Cefaratti v. Aranow ( 2016 )


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    LISA J. CEFARATTI v. JONATHAN S. ARANOW ET AL.
    (SC 19444)
    Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and
    Vertefeuille, Js.
    Argued January 21—officially released June 14, 2016
    Ellen M. Costello, for the appellants (named defen-
    dant et al.).
    Kelly E. Reardon, with whom, on the brief, was
    Robert I. Reardon, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    ROGERS, C. J. The issue that we must resolve in
    this certified appeal is whether the plaintiff’s medical
    malpractice action is barred by the statute of limitations
    or, instead, the statute of limitations was tolled under
    the continuing course of treatment doctrine. The plain-
    tiff, Lisa J. Cefaratti, brought this action against the
    defendants, Jonathan S. Aranow, Shoreline Surgical
    Associates, P.C. (Shoreline), and Middlesex Hospital
    (Middlesex), alleging that Aranow had left a surgical
    sponge in the plaintiff’s abdominal cavity during gastric
    bypass surgery. She further alleged that Middlesex was
    both directly liable for its own negligence and vicari-
    ously liable for Aranow’s negligence, and Shoreline was
    vicariously liable for Aranow’s negligence.1 Thereafter,
    Middlesex filed a motion for summary judgment claim-
    ing, among other things, that the claims against it were
    barred by the applicable statute of limitations, General
    Statutes § 52-584.2 Aranow and Shoreline subsequently
    filed a joint motion for summary judgment raising the
    same claim. The trial court concluded that the direct
    claims against Aranow and Middlesex were barred by
    the statute of limitations and, therefore, the derivative
    claims against Middlesex and Shoreline were also
    barred. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment
    for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed to the
    Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the
    trial court on the ground that there was a genuine issue
    of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations
    had been tolled by the continuing course of treatment
    doctrine.3 Cefaratti v. Aranow, 
    154 Conn. App. 1
    , 22,
    
    105 A.3d 265
    (2014). We then granted Aranow and
    Shoreline’s petition for certification to appeal from that
    ruling, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate
    Court properly apply the ‘continuing course of treat-
    ment’ doctrine in determining what constitutes an ‘iden-
    tifiable medical condition’ under that doctrine?’’4
    Cefaratti v. Aranow, 
    315 Conn. 919
    , 919–20, 
    107 A.3d 960
    (2015). We answer that question in the affirmative
    and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate
    Court.
    The record, which we view in the light most favorable
    to the plaintiff for purposes of reviewing the trial court’s
    rendering of summary judgment, reveals the following
    facts and procedural history. On December 8, 2003,
    after having diagnosed the plaintiff as being morbidly
    obese, Aranow performed gastric bypass surgery on
    the plaintiff at Middlesex. Thereafter, the plaintiff had
    follow-up appointments with Aranow on January 14,
    2004, May 11, 2004, October 22, 2004, May 10, 2005,
    November 16, 2005, December 17, 2007 and March 20,
    2009. The plaintiff testified at her deposition that, start-
    ing approximately one year after her surgery, she began
    to experience uncomfortable sensations in her abdo-
    men. She described the sensations as follows: ‘‘When
    [the sponge] was in there it was so large that I could
    barely bend over without it getting caught on my ribs
    and the pain was very, very intense. I felt like I was
    carrying a child in my abdomen.’’ She further stated
    that she felt that ‘‘something was pushing out . . . and
    it felt like somebody was stabbing me . . . . [W]hen-
    ever I had to have a bowel movement it felt like some-
    body was twisting something inside of me . . . .’’ The
    plaintiff testified that she described these sensations
    exactly to Aranow at every appointment, except per-
    haps the first two.5
    On August 6, 2009, after being diagnosed with breast
    cancer by another physician, the plaintiff underwent
    a computerized tomography (CT) scan of her chest,
    abdomen and pelvis. The CT scan revealed the presence
    of foreign material in the plaintiff’s abdominal cavity.
    On September 9, 2009, the plaintiff met with Aranow,
    who informed her that the object in her abdominal
    cavity was a surgical sponge. After the sponge was
    surgically removed, she no longer had the sensations
    of having something caught on her ribs and of carrying
    a child.6
    On August 18, 2010, the plaintiff brought a medical
    malpractice action alleging that Aranow had negligently
    failed to remove the surgical sponge from her abdomi-
    nal cavity during the gastric bypass surgery, and that
    Middlesex and Shoreline were both directly liable for
    their own negligence and vicariously liable for Aranow’s
    negligence. Thereafter, Middlesex filed a motion for
    summary judgment claiming that, because the plaintiff
    had not brought the action within the three year statute
    of repose provided for in § 52-284,7 the action was
    barred. The defendants filed a separate motion for sum-
    mary judgment raising the same claim. The plaintiff
    opposed the motions, claiming, among other things, that
    the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuing
    course of treatment doctrine.
    The trial court observed in its memorandum of deci-
    sion that, to establish the elements of the continuing
    course of treatment doctrine, the plaintiff was required
    to prove: ‘‘(1) that . . . she had an identified medical
    condition that required ongoing treatment or monitor-
    ing; (2) that the defendant provided ongoing treatment
    or monitoring of that medical condition after the alleg-
    edly negligent conduct, or that the plaintiff reasonably
    could have anticipated that the defendant would do so;
    and (3) that the plaintiff brought the action within the
    appropriate statutory period after the date that treat-
    ment terminated.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Grey v. Stam-
    ford Health System, Inc., 
    282 Conn. 745
    , 754–55, 
    924 A.2d 831
    (2007). The trial court concluded that the iden-
    tified medical condition at issue in the present case
    was the sponge in the plaintiff’s abdomen and, because
    the plaintiff did not know about that condition, she
    could not have sought treatment for it. Accordingly, it
    concluded that the doctrine did not apply and the action
    was, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations, enti-
    tling the defendants to summary judgment.
    The plaintiff appealed from the judgment to the
    Appellate Court. The Appellate Court concluded that
    the plaintiff’s morbid obesity was an identified medical
    condition for purposes of the continuing course of treat-
    ment doctrine and that there was a genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether Aranow had provided ongo-
    ing treatment for that condition. Cefaratti v. 
    Aranow, supra
    , 
    154 Conn. App. 21
    –22. Accordingly, it concluded
    that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
    whether the continuing course of treatment doctrine
    tolled the statute of limitations; 
    id., 22; and
    reversed in
    part the judgment of the trial court. 
    Id., 45. This
    certified appeal followed. The defendants con-
    tend that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined
    that the plaintiff’s morbid obesity was an identified
    medical condition for purposes of the continuing course
    of treatment doctrine. Rather, the defendants contend,
    the plaintiff’s identified medical condition was either
    the retained surgical sponge, for which the plaintiff
    could not have sought treatment because she was
    unaware of it, or the plaintiff’s morbid obesity, which
    was not an identified medical condition for purposes
    of the doctrine because it did not have any connection
    to the injury of which she complained. The plaintiff
    contends that she sought treatment both for her morbid
    obesity and for postoperative complications, such as
    her abdominal discomfort. Accordingly, she contends,
    her abdominal discomfort was an identified medical
    condition for purposes of the doctrine. In turn, the
    defendants respond that this claim fails because the
    plaintiff was required to and did not establish a connec-
    tion between the medical condition for which she
    sought treatment—her abdominal discomfort—and the
    alleged negligence—leaving the sponge in the plaintiff’s
    abdominal cavity. They further contend that, even if
    there is evidence that the sponge caused the plaintiff’s
    abdominal discomfort, the plaintiff cannot prevail
    because she has not alleged or presented evidence that
    Aranow’s continuing failure to diagnose the true cause
    of her discomfort was negligent.
    We conclude that, to establish that there are genuine
    issues of material fact as to whether the continuing
    course of treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limita-
    tions, the plaintiff was required only to present evidence
    that her abdominal discomfort was caused by the
    sponge and that she sought continuing treatment for
    her discomfort from Aranow. We further conclude that
    the plaintiff has established that there is a genuine issue
    of material fact as to whether the doctrine applies.
    ‘‘The standard of review of a trial court’s decision
    granting summary judgment is well established. Prac-
    tice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall
    be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and
    any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
    issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
    a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary
    judgment has the burden of showing the absence of
    any genuine issue of material fact and that the party
    is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant
    the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is ple-
    nary. . . . On appeal, we must determine whether the
    legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally
    and logically correct and whether they find support in
    the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the
    trial court.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 
    262 Conn. 248
    , 253, 
    811 A.2d 1266
    (2002).
    ‘‘[I]n the context of a motion for summary judgment
    based on a statute of limitations special defense, a
    defendant typically meets its initial burden of showing
    the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by dem-
    onstrating that the action had commenced outside of
    the statutory limitation period. . . . When the plaintiff
    asserts that the limitations period has been tolled by
    an equitable exception to the statute of limitations, the
    burden normally shifts to the plaintiff to establish a
    disputed issue of material fact in avoidance of the stat-
    ute.’’ (Citation omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
    America, 
    310 Conn. 304
    , 321, 
    77 A.3d 726
    (2013). Thus,
    in the present case, because there is no dispute that
    the plaintiff filed her complaint after the limitations
    period set forth in § 52-584 had expired, the burden is
    on the plaintiff to establish that there is a genuine issue
    of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations
    was tolled by the continuing course of treatment
    doctrine.
    We begin our analysis with a review of our case law
    involving the continuing course of treatment doctrine.
    ‘‘As a general rule, [t]he [s]tatute of [l]imitations begins
    to run when the breach of duty occurs.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System,
    
    Inc., supra
    , 
    282 Conn. 751
    . ‘‘We have . . . recognized,
    however, that the statute of limitations, in the proper
    circumstances, may be tolled under the continuous
    treatment . . . doctrine, thereby allowing a plaintiff to
    commence his or her lawsuit at a later date.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id. Under that
    doctrine, ‘‘[s]o
    long as the relation of physician and patient continues
    as to the particular injury or malady which [the physi-
    cian] is employed to cure, and the physician continues
    to attend and examine the patient in relation thereto,
    and there is something more to be done by the physician
    in order to effect a cure, it cannot be said that the
    treatment has ceased.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) 
    Id. As we
    have indicated, to establish the elements of
    the continuing course of treatment doctrine, a plaintiff
    is required to prove: ‘‘(1) that he or she had an identified
    medical condition that required ongoing treatment or
    monitoring; (2) that the defendant provided ongoing
    treatment or monitoring of that medical condition after
    the allegedly negligent conduct, or that the plaintiff
    reasonably could have anticipated that the defendant
    would do so; and (3) that the plaintiff brought the action
    within the appropriate statutory period after the date
    that treatment terminated.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) 
    Id., 754–55. To
    constitute an ‘‘identified medical condition’’
    for purposes of the doctrine, the medical condition for
    which the plaintiff received ongoing treatment must be
    connected to the injury of which the plaintiff complains.
    See 
    id., 754 n.6,
    citing Watkins v. Fromm, 
    108 Ohio App. Div
    . 2d 233, 244, 
    488 N.Y.S.2d 768
    (1985) (‘‘continuous
    treatment doctrine applies only to treatment for the
    same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after
    the alleged acts of malpractice, not mere continuity
    of a general physician-patient relationship’’ [internal
    quotation marks omitted]); Miccio v. Gerdis, 
    120 Ohio App. Div
    . 3d 639, 640, 
    990 N.Y.S.2d 863
    (2014) (doctrine
    applies ‘‘where [the physician] treated the patient con-
    tinuously over the relevant time period for symptoms
    that are ultimately traced to [the underlying] condition
    [of which the plaintiff complains]’’).
    With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence
    in the present case. The plaintiff testified that, starting
    approximately one year after the surgery, she developed
    severe abdominal discomfort. She further testified that
    she complained to Aranow of this discomfort at each
    of the subsequent follow-up appointments. Finally, she
    testified that, after the surgical sponge was removed,
    a number of symptoms disappeared.8 On the basis of
    this evidence, we conclude that there are genuine issues
    of material fact as to: (1) whether the plaintiff’s abdomi-
    nal discomfort was caused by the presence of the surgi-
    cal sponge and, therefore, whether it was an ‘‘identified
    medical condition’’ for purposes of the continuing
    course of treatment doctrine; and (2) whether the plain-
    tiff sought continuing treatment for that medical condi-
    tion. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court
    properly determined that there are genuine issues of
    material fact as to whether the continuing course of
    treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations.
    The defendants contend, however, that the doctrine
    does not apply because the plaintiff has not alleged
    that Aranow’s treatment of her after the surgery was
    negligent.9 Specifically, they contend that she has not
    alleged that Aranow negligently failed to discover dur-
    ing the follow-up appointments that a surgical sponge
    had been left in her abdominal cavity during the surgery.
    Thus, the defendants implicitly contend that we should
    adopt the ‘‘single act’’ exception to the continuing
    course of treatment doctrine, under which the doctrine
    does not apply when the plaintiff’s injury was caused
    by a single act of negligence rather than by a continuous
    course of negligent treatment. See Pastchol v. St. Paul
    Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
    326 Ark. 140
    , 146, 
    929 S.W.2d 713
    (1996) (‘‘the continuous treatment doctrine
    becomes relevant when the medical negligence consists
    of a series of negligent acts or, a continuing course
    of improper treatment’’ [emphasis in original; internal
    quotation marks omitted]); Langner v. Simpson, 
    533 N.W.2d 511
    , 522 (Iowa 1995) (‘‘[t]o prevail under the
    continuum of negligent treatment doctrine, the plaintiff
    must show [1] that there was a continuous and unbro-
    ken course of negligent treatment, and [2] that the treat-
    ment was so related as to constitute one continuing
    wrong’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Swang v.
    Hauser, 
    288 Minn. 306
    , 309, 
    180 N.W.2d 187
    (1970) (doc-
    trine does not apply when alleged tort was single act
    and no continued course of treatment could cure or
    relieve it).
    We disagree. Our cases have consistently stated that
    the policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine
    seeks to ‘‘[maintain] the physician/patient relationship
    in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will
    be obtained when the attending physician remains on
    a case from onset to cure.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System, 
    Inc., supra
    ,
    
    282 Conn. 752
    ; Blanchette v. Barrett, 
    229 Conn. 256
    ,
    276, 
    640 A.2d 74
    (1994); Connell v. Colwell, 
    214 Conn. 242
    , 253, 
    571 A.2d 116
    (1990) (same); see also Grey v.
    Stamford Health System, 
    Inc., supra
    , 752 (‘‘[t]he doc-
    trine rests on the premise that it is in the patient’s
    best interest that an ongoing course of treatment be
    continued, rather than interrupted by a lawsuit because
    the doctor not only is in a position to identify and
    correct his or her malpractice, but is best placed to do
    so’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting Nykor-
    chuck v. Henriques, 
    78 N.Y.2d 255
    , 258, 
    577 N.E.2d 1026
    , 
    573 N.Y.S.2d 434
    (1991); Grey v. Stamford Health
    System, 
    Inc., supra
    , 752 (policy underlying doctrine is
    to avoid creating ‘‘a dilemma for the patient, who must
    choose between silently accepting continued corrective
    treatment from the offending physician, with the risk
    that his claim will be time-barred or promptly instituting
    an action, with the risk that the physician-patient rela-
    tionship will be destroyed’’ [internal quotation marks
    omitted]), quoting Rizk v. Cohen, 
    73 N.Y.2d 98
    , 104, 
    535 N.E.2d 282
    , 
    538 N.Y.S.2d 229
    (1989). In addition, we have
    repeatedly recognized that, ‘‘[s]o long as the relation of
    physician and patient continues as to the particular
    injury or malady which [the physician] is employed to
    cure, and the physician continues to attend and examine
    the patient in relation thereto, and there is something
    more to be done by the physician in order to effect a
    cure, it cannot be said that the treatment has ceased.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grey v. Stamford
    Health System, 
    Inc., supra
    , 751; Blanchette v. 
    Barrett, supra
    , 274 (same); see also Giambozi v. Peters, 
    127 Conn. 380
    , 385, 
    16 A.2d 833
    (1940) (‘‘when . . . injuri-
    ous consequences arise from course of treatment, the
    statute [of limitations] does not begin to run until the
    treatment is terminated’’), overruled in part on other
    grounds by Foran v. Carangelo, 
    153 Conn. 356
    , 360,
    
    216 A.2d 638
    (1966). Thus, to require that the continuing
    treatment itself must be negligent before the doctrine
    can be applied would be fundamentally inconsistent
    with one of the primary policies underlying the doctrine,
    namely, to allow the patient to seek ongoing treatment
    for a medical condition caused by a single act of negli-
    gence.10 Accordingly, we decline to adopt this excep-
    tion. See Nobles v. Memorial Hospital of Laramie
    County, 
    301 P.3d 517
    , 527–29 (Wyo. 2013) (rejecting
    single act exception to continuing course of treatment
    doctrine because exception is ‘‘at odds with the basic
    policies at the heart of the continuous treatment
    rule’’).11
    The defendants also contend that, even if evidence
    of continuing negligence is not required, the continuing
    course of treatment doctrine does not apply here
    because ‘‘the plaintiff certainly could not have antici-
    pated [that] the defendant would have treated her for
    a retained foreign object of which no one was aware.’’
    See Grey v. Stamford Health System, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    282 Conn. 755
    –56 (‘‘when the plaintiff had no knowledge
    of a medical condition and, therefore, had no reason
    to expect ongoing treatment for it from the defendant,
    there is no reason to apply the doctrine’’). Thus, the
    defendants contend that a plaintiff should be required to
    prove that the medical condition for which continuing
    treatment was sought was ‘‘identified’’ in the sense that
    the plaintiff knew its true nature and cause. We dis-
    agree. Rather, we conclude that the medical condition
    must be ‘‘identified’’ in the sense that it was the specific
    condition that either gave rise to or was caused by
    the defendant’s negligence. See McDermott v. Torre, 
    56 N.Y.2d 399
    , 406, 
    437 N.E.2d 1108
    , 
    452 N.Y.S.2d 351
    (1982) (‘‘Included within the scope of continuous treat-
    ment is a timely return visit instigated by the patient
    to complain about and seek treatment for a matter
    related to the initial treatment. Thus, there will be con-
    tinuing treatment when a patient, instructed that he or
    she does not need further attention, soon returns to
    the doctor because of continued pain in that area for
    which medical attention was first sought.’’ [Internal
    quotation marks omitted.]);12 Miccio v. 
    Gerdis, supra
    ,
    
    120 Ohio App. Div
    . 3d 640 (‘‘a physician . . . cannot defeat
    the application of the continuous treatment doctrine
    merely because of a failure to make a correct diagnosis
    as to the underlying condition, where [the physician]
    treated the patient continuously over the relevant time
    period for symptoms that are ultimately traced to that
    condition’’); D. Peck, ‘‘The Continuous Treatment Doc-
    trine: A Toll on the Statute of Limitations for Medical
    Malpractice in New York,’’ 49 Alb. L. Rev. 64, 77 (1984)
    (‘‘Although the [defendant] may be aware that its
    actions caused the injury which necessitated the subse-
    quent treatment, this knowledge is not a necessary ele-
    ment of affirmative treatment. The essential factor is
    that the subsequent treatment is related to the act or
    omission which gave rise to the cause of action.’’ [Foot-
    note omitted.]). This conclusion ‘‘is compelled by the
    policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine,
    i.e., that a patient should not be required to interrupt
    corrective medical treatment by a physician and under-
    mine the trust in the physician-patient relationship in
    order to ensure a timely claim . . . .’’ (Citation omit-
    ted.) Couch v. Suffolk, 
    296 A.D. 2d
    194, 197, 
    746 N.Y.S.2d 187
    (2002). ‘‘Although it seems incongruous
    that subsequent treatment can occur without affirma-
    tive action by the physician since the term treatment
    connotes the presence of action, in certain situations
    treatment can occur by omission. This treatment by
    omission arises when the patient returns to the treating
    physician complaining of problems in the mistreated
    area but the physician disregards the complaints. The
    significant factor is that even though the physician may
    not have provided literal treatment to the afflicted area,
    the patient, by returning to the physician, has provided
    him with an opportunity to correct his previous error.’’
    (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    D. 
    Peck, supra
    , 79. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff
    was required only to show that there is a genuine issue
    of material fact as to whether her symptoms of abdomi-
    nal discomfort were connected to the retained surgical
    sponge and that she sought treatment for those symp-
    toms, not that she knew about and sought treatment
    for the presence of the sponge.13
    Accordingly, we conclude this court’s statement in
    Grey v. Stamford Health System, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    282 Conn. 755
    –56, that ‘‘when the plaintiff had no knowledge of
    a medical condition and, therefore, had no reason to
    expect ongoing treatment for it from the defendant,
    there is no reason to apply the doctrine’’ refers either
    to the situation in which the plaintiff was suffering from
    an asymptomatic medical condition and, therefore, had
    no reason to seek treatment for it, or to the situation
    in which the plaintiff sought treatment for certain symp-
    toms, the defendant determined that the symptoms
    required no further treatment and the plaintiff sought
    no further treatment. It does not refer to the situation
    in which a plaintiff continually sought treatment for
    symptoms related to the act of negligence for which
    the true cause was unknown.14
    To the extent that the defendants contend that rou-
    tine appointments can never constitute a continuing
    course of treatment for purposes of the doctrine, we
    again disagree. Rather, we conclude that routine post-
    operative appointments for the purpose of tracking the
    progress of the plaintiff’s condition and postoperative
    complications, if any, constitute continuing treatment
    for any identified medical condition that was caused
    by the surgery. See Miller v. Rivard, 
    180 A.D. 2d
    331, 339, 
    585 N.Y.S.2d 523
    (1992) (routine postoperative
    procedures are part of same course of treatment as
    surgery); Callahan v. Rogers, 
    89 N.C. App. 250
    , 255,
    
    365 S.E.2d 717
    (1988) (it is irrelevant for purposes of
    doctrine whether postoperative appointments were ini-
    tiated by plaintiff or were scheduled office visits). Of
    course, as with any application of the doctrine, the
    plaintiff must present evidence in such cases that he
    or she sought treatment for a specific medical condition
    that was related to the injury of which he or she com-
    plained. For example, in the present case, if the plaintiff
    had failed to present any evidence that the presence of
    the sponge in her abdominal cavity had caused symp-
    toms for which she sought treatment at the follow-
    up appointments, the mere fact that the defendants
    provided ongoing monitoring of the condition that the
    surgery was intended to cure—the plaintiff’s morbid
    obesity—would not have been sufficient.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
    Appellate Court properly determined that there are gen-
    uine issues of material fact as to whether the continuing
    course of treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limita-
    tions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appel-
    late Court reversing the judgment of the trial court that
    the plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limi-
    tations.
    The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    1
    The relevant complaint has four counts. The first count is against ‘‘Jona-
    than S. Aranow, M.D. of . . . Shoreline . . . .’’ The second count is against
    Middlesex. The third count is against ‘‘Middlesex . . . and Aranow . . .
    [respondeat] [s]uperior.’’ The fourth count is against Shoreline. Both the
    first and the fourth count allege that Aranow is Shoreline’s employee but,
    unlike the third count, they do not expressly allege that Shoreline is vicari-
    ously liable for Aranow’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
    rior. Because the trial court apparently assumed that that was the case, and
    the defendants do not contend otherwise, we also make that assumption.
    2
    Middlesex also claimed that the plaintiff did not have a viable claim of
    vicarious liability against it because Aranow was not its actual agent or
    employee and the doctrine of apparent agency is not recognized in tort
    actions in this state. The trial court agreed with Middlesex and granted its
    motion for summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim. The plaintiff
    appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial
    court. Cefaratti v. Aranow, 
    154 Conn. App. 1
    , 45, 
    105 A.3d 265
    (2014). We
    then granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal on the following
    issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the doctrine of appar-
    ent authority does not apply to actions sounding in tort?’’ Cefaratti v. Ara-
    now, 
    315 Conn. 919
    , 
    107 A.3d 960
    (2015). In the companion case of Cefaratti
    v. Aranow, 321 Conn. ,         A.3d     (2016), issued on the same date as this
    opinion, we answer that question in the negative and conclude that the case
    must be remanded so that the plaintiff may have an opportunity to present
    evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact under our
    newly adopted standard for establishing apparent agency in a tort action.
    3
    The plaintiff has not claimed on appeal to the Appellate Court or to this
    court that the continuing course of treatment doctrine tolls the statute of
    limitations with respect to her claim that Middlesex is directly liable for its
    own negligence. Accordingly, the trial court’s summary judgment rendered
    in favor of Middlesex on that count still stands. See Cefaratti v. 
    Aranow, supra
    , 
    154 Conn. App. 6
    n.3 (‘‘Count two of the complaint is not at issue in
    this appeal. . . . Any possible negligence on the part of [Middlesex] is not
    at issue on appeal.’’). To the extent that the plaintiff claims that Shoreline
    is directly liable for its own negligence before and during the surgery, any
    such claim is also barred for the same reason.
    4
    As we have explained, the only remaining claim against Middlesex is
    that it is vicariously liable for Aranow’s negligence. See footnote 3 of this
    opinion. Middlesex did not join in the present appeal, presumably because
    the derivative claim against it would be barred if this court were to agree
    with Aranow and Shoreline that the claim against Aranow is barred. For
    convenience, we hereinafter refer to Aranow and Shoreline as the
    defendants.
    5
    The plaintiff filled out a questionnaire at each of the follow-up appoint-
    ments that specifically asked whether she was suffering from abdominal
    pain. She indicated that she had abdominal pain only on the questionnaire for
    the November 16, 2005 appointment. The plaintiff explained at her deposition
    that she did not indicate that she had abdominal pain on the other question-
    naires because she ‘‘didn’t consider it at that time to be abdominal pain,
    and the way I described [it] to [Aranow] was different than what I would
    describe [as] abdominal pain.’’
    6
    Although it is not absolutely clear, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony
    strongly implies that she underwent surgery to have the surgical sponge
    removed. Specifically, she stated that ‘‘[w]hen the sponge was in there’’ she
    had a specific type of discomfort, and that she had not had that type of
    discomfort ‘‘[s]ince the surgery . . . .’’ The plaintiff’s attorney confirmed
    at oral argument before this court that the sponge was surgically removed
    two years after it was discovered.
    7
    General Statutes § 52-584 provides: ‘‘No action to recover damages for
    injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence,
    or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician,
    surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be
    brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained
    or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discov-
    ered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three
    years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a
    counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the
    pleadings in such action are finally closed.’’
    8
    Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ contention that ‘‘[t]here was not
    one scintilla of evidence in this case that the alleged abdominal pain was
    ultimately traced to the retained sponge.’’ There is sufficient evidence to
    create an issue of fact as to whether the sponge caused the discomfort
    given that some of the discomfort disappeared after the sponge was removed.
    Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 
    79 Conn. App. 78
    , 89, 
    828 A.2d 1260
    (2003) (‘‘An exception to the general rule with regard to expert medical
    opinion evidence is when the medical condition is obvious or common in
    everyday life. . . . Similarly, expert opinion may not be necessary as to
    causation of an injury or illness if the plaintiff’s evidence creates a probability
    so strong that a lay jury can form a reasonable belief.’’ [Citations omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.]).
    9
    Although we conclude in this opinion that it is not necessary for a plaintiff
    to prove that there must be a continuing failure to diagnose in order for the
    doctrine to apply, in her opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment, we note that the plaintiff contended that the defendants ‘‘continu-
    ally breached their duty from 2003 to 2009 by failing to properly examine
    and follow up with the [p]laintiff to determine that a surgical sponge had
    been left behind.’’ In other words, the plaintiff contended that the defendants’
    failure to diagnose the true nature of her condition constituted continuing
    negligence. The only evidence that the plaintiff cited to support this claim,
    however, was Aranow’s deposition testimony that a sponge had been left
    in the abdominal cavity of a former patient and that he had discovered the
    sponge several years after the surgery when he ordered a CT scan. We
    conclude that this evidence is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether Aranow breached the governing standard of
    care when he failed to diagnose the plaintiff’s true condition when she
    complained of abdominal discomfort after the appeal. Rather, the plaintiff
    was required to present expert testimony as to whether Aranow breached
    the standard of care. See Doe v. Yale University, 
    252 Conn. 641
    , 687, 
    748 A.2d 834
    (2000) (‘‘[e]xcept in the unusual case where the want of care or
    skill is so gross that it presents an almost conclusive inference of want of
    care . . . the testimony of an expert witness is necessary to establish both
    the standard of proper professional skill or care on the part of a physician’’
    [citation omitted]); Sullivan v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 64 Conn.
    App. 750, 767, 
    785 A.2d 588
    (2001) (‘‘[b]ecause it was evident that the
    substitute plaintiff did not produce an expert witness who would have
    testified that the defendants had breached the standard of care in their
    treatment of the plaintiff, the court properly found that the defendants were
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law’’).
    10
    We recognize that our cases previously have contrasted situations in
    which the alleged medical malpractice was ‘‘ ‘a single act of a physician or
    surgeon’ ’’ with situations involving a ‘‘ ‘course of treatment.’ ’’ Blanchette
    v. 
    Barrett, supra
    , 
    229 Conn. 274
    , quoting Giambozi v. 
    Peters, supra
    , 
    127 Conn. 385
    . These cases also may be interpreted as suggesting that the
    continuing course of treatment doctrine does not apply when the only
    malpractice was the initial single act of negligence. Blanchette v. 
    Barrett, supra
    , 274 (when malpractice was single act, ‘‘[t]he [s]tatute of [l]imitations
    begins to run when the breach of duty occurs’’); Giambozi v. 
    Peters, supra
    ,
    385 (same); Giambozi v. 
    Peters, supra
    , 384 (‘‘where the injury was inflicted
    at the time of the operation and not occasioned by subsequent treatment
    or neglect, and there has been no fraudulent concealment by the surgeon,
    the period of limitation for actions of this kind commences from the date
    of the wrongful act or omission’’). In Giambozi v. 
    Peters, supra
    , 385, how-
    ever, there was no treatment at all after the initial act of negligence.
    Blanchette also does not definitively answer the question of whether the
    doctrine applies in the absence of ongoing negligence because the court in
    that case found both that the defendant had a continuing duty to the plaintiff
    after the initial act of negligence and that the defendant provided continually
    negligent treatment. See Blanchette v. 
    Barrett, supra
    , 279. Moreover, since
    Giambozi was decided, this court has recognized that, in addition to
    allowing a plaintiff to use the last date of the defendant’s negligent conduct
    as the date that the negligence occurred, ‘‘[t]he policy underlying the continu-
    ous treatment doctrine [also] seeks to maintain the physician/patient rela-
    tionship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be obtained
    when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Connell v. 
    Colwell, supra
    , 
    214 Conn. 253
    . In light
    of the strong policy in favor of allowing the plaintiff to seek treatment for
    the negligently inflicted injury, we conclude that our suggestions in Giam-
    bozi and Blanchette that, when ‘‘[t]he term malpractice . . . [is] applied to
    a single act of a physician or surgeon . . . [t]he [s]tatute of [l]imitation[s]
    begins to run when the breach of duty occurs’’; [internal quotation marks
    omitted] Blanchette v. 
    Barrett, supra
    , 274, quoting Giambozi v. 
    Peters, supra
    ,
    385; were intended to apply to cases in which there has been no continuing
    course of treatment for an identified medical condition, negligent or oth-
    erwise.
    11
    See also Gomez v. Katz, 
    61 A.D. 3d
    108, 109–17, 
    874 N.Y.S.2d 161
    (2009) (doctrine applied when defendant caused injury during allegedly
    negligent eye surgery); Jauregui v. Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater
    County, 
    111 P.3d 914
    , 915, 918–19 (Wyo. 2005) (doctrine applied when
    defendant left sponge in plaintiff’s shoulder during surgery), overruled on
    other grounds by Harmon v. Star Valley Medical Center, 
    331 P.3d 1174
    ,
    1184 and n.9 (Wyo. 2014).
    12
    In McDermott v. 
    Torre, supra
    , 
    56 N.Y.2d 403
    , the plaintiff consulted the
    defendant dermatologist and requested that he examine a mole on her ankle.
    The defendant conducted tests and concluded that the mole did not require
    any treatment. 
    Id., 404. The
    plaintiff then received continued treatment for
    other ailments with the defendant, but received no further treatment for
    the mole. 
    Id. She continued
    to complain, however, about pain and discolor-
    ation in her ankle. It was ultimately determined that the mole was cancerous.
    
    Id. The plaintiff
    brought an action against the defendant after the limitations
    period had expired, claiming that the continuing course of treatment doctrine
    applied. 
    Id., 404–405. The
    Court of Appeals of New York concluded that the
    fact that the defendant had continually misdiagnosed the plaintiff’s condition
    as benign was irrelevant for purposes of the doctrine. 
    Id., 406. Rather,
    the court concluded, the dispositive question was whether the ‘‘plaintiff’s
    concern about her ankle was one of the purposes for her subsequent visits’’
    to the defendant. 
    Id. Thus, the
    plaintiff was not required to prove either
    ongoing negligence or that the plaintiff and the defendant were aware of
    the true nature of the plaintiff’s condition in order to invoke the doctrine.
    13
    The defendants contend that ‘‘[t]he trial court made a finding of fact
    that the retained sponge was the identified medical condition,’’ not the
    plaintiff’s abdominal discomfort, and that we must defer to this finding.
    Trial courts do not make findings of fact, however, in ruling on motions for
    summary judgment. Rather, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the nonmoving party, they determine whether there are genuine issues
    of material fact, which is a question of law. Because this court is in as good
    a position as the trial court to make this determination, our review is plenary.
    Gold v. Greenwich Hospital 
    Assn., supra
    , 
    262 Conn. 253
    .
    14
    To support its conclusion that the continuing course of treatment doc-
    trine does not apply in the present case, the trial court relied on our statement
    in Martinelli v. Fusi, 
    290 Conn. 347
    , 364, 
    963 A.2d 640
    (2009), that, although
    evidence that the defendant was unaware of the true nature of the plaintiff’s
    condition may indicate that the defendant was negligent, ‘‘it does not indicate
    that the defendant was actually aware that the plaintiff’s condition required
    further treatment, such that an ongoing duty to diagnose and treat that
    condition could be imposed.’’ That principle, however, relates to the continu-
    ing course of conduct doctrine, which is distinct from the continuing course
    of treatment doctrine. See 
    id., 357, 365–66
    (analyzing doctrines separately);
    Grey v. Stamford Health System, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    282 Conn. 755
    (‘‘the primary
    difference between the doctrines is that the [continuing course of treatment
    doctrine] focuses on the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation that the treat-
    ment for an existing condition will be ongoing, while the [continuing course
    of conduct doctrine] focuses on the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff arising
    from his knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition’’ [emphasis in original]).