State Grievance Committee v. Ganim ( 2014 )


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    STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. JOSEPH
    P. GANIM
    (SC 19192)
    Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and
    Vertefeuille, Js.
    Argued December 3, 2013—officially released April 15, 2014
    Harold R. Rosnick, with whom, on the brief, were
    Bruce L. Levin and Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the
    appellant (defendant).
    Patricia A. King, chief disciplinary counsel, with
    whom was Suzanne B. Sutton, first assistant chief disci-
    plinary counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    ROGERS, C. J. This case addresses the limits of the
    deference that should be afforded to a local standing
    committee of the state bar when that committee recom-
    mends that an individual, who recently has been
    released from prison after serving a lengthy term for
    multiple federal felonies that he committed while hold-
    ing public office, should be reinstated to the bar and,
    therefore, entrusted again with the privilege of practic-
    ing law. The defendant, Joseph P. Ganim, was sus-
    pended from the practice of law upon presentment by
    the plaintiff, the Statewide Grievance Committee, as a
    result of his conviction of sixteen federal felony
    offenses stemming from actions he took while he was
    the mayor of Bridgeport, the state’s largest city.1 Soon
    after his release from prison, he applied for reinstate-
    ment to the bar. Although a local standing committee
    that investigated the defendant’s application recom-
    mended that he be reinstated, the trial court rejected
    that recommendation and denied the defendant’s appli-
    cation. The defendant appeals2 from the trial court’s
    judgment, claiming that the court improperly failed to
    defer to the standing committee’s recommendation that
    he be reinstated and, relatedly, that the court misinter-
    preted that committee’s report, committed legal impro-
    prieties when reviewing the report, and wrongfully
    determined that some of the standing committee’s find-
    ings were clearly erroneous. We disagree with these
    claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to the appeal. The defendant was admitted to the
    Connecticut bar in 1984. He served as mayor of the city
    of Bridgeport (city) from 1991 until 2003, when he was
    convicted, after a jury trial, of the federal offenses of
    racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c), racke-
    teering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (d),
    extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, honest ser-
    vices mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and
    1346, bribery involving programs receiving federal
    funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1) (B), conspir-
    acy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,
    and filing false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C.
    § 7206 (1). United States v. Ganim, 
    510 F.3d 134
    , 136
    (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 1313
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 1911
    , 
    170 L. Ed. 2d 749
    (2008). The events underlying
    the defendant’s convictions are summarized, as follows,
    in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit upholding those convictions. ‘‘As
    mayor [of the city], [the defendant] was responsible
    for the overall operation of municipal government and,
    among other responsibilities, had final authority over
    the [c]ity’s contracts. During his first campaign for
    mayor, [the defendant] became acquainted with Leo-
    nard J. Grimaldi (Grimaldi), who acted as a media advi-
    sor, and Paul J. Pinto (Pinto), who began as his driver
    and aide. [The defendant] developed close relationships
    with Grimaldi and Pinto over the years that followed.
    Grimaldi subsequently formed a public relations com-
    pany called Harbor Communications, of which he was
    the sole proprietor and employee. Pinto became associ-
    ated with (and later purchased an ownership interest
    in) the Kasper Group, a Bridgeport architecture and
    engineering firm.
    ‘‘A. [Professional Services Group] Contract Bid
    ‘‘In 1995 and 1996, [the city] was considering priva-
    tizing its wastewater treatment facilities. [The defen-
    dant] suggested that Grimaldi contact Professional
    Services Group (PSG) to act as PSG’s public relations
    consultant in connection with its bid for the water treat-
    ment contract. Grimaldi then contacted PSG, which
    retained him as a consultant for a fee of $30,000. PSG
    submitted a proposal for the contract, as did U.S. Water,
    a competing firm which was represented by Pinto and
    by United Properties. The owners of United Properties,
    Albert Lenoci, Sr. and Albert Lenoci, Jr. (the Lenocis),
    were [the defendant’s] political benefactors.
    ‘‘After the bids were submitted, [the defendant] told
    Pinto that he had decided to award the contract to PSG,
    but that Pinto should arrange a financial deal between
    PSG and United Properties because [the defendant]
    did not want to choose between big supporters. [The
    defendant] told Pinto that [i]f they want the deal, they’ll
    do it. In turn, Pinto explained to Grimaldi that if PSG
    wanted to win the contract, it would have to take care
    of the Lenocis. Grimaldi acquiesced, as did PSG upon
    his advice. PSG agreed to pay Grimaldi $70,000 more
    per year for the contract’s duration, which he was to
    pass on to Pinto and the Lenocis. Pinto informed [the
    defendant] of the deal, and [the defendant] approved
    the selection of PSG to operate the wastewater treat-
    ment facilities.
    ‘‘Between May 1997 and April 1999, PSG paid Gri-
    maldi roughly $311,396 in consulting fees, much but not
    all of which Grimaldi paid to Pinto. Grimaldi and Pinto
    used some portion of this money to provide [the defen-
    dant] benefits such as entertainment, meals and
    clothing.
    ‘‘B. Fifty-Fifty Fee Sharing Agreement
    ‘‘In December 1996, [the defendant] traveled with
    Pinto and Grimaldi to Tucson, Arizona. During the trip,
    [the defendant] told them they should join forces by
    agreeing to split any consulting fees they earned
    through future dealings with the [c]ity, and that [the
    defendant] would steer contracts to the pair, in return
    for which they would tak[e] care of his expenses and
    needs. Upon returning to [the city], the three men met
    to confirm the agreement. Grimaldi testified that during
    that meeting, he and Pinto agreed that . . . a portion
    of that money [from the agreement] would be to take
    care of [the defendant]. If he needed cash, we would
    take care of him. If he needed suits, we’d take care of
    him. If he needed shirts, we’d take care of him. Any
    needs that he required, off of that 50/50 arrangement,
    we would take care of [the defendant]. In exchange for
    that, [the defendant] would make sure that all of our
    clients would get work from the city if they wanted
    it, that he would steer city contracts and jobs to our
    clients . . . .
    ‘‘Pursuant to the fee sharing agreement, [the defen-
    dant] steered certain projects (some of which are dis-
    cussed below) to Pinto’s and Grimaldi’s clients from
    February 1997 to April 1999. Meanwhile, Grimaldi and
    Pinto provided [the defendant] with cash, meals, fitness
    equipment, designer clothing, wine, jewelry and other
    items. Also at around that time, Grimaldi employed
    [the defendant’s] wife. At [the defendant’s] insistence,
    Grimaldi overpaid her, gave her payments in cash and
    did not report her income to the Internal Revenue
    Service.
    ‘‘C. Bridgeport Energy-Funded Programs
    ‘‘In 1998, [the defendant] had Grimaldi arrange for
    Bridgeport Energy—one of Grimaldi’s clients—to con-
    tribute [$1 million] to fund a promotional advertising
    campaign and the [c]ity’s Clean & Green program,
    which demolished and rehabilitated blighted proper-
    ties. [The defendant] then arranged for Grimaldi to over-
    see the advertising campaign and for one of the Lenocis’
    firms, represented by Pinto, to administer the Clean &
    Green monies. Pursuant to the fee-sharing agreement,
    Grimaldi and Pinto used a portion of their consulting
    fees for these programs to benefit [the defendant].
    ‘‘D. PSG Contract Extension & One-Third-Each Fee
    Sharing
    ‘‘In late 1998, PSG sought a long-term extension of
    its contract to operate the [c]ity’s wastewater treatment
    facilities. In a meeting with Grimaldi and Pinto, [the
    defendant] told Grimaldi that he would support the
    contract extension. In exchange, Grimaldi was to rene-
    gotiate his contract with PSG to get more of his con-
    sulting fees up front. [The defendant] also directed that
    the three men would split those fees—as well as fees
    from all future deals with the [c]ity—one-third each.
    Grimaldi was to pay [the defendant’s] share to Pinto,
    who would hold the fees for [the defendant]. Following
    these discussions, Grimaldi successfully renegotiated
    his consulting fees with PSG, such that he was paid
    $495,000 in a front-loaded deal. On May 27, 1999, [the
    defendant] awarded PSG the contract extension. Over
    several weeks Grimaldi paid Pinto roughly two-thirds
    of the consulting fee, one third of which was for [the
    defendant]. Pinto kept [the defendant’s] share mixed
    with his own money to avoid detection.
    ‘‘Throughout most of 1999, Grimaldi and Pinto pro-
    vided [the defendant]—upon his request—with money
    and benefits such as wine, cabinets, home improve-
    ments and meals. Pinto stated at trial that I was holding
    [the defendant’s] money. When he needed the money,
    I’d give it to him or use it the way he directed me
    to . . . .
    ‘‘In September 1999, [the defendant] and Grimaldi
    had a falling out, and eventually Grimaldi stopped pay-
    ing [the defendant’s] portion of the money to Pinto.
    From that point forward, [the defendant] shunned Gri-
    maldi and prevented his clients from obtaining con-
    tracts with the [c]ity.
    ‘‘E. Life Insurance Policy
    ‘‘In early 1999, [the defendant] sought to use [c]ity
    funds to purchase a [$1 million] life insurance policy
    for himself, as well as for certain [c]ity department
    heads as cover. He approached Frank Sullivan (Sulli-
    van), a childhood friend who had become a stockbro-
    ker, about brokering the deal. [The defendant] approved
    the purchase of the policies in April, 1999 without the
    [c]ity [c]ouncil’s approval. After the purchase of the
    policies was leaked to the media, [the defendant] wrote
    to The Hartford Life Insurance Company to request that
    his own policy be terminated, but did not fill out the
    appropriate paperwork so that the policy would remain
    in effect. At the end of the fiscal year, [the defendant]
    had the funding for the policies inserted as one of many
    summary budget transfers, which were approved by the
    [c]ity [c]ouncil.
    ‘‘Sullivan received a $17,500 commission for serving
    as the broker for [the defendant’s] policy. Acting on
    behalf of [the defendant], Pinto advised Sullivan that if
    Sullivan wanted to do more business with the [c]ity, he
    would have to pay a kickback. Sullivan subsequently
    paid [$5000] in cash for [the defendant] and Pinto to
    share.
    ‘‘F. Pension Plans
    ‘‘In the fall of 1999, Sullivan sought to become the
    broker of record for two municipal pension plans, Plan
    A and Plan B. [The defendant] had Pinto tell Sullivan
    that if he wanted the position, Sullivan would have to
    give [50] percent of his commissions to [the defendant]
    and Pinto. With [the defendant’s] support, Sullivan was
    appointed as the broker for the Plan B pension in Sep-
    tember 1999. The following year, and again with [the
    defendant’s] support, the [d]irector of [f]inance for the
    [c]ity . . . retained Sullivan’s investment firm to assist
    the city in under-writing the Plan A pension. Sullivan
    received $38,000 as the first installment of his brokerage
    commission, which he intended to split with Pinto and
    [the defendant]. They did not request their respective
    cuts, however, as they had become anxious about the
    pending federal investigation against them.
    ‘‘G. Juvenile Detention Facility
    ‘‘In early 1999, the [c]ity, pursuant to a [s]tate of
    Connecticut project, was attempting to condemn prop-
    erty owned by B.C. Sand & Gravel in order to build a
    juvenile detention facility. B.C. Sand & Gravel retained
    Pinto, agreeing to pay him $100,000 if he successfully
    stopped the condemnation. Pinto informed [the defen-
    dant] of the agreement, who then exercised his influ-
    ence to change the [c]ity’s position on the
    condemnation. The [s]tate ultimately abandoned the
    project, and, as a result, Pinto received his fee from
    B.C. Sand & Gravel. Pinto held [one] half of that fee
    for [the defendant’s] benefit pursuant to their usual fee
    sharing arrangement, and from that sum provided [the
    defendant] with cash and benefits upon his request.
    ‘‘H. United Properties & Dollar-A-Square-Foot
    ‘‘The Lenocis, principals of United Properties, were
    seeking in 1998 and 1999 to develop tracts of land in the
    [c]ity, including a site called Father Panik and another
    called Steel Point. The Lenocis and Pinto worked out
    a deal whereby United Properties would pay Pinto [$1]
    for each square foot of space they constructed in the
    [c]ity in the future. Pinto was to use some of that money
    to take care of [the defendant], who in turn lobbied to
    get the Lenocis a long-term lease to develop Father
    Panik. In 2000, the [c]ity sought bids to develop Steel
    Point. In a November 2000 meeting with Pinto and [the
    defendant], the Lenocis promised to raise $500,000 for
    [the defendant’s] anticipated gubernatorial campaign in
    exchange for his commitment to get them the Steel
    Point project. But the Lenocis did not bid on the project
    when federal search warrants were executed at United
    Properties. Because neither the Father Panik nor the
    Steel Point projects materialized, [the defendant] and
    Pinto received no money in connection with these
    projects.
    ‘‘I. False Income Tax Returns
    ‘‘On his 1998 and 1999 income tax returns, [the defen-
    dant] failed to report as income $47,996 and $265,733,
    respectively, in cash and benefits provided by Pinto
    and Grimaldi, including the sums Grimaldi paid to [the
    defendant’s] wife.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id., 137–40. As
    a result of the foregoing conduct, the defendant
    was convicted as previously described and sentenced
    to a total effective sentence of nine years imprisonment,
    followed by three years of supervised release.3 He fur-
    ther was ordered to pay a total of $148,617 in restitution,
    a fine of $150,000 and a special assessment of $1600.
    Because of his federal convictions and upon present-
    ment by the plaintiff, the trial court, Arnold, J., sus-
    pended the defendant from the practice of law for a
    period of nine years, commencing on August 8, 2003.4
    See Practice Book § 2-41. Pursuant to the trial court’s
    order of suspension, the defendant, as of March 4, 2011,
    would have the right to seek permission from the court
    to apply for reinstatement to the bar, provided that he
    had satisfied certain minimum conditions.5 In no event
    would the defendant’s license to practice law be rein-
    stated any earlier than August 8, 2011.
    The defendant served approximately seven years of
    his prison sentence. He began his three year period of
    supervised release in July, 2010.6 On May 19, 2011, the
    defendant filed a motion seeking permission to apply
    for reinstatement of his license to practice law.7 The
    defendant represented that he had met, or exceeded,
    all of the conditions set by Judge Arnold as prerequisites
    for that application.8 On May 24, 2011, the court granted
    the defendant’s motion.
    After publishing notice and conducting an investiga-
    tion, the Standing Committee on Recommendations for
    Admission to the Bar for Fairfield County (standing
    committee) held a hearing on the defendant’s applica-
    tion for reinstatement.9 See Practice Book (2011) § 2-
    53.10 Thereafter, the standing committee issued a report
    in which it concluded that the defendant was presently
    fit to practice law and, accordingly, recommended that
    he be reinstated.11
    In its report, the standing committee summarized the
    opinions of eleven testifying witnesses that the defen-
    dant, with whom they were long acquainted,12 was hon-
    orable and trustworthy and, therefore, fit to practice
    law. Those people included the defendant’s wife and
    uncle, two church pastors, two local business owners
    and five area attorneys, one of whom was related to
    the defendant by marriage. The standing committee
    further noted the defendant’s testimony that he
    ‘‘accept[ed] the verdict from his criminal case and
    accepts full responsibility for what occurred’’; that he
    wanted his license reinstated because he believed he
    was once a good attorney, and could be again, and that
    he could continue to help people; that he accepted
    that he should be supervised, by his brother or another
    attorney, if reinstated; and that he was willing to do
    pro bono work as a condition of reinstatement. More-
    over, the standing committee found that the defendant
    had satisfied the financial obligations imposed along
    with his convictions, either with his own funds or by
    borrowing from his family.
    The standing committee mentioned the testimony of
    the defendant’s supervising probation officer, who had
    stated that the defendant had been compliant and had
    done all he had been asked to do. Moreover, the proba-
    tion officer ‘‘did not see anything that would say that
    [the defendant] is not fit to practice law.’’ The standing
    committee further cited a March 6, 2012 order of the
    United States District Court in the defendant’s criminal
    case denying early termination of his supervised
    release; see footnote 6 of this opinion; wherein Judge
    Arterton had opined, inter alia, that the defendant’s
    ‘‘community activities . . . serve the purpose of
    enhancing his [b]ar readmission chances and his public
    status rehabilitation.’’13 The standing committee also
    noted that the defendant had not filed for bankruptcy,
    and that he had been working for his family’s law firm
    and for two other attorneys as a paralegal.
    In its report, the standing committee discussed one
    area of inquiry ‘‘that did cause [it] concern . . . .’’ At
    the hearing, the defendant had been questioned about
    a website created for a company he owned called ‘‘Fed-
    eral Prison Consultant,’’ and printouts from that website
    were admitted into evidence. The printouts reflected
    website statements such as ‘‘what happened to me
    should never happen to you or anyone,’’ and ‘‘[i]n Octo-
    ber of 2001, I was targeted and indicted by the [f]ederal
    [g]overnment on various white collar crimes,’’ and that
    the website offers advice from someone who has ‘‘sur-
    vived the onslaught.’’ The website stated further that
    the defendant ‘‘became entangled in a [f]ederal prose-
    cution.’’14
    The standing committee observed that the defendant
    had explained the website statements, which suggested
    a belief that he had been prosecuted wrongfully, by
    testifying as follows: ‘‘And I don’t know if I said it clearly
    before is, in my case, I mean I had a fair trial, I had
    good lawyers, I had a fair judge, and I live and stand
    by the result, I accept the verdict, I was found guilty.
    I accept that, I acknowledge that. I took an appeal, I
    lost. I took on in whatever way I thought I could and
    should, took responsibility and went and did my time
    and come out and understand there’s still continuing
    consequences.’’ Additionally, according to the defen-
    dant, a marketing person had constructed the website,
    and it had been reviewed by the plaintiff’s counsel.
    Subsequent to being questioned on the website, the
    defendant arranged to have most of the previously
    quoted language removed.
    In regard to a large volume of letters of recommenda-
    tion that the defendant had submitted into evidence,
    the standing committee discounted the majority of them
    as nonprobative of the defendant’s present fitness to
    practice law, because they ‘‘were from 2003 and 2005
    and appear to [have been] drafted in connection with
    the criminal and sentencing proceedings against [the
    defendant].’’ Twenty-six of the letters, however, were
    from the fall of 2011 and, therefore, ‘‘did reflect on [the
    defendant’s] present fitness to practice.’’15 The standing
    committee also found the evidence submitted regarding
    the defendant’s work activities while he was in prison
    to be ‘‘not . . . particularly probative . . . .’’ The
    standing committee noted finally that it had ‘‘received
    no evidence or testimony objecting to [the defendant’s]
    application for reinstatement.’’
    After finding that the defendant had satisfied the cri-
    teria set by Judge Arnold to apply for reinstatement,
    that the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing con-
    sistently supported a finding of present fitness, and that
    all of the evidence presented, with the exception of the
    Federal Prison Consultant website, ‘‘point[ed] to the
    fact that [the defendant] is presently fit to practice law,’’
    the standing committee recommended that the defen-
    dant be reinstated to the bar at the time his supervised
    release terminated, whenever that should occur.16 It
    recommended further, consistent with Judge Arnold’s
    order, that he be required to practice for one year under
    the supervision of another attorney, and, consistent
    with the defendant’s own suggestion, that he be
    required to perform 1800 hours of pro bono service as
    a condition for reinstatement.
    Thereafter, the standing committee’s report was
    transferred to a three judge panel of the Superior Court
    to decide whether the defendant’s application should
    be granted. See Practice Book (2011) § 2-53.17 On Sep-
    tember 27, 2012, the trial court rejected the recommen-
    dation of the standing committee and denied the
    defendant’s application for reinstatement.
    In its memorandum of decision, the trial court
    reviewed the detailed factual underpinnings of the
    defendant’s criminal convictions, as previously recited,
    and noted that the standing committee, in its report,
    had made only brief reference to the crimes of which
    the defendant had been convicted and the sentence that
    he had received. The court then opined that the standing
    committee improperly had considered the conditions
    set by Judge Arnold as prerequisites for the defendant’s
    right to apply for reinstatement to be the prerequisites
    for reinstatement itself. Additionally, the trial court
    held, the standing committee had failed to address the
    issue of the defendant’s lack of remorse for his criminal
    misconduct and, on the record before it, improperly
    found that the defendant had admitted and accepted
    responsibility for that misconduct. According to the
    court, the defendant ‘‘was never asked by counsel or
    the [standing] committee whether he [had] committed
    the wrongful acts for which he was convicted nine years
    ago,’’ and ‘‘[h]e was never asked for, nor did he offer, an
    apology or any explanation for the criminal misconduct
    that spanned five years.’’ Moreover, the court stated,
    the defendant had offered no apologies or acknowledg-
    ment of wrongdoing at his earlier suspension hearings
    or at the hearing on his application for reinstatement.
    In the trial court’s view, the defendant’s remorse, and
    acknowledgment that he engaged in criminal miscon-
    duct, were ‘‘necessary components of rehabilitation and
    a finding of present fitness.’’ Finally, the court discussed
    the fact that, following the defendant’s criminal trial,
    he had received a sentence enhancement for what the
    sentencing judge found to be wilfully false testimony
    on material matters. See footnote 3 of this opinion.
    In light of that circumstance, the court held that the
    standing committee’s finding that all of the evidence,
    absent the Federal Prison Consulting website, pointed
    to the defendant’s present fitness to practice law, was
    clearly erroneous.
    The trial court also discussed the defendant’s ques-
    tionable use of a prison substance abuse program to
    achieve a sentence reduction;18 the defendant’s Federal
    Prison Consulting website, which the standing commit-
    tee found did not point to a finding of present fitness;
    and the relatively short amount of time that had elapsed
    since the defendant’s misconduct, given its serious
    nature, particularly since the defendant had spent all
    of that time either incarcerated or under supervised
    release. According to the court, ‘‘[i]t is hard to credit
    the passage of time as an indication of rehabilitation
    when it occurs under the watchful eyes of prison guards
    and a probation officer. A more appropriate barometer
    will involve an assessment of [the defendant’s] conduct
    in the years following his discharge from his sentence.’’
    In sum, the trial court ‘‘conclude[d] that the [standing]
    committee acted unreasonably and in an abuse of its
    discretion in finding that the [defendant] possessed the
    necessary traits of good moral character and fitness to
    practice law that the profession rightfully demands. The
    evidence contained in the record was clearly inadequate
    to rebut the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
    the extraordinarily serious misconduct spanning five
    years, occurring while [the defendant] was in a position
    of public trust.
    ‘‘The egregious misconduct at issue was not an iso-
    lated error of judgment or a youthful indiscretion but
    a deliberate, repeated pattern of dishonesty and corrup-
    tion. The crimes [the defendant] was convicted of
    directly implicate the core components of honesty,
    trustworthiness, and fair-dealing, which are fundamen-
    tal to the legal profession.’’ The court ‘‘recognize[d]
    that [the defendant] must not only be judged for his
    misconduct, but . . . also [must] be judged for his
    good conduct, and [that] the record does reflect his
    many good qualities. However, the underlying crimes
    spanning from 1995–1999, the uncontroverted evidence
    that he intentionally gave false testimony in 2003, the
    clear evidence in the record that he denied engaging in
    the criminal conduct and has never expressed remorse
    despite many opportunities to do so, the fact that he
    remains under the supervision of federal authorities
    and while on federal supervised release, established the
    [F]ederal [P]rison [C]onsulting website that the [stand-
    ing] committee specifically found did not point to pre-
    sent fitness—compel[led] [the court’s] conclusion that
    the record cannot substantiate a finding of good moral
    character and fitness to practice law.’’ This appeal
    followed.
    The defendant claims that the trial court improperly
    exceeded the scope of its review when, as to the ques-
    tion of his present fitness to practice law, it substituted
    its own opinion for that of the standing committee.
    He makes a number of subsidiary contentions in this
    regard, including that the court improperly considered
    as misconduct his false testimony at his criminal trial,
    misconstrued the standing committee’s findings regard-
    ing the Federal Prison Consulting website, determined
    that insufficient time had passed since his misconduct
    to permit his reinstatement and set ‘‘a bright line
    requirement’’ that he had to show remorse and acknowl-
    edge his criminal wrongdoing to be reinstated.19 The
    plaintiff disputes each of these contentions and claims
    generally that the trial court properly concluded that
    the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence, as
    was his burden, to establish that he was presently fit
    to practice law. We agree with the plaintiff.
    We begin with general principles and standards of
    review. ‘‘Fixing the qualifications for, as well as admit-
    ting [or readmitting] persons to, the practice of law in
    this state has ever been an exercise of judicial power.
    . . . This power has been exercised with the assistance
    of committees of the bar appointed and acting under
    rules of court.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Scott v. State Bar Examining Commit-
    tee, 
    220 Conn. 812
    , 817, 
    601 A.2d 1021
    (1992). ‘‘Although
    these committees have a broad power of discretion,
    they act under the court’s supervision.’’ 
    Id. Accordingly, ‘‘[i]t
    is the court, and not the bar, or a committee, which
    takes the final and decisive action.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) 
    Id. In deciding
    whether to accept or reject a standing
    committee recommendation on reinstatement to the
    bar, the trial court does not take evidence or hear the
    matter de novo. 
    Id., 817–18. Rather,
    it reviews the stand-
    ing committee’s ‘‘decision on [the] record to determine
    whether [the standing committee] has conducted a fair
    and impartial investigation,’’ and whether it ‘‘acted fairly
    and reasonably or from prejudice and ill will in its
    consideration of the application.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) 
    Id., 818. Ultimately,
    the court must
    decide whether the standing committee, by approving
    or withholding its approval of an application, ‘‘acted
    arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion
    or without a fair investigation of the facts.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id. In either
    admission or
    readmission proceedings, the burden is on an applicant
    to prove his or her present fitness to practice law.20 In
    re Application of Warren, 
    149 Conn. 266
    , 274, 
    178 A.2d 528
    (1962); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rapo-
    port, 
    119 Conn. App. 269
    , 275 n.3, 
    987 A.2d 1075
    , cert.
    denied, 
    297 Conn. 907
    , 
    995 A.2d 639
    (2010). Accordingly,
    in the case of a positive recommendation on reinstate-
    ment by the standing committee, the trial court must
    ensure that that burden has been satisfied. If the proba-
    tive and credited evidence submitted by the applicant,
    on the whole, is not sufficient to establish present fit-
    ness, a recommendation of reinstatement necessarily
    is outside the reasonable range of outcomes to which
    a reviewing court should defer under the abuse of dis-
    cretion standard.
    As to any subordinate facts found by a standing com-
    mittee, the trial court reviews them only for clear error.
    A factual determination ‘‘is clearly erroneous only in
    cases in which the record contains no evidence to sup-
    port it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but the
    reviewing court is left with the definite and firm convic-
    tion that a mistake has been made.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Considine v. Waterbury, 
    279 Conn. 830
    , 858, 
    905 A.2d 70
    (2006). The standing committee,
    as fact finder, ‘‘determines with finality the credibility
    of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testi-
    mony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scott v.
    State Bar Examining 
    Committee, supra
    , 
    220 Conn. 822
    .
    At the same time, ‘‘[t]he ultimate facts [found by a
    standing committee] are reviewable by the court to
    determine whether they are reasonable and proper in
    view of the subordinate facts found and the applicable
    principles of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id., 824. This
    court’s review of the trial court’s decision, to
    either accept or reject the standing committee’s recom-
    mendation, is plenary. See 
    id., 823 (‘‘[b]ecause
    the trial
    court exercises no discretion, but rather is confined to
    a review of the record before the [standing committee],
    we are not limited to the deferential standard of ‘mani-
    fest abuse’ or ‘injustice’ when reviewing [the trial
    court’s] legal conclusions about the adequacy of the
    evidence before the [standing committee]’’).
    Attorney discipline exists ‘‘for the purpose of preserv-
    ing the courts of justice from the official ministration
    of persons unfit to practise in them. . . . An attorney
    as an officer of the court in the administration of justice,
    is continually accountable to it for the manner in which
    he exercises the privilege which has been accorded
    him. His admission is upon the implied condition that
    his continued enjoyment of the right conferred is depen-
    dent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise
    it, so that when he, by misconduct in any capacity,
    discloses that he has become or is an unfit or unsafe
    person to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
    obligations of an attorney, his right to continue in the
    enjoyment of his professional privilege may and ought
    to be declared forfeited. . . . Therefore, [i]f a court
    disciplines an attorney, it does so not to mete out pun-
    ishment to an offender, but [so] that the administration
    of justice may be safeguarded and the courts and the
    public protected from the misconduct or unfitness of
    those who are licensed to perform the important func-
    tions of the legal profession.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance
    Committee v. Spirer, 
    247 Conn. 762
    , 771–72, 
    725 A.2d 948
    (1999).
    Consistent with the foregoing, the primary issue for
    determination on a reinstatement application is the
    applicant’s present fitness to practice law. In re Appli-
    cation of Pagano, 
    207 Conn. 336
    , 345, 
    541 A.2d 104
    (1988). ‘‘The court’s fundamental inquiry in addressing
    a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is
    whether the attorney has rehabilitated himself or her-
    self in conduct and character since the suspension was
    imposed.’’ 7 Am. Jur. 2d 177, Attorneys at Law § 115
    (2007). The applicant must show that he is presently
    fit ‘‘to again exercise the privileges and functions of an
    attorney as an officer of the court and confidential
    manager of the affairs and business of others entrusted
    to his care . . . keeping . . . in view . . . his previ-
    ous misconduct, his discipline therefor, and any refor-
    mation of character wrought thereby or otherwise as
    shown by his more recent life and conduct.’’ In re Kone,
    
    90 Conn. 440
    , 442, 
    97 A. 307
    (1916).
    To practice law, an individual must possess not only
    legal competence and professional capability, but also
    good moral character. See Practice Book §§ 2-5A and
    2-8 (3); see also Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining
    Committee, 
    263 Conn. 39
    , 51, 
    818 A.2d 14
    (2003)
    (‘‘[g]ood moral character is a necessary and proper
    qualification for admission to the bar’’ [internal quota-
    tion marks omitted]). Good moral character is com-
    prised of, inter alia, ‘‘[t]he qualities of honesty, fairness,
    candor and trustworthiness’’; Practice Book § 2-5A (a)
    (1); and ‘‘[r]espect for and obedience to the law . . . .’’
    Practice Book § 2-5A (a) (3). We have long held these
    qualities to be vital. See Doe v. Connecticut Bar Exam-
    ining 
    Committee, supra
    , 52 (‘‘[N]o moral character
    qualification for [b]ar membership is more important
    than truthfulness and candor. . . . It is not enough for
    an attorney that he be honest. He must be that, and
    more. He must be believed to be honest.’’ [Internal
    quotation marks omitted.]); In re Peck, 
    88 Conn. 447
    ,
    450, 
    91 A. 274
    (1914) (‘‘[a]s important as it is that an
    attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intri-
    cate matters which may be entrusted to him, it is infi-
    nitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy’’);
    see also In re O’Brien’s Petition, 
    79 Conn. 46
    , 53, 
    63 A. 777
    (1906) (‘‘[i]t is absolutely essential to the use-
    fulness of an attorney that he be entitled to the confi-
    dence of the community wherein he practices’’ [internal
    quotation marks omitted]), overruled on other grounds
    by In re Application of Dinan, 
    157 Conn. 67
    , 72, 
    244 A.2d 608
    (1968). In Connecticut, ‘‘the ultimate burden
    of proving good character rests upon the applicant.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Connecticut
    Bar Examining 
    Committee, supra
    , 51.
    Our rules of practice do not enumerate specific crite-
    ria to be used in evaluating an application for reinstate-
    ment to the bar. Connecticut courts and those of other
    jurisdictions, however, have relied on several consider-
    ations, however, among them the following: ‘‘(1) the
    [applicant’s] present moral fitness; (2) the [applicant’s]
    acceptance of wrongdoing with sincerity and honesty;
    (3) the extent of the [applicant’s] rehabilitation; (4) the
    nature and seriousness of the original misconduct; (5)
    the [applicant’s] conduct following the discipline; (6)
    the time elapsed since the original discipline; (7) the
    [applicant’s] character, maturity, and experience at the
    time of discipline and at present; (8) the [applicant’s]
    current competency and qualifications to practice law;
    (9) [the applicant’s payment of] restitution; and (10)
    the proof that the [applicant’s] return to the practice
    of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and stand-
    ing of the bar or the administration of justice, or subver-
    sive of the public interest.’’ In re Reinstatement of
    Wiederholt, 
    24 P.3d 1219
    , 1224–25 (Alaska 2001); see
    also In re Petition of Pier, 
    561 N.W.2d 297
    , 300 n.3
    (S.D. 1997) (citing cases from numerous jurisdictions);
    annot., 
    70 A.L.R. 2d 283
    –93, §§ 11 through 18 (1960)
    (enumerating factors); 7 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 116, p.
    178 (same).21
    In regard to the seriousness of the original miscon-
    duct, a pattern of misconduct, rather than one isolated
    instance, warrants greater concern.22 See, e.g., State-
    wide Grievance Committee v. Schluger, 
    230 Conn. 668
    ,
    680, 
    646 A.2d 781
    (1994); see also Rules of Professional
    Conduct 8.4, commentary (‘‘[a] pattern of repeated
    offenses, even ones of minor significance when consid-
    ered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obli-
    gation’’).23 Consequently, ‘‘[t]he more serious the
    misconduct, the more time required to meet the burden
    of moral trustworthiness.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. 
    Rapoport, supra
    , 
    119 Conn. App. 275
    . Moreover, ‘‘[t]he more egre-
    gious the misconduct resulting in disbarment [or sus-
    pension], the greater the proof of moral character and
    trustworthiness required for reinstatement.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 282.24 Thus,
    when courts
    consider the evidence introduced in reinstatement pro-
    ceedings of an applicant’s current fitness, they must
    evaluate it against the backdrop of the applicant’s prior
    misconduct, and ‘‘[inquire] whether the former is of
    sufficient weight to overcome the latter.’’ In re Rein-
    statement of 
    Wiederholt, supra
    , 
    24 P.3d 1227
    ; see also
    
    id. (‘‘[i]t makes
    little sense to consider a disbarred attor-
    ney’s petition for reinstatement entirely in a vacuum,
    ignoring the conduct and attitude that led to dis-
    barment’’).
    An attorney’s commission of misconduct that results
    in criminal convictions, particularly for crimes that
    involve elements of dishonesty,25 casts a dark shadow
    over his or her fitness to practice law, and typically
    results in a lengthy period of suspension or disbarment.
    See, e.g., In re Richman, 
    191 Ill. 2d 238
    , 241–42, 
    730 N.E.2d 45
    (2000) (denying third petition for reinstate-
    ment, after eight years, of attorney disbarred for
    defrauding insurance companies, resulting in multiple
    federal convictions for mail and wire fraud); In re Peti-
    tion of Sowers, 
    244 Kan. 594
    , 595, 
    771 P.2d 933
    (1989)
    (denying third petition for reinstatement, after nine
    years, of attorney convicted of six federal felonies
    including conspiracy and fraud); In re Reinstatement
    of Hird, 
    184 P.3d 535
    , 539–40 (Okla. 2008) (denying
    second petition for reinstatement, after fourteen years,
    of attorney disbarred for acts which caused large mone-
    tary losses to victims and resulted in convictions for
    bank fraud and money laundering); see also General
    Statutes § 51-91a (c) (requiring that suspension of attor-
    ney for conviction of class B felony in Connecticut
    court must be for at least five years, and suspension
    for conviction of class A felony must be for at least
    seven years);26 A.B.A., Compendium of Professional
    Responsibility: Rules and Standards (2011 Ed.) standard
    5.11 (a) (Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions)
    (recommending disbarment, most severe of available
    sanctions, as ‘‘generally appropriate when . . . a law-
    yer engages in serious criminal conduct,’’ which is
    defined to include ‘‘intentional interference with the
    administration of justice . . . fraud . . . misappropri-
    ation, or theft . . . or an attempt or conspiracy or solic-
    itation of another to commit any of these offenses’’).
    Criminal misconduct committed by an attorney while
    he or she holds public office, in abuse of the public
    trust, is particularly egregious, and creates a daunting
    obstacle to proving rehabilitation and present fitness.
    See, e.g., In re Gordon, 
    385 Mass. 48
    , 50–51, 
    429 N.E.2d 1150
    (1982) (denying second petition for reinstatement,
    after sixteen years of disbarment, of former judge con-
    victed of larceny and conspiracy in highly publicized
    cases involving corruption related to public funds); In
    re Reinstatement of Page, 
    94 P.3d 80
    , 83 (Okla. 2004)
    (denying second petition for reinstatement, after twenty
    years, to former district attorney and judge convicted
    of racketeering and extortion for receiving bribes in
    exchange for influencing criminal proceedings); In re
    Application of Gortmaker, 
    308 Or. 482
    , 484, 
    782 P.2d 421
    (1989) (denying reinstatement, after nine years, of
    former district attorney convicted on eight criminal
    counts, including theft, tampering and unsworn falsifi-
    cation, for actions taken in his official capacity); In re
    Perrone, 
    565 Pa. 563
    , 565, 570, 
    777 A.2d 413
    (2001)
    (denying second petition for reinstatement, after eight
    years, of former public defender convicted of, inter alia,
    theft and tampering with public records, for defrauding
    city of funds intended for representation of indigent
    defendants); Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Moore, 
    214 W. Va. 780
    , 783–84, 796, 
    591 S.E.2d 338
    (2003) (denying
    reinstatement, after twelve years of disbarment, of for-
    mer governor convicted of multiple federal offenses for
    actions taken during election and while holding office);
    see also A.B.A. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanc-
    tions, supra, standard 5.21 (recommending disbarment
    as ‘‘generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or
    governmental position knowingly misuses the position
    with the intent to obtain a significant benefit or advan-
    tage for himself or another’’).
    This is because ‘‘[l]awyers holding public office
    assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of
    other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can
    suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of
    lawyers.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4, commen-
    tary. ‘‘[M]isconduct by lawyers who are public officials
    is more egregious than that of other lawyers because of
    the betrayal of the public trust’’; Lawyer Disciplinary
    Board v. 
    Moore, supra
    , 
    214 W. Va. 792
    ; which can result
    in the citizenry losing confidence in the institutions of
    government. When an attorney holding public office
    engages in misconduct and violates the public trust, he
    brings ‘‘disrepute not only on himself, but on all attor-
    neys and further on all public officials.’’ In re Reinstate-
    ment of Anderson, 
    51 P.3d 581
    , 585 (Okla. 2002).
    After reviewing the record with the foregoing princi-
    ples in mind, we hold that the trial court correctly deter-
    mined that the standing committee acted unreasonably
    and, therefore, abused its discretion when it concluded
    that the defendant had met his burden of proving that
    he was presently morally fit to practice law and, there-
    fore, that he should be reinstated to the bar. In short,
    given the extensive egregious misconduct that led to
    the defendant’s suspension, the evidence he submitted
    to show that he had rehabilitated himself fell far short
    of what was necessary to prove his fitness with the
    requisite degree of confidence so that he again could
    be entrusted with the responsibilities of an attorney.
    As the trial court observed, the standing committee
    directed very little of its investigation and report to an
    examination of the misconduct that led to the defen-
    dant’s suspension.27 That misconduct, however, war-
    ranted serious attention because, as we have explained,
    its severity necessarily informed the extent of the defen-
    dant’s burden to show reformation. It was not an iso-
    lated instance of misjudgment, but rather, was
    extensive in scope, prolonged over a period of five years
    and marked by a consistent pattern of dishonesty, self-
    interest and violation of the public trust. The defen-
    dant’s misconduct was not the unfortunate missteps of
    a young and inexperienced attorney, but instead, was
    the calculated behavior of a mature, sophisticated attor-
    ney who served as the mayor of the state’s largest city.
    It resulted in his conviction of sixteen felony offenses
    in federal court and a lengthy prison sentence. As Judge
    Arterton found when applying multiple sentence
    enhancements, the defendant was a ‘‘leader or orga-
    nizer’’ of an illegal scheme, and his actions caused large
    losses to the government, in excess of $800,000. More-
    over, in Judge Arterton’s view, the defendant wilfully
    had given materially false testimony at his criminal
    trial,28 which occurred in 2003, four years after the ces-
    sation of the misconduct for which he was convicted.29
    See footnote 3 of this opinion.
    Unfortunately, the losses caused by the defendant’s
    misconduct were not merely monetary ones. Because
    the defendant held a high public office and repeatedly
    abused that office by, inter alia, trading government
    contracts and influence for personal remuneration, the
    most serious damage he inflicted was to the public trust
    in government. When sentencing the defendant for his
    crimes, Judge Arterton described ‘‘the extraordinary
    harm done to the political system of the [c]ity . . . and
    beyond’’ as follows: ‘‘Government corruption breeds
    cynicism and mistrust of elected officials. It causes
    the public to disengage from the democratic process
    because . . . the public begins to think of politics as
    ‘only for the insiders.’ . . . Thus corruption has the
    potential to shred the delicate fabric of democracy by
    making the average citizen lose respect and trust in
    elected officials and give up any hope of participating
    in government through legitimate channels.’’ (Citation
    omitted.) United States v. Ganim, United States District
    Court, Docket No. 3:01CR263 (JBA), 
    2006 WL 1210984
    ,
    *5 (D. Conn. May 5, 2006). We agree with this
    assessment.
    Properly viewed against the backdrop of the defen-
    dant’s misconduct and the disrepute it brought upon
    himself, the legal profession and government itself, the
    evidence of reformation that the defendant presented
    to the standing committee, on which the standing com-
    mittee expressly relied, fell well short of proving his
    present fitness to practice law.30 The defendant’s satis-
    faction of the basic prerequisites set by Judge Arnold
    to apply for readmission, his service of his criminal
    sentence, and his payment of his fines and restitution
    were not particularly weighty evidence of his present
    moral fitness, because they were compelled acts; there-
    fore, they say little about the defendant’s moral rehabili-
    tation. See In re Application of 
    Gortmaker, supra
    , 
    308 Or. 494
    n.13 (‘‘[a]pplicant had no choice in these mat-
    ters—the law required him to do them’’); see also A.B.A.
    Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
    Sanctions, supra
    , stan-
    dard 9.4 (a) (for purposes of attorney discipline, ‘‘forced
    or compelled restitution’’ is neither aggravating nor mit-
    igating factor).
    Moreover, the testimony and recent letters of refer-
    ence from the defendant’s character witnesses,
    although unquestioningly positive and unanimously
    favorable, are not sufficient evidence of reformation to
    remove the taint of the defendant’s prior misconduct.
    ‘‘Declarations of good moral character do not necessar-
    ily refute the evidence of bad moral character reason-
    ably inferable from the prior egregious misconduct.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Griev-
    ance Committee v. 
    Rapoport, supra
    , 
    119 Conn. App. 282
    . Such testimonials, even when extensive and from
    persons in positions of high esteem, often are held inad-
    equate to meet the high burden of proof required in
    cases of serious, repeated, criminal misconduct. See,
    e.g., In re Reinstatement of 
    Wiederholt, supra
    , 
    24 P.3d 1230
    –31; In re Reinstatement of 
    Page, supra
    , 
    94 P.3d 84
    . Given the degree of the defendant’s misdeeds, the
    assurances of his supporters, some of whom were fam-
    ily members or close personal friends, cannot shoulder
    the heavy burden of establishing present fitness.
    We further agree with the trial court that the defen-
    dant’s failure to either explain, or acknowledge any
    responsibility for, his extensive criminal wrongdoing,
    or to express remorse for that wrongdoing, was a highly
    relevant consideration in the particular reinstatement
    proceeding in the present case.31 Consequently, when
    the standing committee recommended reinstatement,
    without truly exploring or addressing that matter, it
    failed to undertake a fair investigation of the facts and,
    therefore, abused its discretion. Although we agree with
    the defendant that an applicant’s refusal to admit guilt
    and express remorse for the events that led to his or
    her suspension is not a per se bar to reinstatement; see,
    e.g., In re Hiss, 
    368 Mass. 447
    , 455, 
    333 N.E.2d 429
    (1975); In re Reinstatement of 
    Page, supra
    , 
    94 P.3d 83
    –84; we disagree that it is wholly irrelevant; see In
    re Reinstatement of 
    Wiederholt, supra
    , 
    24 P.3d 1227
    –28,
    1228 n.41 (listing ‘‘numerous jurisdictions . . . [con-
    sidering an applicant’s] remorse and consciousness of
    prior wrongdoing to be persuasive factors in determin-
    ing whether [he or she] currently has the level of moral
    and ethical character required for reinstatement’’); par-
    ticularly where the applicant stands convicted of multi-
    ple felony offenses.32 See Lawyer Disciplinary Board
    v. 
    Moore, supra
    , 
    214 W. Va. 794
    –96. Rather, the fact of the
    applicant’s denial of responsibility, like the convictions
    themselves, ‘‘is simply another piece of evidence to
    consider, and to be given such weight as it deserves in
    light of the circumstances.’’ 
    Id., 795; see
    also In re
    Reinstatement of 
    Page, supra
    , 83.
    Here, in light of the extensiveness of the defendant’s
    criminal misdeeds, of which he stood convicted after
    a jury trial and an unsuccessful appeal, the defendant’s
    failure to acknowledge or explain his misconduct, or
    to recognize the severity thereof, was a circumstance
    that the standing committee needed to explore before
    recommending that the defendant could again be
    entrusted with the responsibility of practicing law. The
    defendant, on the one hand, did not affirmatively state
    his belief that he was innocent of the crimes of which
    he stood convicted, then attempt to reconcile that belief
    with the evidence adduced against him in his criminal
    trial and the fact of his multiple convictions. On the
    other hand, he did not admit his transgressions, explain
    how they had occurred, express contrition therefor or
    assure the standing committee that he had changed and
    would not reoffend. In the face of receiving neither
    an acknowledgment of responsibility, nor some other
    plausible explanation, for the defendant’s extensive
    record of proven criminal misconduct, and in light of
    the other factors weighing against him, the standing
    committee simply was not justified in concluding that
    that misconduct no longer disqualified the defendant
    from practicing law due to his moral unfitness. It bears
    repeating that the purpose of suspending an attorney
    from the practice of law is not to impose additional
    punishment, but to protect the courts and the public.
    Statewide Grievance Committee v. 
    Spirer, supra
    , 247
    Conn 771–72. In the absence of a full exploration of
    the defendant’s attitude and beliefs regarding his con-
    victions, the standing committee could not reliably
    ensure this protection.33
    Finally, because the standing committee found that
    the defendant’s Federal Prison Consultant website did
    not support a finding of present fitness, the trial court
    properly took that website into account when it rejected
    the standing committee’s recommendation of reinstate-
    ment. Because the website, as late as 2011, contained
    language that reasonably can be read as suggesting that
    the defendant had been targeted and prosecuted
    unfairly, the standing committee’s finding in this regard
    was not clearly erroneous.34
    In sum, in view of the defendant’s repeated criminal
    misconduct occurring over a five year period while he
    held public office, which resulted in his conviction of
    sixteen federal felony offenses and a lengthy prison
    sentence, the evidence that the defendant presented of
    his rehabilitation was not sufficient to establish his
    present moral fitness, and the uncontroverted evidence
    of the defendant’s false testimony in 2003 and his ques-
    tionable website statements, on display as late as 2011,
    weighed further against him. Evidence that he had ful-
    filled the obligations attendant to his criminal sentence
    and met the prerequisites to apply for reinstatement,
    was employed and not bankrupt, and had garnered the
    support of certain members of his community, fell short
    of meeting the high burden resulting from his miscon-
    duct. We acknowledge that a criminal conviction is not
    an absolute bar to regaining a license to practice law
    and that, in Connecticut, no statute or court rule directly
    answers the question of what period of time constitutes
    an adequate period of rehabilitation for an individual
    with a record of misconduct comparable to the defen-
    dant’s. We are confident, however, that in the present
    case, the defendant has not demonstrated a period of
    exemplary behavior persisting for a sufficient period
    of time to offset his transgressions and, accordingly, to
    provide the necessary assurance that he may once again
    be entrusted with the practice of law.35 Consequently,
    we hold that the trial court properly concluded that
    the standing committee abused its discretion when it
    determined that the defendant was presently fit to prac-
    tice law and recommended his reinstatement.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    1
    The defendant was indicted on twenty-four counts and convicted of
    sixteen of those counts.
    2
    The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred his
    appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice
    Book § 65-1.
    3
    Pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing
    court applied multiple sentence enhancements due to the amount of losses
    sustained by the government resulting from the defendant’s criminal activity,
    which exceeded $800,000, the defendant’s role as a leader or organizer of
    an illegal scheme and the defendant’s obstruction of justice, specifically,
    his materially false testimony at trial. See United States v. Ganim, United
    States District Court, Docket No. 3:01CR263 (JBA), 
    2006 WL 1210984
    , *1
    (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d, 
    510 F.3d 134
    , 136 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 1313
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 1911
    , 
    170 L. Ed. 2d 749
    (2008). The defendant’s sentence
    was at the top end of the resulting guidelines range, given the court’s finding
    ‘‘that the defendant’s conduct was part of a systematic or pervasive corrup-
    tion of a governmental . . . office that may cause loss of public confidence
    in government . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id. 4 Soon
    after the defendant’s convictions, the trial court, Dewey, J., ordered
    an interim suspension of the defendant’s license to practice law. Judge
    Arnold’s suspension order was issued on March 4, 2010, near the conclusion
    of the defendant’s term of imprisonment, and by its terms applied retroac-
    tively to August 8, 2003. Because the order was based on a stipulated
    agreement between the defendant’s counsel and counsel for the plaintiff,
    no evidentiary hearing was held.
    5
    Those conditions included requirements that the defendant: complete a
    minimum of twelve hours of continuing legal education, at least six of
    which were in the area of professional responsibility; make payment of all
    restitution and fines imposed as a result of his convictions; complete a
    minimum of 100 hours of community service; and comply with all conditions
    of his supervised release. Moreover, in the event the defendant were to be
    reinstated, he would be required to practice under the supervision of a
    mentoring attorney for one year.
    6
    Approximately one year later, on September 1, 2011, the defendant
    requested early termination of his supervised release, which the federal
    government opposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e) (1). On March 6, 2012, the
    United States District Court, Arterton, J., denied the defendant’s request.
    7
    Two months earlier, on March 14, 2011, the defendant had filed with
    the court an application for reinstatement to the bar, which was referred
    to the Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to the Bar
    for Fairfield County for investigation. Thereafter, on May 19, 2011, consistent
    with Judge Arnold’s earlier order of suspension, the defendant filed a motion
    seeking permission to reapply for reinstatement.
    8
    In his March 14, 2011 motion for reinstatement; see footnote 7 of this
    opinion; the defendant stated that he had completed thirty-five hours of
    continuing education and more than 150 hours of community service.
    9
    Notice was published in the Connecticut Law Journal on May 10, 2011.
    The hearing was held on four separate days, concluding on March 5, 2012.
    10
    Practice Book (2011) § 2-53 (a) provides in relevant part that a suspended
    attorney’s application for reinstatement ‘‘shall be referred, by the court to
    which it is brought, to the standing committee on recommendations for
    admission to the bar that has jurisdiction over the judicial district court
    location in which the applicant was suspended . . . and notice of the
    pendency of such application shall be given to the state’s attorney of that
    judicial district, the chair of the grievance panel whose jurisdiction includes
    that judicial district court location, the statewide grievance committee, the
    attorney or attorneys appointed by the court pursuant to [Practice Book §]
    2-64, and to all complainants whose complaints against the attorney resulted
    in the discipline for which the attorney was . . . suspended . . . and it
    shall also be published in the Connecticut Law Journal.’’
    This subsection was amended and redesignated, in part, as subsection
    (f) in 2013. The redesignated provision now provides: ‘‘The application [for
    reinstatement] shall be referred by the clerk of the superior court where it
    is filed to the chief justice or designee, who shall refer the matter to a
    standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar whose
    members do not maintain their primary office in the same judicial district
    as the applicant.’’ Practice Book § 2-53 (f).
    11
    Practice Book (2011) § 2-53 (b) provides: ‘‘The standing committee on
    recommendations shall investigate the application, hold hearings pertaining
    thereto and render a report with its recommendations to the court. It shall
    take all testimony at its hearings under oath and shall include in its report
    subordinate findings of facts and conclusions as well as its recommendation.
    The standing committee shall have a record made of its proceedings which
    shall include a copy of the application for reinstatement or readmission, a
    transcript of its hearings thereon, any exhibits received by the committee,
    any other documents considered by the committee in making its recommen-
    dations, and copies of all notices provided by the committee in accordance
    with this section.’’
    12
    With the exception of one individual, the persons who testified at the
    hearing all had been acquainted with the defendant for at least one decade
    and in most cases for more than twenty years.
    13
    During the proceedings before the standing committee, the defendant
    had argued, on the basis of his probation officer’s testimony regarding off-
    the-record discussions with Judge Arterton, that that judge supported his
    application for reinstatement. In her March 6, 2012 order, however, Judge
    Arterton wrote that ‘‘[t]he [c]ourt has taken no position on [the defendant’s]
    application for bar readmission.’’
    14
    The standing committee’s selective quotation from the website is based
    on a partially illegible printout of the website that was admitted into evi-
    dence. Later in the hearing, however, a standing committee member accessed
    the website and retrieved the full language of the portion at issue. It is
    reflected in the hearing transcript as follows: ‘‘[W]hat happened to me should
    never happen to you or anyone, but it does and it’s happened to you. I hope
    I can help. Regardless of how it happened or why the federal government
    has targeted you for criminal prosecution, you absolutely cannot try to
    prepare yourself and your family with what lies ahead without expert help
    from someone who has been there and who has survived the onslaught. . . .
    ‘‘I’m sure our stories are very similar. We both led successful and prosper-
    ous lives and then for whatever reason we became entangled in a federal
    prosecution. Rightly or wrongly we became what is literally referred to as
    the target of a federal investigation. Once that happened the whole world
    began to change. Lawyers, perhaps other experts in federal law were hired,
    but in the end all the roads seemed to lead to the same stark and perhaps
    unthinkable reality, prison.’’
    15
    Those letters were written by area attorneys and other personal acquain-
    tances of the defendant.
    16
    At the time of the standing committee’s recommendation, the defen-
    dant’s supervised release was scheduled to terminate in July, 2013.
    17
    Practice Book (2011) § 2-53 (c) provides that, upon receipt of the stand-
    ing committee’s report and record of the standing committee proceedings,
    ‘‘[t]he court shall thereupon inform the chief justice of the supreme court
    of the pending application and report, and the chief justice shall designate
    two other judges of the superior court to sit with the judge presiding at the
    session. Such three judges, or a majority of them, shall determine whether
    the application should be granted.’’
    18
    In her order denying the defendant’s request for early termination of
    supervised release, which was submitted to the trial court by stipulation of
    the parties, United States District Court Judge Arterton stated the following:
    ‘‘[The] [d]efendant was released by the Federal Bureau of Prisons . . .
    one year early because he successfully completed the [Bureau of Prison’s]
    Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program [drug program]. The existence
    of any substance abuse problem remains a puzzlement since [the defendant]
    made no claim of a substance abuse problem at sentencing, and as a result
    the [c]ourt waived the mandatory drug testing condition of supervised
    release. Based on the [g]overnment’s notification that [the defendant] had
    been admitted to this drug program, the [United States] Probation Officer
    petitioned for modification of [the] [d]efendant’s conditions of supervised
    release to add a requirement of participation in an approved substance abuse
    treatment program. By report dated October 31, 2011 from the Connecticut
    Renaissance program, however, [the defendant] was deemed not to need
    treatment based on its intake criteria and [the defendant’s] self-report.’’
    At the hearing before the standing committee, the defendant explained
    his use of the drug program, claiming that he had been drinking and taking
    antianxiety medication to handle stress around the time of his prosecution,
    but acknowledging that the potential for a sentence reduction also attracted
    him to the drug program. The trial court recognized that the standing commit-
    tee apparently ‘‘accept[ed]’’ this testimony, as was its prerogative, and con-
    cluded that it would ‘‘not substitute its views on the issue for those of
    the standing committee other than to join in Judge Arterton’s ‘puzzlement’
    regarding [the defendant’s] use of the [drug] program.’’
    19
    The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly concluded
    that the standing committee had confused the conditions set by Judge Arnold
    for the defendant’s right to apply for readmission to the bar; see footnote
    5 of this opinion; with those necessary for him to gain readmission to the
    bar. According to the defendant, the court read one statement in the standing
    committee report, which inaccurately suggested that the issue before it was
    whether the defendant had met the conditions to apply for readmission,
    out of context, and it is clear from the standing committee’s report overall
    that it understood that there were distinct criteria for readmission. We agree
    that the standing committee’s decision, read in full, reflects that that body
    properly understood the issue it was charged with determining. We observe,
    nevertheless, that the court’s concern of confusion, as articulated in its
    decision, is based on two misstatements of that issue in the standing commit-
    tee’s report, as well as one in the defendant’s brief to the standing committee
    and one in a question posed by a standing committee member to counsel
    at the hearing before the standing committee. Moreover, it appears that the
    defendant, when initiating these proceedings, was himself confused about
    the protocol for reinstatement. See footnote 7 of this opinion. In any event,
    reading the trial court’s decision as a whole, we conclude that the court
    properly reviewed the entire substance of the standing committee’s report
    and that the stated concern played only a negligible part in the trial court’s
    ultimate determination.
    20
    This burden of proof has been codified in our rules of practice. See
    Practice Book §§ 2-8 (3) and 2-53 (j). Recently the rules were amended to
    provide that an applicant for reinstatement must ‘‘demonstrate by clear and
    convincing evidence’’ that he or she has met this burden. Practice Book § 2-
    53 (j). We need not decide whether this provision applies retroactively to
    govern the defendant’s application because we conclude, for the reasons
    hereinafter provided, that the defendant failed to prove present fitness even
    under the less vigorous standard of preponderance of the evidence.
    21
    These factors correspond, in part, to the aggravating and mitigating
    factors listed in the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing
    Lawyer Sanctions. See A.B.A., Compendium of Professional Responsibility:
    Rules and Standards (2011 Ed.) standards 9.2 and 9.3; see also 
    id., standard 9.22
    (defining aggravating factors to include ‘‘[c] a pattern of misconduct
    . . . [d] multiple offenses . . . [g] refusal to acknowledge [the] wrongful
    nature of conduct . . . [i] substantial experience in the practice of law . . .
    [j] indifference to making restitution . . . [and] [k] illegal misconduct’’);
    
    id., standard 9.32
    (defining mitigating factors to include ‘‘[d] timely good
    faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct
    . . . [f] inexperience in the practice of law . . . [l] remorse . . . [and] [m]
    remoteness of prior offenses’’). In evaluating attorney misconduct and
    determining appropriate discipline, Connecticut courts have been guided
    by the American Bar Association’s standards. See Statewide Grievance
    Committee v. 
    Spirer, supra
    , 
    247 Conn. 782
    .
    22
    It is clear that misconduct resulting in suspension may include conduct
    unrelated to an attorney’s practice of law. See Statewide Grievance Commit-
    tee v. Schluger, 
    230 Conn. 668
    , 681 n.17, 
    646 A.2d 781
    (1994) (‘‘[P]rofessional
    honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishon-
    esty and dishonor in other relations. So it is that we, in common with other
    courts, hold . . . that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the
    profession, whether it be professional or nonprofessional, justifies dismissal
    as well as exclusion from the bar.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); see
    also Grievance Committee v. Broder, 
    112 Conn. 269
    , 274, 
    152 A. 292
    (1930).
    23
    The Rules of Professional Conduct define the rights and obligations of
    attorneys practicing within Connecticut. Statewide Grievance Committee
    v. 
    Schluger, supra
    , 
    230 Conn. 674
    .
    24
    ‘‘Because a petitioner for reinstatement must demonstrate moral fitness
    and good character sufficient to be trusted again, the petitioner must make a
    showing of these characteristics that overcome[s] the court’s former adverse
    judgment on the petitioner’s character. Accordingly, [courts of our sister
    states] have stated that petitioners for reinstatement should be held to an
    even higher standard of conduct than first-time applicants because they
    have already demonstrated that they are at risk for unethical conduct. The
    majority position among courts is that the more culpable the conduct, the
    greater the burden for proving one is entitled to reinstatement.’’ (Footnotes
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reinstatement of Wieder-
    
    holt, supra
    , 
    24 P.3d 1224
    ; see also Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Moore,
    
    214 W. Va. 780
    , 788, 
    591 S.E.2d 338
    (2003) (‘‘A person seeking reinstatement
    has the burden of overcoming a prior adjudication of disqualification. The
    judgment of disbarment continues to be evidence against the applicant and
    he may overcome it only by most persuasive proof.’’ [Internal quotation
    marks omitted.]).
    25
    The Rules of Professional Conduct describe professional misconduct,
    in part, as an attorney’s ‘‘[commission of] a criminal act that reflects
    adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
    other respects’’; Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 (2); or ‘‘[engaging] in
    conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .’’
    Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 (3).
    26
    There is no statutory counterpart to § 51-91a that addresses federal
    felony convictions, and we have declined to extend the scope of that provi-
    sion beyond its terms to apply to such convictions. See Statewide Grievance
    Committee v. 
    Spirer, supra
    , 
    247 Conn. 777
    . Rather, in the case of a federal
    felony conviction, a court has discretion to either disbar or suspend the
    attorney for whatever period it deems appropriate. See 
    id., 780; see
    also
    Practice Book § 2-41 (e).
    27
    Compare, e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. 
    Spirer, supra
    , 
    247 Conn. 784
    (where memorandum of decision included lengthy discussion of
    attorney’s involvement in illicit transactions, there was ‘‘no basis upon which
    to conclude that the court did not factor into its deliberations the nature
    of the defendant’s offenses’’).
    28
    In applying a two level sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice,
    Judge Arterton stated the following: ‘‘I find by clear and convincing evidence
    that [the defendant’s] trial testimony was so fundamentally and materially
    in dispute to that which was given by others whose testimony was corrobo-
    rated, that I find that the subject of his denials of any fee splitting deals;
    his explanation of where thousands of dollars of cash came from; his explana-
    tion that he, not others, paid for many of the items in evidence; his testimony
    that his attorney brother’s forbearance of a fee on Pinto’s personal injury
    claim constituted reimbursement to Pinto for the home building and furnish-
    ing expenses; his denial of having claimed . . . that he had a legal opinion
    that authorized him to by-pass the city council to obtain the life insurance,
    are examples of material matters on which he gave false testimony with
    willful intent, it was not by confusion, mistake or faulty memory.’’ According
    to the court, the defendant’s testimony constituted ‘‘a flat out and false
    denial,’’ and not mistake, confusion or misunderstanding, ‘‘on material mat-
    ters intended to influence the jury with respect to whether or not he had
    a guilty role, a criminal role in the schemes [at issue]. It sounded like, if
    ever I heard one, a spin to avoid conviction, and it failed when the jury
    disbelieved him, credited those with opposite testimony, and convicted him
    on [sixteen] counts.’’
    29
    The defendant argues that the trial court improperly made a factual
    finding that his testimony at his criminal trial was false and then treated it
    as misconduct, and that the standing committee, which is the body charged
    with fact finding in reinstatement proceedings, did not make such a finding.
    According to the defendant, even if there was evidence in the record that
    he had testified falsely, the standing committee was not obligated to credit
    it and the court was prohibited from doing so. Moreover, the defendant
    contends, if the trial court gave the sentencing judge’s findings as to the
    falsity of his testimony preclusive effect in the reinstatement proceedings,
    it did so improperly because the requirements of the doctrine of collateral
    estoppel were unmet.
    We disagree with the defendant’s characterization of the trial court’s
    analysis. The court did not ‘‘find’’ that the defendant had given false testi-
    mony, nor did it give the sentencing judge’s findings preclusive effect. Rather,
    the court properly observed that there was uncontroverted evidence in the
    record—namely, the sentencing transcript from the defendant’s criminal
    trial—that the sentencing judge found him to have testified falsely. See
    footnote 28 of this opinion. According to the court, therefore, the standing
    committee’s finding in its report, that ‘‘[a]ll’’ of the evidence in the record,
    aside from the defendant’s website, pointed to his present fitness, was
    clearly erroneous.
    We agree with the trial court that the standing committee’s finding regard-
    ing the substance of the evidence is not supported by the record, and that
    the standing committee’s failure to acknowledge or address the sentencing
    transcript was an abuse of its discretion. When a bar applicant has a criminal
    history, the views of the judge(s) who oversaw his or her criminal trial(s),
    particularly in regard to the applicant’s lack of veracity, are relevant evidence
    of unfitness that should not be ignored. See, e.g., In re Application of Koenig,
    
    152 Conn. 125
    , 129, 
    204 A.2d 33
    (1964); In re Application of 
    Gortmaker, supra
    , 
    308 Or. 488
    –89.
    30
    We agree with the standing committee that certain other evidence, such
    as the defendant’s work activities while imprisoned, and letters of support
    that were drafted in 2003–2005 in conjunction with his criminal trial, were
    not probative of the issue of the defendant’s fitness to practice law in 2011.
    31
    In regard to the standing committee’s statement, in its report, that the
    defendant had ‘‘testified that he accepts the verdict from his criminal case
    and accepts full responsibility for what occurred’’; (emphasis added); the
    trial court, after reviewing the page of the hearing transcript cited in support
    of that statement, disagreed. We agree with the trial court that the standing
    committee’s characterization of the cited testimony is inapt, and that the
    defendant never actually acknowledged responsibility for his criminal mis-
    conduct, as opposed to acknowledging that a jury had found that he had
    engaged in that misconduct. Acceptance of the fact of a guilty verdict, after
    a jury trial, is distinct from acceptance of responsibility for one’s own
    actions, and it is clear from the broader context of the defendant’s testimony
    that he was speaking of the former.
    32
    The defendant contends that the trial court improperly held, as a matter
    of law, that he necessarily had to be found remorseful, or acknowledge his
    criminal wrongdoing, before he could be found presently fit to practice law.
    According to the defendant, the court considered remorse and acknowledg-
    ment of wrongdoing to be ‘‘a bright line requirement for readmission,’’ and
    such a requirement ‘‘is not prescribed by statute or court rule . . . .’’ We
    recognize that the trial court did devote a significant portion of its analysis
    to the issue of the defendant’s lack of remorse, and it ended that section
    of its memorandum of decision by concluding that the standing committee
    improperly ‘‘found that [the defendant] was remorseful or acknowledged that
    he engaged in the criminal misconduct, which are necessary components of
    rehabilitation and a finding of present fitness.’’ (Emphasis added.) At the
    same time, however, as we noted previously in this opinion, it is clear that
    lack of remorse was not the sole basis for the court’s ultimate determination
    that the defendant had not met his burden of proving present fitness.
    To the extent the trial court’s decision can be read as stating a hard
    and fast rule requiring remorse, in all cases, as an absolute condition for
    reinstatement, we disavow it as legally incorrect. Nevertheless, as we explain
    more fully hereinafter, the defendant’s lack of remorse, particularly as it
    was not accompanied by an explicit profession of innocence and plausible
    explanation for his sixteen criminal convictions, certainly was a proper
    consideration in this case, even if it was not a dispositive one. Additionally,
    even putting aside the issue of the defendant’s remorse, or lack thereof, we
    still would conclude that the other probative and credited evidence in the
    record was not sufficient to support the standing committee’s finding of
    present fitness. Accordingly, any error by the trial court in this regard was
    of no consequence.
    33
    In a reinstatement proceeding, an applicant’s previous criminal convic-
    tions, upheld on appeal, are treated as conclusive evidence that the applicant
    in fact engaged in conduct that was seriously wrong. Lawyer Disciplinary
    Board v. 
    Moore, supra
    , 
    214 W. Va. 795
    . Unless this premise somehow is
    shown to be faulty, an applicant’s subjective belief that he did not in fact
    engage in wrongful conduct suggests two other possibilities. ‘‘The first possi-
    bility is that the [applicant] is, for whatever reason, in such a state of denial
    as to be unable to appreciate the difference between reality and imagination
    with respect to what he did and did not do. If this is the case, a necessary
    premise for rehabilitation (and for the ability to practice law)—the ability
    to appreciate the reality of what one is doing and has done—is missing
    from the [applicant].
    ‘‘The second possibility is that the [applicant’s] ability to form reasonably
    acceptable moral and legal conclusions about his conduct—and his ability
    to appreciate and apply the commonly-agreed upon meaning of the law and
    the ethical requirements of the legal profession—are so far from adequate
    that he similarly has no business practicing law.’’ 
    Id., 795–96. These
    were
    possibilities that the standing committee should have explored in the pres-
    ent case.
    34
    We disagree with the defendant’s contention that in fact, the standing
    committee found the website to be ‘‘neutral’’ evidence, simply because the
    standing committee report included a recitation of the defendant’s testimony
    explaining the website statements. In its concluding portion, the standing
    committee report states clearly that ‘‘[a]ll of the evidence presented . . .
    other than . . . the Federal Prison Consultant website, point[s] to the fact
    that [the defendant] is presently fit to practice law.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    Additionally, the report provides that the line of questioning concerning the
    website ‘‘cause[d] concern for the [standing] [c]ommittee.’’ Fairly read, these
    statements indicate that the standing committee considered the website to
    be evidence unfavorable to the defendant.
    35
    Although we agree with the defendant that a person’s good behavior
    while he or she is incarcerated or on supervised release is not entirely
    incompetent evidence of his or her rehabilitation, we also concur with the
    trial court that a person’s ability to maintain the straight and narrow outside
    the confines of a structured and supervised life lends much stronger support
    to a finding of moral fitness. We reiterate that the defendant applied for
    reinstatement less than one year after serving his prison term, while he
    remained on supervised release. Although the rules of practice in effect at
    the time permitted his application, they since have been amended to provide
    that an application for reinstatement shall not be filed until, inter alia, ‘‘[t]he
    applicant has successfully completed any criminal sentence including, but
    not limited to, a sentence of incarceration, probation, parole, supervised
    release, or period of sex offender registration and has fully complied with any
    orders regarding conditions, restitution, criminal penalties or fines . . . .’’
    (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 2-53 (d) (4).