Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept. (Dissent) ( 2023 )

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CLARK v. WATERFORD, COHANZIE FIRE DEPARTMENT—DISSENT
ECKER, J., dissenting. The majority today adopts a
novel construction of an important and long-standing
statute, with severe consequences throughout Connect-
icut for innumerable municipal firefighters, police offi-
cers, and their survivors. General Statutes § 7-433c
provides that every ‘‘uniformed member’’ of a municipal
fire department and every ‘‘regular member’’ of a munic-
ipal police department hired before July 1, 1996, is enti-
tled to receive an array of valuable disability and
retirement benefits if they suffer any heath condition or
impairment as a result of heart or hypertension disease.1
These statutory benefits have existed since the early
1950s, and never once in the past seventy years has
this court or, to my knowledge, anyone else suggested
that the benefits were not available to all uniformed
members of any municipal fire department and all regu-
lar members of any municipal police department who
met the statutory criteria. Indeed, heart and hyperten-
sion benefits have been awarded to countless firefight-
ers and police officers under § 7-433c, in contested and
uncontested cases alike, without reference to the defini-
tion of ‘‘member’’ set forth in General Statutes § 7-425
(5).2 Until today.
The majority now holds that § 7-433c heart and hyper-
tension benefits are available only to those municipal
firefighters and police officers who fit the narrow defini-
tion of ‘‘member’’ set forth in § 7-425 (5). In my view,
the flaw in this conclusion is both unmistakable and
decisive: if the majority is correct, then the very same
definition of ‘‘member’’ would mean that heart and
hypertension benefits are available only to those fire-
fighters and police officers who receive pay from a
municipality that chooses to participate in the Connecti-
cut Municipal Employees Retirement System (CMERS),
General Statutes § 7-425 et seq. The named defendant,
the town of Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Department,3
accepts this consequence as a natural result of applying
§ 7-425 (5) to § 7-433c and argues that ‘‘limiting benefits
to those enrolled in [CMERS] is entirely proper.’’ The
majority is not so sanguine and resists the logic con-
ceded by the defendant. The majority agrees that the
legislature never intended to limit heart and hyperten-
sion benefits to CMERS members and even suggests
that such an interpretation would be absurd. But the
majority also concludes that it is not necessary to con-
strue § 7-433c to limit these benefits to CMERS mem-
bers because the sentence defining ‘‘member’’ in § 7-
425 (5) can be split in half, the CMERS requirement can
be excised, and only the second clause (the exclusion
of employees who work less than twenty hours per
week) would plainly and unambiguously apply to § 7-
433c.
The majority’s construction of the relevant statutes
is unsound because, simply put, either the entire defini-
tion applies to § 7-433c or none of it does. Indeed,
guided by General Statutes § 1-2z, I am left with little
doubt regarding the correct outcome in this case. The
statutes under consideration, far from being plain and
unambiguous with respect to the applicability of the
term ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) to ‘‘uniformed member’’
and ‘‘regular member’’ in § 7-433c, are quintessentially
ambiguous on that precise question. On the one hand,
§ 7-425 states that, unless otherwise provided, its defini-
tions apply to the part of the General Statutes in which
§ 7-433c is codified. On the other hand, virtually every
sentence of text in the relevant statutes casts substan-
tial doubt on the meaning that the majority deems obvi-
ous. The context provided by the broader statutory
schemes adds to that doubt. In the final analysis, the
language, legislative history, and remedial purpose of
§ 7-433c, and its relationship to the retirement system
created by § 7-425 et seq. (i.e., CMERS), demonstrates
that the definition of ‘‘member’’ does not apply to the
terms ‘‘uniformed member’’ and ‘‘regular member’’ in
§ 7-433c. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
I
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OUR CASE LAW
CONSTRUING § 7-433c
Before examining the language of the relevant stat-
utes, it is useful to briefly review what this court pre-
viously has said about the heart and hypertension
benefits scheme provided in § 7-433c. Since its enact-
ment in 1951 and subsequent amendment in 1953, the
statute now codified at § 7-433c has provided ‘‘special
compensation to qualifying policemen and firemen who
die or become disabled as a result of hypertension or
heart disease.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Chambers v. Electric Boat Corp., 283 Conn. 840, 858
n.11, 930 A.2d 653 (2007). Our court repeatedly has
observed that ‘‘[§] 7-433c was enacted ‘for the purpose
of placing [municipal firefighters and] policemen who
die or are disabled as a result of hypertension or heart
disease in the same position vis-à-vis compensation ben-
efits as [municipal firefighters and] policemen who die
or are disabled as a result of service related injuries.’ ’’
Lambert v. Bridgeport, 204 Conn. 563, 566–67, 529 A.2d
184 (1987), quoting Pyne v. New Haven, 177 Conn. 456,
460–61, 418 A.2d 899 (1979); accord King v. Sultar, 253
Conn. 429, 442, 754 A.2d 782 (2000); Maciejewski v. West
Hartford, 194 Conn. 139, 144, 146, 480 A.2d 519 (1984).
A municipal firefighter or police officer eligible for
heart and hypertension benefits ‘‘is not required to
prove that the [hypertension or] heart disease is caus-
ally connected to [his or her] employment . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ciarlelli v. Ham-
den, 299 Conn. 265, 276, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010). ‘‘The plain
language of § 7-433c demonstrates that a uniformed
member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular
member of a paid municipal police department [whose
employment began prior to July 1, 1996] is entitled to
benefits under the statute when the officer meets the
following requirements: (1) [the officer] has passed a
preemployment physical; (2) the preemployment physi-
cal failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or
heart disease; (3) [the officer] suffers either off duty or
on duty any condition or impairment of health; (4) the
condition or impairment of health was caused by hyper-
tension or heart disease; and (5) the condition or impair-
ment results in his death or his temporary or permanent,
total or partial disability. The statute contains no other
requirements to qualify for its benefits.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., 323 Conn.
607, 616–17, 149 A.3d 165 (2016).
The majority accurately and frankly acknowledges
the remedial character of § 7-433c. See footnote 11 of
the majority opinion and accompanying text. Indeed,
this characteristic has never been in doubt, and it is
the reason that case after case decided by this court
has observed that the statute ‘‘should be broadly con-
strued in favor of disabled employees.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Coughlin v. Stamford Fire Dept.,
334 Conn. 857, 863, 224 A.3d 1161 (2020). We also have
said that any limitation on the right of recovery must
be interpreted narrowly so as ‘‘not [to] impose greater
constraints on the benefits afforded to disabled police
officers and firefighters than the legislature has chosen
to adopt.’’ Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552, 559, 573
A.2d 1 (1990); see Costello v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 189,
194, 571 A.2d 93 (1990) (‘‘[b]ecause the Heart and Hyper-
tension Act is remedial legislation, we should not our-
selves enlarge [on] the limitations it imposes on
recovery’’).
The foregoing cases are merely representative. As I
previously mentioned, entitlement to heart and hyper-
tension benefits has been an area of frequent litigation
over the past seventy years. This fact is itself notewor-
thy because it places the defendant’s proposed con-
struction of the statute in historical perspective. Heart
and hypertension benefits have been very costly to
municipalities over the years, so much so that the legis-
lature adopted a sunset provision putting an eventual
end to them,4 and municipalities always have had a
strong financial incentive to seek to avoid paying these
benefits by advancing every plausible argument, includ-
ing an argument that the statutory language in § 7-433c
is limited by the definitional terms in § 7-425. Yet, until
now, there never has been any doubt that the benefits
conferred by § 7-433c are available to all uniformed
firefighters and regular police officers hired before July
1, 1996, regardless of whether the employing municipal-
ity chooses to participate in CMERS or the employee
works part-time.5 Indeed, these benefits historically
have been awarded to firefighters and police officers
who clearly were not members of CMERS. See, e.g.,
Lambert v. Bridgeport, supra, 204 Conn. 566, 571 (uphold-
ing award under § 7-433c to police officer who was
beneficiary of pension plan established pursuant to pen-
sion agreement ‘‘not promulgated under [CMERS]’’
(emphasis added)).
There is no statute of limitations barring originality
in statutory construction, and it may be possible that
the plain meaning of § 7-433c has been hiding in plain
sight for the past seventy years. But the sheer novelty
of the defendant’s claim, particularly against a back-
ground of settled expectations, suggests to me that we
should approach its legal theory with great caution.
II
SECTION 1-2z ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT
AND STATUTORY CONTEXT OF
§§ 7-425 (5) AND 7-433c
The defendant claims that the right to recover heart
and hypertension benefits under § 7-433c is limited by
the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5). The sole basis
for this claim is that § 7-433c is codified in the same
part of the General Statutes as § 7-425, which provides
in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he following words and phrases
as used in this part, except as otherwise provided, shall
have the following meanings . . . .’’ Although the plain
language of § 7-425 provides that it shall apply to all
‘‘words and phrases as used in this part,’’ the principles
of statutory construction codified in § 1-2z instruct that
we must examine the entire text of the relevant statutes,
their relationship to other statutes and, if necessary, the
potential absurdity and unworkability of the proffered
construction. These steps are not suspended because
one of the statutes under review contains a statutorily
defined term, especially one that applies ‘‘except as
otherwise provided . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-425.
As a matter of fact, this court has declined to apply
statutory definitions on multiple occasions after con-
ducting the appropriate § 1-2z analysis. As we have
observed, when the applicability of a statutory defini-
tion is at issue, ‘‘[t]he [threshold] question . . . is
whether the statutory definition applies in the first
instance.’’ (Emphasis added.) Commissioner of Envi-
ronmental Protection v. Mellon, 286 Conn. 687, 693 n.7,
945 A.2d 464 (2008). To resolve this question, we must
consider the statutory definition within the context of
the statutory scheme as a whole and the purpose it was
designed to serve to determine whether its application
is plausible, logical, rational, or will yield absurd and
unworkable results. See, e.g., Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn.
642, 665–67, A.3d (2023) (declining to apply
statutory definition of ‘‘municipal clerk’’ when textual
and contextual considerations, including impracticality
of literal definition, indicated that different meaning
was intended); 418 Meadow Street Associates, LLC v.
Clean Air Partners, LLC, 304 Conn. 820, 831 n.11, 43
A.3d 607 (2012) (concluding that statutory definition of
term ‘‘ ‘interest’ . . . quite simply [did not apply]
because such an application would be nonsensical’’);
Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Mellon,
supra, 691, 693–95 (concluding that statutory definition
of term ‘‘person’’ did not apply to statute in same chap-
ter because application would create redundancy in
text and contravene statute’s broader purpose and legis-
lative intent); DaimlerChrysler Services North America,
LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 274 Conn.
196, 205–209, 875 A.2d 28 (2005) (concluding that statu-
tory definition of term ‘‘retailer’’ did not apply to tax
credit under statutory scheme); State v. Stephenson, 207
Conn. App. 154, 181–84, 263 A.3d 101 (2021) (concluding
that statutory definition of term ‘‘physical evidence’’ did
not apply to crime of tampering or fabricating physical
evidence), cert. denied, 342 Conn. 912, 272 A.3d 198(2022).
In the present case, a proper § 1-2z analysis raises
serious doubts about whether the definition of ‘‘mem-
ber’’ in § 7-425 (5) was intended to apply to § 7-433c. The
definitions in § 7-425 are part of the statutory framework
governing the administration of CMERS. See Maturo v.
State Employees Retirement Commission, 326 Conn.
160, 172, 162 A.3d 706 (2017). Subdivision (5) of the
statute manifestly serves that purpose. It begins by des-
ignating a general category of ‘‘regular employee[s] or
elective officer[s]’’ who qualify as ‘‘member[s]’’ under
CMERS and then excludes certain subsets of those per-
sons from the scope of that definition. General Statutes
§ 7-425 (5). Under § 7-425 (5), a ‘‘member’’ means, in
relevant part, ‘‘any regular employee or elective officer
receiving pay from a participating municipality . . .
who has been included by such municipality in the
pension plan as provided in section 7-427, but shall
not include any person who customarily works less than
twenty hours a week if such person entered employ-
ment after September 30, 1969 . . . . ’’ (Emphasis
added.)
The meaning of this definition, in my view, is clear.
To be a ‘‘member,’’ a municipal employee or elective
officer must be paid by a ‘‘participating municipality.’’
A ‘‘participating municipality’’ is defined in § 7-425 (2)
as ‘‘any municipality that has accepted this part, as
provided in section 7-427 . . . .’’ Section 7-427, in turn,
is the provision at the center of the statutory scheme
establishing CMERS; it permits a municipality to opt
into CMERS and to designate which of its departments
will participate in the retirement fund.6 Some of the
largest municipalities in Connecticut (New Haven and
Waterbury, for example) do not participate in CMERS.
Other municipalities, such as Hartford and Stamford,
participate as to certain of their municipal employees
but do not include their fire or police personnel in the
fund.7 As the Appellate Court correctly concluded on
the basis of this statutory scheme, the threshold require-
ment for any municipal employee to fall within the
definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) is employment by
a municipality that participates in CMERS. See Clark
v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., 206 Conn. App. 223,
241, 261 A.3d 97 (2021) (‘‘[a]s a result [of the statutory
definitions in § 7-425], and significantly for purposes of
our analysis, a member within the meaning of [§ 7-425
(2) and (5)] refers only to those regular employees or
elective officers who receive pay from a municipality
that participates in the retirement fund’’ (emphasis in
original)).
The majority appears to conclude that the relevant
portion of the single sentence definition of ‘‘member’’
in § 7-425 (5) can be separated into two independent
parts. It proposes that the first clause, which defines
‘‘member[s]’’ as employees of municipalities that partic-
ipate in CMERS, does not apply to § 7-433c because it
conflicts with the portions of § 7-433c that indicate that
heart and hypertension benefits are available to munici-
pal firefighters and police officers regardless of the
retirement program ‘‘under which [the employee] is
covered . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-433c (a). It then
concludes that the second clause of § 7-425 (5), which
excludes from the definition of ‘‘member’’ those persons
who work less than twenty hours per week, can func-
tion independently of the threshold criterion in the first
clause, which requires CMERS participation. The major-
ity posits that the second clause, operating indepen-
dently, excludes part-time, non-CMERS firefighters and
police officers from receiving § 7-433c heart and hyper-
tension benefits.
These two clauses cannot be disaggregated in the
manner suggested by the majority. The exclusion con-
tained in the second clause is not independent and
freestanding but, rather, operates to limit the general
category of persons designated in the first clause; a
‘‘member’’ is a person who is paid by a participating
municipality—a participant in CMERS—who custom-
arily works twenty hours or more per week. The majori-
ty’s contrary view violates basic principles of statutory
construction by splitting a unitary definition into two
separate parts, discarding the core part of the definition
and retaining only the exception. See Stratford Police
Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, 343
Conn. 62, 79, 272 A.3d 639 (2022) (rejecting plaintiff’s
reliance on latter part of statutory definition at expense
of first part of definition and considering entire defini-
tion in statutory analysis); Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269
Conn. 802, 810, 850 A.2d 114 (2004) (‘‘[a] statute is
enacted as a whole and must be read as a whole rather
than as separate parts or sections’’).
In support of its construction, the majority contends
that ‘‘§ 7-425 (5) uses punctuation to phrase separately
its exclusion of ‘any person who customarily works
less than twenty hours a week if such person entered
employment after September 30, 1969,’ from its descrip-
tion of a ‘member’ as one who ‘receiv[es] pay from a
participating municipality . . . .’ ’’ I cannot deny that
the definition contains two clauses and uses punctua-
tion (a comma), but the meaning of those constituent
parts is what matters, and it is clear to me from the
syntax that the two clauses work together and are not
severable. See United States National Bank of Oregon
v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 454–55, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 124 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1993)
(‘‘[A] purported [plain meaning] analysis based only on
punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk
of distorting a statute’s true meaning. . . . Over and
over we have stressed that [i]n expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member
of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law, and to its object and policy. . . . No more than
isolated words or sentences is punctuation alone a reli-
able guide for discovery of a statute’s meaning. Statu-
tory construction is a holistic endeavor . . . and, at a
minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, lan-
guage as well as punctuation, structure, and subject
matter.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)). Construing the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-
425 (5) as a whole—as we must—results in the logical
and inevitable conclusion that, if the definition applies
to § 7-433c, then heart and hypertension benefits are
available only to those firefighters and police officers
who are employed by a municipality that participates
in CMERS and who customarily work twenty hours or
more per week.
With the unitary nature of this definition in mind, I
believe that the majority concedes the match when it
acknowledges that ‘‘the language of § 7-433c is—at best—
ambiguous with respect to the issue of whether a fire-
fighter or police officer must be employed by a ‘partici-
pating municipality,’ given the ample references in § 7-
433c to the retirement system under which the employee
is covered, which is broader in concept than a simple
reference to the [CMERS] retirement fund.’’ The major-
ity, in other words, agrees that the text of § 7-433c
demonstrates that heart and hypertension benefits are
not limited to CMERS members. Because the definition
of ‘‘member’’ includes only CMERS participants, the
majority’s own analysis of § 7-433c compels the conclu-
sion that the statutory scheme is ‘‘at best’’ ambiguous
as to whether the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5)
was intended to apply to § 7-433c at all.
I agree with the majority that the statutory scheme,
taken as a whole, is at the very least ambiguous as to
whether a firefighter or police officer claiming heart
and hypertension benefits must be employed by a
municipality that participates in CMERS. Extensive tex-
tual evidence indicates that heart and hypertension bene-
fits were intended to be available to all eligible firefight-
ers and police officers, regardless of the retirement
system under which they are covered. The sheer volume
of this evidence demonstrates why we should be
extremely skeptical that the legislature ever intended
the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) to govern health
and hypertension benefits under § 7-433c.
Section 7-433c (a) provides that the eligible employee
‘‘shall receive from his municipal employer compensa-
tion and medical care in the same amount and the same
manner as that provided under chapter 568 . . . from
the municipal or state retirement system under which
he is covered . . . . The benefits provided by this sec-
tion shall be in lieu of any other benefits which such
policeman or fireman or his dependents may be entitled
to receive from his municipal employer under the provi-
sions of chapter 568 or the municipal or state retire-
ment system under which he is covered . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) I agree with the majority that these
ample references to ‘‘municipal or state retirement sys-
tem’’ strongly suggest that the legislature did not intend
for heart and hypertension benefits under § 7-433c to be
restricted solely to those firefighters and police officers
employed by a ‘‘participating municipality.’’
The majority also observes, and I further agree, that
‘‘the independent definition in § 7-433c (a) of the term
‘municipal employer’ by reference to [General Statutes]
§ 7-467, as the entity liable to pay the benefits, is itself
broader than ‘participating municipality.’ ’’ See General
Statutes § 7-467 (1) (defining ‘‘municipal employer’’ as
‘‘any political subdivision of the state, including any
town, city, borough, district, district department of
health, school board, housing authority or other
authority established by law, a private nonprofit corpo-
ration which has a valid contract with any town, city,
borough or district to extinguish fires and to protect its
inhabitants from loss by fire, and any person or persons
designated by the municipal employer to act in its inter-
est in dealing with municipal employees’’ (emphasis
added)).8
There is additional evidence of ambiguity, both in
the text of § 7-433c and in other parts of the broader
statutory scheme, that raises still more doubt as to
whether the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) was
intended to apply to the terms ‘‘uniformed member’’
and ‘‘regular member’’ in § 7-433c. Section 7-433c, for
its part, begins with a robust and unqualified declaration
of exclusive dominion over the subject of heart and
hypertension benefits: ‘‘[n]otwithstanding any provision of
chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, spe-
cial act or ordinance to the contrary . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) General Statutes § 7-433c (a). This broad, pre-
emptive language reasonably could be understood to
reflect a legislative intention that heart and hyperten-
sion benefits should be made available free from any
statutory limitation that might otherwise apply. See
Velez v. Commissioner of Correction, 250 Conn. 536,
544, 738 A.2d 604 (1999) (‘‘the phrase ‘[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of the [G]eneral [S]tatutes’ ’’ overrides
contrary statutory provisions (emphasis omitted)); cf.
National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.,
580 U.S. 288, 302, 137 S. Ct. 929, 197 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2017)
(‘‘[a] ‘notwithstanding’ clause [in a statute] . . . shows
which of two or more provisions prevails in the event
of a conflict’’); Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508
U.S. 10, 18, 113 S. Ct. 1898, 123 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1993)
(‘‘As [the court has] noted previously in construing stat-
utes, the use of . . . a ‘notwithstanding’ clause . . .
override[s] conflicting provisions of any other section.
. . . [A] clearer statement [of legislative intent] is diffi-
cult to imagine.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
Ambiguity in the broader statutory scheme is also
apparent when § 7-433c is viewed in relation to other
statutes relating to heart and hypertension benefits.
General Statutes § 5-145a provides heart and hyperten-
sion benefits to certain state employees, including
‘‘member[s] of the security force or fire department of
The University of Connecticut’’ and ‘‘member[s] of the
Office of State Capitol Police . . . .’’ Section 5-145a is
not codified in the same part of the General Statutes
as § 7-425, and, therefore, the term ‘‘member’’ in the
former statute is not restricted by the definition in § 7-
425 (5). It would be anomalous for the legislature to
provide heart and hypertension benefits to state fire-
fighters and police officers regardless of their part-time
status, but to restrict the same benefits for municipal
firefighters and police officers on that basis. See, e.g.,
LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828, 838, 144 A.3d 373(2016) (reading statutes on same subject matter in dif-
ferent part of statutory scheme harmoniously ‘‘to ensure
the coherency of our construction’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Likewise, volunteer municipal fire-
fighters are entitled to heart and hypertension benefits
under General Statutes § 7-314a, regardless of the munici-
pality’s participation in CMERS and the number of hours
customarily worked per week.9 I can perceive no reason
why the legislature would choose to extend these bene-
fits to part-time, volunteer firefighters, but not to part-
time firefighters and police officers who are paid for
their services.
Lastly, and importantly, our case law indicates that
the ambiguity analysis under § 1-2z also requires consid-
eration of whether a proposed interpretation is plausi-
ble as a matter of common sense within the statute’s
intended sphere of operation, which, in this case is the
provision of heart and hypertension benefits to munici-
pal firefighters and police officers in Connecticut. The
traditional principles of statutory construction codified
in § 1-2z do not permit us to substitute our own policy
preferences for those expressed by the legislature, but
we do not ignore practical and commonsensical consid-
erations when we assess the plausibility of competing
interpretations. See Cohen v. Rossi, supra, 346 Conn.
665–67 (concluding that statutory text was unambigu-
ous in light of practical factors involving operation of
municipal clerk’s office); Seramonte Associates, LLC
v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 91, 282 A.3d 1253 (2022)
(rejecting proposed construction of ‘‘the word ‘sub-
mit’ ’’ in part because of practical considerations regard-
ing incentive of taxpayers to ensure ‘‘that municipal
assessors obtain necessary information in a timely fash-
ion’’); Casey v. Lamont, 338 Conn. 479, 493, 258 A.3d
647 (2021) (considering commonsense implications of
statutory construction before resorting to extratextual
sources to glean legislature’s intent); Board of Educa-
tion v. State Board of Education, 278 Conn. 326, 337,
898 A.2d 170 (2006) (‘‘[i]n construing a statute, common
sense must be used and courts must assume that a
reasonable and rational result was intended’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The majority appears to conclude, as did the Appel-
late Court, that it defies common sense to construe
these statutes to limit heart and hypertension benefits
to firefighters and police officers employed by munici-
palities that participate in CMERS. See Clark v. Water-
ford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., supra, 206 Conn. App. 242.
I cannot think of a reason why the legislature would
limit heart and hypertension benefits in such a manner,
and neither the majority nor the defendant has offered
any reason that would explain such a seemingly arbi-
trary result. The absence of any such explanation is
especially troubling in light of the remedial purpose of
§ 7-433c and the real-world consequences of the majori-
ty’s holding. The majority’s restrictive construction of
§ 7-425 (5) may prove especially harmful to those fire-
fighters and police officers, hired before July 1, 1996,
who have planned their affairs in reasonable reliance
on the availability of these important benefits. For
example, individuals typically make decisions about the
need to purchase life, health or disability insurance
and make similar, forward-looking plans in light of the
employment benefits that they reasonably believe they
already possess. It seems highly unlikely that the fire-
fighters and police officers affected by today’s deci-
sion—those hired prior to July 1, 1996—will be able
to obtain affordable, substitute protection for the lost
benefits at this point in their lives. As a result of the
majority’s decision, the payment of heart and hyperten-
sion benefits to future claimants employed by nonpar-
ticipating municipalities is thrown into doubt, and there
may even be serious question regarding the continua-
tion of past awards payable in the future to non-CMERS
firefighters, police officers, and their survivors.10
III
EXTRATEXTUAL EVIDENCE OF
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
A thorough review of the history, purpose, and legisla-
tive intent animating § 7-433c leads me to conclude that
the terms ‘‘uniformed member’’ and ‘‘regular member’’
do not incorporate the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-
425 (5) but, instead, must be accorded their natural
and ordinary meanings without reference to the latter
statute. See General Statutes § 1-1 (a) (‘‘[i]n the con-
struction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be
construed according to the commonly approved usage
of the language’’). There is simply nothing in the legisla-
tive history to suggest any intention to restrict the avail-
ability of heart and hypertension benefits to firefighters
and police officers employed by a limited class of munici-
palities. To the contrary, the benefits clearly were intended
for all eligible firefighters and police officers, regardless
of whether they are employed by a municipality that
participates in CMERS or work less than twenty hours
per week.
As I previously explained, the purpose of § 7-433c was
to confer heart and hypertension benefits on municipal
firefighters and police officers who meet the statutory
requirements set forth in § 7-433c, regardless of whether
the heart condition or hypertension was caused by, or
even related to, the municipal firefighter’s or police
officer’s employment. The first version of the heart and
hypertension benefits statute was enacted in 1951 and
originally provided these benefits to ‘‘uniformed mem-
ber[s]’’ of ‘‘paid fire department[s] . . . .’’11 Public Acts
1951, No. 220. The legislative history from 1951 is rela-
tively sparse as it pertains specifically to the word
‘‘member,’’ but it is evident that heart and hypertension
benefits were intended to apply to all municipalities
across the state and that ‘‘member’’ took on a plain
meaning. See, e.g., Proposed Senate Bill No. 736, 1951
Sess. (‘‘STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: [t]he purpose of
this act is to provide for firemen whose health is
impaired by hypertension or heart disease while mem-
bers of any city fire department’’ (emphasis added)).12
The version of the bill that was ultimately enacted
in 1951 by the legislature used language that broadly
provided that, ‘‘[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any
general statute or special act to the contrary affecting
the noncontributory or contributory retirement systems
of any municipality of the state as defined by section
680 of the general statutes, any condition of impairment
of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting
in total or partial disability to a uniformed member
of a paid fire department of such municipality who
successfully passed a physical examination on entry
into such service, which examination failed to reveal
any evidence of such condition, shall be presumed to
have been suffered in line of duty.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Public Acts 1951, No. 220. General Statutes (1949 Rev.)
§ 680 defined ‘‘municipality’’ in relevant part as ‘‘each
town, consolidated town and city, consolidated town
and borough, city, [or] borough . . . upon which is
placed by law the duty of, or which has itself assumed
the duty of, protecting its inhabitants from loss of fire.
. . .’’ As the statute was amended to include police and
to strengthen the presumption that these conditions
were sustained in the line of duty, this expansive lan-
guage carried through.13
In 1971, when the statute was renumbered § 7-433c,
the language changed slightly from these earlier ver-
sions, but, as is still the case today, the statute incorpo-
rated the broad definition of ‘‘municipal employer’’ from
§ 7-467 in its scheme and the broad phrase ‘‘municipal
or state retirement system under which he is covered’’
when discussing the administration of benefits. See
Public Acts 1971, No. 524, § 1.14 The legislature in 1971
also discussed the purpose behind the provision of heart
and hypertension benefits: to address ‘‘the unusual risk
attendant to police and fire work and to provide these
benefits for the men who risk their lives for us each
and every day.’’ 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1971 Sess., p. 3525,
remarks of Representative Gerald F. Stevens; see 14 S.
Proc., Pt. 6, 1971 Sess., p. 2804, remarks of Senator
Wilber G. Smith (‘‘[W]e’re always talking about the haz-
ardous conditions of our policemen and our firemen.
[We’re] always talking about pouring in more moneys
for them to do a better job and to be more effective.
. . . [W]e also have to recognize that we’re also adding
and egging them on really, to move into and take care
of these hazardous positions. . . . [I]t ought to be rec-
ognized that . . . throughout their careers, [these]
policemen and firemen are indeed confronted more
seriously with hazardous conditions. And I move for
passage of . . . a vital piece of legislation, in support
of our local police and our local fire departments.’’).15
The legislature again took up the subject in the 1990s
and eventually restricted the benefits to make them
unavailable to firefighters and police officers employed
on or after July 1, 1996; see Public Acts 1996, No. 96-
231, § 2; it continued to express the importance of giving
the benefits to firefighters and police officers across
the state. See, e.g., 35 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1992 Sess.,
p. 1675, remarks of Representative Joseph A. Adamo
(‘‘Connecticut’s [h]eart and [h]ypertension [l]aws . . .
pertain to firefighters and police officers who serve in
our municipalities in the [s]tate of Connecticut’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); id., pp. 1700–1701,
remarks of Representative Dale W. Radcliffe (‘‘[e]very
individual who is subject to the special benefit of [§]
7-433c today, will remain subject to the special benefits
. . . for the balance of the time that that individual is
employed by a police department or by a municipal fire
department in the [s]tate of Connecticut’’ (emphasis
added)); see also, e.g., 39 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1996 Sess., p.
2570, remarks of Senator Louis C. DeLuca (‘‘[t]his is
the so-called grandfather bill on heart and hypertension
whereby all new hires [on or] after July 1, 1996 would
not be under the heart and hypertension law, but all
those now currently employed as paid firemen, police
in the [s]tate of Connecticut in municipal depart-
ments, would still be under the heart and hypertension
law’’ (emphasis added)).
The foregoing legislative history reflects that the leg-
islature’s purpose behind the statute has always been
expansive and remedial, and the available evidence indi-
cates that the benefits were intended to extend to fire-
fighters and police officers in all municipalities. There
is no suggestion anywhere in the legislative history that
the legislature intended to limit the benefits only to
firefighters and police officers employed by municipali-
ties that participate in CMERS. It is implausible and
unrealistic to believe that the legislature would enact
such an important (not to mention seemingly arbitrary
and inexplicable) restriction without so much as a men-
tion anywhere in the legislative materials spanning decades.
See King v. Sultar, supra, 253 Conn. 442–43 (giving
weight to silence in legislative history when determining
whether city employer could intervene in case involving
§ 7-433c benefits).
Heart and hypertension benefits have been around
since 1951, and there has been extensive debate within
the General Assembly since then as to the many aspects
of the statutory scheme. The history reflects significant
discussion among supporters and dissenters alike from
major cities across Connecticut, including those not
participating in CMERS, such as Bridgeport and New
Haven, about exactly how costly these benefits are to
municipalities for eligible firefighters and police offi-
cers. See 35 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 1688–89, remarks of
Representative Radcliffe (‘‘[W]e have to look very hard
at what this special benefit has cost to our municipali-
ties. . . . We’re talking in [f]iscal [y]ear[s] 1989, and
1990, for example, in the [c]ity of Bridgeport, combined
benefits [were] $1,700,000. New Haven, $1,100,000.
West Haven, a distressed municipality, $204,000. And
these numbers . . . represent [a] cost to each and
every municipal taxpayer in the [s]tate of Connecti-
cut.’’); Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor
and Public Employees, Pt. 3, 1996 Sess., p. 824, testi-
mony of Dennis Murphy, chief administrative officer of
the city of Bridgeport (‘‘I would like to say in . . .
Bridgeport . . . heart and hypertension [benefits are]
a burden that we continue to bear. . . . I would just,
on behalf of those taxpayers, request this body to find
the extraordinary responsibility to fund this benefit
should you choose to continue it.’’).
Notwithstanding this extensive historical record doc-
umenting the numerous occasions of legislative consid-
eration and reconsideration of the statutory scheme
over many years, not a single person once said or sug-
gested that these benefits are available only to some
firefighters and police officers, namely, those employed
by municipalities participating in CMERS or those who
work a certain number of hours per week. There is
not even a single reference, anywhere in the legislative
history, to the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5).
In my estimation, it is virtually inconceivable that the
legislature would enact a law of this prominence with-
out any reference whatsoever to a fundamental feature
that so dramatically affects its scope.
In sum, the text and context of the relevant statutes,
the broad remedial purpose of § 7-433c, and the legisla-
tive history convince me that the definition of ‘‘member’’
in § 7-425 (5) does not apply to the heart and hyperten-
sion statute. The terms ‘‘uniformed member’’ and ‘‘regu-
lar member’’ in § 7-433c instead mean what everyone
has understood them to mean for the past seventy years,
and do not restrict the availability of heart and hyperten-
sion benefits to firefighters and police officers paid by
municipalities that participate in CMERS or to those
who customarily work twenty hours or more per week.
See Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Rela-
tions, 217 Conn. 110, 126–27, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991) (‘‘[a]
statute . . . should not be interpreted to thwart its pur-
pose’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is no
indication in the statutory scheme that the legislature
intended to limit heart and hypertension benefits to
‘‘member[s],’’ as defined by § 7-425 (5), and ‘‘[this court]
should not [itself] enlarge [on] the limitations [§ 7-433c]
imposes on recovery.’’ Costello v. Fairfield, supra, 214
Conn. 194.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1
General Statutes § 7-433c provides: ‘‘(a) Notwithstanding any provision
of chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special act or ordinance
to the contrary, in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire
department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department who
successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which
examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease,
suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health
caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his tempo-
rary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents, as the
case may be, shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and
medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided
under chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury
which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was suffered
in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment, and from the
municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, he or his
dependents, as the case may be, shall receive the same retirement or survivor
benefits which would be paid under said system if such death or disability
was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of
his employment, and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope
of his employment. If successful passage of such a physical examination
was, at the time of his employment, required as a condition for such employ-
ment, no proof or record of such examination shall be required as evidence
in the maintenance of a claim under this section or under such municipal
or state retirement systems. The benefits provided by this section shall be
in lieu of any other benefits which such policeman or fireman or his depen-
dents may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer under the
provisions of chapter 568 or the municipal or state retirement system under
which he is covered, except as provided by this section, as a result of any
condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease
resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disabil-
ity. As used in this section, ‘municipal employer’ has the same meaning as
provided in section 7-467.
‘‘(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section,
those persons who began employment on or after July 1, 1996, shall not be
eligible for any benefits pursuant to this section.’’
2
General Statutes § 7-425 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following words
and phrases as used in this part, except as otherwise provided, shall have
the following meanings:
***
‘‘(5) ‘Member’ means any regular employee or elective officer receiving
pay from a participating municipality, and any regular employee of a free
public library that receives part or all of its income from municipal appropria-
tion, who has been included by such municipality in the pension plan as
provided in section 7-427, but shall not include any person who customarily
works less than twenty hours a week if such person entered employment
after September 30, 1969, any police officer or firefighter who will attain
the compulsory retirement age after less than five years of continuous
service in fund B, any teacher who is eligible for membership in the state
teachers retirement system, any person eligible for membership in any pen-
sion system established by or under the authority of any special act or of
a charter adopted under the provisions of chapter 99, or any person holding
a position funded in whole or in part by the federal government as part of
any public service employment program, on-the-job training program or
work experience program, provided persons holding such federally funded
positions on July 1, 1978, shall not be excluded from membership but may
elect to receive a refund of their accumulated contributions without inter-
est . . . .’’
3
The defendant Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management Agency is not
a party to this appeal. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion. All references
in this opinion to the defendant are to the town of Waterford, Cohanzie
Fire Department.
4
See Public Acts 1996, No. 96-231, §§ 1 and 2 (amending subsection (b)
of § 7-433c to provide that municipal firefighters and police officers whose
employment began on or after July 1, 1996, are ineligible for heart and
hypertension benefits); see also 39 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1996 Sess., p. 2571, remarks
of Senator Louis C. DeLuca (‘‘This [amendment] would bring some sort of
relief to the municipalities. We’ve talked about state mandates and unfunded
state mandates. This is one of those that has been consistently a problem
[for] many of the major cities.’’).
5
To be sure, there have been skirmishes over eligibility for heart and
hypertension benefits around the margins. See, e.g., Holston v. New Haven
Police Dept., supra, 323 Conn. 614, 616–17 (police officer was eligible for
benefits after passing preemployment physical and suffering from disability
caused by heart disease); Genesky v. East Lyme, 275 Conn. 246, 253–59,
881 A.2d 114 (2005) (constable was not regular member of paid municipal
police department); Bucko v. New London, 13 Conn. App. 566, 569–71, 537
A.2d 1045 (1988) (temporary appointee to police force was regular member
of paid municipal police department). I consider it notable that our courts
never have looked to § 7-425 (5) for assistance in determining who is eligible
to receive these benefits under § 7-433c.
6
General Statutes § 7-427 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any municipality
except a housing authority, which is governed by subsection (b) of this
section or a regional workforce development board established under sec-
tion 31-3k, which is governed by section 7-427a, may, by resolution passed
by its legislative body and subject to such referendum as may be hereinafter
provided, accept this part as to any department or departments of such
municipality as may be designated therein, including elective officers if
so specified, free public libraries which receive part or all of their income
from municipal appropriation, and the redevelopment agency of such munici-
pality whether or not such municipality is a member of the system, as
defined in section 7-452, but such acceptance shall not repeal, amend or
replace, or affect the continuance of, any pension system established in
such municipality by or under the authority of any special act and all such
special acts shall remain in full force and effect until repealed or amended by
the General Assembly or as provided by chapter 99. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
7
See Office of the State Comptroller, Retiree Resources, ‘‘Who Is in
CMERS? Participating Municipalities,’’ available at https://www.osc.ct.gov/
rbsd/cmers/plandoc/MasterTownListSept132016.pdf (last visited June 14,
2023).
8
The majority concludes that, by expressly providing that the term ‘‘munic-
ipal employer,’’ as used in § 7-433c, has a particular meaning defined in § 7-
467, the legislature demonstrated that the word ‘‘member’’ must have the
meaning ascribed to it in § 7-425 (5) because, otherwise, a different definition
likewise would have been provided in § 7-433c. I would conclude instead
that, having defined ‘‘municipal employer’’ to clarify that all municipalities
are obligated to pay heart and hypertension benefits, there was no need to
provide additional definitions regarding which firefighters and police officers
are entitled to receive those benefits. In other words, because all municipali-
ties cannot mean only ‘‘participating municipalities,’’ the terms ‘‘uniformed
members’’ and ‘‘regular members’’ cannot mean only those ‘‘member[s],’’ as
that term is defined in § 7-425 (5). The statutory scheme is ambiguous
because, as the Appellate Court correctly pointed out, the broad definition
of ‘‘municipal employer’’ in § 7-467 indicates that heart and hypertension
benefits are available under § 7-433c to all ‘‘uniformed firefighters and regu-
lar police officers who are paid by municipalities that do not participate
in [CMERS].’’ Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., supra, 206 Conn.
App. 242.
9
See General Statutes § 7-314a (d) (conferring heart and hypertension
benefits on ‘‘an active member of a volunteer fire department or organization
certified as a volunteer ambulance service in accordance with section 19a-
180 while such member is in training for or engaged in volunteer fire duty
or such ambulance service’’).
10
At least one court has concluded that heart and hypertension benefits
are protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Smith v. East Lyme, Docket No. 527383, 1994 WL 133379, *5 (Conn. Super.
April 5, 1994) (§ 7-433c benefits are identifiable property right for cause of
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The question is not presented in this
case, and I express no opinion on its merits.
11
The definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) was codified in that same
chapter in 1945 and originally provided that ‘‘ ‘member’ shall mean any
regular employee or elective officer receiving pay from a participating munic-
ipality who has been included by such municipality in the pension plan as
provided in section 122h . . . .’’ General Statutes (Supp. 1945) § 121h. The
definition did not contain a limit as to the number of hours until 1969. See
Public Acts 1969, No. 408.
12
This proposed version of the bill contained the word ‘‘member’’ and
began with the following language: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of any
general or special law to the contrary affecting the non-contributory or
contributory retirement systems of any city of the state of Connecticut
. . . .’’ Proposed Senate Bill No. 736, 1951 Sess.
13
The 1961, 1967, and 1969 statutes all contained the following language:
‘‘For the purpose of the adjudication of claims for the payment of benefits
under the provisions of chapter [568] of the general statutes and the contribu-
tory or non-contributory retirement systems of any municipality . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1961, No. 330, § 1; accord Public Acts 1969,
No. 380, § 1; Public Acts 1967, No. 770, § 1. They defined ‘‘ ‘municipality’ ’’
as ‘‘any town, city, borough, fire district or other municipal corporation or
taxing district which provides police or fire protection to its inhabitants.’’
(Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1961, No. 330, § 1; accord Public Acts 1969,
No. 380, § 1; Public Acts 1967, No. 770, § 1.
14
The legislative history indicates that the reenactment came in response
not to the meaning of ‘‘member’’ changing but, rather, to this court’s striking
down the conclusive presumption added in 1969 as unconstitutional in
Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143, 285 A.2d 318 (1971). See 14 S.
Proc., Pt. 6, 1971 Sess., pp. 2803–2804, remarks of Senator Wilber G. Smith.
The history indicates that § 7-433c was enacted to carry out the clear and
consistent intent of the legislature as to the nature of these benefits. See id.
15
Later, there was also discussion that these benefits were intended to
place firefighters and police officers on equal footing with those seeking
workers’ compensation. See King v. Sultar, supra, 253 Conn. 442 (‘‘[the]
history of . . . the bill eventually enacted as P.A. 77-520, § 1, which amended
§ 7-433c, demonstrates that it was intended to place those policemen [or
firemen] who die or are disabled as a result of heart disease or hypertension
in the same position vis-à-vis compensation benefits as policemen [or fire-
men] who die or are disabled as a result of service related injuries’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). I find this latter point significant because nowhere
in the workers’ compensation realm are the benefits to firefighters and
police officers restricted only to those persons employed by municipalities
that participate in CMERS or persons who work a minimum number of
hours per week. See General Statutes § 31-275 (9) (A) (iv) (‘‘employee,’’ for
purposes of Workers’ Compensation Act, includes ‘‘[a] paid member of any
police department or fire department’’).