State v. Griffin ( 2021 )


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    STATE v. GRIFFIN—CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
    ECKER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.1
    The interrogating police detectives lied to the defen-
    dant, Bobby Griffin, about evidence of his guilt, threat-
    ened to arrest his family members, falsely indicated
    that the crime of which he was accused exposed him
    to the death penalty, and falsely indicated that he would
    face a lesser charge if he confessed to the theory of
    the crime proposed to him by the interrogating officers.
    The majority acknowledges that these types of interro-
    gation tactics can be coercive in some circumstances,
    and expresses disapproval of some of them, but ulti-
    mately concludes that each of these deceptive tactics
    was noncoercive in the present case. I respectfully dis-
    agree. The flaw in the majority’s analysis is twofold.
    First, it gives insufficient weight to the coercive effect of
    certain tactics used by the police to extract a confession
    from the defendant. Second, it fails to acknowledge or
    to appreciate that these tactics were not discrete and
    unrelated but, rather, integrally coordinated parts of a
    well established and widely used interrogation method
    specifically designed to employ psychological manipu-
    lation as a means to overwhelm a suspect’s will. Seeing
    the interrogation for what it was—which is to say,
    assessing the cumulative effect of the numerous coer-
    cive tactics employed in the present case in their total-
    ity—it is clear that the state did not meet its burden of
    proving that the defendant’s confession was voluntary.
    I reach this conclusion by application of settled legal
    principles in parts I and II of this opinion. At the end of
    part II, I address the majority’s response to this analysis.
    Part III, although not necessary to the conclusion I
    reach in this particular case, goes on to discuss in
    greater detail the particular interrogation tactic of lying
    about inculpatory evidence and explains why we should
    adopt a less tolerant attitude toward this tactic in the
    future.
    I
    The United States Supreme Court recognized in its
    watershed decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    ,
    445, 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
     (1966), that ‘‘[a]n
    understanding of the nature and setting of this in-cus-
    tody interrogation is essential to our decisions today.’’
    Although the issue presently before us is the voluntari-
    ness of a confession following a valid waiver of
    Miranda rights, it is similarly essential to understand
    how the specific tactics contested by the defendant fit
    into the well documented interrogation method typi-
    cally used by law enforcement officers. I begin with a
    more complete picture of the method employed in the
    defendant’s interrogation, which, as I later explain,
    reflects a particular application of broadly utilized inter-
    rogation techniques. Although there may not be univer-
    sal consensus as to the propriety or wisdom of these
    techniques, there is no question that they are designed
    to work cumulatively to extract a confession from a
    suspect whom the interrogator believes is guilty.
    A
    The two police detectives interrogating the defendant
    initially allowed him to offer his own account of his
    whereabouts on the night in question, how the gun
    seized from his house came into his possession, and
    what he knew about the shooting. For the first couple
    of hours, the defendant disclaimed any participation
    in the crime. In response, the interrogators repeatedly
    asserted that they already had evidence that proved
    that the defendant was the shooter. The interrogators
    told the defendant, falsely, that two eyewitnesses had
    identified him from a photographic array as the shooter
    and as one of two men who were attempting to rob the
    victim, that fingerprints had been recovered from shell
    casings found at the scene that the police were ‘‘gonna
    match to [the defendant’s] prints,’’ and that one of his
    coconspirators had given a statement that incriminated
    the defendant. They emphasized the fact that the (non-
    existent) eyewitnesses were strangers to the defendant
    and asserted that, as such, their identification could not
    be impeached at trial on the basis of a motive to lie
    or bias.
    Because of their purported certitude that the evi-
    dence firmly established the defendant’s identity as the
    shooter, the interrogators conveyed the idea to the
    defendant that the sole purpose of the interrogation
    was to help him by providing him with an opportunity
    to explain why he had shot the victim. They character-
    ized the victim as just an ‘‘asshole drug dealer’’ and ‘‘a
    mope,’’ who ‘‘brought this on himself’’ by not handing
    over the drugs and by making a comment about getting
    his gun. They repeatedly suggested that the shooting
    was an accident or an act of justifiable self-defense.
    They told the defendant that, if that was the case, it
    would make a ‘‘[h]uge difference in charges, huge differ-
    ence in sentencing.’’
    The interrogating officers also informed the defen-
    dant that, if he instead exercised his right to remain
    silent or continued to deny his involvement, things
    would get ‘‘worse’’ for him.2 If he did not admit his role
    in the accidental or justifiable shooting, he could or
    would spend sixty-five years in jail or the state would
    ‘‘fry [him] . . . put [him] in the chair.’’ They repeatedly
    made their point in terms that succinctly emphasized
    the futility of resistance: if the defendant did not con-
    fess, he was ‘‘fucked.’’
    The threats made by the interrogators were multifac-
    eted. The defendant was told that, because he had not
    admitted culpability, his mother and sister probably
    would be arrested for possession of the rifle recovered
    from the house. The officers hammered the point that
    the defendant was not facing a charge of ‘‘regular’’ mur-
    der, but felony murder because he and another person
    had robbed, or attempted to rob, the victim. The defen-
    dant was told—falsely, with no basis in fact or law—
    that ‘‘[t]he choice is yours,’’ that it is ‘‘up to you’’ which
    crime he would be charged with because what he told
    them, and what the officers in turn reported to the
    judge, would determine whether he was charged with
    ‘‘felony murder or being in the wrong place at the wrong
    time murder,’’ ‘‘[felony] murder, manslaughter.’’3
    The defendant inquired how much prison time he
    would get for manslaughter but was not given an
    answer. Offered this ‘‘choice’’ in the face of the forego-
    ing threats and fabricated evidence of guilt, the defen-
    dant ultimately adopted the narrative proposed by the
    officers and confessed to them that he accidentally had
    shot the victim during the course of an attempted rob-
    bery. The defendant, of course, was not charged with
    manslaughter; he was charged with felony murder, the
    very crime that his interrogators told him would be
    avoided by a confession. It was all a ruse.
    B
    The interrogation tactics employed against the defen-
    dant reflect a particular application of a method, com-
    monly known as the Reid method, that has been the
    subject of scholarly debate and judicial criticism for
    decades.4 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 
    supra,
     
    384 U.S. 448
    –53; Dassey v. Dittmann, 
    877 F.3d 297
    , 320–21 (7th
    Cir. 2017) (Wood, C. J., dissenting), cert. denied,
    U.S.      , 
    138 S. Ct. 2677
    , 201 L. Ed 2d 1072 (2018);
    Dassey v. Dittmann, supra, 335–36 (Rovner, J., dis-
    senting); A. Hirsch, Review, ‘‘Going to the Source: The
    ‘New’ Reid Method and False Confessions,’’ 
    11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 803
    , 805–808 (2014); S. Kassin, ‘‘The Psychol-
    ogy of Confession Evidence,’’ 52 Am. Psychologist 221,
    222–24 (1997). The Reid Manual, the most widely used
    and influential interrogation training manual in the
    United States, sets forth tactics ‘‘for the interrogation of
    suspects whose guilt, in the opinion of the investigator,
    seems definite or reasonably certain.’’5 (Emphasis in
    original.) F. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Con-
    fessions (4th Ed. 2004) p. 209 (Reid Manual); see also
    
    id.,
     pp. 5–8 (distinguishing between ‘‘nonaccusatory’’
    interview during which guilt or innocence is assessed
    and ‘‘accusatory’’ interrogation). The Reid Manual sets
    forth a nine step interrogation model.6 See id., p. 215.
    Professor Richard A. Leo, one of the foremost schol-
    ars on interrogation practices,7 explains that ‘‘each step
    of th[is] interrogation process builds on and reinforces
    the previous one so as to systematically neutralize the
    suspect’s resistance, render him passive and compliant,
    persuade him to agree to a minimizing scenario of how
    he could have committed the crime, and then transform
    his compliance into a full written statement. The [nine
    step] method emphasizes that interrogation is a lengthy
    and repetitive process in which the interrogator estab-
    lishes psychological control over the suspect and gradu-
    ally elicits a confession by raising the suspect’s anxiety
    levels while simultaneously lowering the perceived con-
    sequences of confessing.’’ R. Leo, Police Interrogation
    and American Justice (2008) p. 113; accord G. Gudjons-
    son, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and
    Testimony (1992) p. 62 (‘‘[a]ccording to the [Reid]
    model, a suspect confesses (i.e., tells the truth) when
    the perceived consequences of a confession are more
    desirable than the anxiety generated by the deception
    (i.e., denial)’’); see also Dassey v. Dittmann, supra, 
    877 F.3d 321
     (Wood, C. J., dissenting).
    Courts and commentators have categorized Reid’s
    nine steps as falling into two overarching techniques,
    frequently referred to as maximization and minimiza-
    tion.8 See, e.g., United States v. Monroe, 
    264 F. Supp. 3d 376
    , 391 (D.R.I. 2017); In re Elias V., 
    237 Cal. App. 4th 568
    , 583, 
    188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202
     (2015), review denied,
    Docket No. S228370, 
    2015 Cal. LEXIS 9243
     (Cal. Septem-
    ber 23, 2015); Commonwealth v. Cartright, 
    478 Mass. 273
    , 289, 
    84 N.E.3d 851
     (2017); S. Drizin & R. Leo, ‘‘The
    Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,’’
    
    82 N.C. L. Rev. 891
    , 917 (2004); M. Gohara, ‘‘A Lie for
    a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering
    the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques,’’ 
    33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 791
    , 821–22 (2006); see also A. Hirsch,
    supra, 
    11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 805
     (categorizing steps
    as confrontation and minimization); R. Leo, supra, pp.
    150–55 (categorizing steps as use of positive and nega-
    tive incentives). The maximization technique is designed
    to convey ‘‘the interrogator’s [rock solid] belief that the
    suspect is guilty and that all denials will fail. Such tactics
    include making an accusation, overriding objections,
    and citing evidence, real or manufactured, to shift the
    suspects’ mental state from confident to hopeless.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elias V.,
    supra, 583; accord M. Kim, ‘‘When and Why Suspects
    Fail to Recognize the Adversary Role of an Interrogator
    in America: The Problem and Solution,’’ 
    52 Gonz. L. Rev. 507
    , 511 (2016–2017). ‘‘[T]he interrogator aggressively
    confronts the suspect with the magnitude of his situa-
    tion, hoping to convince him that he is in serious trouble
    and likely to be punished severely.’’ M. Gohara, supra,
    821–22. ‘‘The minimization technique is the opposite. It
    is designed to provide the suspect with moral justifica-
    tion and face-saving excuses for having committed the
    crime in question. This technique includes methods
    such as lulling suspects into a false sense of security
    by blaming the victim and downplaying the seriousness
    of the crime.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) M. Kim, supra, 511–12; see also M.
    Gohara, supra, 821. This tactic ‘‘communicates by impli-
    cation that leniency in punishment is forthcoming upon
    confession.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
    Elias V., supra, 583.
    ‘‘[I]nterrogators will . . . commonly [say] that the
    only way [that the suspect] can help himself is by provid-
    ing the reasons he committed the crime. Usually, how-
    ever, interrogators will first suggest possible reasons
    or scenarios to get him to admit to it. . . . Interrogators
    advance scenarios to persuade a suspect that if he
    admits to the act he can—with the interrogators’ help—
    control how that act is framed to other audiences (e.g.,
    prosecutors, judges, juries, his friends and family, the
    victim, the victim’s friends and family, the media, and
    so on). In other words, he can explain his motive in a
    way that will portray him in the most sympathetic light
    and minimize his social, moral, and legal culpability.’’
    (Citation omitted.) R. Leo, supra, pp. 152–53.
    ‘‘[T]he most significant and effective scenarios are
    those that offer the suspect legal excuses or justifica-
    tions for his alleged behavior. These types of scenarios
    redefine the suspect’s mens rea (i.e., mental state) and
    thus the formal elements of the crime such that the
    suspect’s legal culpability is reduced or eliminated. For
    example, it is common in murder investigations for
    interrogators to suggest that the suspect killed the vic-
    tim in self-defense. Because self-defense is not a crime,
    the scenario suggests that the suspect will not be
    charged or punished for admitting to it. It is also com-
    mon in murder investigations for interrogators to sug-
    gest that the suspect killed the victim accidentally, again
    mitigating the criminality of the act and seemingly low-
    ering the punishment if the suspect agrees to the acci-
    dent scenario . . . . These scenarios are effective
    because they ‘pragmatically’ communicate that the sus-
    pect will receive a lower charge or lesser punishment
    if he agrees to the suggested scenario . . . .’’ (Citations
    omitted.) Id., pp. 153–54.
    A particular application of one of these minimization
    or maximization tactics may be deemed so egregious
    as to be sufficient in and of itself to establish coercion.9
    See State v. Baker, 
    147 Haw. 413
    , 435, 
    465 P.3d 860
    (2020) (‘‘a single coercive interrogation technique may
    render a confession involuntary’’). Because these tac-
    tics, however, are designed to work cumulatively and
    synergistically to overcome a presumptively guilty sus-
    pect’s resistance to admit his culpability; see R. Leo,
    supra, p. 113; their impact cannot be dismissed when
    individual tactics do not rise to this level. The totality
    of the circumstances test demands consideration of
    the cumulative impact of these tactics. See Dassey v.
    Dittmann, supra, 
    877 F.3d 322
     (Wood, C. J., dissenting)
    (‘‘The majority finds some significance in the notion
    that the detectives’ tactics were not per se coercive,
    but that is a red herring. [The] cases cannot be assessed
    based on one sentence, or one restroom break, or the
    comfort (or lack thereof) of one room. The [United
    States] Supreme Court has instructed that the voluntari-
    ness inquiry requires a full consideration of the com-
    pounding influence of the police techniques as applied
    to this suspect.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.)); Wilson v. Lawrence County, 
    260 F.3d 946
    , 953 (8th Cir. 2001) (‘‘a totality of the circumstances
    analysis does not permit state officials to cherry-pick
    cases that address individual potentially coercive tac-
    tics, isolated one from the other, in order to insulate
    themselves when they have combined all of those tac-
    tics in an effort to overbear an accused’s will’’); State
    v. Baker, supra, 423 (‘‘[c]rucially, a court must not ana-
    lyze the individual circumstances in isolation, but must
    weigh those circumstances in their totality’’); State v.
    Grey, 
    274 Mont. 206
    , 211, 
    907 P.2d 951
     (1995) (‘‘[s]everal
    factors can culminate in a totality of circumstances that
    render a confession involuntary’’).
    The Hawaii Supreme Court’s recent decision in State
    v. Baker, supra, 
    147 Haw. 413
    , is a good example of the
    proper approach.10 That court identified seven separate,
    potentially coercive interrogation tactics that had been
    employed in that case, none of which was so individu-
    ally coercive as to overcome the defendant’s will.11 See
    
    id.,
     433–35. The court recognized, however, as have
    other courts, that ‘‘[a]n interrogator’s use of multiple
    coercive interrogation tactics in conjunction can exac-
    erbate the coercive effect of the individual tactics. See
    [Commonwealth v.] DiGiambattista, [
    442 Mass. 423
    ,
    438–39, 
    813 N.E.2d 516
     (2004)] (explaining that . . .
    coercive effect of . . . assertion about irrefutable evi-
    dence of guilt is worsened when it is combined with
    minimization tactics); [State v.] Rettenberger, 984 P.2d
    [1009, 1017 (Utah 1999)] (‘The significance of the [false
    friend technique] comes in relation to other tactics and
    factors.’).’’ State v. Baker, supra, 433. It ultimately con-
    cluded: ‘‘All of the tactics used [in Baker], except for
    the improper gender stereotyping, made an implied
    promise to [the defendant] that he would benefit if he
    confessed and suffer adverse consequences if he did
    not. The use of these tactics in conjunction with one
    another exacerbated their overall coercive effect on
    [the defendant] because they ultimately presented the
    same implicit promise of gaining a benefit by confess-
    ing—and receiving a detriment by not admitting
    guilt.’’ Id.
    II
    I next turn to the voluntariness of the defendant’s
    confession in the present case. It is important to empha-
    size that not every minimization and maximization tac-
    tic is coercive. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 
    468 Mass. 429
    , 436–37, 
    11 N.E.3d 95
     (2014) (particular mini-
    mization tactics used were not coercive). Several tactics
    employed in the present case are unchallenged and
    are widely accepted as within the proper bounds of
    interrogation. The tactics that are challenged include
    engaging in false evidence ploys, threatening the defen-
    dant’s family with arrest, maximizing the consequences
    of not confessing, and suggesting that confessing would
    be met with leniency. The majority purports to apply
    the totality of the circumstances test, but its analysis
    suffers from two related flaws. When addressing each
    of the individual tactics, the majority unduly minimizes
    its potential effect on the defendant. Then, having con-
    cluded that none of these tactics is coercive per se, it
    reaches the seemingly logical conclusion that they
    could not have overcome the defendant’s will under
    the totality of the circumstances. I first explain why
    I take a different view of the coercive nature of the
    individual tactics and conclude that their cumulative
    effect rendered the defendant’s confession involuntary.
    Following that explanation, I respond to the majority’s
    critique of this opinion.
    I begin with the false evidence of guilt presented to
    the defendant, principally consisting of the supposed
    existence of independent eyewitness identifications of
    the defendant as the shooter and fingerprints on shell
    casings found at the scene. I agree with the majority
    that courts generally have not deemed such conduct,
    in and of itself, sufficient to render a confession invol-
    untary.12 Many courts have, however, recognized that
    such ploys are a factor that should be considered when
    determining whether a confession was coerced. See,
    e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 
    394 U.S. 731
    , 739, 
    89 S. Ct. 1420
    ,
    
    22 L. Ed. 2d 684
     (1969) (‘‘[t]he fact that the police mis-
    represented the statements that [the defendant’s com-
    panion] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our
    view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inad-
    missible’’ (emphasis added)); Mara v. Rilling, 
    921 F.3d 48
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2019) (misrepresentations regarding exis-
    tence of eyewitness are ‘‘relevant to voluntariness’’);
    Holland v. McGinnis, 
    963 F.2d 1044
    , 1051 (7th Cir.
    1992) (‘‘[t]he fact that the officer misrepresented to [the
    defendant] the strength of the evidence against him,
    while insufficient [by itself] to make [an] otherwise
    voluntary confession inadmissible, is one factor to con-
    sider among the totality of circumstances in determin-
    ing voluntariness’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
    cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 1082
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 1053
    , 
    122 L. Ed. 2d 360
     (1993); Green v. Scully, 
    850 F.2d 894
    , 903 (2d
    Cir.) (noting that falsely informing defendant that his
    fingerprints matched prints in blood in victims’ apart-
    ment ‘‘is the type of police tactic that makes the issue
    of voluntariness in this case such a close one’’ but
    concluding that defendant’s statement revealed that he
    confessed for entirely different reason), cert. denied,
    
    488 U.S. 945
    , 
    109 S. Ct. 374
    , 
    102 L. Ed. 2d 363
     (1988);
    State v. Swanigan, 
    279 Kan. 18
    , 32, 
    106 P.3d 39
     (2005)
    (lies that fingerprints were found at scene and matched
    to defendant ‘‘must be viewed as a circumstance in
    conjunction with others, e.g., additional police interro-
    gation tactics’’); Commonwealth v. Libby, 
    472 Mass. 37
    ,
    42, 
    32 N.E.3d 890
     (2015) (‘‘the use of false information
    by [the] police during an interrogation is deceptive and
    is a relevant factor indicating a possibility that the
    defendant’s statements were made involuntarily’’ (inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted)); Commonwealth v. DiGi-
    ambattista, supra, 
    442 Mass. 433
     (‘‘our case law . . .
    suggests that where the use of a false statement is the
    only factor pointing in the direction of involuntariness,
    it will not ordinarily result in suppression, but that if
    the circumstances contain additional indicia suggesting
    involuntariness, suppression will be required’’ (empha-
    sis in original)); State v. Allies, 
    186 Mont. 99
    , 113, 
    606 P.2d 1043
     (1979) (lying to defendant about how much
    is known about his involvement in crimes was one of
    two variables weighing heavily in court’s voluntariness
    analysis); State v. Register, 
    323 S.C. 471
    , 479, 
    476 S.E.2d 153
     (1996) (‘‘misrepresentations of evidence by police,
    although a relevant factor, do not render an otherwise
    voluntary confession inadmissible’’), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1129
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 988
    , 
    136 L. Ed. 2d 870
     (1997).
    The majority discounts the relevance of the false
    evidence ploys in the present case because most of the
    statements regarding false evidence were made in the
    first hour of the interrogation, when the defendant con-
    tinued to deny his involvement and ‘‘pushed back’’ on
    these claims. Part II of the majority opinion. I find this
    temporal isolation to be a serious mistake because it
    ignores the fundamentally integrated nature of the inter-
    rogation tactics at issue and the cumulative and syner-
    gistic effect, over time, of the various tactics employed
    by the police. The entire point of the maximization and
    minimization techniques is that they work together over
    the course of the interrogation. See State v. Baker,
    supra, 
    147 Haw. 423
    , 433. It is significant, moreover, that
    the interrogators not only returned to the importance
    of the eyewitness identifications after the defendant’s
    initial push back but also cast the false evidence as
    effectively unimpeachable—an assertion that could
    only be intended to convince the defendant that resis-
    tance would be futile. In addition, simply because the
    defendant asserted that his fingerprints were not on the
    shell casings does not mean that he was unconcerned
    by the lead interrogator’s unequivocal statements that
    the (nonexistent) prints were ‘‘gonna’’ match the defen-
    dant’s. These lies about the strength of the evidence
    against the defendant undoubtedly contributed to the
    pressure on him to ‘‘choose’’ to confess to manslaughter
    rather than to maintain his disavowal of responsibility
    and face felony murder charges.13 The lies played an
    obvious and essential role in communicating the drum-
    beat theme of the Reid method, which is that resistance
    is futile and confession is the only rational choice.
    With regard to the threat to arrest the defendant’s
    mother and sister, the majority acknowledges that this
    threat ‘‘apparently was intended to exploit and play on
    the defendant’s previously expressed concern’’ about
    his family’s criminal exposure for the rifle. Part II A
    of the majority opinion. The majority also refuses to
    ‘‘condone’’ this tactic and ‘‘acknowledge[s] that such
    tactics can provide a basis for concluding that a confes-
    sion is involuntary.’’ 
    Id.
     I agree with each of these state-
    ments, although I would have expressed my disapproval
    of this tactic in far stronger terms. I disagree, however,
    with the majority’s inexplicable decision to overlook
    the coercive effect of this conduct simply because it
    was the defendant who had initially raised this matter.
    The logic of this point escapes me. If anything, the
    defendant’s admitted concern about his family’s welfare
    makes the tactic more coercive because it demonstrates
    that he was susceptible to his interrogators’ exploitation
    of that fear, and the interrogators used this psychologi-
    cal vulnerability improperly to increase the pressure
    on the defendant to confess. Given that the defendant
    had stated from the outset that he would take responsi-
    bility for possession of the rifle, and there was no evi-
    dence that anyone else in the home knew about the
    rifle; see State v. Rhodes, 
    335 Conn. 226
    , 234, 
    249 A.3d 683
     (2020); his family members were not actually at
    risk of criminal exposure, and it was coercive for the
    interrogators to suggest that the defendant’s failure to
    take responsibility for the shooting put them at such
    risk. See People v. Dowdell, 
    227 Cal. App. 4th 1388
    , 1401,
    
    174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547
     (2014) (‘‘[a] threat by [the] police
    to arrest or punish a close relative, or a promise to free
    the relative in exchange for a confession, may render an
    admission invalid’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
    review denied, Docket No. S220560, 
    2014 Cal. LEXIS 9829
     (Cal. October 15, 2014), and review denied sub
    nom. In re Lincoln, Docket No. S220800, 
    2014 Cal. LEXIS 9837
     (Cal. October 15, 2014).
    With regard to the interrogators’ statements maximiz-
    ing the consequences of not confessing, I agree in part
    with the majority’s treatment of this conduct. There
    was nothing improper about telling the defendant that
    he could or would face a sixty-five year term of impris-
    onment if he were convicted of felony murder, or even
    murder. This was an accurate statement of the law,
    consistent with the known facts of the crimes. See State
    v. Evans, 
    146 N.M. 319
    , 328, 
    210 P.3d 216
     (2009)
    (‘‘[T]hreats that merely highlight potential real conse-
    quences, or are adjurations to tell the truth, are not
    characterized as impermissibly coercive. . . . It is not
    per se coercive for [the] police to truthfully inform an
    accused about the potential consequences of his alleged
    actions.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.)). I disagree with the majority, however, that
    the lead interrogator’s reference to the death penalty
    should not be given meaningful weight in the totality
    of the circumstances analysis. The threat was emphati-
    cally not an accurate statement of the law, but a rank
    falsehood; the defendant could not have been exposed
    to a potential death sentence. See People v. Holloway,
    
    33 Cal. 4th 96
    , 115–17, 
    91 P.3d 164
    , 
    14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 212
    (2004) (contrasting cases in which officers properly and
    accurately represented that death penalty was available
    from cases in which officers improperly made false
    representations regarding death penalty), cert. denied,
    
    543 U.S. 1156
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 1302
    , 
    161 L. Ed. 2d 122
     (2005).
    Irrespective of the facts that it was ‘‘a single, isolated
    statement’’ and that the other interrogator immediately
    thereafter changed the subject; part II A of the majority
    opinion; it defies common sense to conclude that the
    possibility of a death sentence was shrugged off or
    forgotten by the defendant. Cf. Green v. Scully, supra,
    
    850 F.2d 903
     (deeming it significant that improper
    ‘‘scare tactic’’ of referring to electric chair was not fur-
    ther employed and that petitioner was told several times
    that ‘‘this case was ‘not about the chair’ ’’).
    The interrogator’s statement about the death penalty
    was not the only misrepresentation of law made to the
    defendant. The interrogators repeatedly indicated to
    the defendant that, without a confession, he would face
    a felony murder charge, but suggested that, if he admit-
    ted that the shooting was accidental or in self-defense,
    he would face far lesser charges, in particular, man-
    slaughter. Again, none of this is true. Neither accident
    nor self-defense is relevant when the elements of felony
    murder are established. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery,
    
    254 Conn. 694
    , 734, 
    759 A.2d 995
     (2000); State v. Amado,
    
    254 Conn. 184
    , 201–202, 
    756 A.2d 274
     (2000); State v.
    Lewis, 
    245 Conn. 779
    , 812, 
    717 A.2d 1140
     (1998). The
    ‘‘choice’’ that the interrogators offered to the defendant
    between being charged with felony murder (if he
    refused to admit culpability) or with manslaughter (if
    he confessed) was completely fabricated and terribly
    misleading.14 ‘‘Unlike misrepresentations of fact, which
    generally are not enough to render a suspect’s ensuing
    confession involuntary, [p]olice misrepresentations of
    law . . . are much more likely to render a suspect’s
    confession involuntary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Johnson v. State, 
    268 So. 3d 806
    , 810 (Fla.
    App. 2019); see also United States v. Lall, 
    607 F.3d 1277
    ,
    1285 (11th Cir. 2010); People v. Cahill, 
    22 Cal. App. 4th 296
    , 315, 
    28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1
     (1994), review denied,
    California Supreme Court, Docket No. S020126 (June
    2, 1994); State v. Valero, 
    153 Idaho 910
    , 913, 
    285 P.3d 1014
     (App. 2012); Commonwealth v. Baye, 
    462 Mass. 246
    , 257, 
    967 N.E.2d 1120
     (2012). ‘‘Although we do not
    require a law enforcement officer to inform a suspect
    of the penalties for all the charges he may face, if he
    misrepresents these penalties, then that deception
    affects our evaluation of the voluntariness of any
    resulting statements.’’ United States v. Young, 
    964 F.3d 938
    , 944 (10th Cir. 2020).
    The majority recognizes that the interrogators made
    many statements suggesting that the defendant would
    receive leniency in exchange for confessing. It dis-
    misses the coercive effect of these statements because
    the interrogators did not ‘‘definitively’’ promise
    leniency, and case law recognizes that it is not coercive
    to tell a defendant that cooperation would be to his
    benefit. Part II A of the majority opinion. The first rea-
    son, although supported by some authority, ignores
    reality by failing to acknowledge that an officer’s
    implied promise of leniency may be just as meaningful
    to a lay defendant as a ‘‘definitive’’ promise of leniency.
    See S. Drizin & R. Leo, supra, 
    82 N.C. L. Rev. 917
     n.138
    (citing psychology research addressing ‘‘ ‘[p]ragmatic
    [i]mplication,’ ’’ which ‘‘refers to the sending and pro-
    cessing of implicit meanings in communication, as
    occurs when an individual ‘reads between the lines’ or
    when information or meaning is inferred from what a
    speaker is saying or suggesting’’). Many courts have
    recognized that an implied promise of leniency can
    convey the same message as an express one.15 See, e.g.,
    United States v. Craft, 
    495 F.3d 259
    , 263–64 (6th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 1052
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 679
    , 
    169 L. Ed. 2d 532
     (2007); People v. Cahill, 
    supra,
     
    22 Cal. App. 4th 311
    –15; Martin v. State, 
    107 So. 3d 281
    , 314 (Fla. 2012),
    cert. denied, 
    570 U.S. 908
    , 
    133 S. Ct. 2832
    , 
    186 L. Ed. 2d 890
     (2013); State v. Baker, supra, 
    147 Haw. 433
    ; State
    v. Smith, 
    162 Idaho 878
    , 885, 
    406 P.3d 890
     (App. 2017),
    review denied, Idaho Supreme Court, Docket No. 44499-
    2016 (December 21, 2017); McGhee v. State, 
    899 N.E.2d 35
    , 38 (Ind. App. 2008), transfer denied, 
    915 N.E.2d 995
    (Ind. 2009); State v. Nicklasson, 
    967 S.W.2d 596
    , 606
    (Mo.), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 1021
    , 
    119 S. Ct. 549
    , 
    142 L. Ed. 2d 457
     (1998); State v. Old-Horn, 
    375 Mont. 310
    ,
    317, 
    328 P.3d 638
     (2014); State v. L.H., 
    239 N.J. 22
    , 43–46,
    
    215 A.3d 516
     (2019). As the Massachusetts Supreme
    Judicial Court noted: ‘‘We have long recognized that
    false promises . . . as might excite hopes in the mind
    of the prisoner, that he should be materially benefitted
    by making disclosures can undermine a defendant’s
    ability to make an autonomous decision to confess, and
    are therefore properly regarded as coercive. . . . Such
    promises may be either expressed or implied.’’16 (Cita-
    tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Com-
    monwealth v. Baye, supra, 
    462 Mass. 257
    –58; see also
    Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, supra, 
    442 Mass. 435
    –36 (‘‘[c]oercion may be readily applied by way of
    implied threats and promises, just as it is by express
    threats and promises’’); cf. State v. Phelps, 
    215 Mont. 217
    , 224, 
    696 P.2d 447
     (1985) (although confession must
    not be ‘‘obtained by any direct or implied promises,
    however, slight,’’ alleged promise that is ‘‘couched in
    terms of a mere possibility or an opinion . . . does not
    constitute a sufficient promise to render a confession
    involuntary’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
    question is not whether the officers spoke in definitive
    or formally binding contractual terms, but whether a
    reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
    have interpreted their statements as a promise of
    leniency. See Grades v. Boles, 
    398 F.2d 409
    , 412 (4th
    Cir. 1968) (‘‘[t]he perspective from which the state-
    ments must be viewed is that of the defendant’’); People
    v. Conte, 
    421 Mich. 704
    , 739–40, 
    365 N.W.2d 648
     (1984)
    (‘‘[I]t is from [the] defendant’s perspective that we will
    view the alleged promises. . . . The inquiry will be
    whether the defendant is likely to have reasonably
    understood the statements in question to be promises
    of leniency.’’ (Citations omitted.)).
    The second reason cited by the majority to condone
    the interrogators’ false ‘‘suggestions’’ of leniency is that
    it is permissible to tell a suspect that it would benefit
    him to cooperate. Part II A of the majority opinion. This
    is a correct and uncontroversial statement of the law,
    but the point has no application to the contested state-
    ments in the present case. It is true enough that the
    interrogators properly could tell the defendant that, if
    he took responsibility—whether claiming accident, self-
    defense, or simply an intentional but regrettable act—
    he could likely help himself.17 They properly could tell
    him that, by doing so, he could face lesser punishment.
    These would not be false statements. An early admis-
    sion of responsibility could reduce the sentence ulti-
    mately imposed. It is an entirely different matter, how-
    ever, to falsely convey to the defendant that it was his
    ‘‘choice’’ and ‘‘up to him’’ as to whether he was charged
    with felony murder or a far less serious crime (i.e., a
    ‘‘huge difference in charges’’).18 See United States ex
    rel. Everett v. Murphy, 
    329 F.2d 68
    , 70 (2d Cir.) (‘‘[a]
    confession induced by [the] police falsely promising
    assistance on a charge far less serious than the police
    knew would actually be brought is not to be considered
    a voluntary confession’’), cert. denied, 
    377 U.S. 967
    , 
    84 S. Ct. 1648
    , 
    12 L. Ed. 2d 737
     (1964); State v. McCoy, 
    692 N.W.2d 6
    , 28 (Iowa 2005) (officer can tell suspect that
    it is better to tell truth, but, if officer tells suspect what
    advantage is to be gained or is likely from making con-
    fession, officer’s statement becomes promise of leniency
    rendering statement involuntary). This was an implicit
    promise that the interrogators could not keep, not only
    because they lacked the authority to make good on
    any such promise but, more importantly, because the
    promise had no realistic basis in the law. As such, the
    promise of leniency in the present case is a highly rele-
    vant factor in assessing the voluntariness of the confes-
    sion. See P. Marcus, ‘‘It’s Not Just About Miranda:
    Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Crimi-
    nal Prosecutions,’’ 
    40 Val. U. L. Rev. 601
    , 621–22 and
    n.124, 622 n.129 (2006) (citing case law demonstrating
    that promise of leniency does not, by itself, require
    suppression of confession but is relevant factor in total-
    ity of circumstances analysis, except when promise
    lacks causal connection to decision to confess or prom-
    ise is kept).
    The timing of this particular aspect of the interroga-
    tion also warrants consideration because the defendant
    agreed to give a confession immediately after being
    presented with this legally baseless ‘‘choice.’’ Under the
    majority’s view that temporal proximity to the confes-
    sion is key in assessing the coercive effect of an interro-
    gation tactic, this tactic should be deemed particularly
    significant given that the defendant’s confession imme-
    diately followed his interrogator’s implied promise that
    the defendant’s confession could result in only a man-
    slaughter charge. Although the synergistic and cumula-
    tive nature of the interrogation method at issue compels
    me to disagree with the majority’s view regarding the
    importance of temporal proximity generally, this partic-
    ular aspect of the interrogation plainly was the tipping
    point for the defendant, and the false information con-
    veyed to the defendant in this respect should also be
    given significant weight in assessing whether his confes-
    sion was coerced.
    Finally, it is important to consider that the promises
    of leniency if the defendant confessed were juxtaposed
    against threats that the judge would be told that the
    defendant was not cooperating, which would be
    ‘‘worse’’ for the defendant. The Kansas Supreme Court
    had this to say about such a tactic: ‘‘This court has held
    that, without more, a law enforcement officer’s offer
    to convey a suspect’s cooperation to the prosecutor is
    insufficient to make a confession involuntary. . . .
    Kansas appellate courts, however, have not addressed
    the other side of the same coin . . . i.e., law enforce-
    ment conveying a suspect’s lack of cooperation to the
    prosecutor. A growing number of courts have disap-
    proved [of] this tactic. Those not finding that it is coer-
    cive per se regard it as another circumstance to be
    considered in determining the voluntariness of the con-
    fession.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Swanigan, 
    supra,
    279 Kan. 33
    –34; see also State v. Rettenberger, supra,
    
    984 P.2d 1018
     (‘‘[p]romises of leniency necessarily imply
    the threat of harsher punishment’’).19
    The interrogators’ use of multiple, coercive interroga-
    tion tactics plainly exacerbated the coercive effect of
    each individual tactic. It took close to four hours for
    the collective effect of these tactics to overbear the
    defendant’s will to resist the interrogators’ pressure to
    confess to accidentally shooting the victim. The fact
    that the defendant failed to present evidence that he
    had any specific characteristics that rendered him par-
    ticularly susceptible to coercion20 does not negate the
    coercive effect of this multidimensional strategy.21
    ‘‘[P]olice induce most false confessions from mentally
    normal adults . . . .’’ R. Leo, supra, p. 234. The defen-
    dant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system
    is a factor that cuts both ways. Although such experi-
    ence may further bolster the defendant’s understanding
    of his Miranda rights, a study has demonstrated that
    suspects with prior felony convictions are more vulner-
    able than others to false evidence ploys. See R. Leo,
    ‘‘Inside the Interrogation Room,’’ 86 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
    nology 266, 295 (1996). ‘‘While [personal characteris-
    tics] are pertinent considerations when assessing
    whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the defen-
    dant’s will was overborne . . . their significance is
    context dependent and diminishes with the severity of
    the police misconduct at issue . . . .’’ (Citation omit-
    ted.) Commonwealth v. Baye, supra, 
    462 Mass. 262
    ; see
    also United States v. Young, supra, 
    964 F.3d 946
     (‘‘[the
    defendant’s] personal characteristics are not disposi-
    tive, and they do not convince us that [the defendant]
    could withstand the coercion created by [the federal
    agent’s] legal misrepresentations and promises of
    leniency’’); Green v. Scully, supra, 
    850 F.2d 902
     (offi-
    cer’s conduct is ‘‘[the] most critical circumstance’’).
    Given the nature, variety, and pervasiveness of the
    coercive tactics employed in the present case, I would
    conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances,
    ‘‘the conduct of [the] law enforcement officials was
    such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and
    bring about confessions not freely self-determined
    . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Andrews, 
    313 Conn. 266
    , 321, 
    96 A.3d 1199
     (2014). ‘‘The
    use of these tactics in conjunction with one another
    exacerbated their overall coercive effect . . . .’’ State
    v. Baker, supra, 
    147 Haw. 433
    . The majority’s conclusion
    to the contrary is not, in my view, a fair assessment of
    the totality of the circumstances.
    Before I turn to the question of whether the improper
    admission of the defendant’s confession requires a new
    trial, it is necessary to respond to several unfounded
    criticisms leveled by the majority. The majority con-
    tends that I have improperly discounted the trial court’s
    finding that the defendant remained ‘‘ ‘calm and low-
    key’ ’’ by failing to give that finding due weight in
    assessing whether the defendant’s confession was vol-
    untary, as the majority does; part II A of the majority
    opinion; and by instead acknowledging the possibility,
    supported by social science research, that psychologi-
    cal, emotional, and cultural factors may cause a person
    to adopt a mask of calm fearlessness. See footnote 21
    of this opinion; cf. State v. Purcell, 
    331 Conn. 318
    , 356–
    57, 
    203 A.3d 542
     (2019) (drawing on sociolinguistic
    research not presented at trial to support analysis).
    I disagree with several of the underpinnings of this
    argument.22 First, the issue is not whether the defendant
    appeared to be ‘‘calm and low-key’’ during his interroga-
    tion; indeed, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, I
    fully accept this finding. The real question is what to
    make of that demeanor. In my view, the well-known
    phenomenon of masking and the social science
    research on that subject—not to mention the interrogat-
    ing officer’s own assessment that the defendant was
    putting on a ‘‘tough guy’’ facade while being ques-
    tioned—cast doubt on the trial court’s uncritical
    assumption that the defendant’s outward demeanor
    reflected an inner state of unpressured calmness. Sec-
    ond, the fact that the defendant adopted a different
    demeanor at one point during the interrogation, pre-
    tending to be fearful of Quan Bezzle, supports rather
    than undermines the possibility that the defendant was
    engaged in masking. If we believe that the defendant
    was concealing his true emotions by pretending to be
    afraid of Bezzle, we must also take seriously the possi-
    bility that he was concealing his true emotions by pre-
    tending to be calm. The majority does not explain why
    it chooses to discern one instance of deceptive demeanor
    but dismiss out of hand the realistic possibility of a
    second instance of deceptive demeanor by the same
    person during the same interrogation. Third, the major-
    ity draws on a well settled but inapt principle, namely,
    that a fact finder may rely on demeanor, as one of many
    factors, to assess a witness’ credibility.23 Because the
    trial court’s determination of voluntariness is not a find-
    ing of fact to which we must defer, it is proper to take
    into account the research regarding masking and record
    evidence consistent with that research. See State v.
    Christopher S., 
    338 Conn. 255
    , 274–75, 
    257 A.3d 912
    (2021) (‘‘[T]he trial court’s findings as to the circum-
    stances surrounding the defendant’s interrogation and
    confession are findings of fact . . . which will not be
    overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. . . .
    [A]lthough we give deference to the trial court concern-
    ing these subsidiary factual determinations, such defer-
    ence is not proper concerning the ultimate legal deter-
    mination of voluntariness. . . . [W]e review the
    voluntariness of a confession independently, based on
    our own scrupulous examination of the record. . . .
    Accordingly, we conduct a plenary review of the record
    in order to make an independent determination of vol-
    untariness.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) The
    majority further criticizes this opinion for failing to
    focus on the defendant’s personal characteristics such
    as his age, educational status, and intellectual function-
    ing. The majority is correct that the defendant was over
    the age of majority and exhibited no obvious intellectual
    impairments. See footnote 20 of this opinion. The point
    of this opinion, however, is that the coercive tactics
    used by police interrogators are designed to overbear
    the will of a suspect even without impaired intellect or
    extreme youth. The statistics cited herein demonstrate
    this very point.
    The majority also seriously misapprehends my point
    about the interrogators’ misrepresentation about the
    defendant’s ‘‘choice.’’ The majority states that I inter-
    pret ‘‘the officers [to be] telling the defendant that he
    could decide which charges to levy against himself
    . . . .’’ Footnote 24 of the majority opinion. I am saying
    nothing of the kind. My focus is on the following state-
    ment made immediately before the defendant’s confes-
    sion: ‘‘The choice is yours. Murder, manslaughter.
    That’s your choice. That’s what you’re looking at. Right
    now, you’re looking at murder, felony murder. Just cuz
    you’re being a knucklehead and not coming to grips
    that you’re fucked if you continue to stick with this
    story. We have too much against you.’’ (Emphasis
    added.) In making this statement, the interrogators
    plainly were not suggesting that the defendant would
    be drafting the charging instrument or participating in
    the decision whether to charge himself with manslaugh-
    ter or murder. The misrepresentation by the officers
    consisted of telling the defendant that, if he confessed
    to shooting the victim by accident—a narrative that the
    interrogators earlier had cast as wholly believable under
    the known circumstances—his ‘‘choice’’ to confess to
    that scenario would influence the charging decision and
    result in a reduction of the charge from felony murder
    to manslaughter, i.e., it would make a ‘‘[h]uge difference
    in [the] charges . . . .’’ See R. Leo, Police Interrogation
    and American Justice, supra, pp. 153–54 (minimization
    tactic used by police falsely suggests to ‘‘a suspect that
    if he admits to the act he can—with the interrogators’
    help—control how that act is framed to other audiences
    (e.g., prosecutors, judges, juries . . .)’’ and, in doing
    so, can ‘‘minimize his . . . legal culpability,’’ and sce-
    narios suggesting accident or self-defense ‘‘ ‘pragmati-
    cally’ communicate that the suspect will receive a lower
    charge or lesser punishment if he agrees to the sug-
    gested scenario’’ (emphasis added)). The interrogating
    officer made a gross misrepresentation of applicable
    law because there was no basis whatsoever to tell the
    defendant that confessing to the proposed narrative
    would (or probably would, or even realistically might)
    result in a manslaughter charge rather than ‘‘murder,
    felony murder’’ charges.24 See footnote 18 of this opin-
    ion. Although the majority attempts to diminish the
    effect of the legal misstatement by positing that the
    prosecutor could ‘‘consider [accident or self-defense]
    when choosing whether to charge the defendant with
    felony murder,’’ I consider that interpretation to be
    objectively unreasonable because it simply cannot be
    derived from what the officer actually said to the defen-
    dant. Footnote 24 of the majority opinion. The officer’s
    words explicitly and unambiguously placed the
    ‘‘choice’’ in the defendant’s hands and mentioned noth-
    ing whatsoever about prosecutorial discretion. The
    majority’s misreading of this point allows it to knock
    down a strawman rather than address what this opinion
    actually says.
    Ultimately, the majority’s view glosses over the para-
    mount fact that the state bears the burden of proving
    that the defendant’s confession was voluntary; see Lego
    v. Twomey, 
    404 U.S. 477
    , 489, 
    92 S. Ct. 619
    , 
    30 L. Ed. 2d 618
     (1972); which includes the burden of proving
    that the coercive interrogation tactics employed were
    not a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to
    confess. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 
    479 U.S. 157
    , 168,
    
    107 S. Ct. 515
    , 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 473
     (1986) (government
    bears burden of proof on threshold issue of whether
    valid waiver of Miranda rights occurred); United States
    v. Matlock, 
    415 U.S. 164
    , 178 n.14, 
    94 S. Ct. 988
    , 
    39 L.Ed.2d 242
     (1974) (preponderance of evidence stan-
    dard is controlling burden of proof for suppression hear-
    ings). I would conclude that the state has not proved
    that it is more likely than not that, in the absence of the
    cumulative effective of the coercive tactics employed—
    lying about inculpatory evidence, threatening to arrest
    the defendant’s family members, falsely indicating that
    the defendant could face the death penalty, and making
    false promises of leniency—the defendant still would
    have confessed.
    I would also conclude that the state failed to meet
    its burden of proving that the improper admission of
    the defendant’s confession was harmless beyond a rea-
    sonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Hafford, 
    252 Conn. 274
    , 297, 
    746 A.2d 150
    , cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 855
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 136
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 89
     (2000). ‘‘A confession is
    like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own
    confession is probably the most probative and damag-
    ing evidence that can be admitted against him. . . .
    [T]he admissions of a defendant come from the actor
    himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable
    source of information about his past conduct. Certainly,
    confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much
    so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them
    out of mind even if told to do so.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Zappulla v. New York, 
    391 F.3d 462
    ,
    473 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 957
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 472
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 358
     (2005), quoting Arizona v.
    Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 296, 
    111 S. Ct. 1246
    , 
    113 L. Ed. 2d 302
     (1991); see also Arizona v. Fulminante,
    
    supra, 313
     (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
    (‘‘the court conducting a [harmless error] inquiry must
    appreciate the indelible impact a full confession may
    have on the trier of fact’’). ‘‘[A]n error in admitting the
    confession should not ordinarily be deemed harmless
    absent a strong showing by the state that [the defen-
    dant’s] guilt would have been assured based solely on
    the other evidence presented at trial.’’ (Emphasis omit-
    ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zappulla v. New
    York, 
    supra,
     473–74.
    Only ‘‘when there is independent overwhelming evi-
    dence of guilt’’ can the state meet its burden of proving
    that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    State v. Hafford, supra, 
    252 Conn. 297
    . It cannot meet
    that burden on this record. There were no eyewitnesses
    or forensic evidence proving that the defendant was at
    the scene. But cf. id., 298 (admission of confession was
    harmless when defendant was seen fleeing crime scene
    and, when approached by police, volunteered ‘‘ ‘I did
    it’ numerous times,’’ defendant’s blood and footprints
    were found at crime scene, victim’s blood was on defen-
    dant’s clothes and on knife discovered in his car, and
    defendant’s pubic hair was discovered near victim’s
    naked body). No fruits of the robbery were found in
    the defendant’s possession. The state’s principal wit-
    ness and the defendant’s purported coconspirator,
    Nathan Johnson, testified pursuant to a cooperation
    agreement. The defendant’s ambiguous comment about
    the shooting to the confidential police informant and
    the presence of the rifle in the defendant’s home helped
    bolster Johnson’s testimony, but this evidence was not
    direct proof of the defendant’s actual participation in
    the crime itself. I would therefore reverse the defen-
    dant’s conviction, except for the charge of criminal
    possession of a firearm, and remand for a new trial.
    III
    In part II of this opinion, I explained why, under the
    current legal standard and case law, the majority has
    incorrectly concluded that the defendant’s confession
    was not involuntary under the federal constitution. In
    this section, I set forth justifications for reconsidering
    the treatment historically given to the use of the false
    evidence ploy in the interrogation process and provide
    support for an approach under which that ploy is given
    greater weight in assessing the coerciveness of an inter-
    rogation under the totality of the circumstances test
    than it is currently given.25
    The view that a false evidence ploy during an interro-
    gation rarely is coercive and has a minimally coercive
    effect, even when combined with other interrogation
    tactics, comes from a case that was decided more than
    one-half century ago. See Frazier v. Cupp, 
    supra,
     
    394 U.S. 737
    –39 (1969 case holding that confession was
    voluntary even though officer falsely told suspect that
    his admitted companion on night of crime had con-
    fessed to crime).26 Courts and commentators have
    begun to recognize that this view is premised on an
    anachronistic understanding of coercion, formed
    before the prevalence of false confessions was known.
    See, e.g., Dassey v. Dittmann, supra, 
    877 F.3d 332
    (Rovner, J., dissenting) (‘‘[Frazier and its progeny]
    were born in an era when the human intuition that told
    us that ‘innocent people do not confess to crimes’ was
    still largely unchecked. . . . We know, however, that
    this statement is unequivocally incorrect. Innocent peo-
    ple do in fact confess, and they do so with shocking
    regularity. . . . In a world where we believed that
    ‘innocent people do not confess to crimes they did
    not commit,’ we were willing to tolerate a significant
    amount of deception by the police. . . . And so our
    case law developed in a factual framework in which
    we presumed that the trickery and deceit used by police
    officers would have little effect on the innocent.’’ (Cita-
    tion omitted; footnotes omitted.)); id., 336 (Rovner, J.,
    dissenting) (‘‘[w]hat has changed is not the law, but
    our understanding of the facts that illuminate what con-
    stitutes coercion under the law’’); State v. Baker, supra,
    
    147 Haw. 431
     (‘‘in light of the various studies and cases
    that have emerged . . . we recognize that false claims
    of physical evidence result in an unsettling number of
    false or involuntary confessions’’); Commonwealth v.
    DiGiambattista, supra, 
    442 Mass. 434
     (‘‘[w]hile we
    adhere to the view that false statements about the evi-
    dence against the suspect do not automatically render
    the suspect’s confession involuntary, we note that ongo-
    ing research has identified such use of false statements
    as a significant factor that pressures suspects into waiv-
    ing their rights and making a confession’’); M. Gohara,
    supra, 
    33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 794
     (‘‘The bedrock cases
    sanctioning police deception . . . [predate] the advent
    of DNA testing and the many exonerations that followed
    from DNA test results. . . . Examination of actual
    wrongful convictions and additional empirical data
    demonstrating the correlation between deceptive inter-
    rogation practices and false confessions provide a basis
    for reconsidering the line of cases that allow[s] [the]
    police to use trickery to obtain confessions. Such recon-
    sideration is particularly critical because at the time
    those cases were decided, it was assumed that decep-
    tive interrogations would not lead to false confessions.’’
    (Footnote omitted.)); see also Corley v. United States,
    
    556 U.S. 303
    , 320–21, 
    129 S. Ct. 1558
    , 
    173 L. Ed. 2d 443
     (2009) (‘‘[c]ustodial police interrogation, by its very
    nature, isolates and pressures the individual . . . and
    there is mounting empirical evidence that these pres-
    sures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of
    people to confess to crimes they never committed’’
    (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted));
    State v. Purcell, supra, 
    331 Conn. 361
     (noting that,
    although United States Supreme Court recognized in
    Miranda possibility of coercive custodial interrogation
    resulting in false confessions, magnitude of this prob-
    lem was not known until recently).
    There is mounting proof that lying to suspects about
    evidence against them contributes to false confessions.
    ‘‘False confessions are one of the leading causes of
    wrongful conviction of the innocent, second only to
    eyewitness misidentification.’’27 M. Godsey, ‘‘Shining
    the Bright Light on Police Interrogation in America,’’ 
    6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 711
    , 723 (2009); see also S. Kassin
    et al., ‘‘Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
    Recommendations,’’ 
    34 Law & Hum. Behav. 3
    , 3 (2010)
    (‘‘research suggests that false confessions and admis-
    sions are present in 15–20 [percent] of all DNA exonera-
    tions,’’ which does not include false confessions dis-
    proved before trial, many that result in guilty pleas,
    those in which DNA evidence is not available, etc.).
    There is near universal consensus that the known false
    confessions represent a tip of the iceberg. See S.
    Drizin & R. Leo, supra, 
    82 N.C. L. Rev. 921
    ; M. Godsey,
    supra, 724–25; A. Hirsch, supra, 
    11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 813
    ; S. Kassin et al., supra, 3.
    ‘‘From a convergence of three sources, there is strong
    support for the proposition that outright lies can put
    innocents at risk to confess by leading them to feel
    trapped by the inevitability of evidence against them.
    These three sources are: (1) the aggregation of actual
    false confession cases, many of which involved use of
    the false evidence ploy;28 (2) one hundred-plus years
    of basic psychology research, which proves without
    equivocation that misinformation can substantially alter
    people’s visual perceptions, beliefs, motivations, emo-
    tions, attitudes, memories, self-assessments, and even
    certain physiological outcomes, as seen in studies of
    the placebo effect; and (3) numerous experiments, from
    different laboratories, demonstrating that presentations
    of false evidence increase the rate at which innocent
    research participants agree to confess to prohibited
    acts they did not commit.’’29 (Footnote added.) S. Kassin
    et al., supra, 
    34 Law & Hum. Behav. 28
    –29. See generally
    M. Gohara, supra, 
    33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 827
    –31 (provid-
    ing overview of ‘‘[e]mpirical [s]tudies [e]stablishing
    [t]hat [c]onfronting [s]uspects [w]ith [f]alse [e]vidence
    [a]nd [o]ther [d]eceptive [i]nterrogation [p]ractices
    [i]nduces [s]uspects to [c]onfess [f]alsely’’); A. Hirsch,
    supra, 
    11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 805
    –806 and n.18 (address-
    ing alt key experiment). The Reid Manual itself con-
    cedes that, although lying to a suspect about inculpatory
    evidence in and of itself would not cause a false confes-
    sion, ‘‘it becomes much more plausible that an innocent
    person may decide to confess’’ if ‘‘such false statements
    were . . . used to convince the suspect that regardless
    of his stated innocence, he would be found guilty of
    the crime and . . . sentenced to prison’’ but would be
    afforded leniency ‘‘if he cooperates by confessing
    . . . .’’ F. Inbau et al., supra, p. 428.
    ‘‘Psychologists have teased out two causal mecha-
    nisms by which the false evidence ploy may give rise
    to false confessions. . . . First, suspects may falsely
    confess as an act of compliance when they perceive
    that there is strong evidence against them.30 Second,
    innocent suspects confronted with evidence that law
    enforcement claims to prove their guilt as an incontro-
    vertible fact may falsely confess because they have
    come to internalize the belief that [they] committed the
    crime without awareness.
    ‘‘The key factor underlying each of these psychologi-
    cal processes is the defendant’s perception that his or
    her likelihood of conviction at trial is high . . . . The
    false evidence ploy enables interrogators to artificially
    inflate an innocent suspect’s estimated likelihood of
    conviction and thereby make a plea bargain appear
    rational.’’31 (Footnote altered; footnotes omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) K. Wynbrandt, Comment,
    ‘‘From False Evidence Ploy to False Guilty Plea: An
    Unjustified Path to Securing Convictions,’’ 
    126 Yale L.J. 545
    , 552–53 (2016).
    This tactic may be especially effective with those
    segments of society that are more likely to believe that
    they, or others in their community, have been treated
    unfairly by the police and the legal system. See K.
    Momolu, Gallup, Black Adults More Likely To Know
    People Mistreated by Police, (August 3, 2020), available
    at https://news.gallup.com/poll/316526/black-adults-likely-
    know-people-mistreated-police.aspx (last visited July
    19, 2021) (reporting results of 2020 survey reflecting
    that 71 percent of ‘‘[b]lack Americans . . . [report]
    know[ing] ‘some’ or ‘a lot of’ people who were treated
    unfairly by the police . . . twice the [response] rate
    among [w]hite Americans,’’ and that 50 percent of black
    adults, and 61 percent of black Americans between ages
    eighteen and forty-four ‘‘report knowing ‘some’ or ‘a lot
    of’ people who were unfairly sent to jail’’); I. Capers,
    ‘‘Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying,’’ 
    83 Ind. L.J. 835
    ,
    836 (2008) (‘‘[f]or many people of color and members
    of other politically vulnerable groups, [it] . . . comes
    as [no] surprise’’ that police officers misrepresent facts
    to justify traffic stops); D. Young, ‘‘Unnecessary Evil:
    Police Lying in Interrogations,’’ 
    28 Conn. L. Rev. 425
    ,
    468 (1996) (‘‘Those people who protest their innocence
    in the face of police lies about overwhelming evidence
    . . . may genuinely fear that they are being framed
    with fabricated evidence. While a more sophisticated,
    educated, and financially secure individual may be con-
    fident that he or his lawyer ultimately will be heard and
    the accusations withdrawn, those not so well situated
    may fear punishment for wrongs they did not commit.
    In particular, members of social groups with dispropor-
    tionately high conviction rates, such as young black
    men, may despair of release and conclude they must
    confess to something to escape a worse fate.’’).
    Recognition of the causal connection between decep-
    tive interrogation tactics and false confessions has been
    a significant factor in a recent shift away from the use
    of the Reid method, which sanctions lying. One of the
    nation’s largest police consulting firms has repudiated
    the Reid method; see Wicklander-Zulawski & Associates,
    Inc., Identify the Truth, available at https://www.w-z.com/
    truth/ (last visited July 19, 2021) (‘‘[t]he high risk of
    false confessions, potential for incorrect or unreliable
    information, and ultimately the misapplication of con-
    frontational techniques are all reasons why [Wicklander
    -Zulawski & Associates, Inc.] has chosen to no longer
    offer the confrontational approach in its course selec-
    tions’’); as have some foreign countries. See W. Kozin-
    ski, ‘‘The Reid Interrogation Technique and False Con-
    fessions: A Time for Change,’’ 16 Seattle J. Soc. Just.
    301, 304 n.16, 333–34 (2017) (noting England’s shift from
    Reid method after concluding that its overly manipula-
    tive and coercive tactics caused false confessions and
    subsequent adoption of England’s alternative, noncon-
    frontational method by United Kingdom, Norway and
    New Zealand).
    The connection between police deception in interro-
    gation and false confessions has also prompted recent
    legislative action. A bill proposed in New York State,
    which notes this connection in its statement of purpose,
    would deem a confession or admission ‘‘involuntarily
    made’’ when it is obtained from a defendant ‘‘by know-
    ingly communicating false facts about evidence to the
    defendant . . . .’’32 Senate Bill No. S324, § 1, 2021–2022
    Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
    This evidence has led to a call to recognize the coer-
    cive effect of lies and deception and give these consider-
    ations due weight when assessing whether a confession
    was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
    See Dassey v. Dittmann, supra, 
    877 F.3d 331
     (Rovner,
    J., dissenting) (‘‘[R]eform of our understanding of coer-
    cion is long overdue. When conducting a totality of
    the circumstances review, most courts’ evaluations of
    coercion still are based largely on outdated ideas about
    human psychology and rational [decision making]. It is
    time to bring our understanding of coercion into the
    twenty-first century.’’);33 State v. Allies, supra, 
    186 Mont. 113
     (‘‘[L]ying to [the] defendant about how much is
    known about his involvement in the crimes . . . is par-
    ticularly repulsive to and totally incompatible with the
    concepts of due process embedded in the federal and
    [Montana] constitutions. The effect is particularly coer-
    cive . . . .’’).
    False confessions are not the only reason for concern.
    From another vantage point, it should be immaterial
    whether there is a basis to believe that the defendant’s
    confession in a given case was false. To the extent
    that the foregoing evidence demonstrates the realistic
    potential for coercion associated with lying as an inter-
    rogation tactic, the United States Supreme Court has
    reminded us that the rules that we adopt to prevent the
    admission of involuntary confessions apply even when
    it is clear that the defendant confessed to the truth:
    ‘‘[C]onvictions following the admission into evidence
    of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product
    of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot
    stand. This is so not because such confessions are
    unlikely to be true but because the methods used to
    extract them offend an underlying principle in the
    enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusa-
    torial and not an inquisitorial system—a system in
    which the [s]tate must establish guilt by evidence inde-
    pendently and freely secured and may not by coercion
    prove its charge against an accused out of his own
    mouth. . . . To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted
    may be and have been, to an unascertained extent,
    found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional prin-
    ciple of excluding confessions that are not voluntary
    does not rest on this consideration. Indeed, in many of
    the cases in which the command of the [d]ue [p]rocess
    [c]lause has compelled us to reverse state convictions
    involving the use of confessions obtained by impermis-
    sible methods, independent corroborating evidence left
    little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had con-
    fessed. Despite such verification, confessions were
    found to be the product of constitutionally impermissi-
    ble methods in their inducement. Since a defendant
    had been subjected to pressures to which, under our
    accusatorial system, an accused should not be sub-
    jected, we were constrained to find that the procedures
    leading to his conviction had failed to afford him that
    due process of law which the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment
    guarantees.’’ (Citations omitted.) Rogers v. Richmond,
    
    365 U.S. 534
    , 540–41, 
    81 S. Ct. 735
    , 
    5 L. Ed. 2d 760
    (1961); see also Spano v. New York, 
    360 U.S. 315
    , 320–21,
    
    79 S. Ct. 1202
    , 
    3 L. Ed. 2d 1265
     (1959) (‘‘The abhorrence
    of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
    not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It
    also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police
    must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the
    end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
    illegal methods used to convict those thought to be
    criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.’’).
    These broader concerns about the integrity of the
    means by which we obtain confessions recognize that
    the tactics employed by law enforcement have ramifica-
    tions beyond the present case. Many courts have
    expressed disapproval of the use of deception as an
    interrogation tactic; see, e.g., Ex parte Hill, 
    557 So. 2d 838
    , 842 (Ala. 1989); State v. Cayward, 
    552 So. 2d 971
    ,
    973 (Fla. App. 1989), review dismissed, 
    562 So. 2d 347
    (Fla. 1990); State v. Old-Horn, supra, 
    375 Mont. 318
    ;
    People v. Robinson, 31 App. Div. 2d 724, 725, 
    297 N.Y.S.2d 82
     (1968); State v. Jackson, 
    308 N.C. 549
    , 573,
    
    304 S.E.2d 134
     (1983); State v. Galli, 
    967 P.2d 930
    , 936
    (Utah 1998); sometimes quite vehemently. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Orso, 
    266 F.3d 1030
    , 1039 (9th Cir.
    2001) (‘‘reprehensible’’), cert. denied, 
    537 U.S. 828
    , 
    123 S. Ct. 125
    , 
    154 L. Ed. 2d 42
     (2002); Ex parte Hill, 
    supra, 842
     (‘‘especially repugnant when used against suspects
    of diminished intellectual ability’’); State v. Phelps,
    
    supra,
     
    215 Mont. 225
     (‘‘[w]e cannot overemphasize our
    strong condemnation’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted)); State v. Register, 
    supra,
     
    323 S.C. 480
     (‘‘a deplor-
    able practice’’); State v. Von Dohlen, 
    322 S.C. 234
    , 243,
    
    471 S.E.2d 689
     (‘‘reprehensible’’) (overruled on other
    grounds by State v. Burdette, 
    427 S.C. 490
    , 
    832 S.E.2d 575
     (2019)), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 972
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 402
    ,
    
    136 L. Ed. 2d 316
     (1996). See generally State v. Jackson,
    
    308 N.C. 549
    , 573, 
    304 S.E.2d 134
     (1983) (noting general
    view that this tactic is ‘‘not morally justifiable or a
    commendable practice’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted)).
    These tactics are condemned not only because of
    their effect on the suspect but because they diminish
    society’s perception of the honesty and legitimacy of
    the police. See State v. Cayward, 
    supra,
     
    552 So. 2d 975
    (‘‘We must . . . decline to undermine the rapport the
    police have developed with the public by approving
    participation of law enforcement officers in practices
    which most citizens would consider highly inappropri-
    ate. We think that for us to sanction the manufacturing
    of false documents by the police would greatly lessen
    the respect the public has for the criminal justice system
    and for those sworn to uphold and enforce the law.’’);
    D. Young, supra, 
    28 Conn. L. Rev. 471
     (‘‘We entrust [the]
    police with the initial enforcement of our community
    standards, in the form of our criminal laws. When [the]
    police themselves misstate and violate the standards,
    even when that violation does not rise to a criminal
    level, they undermine their own role within the commu-
    nity.’’); D. Young, supra, 468–69 (‘‘Police lying also gen-
    erates a systemic loss of integrity. Research and analysis
    by ethicists and philosophers [remind] us of the impact
    of lying on society and societal perceptions of such
    lying. . . . Truth from doctors, truth from business
    people, and truth from government officials are essen-
    tial for us to plan our lives and to maintain control over
    our choices. We condemn lying in personal affairs and
    criminalize it in many contexts. . . . We condemn lying
    in part because we recognize that lying manipulates. If
    we want people to make free choices, we do not want
    them manipulated through lying.’’ (Footnotes omit-
    ted.)).
    Sanctioning lying in interrogations adds fuel to the
    current crisis in trust and confidence in the police, as
    reflected in nationwide protests. See S. Klein, ‘‘Trans-
    parency and Truth During Custodial Interrogations and
    Beyond,’’ 
    97 B.U. L. Rev. 993
    , 998–99 (2017) (‘‘[W]e
    have reached a point where there is little trust in law
    enforcement and the criminal justice system writ large.
    Rioting in Ferguson, Missouri and Charlotte, North Car-
    olina is a serious symptom of this distrust. In fact, only
    about [one] half of Americans report confidence in the
    police.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)); K. Momolu, supra (71
    percent of black Americans surveyed in 2020 reported
    ‘‘know[ing] ‘some’ or ‘a lot of’ people who were treated
    unfairly by the police’’).
    Legitimizing this unethical conduct also could
    encourage the police to adopt the pernicious attitude
    that the end justifies the means, which, in turn, could
    be used to justify other dishonest acts when the police
    are equally convinced of a suspect’s guilt, such as lying
    in affidavits to support search or arrest warrants, plant-
    ing evidence, and offering false testimony.34 See State
    v. Cayward, 
    supra,
     
    552 So. 2d 975
     (‘‘[W]ere we to
    approve the conduct [by the police fabricating false
    evidence], we might be opening the door for [the] police
    to fabricate court documents, including warrants,
    orders, and judgments. We think that such a step would
    drastically erode and perhaps eliminate the public’s
    recognition of the authority of court orders, and without
    the citizenry’s respect, our judicial system cannot long
    survive.’’);35 Darity v. State, 
    220 P.3d 731
    , 738 n.1 (Okla.
    Crim. App. 2009) (Chapel, J., dissenting) (‘‘Courts have
    opened a Pandora’s box by sanctioning police lies. The
    ‘ends justify the means’ rationale employed by most
    courts is very difficult to limit, and thus, the circum-
    stances of ‘permissible deceit’ have increased. So too
    has the evidence of ‘unlawful deceit.’ How does a law
    enforcement officer accept a message that it is permissi-
    ble to lie to obtain evidence, but not permissible to lie
    in a suppression hearing when the conviction or release
    of a murderer is in the balance. Empirical studies dem-
    onstrate that police are lying both in and out of court.
    . . . The consequences penetrate deep into the crimi-
    nal justice system, as the authority of the courts and
    legitimacy of their rulings are based largely on integrity
    and trust.’’ (Citations omitted.)); A. Clemens, Note,
    ‘‘Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms To
    Prevent Unjust Convictions,’’ 
    23 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 151
    ,
    192 (2004) (‘‘[A]n officer [may grow] ‘convinced that
    the suspect is factually guilty of the offense, may believe
    that necessary elements of legal guilt are lacking [and
    feel] that he/she must supply the missing elements.’ For
    example, one police officer explained how ‘it is often
    necessary to ‘‘fluff up the evidence’’ to get a search
    warrant or [to] ensure conviction [so this] officer will
    attest to facts, statements, or evidence [that] never
    occurred or occurred in a different fashion.’ Police offi-
    cers rationalize these lies, often themselves criminal
    acts, ‘because they are necessary to ensure that crimi-
    nals do not get off on ‘‘technicalities.’’ ’ ’’ (Footnotes
    omitted.)); D. Young, supra, 
    28 Conn. L. Rev. 463
    –64
    (‘‘The justification of lying for the public good . . .
    may readily transfer to other lies. The officer wants
    to convict the criminal, punish him, and protect other
    potential victims throughout the officer’s involvement
    in the case, not just during interrogation. For example,
    an officer may extend this justification to lying on a
    warrant affidavit for a search. . . . The officer’s
    motives may also trigger lies to third parties, such as
    to encourage consent for a search or to encourage false
    testimony by others. . . . In an even more egregious
    application of this justification, an officer may lie at
    trial, committing perjury to obtain the conviction of
    someone he believes is guilty. . . . The inherent prob-
    lem with lying for the public good is that people who
    believe their entire work is for the public good, as police
    officers do and should, may use this rationale to justify
    any and all lies that they tell . . . .’’ (Footnotes omit-
    ted.)).
    Beyond concerns about the practical consequences
    of sanctioning lying, there are moral and ethical con-
    cerns. ‘‘[S]tate officials, at least in a democracy, must
    aspire to be relevant epistemic authorities on the law
    and on at least that aspect of morality embodied in law.
    We should be able to rely on their transmissions about
    the content of law, legally relevant morality, and legally
    relevant facts. These ideas would render police misrep-
    resentation—even to a wrongdoer—especially morally
    problematic. If their role partly involves serving as a
    reliable epistemic repository, then the police subvert
    their own role when they misrepresent the content of
    the law, the moral severity of an offense, or the evidence
    they have collected. . . . Because their epistemic
    responsibilities are bound together with and frame their
    investigatory aims, the police cannot argue that the
    mere significance of the end justifies the suspension of
    the truthfulness presumption.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
    S. Shiffrin, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the
    Law (2014) p. 198; see also Miranda v. Arizona, supra,
    
    384 U.S. 479
    –80 (‘‘ ‘Decency, security, and liberty alike
    demand that government officials shall be subjected to
    the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
    citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the gov-
    ernment will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
    law scrupulously. Our [g]overnment is the potent, the
    omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
    whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If
    the [g]overnment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con-
    tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
    unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
    administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
    means . . . would bring terrible retribution. Against
    that pernicious doctrine this [c]ourt should resolutely
    set its face.’ ’’), quoting Olmstead v. United States, 
    277 U.S. 438
    , 485, 
    48 S. Ct. 564
    , 
    72 L. Ed. 944
     (1928) (Bran-
    deis, J., dissenting).
    Despite the aforementioned concerns, there are those
    who would argue that allowing the police to lie, at
    least in interrogations, is a necessary evil. Confessions
    undoubtedly may be essential in some cases. See Moran
    v. Burbine, 
    475 U.S. 412
    , 426, 
    106 S. Ct. 1135
    , 
    89 L. Ed. 2d 410
     (1986) (‘‘[a]dmissions of guilt are more than
    merely desirable . . . they are essential to society’s
    compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing
    those who violate the law’’ (citation omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted)); see also McNeil v. Wiscon-
    sin, 
    501 U.S. 171
    , 181, 
    111 S. Ct. 2204
    , 
    115 L. Ed. 2d 158
     (1991) (‘‘the ready ability to obtain uncoerced con-
    fessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good’’). But,
    although confessions may be essential proof in some
    cases, it does not follow that lying to obtain those con-
    fessions is equally necessary.
    There is a wealth of evidence that nonconfrontational
    interrogation methods, which do not sanction lying to
    suspects, are at least as effective as inquisitorial, advers-
    arial methods like the Reid method. This evidence is
    found in empirical research; see Dassey v. Dittmann,
    supra, 
    877 F.3d 335
    –36 (Rovner, J., dissenting); M. Kim,
    supra, 
    52 Gonz. L. Rev. 517
    ; S. Tekin et al., ‘‘Interviewing
    Strategically To Elicit Admissions from Guilty Sus-
    pects,’’ 
    39 Law & Hum. Behav. 244
    , 244–46 (2015); the
    practices of other countries that have successfully
    shifted from the inquisitorial, adversarial Reid method
    to information gathering, conversational models; see
    M. Kim, supra, 513 (England); W. Kozinski, supra, 16
    Seattle J. Soc. Just. 333–34 (United Kingdom, Norway,
    and New Zealand); Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
    The Art of an Effective Interview: Why Non-Accusatory
    Is the New Normal, (January 13, 2017), available at
    http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/gazette/the-art-an-effective-
    interview (last visited July 19, 2021) (Canada); and the
    adoption of rules by foreign courts prohibiting misrep-
    resentation of evidence. See C. Slobogin, ‘‘An Empiri-
    cally Based Comparison of American and European
    Regulatory Approaches to Police Investigation,’’ 22
    Mich. J. International L. 423, 443–44 (2001) (English
    and German courts developed special rules barring
    deception).36
    One of our nation’s largest police departments, the Los
    Angeles Police Department, is in the process of abandon-
    ing Reid style interrogation methods in favor of noncon-
    frontational techniques developed by the High-Value
    Detainee Interrogation Group (known as HIG), a joint
    effort of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central
    Intelligence Agency, and the Pentagon, created to conduct
    noncoercive interrogations. See R. Kolker, The Marshall
    Project, Nothing but the Truth: A Radical New Interroga-
    tion Technique Is Transforming the Art of Detective
    Work: Shut Up and Let the Suspect Do the Talking (May
    24, 2016), available at https://www.themarshallproject.
    org/2016/05/24/nothing-but-the-truth#.gR9TabJrx (last
    visited July 19, 2021).
    To those who would argue that we must permit lying
    during interrogations because we sanction lying in other
    contexts that are necessary for effective law enforce-
    ment (i.e., undercover activities, use of informants,
    etc.); see, e.g., Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, 
    112 Nev. 322
    , 328, 
    914 P.2d 618
     (1996); L. Magid, ‘‘Deceptive
    Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?,’’ 
    99 Mich. L. Rev. 1168
    , 1182 (2001); there are fundamental
    distinctions in those other circumstances that may jus-
    tify different treatment. Those circumstances do not
    involve actions by the police presenting themselves as
    officers of the law, or the use of psychologically coer-
    cive tactics to pressure the suspect to make inculpatory
    statements.37
    The broad societal harms caused by allowing the
    police to lie during interrogations, along with the risk
    of false confessions, may support a per se ban on this
    practice, whether as a matter of legislation action or
    the exercise of the court’s supervisory authority. The
    best course of action would be for our state and local
    police to abandon this tactic before such action is neces-
    sary, as some police departments in other states already
    have done. To be clear, I do not presently suggest that
    we adopt so extreme a rule as a per se ban. For now,
    it is sufficient to lay out concerns that should be consid-
    ered, in a future case, when deciding whether this court
    should give this particular tactic greater weight in
    assessing whether the defendant’s confession was
    coerced. For the reasons stated in part II of this opinion
    regarding the many other coercive tactics applied in
    the present case in conjunction with the false evidence
    ploy, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that
    the defendant’s confession was voluntary under the
    totality of the circumstances.
    I respectfully dissent in part.
    1
    I agree with part I of the majority opinion, in which the majority concludes
    that the search of the home of the defendant, Bobby Griffin, that resulted
    in the seizure of the rifle and ammunition was not unconstitutional.
    2
    The defendant was told, ‘‘if you don’t [explain why it happened] and
    you sit there and you keep [your] mouth shut, it’s just gonna get worse,
    it’s gonna get worse and worse,’’ and, ‘‘if you wanna spend the rest of your
    life in prison and sit there and keep your mouth shut, that’s fine.’’ (Emphasis
    added.) Although the majority is correct that courts often give significant
    weight to a valid waiver of Miranda rights in assessing the voluntariness
    of a confession, that waiver should be entitled to less weight when the
    interrogators effectively attempt to dissuade the defendant from exercising
    his right to revoke that waiver. See United States v. Harrison, 
    34 F.3d 886
    ,
    891–92 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘‘there are no circumstances in which law enforce-
    ment officers may suggest that a suspect’s exercise of the right to remain
    silent may result in harsher treatment by a court or prosecutor’’ (emphasis
    in original)); United States v. Leon Guerrero, 
    847 F.2d 1363
    , 1366 n.2 (9th
    Cir. 1988) (‘‘threatening to inform the prosecutor of a suspect’s refusal to
    cooperate violates [the suspect’s] fifth amendment right to remain silent’’);
    Beavers v. State, 
    998 P.2d 1040
    , 1045–46 (Alaska 2000) (‘‘A criminal suspect’s
    right to remain silent in the face of police interrogation represents one of
    the most fundamental aspects of our constitutional jurisprudence. It includes
    the right to terminate an interrogation at any time. We regard any potential
    encroachment upon this right with the utmost concern. A law enforcement
    officer’s threat of harsher than normal treatment—however phrased—essen-
    tially conveys to criminal suspects that they will be punished for their
    silence, including any refusal to give further answers. . . . Suspects are
    told, in effect, that they must give up their constitutional right to silence or
    they will suffer greater punishment. We view such threats with disfavor.
    Where they are used, the resulting confession should be considered involun-
    tary unless the state can show affirmatively that the confession was volunta-
    rily made.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)). See generally 23 C.J.S. 222, Criminal Law
    § 1269 (2006) (‘‘[a] waiver of [Miranda] rights may be revoked’’). Plainly put,
    ‘‘Miranda warnings do not immunize statements obtained during custodial
    interrogations from being the product of coercion.’’ State v. Baker, 
    147 Haw. 413
    , 434, 
    465 P.3d 860
     (2020).
    3
    The full quote of this statement, set forth in part I B of this opinion,
    makes clear that the interrogator was contrasting felony murder to man-
    slaughter, not simple murder.
    4
    Part III of this opinion addresses how training methods are beginning
    to shift from adversarial, Reid type models to nonadversarial models in light
    of concerns about the effectiveness of the Reid method and its capacity to
    cause false confessions. Alan Hirsch, chair of the justice and law studies
    program at Williams College and author of articles examining the Reid
    method, testified for the defense at trial as an expert on this type of method
    and how it can affect the reliability of a confession.
    5
    ‘‘An organization called John E. Reid & Associates [Inc.] developed the
    method in the mid-twentieth century and has since trained more interroga-
    tors than any other organization in the world. The Reid Technique is codified
    in Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (otherwise known as the ‘Reid
    Manual’), a handbook that is frequently termed ‘the bible of modern police
    interrogation training.’ Over the past several decades, the Reid Manual’s
    approach to interrogation has shaped ‘nearly every aspect of modern police
    interrogations, from the setup of the interview room to the behavior of
    detectives.’ ’’ (Footnotes omitted.) K. Wynbrandt, Comment, ‘‘From False
    Evidence Ploy to False Guilty Plea: An Unjustified Path to Securing Convic-
    tions,’’ 
    126 Yale L.J. 545
    , 549 (2016); see also Dassey v. Dittmann, supra,
    
    877 F.3d 335
    –36 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
    6
    The nine steps are: (1) ‘‘The Direct, Positive Confrontation,’’ (2) ‘‘Theme
    Development,’’ (3) ‘‘Handling Denials,’’ (4) ‘‘Overcoming Objections,’’ (5)
    ‘‘Keeping the Suspect’s Attention,’’ (6) ‘‘Handling the Suspect’s Passive
    Mood,’’ (7) ‘‘Presenting the Alternative Question,’’ (8) ‘‘Bringing the Suspect
    into the Conversation,’’ and (9) ‘‘The Written Confession.’’ F. Inbau et al.,
    supra, p. 215.
    7
    ‘‘Leo is an [a]ssociate [p]rofessor of [l]aw at the University of San Fran-
    cisco School of Law and formerly a professor of psychology and criminology
    at the University of California, Irvine. . . . He has written five books and
    more than fifty articles on police interrogation practices, false confessions,
    and wrongful convictions. . . . Leo holds both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in [j]uris-
    prudence and [s]ocial [p]olicy (with a specialization in criminology and
    social psychology).’’ (Citations omitted.) B. Gallini, ‘‘Police ‘Science’ in the
    Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of Pseudo-Psychological Interrogation
    Methods To Obtain Inadmissible Confessions,’’ 
    61 Hastings L.J. 529
    , 570
    n.335 (2010). Leo, ‘‘a highly respected expert in the area of police interroga-
    tion practice, the psychology of police interrogation and suspect [decision
    making], psychological coercion, false confessions, and wrongful convic-
    tions,’’ has also ‘‘consulted on more than 900 cases involving disputed interro-
    gations, qualified as an expert witness 168 times in state, federal, and military
    courts, and has testified for both the prosecution and defense, as well as
    in civil cases.’’ Ex parte Soffar, Docket Nos. WR-29980-03 and WR-29980-
    04, 
    2012 WL 4713562
    , *9 (Tex. Crim. App. October 3, 2012) (Cochran, J.,
    concurring), cert. denied sub nom. Soffar v. Texas, 
    569 U.S. 957
    , 
    133 S. Ct. 2021
    , 
    185 L. Ed. 2d 885
     (2013).
    8
    A prefatory step is to place suspects in an unfamiliar, unsupportive, and
    stressful setting from which they will want to extricate themselves. See
    Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 
    384 U.S. 449
    –50; S. Kassin, ‘‘Inside Interrogation:
    Why Innocent People Confess,’’ 
    32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 525
    , 532 (2009); M.
    Kim, ‘‘When and Why Suspects Fail To Recognize the Adversary Role of an
    Interrogator in America: The Problem and Solution,’’ 
    52 Gonz. L. Rev. 507
    ,
    510–11 (2016–2017).
    9
    See, e.g., Quartararo v. Mantello, 
    715 F. Supp. 449
    , 461 (E.D.N.Y.) (‘‘Evi-
    dence . . . procured [by way of a promise of leniency that was the equiva-
    lent of a promise of immunity] can no more be regarded as the product of
    a free act of the accused than that obtained by official physical or psychologi-
    cal coercion. . . . This factor alone would make it difficult to conclude
    that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving by a preponderance
    of the evidence that the first confession was voluntary.’’ (Citations omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.)), aff’d, 
    888 F.2d 126
     (2d Cir. 1989); United
    States v. Goldstein, 
    611 F. Supp. 626
    , 632 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (‘‘when the govern-
    ment misleads a suspect concerning the consequences of a confession, his
    statements are regarded as having been unconstitutionally induced by a
    prohibited direct or implied promise’’); People v. Weiss, 
    102 Misc. 2d 830
    ,
    831–36, 
    424 N.Y.S.2d 844
     (1980) (recognizing that totality of circumstances
    determines voluntariness but concluding that specific tactic of threatening
    defendant with loss of his business rendered statement involuntary). This
    does not mean that the totality of the circumstances is inapplicable in such
    a case. For example, there might be evidence that the tactic was not the
    motivating cause of the confession.
    10
    The majority dismisses Baker as irrelevant because the Hawaii Supreme
    Court decided the case under the Hawaii constitution. See footnote 23 of
    the majority opinion. The case is not so easily swept aside. The Hawaii
    court, applying a ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ test, relied on settled federal
    constitutional case law and principles, as well as case law from other jurisdic-
    tions relying on the federal constitution, to reach its conclusion. See State
    v. Baker, supra, 
    147 Haw. 424
    –34. I do not rely on Baker for any principles
    grounded in state constitutional law but for the unremarkable proposition,
    supported by a wealth of authority rooted in the federal law cited in part
    II of this opinion, that the totality of the circumstances test requires the
    consideration of the cumulative effect of the interrogation tactics. The major-
    ity’s rejection of this principle as stated in Baker, therefore, requires it to
    distinguish that federal authority; it has not done so.
    11
    The individual tactics identified in Baker were ‘‘(1) the comments sug-
    gesting the public and media would perceive [the defendant] more favorably
    if he confessed; (2) the implication that [the defendant] would be perceived
    less favorably in court if he continued to deny guilt; (3) the minimization
    narratives suggesting the conduct was understandable because of the drugs
    and alcohol involved; (4) the use of unlawfully discriminatory [gender based]
    stereotypes to excuse or explain conduct; (5) the use of the false friend
    technique; (6) the insinuation that [the defendant’s] refusal to admit to
    assaulting the [complaining witness] would be set forth in the detective’s
    report and could adversely affect him; and (7) the detective’s false assertion
    that there was incontrovertible DNA evidence showing that [the defendant]
    had sex with the [complaining witness], which, as the detective testified at
    trial, was told to [the defendant] to ‘[try] to get the truth out of him.’ ’’ State
    v. Baker, supra, 
    147 Haw. 433
    .
    12
    In part III of this opinion, I address the broader policy concerns and
    ethical implications of sanctioning police lying in interrogations.
    13
    In part III of this opinion, I give examples of cases in which a false
    confession was obtained after the police, along with the use of other coercive
    tactics, lied to the defendant about inculpatory evidence.
    14
    The defendant ultimately was charged with both felony murder and
    murder. Although treating the shooting as an ‘‘accident’’ would be relevant
    to the murder charge because the absence of proof of intent to cause death
    would support only a conviction of manslaughter; see General Statutes
    §§ 53a-54a and 53a-55; the clear import of the interrogator’s comments was
    that the defendant could also avoid a felony murder charge if he admitted
    that the shooting occurred by accident or in self-defense, as the interrogators
    proposed. See also footnote 18 of this opinion (addressing false charging
    choice proposed to defendant). This representation was blatantly false.
    15
    John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., has responded to critics of its method
    in a posting on its website entitled ‘‘Clarifying Misinformation about The Reid
    Technique,’’ which states: ‘‘The Reid [t]echnique teaches that the investigator
    should not offer any direct or implied promises of leniency to the subject.’’
    (Emphasis added.) John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Clarifying Misinformation
    about the Reid Technique, p. 2, available at http://www.reid.com/pdfs/
    20120311.pdf (last visited July 19, 2021).
    16
    Massachusetts is one of a handful of jurisdictions that requires the
    state to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by
    the preponderance of the evidence standard applied by the United States
    Supreme Court. However, that fact does not negate the relevance of Massa-
    chusetts case law regarding what constitutes coercive conduct. See Com-
    monwealth v. Baye, supra, 
    462 Mass. 255
     n.11 (‘‘[o]ur cases remain broadly
    consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent on the voluntariness
    of statements made to [s]tate actors, except that we require the [c]ommon-
    wealth to meet a heightened burden of proof in demonstrating voluntari-
    ness’’).
    17
    See Rogers v. State, 
    289 Ga. 675
    , 678–79, 
    715 S.E.2d 68
     (2011) (telling
    defendant ‘‘ ‘you are not trying to help yourself’ ’’ did not make confession
    involuntary because exhortation to tell truth and telling suspect that truthful
    cooperation may be considered by others is permissible); State v. Flowers,
    
    204 So. 3d 271
    , 280 (La. App. 2016) (‘‘a confession is not rendered inadmissi-
    ble because officers ‘exhort or adjure’ an accused to tell the truth’’), writ
    denied, 
    224 So. 3d 983
     (La. 2017); State v. Thomas, 
    711 So. 2d 808
    , 811 (La.
    App. 1998) (‘‘a mild exhortation to tell the truth, or an indication that if the
    defendant cooperates the officer will ‘do what he can’ or ‘things will go
    easier,’ will not negate the voluntary nature of a confession’’), writ denied,
    
    747 So. 2d 8
     (La. 1999).
    18
    The falsity of the representation is especially extreme in the present
    case because the homicide occurred during the course of a robbery (or
    attempted robbery), which, as the interrogators correctly informed the
    defendant, exposed him to a felony murder charge. Consequently, this was
    not simply a case in which the interrogators falsely indicated that the defen-
    dant’s confession to an accidental shooting would result in a manslaughter
    charge, when the choice of charges actually would be a matter left entirely
    to the prosecutor’s discretion (i.e., misrepresentation of fact). Rather, the
    interrogators affirmatively misled the defendant by telling him that the
    accident/self-defense narrative proposed to him was relevant and material
    to his criminal exposure for felony murder, which was untrue as a matter
    of law.
    19
    The Reid Manual itself provides: ‘‘The important question to answer is
    whether it is human nature to accept responsibility for something we did
    not do in the face of contrary evidence. . . . Would a suspect, innocent of
    a homicide, bury his head in his hands and confess because he was told
    that the murder weapon was found during a search of his home? Of course
    not! However, consider that such false statements were then used to con-
    vince the suspect that regardless of his stated innocence, he would be
    found guilty of the crime and would be sentenced to prison. Further, the
    investigator tells the suspect that if he cooperates by confessing, he will be
    afforded leniency. Under these conditions it becomes much more plausible
    that an innocent person may decide to confess—not because fictitious evi-
    dence was presented against him, but because the evidence was used to
    augment an improper interrogation technique (the threat of inevitable conse-
    quences).’’ F. Inbau et al., supra, pp. 428–29.
    20
    In his motion to suppress his statement, the defendant represented that
    his suppression hearing would show that he is of limited intelligence and
    highly susceptible to suggestion. For reasons that are not apparent from
    the record, the defendant did not present support for this assertion until his
    sentencing hearing, when he submitted a psychological evaluation indicating
    that he has an intelligence quotient (IQ) score between 80 and 85—low
    average—with mild, intellectual impairments, corresponding to a ‘‘ ‘mental
    age’ ’’ equivalency of fourteen years, and a tendency to cede to authority
    or social pressure. The trial court’s only reference to the evaluation was in
    connection with the characterization of the crime as ‘‘an impetuous deci-
    sion.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘[the defendant’s] conduct during this
    crime and the aftermath of the crime, in the court’s view, clearly contradicts
    and undermines [the psychologist’s] statements [in the evaluation] that the
    defendant . . . was likely to be nonassertive and [to] adapt socially to his
    surroundings. He certainly did not [cede] control to other people based on
    the court’s view of the credible evidence that was presented.’’ (Emphasis
    added.) The majority infers from the trial court’s failure to specify what it
    meant by ‘‘aftermath of the crime’’ that it means every action taken by the
    defendant after the crime occurred, including his conduct in the interroga-
    tion, and thus the court made a wholesale rejection of the psychologist’s
    opinion. See footnote 28 of the majority opinion. I believe that the context
    plainly indicates otherwise. I also note that the court made no mention of
    the psychologist’s assessment of the defendant’s IQ and mental age.
    21
    The trial court and the majority, in assessing the voluntariness of the
    defendant’s confession, ascribe significance to the fact that the defendant
    maintained a calm demeanor throughout the interrogation. This view con-
    forms to case law that implicitly assumes that a person’s external demeanor
    provides a reliable indication of his or her internal emotional state during
    an interrogation, and, thus, a calm demeanor suggests the absence of coer-
    cion. This unexamined assumption strikes me as dubious at best. We now
    know that a subject’s external appearance may not accurately reflect his
    or her internal reality. See A. Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology
    of Lying and the Implications for Professional Practice (2000) p. 38 (summa-
    rizing scientific evidence showing that observable behavioral cues assumed
    to indicate deceit do not do so). We also know that cultural differences
    between the subject and the observer greatly increase the likelihood that
    the subject’s external demeanor will be misconstrued. See J. Simon-Kerr,
    ‘‘Unmasking Demeanor,’’ 88 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 158, 161 (2020)
    (‘‘Demeanor is understood to be a guide to a [witness’] credibility in the
    sense that we can ‘read’ it for clues to a person’s truthfulness. Probing
    behind this assumption reveals it to be both culturally mediated and without
    basis in science, rather than reflecting a truism about human beings. Other
    cultures have different expectations about the revelatory nature of demeanor
    that, in turn, reflect different beliefs about the relationship between the
    internal and the external.’’).
    One important example of this phenomenon is documented in a substantial
    body of literature indicating that it is not uncommon for individuals growing
    up in a violent home or neighborhood, as the defendant in the present case
    did, to adopt a mask of unemotional fearlessness as a coping mechanism.
    See, e.g., N. Dowd, ‘‘Black Boys Matter: Developmental Equality,’’ 
    45 Hofstra L. Rev. 47
    , 93 (2016) (‘‘[b]ravado is particularly the response in high risk
    neighborhoods for self-protection’’); S. Dworkin, ‘‘Masculinity, Health, and
    Human Rights: A Sociocultural Framework,’’ 33 Hastings International &
    Comp. L. Rev. 461, 474 (2010) (‘‘marginalized men may be [overly reliant]
    on garnering identity through narrow definitions of masculinity in order
    to garner status and respect’’); M. Thomas, ‘‘The African American Male:
    Communication Gap Converts Justice into ‘Just Us’ System,’’ 13 Harv.
    BlackLetter L.J. 1, 9 (1997) (‘‘‘[c]ool pose is a distinctive coping mechanism
    that serves to counter, at least in part, the dangers that black males encounter
    on a daily basis’ ’’), quoting R. Majors & J. Billson, Cool Pose: The Dilemmas
    of Black Manhood in America (1992) p. 5; see also R. Klein, Trial Practice
    Series: Trial Communication Skills (2d Ed. 2020) § 4:4 (‘‘In truth, the feelings
    are always there, but for one reason or another, they are masked. With men,
    an open display of emotion is usually considered a sign of weakness. To
    be in control, to show no feelings, to act ‘cool’ in the face of any threat is
    considered manly.’’); M. Dargis & M. Koenigs, ‘‘Witnessing Domestic Violence
    During Childhood Is Associated with Psychopathic Traits in Adult Male
    Criminal Offenders,’’ 
    41 Law & Hum. Behav. 173
    , 174 (2017) (‘‘[E]xposure
    to community violence is directly correlated with callous-unemotional traits
    in detained juveniles. Moreover, this violence exposure mediates the rela-
    tionship between callous-unemotional traits and delinquency, suggesting
    that witnessing violent acts account[s] for the relationship between callous-
    unemotional traits and heightened risk for engaging in violent behavior.’’); cf.
    State v. Purcell, 
    331 Conn. 318
    , 356–57, 
    203 A.3d 542
     (2019) (acknowledging
    sociolinguistic research concluding that ‘‘indirect speech patterns are com-
    mon within African-American spoken language’’ and are used as linguistic
    mechanism to avoid conflict (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    I do not profess to know what psychological, emotional, and cultural
    factors actually lay behind this defendant’s calm demeanor. My point is that
    I have no way to know or even guess, and neither does the trial court or the
    majority. That said, at least two aspects of the record make my alternative
    scenario plausible. First, one of the officers said to the defendant, well into
    the interrogation, ‘‘I think you’re putting a tough guy front on,’’ indicating
    that the interrogators themselves perceived the defendant to be wearing
    precisely the type of mask identified in the research studies. Second, the
    defendant’s background places him within the demographic referenced in
    those studies. He had committed four felonies by the age of eighteen, and he
    reported ‘‘a significant family history of drug addiction and related criminal
    behavior in [his] first degree relatives’’ and described ‘‘violence in the home
    [and] exposure to violence as a youth in the streets (including shootings
    and stabbings) . . . .’’
    The fact that the latter information was not made known to the trial court
    until sentencing does not undermine my point, but reinforces it: no judge
    can even begin to understand the meaning of a defendant’s calm demeanor
    during an interrogation without knowing much more about him or her. As
    a consequence, there is simply no basis to be confident that the defendant’s
    ‘‘cool’’ demeanor signified internal calm rather than masked distress, and,
    in my view, it is a mistake to give weight to this consideration under these
    circumstances.
    22
    The majority also mischaracterizes my reasoning, but I rely on footnote
    21 of this opinion to make my position clear.
    23
    Even in the context of using demeanor to assess credibility—an assess-
    ment made in an adversarial proceeding, not an interrogation—courts have
    begun to recognize that cultural differences and other factors may impact
    demeanor and, in turn, our ability to draw accurate inferences from appear-
    ances. See, e.g., Djouma v. Gonzales, 
    429 F.3d 685
    , 687–88 (7th Cir. 2005)
    (‘‘[A]s a foreigner [the asylum applicant’s] demeanor will be difficult for the
    immigration judge to ‘read’ as an aid to determining the applicant’s credibil-
    ity. . . . The [United States Department of Homeland Security and the
    United States Department of Justice] seem committed to [case-by-case]
    adjudication in circumstances in which a lack of background knowledge
    denies the adjudicators the cultural competence required to make reliable
    determinations of credibility.’’); see also Yang v. Lynch, 
    832 F.3d 817
    , 821
    (7th Cir. 2016) (‘‘we’ve commented on the unreliability of demeanor evidence
    generally . . . and the particular difficulty of using such evidence to evalu-
    ate the credibility of witnesses from other cultures’’ (citations omitted)),
    citing United States v. Pickering, 
    794 F.3d 802
    , 805 (7th Cir. 2015), and
    Djouma v. Gonzales, 
    supra, 687
    ; Morales v. Artuz, 
    281 F.3d 55
    , 61 and n.3
    (2d Cir.) (acknowledging that idea that demeanor is useful basis for assessing
    credibility is ‘‘grounded perhaps more on tradition than on empirical data’’
    and citing articles reviewing social science research), cert. denied sub nom.
    Morales v. Greiner, 
    537 U.S. 836
    , 
    123 S. Ct. 152
    , 
    154 L. Ed. 2d 56
     (2002).
    24
    The majority interprets the interrogator’s statement ‘‘[t]he choice is
    yours’’ as a simple assertion ‘‘that it was [the defendant’s] choice whether
    to tell the truth.’’ Footnote 24 of the majority opinion. The flaw in this
    interpretation is that it ignores what the officer actually said. The ‘‘choice’’
    confronted by the defendant was expressly tied to the charges his ‘‘choice’’
    would determine: ‘‘The choice is yours. Murder, manslaughter. That’s your
    choice.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    25
    My conclusion in part II of this opinion makes it unnecessary to decide
    whether the modest doctrinal reform that I propose in part III could be
    implemented as a matter of state constitutional law or in the exercise of
    this court’s supervisory authority. I note that several of the considerations
    discussed in part III bear directly on some of the factors that are employed
    to determine whether our state constitution affords greater protection than
    the federal constitution. See State v. Geisler, 
    222 Conn. 672
    , 684–86, 
    610 A.2d 1225
     (1992) (setting forth six factors that, to extent applicable, are to
    be considered in construing contours of state constitution). ‘‘Although, in
    Geisler, we compartmentalized the factors that should be considered in
    order to stress that a systematic analysis is required, we recognize that they
    may be inextricably interwoven. . . . [Moreover], not every Geisler factor
    is relevant in all cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v.
    Commissioner of Public Health, 
    289 Conn. 135
    , 157, 
    957 A.2d 407
     (2008).
    26
    In Frazier, the one lie told to the defendant was not made in concert
    with any other potentially coercive tactic, and the defendant confessed
    approximately one hour after the interrogation commenced. See Frazier v.
    Cupp, 
    supra,
     
    394 U.S. 737
    –38.
    27
    ‘‘As of June 7, 2016, [t]he National Registry of Exonerations had collected
    data on [1810] exonerations in the United States since 1989 (that number
    as of December 4, 2017 is [2132]), and that data [include] 227 cases of
    innocent people who falsely confessed. This research indicates that false
    confessions (defined as cases in which indisputably innocent individuals
    confessed to crimes they did not commit) occur in approximately 25 [per-
    cent] of homicide cases.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Dassey v. Dittmann, supra,
    
    877 F.3d 332
     (Rovner, J., dissenting). Interrogators themselves indicate that
    false confessions are surprisingly frequent. One self-report study of more
    than 600 professional interrogators found that the interrogators, based on
    their personal experiences and observations, estimated that, on average,
    almost 5 percent of innocent suspects confess. See S. Kassin et al., ‘‘Police
    Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices
    and Beliefs,’’ 
    31 Law & Hum. Behav. 381
    , 392–93 (2007).
    28
    Some examples cited in the literature include: Anthony Gray confessed
    to rape and murder after a series of interrogations, during which detectives
    falsely informed him that two other men had confessed to involvement in
    the crime and had named Gray as the killer and that he had failed two
    polygraph tests. Gray spent more than seven years in prison ‘‘before he was
    exonerated on the basis of DNA evidence.’’ K. Wynbrandt, Comment, ‘‘From
    False Evidence Ploy to False Guilty Plea: An Unjustified Path to Securing
    Convictions,’’ 
    126 Yale L.J. 545
    , 545–46 (2016).
    Marty Tankleff, then seventeen years old, confessed to killing his mother
    and beating his father after an interrogator lied about the evidence of his
    guilt, including that his father had said that he did it. His conviction was
    later vacated, and the charges were dropped. See S. Kassin, ‘‘Inside Interroga-
    tion: Why Innocent People Confess,’’ 
    32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 525
    , 536 (2009).
    John Watkins confessed to rape after the police falsely told him that they
    had recovered his fingerprints from the crime scene, that the victim had
    identified him, and that he had failed a voice stress analysis test. He was later
    exonerated by DNA evidence. See S. Gross et al., National Registry of Exonera-
    tions, Government Misconduct and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of
    Prosecutors, Police and Other Law Enforcement (September 1, 2020) p. 56,
    available at https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
    Government_Misconduct_and_Convicting_the_Innocent.pdf (last visited July
    19, 2021).
    Frank Sterling confessed to murder after officers falsely told him that his
    brother had implicated him and that he was justified in hurting the victim
    because she deserved it. Sterling was exonerated by DNA evidence that
    implicated another man. See id., p. 45.
    Robert Miller, later exonerated, confessed after being falsely told by a
    detective that an eyewitness had seen him leaving the crime scene and
    that this witness had identified him in a photograph. See B. Garrett, ‘‘The
    Substance of False Confessions,’’ 
    62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051
    , 1098 (2010).
    In a recent opinion piece in the New York Times by three of the defendants
    convicted as part of the group known as the ‘‘Central Park Five,’’ the authors
    explain how the interrogators’ blatant lies—telling the defendants that the
    police had matched their fingerprints to crime scene evidence and telling
    each of them that the others had confessed and implicated each of them
    in the attack—contributed to their false confessions. See Y. Salaam et al.,
    ‘‘Act Against Coerced Confessions,’’ N.Y. Times, January 5, 2021, p. A19.
    In a book by a former Washington, D.C., homicide detective, he examined
    how he could have elicited a confession from a suspect who he later proved
    could not have committed the crime. See T. Jackman, ‘‘Homicide Detective’s
    Book Describes ‘How the Police Generate False Confessions,’ ’’ Wash. Post,
    October 20, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-
    crime/wp/2016/10/20/homicide-detectives-book-describes-how-the-police-
    generate-false-confessions/ (last visited July 19, 2021). ‘‘He realized that
    implying that [the suspect’s] cooperation would get her better treatment
    from the prosecutors, and minimizing her role in the case to obtain her
    testimony against [her codefendants], as well as a mistaken handwriting
    analysis and a bogus ‘voice stress test,’ got her to confess.’’ Id.; see also M.
    Gohara, supra, 
    33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 831
     n.239 (providing examples of four
    other cases in which defendants falsely confessed after police lied about
    evidence inculpating them).
    29
    The doubters argue that the empirical evidence does not demonstrate
    the frequency of the problem and may not accurately reflect proven cases
    of innocence; see, e.g., F. Inbau et al., supra, pp. 442–43; L. Magid, ‘‘Deceptive
    Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?,’’ 
    99 Mich. L. Rev. 1168
    ,
    1192 (2001); suggest that false confessions are such a rarity that their risk
    may not outweigh the benefits of the questioned interrogation practices;
    see, e.g., Dassey v. Dittmann, supra, 
    877 F.3d 318
     n.8; or point to the
    uncontested fact that social science experiments cannot replicate the high
    stakes context of an interrogation for a serious crime. See, e.g., F. Inbau et
    al., supra, p. 443; A. Hirsch, supra, 
    11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 805
    –808; S. Tekin
    et al., ‘‘Interviewing Strategically To Elicit Admissions from Guilty Suspects,’’
    
    39 Law & Hum. Behav. 244
    , 251 (2015). These concerns have been addressed
    to my satisfaction in several sources, including Dassey v. Dittmann, supra,
    331–33 (Rovner, J., dissenting), and A. Hirsch, supra, 806 n.18, 812–13,
    825 n.129.
    30
    Research also suggests that some innocent individuals may falsely con-
    fess voluntarily during police interrogations ‘‘because they believe that ‘truth
    and justice will prevail’ later even if they falsely admit their guilt.’’ B. Garrett,
    ‘‘The Substance of False Confessions,’’ 
    62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051
    , 1100 (2010);
    see, e.g., 
    id.,
     1054–56 (Jeffrey Deskovic, exonerated of rape and murder
    with DNA evidence after making inculpatory statements, later explained
    that ‘‘ ‘[b]elieving in the criminal justice system and being fearful for myself,
    I told [the police] what they wanted to hear’ ’’). As I explain later in this
    opinion, this optimistic view of the criminal justice system is not univer-
    sally shared.
    31
    Several of the exonerated ‘‘Central Park Five’’ defendants recently
    explained: ‘‘It’s hard to imagine why anyone would confess to a crime
    they didn’t commit. But when you’re in that interrogation room, everything
    changes. During the hours of relentless questioning that we each endured,
    detectives lied to us repeatedly. . . . It felt like the truth didn’t matter.
    Instead, it seemed as though they locked onto one theory and were hellbent
    on securing incriminating statements to corroborate it. A conviction rather
    than justice felt like the goal.’’ Y. Salaam et al., ‘‘Act Against Coerced Confes-
    sions,’’ N.Y. Times, January 5, 2021, p. A19.
    32
    A bill also was raised in Connecticut in 2014, which would have estab-
    lished a presumption that a statement made by a suspect as a result of a
    custodial interrogation is inadmissible if the police knowingly present the
    suspect with false evidence or knowingly misrepresent the evidence about
    the case. See Raised Bill No. 5589, 2014 Sess., § 1. Interestingly, in written
    testimony submitted to the Judiciary Committee, the Division of Criminal
    Justice successfully urged no action on the bill, suggesting that the courts
    should address this concern on a case-by-case basis under the current state of
    the law rather than adopt a per se rule. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee
    Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8, 2014 Sess., pp. 3564–65. That is precisely what
    this opinion advocates.
    33
    Judge Rovner’s dissent in Dassey is particularly notable because it was
    joined by two other Seventh Circuit judges. The four judges in the majority
    did not decide the issue raised in Judge Rovner’s dissent because they
    concluded that that dissent’s approach would not apply under the deferential
    standard that the federal court was required to apply to the review of a
    state court decision. See Dassey v. Dittmann, supra, 
    877 F.3d 302
     (‘‘[e]ven
    if we were to consider the approach in past [United States] Supreme Court
    decisions outmoded, as the dissents suggest, a state court’s decision consis-
    tent with the Supreme Court’s approach could not be unreasonable under
    [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)]’’).
    Chief Judge Wood wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the confession
    was involuntary despite the deferential standard of the AEDPA. See 
    id.,
    319–31 (Wood, C. J., dissenting).
    34
    The possibility that an end justifies the means mentality could result in
    some police officers committing perjury to advance what they perceive to
    be the greater public good is not hyperbole. Such conduct was sufficiently
    pervasive in New York City that police officers had their own name for the
    practice, ‘‘testilying’’; see J. Goldstein, ‘‘ ‘Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn
    Problem,’’ N.Y. Times, March 18, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/
    2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html (last visited July
    19, 2021); and there is evidence that this conduct is not limited to that locale.
    ‘‘Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has observed that it is ‘an open
    secret long shared by prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges that perjury
    is widespread among law enforcement officers.’ ’’ I. Capers, supra, 
    83 Ind. L.J. 836
    –37. ‘‘Blue lies are so pervasive that even former prosecutors have
    described them as ‘commonplace’ and ‘prevalent.’ Surveyed prosecutors,
    defense attorneys, and judges believed perjury was present in approximately
    [20] percent of all cases. A separate survey of police officers was even more
    sobering. Seventy-six percent of responding officers agreed that officers
    shade the facts to establish probable cause; [48] percent believed judges
    were often correct in disbelieving police testimony.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
    Id., 870; see also K. Holloway, ‘‘Lying Is a Fundamental Part of American
    Police Culture,’’ Salon, March 31, 2018, available at https://www.salon.com/
    2018/03/31/lying-is-a-fundamental-part-of-american-police-culture_partner/
    (last visited July 19, 2021); Editorial, ‘‘Police Perjury: It’s Called ‘Testilying,’ ’’
    Chicago Tribune, July 5, 2015, available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/
    news/opinion/editorials/ct-police-false-testimony-edit-20150702-story.html
    (last visited July 19, 2021).
    35
    The Florida Appellate Court in Cayward made this statement when
    distinguishing between manufactured evidence and verbal lies, deeming the
    former coercive per se; see State v. Cayward, 
    supra,
     
    552 So. 2d 973
    –75; a
    distinction adopted by a few other courts. See State v. Patton, 
    362 N.J. Super. 16
    , 31–32, 
    826 A.2d 783
     (App. Div.), cert. denied, 
    178 N.J. 35
    , 
    834 A.2d 408
     (2003); State v. Farley, 
    192 W. Va. 247
    , 257 n.13, 
    452 S.E.2d 50
    (1994). I agree with those courts that have rejected the proposition that a
    verbal lie about evidence will necessarily have less of an effect than present-
    ing that same lie in physical form, i.e., false test results. See, e.g., State v.
    Baker, supra, 
    147 Haw. 431
     (‘‘[t]o the suspect, who does not expect the
    police to lie, there is no meaningful distinction between being given a piece
    of paper that purports to document guilt and an officer’s confident assertion
    that scientific evidence incontrovertibly establishes the suspect’s guilt’’);
    see also M. Gohara, supra, 
    33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 833
     (‘‘Both sorts of official
    misrepresentation offend traditional notions of due process. Forgery and
    oral misrepresentation differ from one another only in degree rather than
    in kind.’’).
    36
    It should be noted that, although there is evidence that the United
    Kingdom has a higher or similar rate of confessions as the United States;
    see C. Slobogin, ‘‘Lying and Confessing,’’ 
    39 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1275
    , 1282–83
    and nn. 43 and 44 (2007); the United Kingdom permits the police to continue
    questioning suspects even after they have indicated a desire to remain silent
    and to tell suspects that their silence may be used against them. 
    Id.,
     1282–83;
    see also C. Slobogin, supra, 22 Mich. J. International L. 446.
    37
    See Lewis v. United States, 
    385 U.S. 206
    , 209, 
    87 S. Ct. 424
    , 
    17 L. Ed. 2d 312
     (1966) (The court acknowledged, in the context of information
    obtained by an undercover agent, ‘‘that, in the detection of many types of
    crime, the [g]overnment is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity
    of its agents. The various protections of the Bill of Rights, of course, provide
    checks upon such official deception for the protection of the individual.’’);
    see also Hoffa v. United States, 
    385 U.S. 293
    , 302, 
    87 S. Ct. 408
    , 
    17 L. Ed. 2d 374
     (1966) (use of government informant to obtain incriminating
    statements was not violation of fourth amendment when informant was
    invited to defendant’s hotel suite and was not ‘‘a surreptitious eavesdropper,’’
    and defendant was relying on his ‘‘misplaced belief that a person to whom
    he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it’’).