Hylton v. Gunter ( 2014 )


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    RICHARD HYLTON v. GARFIELD GUNTER ET AL.
    (SC 19159)
    Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson, Js.
    Argued April 23—officially released September 9, 2014
    Houston Putnam Lowry, with whom, on the brief,
    was Julie A. Morgan, for the appellant (named
    defendant).
    Gerald M. Beaudoin, with whom, on the brief, was
    Francisco A. Cardona, for the appellee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    ROBINSON, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal
    is whether we should overrule Lord v. Mansfield, 
    50 Conn. App. 21
    , 
    717 A.2d 267
    , cert. denied, 
    247 Conn. 943
    , 
    723 A.2d 321
     (1998), in which the Appellate Court
    held that a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal
    under General Statutes § 52-2631 when the trial court
    has awarded, but not yet determined the amount of,
    common-law punitive damages, which are limited under
    Connecticut law to attorney’s fees and certain litigation
    costs. See, e.g., Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v.
    Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 
    193 Conn. 208
    , 237–38, 
    477 A.2d 988
     (1984). The defendant Garfield Gunter2
    appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,3
    from the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing
    his appeal, pursuant to Lord, from the judgment of
    the trial court awarding the plaintiff, Richard Hylton,
    $342,648 in compensatory damages, and ‘‘ ‘punitive
    damages in the form of attorney’s fees’ ’’ on the counts
    of his complaint alleging, inter alia, fraud and civil theft.
    Hylton v. Gunter, 
    142 Conn. App. 548
    , 551, 
    66 A.3d 517
    (2013). We agree with the defendant’s claim that Lord
    was wrongly decided because, among other reasons, it
    is inconsistent with this court’s decision in Paranteau
    v. DeVita, 
    208 Conn. 515
    , 523, 
    544 A.2d 634
     (1988),
    which adopted the ‘‘bright line rule’’ that ‘‘a judgment
    on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though
    the recoverability or amount of attorney’s fees for the
    litigation remains to be determined.’’ Accordingly, we
    reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
    The record and the Appellate Court’s opinion reveal
    the following relevant facts and procedural history. The
    plaintiff and the defendant are equal members of Pro-
    gressive Electric & Telecommunications, LLC (Progres-
    sive). The plaintiff stopped working for Progressive in
    July, 2008, leaving the defendant to manage its opera-
    tions and finances. After the plaintiff learned that the
    defendant was misappropriating Progressive’s moneys
    for his own personal use, he brought this action seeking
    damages from the defendant in an eight count complaint
    alleging fraud, negligence, breach of contract, unjust
    enrichment, civil theft, conversion, breach of fiduciary
    duty, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and
    fair dealing. See Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 
    142 Conn. App. 551
     and n.3. The case was tried to the court. See
    
    id.,
     550–51.
    ‘‘On March 14, 2011, the trial court issued a memoran-
    dum of decision in which it found in favor of the plaintiff
    on the eight counts of his complaint and awarded him
    $342,648 in compensatory damages. The court also
    found that the plaintiff was entitled to ‘punitive damages
    in the form of attorney’s fees’ on the counts alleging
    fraud, civil theft, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach
    of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,4 and
    it instructed the plaintiff to file an affidavit of attorney’s
    fees within thirty days. On April 6, 2011, the defendant
    filed this appeal [in the Appellate Court]. On May 20,
    2011, after a hearing, the trial court awarded the plaintiff
    $23,400 in punitive damages, which represented the
    amount claimed in attorney’s fees. The defendant did
    not amend his appeal subsequent to the trial court
    determining the amount of the punitive damages. On
    September 12, 2012, this appeal was placed on the
    [Appellate Court’s] own motion calendar for dismissal
    for lack of a final judgment on the ground that, at the
    time the appeal was filed, the trial court had not yet
    resolved the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. After
    the motion hearing, the [Appellate Court] marked the
    matter over and ordered the parties to brief whether
    the defendant’s appeal from the March 14, 2011 judg-
    ment was an appeal from a final judgment. Both parties
    subsequently briefed the issue and argued the issue as
    part of this appeal.’’ (Footnotes altered.) 
    Id.,
     550–51.
    The Appellate Court subsequently dismissed the
    defendant’s appeal for lack of a final judgment pursuant
    to § 52-263. See id., 552–54. The Appellate Court noted
    that, in Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 
    208 Conn. 522
    –23,
    this court held that ‘‘ ‘a judgment on the merits is final
    for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability
    or amount of attorney’s fees for the litigation remains
    to be determined.’ ’’ Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 
    142 Conn. App. 552
    . The Appellate Court then relied, however, on
    its subsequent decision in Lord v. Mansfield, supra, 
    50 Conn. App. 21
    , which ‘‘distinguished the reimbursement
    of attorney’s fees from the awarding of punitive dam-
    ages. Punitive damages . . . serve the purpose of vindi-
    cating the public interest and deterring others from
    committing similar wrongs. . . . This court held that
    an appeal taken prior to a determination by the trial
    court as to the recoverability and amount of punitive
    damages was not an appeal from a final judgment.’’
    (Citation omitted.) Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 552; see
    also id., 550 (‘‘this court does not have subject matter
    jurisdiction to decide an appeal prior to a determination
    by the trial court of the recoverability and amount of
    punitive damages; a judgment is final only after such
    a determination is made’’). The Appellate Court then
    concluded that, because the trial court’s award of attor-
    ney’s fees was not made pursuant to an authorizing
    statute, but rather, was ‘‘explicitly called . . . punitive
    damages, its manifest intention was to award the plain-
    tiff punitive damages.’’ Id., 554. Accordingly, the Appel-
    late Court followed Lord and dismissed the defendant’s
    appeal for lack of a final judgment. Id. This certified
    appeal followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.
    On appeal, the defendant argues that the Appellate
    Court improperly dismissed his appeal for lack of a
    final judgment. Specifically, he relies on this court’s
    endorsement of bright line rules in the final judgment
    context in Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 
    208 Conn. 522
    –
    23, as explained in Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 
    245 Conn. 495
    , 498–500, 
    715 A.2d 743
     (1998). The defendant con-
    tends that there was a final judgment in this case
    because all that remained for the trial court to do was
    set the amount of attorney’s fees, despite the fact that
    those fees were awarded in the context of common-
    law punitive damages rather than pursuant to a
    statute. The defendant further contends that the deci-
    sion that controlled this case before the Appellate
    Court, Lord v. Mansfield, supra, 
    50 Conn. App. 23
    –28,
    was wrongly decided. He argues that Lord is inconsis-
    tent with Paranteau and Benvenuto because the case-
    by-case determination regarding the finality of judg-
    ments in Lord, which depends on whether an attorney’s
    fees order is compensatory and integral to the judgment
    on the merits or collateral in nature, spawns confusion.
    In response, the plaintiff notes the policy behind the
    final judgment rule, namely, discouraging piecemeal
    litigation, and relies on the doctrinal distinction
    between attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to a statute
    and those awarded as punitive damages, in arguing that
    the Appellate Court properly followed Lord in dismiss-
    ing the defendant’s appeal.5 We agree with the defendant,
    and conclude that an appealable final judgment existed
    when this appeal was filed, despite the fact that the
    trial court had not yet determined the amount of the
    attorney’s fees that comprised its common-law punitive
    damages award.
    ‘‘As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard
    of review. The lack of a final judgment implicates the
    subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear
    an appeal. A determination regarding . . . subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction is a question of law . . . [and, there-
    fore] our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Khan v. Hillyer, 
    306 Conn. 205
    , 209, 
    49 A.3d 996
     (2012).
    ‘‘The right of appeal is accorded only if the conditions
    fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and
    prosecuting the appeal are met. . . . It is . . . axiom-
    atic that, except insofar as the legislature has specifi-
    cally provided for an interlocutory appeal or other form
    of interlocutory appellate review . . . appellate juris-
    diction is limited to final judgments of the trial court.
    General Statutes § 52-263 . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Jamar D., 
    300 Conn. 764
    , 770,
    
    18 A.3d 582
     (2011).
    It is well settled that a ‘‘judgment rendered only upon
    the issue of liability without an award of damages is
    interlocutory in character and not a final judgment from
    which an appeal lies.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 
    294 Conn. 280
    , 297, 
    984 A.2d 658
     (2009); see also, e.g., Balf Co. v. Spera Con-
    struction Co., 
    222 Conn. 211
    , 212, 
    608 A.2d 682
     (1992);
    Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 
    197 Conn. 82
    ,
    84, 
    495 A.2d 1063
     (1985). Nevertheless, ‘‘a judgment on
    the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though
    the recoverability or amount of attorney’s fees for the
    litigation remains to be determined.’’ Paranteau v.
    DeVita, supra, 
    208 Conn. 523
    .
    In concluding that a judgment of the trial court award-
    ing common-law punitive damages limited to attorney’s
    fees is final, despite the fact that the court has not yet
    determined the amount of those fees, we begin with a
    review of the leading case, Paranteau v. DeVita, supra,
    
    208 Conn. 515
    . In Paranteau, this court considered
    whether an appealable final judgment existed when a
    trial court found that the defendant, a landlord, had
    violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
    (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and
    granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees pursu-
    ant to the authorizing statute, General Statutes § 42-
    110g (d), ‘‘but delay[ed] the determination of their
    amount.’’ Id., 517. In holding that this judgment was final
    for purposes of appeal,6 this court followed Budinich v.
    Becton Dickinson & Co., 
    486 U.S. 196
    , 
    108 S. Ct. 1717
    ,
    
    100 L. Ed. 2d 178
     (1988),7 which had resolved a split in
    federal authority on point in favor of the majority view,
    which was ‘‘a bright line approach which obviates the
    need for individual case review through the implemen-
    tation of a uniform rule stating that an unresolved issue
    of attorney’s fees does not prevent judgment on the
    merits from being final and immediately appealable.’’8
    Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 520. This court agreed with
    the United States Supreme Court that a ‘‘bright line rule
    provides notice that decisions on the merits and those
    on attorney’s fees will be treated separately, giving clear
    guidance as to when an appeal on the merits must be
    taken. We do not believe the timeliness of an appeal
    should be based upon retrospective, technical consider-
    ations of whether a particular supplemental postjudg-
    ment claim for attorney’s fees was collateral to, or an
    integral part of, the judgment on the merits. Such a
    case-by-case approach promotes, rather than elimi-
    nates, uncertainty as to when an appeal on the merits
    must be taken.’’9 Id., 522–23. Thus, this court concluded
    that ‘‘a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of
    appeal even though the recoverability or amount of
    attorney’s fees for the litigation remains to be deter-
    mined.’’10 Id., 523.
    Subsequently, this court decided Benvenuto v. Maha-
    jan, supra, 
    245 Conn. 500
    , wherein it considered
    whether the Appellate Court’s position that ‘‘without
    a determination of the amount of the attorney’s fees, a
    judgment of strict foreclosure does not constitute
    a final appealable judgment,’’11 was consistent with
    Paranteau. This court ‘‘acknowledge[d] the analytical
    appeal of the position of the Appellate Court. In a strict
    foreclosure case, until the amount of attorney’s fees is
    set by the court, the total amount of the debt is not
    fully determined, and any party wishing to redeem on
    his or her law day will not know precisely how much
    to pay in order to do so. That reasoning argues with
    considerable persuasiveness for a conclusion that, in
    such a case, there is no final judgment for purposes of
    appeal until attorney’s fees are determined. Thus, a
    judgment of strict foreclosure that does not contain a
    determination of attorney’s fees does not fit comfort-
    ably with traditional notions of finality.’’ Id., 501. Never-
    theless, this court concluded in Benvenuto ‘‘that the
    bright line rule that we articulated in Paranteau applies
    as well to a strict foreclosure case. First, that is ordi-
    narily what having a bright line test means: it applies
    across the board, even to cases that might not seem
    particularly apt for it. Thus, it attempts to relieve the
    parties who must live under it from the task of determin-
    ing on a case-by-case basis when it applies and when
    it does not.’’ Id.
    Significantly, in Benvenuto, this court expressly
    rejected a narrow reading of the bright line rule of
    Paranteau ‘‘to apply only to those claims for attorney’s
    fees that arise in postjudgment proceedings, such as
    are contemplated by CUTPA, the statute at issue in
    that case.’’ Id., 502. Instead, this court emphasized the
    ‘‘advantages of having and applying a bright line rule
    regarding whether an outstanding determination of
    attorney’s fees undermines the finality of a judgment
    on the merits that is otherwise final,’’ observing that
    ‘‘[t]here are numerous contexts in which attorney’s fees
    may be awarded, including foreclosure actions, actions
    on notes or other contracts with attorney’s fees clauses,
    and statutory claims that carry with them the potential
    for an award of attorney’s fees. In Paranteau, we recog-
    nized that in some cases the fees would be integral to
    the judgment on the merits and in others they would
    be collateral to it. . . . By opting for a bright line rule,
    we implicitly recognized that there would be some
    cases—indeed, this is such a case—in which the appli-
    cation of the bright line rule would mean that an attor-
    ney’s fees award that would otherwise be considered
    integral to the judgment on the merits would neverthe-
    less be severable from that judgment for purposes of
    finality.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id. The court also noted
    that ‘‘reading Paranteau narrowly, so as to apply only
    to a ‘supplemental postjudgment claim for attorney’s
    fees’ . . . would require the court and parties in each
    case to determine whether the claim fit within that
    category. That necessity would significantly reduce the
    value of having a bright line rule, which consists largely
    of the rule’s clarity and, therefore, its efficiency for both
    the court and the parties.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id.,
    502–503.
    In contrast to Benvenuto, in Balf Co. v. Spera Con-
    struction Co., 
    supra,
     
    222 Conn. 211
    , this court consid-
    ered whether an appealable final judgment existed
    under Paranteau when the trial court had awarded
    damages, but not yet ruled on the plaintiff’s claim of
    entitlement to prejudgment interest. The court followed
    the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oster-
    neck v. Ernst & Whinney, 
    489 U.S. 169
    , 175–77, 
    109 S. Ct. 987
    , 
    103 L. Ed. 2d 146
     (1989), and held that there
    was no appealable final judgment when the trial court
    had not yet ruled on a postjudgment motion for discre-
    tionary prejudgment interest because, first, ‘‘unlike
    attorney’s fees, which at common law were regarded
    as an element of costs and therefore not part of the
    merits judgment . . . prejudgment interest tradition-
    ally has been considered part of the compensation due
    [the] plaintiff. Second, unlike a request for attorney’s
    fees or a motion for costs, a motion for discretionary
    prejudgment interest does not rais[e] issues wholly
    collateral to the judgment in the main cause of action
    . . . nor does it require an inquiry wholly separate
    from the decision on the merits . . . . In deciding if
    and how much prejudgment interest should be granted,
    a district court must examine—or in the case of a
    postjudgment motion, reexamine—matters encom-
    passed within the merits of the underlying action.
    . . . Third, the conclusion that a postjudgment motion
    for discretionary prejudgment interest postpones the
    finality of a judgment on the merits helps further the
    important goal of avoiding piecemeal appellate review
    of judgments.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Balf Co. v. Spera
    Construction Co., 
    supra,
     214–15.
    This court’s treatment of Paranteau in Benvenuto
    and Balf Co. leads us to conclude that an appealable
    final judgment existed when the defendant filed the
    present appeal, despite the fact that the trial court had
    not yet determined the amount of the attorney’s fees
    that would comprise the common-law punitive damages
    award. In Benvenuto, this court expressly rejected a
    narrow reading of Paranteau’s bright line rule that
    would have limited its application to postjudgment
    claims for attorney’s fees; instead, the court extended it
    to the strict foreclosure situation wherein the attorney’s
    fees for the action are squarely part of the total debt
    amount subject to redemption. Benvenuto v. Mahajan,
    supra, 
    245 Conn. 502
    –503. Indeed, this court squarely
    rejected a distinction between attorney’s fees integral
    to a judgment on the merits, and those that are more
    collateral in nature. See id., 502. This practically ori-
    ented conclusion is consistent with the fact that the
    calculation of the attorney’s fees to be awarded in the
    present case as common-law punitive damages derives
    from evidence separate and apart from the merits of
    the case—in contrast to the prejudgment interest at
    issue in Balf Co., where the determination of the amount
    of prejudgment interest was squarely encompassed
    within the damages determined in the main cause of
    action. Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co., 
    supra,
     
    222 Conn. 214
    –15. Thus, we agree with the United States
    Supreme Court that the final judgment ‘‘effect of an
    unresolved issue of attorney’s fees for the litigation at
    hand should not turn upon the characterization of those
    fees by the statute or decisional law that authorizes
    them.’’ Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 
    supra,
     
    486 U.S. 201
    .
    To this end, the plaintiff proffers no reasons, and we
    cannot conceive of any, why the benefits of the bright
    line rule articulated in Paranteau do not apply equally
    in the context of common-law punitive damages, which
    are limited under Connecticut law to litigation
    expenses, such as attorney’s fees less taxable costs.
    See, e.g., Berry v. Loiseau, 
    223 Conn. 786
    , 827, 
    614 A.2d 414
     (1992). The assessment a court is required to make
    in order to award punitive damages is identical to the
    assessment required in any other matter involving a
    common-law, contractual, or statutory basis for depar-
    ture from the ‘‘American rule,’’ which is the general
    principle ‘‘that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses
    and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the success-
    ful party . . . .’’12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co.,
    
    282 Conn. 576
    , 582, 
    923 A.2d 697
     (2007). Indeed, com-
    mon-law punitive damages are akin to statutorily
    authorized attorney’s fees in practicality and purpose,
    insofar as both ‘‘provide the same relief and serve the
    same function’’;13 Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 
    275 Conn. 72
    , 99–100, 
    881 A.2d 139
     (2005); namely, fully
    compensating injured parties.14 Berry v. Loiseau, supra,
    827; see also Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra,
    97–98 (characterizing double damages under General
    Statutes § 31-72 as more punitive in nature than com-
    mon-law punitive damages); Schoonmaker v. Lawrence
    Brunoli, Inc., 
    265 Conn. 210
    , 273, 
    828 A.2d 64
     (2003)
    (‘‘[a]s long as the court awards attorney’s fees that are
    sufficient to cover a plaintiff’s financial obligations to
    his or her attorney, such as an existing contingency fee
    agreement, the employee still will be made whole by
    the award of double damages’’). Thus, our ‘‘practical
    approach to the matter suggests that what is of impor-
    tance here is not preservation of conceptual consis-
    tency in the status of a particular fee authorization
    as ‘merits’ or ‘nonmerits,’ but rather preservation of
    operational consistency and predictability in the overall
    application of [the final judgment rule].’’ Budinich v.
    Becton Dickinson & Co., supra, 
    486 U.S. 202
    . Accord-
    ingly, we conclude that an appealable final judgment
    existed when all that remained for the trial court to
    do was determine the amount of the attorney’s fees
    comprising the common-law punitive damages that it
    previously had awarded.15
    This brings us, then, to a determination of the vitality
    of the Appellate Court’s decision in Lord v. Mansfield,
    supra, 
    50 Conn. App. 21
    , on which that court was bound
    to rely in the present case,16 which held that a judgment
    was not final for purposes of appeal when the trial court
    had not yet determined the prevailing party’s litigation
    expenses for purposes of calculating common-law puni-
    tive damages. See Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 
    142 Conn. App. 552
    –53. In our view, the Appellate Court’s conclu-
    sion in Lord is particularly inconsistent with this court’s
    heavy emphasis on the benefits of bright lines in the
    final judgment context in Benvenuto v. Mahajan, supra,
    
    245 Conn. 495
    , a decision published shortly before the
    release of Lord, but not cited therein.17 Finally, in relying
    on this court’s decision in Balf Co. v. Spera Construc-
    tion Co., supra, 
    222 Conn. 211
    , which had held that
    there was no final judgment when the trial court had
    not yet awarded prejudgment interest, the Appellate
    Court in Lord placed improper emphasis on the doc-
    trinal source for a statutory award of attorney’s fees,
    in contrast to what it deemed to be the compensatory
    and more integral purpose of common-law punitive
    damages. See Lord v. Mansfield, supra, 25–28. This
    distinction failed to consider the common purpose and
    effect of both statutory attorney’s fees and common-
    law punitive damages, namely, to ensure the full com-
    pensation of plaintiffs in mitigation of the effects of the
    American rule. See, e.g., Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald &
    Co., supra, 
    275 Conn. 99
    –100; Berry v. Loiseau, supra,
    
    223 Conn. 827
    . Insofar as the analysis in Lord amounts
    to a triumph of form over substance, we conclude that
    it was wrongly decided and, accordingly, overrule it.
    The Appellate Court, therefore, improperly dismissed
    the defendant’s appeal for lack of a final judgment.
    The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
    the case is remanded to that court with direction to
    consider the merits of the defendant’s claims on appeal.
    In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER and
    EVELEIGH, Js., concurred.
    1
    General Statutes § 52-263 provides: ‘‘Upon the trial of all matters of fact
    in any cause or action in the Superior Court, whether to the court or jury,
    or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding
    is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or
    judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial, including
    the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict, he may appeal to the court
    having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of such judge,
    or from the decision of the court granting a motion to set aside a verdict,
    except in small claims cases, which shall not be appealable, and appeals
    as provided in sections 8-8 and 8-9.’’
    2
    ‘‘The other defendant named in the complaint, Progressive Electric &
    Telecommunications, LLC, was defaulted for failure to appear and for failure
    to appear at trial. Accordingly, we refer in this opinion to . . . Gunter as
    the defendant.’’ Hylton v. Gunter, 
    142 Conn. App. 548
    , 550 n.1, 
    66 A.3d 517
    (2013) (per curiam).
    3
    We granted the defendant’s petition for certification limited to the follow-
    ing issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the . . . defendant’s
    appeal for lack of a final judgment?’’ Hylton v. Gunter, 
    309 Conn. 908
    , 
    68 A.3d 663
     (2013).
    4
    The Appellate Court noted that ‘‘the plaintiff, in his complaint, requested
    punitive damages as relief in only two of the relevant counts, those alleging
    civil theft and fraud. The court awarded punitive damages on four counts.
    That determination has not been challenged in this appeal.’’ Hylton v. Gunter,
    supra, 
    142 Conn. App. 551
     n.4.
    5
    The plaintiff puts great stock in the fact that this court denied a petition
    for certification to review the Appellate Court’s decision in Lord. See Lord
    v. Mansfield, supra, 
    247 Conn. 943
    . This reliance is, however, misplaced
    because it is well established that the ‘‘denial of a petition for certification
    to appeal does not signify that this court approves of or affirms the decision
    or judgment of the Appellate Court.’’ Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment
    Co., 
    298 Conn. 620
    , 653, 
    6 A.3d 60
     (2010).
    6
    The final judgment issue in Paranteau arose in the context of determining
    the timeliness of the defendant’s appeal, which was filed within twenty days
    after the trial court’s subsequent ‘‘order determining the amount of attorney’s
    fees to be awarded the plaintiffs, but more than twenty days after the trial
    court’s judgment on the merits.’’ Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 
    208 Conn. 519
    .
    Because the court concluded that an appealable final judgment existed when
    the trial court rendered judgment on the merits without determining the
    amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded under CUTPA, it also concluded
    that the defendant’s appeal, filed more than twenty days after that judgment,
    was untimely. Id., 523. The court then concluded that the attorney’s fee
    determination is an order that ‘‘may raise a collateral and independent claim
    that is separately appealable as a final judgment. . . . Thus, that portion
    of the defendant’s . . . appeal challenging the fee award was timely filed
    . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 523–24.
    7
    See also Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Interna-
    tional Union of Operating Engineers & Participating Employers,                 U.S.
    , 
    134 S. Ct. 773
    , 777, 
    187 L. Ed. 2d 669
     (2014) (extending Budinich bright
    line final judgment rule from attorney’s fees based on statute to those
    awarded pursuant to contractual provisions).
    8
    In contrast, this court noted that the federal ‘‘minority view favors analyz-
    ing each case individually to determine whether attorney’s fees were ‘collat-
    eral’ to the main cause of action, in which case they would not preclude
    the finality and appealability of a judgment on the merits, or whether the
    fees were an ‘integral part’ of the merits of the case, thus requiring their
    determination before judgment could be deemed final for purposes of
    appeal.’’ Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 
    208 Conn. 520
    .
    9
    In adopting the bright line rule, the court also observed that, ‘‘[f]rom
    the standpoint of efficient judicial administration . . . a bright line rule is
    far superior to the case-by-case approach’’ given the fact that, ‘‘because it
    has jurisdictional consequences, the time of appealability should above all
    be clear.’’ Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 
    208 Conn. 522
    . Subsequent case law,
    however, has ‘‘clarified that the twenty day time period for filing an appeal,
    as provided by Practice Book § 63-1 . . . is not subject matter jurisdictional.
    See Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 
    226 Conn. 757
    , 762–63,
    
    628 A.2d 1303
     (1993).’’ Benvenuto v. Mahajan, supra, 
    245 Conn. 502
    .
    10
    The court acknowledged that this bright line rule ‘‘may, in some cases,
    lead to ‘piecemeal’ appeals of judgments on the merits and awards of attor-
    ney’s fees. The problem of fragmented appeals, however, may be averted
    if trial judges delay rendering judgment on the merits until the fee issue is
    resolved and dispose of both the merits and attorney’s fees in a single
    judgment. . . . If for some reason the question of attorney’s fees must be
    decided after the entry of judgment on the merits, we suggest that the trial
    court insist upon the prompt filing and disposition of fee requests so that
    any pending appeal on the merits of the action may be amended to include
    any prospective appeal from a supplemental postjudgment award of attor-
    ney’s fees.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Paranteau v. DeVita,
    supra, 
    208 Conn. 524
    .
    11
    This court cited, as an example of the Appellate Court’s position, Con-
    necticut National Bank v. L & R Realty, 
    40 Conn. App. 492
    , 
    671 A.2d 1315
    (1996). Benvenuto v. Mahajan, supra, 
    245 Conn. 500
    .
    12
    In arguing that there is no final judgment in this case, the dissent observes
    that litigation costs and attorney’s fees are distinct items when awarded
    pursuant to statute, but both are components of common-law punitive dam-
    ages, with litigation costs being potentially substantial in amount. See, e.g.,
    Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 
    193 Conn. 237
    –38; see also Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 
    131 Conn. App. 99
    , 169, 
    30 A.3d 703
     (plaintiff awarded punitive damages in
    amount of $210,039, consisting of $54,600 in attorney’s fees and $155,439
    in costs), cert. granted, 
    303 Conn. 904
    , 
    31 A.3d 1179
     (2011) (appeal withdrawn
    January 27, 2012). We respectfully suggest that, for final judgment purposes,
    there is no significant difference, because the calculation of both attorney’s
    fees and litigation costs derives from evidence that is collateral to that
    considered in the main cause of action. See, e.g., Benvenuto v. Mahajan,
    supra, 
    245 Conn. 502
    –503.
    13
    We emphasize that our conclusion in this case is limited to those com-
    mon-law punitive damages that compensate a party for the expenses of
    litigating his claim for damages; attorney’s fees that themselves form the
    basis of a plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages, such as those occa-
    sioned by an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend, are conceptually different
    and must be established in order to have an appealable final judgment.
    See R. Crummins, ‘‘Judgment on the Merits Leaving Attorney’s Fees Issues
    Undecided: A Final Judgment?,’’ 
    56 Fordham L. Rev. 487
    , 499–500 (1987);
    accord Broadnax v. New Haven, 
    supra,
     
    294 Conn. 297
     (no final judgment
    when determination postponed on valuation of front pay and lost pension
    value claims because their ‘‘resolution . . . was a necessary predicate to
    the finality of the judgment . . . because the claims seek compensation for
    the alleged wrongful conduct of the defendants, which depend[s] upon an
    assessment of the underlying merits of the transaction between the parties’’
    [internal quotation marks omitted]); ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York
    Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 
    282 Conn. 593
    –94 (noting distinction between
    insured’s recoverability of attorney’s fees incurred in defending underlying
    action, and those incurred in declaratory judgment action, which require
    policyholder to establish bad faith conduct on part of insurer or statutory
    or contractual basis for award).
    14
    By way of background, we note that: ‘‘To furnish a basis for recovery
    of punitive damages, the pleadings must allege and the evidence must show
    wanton or wilful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the
    pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing
    counsel that such damages are being sought. . . . If awarded, punitive dam-
    ages are limited to the costs of litigation less taxable costs, but, within that
    limitation, the extent to which they are awarded is in the sole discretion of
    the trier. . . . Limiting punitive damages to litigation expenses, including
    attorney’s fees, fulfills the salutary purpose of fully compensating a victim
    for the harm inflicted on him while avoiding the potential for injustice which
    may result from the exercise of unfettered discretion by a jury. . . . We
    have long held that in a claim for damages proof of the expenses paid or
    incurred affords some evidence of the value of the services, and if unreason-
    ableness in amount does not appear from other evidence or through applica-
    tion of the trier’s general knowledge of the [subject matter], its
    reasonableness will be presumed.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 
    270 Conn. 291
    ,
    335–36, 
    852 A.2d 703
     (2004); but cf. Berry v. Loiseau, supra, 
    223 Conn. 827
    (common-law punitive damages, ‘‘when viewed in the light of the increasing
    costs of litigation, also [serve] to punish and deter wrongful conduct’’).
    We also note that, against the backdrop of our ‘‘conservative’’ measure
    of common-law punitive damages, ‘‘the legislature has authorized punitive
    damage awards for certain causes of action. These statutes fall into three
    categories: (1) those that limit the amount of the award to no more than
    two times the actual damages incurred; (2) those that designate a specific,
    albeit modest, dollar limit for such awards; and (3) those that authorize
    punitive damages, but leave the amount of the award to the discretion
    of the court.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v.
    MemberWorks, Inc., 
    273 Conn. 634
    , 672, 
    872 A.2d 423
     (Zarella, J., dissenting),
    cert. denied sub nom. Vertrue, Inc. v. MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc.,
    
    546 U.S. 960
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 479
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 363
     (2005). Punitive damages
    under these statutes, particularly under statutes that provide for awards of
    fees and costs in addition to punitive damages like CUTPA; see General
    Statutes § 42-110g; are distinct from common-law punitive damages because
    they ‘‘are not intended merely to compensate the plaintiff for the harm
    caused by the defendant but, rather, serve a broader, twofold purpose. First,
    they foster private enforcement of unfair trade practices by providing a
    reasonable incentive to litigate. . . . Second, they deter the defendant and
    others from engaging in future violations of CUTPA.’’ (Citation omitted.)
    Vertrue, Inc. v. MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc., supra, 673; see also
    Ulbrich v. Groth, 
    310 Conn. 375
    , 450–51, 
    78 A.3d 76
     (2013) (discussing
    relationship between common-law punitive damages and those awarded
    under CUTPA).
    15
    In arguing that a final judgment does not exist in this case, wherein
    common-law punitive damages have been awarded, but not yet calculated,
    the dissent notes the substantive proof required to justify the award; see
    footnote 14 of this opinion; and contends that ‘‘a challenge to an award of
    punitive damages often will relate directly to the merits of the action.’’ We
    agree with the dissent with respect to the nature of the proof necessary to
    justify an award of common-law punitive damages in the first instance, and
    emphasize that our conclusion that a final judgment exists is limited to
    cases like this one, wherein common-law punitive damages have been
    awarded, and all that remains for the trial court to do is to find the amount
    of that award.
    We also note that statutory punitive damage awards, which in many cases
    may be awarded in addition to attorney’s fees and costs; see authorities
    cited in footnote 12 of this opinion; present unique final judgment considera-
    tions not present in this case. See Perkins v. Colonial Cemeteries, Inc., 
    53 Conn. App. 646
    , 649, 
    734 A.2d 1010
     (1999) (no final judgment when jury has
    found liability under CUTPA, but before trial court has decided whether to
    award punitive damages, given that, under CUTPA, ‘‘courts generally award
    punitive damages in amounts equal to actual damages or multiples of the
    actual damages, the rights of the parties may be substantially affected by
    the further proceedings that remain in this case’’).
    16
    We acknowledge that, under the Appellate Court’s well established
    policy, its three judge panel in this case was bound to apply Lord v. Mans-
    field, supra, 
    50 Conn. App. 21
    . See, e.g., Boccanfuso v. Conner, 
    89 Conn. App. 260
    , 285 n.20, 
    873 A.2d 208
     (‘‘[T]his court’s policy dictates that one
    panel should not, on its own, reverse the ruling of a previous panel. The
    reversal may be accomplished only if the appeal is heard en banc.’’ [Internal
    quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 
    275 Conn. 905
    , 
    882 A.2d 668
     (2005).
    17
    The Appellate Court’s decision in Lord was released on August 25, 1998;
    Lord v. Mansfield, supra, 
    50 Conn. App. 22
    ; this court’s decision in Benvenuto
    was released on July 21, 1998. Benvenuto v. Mahajan, supra, 
    245 Conn. 495
    .