Coley v. Hartford ( 2014 )


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    COLEY v. HARTFORD—DISSENT
    EVELEIGH, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The
    majority opinion concludes that, in the present case
    the police officers employed by the defendant, the city
    of Hartford, performed discretionary acts and, there-
    fore, since no exception was claimed by the plaintiff,
    Orville Coley, the administrator of the estate of Lorna
    Coley (decedent), the Appellate Court properly
    affirmed the summary judgment rendered by the trial
    court. I disagree. The trial court’s opinion regarding this
    wrongful death case reads as follows: ‘‘Under [General
    Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B)], the [defendant] is not
    liable for discretionary acts and the officers’ decision
    to try and find and arrest the domestic violence perpe-
    trator and eventual shooter, was a discretionary act.
    The [decedent] . . . was not an identifiable victim sub-
    ject to imminent harm, [her] daughter, [Jahmesha Wil-
    liams], was. [General Statutes § 46b-38b (d)] requires
    the officers to exercise reasonable time and reasonable
    judgment which makes it discretionary.’’ The Appellate
    Court agreed and further stated that ‘‘any duty owed
    by the police under the police response procedures
    was owed to Williams, not to [the decedent].’’ Coley v.
    Hartford, 
    140 Conn. App. 315
    , 325, 
    59 A.3d 811
    (2013);
    see Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, No. 7-
    40 (October 1, 1986) (police response procedure). I
    disagree. In my view, since the decedent was a member
    of the household, the police procedures specifically
    applied to her. Further, I would conclude that, although
    the manner in which the police investigated the com-
    plaint was discretionary, once they determined that
    there was probable cause to make an arrest, and that
    the arrest could not be made at that time, they were
    under a ministerial duty to remain in the household
    with the family for a reasonable period of time. The
    ‘‘reasonable period of time’’ was again discretionary,
    but that discretionary action describes only the manner
    in which the police officers were to perform the ministe-
    rial act of staying in the house. Therefore, I would
    conclude that the act of not staying, which was admitted
    in the pleadings, constituted a question for the jury that
    should not have been discarded by way of summary
    judgment.
    There is no need for me to recite the facts of the
    present case, which have been sufficiently set forth by
    the majority. I wish to highlight, however, paragraph
    15 of the complaint, which reads as follows: ‘‘Williams
    had requested that the police officers stay at the scene,
    but the officers did not do so.’’ The defendant’s answer
    to paragraph 15 reads as follows: ‘‘Paragraph 15 is
    admitted.’’ In my view, this answer becomes extremely
    important in any analysis related to the actions of the
    police officers when compared with their obligations
    pursuant to the department’s regulations and proce-
    dures. It is not, however, discussed in the majority opin-
    ion. Rather, the majority concludes that the relevant
    police procedures did not create a ministerial duty to
    remain at the scene for at least some period of time
    following their determination that probable cause
    existed that a family violence crime had been commit-
    ted. I have three difficulties with the majority’s con-
    clusion.
    First, this matter concerns the rendering of summary
    judgment in which the trial court made no findings of
    fact upon which it based its opinion. ‘‘Practice Book
    [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be ren-
    dered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other
    proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as
    to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion
    for summary judgment, the trial court must view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
    party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has
    the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
    [of] material facts which, under applicable principles
    of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter
    of law . . . . Finally, the scope of our review of the
    trial court’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion for
    summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena,
    LLC, 
    306 Conn. 107
    , 116, 
    49 A.3d 951
    (2012). As the
    majority correctly states, ‘‘the trial court’s order grant-
    ing summary judgment in favor of the defendant does
    not discuss the facts alleged in this case, nor does it
    reference any affidavits or supporting documents sub-
    mitted by the parties.’’ See footnote 5 of the majority
    opinion. It appears to me that the trial court based
    its opinion entirely on a question of law relating to a
    discretionary duty compared to a ministerial duty. With
    regard to this issue, I believe that there exists an issue
    of material fact. The majority concludes that the facts
    contained within the police report are uncontested.
    However, counsel for the plaintiff indicated during oral
    argument that a crucial fact was contested, namely,
    whether the police stayed for a reasonable period of
    time after a determination of probable cause for an
    arrest had been made. Therefore, I question the majori-
    ty’s statement regarding the uncontested nature of all
    of the facts in this case. It certainly appears that the
    key fact in the case—whether the police remained in
    the house after a probable cause to arrest determination
    was made and the suspect could not be found—was,
    indeed, contested. The majority goes on to recite some
    facts that, it contends, may indicate that the police did
    stay after a probable cause determination was made.
    In my view, however, a material issue of fact is created
    by the admission in the pleadings that the police did
    not stay when requested to do so by Williams. Viewing
    this issue in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
    facts recited by the majority are directly contradicted
    by the admission in the pleadings. In view of the fact
    that this issue of material fact was never discussed, let
    alone resolved, in either the trial court, Appellate Court
    or the majority opinion, I believe that it can only be
    resolved by the trier of fact, and the case must be
    remanded for further proceedings.
    Second, the majority explains the following: ‘‘At oral
    argument before this court, the defendant, as evidenced
    by the following colloquy, appeared to concede that
    the police response procedures give rise to a duty to
    remain at the scene for at least some period of time.
    ‘‘ ‘The Court: The procedures do require [the police]
    to remain at the scene for some time?
    ‘‘ ‘The defendant: Yes. . . .
    ‘‘ ‘The Court: Would you agree [the police] have to
    stay for a certain period of time?
    ‘‘ ‘The Defendant: Yes, they do have to stay for a
    certain period of time. Of course, it’s difficult to put a
    number on that . . . .’
    ‘‘It is unclear, however, whether the defendant’s state-
    ment that the police officers had to remain at the scene
    for some duration was a concession that they had to
    remain at the scene after they determined there was
    probable cause for arrest as opposed to after the police
    initially responded to the scene.’’ See footnote 14 of
    the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with this
    conclusion. In my view, upon reviewing the police
    response procedures, it is very clear that the police
    were required to stay after they had made a probable
    cause determination for arrest and were unable to make
    the arrest. I believe this fact was conceded by defen-
    dant’s counsel.1 If, in fact, there was a concession by
    the defendant, there can be no question that there was
    a ministerial duty imposed on the police to remain at
    the scene for a reasonable period of time. The premise
    that counsel for the defendant would admit that the
    police had a duty to stay at the house indicates the
    mandatory nature of this requirement. This conclusion
    runs contrary to the express decisions of both the
    Appellate Court and the trial court. Even if there is
    disagreement on this issue, its very determination
    should be made in the trial court, not in this court,
    when we are examining issues not considered by the
    trial court.
    Third, as discussed later in this dissent, the police had
    a ministerial duty to remain at the house. The manner
    in which they performed that duty was discretionary.
    Perhaps, they could have chosen to post a guard at the
    front of the house while the other officer applied for
    the warrant. Perhaps, they could have remained in the
    same room with the family. Perhaps, they could have
    asked for backup and post guards at both entrances to
    the house or remain in the yard. It would not matter
    in terms of the execution of the ministerial duty. The
    point remains that they had a mandatory duty to remain
    at the house which unquestionably constituted a minis-
    terial duty. Therefore, the suit was properly before the
    trial court and should not have been dismissed. The
    majority suggests that because the police response pro-
    cedures contain a reasonableness clause, a discretion-
    ary act is created and not a ministerial duty. This is the
    precise point at which I part ways with the majority. The
    duty to stay, in my view, was ministerial. The manner in
    which they choose to stay was discretionary.
    Although police officers, and police departments, are
    typically protected by discretionary act immunity, the
    mere status of a defendant as a police officer does not
    itself impart a cloak of immunity. The policy behind
    discretionary act immunity for police officers is based
    on the desire to encourage police officers to use their
    discretion in the performance of their typical duties.
    ‘‘Discretionary act immunity reflects a value judgment
    that—despite injury to a member of the public—the
    broader interest in having government officers and
    employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in
    their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-
    guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the bene-
    fits to be had from imposing liability for that injury.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soderlund v. Merri-
    gan, 
    110 Conn. App. 389
    , 395, 
    955 A.2d 107
    (2008).
    ‘‘Police officers are protected by discretionary act
    immunity when they perform the typical functions of
    a police officer.’’ 
    Id., 400. Thus,
    in Soderlund, the Appel-
    late Court held that the police officer’s failure to vacate
    a warrant pursuant to a court order was a ministerial
    duty and ‘‘[the police officer] should have taken steps to
    vacate the warrant from the computer system because it
    was at the direction of the court. It does not matter
    how she performed this duty, but she was required to
    vacate the warrant.’’ 
    Id. Therefore, the
    Appellate Court
    reversed the summary judgment entered by the trial
    court.
    However, under the common law, ‘‘[g]enerally, a
    municipal employee is liable for the misperformance
    of ministerial acts, but has a qualified immunity in the
    performance of governmental acts. . . . Governmental
    acts are performed wholly for the direct benefit of the
    public and are supervisory or discretionary in nature.
    . . . The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it
    requires the exercise of judgment. . . . In contrast,
    [m]inisterial refers to a duty [that] is to be performed
    in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judg-
    ment or discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Bonington v. Westport, 
    297 Conn. 297
    , 306, 
    999 A.2d 700
    (2010). ‘‘Although the determination of whether
    official acts or omissions are ministerial or discretion-
    ary is normally a question of fact for the fact finder
    . . . there are cases where it is apparent from the com-
    plaint . . . [that] [t]he determination of whether an act
    or omission is discretionary in nature and, thus, whether
    governmental immunity may be successfully invoked
    pursuant to . . . § 52-557n (a) (2) (B), turns on the
    character of the act or omission complained of in the
    complaint. . . . Accordingly, where it is apparent from
    the complaint that the defendants’ allegedly negligent
    acts or omissions necessarily involved the exercise of
    judgment, and thus, necessarily were discretionary in
    nature, summary judgment is proper.’’ (Footnote omit-
    ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 307–308. In
    my view, the police were under a ministerial duty to
    stay at the household. The manner in which they per-
    formed this duty and the length of time they stayed
    was discretionary. Therefore, the trial court improperly
    granted summary judgment in favor of the defen-
    dant.Paragraph 17 of the plaintiff’s complaint alleges
    in relevant part as follows: ‘‘The losses suffered by the
    plaintiff, as hereinafter alleged, are due to the negli-
    gence and carelessness of the defendant, its agents,
    servants or employees, in one or more of the following
    ways . . . (d) in that they left the scene before the
    likelihood of further imminent violence had been elimi-
    nated, in violation of the [p]olice [r]esponse [p]roce-
    dures.’’ The plaintiff relies on § III (B) (4) of the police
    response procedures entitled ‘‘Police Response to
    Cases of Family Violence,’’ which provides as follows:
    ‘‘Victim Safety: In the event that an arrest is not made,
    [Public Acts 1986, No. 86-337] requires that officers shall
    remain at the scene for a reasonable time until, in the
    reasonable [judgment] of the officer, the likelihood of
    further imminent violence has been eliminated.’’ Fur-
    ther, § III (B) (5) of the police response procedures,
    which deal with temporary restraining orders and pro-
    tective orders, provides in relevant part: ‘‘c. Officers
    shall arrest when there is probable cause to believe
    that the subject of the [t]emporary [r]estraining or [p]ro-
    tective [o]rder has violated the order. d. Violators shall
    be arrested for a violation of the terms of the order
    which may include criminal trespass in the first degree
    [General Statutes § 53a-107] and any other violations
    charged. e. If the violator is not present when the officer
    arrives, the officer shall investigate the incident and, if
    probable cause exists, the officer will apply for an arrest
    warrant.’’ Moreover, § II (B) of the police response pro-
    cedures provides the following relevant definitions: ‘‘[1]
    ‘[F]amily violence’—means an incident resulting in
    physical harm, bodily injury or assault . . . between
    family or household members. . . . [2] ‘[F]amily/
    household members’—means spouse, parents, persons
    eighteen years of age or older related by blood or mar-
    riage and persons presently residing together or who
    have resided together, and persons who have a child
    in common regardless of whether they are or have been
    married or have lived together at any time. [3] ‘[F]amily
    violence crime’—means a crime defined in [General
    Statutes § 53a-24] which, in addition to its other ele-
    ments, contains as an element thereof an act of family
    violence to a family member and shall not include acts
    by parents or guardians disciplining minor children
    unless such acts constitute abuse.’’
    In my view, the trial court and Appellate Court were
    correct that the actions of the police officers were dis-
    cretionary up to the point that the police determined
    that an arrest should be made, but could not be accom-
    plished at that time due to the inability of the police to
    locate the person who had violated the restraining
    order. Neither court, however, evaluated the separate
    ministerial duty to ‘‘remain at the scene for a reasonable
    time.’’ 
    Id., § III
    (B) (4). This duty commenced after the
    police officers had conducted their investigation and
    determined whether an arrest should take place. In
    Bonington v. 
    Westport, supra
    , 
    297 Conn. 319
    , we held
    that ‘‘even when the duty to respond to a violation is
    ministerial because the specific response is mandated,
    the predicate act—determining whether a violation of
    law exists—generally is deemed to be a discretionary
    act.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) In this case, the officers
    determined that there was probable cause for an arrest,
    but they could not find the perpetrator. In this regard,
    I find the case of Wright v. Brown, 
    167 Conn. 464
    , 
    356 A.2d 176
    (1975), particularly instructive. In that case,
    a state statute required a town dog warden to quarantine
    a dog for a period of fourteen days after the dog had
    bitten someone. 
    Id., 466. The
    dog warden, after an initial
    quarantine of several days, had released the dog prior
    to the fourteen day period and, thereafter, it bit another
    person. 
    Id. We held
    that ‘‘[i]n this case, the dog warden
    was charged under [General Statutes] § 22-358 with the
    duty of quarantining the dog for fourteen days once she
    found that the dog had bitten a person who was not
    upon the premises of the owner or keeper of the dog.
    While the determination of that state of facts involved
    the exercise of judgment, the subsequent duty to quar-
    antine for fourteen days was mandatory and, therefore,
    ministerial.’’ 
    Id., 471–72. Likewise,
    in this case, the
    actions of the police in making a determination that
    probable cause existed for an arrest and that the perpe-
    trator could not be found, in my view, were the predi-
    cate discretionary acts. However, at that point, the
    language of § III (B) (4) of the police response proce-
    dures controlled, requiring that the ‘‘officers shall
    remain at the scene for a reasonable time until, in the
    reasonable [judgment] of the officer, the likelihood of
    further imminent violence has been eliminated.’’ In this
    case, the police were required to remain at the scene.
    There was no discretion involved in that mandatory
    act. The defendant’s counsel conceded this fact at oral
    argument. It is a classic ministerial duty. It is equally
    clear, however, from the defendant’s answer to para-
    graph 15, that the police did not remain at the scene
    for any length of time, let alone a reasonable length of
    time. The facts recited by the majority would create,
    in my view, an issue for the trier of fact, at the time of
    trial. Therefore, since I would conclude that there was
    a ministerial duty to remain at the scene for some period
    of time, and that the complaint and answer, when read
    together, establish that the duty was breached, sum-
    mary judgment is inappropriate in this case. ‘‘[M]unici-
    pal officers are not immune from liability for negligence
    arising out of their ministerial acts, defined as acts
    to be performed in a prescribed manner without the
    exercise of judgment or discretion. . . . This is
    because society has no analogous interest in permitting
    municipal officers to exercise judgment in the perfor-
    mance of ministerial acts.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Soderlund v. 
    Merrigan, supra
    , 
    110 Conn. App. 395
    . In the present case, the police officers, or at least
    one of them, as established by their own regulations,
    were under a ministerial duty to remain at the scene
    for some period of time. They, arguably, did not perform
    this duty. The matter then becomes an issue of fact
    for a decision by the fact finder. I would reverse the
    summary judgment entered by the trial court and
    affirmed by the Appellate Court, and remand the matter
    for further proceedings. Therefore, I respectfully
    dissent.
    1
    At oral argument, the defendant conceded that such a duty exists.
    Although the majority concludes that ‘‘[i]t is unclear whether . . . the defen-
    dant’s statement that the police officers had to remain at the scene for some
    duration was a concession that they had to remain at the scene after they
    determined there was probable cause for arrest as opposed to after the
    police initially responded to the scene.’’ See footnote 14 of the majority
    opinion. I find the defendant’s concession at oral argument to be far less
    ambiguous. The relevant portion of the oral argument is as follows:
    ‘‘The Court: The procedures do require [the police officers] to remain at
    the scene for some time?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Do we know from this record whether they remained at
    the scene?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Well, we do know from the record that [the police offi-
    cers] took enough information from [the decedent] and from Williams as
    to what happened that day, there [is] a three page report, they must have
    stayed for some period of time to get that information.
    ‘‘The Court: But they first of all have to determine whether or not there
    is probable cause for an arrest, I would think that [the police officers] would
    have to take information for that, but after they determined whether or not
    to make an arrest, it would seem that there is some requirement that they
    have to stay at the scene. And do we know whether they stayed at the scene
    here? Other than asking for information?
    ‘‘The Defendant: I guess it’s not clear as to how long they were there.
    ‘‘The Court: Would you agree they have to stay for a certain period of time?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes, they do have to stay for a certain period of time.
    Of course, it’s difficult to put a number on that, whether it be an hour, two
    hours, three hours, twenty-four hours.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    In my opinion, it is clear from the transcript that the defendant conceded
    that officers do have a ministerial duty to remain at the scene for at least
    some period of time after a probable cause determination has been made
    to arrest a given suspect for a family violence crime and the arrest has not
    yet been made. At the very least, it is quite clear, both from the statements
    made by the plaintiff and the defendant in their pleadings and at oral argu-
    ment before this court, that the record is unclear as to whether the police
    ‘‘remained’’ at the scene following the determination of probable cause, and
    as to whether the duty to ‘‘remain’’ is ministerial or discretionary in nature.
    As a result, I believe that these questions should be resolved by a trier of
    fact. See Tango v. New Haven, 
    173 Conn. 203
    , 205–206, 
    377 A.2d 284
    (1977).