Pryor v. Brignole ( 2023 )

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J. XAVIER PRYOR v. TIMOTHY BRIGNOLE ET AL.
(SC 20581)
(SC 20583)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
Mullins, Ecker and Prescott, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff attorney, who previously had been employed by the defendant
law firm, L Co., sought to recover damages for breach of a contractual
nondisparagement clause in connection with anonymous letters that
the defendant B, who owned and managed L Co., allegedly sent to
various news outlets. In the letters, B identified the plaintiff, described
an incident in which the plaintiff was arrested and charged with certain
serious crimes, and opined that the plaintiff’s conduct was of public
concern because it implicated his fitness to practice law. B also claimed
that the judicial system was likely to conceal the matter because the
plaintiff was an attorney. The defendants each filed a special motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to the statute (§ 52-196a (b))
permitting the trial court to dismiss a complaint that is based on, inter
alia, the opposing party’s exercise of his or her constitutional right to
free speech on a matter of public concern. The trial court denied the
defendants’ special motions to dismiss, however, concluding that they
could not meet their initial burden of showing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that they were being sued because B exercised his right
of free speech, insofar as B had denied sending the anonymous letters
and, thus, had denied engaging in any speech at all. The defendants
subsequently filed with the Appellate Court separate appeals from the
trial court’s denial of their special motions to dismiss. The plaintiff
moved to dismiss the appeals for lack of a final judgment, and, over
the defendants’ objections, the Appellate Court granted the plaintiff’s
motions and dismissed the appeals. On the granting of certification, the
defendants filed separate appeals with this court.
Held that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the defendants’ appeals
from the trial court’s denial of their special motions to dismiss for lack
of a final judgment, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate
Court’s judgments and remanded the cases to the Appellate Court for
further proceedings:
The issue of whether the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ special
motions to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a (b) could constitute an
appealable final judgment was resolved in the companion case of Smith
v. Supple (346 Conn. 928), in which this court examined the relevant
statutory text, legislative history, and analogous laws of other states,
and concluded that § 52-196a affords defendants a substantive right to
avoid litigation on the merits and that, pursuant to the second prong of
the test for determining the appealability of interlocutory orders set forth
in State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27), an immediate appeal may be taken in
cases in which a defendant can assert a colorable claim that a trial
court’s denial of a special motion to dismiss has placed at risk the right
of the defendant to avoid litigation on the merits.
In the present case, the defendants’ special motions to dismiss purport-
edly invoked the protections afforded by § 52-196a insofar as the plain-
tiff’s complaint was based on a right protected by that statute, namely,
B’s ‘‘right of free speech,’’ as that term is defined in § 52-196a (a) (2).
In construing § 52-196a (a) (2), which requires that the speech occur ‘‘in
a public forum on a matter of public concern,’’ the courts of this state
have interpreted the term ‘‘public forum’’ to include communications to
newspapers and other traditional media outlets, and the term ‘‘matter
of public concern’’ to include speech about issues of economic or commu-
nity well-being and other regulatory matters, such as unethical behavior
alleged against a regulated professional, it was well established that
the commission and prosecution of a crime, and the resulting judicial
proceedings, are events of legitimate concern to the public, and it was
of no consequence that B denied writing the letters, as the initial analysis
concerning whether to grant a special motion to dismiss under § 52-196a
(e) (3) turns on the nature of the statements alleged in the plaintiff’s com-
plaint.
Accordingly, the defendants had asserted at least a superficially well
founded claim that B’s conduct of sending the letters to various news
outlets concerning the arrest and prosecution of an attorney could be
considered conduct furthering communication in a public forum on a
matter of public concern.
(Two justices dissenting in one opinion)
Argued February 24 and October 12, 2022—officially released May 2, 2023**
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court,
Budzik, J., denied the defendants’ special motions to
dismiss, from which the defendants filed separate
appeals with the Appellate Court, which granted the
plaintiff’s motions to dismiss the appeals, and the defen-
dants, on the granting of certification, appealed to this
court, which consolidated the appeals. Reversed; fur-
ther proceedings.
Sarah F. D’Addabbo, with whom was Mario Cerame,
for the appellants (defendants).
Matthew S. Blumenthal filed a brief for the Connecti-
cut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
William Tong, attorney general, Clare Kindall, for-
mer solicitor general, Matthew I. Levine, assistant attor-
ney general, and Daniel M. Salton, assistant attorney
general, filed a brief for the state of Connecticut as
amicus curiae.
Opinion
ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in these certified
appeals is whether the denial of a special motion to
dismiss filed pursuant to our state’s anti-SLAPP1 statute,
General Statutes § 52-196a,2 is an appealable final judg-
ment. The defendants, Timothy Brignole and Brignole,
Bush & Lewis, LLC (law firm), appeal, upon our granting
of their petitions for certification,3 from the judgments
of the Appellate Court, which dismissed their appeals
from the order of the trial court denying their special
motions to dismiss the underlying civil action brought
against them by the plaintiff, J. Xavier Pryor.4 Specifi-
cally, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court
improperly dismissed their respective appeals for lack
of a final judgment because (1) the legislature expressly
provided for an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a
special motion to dismiss in subsection (d) of § 52-196a,
and (2) the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute constitutes an appeal-
able final judgment under the second prong of State v.
Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the
reasons set forth in the companion case that we also
decide today, Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, A.3d
(2023), we conclude that a trial court’s denial of a
colorable special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
§ 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under Curcio.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Court and remand the case to that court for further
proceedings according to law.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history, which are undisputed for purposes
of this appeal. Brignole is the owner, manager, and princi-
pal of the law firm. The law firm previously employed
the plaintiff as an associate attorney. In 2015, the law
firm brought a civil action against the plaintiff and
another law firm in the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford (2015 action). In March, 2018, the
plaintiff and the law firm resolved the 2015 action by
executing a settlement agreement pursuant to which
the plaintiff paid the law firm $45,000 in exchange for
a general release of all causes of action brought or
which could have been brought in the 2015 action. The
settlement agreement also included a nondisparage-
ment clause under which Brignole, in particular, agreed
‘‘to not disparage or criticize [the plaintiff] and to not
do or say anything that could harm the [plaintiff’s] inter-
ests or reputation . . . .’’
Approximately three months later, the plaintiff was
arrested and charged with assault in the third degree,
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61, and risk of
injury to a child, in violation of General Statutes § 53-
21, in connection with an incident in West Hartford.
Thereafter, Brignole sent or caused to be sent to ‘‘vari-
ous news outlets and persons’’ an anonymous letter
bearing the headline ‘‘Attorney Beats Wife [i]n Front of
Child,’’ which stated the factual basis for the charges
against the plaintiff, identified the plaintiff by his name,
date of birth, and office address, and opined that his
conduct was a matter of public concern because it
implicated his fitness to practice law and because, Brig-
nole claimed, the judicial system was likely to cover up
the matter because the plaintiff is an attorney.5 Brignole
addressed each letter with the return address of the
plaintiff’s law office to make it look like it was sent by
a member of the plaintiff’s staff.
Subsequently, the plaintiff brought this action against
the defendants, claiming that Brignole’s actions consti-
tuted a breach of the nondisparagement provision of
the settlement agreement, could have harmed his repu-
tation and interests, caused him to suffer economic
damages, and deprived him of the benefit of the agree-
ment.6 The defendants thereafter filed separate special
motions to dismiss the action as a SLAPP suit pursuant
to § 52-196a, along with accompanying memoranda of
law, in which they (1) denied the allegations in the
complaint, and (2) contended that the plaintiff’s breach
of contract claims were based on the exercise of a right
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, namely, ‘‘the right
of free speech in connection with a matter of public
concern,’’ and that the plaintiff was unable to ‘‘show
probable cause that he [would] prevail on the merits
of his claim.’’ The plaintiff objected to the defendants’
respective special motions to dismiss.
On August 24, 2020, the trial court issued a memoran-
dum of decision denying the defendants’ special motions
to dismiss, rejecting their argument that ‘‘the letters
constitute[d] an exercise of free speech on a matter of
public concern and, thus, [were] protected under § 52-
196a.’’ The court observed that the ‘‘problem . . .
[was] that [Brignole, as manager, owner, and principal
of the law firm] denie[d] sending the letters at issue and,
thus, denie[d] engaging in any speech at all, protected
or not.’’ Thus, the court determined that the defendants
could not meet their ‘‘initial burden’’ under § 52-196a
(e) (3) of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that they were being sued because Brignole exercised
his right of free speech.7 As such, the trial court denied
the defendants’ special motions to dismiss.
The defendants subsequently filed separate appeals
from the denials of their special motions to dismiss
with the Appellate Court. The plaintiff moved to dismiss
each appeal for lack of an appealable final judgment.
The defendants then objected, arguing that the denial
of a special motion to dismiss is immediately appealable
both under the plain language of § 52-196a (d) and as
a final judgment under this court’s decision in State
v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 31. The Appellate Court
ultimately granted the plaintiff’s motions to dismiss and
rendered judgments dismissing the appeals. These certi-
fied appeals followed.8 See footnote 3 of this opinion.
The primary issue raised in these certified appeals—
namely, whether a trial court’s denial of a special
motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute can
constitute an appealable final judgment—is identical to
that considered in Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn.
928. In that case, we examined relevant statutory text,
legislative history, and analogous laws from our sister
states, and concluded that our ‘‘anti-SLAPP statute
affords a defendant a substantive right to avoid litiga-
tion on the merits . . . .’’ Id., 949; see id., 938–60. We
then continued to conclude that, in cases in which a
defendant can assert a colorable claim that a trial
court’s denial of a special motion to dismiss under that
statute has placed that particular right at risk, an imme-
diate appeal may be taken pursuant to the second prong
of Curcio. See id., 949; see also Sena v. American Medi-
cal Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 41, 213
A.3d 1110 (2019) (‘‘[a defendant] must make at least
a colorable claim that some recognized statutory or
constitutional right is at risk’’ (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Turning to the record in these certified appeals, we
now consider whether the defendants have asserted a
colorable claim to the protections afforded by the anti-
SLAPP statute. In particular, we must determine whether
the defendants have asserted a colorable claim that Brig-
nole’s conduct, as alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint,
is based on the exercise of his ‘‘right of free speech,’’
as that term has been defined by our legislature in § 52-
196a (a) (2).
The statute defines the phrase ‘‘right of free speech’’
as ‘‘communicating, or conduct furthering communica-
tion, in a public forum on a matter of public concern
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (2). Although the
term ‘‘public forum’’ is not defined, the phrase ‘‘matter
of public concern’’ is defined as ‘‘an issue related to
(A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or
community well-being, (C) the government, zoning and
other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public
figure, or (E) an audiovisual work . . . .’’ General Stat-
utes § 52-196a (a) (1).
A review of relevant case law reveals several Superior
Court decisions that have interpreted the term ‘‘public
forum,’’ as used in the anti-SLAPP statute, to include
communications to newspapers and other traditional
media outlets. See, e.g., Primrose Cos. v. McGee, Superior
Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. UWY-
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 26, 2022) (citing cases and
finding that defendant’s letter to editors, which was
published in newspaper, was action in public forum);
Lawrence v. Chambers, Superior Court, judicial district
of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S (September 21, 2020) (‘‘[t]he newspaper and television
station[s] are public for[a]’’ in exercise of free speech);
Pacheco Quevedo v. Hearst Corp., Superior Court, judi-
cial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S (December 19, 2019) (‘‘[e]mbedded in anti-
SLAPP laws like § 52-196a is the fundamental principle
that ‘news reporting activity is free speech’ ’’).
Courts of this state, in construing our anti-SLAPP
statute, have further concluded that speech that involves
a ‘‘matter of public concern’’ includes ‘‘issues of economic
or community [well-being] . . . and other regulatory
matters . . . . This would appear to include unethical
behavior alleged against a regulated professional. As to
an allegation of illegal behavior, [i]t is well established
that [t]he commission of [a] crime, prosecutions
resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from
the prosecutions . . . are without question events of
legitimate concern to the public . . . . Indeed, [p]ublic
allegations that someone is involved in crime generally
are speech on a matter of public concern.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockoff v.
Annulli, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. HHD-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 10, 2020) (70
Conn. L. Rptr. 39, 40); see, e.g., Noble v. Hennessey,
Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket
No. KNL-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January 12, 2021) (attorney
grievance complaint was related to matter of public
concern because legal profession is regulated and com-
plaint alleged unethical behavior); Rockoff v. Annulli,
supra, 70 Conn. L. Rptr. 40 (allegations of unethical and
criminal behavior by regulated professional concerning
private real estate transaction involved matters of pub-
lic concern); see also Graves v. Chronicle Printing Co.,
Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (November 7, 2018) (67 Conn. L. Rptr.
442, 446) (‘‘[p]ublishing articles concerning the arrest
and prosecution of a person accused of harming chil-
dren certainly satisfies the statutory definitions of ‘free
speech’ and ‘matter of public concern’ ’’); cf. Gleason
v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 412, 125 A.3d 920 (2015)
(‘‘ ‘[s]peech deals with matters of public concern when
it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community
. . . or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public’ ’’).
Although the pertinent case law is less developed,
courts in other jurisdictions presented with similarly
worded anti-SLAPP statutes have also considered the
merits of special motions to dismiss, even in cases in
which the defendant has denied making all or some of
the underlying statements alleged. Those courts have
reasoned, as the defendants in the present case initially
argued, that an initial analysis under their states’ respec-
tive anti-SLAPP statutes should turn on the nature of
the statements alleged in the complaint. See Spirtos v.
Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711, 714, 499 P.3d 611 (2021)
(concluding, under similarly worded statute, that ‘‘[the
defendant’s] denial that he made the alleged statement
[was] irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis’’
(emphasis omitted)); Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462,
467 (Tex. 2017) (dismissal under Texas’ anti-SLAPP
statute was not precluded by fact that defendant denied
making statements at issue because ‘‘[t]he basis of a
legal action is not determined by the defendant’s admis-
sions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations,’’ and,
‘‘[w]hen it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that
the action is covered by the [anti-SLAPP statute], the
defendant need show no more’’).
Because the issue before us is limited to whether the
defendants in the present case have asserted a colorable
claim to the protections afforded by our state’s anti-
SLAPP statute, as required to obtain an immediate
review of the trial court’s denial of their special motions
to dismiss under the second prong of Curcio, we need
not determine whether any of the foregoing persuasive
authority is either factually distinguishable or legally
correct. A showing of colorability in this context, although
meaningful, presents a lower bar. See, e.g., In re Santi-
ago G., 325 Conn. 221, 231, 157 A.3d 60 (2017) (‘‘A
colorable claim is one that is superficially well founded
but that may ultimately be deemed invalid . . . . For
a claim to be colorable, the defendant need not convince
the trial court that he necessarily will prevail; he must
demonstrate simply that he might prevail.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.)). The existence of the previously cited case
law affords the defendants with at least a superficially
well founded claim that the conduct alleged in the plain-
tiff’s complaint—namely, Brignole’s sending letters to
‘‘various news outlets and persons’’ concerning the
arrest and prosecution of an attorney—could be consid-
ered conduct furthering communication in a public
forum on a matter of public concern. Cf. Graves v.
Chronicle Printing Co., supra, 67 Conn. L. Rptr. 446(police officer’s sending statements to newspaper con-
cerning allegations of criminal behavior fell within
scope of anti-SLAPP statute, as officer was ‘‘furthering
communication, in a public forum on a matter of public
concern’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s denial
of the defendants’ colorable special motions to dismiss
under § 52-196a constitutes an appealable final judg-
ment under Curcio.9 The Appellate Court, therefore,
improperly dismissed the defendants’ respective appeals
for lack of a final judgment.10
The judgments of the Appellate Court are reversed
and the cases are remanded to that court for further
proceedings according to law.
In this opinion McDONALD, MULLINS and PRES-
COTT, Js., concurred.
* This case originally was argued on February 24, 2022, before a panel
consisting of Chief Justice Robinson, and Justices McDonald, D’Auria, Mul-
lins and Ecker. Thereafter, the court sua sponte ordered that the case be
reargued on October 12, 2022, before that same panel. Subsequently, Judge
Prescott was added to the panel. He has read the briefs and appendices,
and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in
this decision.
** May 2, 2023, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1
‘‘SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332,
337 n.4, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2467, 209
L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021).
2
General Statutes § 52-196a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) In any civil
action in which a party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross claim against
an opposing party that is based on the opposing party’s exercise of its right
of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in
connection with a matter of public concern, such opposing party may file
a special motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.
***
‘‘(d) The court shall stay all discovery upon the filing of a special motion
to dismiss. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until the court grants
or denies the special motion to dismiss and any interlocutory appeal thereof.
Notwithstanding the entry of an order to stay discovery, the court, upon
motion of a party and a showing of good cause, or upon its own motion,
may order specified and limited discovery relevant to the special motion
to dismiss.
***
‘‘[e] (3) The court shall grant a special motion to dismiss if the moving
party makes an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the opposing party’s complaint, counterclaim or cross claim is based on the
moving party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the
government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public
concern, unless the party that brought the complaint, counterclaim or cross
claim sets forth with particularity the circumstances giving rise to the com-
plaint, counterclaim or cross claim and demonstrates to the court that there
is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that the party will prevail
on the merits of the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim. . . .’’
3
We granted the defendants’ petitions for certification to appeal to con-
sider whether the Appellate Court properly dismissed their respective
appeals from the trial court’s denial of their special motions to dismiss
pursuant to § 52-196a for lack of a final judgment. See Pryor v. Brignole,
336 Conn. 941, 249 A.3d 353 (2021); Pryor v. Brignole, 336 Conn. 933, 248
A.3d 3 (2021). This court subsequently consolidated the defendants’ certified
appeals and ordered joint briefing. See Practice Book § 61-7 (b) (1).
4
We note that the plaintiff declined to exercise his right to briefing and
oral argument in this consolidated appeal and that we granted permission
to the state of Connecticut and the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association
to file briefs as amici curiae.
5
Specifically, the letter provided in relevant part: ‘‘To Whom It May
Concern:
‘‘On June 10, 2018 [the plaintiff] ([o]ffice, 525 Windsor [Avenue], Windsor,
CT) was arrested in West Hartford . . . on charges of [a]ssault [in the third]
[d]egree ‘with intent to cause grave physical injury’ and [r]isk of [i]njury to
a [m]inor, a [c]lass C [f]elony. While driving a car in West Hartford with his
young child in the back seat, [the plaintiff] got in an argument with his wife
and he punched her in the face. When he stopped the car, she fled to an
adjacent store and called [the] police. The police observed [that] she had
a swollen eye from being punched.
‘‘Under [rule 8.4 of the] Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct . . .
it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the fitness of a lawyer. Commentary: [l]awyers are
subject to discipline when they violate these rules and ‘offenses involving
violence, dishonesty and breach of trust are in that category.’
‘‘I bring this to your attention out of public concern and under your
watchful eye of enforcing the rules and public mandates. The fact that [the
plaintiff] is a lawyer going around assaulting people reflects badly on the
legal community as a whole. As a lawyer in the Hartford [c]ourts he is held
to a high standard of public trust. His [w]ife and [c]hild are real victims and
he needs to be held accountable. Just because he is a lawyer the system
will try to cover this up. You are our [v]ictims’ [a]dvocates. Help us please.’’
6
The plaintiff also filed an attorney grievance against Brignole, claiming
that Brignole’s actions violated several Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel for Geographic Area 13 and the
city of Hartford reviewed the complaint and the proffered defenses and
determined that no probable cause existed that Brignole had committed
professional misconduct by sending the letters.
7
In so concluding, the trial court rejected the defendants’ argument ‘‘that
the court should simply assume [that] the allegations of the complaint are
true for purposes of the motion, as may be done, in some circumstances,
on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30.’’ The court deter-
mined that ‘‘[§] 52-196a (e) (3) plainly sets forth a requirement that the
moving party must establish his right to the special protections of the statute
by the presentation of actual facts, not assumptions valid only for purposes
of the [special] motion [to dismiss].’’
8
On February 1, 2022, this court ordered supplemental briefing on the
issue of ‘‘whether the Appellate Court’s dismissal of [the law firm’s] appeal
. . . can be affirmed on the alternative ground that the Appellate Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal because [the law
firm] failed to amend its appeal under Practice Book § 61-9 to include the
trial court’s November 18, 2020 ruling denying its special motion to dismiss.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Having reviewed the record in this case
as a whole, we conclude that the trial court’s November 18, 2020 ruling is
most fairly characterized as an articulation clarifying that it had previously
denied the law firm’s special motion to dismiss—for the same reason as
Brignole’s—in its initial ruling dated August 24, 2020. The trial court’s articu-
lation, which was issued in response to a sua sponte order from the Appellate
Court, does not appear to us to constitute a separate, substantive decision
on the merits of the law firm’s underlying motion to dismiss so as to require
an amended appeal under Practice Book § 61-9. See, e.g., In re Santiago
G., 325 Conn. 221, 232–33, 157 A.3d 60 (2017) (noting that ‘‘the well estab-
lished rule that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction’’
extends to appellate proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)). But
cf. Gibson v. Jefferson Woods Community, Inc., 206 Conn. App. 303, 304–305
n.1, 260 A.3d 1244 (given plaintiff’s failure to file amended appeal, Appellate
Court lacked jurisdiction over appeal from trial court’s subsequent granting
of motion to dismiss filed by codefendant, when existing appeal was limited
to granting of motion to dismiss filed by different defendant, despite fact
that motions were granted on ‘‘same bases’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), cert. denied, 339 Conn. 911, 261 A.3d 747 (2021); Juliano v. Juliano,
96 Conn. App. 381, 386, 900 A.2d 557 (Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction
over appeal from denial of motion to open conversion and fraud judgment,
filed subsequent to original appeal from that judgment, because, ‘‘[i]f [the
party] desired appellate review of the court’s denial of his motion to open,
he should have filed an appeal form indicating such intention or amended
the existing form’’), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 921, 908 A.2d 544 (2006).
9
We note that the trial court’s decision in the present case focused exclu-
sively on the first step of the burden shifting analysis set forth in § 52-196a
(e) (3). As a result, we express no opinion on the various other aspects of
this case, such as issues of contractual waiver and causation, which are
more properly considered under the second step of § 52-196a (e) (3). See,
e.g., Thompson v. Inglewood Unified School District, Docket No. B264151,
2016 WL 5462850, *5 n.4 (Cal. App. September 29, 2016) (finding that defen-
dants had met their burden under step one of California’s anti-SLAPP statute
and noting that whether speech violated nondisparagement clause was issue
addressed in probability of prevailing on claims analysis under step two).
10
The dissent posits that we should ‘‘not saddle the Appellate Court with
a remand’’ in this case because of the several novel issues that this case
presents. Footnote 3 of the dissenting opinion. We disagree. We note that
transfer remains available as an appropriate means for addressing—without
additional delay—any novel constitutional or statutory issues that are pre-
sented with respect to the merits of this appeal. See Practice Book § 65-1.