State v. Frilando ( 1980 )

Cotter, C. J.

On this appeal the defendant challenges his conviction on two counts of larceny in the third degree as set forth in the substitute information. He was also convicted of two counts of burglary. He attacks the validity of the conviction in the Perine larceny, the first count in the information, claiming that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “that the value of the goods taken exceeded $50.00.” He also claims that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the method of determining the value of the property he took from the homes of the victims Perine and McDonough. See General Statutes § 53a-121 (a) (1). The sentences imposed on the four counts run concurrently.

The evidence offered as to the Perine personal property consisted of five rings, two necklaces, one set of earrings and one gold stud earring. Whitcliff Gill, a professional jeweler of some twenty years of experience, appraised each of these items individually and testified that in his opinion the total fair market value as of the end of November 1978 was $735. The individual appraisals ranged from a three strand necklace valued at $250 to a gold stud earring valued at $5 and included Mrs. Perine’s dinner ring valued at $175. He also testified that as of December 28, 1977, the date of the larceny, the valuation would have to be reduced by 20 percent or to a total of $588 to account for the fluctuation in the price of gold. He felt that based upon his twenty years of experience he could determine the value of a piece of jewelry by just looking at it. This testimony, if believed, was sufficient to establish that the value of the items stolen far exceeded $50, the flash point for larceny in the third degree. To hold otherwise is to defy both common sense and legal reasoning. The process of valuation at best is a matter of approximation. National Folding Box Co. v. New Haven, 146 Conn. 578, 586, 153 A.2d 420 (1959).

The evidence introduced as to the McDonough personal property, which is the subject of the fourth count of the information, satisfied the burden of proof necessary for a conviction. The testimony of the owner as to the cost of a television set purchased about a week before the larceny can be considered evidence of its value. State v. Baker, 182 Conn. 52, 63, 437 A.2d 83 (1980); Devinne Hallenbeck Co. v. Autoyre Co., 113 Conn. 97, 101, 154 A. 170 (1931); see Filosi v. Crossman, 111 Conn. 178, 185, 149 A. 774 (1930). The aggregate value of the items taken from the McDonough residence exceeded $50. General Statutes § 53a-124 (a) (1).

We reject the defendant’s second claim of error. “The expressions actual value, market value, or market price, when applied to any article, mean the same thing. They mean the price or value of the article established or shown by sales public or private in the way of ordinary business.” Sanford v. Peck, 63 Conn. 486, 493, 27 A. 1057 (1893); see also National Folding Box Co. v. New Haven, supra, 584. Thus the omission of the statutory definition of “value” from the charge could not have reasonably misled the jury especially since the expert witness phrased his appraisal in terms of that definition—“the market value ... at the time and place of the crime.” State v. Baker, supra, 64; State v. Rose, 169 Conn. 683, 688, 363 A.2d 1077 (1975). Because the charge as given did not deprive the defendant of a fundamental right or a fair trial, his failure to ask for an instruction on the statutory definition of “value” or to take exception to its omission leads us to find no error. State v. Baker, supra.

There is no error.

In this opinion Peters, Healey and Parskey, Js., concurred.