Lackman v. McAnulty ( 2016 )


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    ZARA LACKMAN ET AL. v. SAMANTHA
    HUNT MCANULTY ET AL.
    (SC 19668)
    Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson, Js.
    Argued October 14—officially released December 28, 2016*
    Bruce S. Beck, for the appellants-cross appellees
    (plaintiffs).
    Stephen G. Walko, with whom were Andrea C. Sisca
    and, on the brief, Julia E. Braun, for the appellees-
    cross appellants (named defendant et al.).
    Opinion
    ROBINSON, J. In this case, we consider whether a
    grantor’s failure to record a separate document limiting
    his powers ‘‘ ‘as trustee’ ’’ in accordance with General
    Statutes § 47-20,1 when that grantor quitclaimed real
    property to himself as trustee, has the effect of nullifying
    the transfer of that property to the trust corpus, thereby
    allowing that grantor, as an individual, subsequently to
    devise that property through his will. The plaintiffs,
    Zara Lackman and Dylan Hunt, appeal2 from the trial
    court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the
    defendants,3 who are beneficiaries of a trust settled by
    the decedent, Hugh I. Hunt. On appeal, the plaintiffs
    claim that the trial court improperly determined that
    the phrase ‘‘otherwise dispose of’’ within § 47-20 does
    not include a specific devise in a will. The plaintiffs
    argue, therefore, that the decedent’s failure to record
    a separate document limiting his powers as trustee
    when he quitclaimed a certain parcel of real property
    to himself as trustee subsequently allowed the decedent
    to devise the property to the plaintiffs in his will. We
    disagree with the plaintiffs, and conclude that § 47-20
    does not apply in this case because it protects only the
    interests of third parties who obtain property by means
    of a conveyance from a grantor who had received that
    property as trustee in the first instance. Because § 47-
    20 did not nullify the decedent’s quitclaim deed to him-
    self as trustee, the property was a trust asset, and the
    specific devise in the decedent’s will adeemed. Accord-
    ingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.4
    The record reveals the following facts and procedural
    history. On December 8, 1994, the decedent became
    the sole owner of the property, which is located at 6
    North Street in the town of Goshen. On October 21,
    1999, the decedent settled an inter vivos trust. The trust
    was revocable, and the decedent amended it on three
    separate occasions. In the first amendment, made on
    March 7, 2003, the decedent removed his daughter,
    Robyn Hunt Vogel as trustee, leaving himself as sole
    trustee, and funded the trust with $10 ‘‘together with
    any property added to the trust estate.’’ This amend-
    ment also included a provision transferring the dece-
    dent’s interest in the property at his death equally to
    his daughters, Alexandra A. Armitage and Samantha
    Hunt McAnulty. On June 30, 2004, the decedent
    amended the trust for a second time. Through that sec-
    ond amendment, the decedent eliminated, inter alia,
    the provision concerning the property in the previous
    amendment and replaced it with a more generalized
    provision distributing the remaining trust corpus
    equally to all of his daughters. The decedent also added
    a provision in the second amendment expressing his
    specific intent not to provide a distribution for his son,
    Hugh Hunt III. On February 24, 2006, the decedent made
    a third and final amendment to the trust, in which he,
    inter alia, equalized the trust distribution among all of
    his children, including his son.
    Shortly after the second amendment, on July 8, 2004,
    the decedent executed a quitclaim deed of the property
    to himself as trustee, placing the property into the trust
    corpus. The quitclaim deed then was recorded on the
    Goshen land records. However, no document specifying
    or restricting his powers as trustee ever was recorded.
    As the trial court noted, ‘‘[a]fter deeding the property
    to himself as trustee, the decedent never amended the
    trust to exclude the property, never conveyed the prop-
    erty out of the trust, and never revoked the trust.’’
    Subsequently, in 2011, the decedent executed a will
    through which he purported to devise the property to
    the plaintiffs and their father, Hugh I. Hunt III. In 2013,
    the decedent passed away. McAnulty, acting as the
    executrix of the decedent’s estate, did not distribute
    the property to the plaintiffs because counsel advised
    her that the property remained in the trust, outside of
    the probate estate, and therefore could not have been
    devised through the will.
    The plaintiffs then brought this action against the
    defendants seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment
    determining, pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31, the
    rights and ownership interests of the defendants in the
    property.5 The defendants also filed a counterclaim that
    sought judgment, pursuant to § 47-31, dismissing the
    plaintiffs’ claims to the property and quieting title in
    favor of McAnulty and Katherine Hunt McNeil as suc-
    cessor trustees. Thereafter, the defendants moved for
    summary judgment, claiming that the property
    remained a trust asset at the time of the decedent’s
    death and, as such, never became part of the decedent’s
    probate estate. In response, the plaintiffs filed a cross
    motion for summary judgment claiming that, pursuant
    to § 47-20, the failure to record a separate, duly exe-
    cuted document setting forth the powers of the grantee
    rendered the quitclaim deed a nullity and, as such,
    allowed the decedent to dispose of the property through
    his will. On October 6, 2015, the trial court issued the
    operative memorandum of decision,6 dismissing, inter
    alia, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and
    granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
    as to count one of the complaint.7
    In its memorandum of decision, the trial court applied
    General Statutes § 1-2z to its analysis of § 47-20. In a
    thorough textual analysis, the trial court determined
    that the legislature’s use of the word ‘‘such’’ to modify
    the words ‘‘real estate’’ and ‘‘interest’’ in the second
    sentence, required it to read the two sentences of § 47-
    20 together. The trial court then determined that the
    dictionary definition of ‘‘dispose of’’ encompassed both
    a permanent assignment and a more temporary designa-
    tion. Although those two conflicting meanings could
    lead to ambiguity, the trial court reasoned that, when
    read in the context of the remainder of § 47-20, the
    statute clearly and unambiguously indicates that the
    legislature intended the phrase ‘‘dispose of’’ only to
    include permanent transfers of real property. The court
    ultimately concluded that the phrase ‘‘otherwise dis-
    pose of’’ as used in § 47-20, plainly and unambiguously
    did not include devising property through a will.
    Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendants’
    motion for summary judgment and quieted title to the
    property in their favor. The plaintiffs’ appeal followed.
    On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court
    improperly interpreted § 47-20. Specifically, the plain-
    tiffs assert that the phrase ‘‘dispose of’’ within § 47-20
    has a well recognized meaning under Connecticut law
    that includes devises in wills. Additionally, the plaintiffs
    contend that the phrase ‘‘or otherwise’’ is meant to be
    read as broadly inclusive, and so, taken together with
    the phrase, ‘‘dispose of,’’ § 47-20 plainly and unambigu-
    ously includes will devises. Thus, according to the plain-
    tiffs’ view of § 47-20, based in part on this court’s
    decision in Benassi v. Harris, 
    147 Conn. 451
    , 
    162 A.2d 521
    (1960), the property never became part of the trust
    corpus because the decedent failed to record a separate
    instrument limiting his powers as trustee, thereby ren-
    dering the term ‘‘trustee’’ in the quitclaim deed without
    legal effect, leaving the decedent free to dispose of the
    property as if he had continued to hold it as an individ-
    ual. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the second sen-
    tence of § 47-20 does not limit the first sentence’s
    applicability only to permanent transfers, in that the
    two sentences govern the rights of two different constit-
    uencies, namely, the rights of the grantee as trustee
    and the rights of a transferee receiving property from
    such grantee, respectively.
    In response, the defendants initially contend that
    § 47-20 does not apply to the question presented, as it
    only applies when there is a transfer of real estate from
    a grantee, as trustee, to a third party. The defendants
    further argue that the phrase ‘‘otherwise dispose of’’
    within § 47-20 does not include a will devise because
    the plaintiffs erroneously assume that the occasional
    colloquial use of the term ‘‘disposition’’ to describe leav-
    ing property in a will must also include will transfers.
    The defendants contend that a fee interest in the prop-
    erty never transferred to the plaintiffs because a will
    devise is not a transfer of interest in real property, but
    is rather a statement of a future intent to transfer and,
    as such, no interest transferred prior to the decedent’s
    death. In contrast, however, the defendants observe
    that the transfer of property from a grantor to a trustee
    is a present transfer of interest because it conveys legal
    title to the trustee with the beneficial interest in the
    property going to the beneficiaries of the trust. We agree
    with the defendants, and conclude that the plain and
    unambiguous language of § 47-20 does not apply in the
    present case, which does not involve a subsequent
    transfer of the property of the grantee ‘‘as trustee’’ to
    a third party.8
    Whether § 47-20 applies to the facts of this case pre-
    sents a question of statutory construction over which
    we exercise plenary review. Gonzalez v. O & G Indus-
    tries, Inc., 
    322 Conn. 291
    , 302, 
    140 A.3d 950
    (2016).
    ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
    tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
    of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
    determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
    statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
    including the question of whether the language actually
    does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning
    . . . § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the
    statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If,
    after examining such text and considering such relation-
    ship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous
    and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-
    textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
    be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and
    unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance
    to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding
    its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
    implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation
    and common law principles governing the same general
    subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) 
    Id., 302–303. Significantly,
    ‘‘our case law is clear
    that ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at
    issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpre-
    tation.’’ State v. Orr, 
    291 Conn. 642
    , 654, 
    969 A.2d 750
    (2009).
    In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with
    the text of the statute. Section 47-20 provides in relevant
    part: ‘‘The word ‘trustee’ or ‘agent’, or the words ‘as
    trustee’, or words of similar meaning, following the
    name of the grantee in a duly executed and recorded
    instrument which conveys, transfers or assigns real
    estate or any interest therein . . . do not, in the
    absence of a separate duly executed and recorded
    instrument defining the powers of the grantee, affect
    the right of the grantee to sell, mortgage or otherwise
    dispose of the real estate or interest therein in the same
    manner as if those words had not been used. No person
    to whom such real estate or interest therein has been
    transferred or mortgaged by such grantee is liable for
    the claim of any undisclosed beneficiary or principal
    or for the application of any money which may have
    been paid by such person therefor.’’ When read in isola-
    tion, the first sentence, as viewed by the plaintiffs,
    appears to describe the precise factual scenario pres-
    ently before us. Here, we have a grantor, the decedent,
    who quitclaimed the property to himself, as trustee,
    without recording a separate document defining his
    duties as trustee. Reading just the first sentence sug-
    gests that the plaintiffs’ interpretation is correct, and
    that here, because the decedent failed to execute a
    separate document limiting his powers as trustee, that
    he was free to dispose of the property as if he owned
    it as an individual.
    We do not, however, read the first sentence of § 47-
    20 in isolation. ‘‘[I]t is a basic tenet of statutory construc-
    tion that [w]e construe a statute as a whole and read its
    subsections concurrently in order to reach a reasonable
    overall interpretation.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Dept. of Develop-
    mental Services, 
    297 Conn. 391
    , 403–404, 
    999 A.2d 682
    (2010). Importantly, ‘‘[l]egislative intent is not to be
    found in an isolated sentence; the whole statute must
    be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Historic District Commission v. Hall, 
    282 Conn. 672
    ,
    684, 
    923 A.2d 726
    (2007). The second sentence focuses
    on eliminating a third-party grantee’s liability sur-
    rounding a transfer of ‘‘such real estate or interest
    therein’’ based on undisclosed beneficiaries. General
    Statutes § 47-20. As the statute does not define the word
    ‘‘such,’’ in accordance with General Statutes § 1-1 (a),
    we look to the common understanding expressed in
    dictionaries in order to afford the term its ordinary
    meaning. See, e.g., Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc.
    v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act,
    
    320 Conn. 611
    , 645, 
    134 A.3d 581
    (2016). ‘‘The word
    ‘such’ has been construed as an adjective referring back
    to and identifying something previously spoken of; the
    word naturally, by grammatical usage, refers to the last
    antecedent. . . . The accepted dictionary definitions
    of ‘such’ include ‘having a quality already or just speci-
    fied,’ ‘previously characterized or specified,’ and ‘afore-
    mentioned.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.) LaProvidenza v.
    State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 
    178 Conn. 23
    , 27, 
    420 A.2d 905
    (1979), quoting Webster’s Third
    New International Dictionary (1971). Mindful of the dic-
    tionary definition of the term ‘‘such,’’ the defendants’
    contention that the second sentence of § 47-20, through
    the use of the phrases ‘‘such real estate or interest
    therein’’ and ‘‘such grantee,’’ limits the scope of the
    first sentence.
    The second sentence of § 47-20 focuses on eliminat-
    ing liability surrounding a transfer of ‘‘such real estate
    or interest therein’’ based on the claims of potential
    beneficiaries to the property, undisclosed to the trans-
    feree. ‘‘Such real estate or interest therein’’ refers back
    to the property transferred from a grantor to another
    person ‘‘as trustee,’’ as set forth in the first sentence
    of § 47-20. Thus, when read as a whole, § 47-20 describes
    two separate conveyances of the same property: (1)
    from the original grantor to a grantee ‘‘as trustee,’’ and
    (2) from that trustee to a third-party grantee. Section
    47-20 therefore provides protection to a third party
    grantee in the second conveyance in the event of subse-
    quent claims to the property from undisclosed benefici-
    aries. Put simply, without a second conveyance of
    property to a third-party grantee, § 47-20 does not apply.
    In contending that the decedent’s failure to record a
    separate instrument restricting his powers as trustee
    nullified the transfer of the property to the trust, the
    plaintiffs, however, rely on this court’s decision in
    Benassi v. 
    Harris, supra
    , 
    147 Conn. 457
    , for the proposi-
    tion that, pursuant to § 47-20, in the absence of such
    an instrument, the use of the word ‘‘trustee’’ in the
    decedent’s quitclaim deed is a nullity. We disagree. As
    the trial court aptly noted in its memorandum of deci-
    sion, Benassi is readily distinguishable from the situa-
    tion before us and, particularly, buttresses our
    interpretation that § 47-20 applies only to protect the
    interest of third parties who have received their interest
    via a second conveyance of property from a grantor
    who received his interest as a trustee. In Benassi, two
    conveyances of property occurred. 
    Id., 453–54. First,
    the plaintiff conveyed the property to a developer as a
    trustee. 
    Id. Second, the
    developer, purporting to act as
    a trustee of the property for the benefit of his own
    existing corporations, conveyed the property to a third-
    party grantee, namely, the defendants, who were his
    existing corporations’ bankruptcy trustees.9 
    Id., 454. This
    court held that the defendants could not be
    required to perform the contract between the plaintiff
    and the developer or to pay damages to the plaintiff,
    noting, in part, that use of the word ‘‘ ‘trustee’ ’’ in the
    first conveyance ‘‘was a nullity . . . .’’ 
    Id., 457. Thus,
    pursuant to § 47-20, the defendants were protected from
    certain claims made by the plaintiff. 
    Id. Here, unlike
    in Benassi, we do not have a second
    conveyance of the property to a third-party grantee that
    would warrant protection under § 47-20. We have just
    one conveyance of the property—from the decedent to
    himself as trustee for the benefit of his children. The
    decedent, ‘‘as trustee,’’ never purported to make
    another transfer of the property. Accordingly, we con-
    clude that § 47-20 is clear and unambiguous in that it
    does not apply to the present case.10
    Having concluded that § 47-20 does not apply, we
    must determine whether the property remained within
    the trust corpus or passed through probate upon the
    decedent’s death. The decedent, through a quitclaim
    deed conveyed to the grantee, here, himself as trustee,
    his fee simple interest in the property, and through the
    words ‘‘as trustee,’’ placed the property into the trust
    corpus. See Socha v. Bordeau, 
    277 Conn. 579
    , 588 n.7,
    
    893 A.2d 422
    (2006); Hansen v. Norton, 
    172 Conn. 292
    ,
    295–96, 
    374 A.2d 230
    (1977); Restatement (Second),
    Trusts § 100 (1959). Upon transfer of the property to
    himself as trustee, the decedent, as an individual, no
    longer had an interest in the property. Rather, the dece-
    dent, as trustee, held legal title to the property, and
    the defendants, as beneficiaries of the trust, held the
    beneficial interest in the property. See Naier v. Beck-
    enstein, 
    131 Conn. App. 638
    , 646–47, 
    27 A.3d 104
    , cert.
    denied, 
    303 Conn. 910
    , 
    32 A.3d 963
    (2011). Put simply,
    the decedent, as an individual, no longer had any inter-
    est in the property that he could devise in a will.11 As
    such, although the decedent specifically devised the
    property through his will, because he did not own the
    property at the time of his death, the specific devise
    adeemed and, therefore, the plaintiffs took nothing as
    devisees. See R. Folsom & L. Beck, Revocable Trusts
    and Trust Administration in Connecticut (2016) § 17:7.
    Thus, the trial court properly determined that, upon
    the decedent’s death, the property remained within the
    trust corpus, and the interest in the property transferred
    to successor trustees to convey to the trust beneficiar-
    ies, namely, the defendants.
    The judgment is affirmed with respect to the plain-
    tiffs’ appeal. The defendants’ cross appeal is dismissed.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    * December 28, 2016, the date that this decision was released as a slip
    opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
    1
    General Statutes § 47-20 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The word ‘trustee’
    or ‘agent’, or the words ‘as trustee’, or words of similar meaning, following
    the name of the grantee in a duly executed and recorded instrument which
    conveys, transfers or assigns real estate or any interest therein . . . do not,
    in the absence of a separate duly executed and recorded instrument defining
    the powers of the grantee, affect the right of the grantee to sell, mortgage
    or otherwise dispose of the real estate or interest therein in the same manner
    as if those words had not been used. No person to whom such real estate
    or interest therein has been transferred or mortgaged by such grantee is
    liable for the claim of any undisclosed beneficiary or principal or for the
    application of any money which may have been paid by such person
    therefor.’’
    2
    The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the
    trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
    Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
    3
    References to the defendants in this opinion include the following individ-
    uals: Alexandra A. Armitage, Christina Lona Hunt, Samantha Hunt McAnulty,
    Katherine Hunt McNeil, Robyn Hunt Vogel, and Jacqulyn Hunt Wicklund.
    We note that the complaint in the present case also named the following
    additional defendants: the plaintiffs’ father, Hugh I. Hunt III; an attorney,
    Peter V. Reis, Jr.; and a law firm, Sullivan, Reis, Sanchy & Perlotto, LLC.
    The claims against these additional defendants are not, however, presently
    at issue. See footnote 5 of this opinion.
    4
    We note that, in light of this conclusion, we need not address the issues
    raised in the defendants’ cross appeal. See footnote 8 of this opinion.
    5
    In count one of the complaint, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judg-
    ment determining their ownership interest in the property. In count two,
    the plaintiffs alleged a breach of duty of care against McAnulty, in her
    position as the executrix of the decedent’s estate, and also against the
    attorney, Peter V. Reis, Jr., and the law firm, Sullivan, Reis, Sanchy & Perlotto,
    LLC, that had advised McAnulty not to transfer interest in the property to
    the plaintiffs. Count two of the complaint is not, however, at issue in this
    case and, therefore, we need not consider it further.
    6
    The court initially issued a memorandum of decision on May 26, 2015.
    After the plaintiffs successfully moved for reconsideration, the court revised
    its analysis of the issues, but ultimately came to the same conclusion. As
    such, the October 6, 2015 memorandum of decision ‘‘supersede[d] and clari-
    fie[d] the May 26, 2015 memorandum of decision.’’
    7
    We note that the trial court also denied the plaintiffs’ cross motion
    for summary judgment as to both counts one and two. See footnote 5 of
    this opinion.
    8
    In support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants filed two affidavits,
    including one from Professor Jeffrey Cooper, as a legal expert in trusts and
    estates. In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Cooper’s affidavit.
    Cooper then submitted a revised affidavit, in response to which the plaintiffs
    filed a second motion to strike. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ second
    motion to strike Cooper’s affidavit on the ground that it expressed an opinion
    on the ultimate legal issue, which was the court’s prerogative, rather than
    that of the expert witness. The defendants have filed a cross appeal to
    challenge the trial court’s decision with respect to the issue of the admissibil-
    ity of Cooper’s affidavit. We note that, because the defendants were not
    aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, this claim is not the proper
    subject of a cross appeal. See Erickson v. Erickson, 
    246 Conn. 359
    , 370 n.9,
    
    716 A.2d 92
    (1998). Moreover, because we affirm the trial court’s award of
    summary judgment in favor of the defendants, we need not consider whether
    to address the issues presented in the defendants’ cross appeal as an adverse
    ruling. See id.; see also Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) (B).
    9
    In Benassi, the plaintiff conveyed property to the developer, ‘‘as trustee,’’
    pursuant to a written agreement. Benassi v. 
    Harris, supra
    , 
    147 Conn. 453
    .
    The parties recorded the deeds and the agreement, which provided that the
    developer was to build homes on two lots and convey them back to the
    plaintiff. 
    Id., 453–54. The
    parties also agreed that the developer would create
    a new corporation for the subdivision, rather than convey this property to
    one of his existing corporations. 
    Id., 453. The
    developer never performed his duties under the agreement by seeking
    approval for subdivision of the property or by creating a new corporation
    to hold the plaintiff’s property. 
    Id., 454. Rather,
    his existing corporations
    faced bankruptcy, so he deeded the property to the defendants. 
    Id. To do
    so, the developer added language to this second conveyance purporting to
    state that he had been acting as trustee for the benefit of his existing
    corporations in the original conveyance. 
    Id. The plaintiff
    brought an action to
    invalidate his original conveyance to the developer, as well as the subsequent
    conveyance from the developer to the defendants. 
    Id., 452–53. In
    ruling for the plaintiff, this court relied on § 354 of the Restatement
    of Contracts to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to an equitable
    remedy for specific restitution and retransfer of property based on the
    unavailability of other adequate remedies. Benassi v. 
    Harris, supra
    , 
    147 Conn. 456
    . In considering whether the plaintiff had another adequate remedy,
    the court relied on § 47-20 to hold that the use of the word ‘‘ ‘trustee’ ’’ in
    the first conveyance was a nullity and could not make the developer ipso
    facto a trustee. 
    Id., 457. The
    defendants were not parties to the developer’s
    agreement with the plaintiff, and as such, could not be required specifically
    to perform the contract or pay damages for its breach. Accordingly, the
    only adequate remedy available to the plaintiff was the cancellation of his
    deed to the developer, as trustee, and the developer’s subsequent deed to
    the defendants. 
    Id. 10 To
    the extent that any ambiguity remains, the only recorded legislative
    history for § 47-20 supports this interpretation that it is intended to protect
    third parties obtaining property from a trustee. See State v. Rodriguez-
    Roman, 
    297 Conn. 66
    , 78, 
    3 A.3d 783
    (2010). When discussing the purpose
    of the bill in the Senate, Senator T. Clark Hull stated the following: ‘‘Mr.
    President, this is a technical bill . . . to clarify language in a long existing
    statute, to make it clear that when title is taken by a person as trustee,
    agent or other similar meanings, it does not require a person thereafter
    dealing with that title to check into the trust or agency power to that deed.’’
    13 S. Proc., Pt. 1, 1969 Sess., p. 439.
    These remarks reveal that the legislature did not intend for § 47-20 to
    remove corpus from the trust based on a grantor’s failure to record a separate
    document limiting his or her powers as trustee with respect to that corpus.
    Rather, based on these remarks, § 47-20 was enacted to protect third-party
    grantees in a second conveyance of property. Specifically, in the first convey-
    ance of property, a grantor conveys land to a grantee, as trustee. In the
    second conveyance, that grantee transfers the property to a third party.
    Section 47-20 provides protection for third-party grantees in a second con-
    veyance who receive title to property from a ‘‘ ‘trustee, agent,’ ’’ or from a
    person with a title of similar meaning. 
    Id., remarks of
    Senator Senator T.
    Clark Hull.
    11
    At oral argument before this court, a question was raised about whether
    the decedent’s second trust amendment, which eliminated the specific refer-
    ence to the property and replaced it with a more generalized provision that
    included the entire remaining trust corpus, effectively removed the property
    from the trust. Although the trust was revocable, the record is devoid of
    any indication that the decedent amended the trust specifically to exclude
    the property, conveyed the property out of the trust, or revoked the trust.
    Thus, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that it was undisputed
    that, ‘‘[a]fter deeding the property to himself as trustee, the decedent never
    amended the trust to exclude the property, never conveyed the property
    out of the trust, and never revoked the trust.’’
    It is of note that, in the decedent’s second amendment to the trust, he
    eliminated the provision concerning the property and replaced it with a
    new, more generalized provision that stated that all of the remaining trust
    corpus would be distributed equally to his daughters. Less than two weeks
    after the second amendment, the decedent quitclaimed the property to
    himself, as trustee, placing it within the trust corpus. As such, the generalized
    language encompassed the property, as well as any other trust corpus
    remaining in the trust, upon the decedent’s death.