Santana v. State ( 2023 )


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    ESCOBAR-SANTANA v. STATE—CONCURRENCE
    ROBINSON, C. J., concurring. I agree with the majority’s
    conclusion that, for purposes of General Statutes § 4-
    160 (f),1 the plaintiffs, Celine Escobar-Santana (Escobar-
    Santana) and her infant son, Emmett Escobar-Santana,
    have pleaded a colorable medical malpractice claim
    with respect to count two of their complaint. As the
    majority aptly concludes, § 4-160 (f) waives sovereign
    immunity for ‘‘ ‘medical malpractice claims only’ ’’ and
    affords a mechanism by which plaintiffs can bypass
    the Claims Commissioner upon the filing of a timely
    medical malpractice action in the Superior Court. Part
    II B of the majority opinion. Given our mandate to
    construe pleadings broadly; see, e.g., Carpenter v. Daar,
    
    346 Conn. 80
    , 127, 
    287 A.3d 1027
     (2023); and the legisla-
    tive purpose of § 4-160 (f) as explained by the majority;
    see part II B 1 and 2 of the majority opinion; I agree
    with the majority’s conclusion that count two can be
    read to allege a medical malpractice claim by Escobar-
    Santana for purposes of the sovereign immunity waiver
    provided by that statute. Not only does count two sound
    in medical malpractice, but the plaintiffs also attached
    a good faith certificate and opinion letter that alleged
    that the defendant, the state of Connecticut, had
    breached the standard of care during the labor and
    delivery process. See General Statutes § 52-190a (a).
    Given the common-law trend of recognizing emotional
    distress damages in medical malpractice actions, I agree
    with the majority’s conclusion that, to the extent that
    Escobar-Santana alleged only damages caused by emo-
    tional distress, in the absence of her own physical
    injury, she is not precluded from bypassing the Claims
    Commissioner under § 4-160 (f).
    I write separately, however, to emphasize that the
    dispositive issue in this case is limited to whether there
    has been a waiver of sovereign immunity for purposes
    of § 4-160 (f) as a matter of construction of that statute,
    thus affording the trial court subject matter jurisdiction
    over the claims pleaded in count two of the plaintiffs’
    complaint. Because, as was highlighted at oral argument
    before this court, the state assumes for purposes of this
    motion to dismiss that there was a duty of care owed to
    Escobar-Santana, I, too, assume that such duty existed
    given the procedural posture of this case. Given that
    assumption, I leave to another day a comprehensive
    examination of whether there was, in fact, a duty of
    care owed to Escobar-Santana and whether she ulti-
    mately will prevail on her emotional distress claim.
    Accordingly, I join the majority opinion affirming the
    decision of the trial court to deny the state’s motion to
    dismiss count two of the complaint.
    1
    See footnote 1 of the majority opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SC20772

Filed Date: 8/22/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2023