Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts ( 2015 )


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    SIKORSKY FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION,
    INC. v. WILLIAM D. BUTTS
    (SC 19216)
    Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,
    Espinosa and Keller, Js.*
    Argued September 23, 2014—officially released February 3, 2015
    William L. Marohn, for the appellant (plaintiff).
    Joanne S. Faulkner, for the National Association of
    Consumer Advocates as amicus curiae.
    Opinion
    ZARELLA, J. In this certified appeal, we consider
    whether postmaturity interest on a loan continues to
    accrue after the entry of judgment under General Stat-
    utes § 37-1, which provides that, in the absence of any
    agreement to the contrary, interest shall accrue ‘‘as an
    addition to the debt’’ at an annual rate of 8 percent
    ‘‘from the date of maturity of a debt . . . .’’ The trial
    court and the Appellate Court concluded that it does
    not, deciding instead that the entry of judgment termi-
    nated the accrual of postmaturity interest on the loan,
    leaving any award of postjudgment interest to the trial
    court’s discretionary powers under General Statutes
    § 37-3a (a), which allows a court to award interest ‘‘as
    damages for the detention of money after it becomes
    payable.’’ We disagree with those courts and conclude
    that, under § 37-1 (b), postmaturity interest continues
    to accrue on the unpaid balance of a loan even after
    the entry of judgment. Consequently, we reverse the
    judgment of the Appellate Court and direct that court
    to remand the case to the trial court for a recalculation
    of the interest award.
    The facts are not in dispute. The defendant, William
    D. Butts, financed his purchase of a used car with a retail
    installment loan from the plaintiff, Sikorsky Financial
    Credit Union, Inc. At the time of purchase, the parties
    entered into a retail installment contract (contract),
    which governed the terms of the loan. The contract
    required the defendant to make regular payments on
    the loan and set an annual interest rate of 9.14 percent.
    The defendant granted the plaintiff a security interest
    in his car. The contract further provided that, in the
    event of a default, the plaintiff had the right to repossess
    the car and to demand any deficiency from the defen-
    dant.1 If the defendant failed to pay the deficiency when
    requested, the contract provided that the plaintiff ‘‘may
    charge [the defendant] interest at a rate not exceeding
    the highest lawful rate’’ until the deficiency is paid in
    full.
    The defendant later defaulted on the loan, so the
    plaintiff repossessed the car and sold it. The fair market
    value of the vehicle, calculated according to General
    Statutes § 36a-785 (g), was not enough to cover the full
    contract balance and the cost of repossession, so the
    plaintiff demanded the deficiency from the defendant,
    who did not pay it. The plaintiff brought the present
    action against the defendant, seeking a deficiency judg-
    ment, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs as provided
    for in the contract. The defendant failed to appear, and
    a default judgment was entered against him.
    Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing in damages
    and awarded the plaintiff the difference between the fair
    market value of the car and the outstanding principal
    balance on the contract, as well as the plaintiff’s costs
    and reasonable attorney’s fees. The court also awarded
    prejudgment interest under § 37-1 at the contract rate
    of 9.14 percent and discretionary postjudgment interest
    under § 37-3a at an annual rate of 2 percent.
    The plaintiff filed a motion for reargument and recon-
    sideration of the trial court’s postjudgment interest
    award. The plaintiff argued that, under § 37-1 (b), the
    trial court was required to award postmaturity interest
    at the contract rate of 9.14 percent until the balance was
    paid in full because the parties had expressly agreed to
    allow postmaturity interest. The plaintiff contended
    that it was entitled to postmaturity interest at the con-
    tract rate from the date of maturity (when the deficiency
    balance became due) until the balance was paid in full.
    According to the plaintiff, postmaturity interest at the
    contract rate continues to accrue even after the entry
    of judgment, leaving the trial court without discretion
    to order a different rate of interest. In support, the
    plaintiff cited this court’s decision in Little v. United
    National Investors Corp., 
    160 Conn. 534
    , 
    280 A.2d 890
    (1971), which held that, under General Statutes (1958
    Rev.) § 37-1, if parties to a loan agreed to a specific
    rate of postmaturity interest, that rate would apply to
    any unpaid balance, even after the entry of a judgment
    enforcing the loan agreement. See 
    id., 541–42. The
    trial court declined to modify its interest award.
    The trial court determined that postmaturity interest
    was the equivalent of prejudgment interest, such that
    interest after maturity would accrue at the contract
    rate only until the entry of judgment. The court further
    determined that postmaturity interest could continue
    to accrue at the contract rate after the entry of judgment
    only if the parties had made a specific agreement for
    postjudgment interest. Because the parties in this case
    had made no such agreement, the trial court determined
    that any postjudgment interest could be awarded only
    pursuant to the trial court’s discretionary powers under
    § 37-3a, which the trial court had granted at a rate of
    2 percent.
    The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment
    to the Appellate Court.2 Sikorsky Financial Credit
    Union, Inc. v. Butts, 
    144 Conn. App. 755
    , 756, 
    75 A.3d 700
    (2013). The plaintiff claimed that the trial court
    improperly awarded discretionary postjudgment inter-
    est at a rate of 2 percent pursuant to § 37-3a because
    it was required, pursuant to Little and § 37-1 (b), to
    award postjudgment interest at the contract rate of 9.14
    percent or, in the alternative, at the legal rate of 8
    percent set forth in § 37-1 (a). 
    Id., 759, 761.
      The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judg-
    ment. 
    Id., 763. It
    determined that the postmaturity inter-
    est under the parties’ contract terminated when the trial
    court rendered judgment. See 
    id., 760–61. The
    Appellate
    Court also determined that the plaintiff could receive
    postmaturity interest at the contract rate after the entry
    of judgment only if the parties had expressly agreed to
    postjudgment interest, which they had not. 
    Id., 761. The
    plaintiff filed a petition for certification to appeal
    to this court, which we granted, limited to the following
    question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude
    that contractual postmaturity interest was properly ter-
    minated upon the entry of the judgment?’’ Sikorsky
    Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, 
    310 Conn. 931
    ,
    
    78 A.3d 857
    (2013). The defendant has not appeared or
    argued before this court. We granted a request by the
    amicus curiae, National Association of Consumer Advo-
    cates, to file an amicus brief and to present oral
    argument.
    I
    On appeal, the plaintiff maintains its claim that, under
    § 37-1, it is entitled to postmaturity interest on the defi-
    ciency balance beginning from the date of maturity and
    continuing until the balance is paid in full. The plaintiff
    asserts that the trial court therefore was required by
    § 37-1 to order prejudgment and postjudgment interest
    at the applicable rate. The plaintiff argues that the appli-
    cable rate of postmaturity interest in this case is the
    contract rate of 9.14 percent. In the alternative, the
    plaintiff argues that, if the rate of postmaturity interest
    is not clear from the parties’ contract, then it neverthe-
    less is entitled to postmaturity interest at the legal rate
    of 8 percent pursuant. The amicus disagrees and argues
    that the Appellate Court properly construed the applica-
    ble statutes. We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled
    to postmaturity interest at the rate of 8 percent.
    The principles that guide our interpretation of stat-
    utes are set forth in General Statutes § 1-2z and are
    further elaborated on in Marandino v. Prometheus
    Pharmacy, 
    294 Conn. 564
    , 574–75, 
    986 A.2d 1023
    (2010).
    We note that we also are guided by our prior interpreta-
    tions of the meaning and interrelationship of the current
    interest statutes and their predecessors.
    We begin our analysis with a review of the interest
    statutes at issue in this appeal and their respective
    functions. Sections 37-1 and 37-3a both relate to inter-
    est, but they serve markedly different purposes. They
    reflect our law’s long-standing recognition of two dis-
    tinct types of interest: (1) interest, usually by agree-
    ment, as compensation for a loan (interest eo nomine);3
    and (2) interest as damages for the detention of money.
    See, e.g., Selleck v. French, 
    1 Conn. 32
    , 33 (1814) (noting
    distinction between interest ‘‘allowed on the ground of
    some contract express or implied to pay it’’ and interest
    ‘‘as damage[s]’’); see also Hubbard v. Callahan, 
    42 Conn. 524
    , 530 (1875) (‘‘[when], in a bill or note, interest
    after maturity is expressly reserved, it is treated as
    interest eo nomine, and never as damages’’ [emphasis
    in original]).
    Section 37-1 governs interest eo nomine, whereas
    § 37-3a (a), by its express terms, applies to interest ‘‘as
    damages for the detention of money . . . .’’ A more
    detailed history of these two statutes (and their prede-
    cessors) and our cases interpreting and applying them
    can be found in Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee
    Schiff, P.C., 
    304 Conn. 348
    , 373–83, 
    39 A.3d 1075
    (2012)
    (Zarella, J., concurring), and Little v. United National
    Investors 
    Corp., supra
    , 
    160 Conn. 537
    –38, 541.
    Section 37-1 applies to interest eo nomine as compen-
    sation for loans of money or property, as long as the
    parties have not disclaimed or waived any right to
    receive interest on the transaction. Section 37-1 pro-
    vides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The compensation for for-
    bearance of property loaned at a fixed valuation, or for
    money, shall, in the absence of any agreement to the
    contrary, be at the rate of eight per cent a year . . . .
    ‘‘(b) Unless otherwise provided by agreement, inter-
    est at the legal rate from the date of maturity of a debt
    shall accrue as an addition to the debt.’’ This provision
    embodies a number of principles, as reflected in our
    cases.
    Section 37-1 (a) sets a default rule that a loan of
    money or property shall be compensated with interest
    eo nomine at a rate of 8 percent. The phrase ‘‘in the
    absence of any agreement to the contrary’’ in § 37-1
    (a) recognizes, however, that parties may agree to a
    different interest rate, subject to usury restrictions, or
    may waive or disclaim any interest on the loan. See,
    e.g., Little v. United National Investors 
    Corp., supra
    ,
    
    160 Conn. 537
    –38, 541; Hubbard v. 
    Callahan, supra
    , 
    42 Conn. 527
    . Accordingly, unless the parties to a loan
    agree to a different rate of interest, or they specifically
    disclaim any right to interest, a creditor will be entitled
    to interest eo nomine at the legal rate of 8 percent as
    compensation for the loan. See General Statutes § 37-
    1 (a); Little v. United National Investors 
    Corp., supra
    ,
    537–38; Hubbard v. 
    Callahan, supra
    , 527.
    Section 37-1 (b) allows the parties to decide whether
    interest eo nomine will continue to accrue after a loan
    matures and the balance remains unpaid. See Little
    v. United National Investors 
    Corp., supra
    , 
    160 Conn. 541
    –42; Globe Investment Co. v. Barta, 
    107 Conn. 276
    ,
    279–80, 
    140 A. 202
    (1928); Hubbard v. 
    Callahan, supra
    ,
    
    42 Conn. 527
    ; see also Ballou v. Law Offices Howard
    Lee Schiff, 
    P.C., supra
    , 
    304 Conn. 373
    –76. Under § 37-
    1 (b), unless the parties agree otherwise, postmaturity
    interest will accrue at the legal rate on the unpaid bal-
    ance of the loan. Thus, if the parties fail to specify
    whether interest will accrue after maturity, or fail to
    specify the rate of postmaturity interest, § 37-1 (b) man-
    dates that interest eo nomine shall continue to accrue
    after maturity at the legal rate. See Ballou v. Law Offices
    Howard Lee Schiff, 
    P.C., supra
    , 376. Furthermore, post-
    maturity interest under § 37-1 (b) continues to accrue
    even after the entry of judgment and until the outstand-
    ing balance is paid in full. See Little v. United National
    Investors 
    Corp., supra
    , 542 (agreed on postmaturity
    interest rate applies to any unpaid loan balance, even
    after entry of judgment). Consequently, an award of
    prejudgment and postjudgment interest on a loan that
    carries postmaturity interest is not discretionary; it is
    an integral part of enforcing the parties’ bargain. See,
    e.g., 
    id., 541–42; see
    also Selleck v. 
    French, supra
    , 
    1 Conn. 33
    (‘‘[i]nterest will be allowed in all cases [when]
    there is an express contract to pay it’’). The trial court
    must, therefore, as part of any judgment enforcing a
    loan, allow prejudgment and postjudgment interest at
    the agreed rate, or the legal rate if no agreed rate is
    specified. The trial court is relieved of this obligation
    only if the parties disclaim any right to interest eo
    nomine after maturity. See General Statutes § 37-1 (b);
    Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, 
    P.C., supra
    ,
    376; Little v. United National Investors 
    Corp., supra
    ,
    537–38, 541.
    Unlike § 37-1, § 37-3a applies to interest as damages
    and allows a trial court to award interest as compensa-
    tion for the detention of money when the duty to pay
    arises from an obligation other than a loan of money or
    property, or when the parties to the loan have decided
    against interest on the loan. See, e.g., Sosin v. Sosin,
    
    300 Conn. 205
    , 230, 
    14 A.3d 307
    (2011) (interest for
    detention of money was allowed when spouse withheld
    payment of money under divorce settlement); Winsted
    Savings Bank v. New Hartford, 
    78 Conn. 319
    , 323–24,
    
    62 A. 81
    (1905) (interest after maturity may be awarded
    as damages for detention of money even if parties
    expressly agreed that contractual interest terminated
    at maturity). Section 37-3a (a) provides in relevant part:
    ‘‘[I]nterest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no
    more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions
    . . . including actions to recover money loaned at a
    greater rate, as damages for the detention of money
    after it becomes payable.’’4
    The purpose of § 37-3a ‘‘is not to punish persons who
    have detained money owed to others in bad faith but,
    rather, to compensate parties that have been deprived
    of the use of their money.’’ Sosin v. 
    Sosin, supra
    , 
    300 Conn. 230
    ; see Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Associates,
    Inc., 
    199 Conn. 683
    , 691, 
    508 A.2d 438
    (1986). An award
    of interest under § 37-3a may include either or both
    prejudgment and postjudgment interest. See Salce v.
    Wolczek, 
    314 Conn. 675
    , 696–97,          A.3d      (2014)
    (trial court may award postjudgment interest while
    declining to award prejudgment interest); DiLieto v.
    County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 
    310 Conn. 38
    , 50 n.12, 
    74 A.3d 1212
    (2013) (‘‘[§] 37-3a is not
    limited by its terms to prejudgment interest, and . . .
    postjudgment interest also may be awarded under that
    provision’’). Whether a prevailing party will receive
    interest as damages pursuant to § 37-3a is principally
    an equitable question lying within the trial court’s dis-
    cretion. See, e.g., DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gyne-
    cology Group, 
    P.C., supra
    , 54; Sosin v. 
    Sosin, supra
    ,
    227. The trial court also has discretion to choose the
    rate of prejudgment and postjudgment interest, up to
    the statutory maximum rate of 10 percent.5 Sosin v.
    
    Sosin, supra
    , 246 n.26; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
    Board of Tax Review, 
    241 Conn. 749
    , 765–66, 
    699 A.2d 81
    (1997); see also General Statutes § 37a-3 (a).
    The Appellate Court’s conclusion that postmaturity
    interest is akin to prejudgment interest and that it termi-
    nates upon the entry of judgment; see Sikorsky Finan-
    cial Credit Union, Inc. v. 
    Butts, supra
    , 
    144 Conn. App. 761
    ; is inconsistent with our case law and § 37-1 (b).
    For example, in Little v. United National Investors
    
    Corp., supra
    , 
    160 Conn. 534
    , this court held that, under
    General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 37-1, if parties to a loan
    expressly agree to a rate of postmaturity interest, inter-
    est eo nomine will accrue on the unpaid balance of the
    loan from the date of maturity and will continue to
    accrue as long as the debt remains unpaid, even after
    the entry of judgment. See 
    id., 541–42. Shortly
    after this
    court decided Little, the legislature amended § 37-1 to
    add subsection (b). See Public Acts 1971, No. 783, § 1.
    This new subsection expanded on the decision in Little
    by creating a new default rule for postmaturity interest.
    Section 37-1 (b) provides: ‘‘Unless otherwise provided
    by agreement, interest at the legal rate from the date
    of maturity of a debt shall accrue as an addition to the
    debt.’’ The addition of subsection (b) to § 37-1 accom-
    plished two things. First, it made clear that, unless the
    parties agree otherwise, postmaturity interest eo
    nomine will accrue on a loan. Second, if the parties do
    not choose a specific rate of postmaturity interest, the
    applicable interest rate will be the statutory legal rate.
    Applying these principles to the present case, we
    conclude that the Appellate Court improperly construed
    the interest statutes and our case law. Although the
    Appellate Court concluded that postmaturity interest
    terminates upon the entry of judgment in the absence
    of a specific agreement for postjudgment interest; see
    Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. 
    Butts, supra
    ,
    
    144 Conn. App. 761
    ; neither § 37-1 (b) nor Little contains
    such a requirement. The decision in Little makes clear
    that postmaturity interest accrues even after the entry
    of judgment, and § 37-1 (b) did not alter that result but
    codified it. Only if the parties to a loan expressly reject
    postmaturity interest will the trial court then have dis-
    cretion under § 37-3a to award interest as damages for
    the detention of money. See, e.g., Winsted Savings
    Bank v. New 
    Hartford, supra
    , 
    78 Conn. 323
    –24 (trial
    court may award interest as damages even when parties
    agreed to waive interest eo nomine).
    The parties’ loan contract in the present case did not
    disclaim postmaturity interest, and, thus, the plaintiff
    was entitled to postmaturity interest under § 37-1 (b).
    The parties agreed that, if the defendant failed to pay
    the deficiency when due, the plaintiff ‘‘may charge [the
    defendant] interest at a rate not exceeding the highest
    lawful rate’’ until the deficiency is paid in full. Although
    the parties did not specify a specific postmaturity inter-
    est rate, they clearly did not disclaim any right to post-
    maturity interest.6 Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled
    to postmaturity interest under § 37-1 (b), and § 37-3a
    does not apply.
    This conclusion requires us also to determine the
    proper rate of postmaturity interest. The plaintiff claims
    that it should be the contract rate of 9.14 percent, but
    we disagree. The parties’ contract did not enumerate a
    specific postmaturity interest rate but, instead, used
    the phrase ‘‘highest lawful rate . . . .’’ This reference
    falls short of adopting a specific postmaturity interest
    rate. Because the parties did not disclaim postmaturity
    interest, but also did not agree to a specific postmaturity
    interest rate, the legal rate in § 37-1 applies, and the
    plaintiff is entitled to interest at the legal rate of 8
    percent from the date of maturity until the deficiency
    is paid in full.
    II
    Although we have concluded in part I of this opinion
    that the rationale of the Appellate Court is untenable,
    the amicus has offered other arguments in support of
    the Appellate Court’s judgment. Many of those argu-
    ments, which were directed at the interest statutes and
    the language of the parties’ contract, are resolved by
    our analysis in part I of this opinion. There is, however,
    one other contention that merits separate consider-
    ation. In addition to its other arguments, the amicus
    argues that the repossession statute; General Statutes
    § 36a-785; pursuant to which the plaintiff brought its
    deficiency action, does not allow interest eo nomine
    under § 37-1 on deficiency judgments. According to the
    amicus, the common law did not allow for deficiency
    actions in cases of repossession because repossession
    of the collateral eliminated a creditor’s ‘‘right to enforce
    the underlying contract.’’7 In the absence of a common-
    law remedy, the amicus asserts that any recovery of a
    deficiency by the plaintiff is limited to that expressly
    allowed by the statute that authorized the deficiency
    action, § 36a-785, which does not directly address
    awards of interest. Thus, the amicus argues that,
    because § 36a-785 does not expressly authorize the
    recovery of postmaturity interest under § 37-1, any
    award of interest is left to the trial court’s discretionary
    powers under § 37-3a.
    The plaintiff acknowledges that its right to recover
    is governed by § 36a-785 but maintains that the statute
    expressly permits it to recover ‘‘the balance due under
    the contract,’’ which includes any interest that would
    be due under the contract. We agree with the plaintiff.
    We begin our analysis, as we must, with the text of the
    statute at issue. The statutory authority for deficiency
    actions for retail installment loans is found in § 36a-
    785. This statute allows creditors to repossess a motor
    vehicle if the debtor defaults, subject to certain restric-
    tions. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (a) and (b). If
    the debtor does not redeem the motor vehicle after
    repossession, the creditor must sell it. See General Stat-
    utes § 36a-785 (c) and (d). The proceeds of the resale
    then must be applied ‘‘(1) to the payment of the actual
    and reasonable expenses thereof, (2) to the payment
    of the actual and reasonable expenses of any retaking
    and storing of said goods, [and] (3) to the satisfaction
    of the balance due under the contract.’’ General Statutes
    § 36a-785 (e). Any surplus must be paid to the debtor.
    See General Statutes § 36a-785 (e). If the proceeds do
    not cover the creditor’s repossession expenses and the
    balance due under the contract, the creditor may not
    recover the deficiency, except to the extent provided
    in § 36a-785 (g). See General Statutes § 36a-785 (f).
    Section 36a-785 (g) generally allows creditors to
    recover a deficiency for motor vehicles with a cash
    price of more than $2000, subject to certain restrictions.
    The creditor first must calculate the fair market value
    of the motor vehicle using a formula specified in the
    statute. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (g). ‘‘If [the fair
    market] value of the motor vehicle . . . is less than
    the balance due under the contract, plus the actual and
    reasonable expenses of the retaking of possession, the
    holder of the contract may recover from the retail buyer
    . . . as a deficiency, the amount by which such liability
    exceeds such fair market value, as defined in . . . sub-
    section [g].’’ General Statutes § 36a-785 (g).
    Section 36a-785 (h) requires a creditor to elect its
    remedy. That subsection provides in relevant part:
    ‘‘After the holder retakes possession as provided in
    subsection (a) . . . the retail buyer or anyone who has
    succeeded to his obligations shall not be liable for any
    balance due, except to the extent permitted by subsec-
    tion (g) of this section. The holder may seek a monetary
    judgment on the contract against the buyer unless the
    goods have been repossessed, with or without judicial
    process. Goods purchased under the contract shall not
    be executed upon to satisfy such judgment. When such
    judgment becomes final, the holder’s security interest
    in the goods shall be extinguished. . . .’’ General Stat-
    utes § 36a-785 (h).
    According to the amicus, subsection (h) limits the
    plaintiff’s recovery of a deficiency to the extent permit-
    ted in § 36a-785 (g), which must be construed narrowly
    in favor of consumers. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Healey Ford-
    Subaru, Inc., 
    231 Conn. 707
    , 722, 
    652 A.2d 496
    (1995).
    The amicus contends that, because subsection (g) does
    not provide expressly that the plaintiff may obtain inter-
    est eo nomine on its underlying contract, the plaintiff
    may not receive interest eo nomine and that any interest
    award is left to the trial court’s discretion to award
    interest as damages under § 37-3a.
    We disagree that repossession under § 36a-785 (g)
    terminates the plaintiff’s rights under the contract or
    prohibits the recovery of interest eo nomine under § 37-
    1. Subsection (g) limits the extent of a creditor’s remedy
    for a deficiency claim, but only to the extent that it
    requires the creditor to reduce the balance due under
    its contract by either the fair market value of the collat-
    eral or the actual price for which the creditor sells it,
    whichever is greater. It does not terminate the operation
    of the parties’ contract.
    The text of subsection (g) specifically contemplates
    the survival of the parties’ contract following reposses-
    sion and defines the deficiency due as ‘‘the balance due
    under the contract,’’ less the fair market value of the
    vehicle8 and the reasonable expenses incurred in repos-
    sessing the vehicle. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
    § 36a-785 (g). Notably, the statutory language does not
    limit a creditor’s recovery to only the remaining princi-
    pal balance. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (g). The
    statute’s use of the broader phrase ‘‘balance due under
    the contract’’ therefore indicates an intention to include
    principal, interest, fees and other amounts due under
    the contract. Furthermore, the text of subsection (g)
    contemplates that the balance due under the contract
    may change as interest continues to accrue because it
    does not prescribe a terminus date for determining the
    contract balance. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (g).
    This stands in contrast to the directive in the same
    subsection that the fair market value of the vehicle be
    determined ‘‘as of the date of repossession.’’ General
    Statutes § 36a-785 (g). We presume that the legislature’s
    decision to require that the fair market value be set at
    a specific date, on the one hand, and its omission of
    any similar requirement for determining the contract
    balance, on the other, were intentional and reflect an
    acknowledgment that the contract balance will change
    as interest accrues. Cf. State v. B.B., 
    300 Conn. 748
    ,
    759, 
    17 A.3d 30
    (2011) (‘‘[when] a statute, with reference
    to one subject contains a given provision, the omission
    of such provision from a similar statute concerning a
    related subject . . . is significant to show that a differ-
    ent intention existed’’ [internal quotation marks omit-
    ted]).
    Our interpretation is also supported by the text of a
    related statutory provision that governs the calculation
    of interest in retail installment agreements. General
    Statutes § 36a-772 regulates the calculation of interest
    on retail installment loans. Subsection (a) of § 36a-772
    limits interest rates on motor vehicle installment loans,
    subsection (b) limits interest rates on retail installment
    loans for any good other than a motor vehicle, and
    subsection (c) governs the computation of finance
    charges. The final sentence of § 36a-772 (c) provides
    in relevant part: ‘‘Nothing contained in sections 36a-
    770 to 36a-788, inclusive . . . shall be construed to pro-
    hibit the computation of the interest component of the
    finance charge by application of an interest rate to the
    actual balance of such principal amount financed as
    may be outstanding from time to time.’’ This sentence
    expressly authorizes parties to compute interest using
    the simple interest method. We find this sentence signif-
    icant to the present case because it applies, by its
    express terms, to the entire Retail Installment Sales
    Financing Act, General Statutes § 36a-770 through 36a-
    788, including the repossession statute at issue, namely,
    § 36a-785. See General Statutes § 36a-772 (c). The spe-
    cific reference in this sentence to the repossession and
    deficiency provisions in § 36a-785 indicates that interest
    will continue to be computed on the outstanding princi-
    pal of the loan, even after repossession.9
    In light of the language of the foregoing statutes, we
    conclude that repossession under § 36a-785 does not
    terminate the parties’ rights under the contract and thus
    preserves the general rule that interest eo nomine (at
    either the contractual or legal rate) continues to accrue
    after maturity under § 37-1 (b). The plaintiff is entitled
    to postmaturity interest at the rate of 8 percent from
    the date of maturity until the balance is paid in full.
    The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
    the case is remanded to that court with direction to
    reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to
    the award of interest and to remand the case to the trial
    court to reconsider the award of interest in accordance
    with this opinion.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    * This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting
    of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald
    and Espinosa. Thereafter, Judge Keller was added to the panel and read
    the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of oral argument
    prior to participating in this decision.
    1
    In the event the fair market value or resale value of the car exceeded
    the amount owed under the contract, the plaintiff was required under the
    contract to credit the difference to the defendant.
    2
    The defendant did not appear before the Appellate Court.
    3
    The Latin phrase ‘‘eo nomine’’ means ‘‘by or under that name . . . .’’
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) p. 760.
    4
    Section 37-3a does not apply to: (1) negligence claims; see General
    Statutes § 37-3b; (2) condemnation proceedings; see General Statutes § 37-
    3c; or (3) awards of prejudgment offer of compromise interest. See General
    Statutes § 52-192a.
    5
    In the case of debts arising from the provision of hospital services, § 37-
    3a (b) sets the maximum rate of interest as damages at 5 percent.
    6
    The amicus argues that the provision in the parties’ contract concerning
    postmaturity interest was indefinite because it stated that the plaintiff ‘‘may’’
    charge interest and therefore did not amount to a valid contract for postmatu-
    rity interest. The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that the contract
    used the term ‘‘may’’ as a means to comply with the plain language require-
    ments for consumer contracts. See General Statutes § 42-152. We need not
    resolve this dispute because, even if the parties’ contract was indefinite, it
    would have no impact on our conclusion. What matters for our purposes
    is that the parties did not disclaim or waive postmaturity interest. In the
    absence of such a disclaimer or waiver, the default rule in § 37-1 (b) applies,
    and postmaturity interest accrues pursuant to statute.
    7
    We take no position on the validity of the assertion of the amicus that
    the common law forbade deficiency actions after the repossession of an
    automobile. In light of our conclusion that the text of § 36a-785 permits the
    plaintiff to recover interest eo nomine on a deficiency claim, an analysis of
    the common law and its relationship to the statute is unnecessary. See
    General Statutes § 1-2z; see also, e.g., Marandino v. Prometheus 
    Pharmacy, supra
    , 
    294 Conn. 574
    –75.
    8
    If the vehicle is resold and the actual resale price exceeds the fair market
    value of the vehicle, the actual resale price controls for purposes of this
    equation. See General Statutes § 36a-875 (g).
    9
    Although it could be argued that the reference in § 36a-772 (c) to the
    entire Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (act) was merely a matter of
    convenience, other portions of that act demonstrate that, when the legisla-
    ture intended to render certain provisions inapplicable to the repossession
    statute at issue, § 36a-785, it did so expressly. See, e.g., General Statutes
    § 36a-778 (‘‘[t]he restriction on charges herein provided shall not apply to
    any expenses permitted under section 36a-785’’).