State v. Garrison (Dissent) ( 2024 )


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    State v. Garrison
    McDONALD, J., with whom ECKER, J., joins, dis-
    senting. This court today sets the troubling precedent
    that an intoxicated person admitted to a hospital for
    medical treatment, attached to an intravenous catheter
    (also called a IV), and informed that he should not leave
    until he has reached the point of medical sobriety, and
    subjected to a cumulative hour of questioning over a
    period of approximately four hours by five separate
    police officers, many of whom were in uniform or visi-
    bly carrying weapons, is nevertheless not in custody
    for purposes of Miranda.1
    In this certified appeal, this court must consider
    whether the defendant, Alexander A. Garrison, was in
    custody when he spoke with police officers during his
    admission to, and treatment in, the hospital. See State
    v. Garrison, 
    345 Conn. 959
    , 
    285 A.3d 52
     (2022). Further,
    if he was in custody, we must consider whether the
    trial court’s admission of the statements the defendant
    made during that interaction with the police was harm-
    less beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
    id.
     The Appellate
    Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded
    the case for a new trial after determining that the defen-
    dant was in custody when he spoke with the police.
    See State v. Garrison, 
    213 Conn. App. 786
    , 790, 841,
    
    278 A.3d 1085
     (2022). The Appellate Court also deter-
    mined that the improper admission of these statements
    was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.,
    790, 832, 840–41. I agree with the reasoning of the Appel-
    late Court and would affirm its judgment.
    The opinion of the Appellate Court thoroughly and
    accurately sets forth the facts and evidence considered
    by the trial court. The state contends that the Appellate
    Court’s judgment should be reversed because a ‘‘reason-
    able person in the defendant’s position would not believe
    that he was in police custody,’’ specifying, among other
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
     (1966).
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    State v. Garrison
    factors, that the defendant voluntarily sought admission
    at the hospital, he was never restrained or any restraint
    was ‘‘minor,’’ and, although the defendant spoke with
    a total of five police officers, the majority of the time,
    he spoke with only a single officer. The state also argues
    that the Appellate Court erred in finding that the admis-
    sion of the statements was not harmless beyond a rea-
    sonable doubt because ‘‘the state’s case was very strong
    and supported by overwhelming evidence . . . .’’ The
    defendant contends that the Appellate Court correctly
    determined that he was in custody when he spoke with
    police officers after admitting himself to the hospital
    and that the state has failed to demonstrate that the
    improper admission of the defendant’s statements was
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    My examination of the record and briefs, and consid-
    eration of the parties’ arguments, persuades me that this
    court should affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.
    Because the Appellate Court’s well reasoned opinion
    fully addresses both of the certified issues in this appeal,
    it would serve no useful purpose for me to repeat the
    discussion contained in that opinion. I therefore adopt
    the Appellate Court’s opinion as the proper statement
    of the issues and the applicable law and reasoning con-
    cerning both issues. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 
    330 Conn. 793
    , 799, 
    201 A.3d 389
     (2019).
    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SC20773

Filed Date: 10/15/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/9/2024