defendant committed any one particular assault
    because, although there was a mixture of both general testimony and specific
    testimony, ‘‘the defense as to each of those incidents—as well as to all of
    the generic continuous/repeated sexual abuse testimony—was the same’’;
    text accompanying footnote 4 of the concurring and dissenting opinion;
    namely, that the witnesses, the victim and T lacked credibility. Although
    defense counsel did attack the credibility of these witnesses, the dissent
    overlooks the fact that defense counsel also cross-examined the victim and
    T extensively regarding the specifics of each of the three specific incidents
    of conduct and then argued in closing why the jury should not credit each
    particular incident. The primary focus of the trial was on these specific
    incidents of conduct. The present case is distinguishable from prior Appellate
    Court cases in which that court held that any duplicity or unanimity problem
    was not prejudicial because there was only generic testimony regarding
    ongoing abuse. See, e.g., State v. Saraceno, supra, 
    15 Conn. App. 230
    . Thus,
    it was very possible that the jury did not agree unanimously on which
    instance of conduct the defendant committed.
    22
    This court cited to Schad in Famiglietti but did not address the effect
    of Schad on the applicable test. See State v. Famiglietti, 
    supra,
     
    219 Conn. 620
    .
    23
    The state argues that the Gipson and Schad tests merely use different
    language to express the same legal test. This argument is undermined by
    Schad’s explicit rejection of the test applied in Gipson. Even if the Gipson
    rule were still considered good law, the defendant’s claim would fail both
    because the trial court did not explicitly sanction a nonunanimous verdict
    and because, even if we assume that the trial court did sanction a nonunani-
    mous verdict, this court already has held that, under the Gipson test, active
    or passive participation in sexual activity as proscribed under § 53-21 (a)
    (2) constitutes alternative means, not elements, and does not require a
    specific unanimity instruction. See State v. Spigarolo, 
    210 Conn. 359
    , 391–92,
    
    556 A.2d 112
    , cert. denied, 
    493 U.S. 933
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 322
    , 
    107 L. Ed. 2d 312
     (1989).
    24
    General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of conspiracy
    when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees
    with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such
    conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such con-
    spiracy.’’
    The defendant argues that because, in the present case, the state could
    have based the charge of risk of injury to a child on alternative types
    of statutorily prohibited conduct, the conspiracy count likewise rested on
    alternative bases of criminal liability. Thus, the defendant’s claim as it relates
    to count three is premised on the success or demise of his claim regarding
    count two. Because we hold that the statutory language at issue in § 53-21
    (a) (2) created alternative means of committing a single element, and not
    separate elements, thereby not violating the defendant’s right to jury unanim-
    ity, the defendant’s claims as it relates to count three likewise fails.
    25
    The defendant argues that case law regarding double jeopardy and risk
    of injury to a child establishes that the two alternatives create separate
    offenses that the state must charge as such. The defendant, however, miscon-
    strues our double jeopardy case law. For example, in State v. Snook, 
    supra,
    210 Conn. 244
    , this court held that the state may charge a defendant with
    two counts of risk of injury to a child: one count premised on the defendant’s
    contact with the victim’s intimate parts; the other count premised on the
    defendant’s having subjected the victim to contact with the defendant’s
    intimate parts. See 
    id., 262
    . We did not hold, however, that, when alleging
    that a defendant has violated § 53-21 multiple times, the state must charge
    the defendant under separate counts for each violation. Rather, for double
    jeopardy purposes, the state may, but is not required to, charge each violation
    in a separate count.