Schoenhorn v. Moss ( 2023 )

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JON L. SCHOENHORN v. MELODIE MOSS ET AL.
(SC 20710)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins,
Ecker and Alexander, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff attorney sought a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant,
the chief court reporter for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
to produce certain transcripts that were sealed by another court in a
marital dissolution action involving different parties. In the dissolution
action, the family court had held a hearing concerning child custody,
during which it issued an oral order closing the courtroom to the public
and sealing the hearing transcripts. Following the dismissal of the disso-
lution action, the defendant declined to provide the transcripts of the
custody hearing to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff commenced the present
mandamus action against the defendant individually and in her official
capacity as chief court reporter, seeking an injunction compelling the
defendant, pursuant to statute (§ 51-61 (c)), to produce those transcripts.
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered
judgment dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Relying on Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission (294 Conn.
534), in which this court concluded that a trial court presiding over an
administrative appeal did not have subject matter jurisdiction to overturn
sealing orders issued by another court in an unrelated case involving
different parties, the trial court in the present case concluded that
the plaintiff’s mandamus action constituted an impermissible collateral
attack on the family court’s sealing order, and, therefore, the action was
nonjusticiable because no practical relief was available to the plaintiff.
On appeal from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff
claimed that the trial court incorrectly had determined that his action
was nonjusticiable.
Held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s mandamus action
on the ground that it was nonjusticiable, as the trial court could not
afford the plaintiff any practical relief:
The plaintiff’s action seeking to compel the defendant to produce the
transcripts at issue constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a
sealing order issued by a different court in a different action involving
different parties.
The plaintiff’s mandamus action, like the administrative appeal in Valvo,
did not adequately protect the interests of all affected parties, such as
the children in the marital dissolution action whose custody was the
subject of the hearing at issue, and, because the trial court in the present
case had no continuing jurisdiction over the marital dissolution action
and no custody or control over the sealed transcripts, it had no authority
to overturn the family court’s sealing order.
This court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s action was nonjusticiable
accorded not only with Valvo and the principles cited therein but also
with this court’s deep-rooted public policies favoring consistency and
stability of judgments, the orderly administration of justice, and the
prevention of inconsistent rulings.
Moreover, although the plaintiff claimed that Valvo was distinguishable
from the present case because a trial court’s powers in a mandamus
action are broader than they are in an administrative appeal and that
his mandamus action was justiciable by virtue of a trial court’s broad,
equitable powers to issue a writ of mandamus, the mere fact that the
plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus did not relieve him from proving that
his claim was justiciable, and when a plaintiff brings an impermissible
collateral attack on another court’s sealing order by way of a mandamus
action, no practical relief can be granted, and the court lacks competency
to adjudicate the matter.
The plaintiff’s reliance on Lechner v. Holmberg (165 Conn. 152), in which
this court recognized that an action for a writ of mandamus is the
proper vehicle for compelling the production of court transcripts, was
misplaced, as that case does not stand for the broad proposition that a
plaintiff can bring a mandamus action requesting the trial court to revoke,
undo, or ignore a sealing order imposed by a different court in a sepa-
rate proceeding.
Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that a collateral
attack on the family court’s sealing order was permissible in this case
on the ground that the order was void ab initio in light of the family
court’s failure to follow certain procedures set forth in the rule of practice
(§ 25-59) governing the closure of courtrooms in family matters, which,
in turn, deprived the family court of subject matter jurisdiction to close
the courtroom and to seal the transcripts, as this court could not conclude
that the family court’s jurisdiction over the marital dissolution action
was so lacking as to be entirely obvious.
In addition, even if the family court had violated the rules of practice
in issuing the sealing order, any error in applying the rules of practice
is not even arguably jurisdictional and does not affect a trial court’s
competency to adjudicate the type of action before it, and, accordingly,
the family court’s sealing order was not void ab initio and was not open
to collateral attack.
(One justice concurring separately)
Argued March 22—officially released August 8, 2023
Procedural History
Action for a writ of mandamus to compel the defen-
dants to produce transcripts of certain court proceed-
ings, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, where the court, Sheridan, J.,
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed.
Jon L. Schoenhorn, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Emily Adams Gait, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Robert J. Deichert, assistant attorney gen-
eral, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general,
and Alma Rose Nunley, assistant attorney general, for
the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J. The plaintiff, Attorney Jon L. Schoen-
horn, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court dis-
missing his action for a writ of mandamus2 ordering
the defendant, Melodie Moss, the chief court reporter
for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, to produce
certain transcripts that were sealed by another trial
court in a separate proceeding involving different par-
ties. The plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly
determined that his action was nonjusticiable and,
therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over it. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural
history. In 2017, Jennifer R. Dulos commenced a marital
dissolution action against her husband, Fotis Dulos, in
the family division of the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Stamford-Norwalk (family court). Dulos v.
Dulos, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Nor-
walk, Docket No. FST-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S. As a part of
that proceeding, the family court conducted a hearing
on May 14 and 17, 2019, relating to the custody of the
Dulos children. At the commencement of the hearing,
the family court issued an oral order closing the court-
room to the public and sealing the hearing transcripts.
On February 4, 2020, following the death of Fotis Dulos,
the family court rendered a judgment of dismissal in
the Dulos marital dissolution action. The transcripts of
the hearing are the subject of this appeal.
In April, 2021, the plaintiff commenced the present
mandamus action in the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, against the defendant, individually
and in her official capacity as the chief court reporter
for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, after she
declined to produce the transcripts to the plaintiff. In his
complaint, the plaintiff sought an injunction compelling
the defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-61 (c),3
to produce the transcripts. The defendant thereafter
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the writ of
mandamus because to grant the requested relief would
require the trial court to overturn the family court’s
order sealing the transcripts. In support of her motion,
the defendant attached certified transcript pages from
the hearing that contained the family court’s oral ruling
sealing the transcripts and closing the courtroom to
the public.4
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss and rendered judgment dismissing the action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Relying on Valvo
v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn.
534, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010), the trial court concluded that
‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s . . . mandamus [action was] nothing
more than an impermissible collateral attack on the
sealing order imposed by the [family] court,’’ and, there-
fore, the action was ‘‘nonjusticiable because no practi-
cal relief [was] available to the plaintiff . . . .’’
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court
incorrectly determined that Valvo required dismissal
of his mandamus action. The plaintiff argues that, in
Lechner v. Holmberg, 165 Conn. 152, 157–58, 328 A.2d
701 (1973), this court recognized that an action for a
writ of mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for compel-
ling the production of judicial transcripts. The plaintiff
further argues that Valvo is inapposite because, unlike
the sealing order in that case, which was properly
issued, the order in Dulos violated Practice Book § 25-
59 and the constitutional principles underlying that sec-
tion, rendering the order void ab initio.5 The plaintiff
argues that, because the sealing order in Dulos was
void from its inception, the trial court in the present
case had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the writ
of mandamus. We conclude that the plaintiff’s action
is nonjusticiable.6
‘‘A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the juris-
diction of the court, essentially asserting that the plain-
tiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of
action that should be heard by the court. . . . In ruling
on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction, the trial court must consider the allegations of
the complaint in their most favorable light . . . includ-
ing those facts necessarily implied from the allegations
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v.
Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, 329 Conn. 515, 522, 187
A.3d 1154 (2018). ‘‘[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of
proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and how-
ever [that issue is] raised.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New Lon-
don, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
‘‘Because courts are established to resolve actual con-
troversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to
a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . .
Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual contro-
versy between or among the parties to the dispute . . .
(2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . .
(3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being
adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the
determination of the controversy will result in practical
relief to the complainant. . . . As we have recognized,
justiciability . . . implicate[s] a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particu-
lar matter. . . . [B]ecause . . . justiciability raises a
question of law, our appellate review is plenary.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition
for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295
Conn. 240, 254–55, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).
‘‘In deciding whether the plaintiff’s complaint pre-
sents a justiciable claim, we make no determination
regarding [the complaint’s] merits. Rather, we consider
only whether the matter in controversy [is] capable of
being adjudicated by judicial power according to the
aforestated well established principles.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan &
Dost, LLP, supra, 329 Conn. 525.
In Valvo, this court concluded that a trial court presid-
ing over an administrative appeal did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to overturn sealing orders issued
by another trial court in an unrelated case involving
different parties. Valvo v. Freedom of Information
Commission, supra, 294 Conn. 543. We stated that to
conclude otherwise would be ‘‘completely unwork-
able’’; id.; because ‘‘[o]ur jurisprudence concerning the
trial court’s authority to overturn or to modify a ruling
in a particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic
that it requires no citation of authority, that any such
action will be taken only by the trial court with continu-
ing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court
with continuing jurisdiction is the court that originally
rendered the ruling. . . . This assumption is well justi-
fied in light of the public policies favoring consistency
and stability of judgments and the orderly administra-
tion of justice. . . . It would wreak havoc on the judi-
cial system to allow a trial court in an administrative
appeal to second-guess the judgment of another trial
court in a separate proceeding involving different par-
ties, and possibly to render an inconsistent ruling. This
is especially true when a direct challenge to the original
ruling can be made by any person at any time in the
trial court with continuing jurisdiction, as is the case
with sealing orders.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omit-
ted.) Id., 543–45. Of particular concern to this court
was the fact that the interests of all of the affected
parties may not be adequately protected in a collateral
proceeding. See id., 545 (‘‘it is by no means clear that
procedures adequate to protect the interests of all
affected parties could even be devised in such a pro-
ceeding’’); id., 545 n.13 (‘‘[t]he trial court . . . would
have no jurisdiction to order the trial courts that issued
the sealing orders to do anything unless those courts
and the parties in the underlying cases were named as
parties in this administrative appeal, which they were
not’’). In light of the foregoing, we held that, because
the trial court in Valvo did not have continuing jurisdic-
tion over the cases in which the sealing orders were
imposed or custody or control over the sealed docu-
ments, and because the interests of all parties affected
by the sealing orders were not adequately represented
in the appeal, the trial court was without jurisdiction
to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claim. Id., 545.
In the present case, we agree with the defendant that
the plaintiff’s action is nonjusticiable because no relief
can be granted to him by the trial court. The plaintiff
sought an injunction by way of a writ of mandamus to
compel the defendant to produce transcripts that were
sealed by another trial court in a separate proceeding
involving different parties. The plaintiff’s action is,
therefore, a collateral attack on a sealing order imposed
by a different court in a different action, which is not
permissible. See, e.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v.
Crawford, 333 Conn. 731, 741 n.7, 219 A.3d 744 (2019)
(‘‘a party may not bring an action in the [trial court]
effectively asking that court to review a ruling of
another trial court in another case’’); Mendillo v. Tinley,
Renehan & Dost, LLP, supra, 329 Conn. 527 (declara-
tory judgment action seeking to undo another trial
court’s protective order was nonjusticiable); Traylor
v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X03-HHD-CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S (June 6, 2017) (‘‘to the extent the plaintiff
asserts claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
whereby he seeks to have this court overturn, revoke,
ignore, or reverse the actions of another [trial court] in
another action, or even an action taken by the Appellate
Court, those claims are clearly nonjusticiable’’).
Furthermore, the present mandamus action, like the
administrative appeal in Valvo, does not adequately pro-
tect the interests of all affected parties, such as the
Dulos children, whose custody is the subject of the
sealed transcripts. See Valvo v. Freedom of Information
Commission, supra, 294 Conn. 545 (‘‘it is by no means
clear that procedures adequate to protect the interests
of all affected parties could even be devised in such a
proceeding’’); see also id., 545 n.13 (‘‘the trial court . . .
would have no jurisdiction to order the trial courts that
issued the sealing orders to do anything unless those
courts and the parties in the underlying cases were
named as parties in this . . . appeal, which they are
not’’). Because the trial court in the present case had
no continuing jurisdiction over the Dulos marital disso-
lution action and no custody or control over the sealed
transcripts, it had no authority to overturn the family
court’s sealing order. Our conclusion accords not only
with Valvo and the principles cited therein but also with
our deep-rooted public policies favoring ‘‘consistency
and stability of judgments,’’ ‘‘the orderly administration
of justice,’’ and the prevention of inconsistent rulings.7
Id., 545; see also id. (collateral attack is impermissible
when ‘‘direct challenge to the original ruling can be
made by any person at any time in the trial court with
continuing jurisdiction, as is the case with sealing
orders’’); cf. Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 220–21, 884 A.2d 981(2005) (Nonparties could intervene in withdrawn cases
to challenge protective orders when the trial court that
issued the orders ‘‘had inherent power to vacate or
modify [them] in the withdrawn cases—even though
[presumably], by operation of [the applicable statute],
the court otherwise had been divested of its authority
to affect the substantive rights of the parties to those
cases—as long as those protective orders remained in
effect. To conclude otherwise would . . . ignore both
the court’s inherent common-law authority to vacate
or modify its own equitable orders and the . . . public
interest in documents filed with the court in connection
with its adjudicatory function.’’)
The plaintiff argues that Valvo is distinguishable from
the present case because it involved an administrative
appeal, whereas the present case involves an action for
a writ of mandamus. The plaintiff contends that a
court’s powers in a mandamus action are not as limited
as they are in an administrative appeal.8 The plaintiff
asserts that, given a trial court’s broad equitable powers
to issue a writ of mandamus and our decision in Lechner,
in which we acknowledged that an action for a writ of
mandamus is the proper vehicle for obtaining court
transcripts; Lechner v. Holmberg, supra, 165 Conn.
157–58; his action is justiciable because practical relief
is available to him. We disagree.
General Statutes § 52-485 (a) provides that ‘‘[t]he
Superior Court may issue a writ of mandamus in any
case in which a writ of mandamus may by law be
granted, and may proceed therein and render judgment
according to rules made by the judges of the Superior
Court or, in default thereof, according to the course of
the common law.’’ Although the statute confers broad
power on our trial courts to issue writs of mandamus,
it cannot be used as a vehicle to create jurisdiction
where it does not otherwise exist. See, e.g., Connecticut
Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Milano, 191 Conn. 555,
559, 468 A.2d 1230 (1983) (‘‘[a] trial court that has the
competency to adjudicate what duties can be compelled
by mandamus has subject matter jurisdiction’’ (empha-
sis added)).
In this regard, this court’s decision in Mendillo v.
Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, supra, 329 Conn. 515, is
instructive. In that case, we held that a declaratory
judgment action before a trial court seeking to undo
another trial court’s protective order was nonjusticiable
because no practical relief could be granted. Id., 527.
Although broad power to issue a declaratory judgment
is vested in our trial courts under General Statutes § 52-
29 (a),9 we held that ‘‘[a] declaratory judgment action
is not . . . a procedural panacea for use on all occa-
sions, but, rather, is limited to solving justiciable contro-
versies. . . . Invoking § 52-29 does not create
jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 524. Looking to our
prior jurisprudence, we emphasized that, although ‘‘the
declaratory judgment procedure . . . may be
employed in a justiciable controversy . . . the determi-
nation of the controversy must be capable of resulting
in practical relief . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.; see also Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110,
116, 617 A.2d 433 (1992) (‘‘[A] declaratory judgment
must rest on some cause of action that would be cogni-
zable in a nondeclaratory suit. . . . To hold otherwise
would convert our declaratory judgment statute and
rules into a convenient route for procuring an advisory
opinion on [nonjusticiable] questions . . . and would
mean that the . . . statute and rules created substan-
tive rights that did not otherwise exist.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.)).
Likewise, a writ of mandamus is not ‘‘a procedural
panacea for use on all occasions’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost,
LLP, supra, 329 Conn. 524; and does not relieve the
plaintiff from justiciability requirements. As we have
explained, justiciability goes to a court’s competency
to adjudicate a particular matter. See, e.g., Connecticut
Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v.
Rell, supra, 295 Conn. 254. When justiciability is raised,
the burden rests on the plaintiff to show that his or her
claim is justiciable, regardless of the nature of the claim
or procedural vehicle utilized in pursuing it. See, e.g.,
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265
Conn. 430 n.12; see also Wozniak v. Colchester, 193
Conn. App. 842, 853–54, 220 A.3d 132 (conducting justi-
ciability analysis with respect to mandamus action and
concluding that appeal was not moot), cert. denied, 334
Conn. 906, 220 A.3d 37 (2019). Accordingly, when a
plaintiff brings an impermissible collateral attack on
another trial court’s sealing order by way of an action
for a writ of mandamus, no practical relief can be
granted, and the court lacks the competency to adjudi-
cate the matter.
For the same reason, the plaintiff’s reliance on Lechner
is unavailing. In Lechner, the plaintiff brought a manda-
mus action to compel the release of certain transcripts
in the possession of the court reporter, court clerk, and
chief judge of the Circuit Court after the Circuit Court
had ordered that the transcripts be released to him.
Lechner v. Holmberg, supra, 165 Conn. 154. We con-
cluded that, because ‘‘[c]ourt reporters generally have
a ministerial duty to furnish transcripts to parties,’’ a
mandamus action was proper to compel the defendants
to produce the transcripts. Id., 157–58. We, however,
ultimately reversed the trial court’s grant of mandamus
in light of our determination that the defendants were
precluded by statute from producing the transcripts.
Id., 162. Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, Lechner
does not stand for the broad proposition that a plaintiff
can bring a mandamus action requesting the trial court
to revoke, undo, or ignore a sealing order imposed by
a different trial court in a separate proceeding. Although
an action for a writ of mandamus is a proper vehicle
for obtaining court transcripts, that is so only when the
action is not a collateral attack on a court order entered
in a different case.10
Finally, the plaintiff contends that a collateral attack
on the sealing order issued by the family court is permis-
sible under the circumstances of this case because the
oral sealing order was void ab initio. In support of his
contention, the plaintiff argues that the family court’s
failure to follow certain procedures for closing the
courtroom to the public under Practice Book § 25-59
deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction to close
the courtroom and to seal the transcripts. We disagree.
Generally, ‘‘[a]s a matter of law, in the absence of
jurisdiction over the parties, a judgment is void ab initio
and is subject to both direct and collateral attack.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reiner, Reiner &
Bendett, P.C. v. Cadle Co., 278 Conn. 92, 99 n.7, 897
A.2d 58 (2006). In Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 143
A.3d 578 (2016), this court held that ‘‘it is now well
settled that, [u]nless a litigant can show an absence of
subject matter jurisdiction that makes the prior judg-
ment of a tribunal entirely invalid, he or she must
resort to direct proceedings to correct perceived wrongs,’’
rather than to a collateral proceeding. (Emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 771–72.
We concluded that, to sustain a collateral attack on
a judgment, the lack of jurisdiction must be ‘‘entirely
obvious’’ and that the alleged deficiency ‘‘must amount
to a fundamental mistake that is so plainly beyond the
court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a
manifest abuse of authority.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 773; see also id. (‘‘[o]ur cases demonstrate
that it is extraordinarily rare for a tribunal’s jurisdiction
to be so plainly lacking that it is entirely obvious [that
a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction]’’ (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358,
363, 422 A.2d 271 (1979) (‘‘A court does not truly lack
subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to enter-
tain the action before it. . . . Lesser irregularities do
not make a final judgment void.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
Under the standard set forth in Sousa, we cannot
conclude that the family court’s jurisdiction over the
Dulos marital dissolution action was so lacking as to
be entirely obvious. To the contrary, our trial courts
have the broad power and competence to adjudicate
dissolution matters, to close their courtrooms to the
public, and to issue sealing orders. See, e.g., General
Statutes § 46b-1 (a) (family relations matters, including
marital dissolution actions, are within jurisdiction of
trial court); General Statutes § 46b-11 (‘‘Any case which
is a family relations matter may be heard in chambers
or, if a jury case, in a courtroom from which the public
and press have been excluded, if the judge hearing
the case determines that the welfare of any children
involved or the nature of the case so requires. The
records and other papers in any family relations matter
may be ordered by the court to be kept confidential
and not to be open to inspection except upon order of
the court or judge thereof for cause shown.’’); General
Statutes § 46b-49 (‘‘When it considers it necessary in
the interests of justice and the persons involved, the
court shall, upon the motion of either party or of counsel
for any minor children, direct the hearing of any [family
relations] matter . . . to be private. The court may
exclude all persons except the officers of the court, a
court reporter, the parties, their witnesses and their
counsel.’’); see also Practice Book § 25-59 (governing
closure of courtrooms in family matters); Practice Book
§ 25-59A (governing sealing of files and limiting disclo-
sure of documents in family matters). Accordingly,
because the family court had subject matter jurisdiction
over the Dulos marital dissolution action, it had jurisdic-
tion to issue the sealing order.
The plaintiff argues that the family court’s sealing
order is void ab initio because the court violated Prac-
tice Book § 25-59 in issuing the order.11 We disagree.
An error in applying such rules of practice or statutory
procedures is not even arguably jurisdictional and does
not affect a trial court’s competency to adjudicate the
type of action before it.12 See, e.g., Meinket v. Levinson,
193 Conn. 110, 115, 474 A.2d 454 (1984) (‘‘[In] this
appeal, the defendant attacks the validity of the original
judgment on the ground that the trial court rendered
judgment without requiring the plaintiff to produce
either an affidavit of debt or live testimony at a hearing
in damages. The defendant claims that by virtue of this
error the judgment was in excess of [the trial court’s]
jurisdiction, and therefore [the judgment is] unenforce-
able. We disagree. Such an error in applying the [rules
of practice] governing judgments following default is
not even arguably jurisdictional. . . . [A] court does
not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has com-
petence to entertain the action before it.’’ (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also
Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 729–30, 724 A.2d
1084 (1999) (‘‘[Section] 46b-1 . . . provides the [trial
court] with plenary and general subject matter jurisdic-
tion over legal disputes in ‘family relations matters,’
including alimony and support. General Statutes § 46b-
86 (a) provides the trial court with continuing jurisdic-
tion to modify support orders. Together, therefore,
these two statutes provided the trial court with subject
matter jurisdiction [to modify support orders]. Separate
and distinct from the question of whether a court has
jurisdictional power to hear and determine a support
matter, however, is the question of whether a trial court
properly applies § 46b-86 (a), that is, properly exercises
its statutory authority to act.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnotes omitted.)). See generally Reinke v. Sing, 328
Conn. 376, 390, 179 A.3d 769 (2018) (following reasoning
in Amodio concerning distinction between jurisdiction
and exercise of authority). As such, the family court’s
order sealing the transcripts in Dulos was not void ab
initio and is not open to collateral attack.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s action for
a writ of mandamus on the ground that it was nonjusti-
ciable.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and McDONALD
and MULLINS, Js., concurred.
1
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the
appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice
Book § 65-1.
2
General Statutes § 52-485 (a) provides: ‘‘The Superior Court may issue
a writ of mandamus in any case in which a writ of mandamus may by law
be granted, and may proceed therein and render judgment according to rules
made by the judges of the Superior Court or, in default thereof, according
to the course of the common law.’’
3
General Statutes § 51-61 (c) provides: ‘‘Each official court reporter and
court recording monitor shall, when requested, furnish to the court, to the
state’s attorney, to any party of record and to any other person, within a
reasonable time, a transcript as may be desired, except that, if the proceed-
ings were closed to the public, such official court reporter or court recording
monitor shall not furnish such transcript to such other person unless the
court in its discretion determines that such disclosure is appropriate.’’
4
The defendant represents that the attached transcript pages were sealed
due to ‘‘clerical error’’ and that, after the error was discovered but before
the defendant filed her motion to dismiss, the defendant sent the plaintiff
an electronic copy of the portion of the hearing that was not under seal.
The plaintiff claims that he became aware of the sealing order for the
first time when the defendant attached the transcript pages to her motion
to dismiss.
5
Practice Book §§ 25-59 and 25-59A govern closure of courtrooms and
sealing of files in family matters, respectively. The plaintiff relies on § 25-
59 (a), which provides that, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, there
shall be a presumption that courtroom proceedings shall be open to the
public’’ and § 25-59 (b), which provides that, ‘‘[e]xcept as provided in this
section and except as otherwise provided by law, the judicial authority shall
not order that the public be excluded from any portion of a courtroom pro-
ceeding.’’
6
As a preliminary matter, the plaintiff asks this court not to take judicial
notice of the certified transcript pages from the hearing. He argues that the
trial court erred in basing its decision to dismiss the action on those pages
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine how the ‘‘cleri-
cal error’’ was discovered and how the transcript was obtained by the Office
of the Attorney General. See footnote 4 of this opinion. We disagree. It is
well established that courts can take judicial notice of court transcripts.
See, e.g., State v. Gore, 342 Conn. 129, 139 n.9, 269 A.3d 1 (2022). In addition,
because the plaintiff did not produce any contrary evidence to contest that
a sealing order had, in fact, been imposed, the trial court was permitted to
rely on the transcript and to dismiss the plaintiff’s action without further
proceedings. See, e.g., Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 652, 974 A.2d 669(2009) (‘‘[i]f . . . evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to
dismiss conclusively establish[es] that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff
fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evi-
dence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings’’
(citation omitted)).
7
As we explained in Valvo, we do not suggest that ‘‘a ruling may be
overturned or modified only by the same judge that issued the original
ruling.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commis-
sion, supra, 294 Conn. 543 n.11.
8
The plaintiff relies on this factual difference and other differences to
argue that Valvo should not control the outcome of the present case. We
are not persuaded. Our holding in Valvo was largely premised on the well
established principles concerning a trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over
its own rulings, the importance of fairness to all interested parties, the
orderly administration of justice, and consistency and stability of judgments.
See Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 294 Conn. 545.
9
General Statutes § 52-29 (a) provides: ‘‘The Superior Court in any action
or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for
such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The
declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.’’
10
The plaintiff also argues that the defendant has a mandatory duty under
Lechner and § 51-61 (c) to produce the transcripts because the family court’s
sealing order is unlawful. The legality of the family court’s sealing order
does not change the fact that an order is in place, which precludes the
defendant from producing the transcripts under § 51-61 (c). The plaintiff’s
argument further exemplifies that he is seeking a collateral review of the
family court’s sealing order.
11
We express no opinion as to whether the family court violated any
rule of practice in issuing the sealing order. See, e.g., Mendillo v. Tinley,
Renehan & Dost, LLP, supra, 329 Conn. 525 (‘‘In deciding whether [a]
complaint presents a justiciable claim, we make no determination regarding
merits. Rather, we consider only whether the matter in controversy [is]
capable of being adjudicated by judicial power according to the aforestated
well established principles’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.))
12
The plaintiff also argues that the family court’s sealing order is void ab
initio because the family court’s issuance of the order was in derogation of
the constitutional principles that underlie Practice Book § 25-59. Again, we
reiterate that the family court’s sealing order is not open to a collateral
attack under the standard set forth in Sousa.