Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept. ( 2023 )

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CHRISTOPHER A. CLARK v. TOWN OF WATERFORD,
COHANZIE FIRE DEPARTMENT ET AL.
(SC 20630)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
Ecker and Alexander, Js.*
Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (§ 7-433c (a)), ‘‘a uniformed member of a paid municipal
fire department,’’ who successfully passed a physical examination that
failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease before
beginning such employment and then subsequently suffered any condi-
tion or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease
resulting in his disability, is entitled to ‘‘receive from his municipal
employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the
same manner as that provided under [the Workers’ Compensation Act]
. . . from the municipal or state retirement system under which he is
covered . . . . [These] benefits . . . shall be in lieu of any other bene-
fits which such . . . fireman . . . may be entitled to receive from his
municipal employer under the provisions of [the Workers’ Compensation
Act] or the municipal or state retirement system under which he is
covered . . . .’’
Pursuant further to statute (§ 7-433c (b)), ‘‘those persons who began employ-
ment on or after July 1, 1996, shall not be eligible for [heart and hyperten-
sion] benefits’’ under § 7-433c (a).
Pursuant further to statute (§ 7-425 (5)), ‘‘except as otherwise provided,’’
the word ‘‘member,’’ as used in part II of chapter 113 (title 7) of the
General Statutes, ‘‘means any regular employee . . . receiving pay from
a participating municipality . . . who has been included by such munici-
pality in the pension plan as provided in section 7-427, but shall not
include any person who customarily works less than twenty hours a
week . . . .’’
The named defendant, the town of Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Department,
appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which
upheld the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decision that the
plaintiff’s claim for heart and hypertension benefits was compensable
under § 7-433c (a). The town originally hired the plaintiff as a part-time
firefighter in 1992, prior to which he passed a physical examination that
revealed no evidence of heart disease or hypertension. In 1997, the town
hired the plaintiff as a full-time firefighter, and, in 2017, he suffered a
myocardial infarction and underwent quadruple bypass surgery. The
plaintiff then filed a claim under § 7-433c seeking compensation for his
heart disease, which the town contested as noncompensable on the
ground that the plaintiff had not been employed as a full-time firefighter
until 1997 and, therefore, did not qualify for benefits in light of § 7-433c
(b). At a hearing before the commissioner, the plaintiff testified that,
while employed as a part-time firefighter, he worked assigned shifts,
and the number of shifts he was assigned to work was irregular, but
he did not indicate the number of hours he customarily worked. The town
reasoned that benefits under § 7-433c are available only to a ‘‘uniformed
member of a paid municipal fire department’’ hired prior to July 1, 1996,
the term ‘‘member’’ in § 7-433c is controlled by the definition of that
term in § 7-425 (5), which excludes persons who customarily work less
than twenty hours per week, and, because the plaintiff failed to establish
that he customarily worked twenty hours or more per week when he
was employed as a part-time firefighter, he was not eligible for benefits.
The commissioner rejected the town’s claim and ordered it to accept
the plaintiff’s myocardial infarction as compensable. In doing so, the
commissioner made no finding as to the number of hours the plaintiff
worked per week as a part-time firefighter. Instead, the commissioner
noted that § 7-433c does not define the phrase ‘‘uniformed member of
a paid municipal fire department’’ or distinguish between part-time and
full-time employment and applied the common definition of the word
‘‘member’’ to conclude that the plaintiff’s date of employment was in
1992 and that he therefore was entitled to benefits. The board upheld
the commissioner’s award of benefits, and the town appealed to the
Appellate Court, which affirmed the board’s decision. The Appellate
Court observed that, although §§ 7-425 (5) and 7-433c are both contained
within part II of chapter 113 of the General Statutes, they do not concern
the same subject matter and could not be read together without reaching
an absurd result, insofar as § 7-425 (5) defines terms related to the
governance of the voluntary public pension plan provided by the state
for participating municipalities and their employees and elected officials,
including the term ‘‘member,’’ which is defined therein as a regular
employee who receives pay from a municipality that participates in that
state retirement fund, whereas § 7-433c (a) mandates that municipal
employers pay heart disease and hypertension benefits to qualified uni-
formed members of paid municipal fire departments, regardless of
whether the municipality participates in the state retirement fund. The
Appellate Court also concluded that the town’s interpretation would
lead to the absurd result that benefits under § 7-433c are available only
to uniformed firefighters employed and paid by municipalities that par-
ticipate in the state retirement fund. On the granting of certification,
the town appealed to this court.
Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the definition
of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) does not affect eligibility for heart and
hypertension benefits under § 7-433c, and, accordingly, this court
reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court:
When considered in context, the language of §§ 7-425 (5) and 7-433c
compelled the conclusion that the meaning of the word ‘‘member’’ in
§ 7-433c was controlled by the definition set forth in § 7-425 (5), especially
in view of the relationship between § 7-433c and other statutes, the
principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature, in amending or
enacting statutes, is presumed to have created a harmonious and consis-
tent body of law, and the absence of legislative history squarely support-
ing the proposition that the legislature did not intend the definition of
‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) to apply to § 7-433c.
Section 7-425 clearly and unambiguously provides that, ‘‘except as other-
wise provided,’’ it governs the meanings of the statutes in part II of
chapter 113 (title 7) of the General Statutes, that is the part of the General
Statutes that provides for the establishment of the state retirement fund,
tenets of statutory interpretation required this court to presume that the
legislature acted consciously when it codified § 7-433c with the governing
definitions in that part of the General Statutes, and, in view of the logical
and factual relationship between heart and hypertension benefits and
retirement benefits, as expressly and repeatedly recognized by the text
of § 7-433c (a), this court assumed that the placement of § 7-433c was
intentional, particularly when there were other logically suitable places
in the General Statutes where that statute could have been codified,
such as within the related provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Moreover, because the legislature specifically defined the operative term
‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5), this court was bound to accept that definition
unless it would create an irrational result that the legislature could not
have intended.
Furthermore, insofar as the legislature expressly provided in § 7-433c for
an independent definition of a different term, specifically that ‘‘municipal
employer,’’ as used in § 7-433c, would be defined by another statute (§ 7-
467), it was evident that, if the legislature had desired to incorporate a
different definition of ‘‘member’’ for purposes of heart and hypertension
benefits eligibility, it could have done so, and, similarly, if the legislature
had desired to provide more flexibility with respect to the eligibility for
such benefits under § 7-433c, it could have done so by using broader
terminology, such as ‘‘firefighter’’ instead of ‘‘a uniformed member of a
paid municipal fire department,’’ or, alternatively, more flexible phrasing
in the definitions, as it did when it added the qualifier, ‘‘unless the context
otherwise provides,’’ in the context of the definitions applicable to the
workers’ compensation statutes.
Although the plaintiff, as a part-time firefighter, performed the same
tasks as full-time firefighters, similarity in job function did not require
the town to pay its part-time firefighters benefits under § 7-433c, as the
terminology that the legislature used to describe the officials who are
eligible for benefits under § 7-433c was controlling, notwithstanding the
similarity in the officers’ respective job functions, this court disagreed
with the plaintiff’s claim and the Appellate Court’s conclusion that
applying the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) to § 7-433c necessarily
would lead to an absurd result insofar as only those firefighters whose
municipal employers have elected to participate in the state retirement
fund can qualify for benefits under § 7-433c, and, to the extent that this
court’s construction of the plain and unambiguous statutory text of §§ 7-
425 (5) and 7-433c could lead to results unintended by the legislature,
that was not a reason to depart from the plain and unambiguous statutory
text, as the legislature was free to clarify the meaning of § 7-433c if it
desired to make it plain that any paid firefighter is eligible for benefits
under that statute.
Because the commissioner did not apply the correct legal standard in
failing to make a finding as to whether the plaintiff had customarily
worked twenty hours or more per week before being hired as a full-
time firefighter, the plaintiff was entitled to have the commissioner decide
that factual issue, and, accordingly, the case was remanded for fur-
ther proceedings.
(One justice dissenting)
Argued November 17, 2022—officially released June 20, 2023
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Commissioner for the Second District finding that
the plaintiff had sustained a compensable injury and
awarding certain disability benefits, brought to the
Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the com-
missioner’s decision, and the named defendant appealed
to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and Moll and Clark,
Js., which affirmed the decision of the Compensation
Review Board, and the named defendant, on the grant-
ing of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed;
judgment directed.
Kyle J. Zrenda, with whom was James P. Berryman,
for the appellant (named defendant).
Eric W. Chester, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in this certified appeal
is whether a uniformed firefighter must ‘‘customarily’’
work twenty hours or more per week to be eligible for
heart and hypertension benefits under General Statutes
§ 7-433c.1 The named defendant, the town of Waterford,
Cohanzie Fire Department (town),2 appeals, upon our
grant of its petition for certification,3 from the judgment
of the Appellate Court affirming the decision of the
Compensation Review Board (board), which upheld the
finding and award of the Workers’ Compensation Com-
missioner for the Second District (commissioner),4 order-
ing the town to accept as compensable a claim filed by
the plaintiff, Christopher A. Clark, for heart disease
benefits pursuant to § 7-433c. Clark v. Waterford,
Cohanzie Fire Dept., 206 Conn. App. 223, 224–25, 243,
261 A.3d 97 (2021). On appeal, the town claims that the
Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the defini-
tion of ‘‘member’’ in General Statutes § 7-425 (5),5 which
excludes ‘‘any person who customarily works less than
twenty hours a week if such person entered employ-
ment after September 30, 1969,’’ does not govern whether
the plaintiff was ‘‘a uniformed member of a paid munici-
pal fire department’’ for purposes of § 7-433c. (Empha-
sis added.) General Statutes § 7-433c (a). We agree with
the town and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history, much of which is aptly set forth
in the opinion of the Appellate Court.6 ‘‘The town, a
municipality organized under the laws of the state, hired
the plaintiff as a part-time firefighter on May 24, 1992.
Prior to being hired by the town, the plaintiff underwent
and passed a physical examination that revealed no
evidence of heart disease or hypertension.
‘‘As a part-time firefighter in Waterford, the plaintiff’s
responsibilities included answering the telephone at the
fire station, keeping the fire station clean, responding
to medical and fire emergencies, and maintaining fire
apparatus. When he was working, the plaintiff wore a
uniform shirt, badge, belt, pants, and black shoes, which
is what other firefighters also wore. He was issued fire
protective gear in the event he had to respond to a fire
call. In 1997, the plaintiff was hired by the town as a
full-time firefighter.
‘‘On or about June 24, 2017, the plaintiff suffered
a myocardial infarction that required him to undergo
quadruple bypass surgery. On August 14, 2017, the plain-
tiff filed a [f]orm 30C, seeking heart disease benefits
under § 7-433c. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-294c
(b), the town gave notice of its intent to contest the
compensability of the plaintiff’s claim on the ground
that he was not employed as a full-time firefighter until
June 18, 1997, and therefore did not qualify for benefits
because § 7-433c (b) precludes benefits for persons who
began their employment on or after July 1, 1996.
‘‘The commissioner held a formal hearing on the plain-
tiff’s claim on March 7, 2019. The plaintiff testified at
the hearing, but he did not testify on direct examination
as to the number of hours he customarily worked while
he was employed as a part-time firefighter. On cross-
examination, however, the plaintiff testified that he
worked assigned shifts and that the number of shifts
he was assigned varied from week to week. In light of
the plaintiff’s testimony regarding his other employ-
ment and the irregular number of hours he worked per
week as a part-time firefighter, the town argued that
the plaintiff had failed to establish that he customarily
worked twenty hours or more per week prior to July 1,
1996.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie
Fire Dept., supra, 206 Conn. App. 226–27.
The town claimed before the commissioner that the
plaintiff’s failure to establish that he customarily worked
twenty hours or more per week prior to July 1, 1996,
was fatal to his claim for benefits under § 7-433c. See
id., 227. Specifically, the town contended that ‘‘§ 7-433c
benefits are available only to ‘a uniformed member of
a paid municipal fire department’ hired . . . before
July 1, 1996, and that the term member, as used in § 7-
433c, is controlled by the definition set forth in § 7-
425 (5).’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. ‘‘Because member
under § 7-425 (5) ‘shall not include any person who
customarily works less than twenty hours per week’
and the plaintiff was not hired as a full-time firefighter
until June 18, 1997, the town contended that the plaintiff
was not entitled to § 7-433c benefits, as ‘persons who
began employment on or after July 1, 1996, shall not
be eligible for any benefits pursuant to this section.’
General Statutes § 7-433c (b).’’ (Emphasis in original.)
Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., supra, 206
Conn. App. 227.
In his findings and award, the commissioner did not
make a finding as to whether the plaintiff had worked
twenty hours or more per week prior to being hired as
a full-time firefighter on June 18, 1997.7 Instead, the
‘‘commissioner decreed that § 7-433c does not define
the phrase ‘uniformed member of a paid municipal fire
department’ or distinguish between part-time and full-
time employment status. . . . The commissioner, thus,
determined that the plaintiff’s date of employment was
May 24, 1992, which was prior to July 1, 1996, and that
he was entitled to benefits pursuant to § 7-433c. The
commissioner ordered the town to accept the plaintiff’s
June 24, 2017 myocardial infarction as a compensable
impairment of his health.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.,
228.
The town appealed from the decision of the commis-
sioner to the board. Id., 229–30. The board concluded
that, although ‘‘it [could not] reasonably be inferred
from the subordinate facts that the plaintiff worked
more than twenty hours per week prior to the time he
became a full-time firefighter on June 18, 1997’’;8 id.,
230–31; ‘‘applying the § 7-425 (5) definition to the plain-
tiff’s claim would produce a result contrary to the letter
and spirit of the heart and hypertension legislation,
particularly in light of the plaintiff’s long career with
the town. The board, therefore, [upheld] the commis-
sioner’s award of § 7-433c benefits to the plaintiff and
rejected the town’s contention that the [commissioner
incorrectly had applied] the common definition of the
word member, rather than the statutory definition set
forth in § 7-425 (5) . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.,
234. Accordingly, in a divided opinion, the board upheld
the decision of the commissioner.9 Id., 224.
The town appealed from the decision of the board to
the Appellate Court. Id., 234. On appeal, the town renewed
its claim that the definition of ‘‘member’’ set forth in
§ 7-425 (5) governed whether the plaintiff was eligible
for benefits under § 7-433c as ‘‘a uniformed member of
a paid municipal fire department’’ while he was employed
by the town as a part-time firefighter. (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id. Observing that this is an issue
of first impression; id., 237; the Appellate Court cited
Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265, 277–78, 8 A.3d 1093(2010), for the proposition that § 7-433c is workers’
compensation legislation that is remedial in nature and,
therefore, subject to a broad construction in favor of
disabled employees. See Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie
Fire Dept., supra, 206 Conn. App. 238. The Appellate
Court then concluded that, although §§ 7-425 (5) and
7-433c ‘‘are both contained within part II of chapter 113
of the General Statutes, which is titled Retirement,’’ they
do not ‘‘concern the same subject matter’’ and ‘‘cannot
be read together without reaching an absurd result.’’
Id., 239. Specifically, the Appellate Court relied on the
definition of ‘‘participating municipality,’’ as set forth
in § 7-425 (2) and mentioned in § 7-425 (5), which, it
observed, ‘‘means a municipality that participates in the
retirement fund’’ that is ‘‘governed by § 7-425 [namely]
the voluntary public pension plan provided by the state
for participating municipalities and their employees and
elective officers [retirement fund].’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 240. Observing that ‘‘[n]ot all munic-
ipalities or departments participate in the retirement
fund,’’ the Appellate Court determined that § 7-433c (a)
refers to General Statutes § 7-46710 to incorporate a broader
definition of ‘‘municipal employer’’ to make ‘‘clear that
heart and hypertension benefits shall be paid . . . to
a qualifying uniformed firefighter or regular member of
a municipal police department, regardless of whether
the municipality participates in the retirement fund.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 241. The Appel-
late Court further observed that ‘‘the town’s interpreta-
tion also leads to an absurd result that heart and
hypertension benefits are available only to uniformed
firefighters employed and paid by municipalities that
participate in the retirement fund.’’ Id., 242. To this end,
the Appellate Court emphasized that ‘‘§ 7-425 explicitly
provides that the definitions set forth therein shall apply
‘except as otherwise provided’ ’’ and that ‘‘the use of
the term member in § 7-433c is one of the exceptions
expressly contemplated by § 7-425, itself.’’ (Emphasis in
original.) Id., 242–43. Accordingly, the Appellate Court
rendered judgment affirming the decision of the board.
Id., 243. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3
of this opinion.
On appeal, the town claims that the Appellate Court
incorrectly concluded that the definition of ‘‘member’’
in § 7-425 (5) does not govern the plaintiff’s eligibility
for benefits under § 7-433c. Urging a strict construction
of § 7-433c; see footnote 11 of this opinion; the town
contends that the Appellate Court’s construction of the
statutes improperly disregarded the plain language of
§ 7-425 (5) and discounted the importance of the place-
ment of § 7-433c in the part of the General Statutes that
contains the provisions governing the municipal retire-
ment fund. The town argues that the Appellate Court’s
construction of the statutes renders meaningless, redun-
dant, and superfluous the words ‘‘paid’’ and ‘‘member’’
in § 7-433c. The town emphasizes that applying § 7-425
(5) to § 7-433c does not create an absurd or unworkable
result given that it is well settled that § 7-433c is a
legislative bonus; see, e.g., Carriero v. Naugatuck, 243
Conn. 747, 754–55, 760–61, 707 A.2d 706 (1998); Grover
v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 88–89, 357 A.2d 922, appeal
dismissed, 423 U.S. 805, 96 S. Ct. 14, 46 L. Ed. 2d 26(1975); with part-time employees often not being eligi-
ble for benefits otherwise given to full-time employees,
such as retirement or vacation pay. Citing Genesky v.
East Lyme, 275 Conn. 246, 266–67, 881 A.2d 114 (2005),
the town emphasizes its prerogative under the statutory
scheme to make staffing choices that would enable it
to avoid liability under § 7-433c.
The plaintiff argues in response that the Appellate
Court correctly concluded that the definition of ‘‘mem-
ber’’ in § 7-425 (5) is inapplicable to the plain and unam-
biguous language of § 7-433c. The plaintiff argues that
§ 7-425 (5) is limited to the retirement fund insofar as
its plain language, particularly its numerous exclusions
for classifications such as teachers who are in the state
retirement system, ‘‘repeatedly references retirement
and pension systems.’’ The plaintiff posits that § 7-433c
benefits are related to but ‘‘distinct in purpose and
scope from the rest of the retirement [fund] benefits.’’
The plaintiff further argues that the town’s construction
of the statutes is inconsistent with our recent explica-
tion of eligibility for benefits under § 7-433c in Holston
v. New Haven Police Dept., 323 Conn. 607, 616–17, 149
A.3d 165 (2016). Citing, among other cases, Grover v.
Manchester, supra, 168 Conn. 88, and the Appellate
Court’s decision in Bucko v. New London, 13 Conn.
App. 566, 569, 537 A.2d 1045 (1988), the plaintiff con-
tends that the only restriction imposed on the word
‘‘member’’ under § 7-433c is that the member be ‘‘uni-
formed,’’ which recognizes the risks associated with
firefighting and law enforcement and distinguishes cler-
ical or other employees from those who are eligible for
benefits. The plaintiff also cited to Bucko in support of
his argument that the Appellate Court had correctly
determined that incorporating the definition from § 7-
425 (5) would complicate the eligibility of police officers
for benefits under § 7-433c and ‘‘produce an absurd and
unworkable result by denying officers the benefits to
which they are entitled under § 7-433c because their
municipal employer does not participate in the volun-
tary [retirement fund],’’ insofar as ‘‘the benefits granted
under § 7-433c are in no way related to or contingent
[on] participation in the retirement [fund].’’ Finally, the
plaintiff argues that the Appellate Court’s construction
of the statutes is compatible with this court’s decision
in Genesky v. East Lyme, supra, 275 Conn. 246, because
both cases involved a straightforward interpretation of
the plain language of § 7-433c. We, however, agree with
the town and conclude that the definition of ‘‘member’’
in § 7-425 (5) governs eligibility for benefits under § 7-433c.
‘‘The principles that govern our standard of review
in workers’ compensation appeals are well established.
The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from
the facts found must stand unless they result from an
incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts
or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn
from them. . . . [Moreover, it] is well established that
[a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to
the construction given to the workers’ compensation
statutes by the commissioner and [the] board. . . .
Cases that present pure questions of law, however,
invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily
involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence,
the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally
or in abuse of its discretion. . . . We have determined,
therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwar-
ranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not
previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to]
. . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpreta-
tion . . . .
‘‘In addition, we are mindful of the proposition that
all workers’ compensation legislation, because of its
remedial nature, should be broadly construed in favor
of disabled employees. . . . This proposition applies
as well to the provisions of [§] 7-433c . . . because
the measurement of the benefits to which a § 7-433c
claimant is entitled is identical to the benefits that may
be awarded to a [claimant] under’’ the Workers’ Com-
pensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.11 (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Coughlin v. Stamford Fire Dept., 334 Conn. 857, 862–63,
224 A.3d 1161 (2020). It is axiomatic that we follow the
plain meaning rule set forth in General Statutes § 1-
2z in construing statutes, including § 7-433c. See, e.g.,
Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., supra, 323 Conn.
613–14; Genesky v. East Lyme, supra, 275 Conn. 253–54.
By way of background, we note that ‘‘§ 7-433c simply
[provides] special compensation, or even an outright
bonus, to qualifying [police officers] and fire[fighters],
[and] serves a proper public purpose . . . . [T]he out-
right bonus provided by the statute is that the claimant
is not required to prove that the heart disease is causally
connected to this employment, which he would ordi-
narily have to establish in order to receive benefits
pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act. . . .
Thus, although [the Workers’ Compensation Act] is
used . . . as a procedural avenue for administration
of the benefits under § 7-433c . . . an award under § 7-
433c is not a workers’ compensation award. . . .
Therefore, although this court has recognized that the
type and amount of benefits available pursuant to § 7-
433c are the same as those under the Workers’ Compen-
sation Act . . . the liability for payment of those bene-
fits is not.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Bergeson v. New
London, 269 Conn. 763, 777–78, 850 A.2d 184 (2004);
see, e.g., King v. Sultar, 253 Conn. 429, 438–39, 444,
754 A.2d 782 (2000); Carriero v. Naugatuck, supra, 243
Conn. 754–55.
We begin with the text of § 7-433c (a), which provides
in relevant part: ‘‘Notwithstanding any provision of
chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special
act or ordinance to the contrary, in the event a uni-
formed member of a paid municipal fire department or
a regular member of a paid municipal police department
who successfully passed a physical examination on
entry into such service, which examination failed to
reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease,
suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or
impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart
disease resulting in his death or his temporary or perma-
nent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents,
as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal
employer compensation and medical care in the same
amount and the same manner as that provided under
chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by
a personal injury which arose out of and in the course
of his employment and was suffered in the line of duty
and within the scope of his employment, and from the
municipal or state retirement system under which he
is covered, he or his dependents, as the case may be,
shall receive the same retirement or survivor benefits
which would be paid under said system if such death
or disability was caused by a personal injury which
arose out of and in the course of his employment, and
was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope
of his employment. . . . The benefits provided by this
section shall be in lieu of any other benefits which
such policeman or fireman or his dependents may be
entitled to receive from his municipal employer under
the provisions of chapter 568 or the municipal or state
retirement system under which he is covered, except
as provided by this section, as a result of any condition
or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart
disease resulting in his death or his temporary or perma-
nent, total or partial disability. As used in this section,
‘municipal employer’ has the same meaning as provided
in section 7-467.’’ (Emphasis added.)
The single issue of statutory construction presented
in this appeal is whether we must construe the word
‘‘member’’ in the phrase ‘‘a uniformed member of a paid
municipal fire department,’’ as used in § 7-433c (a), in
accordance with its ordinary meaning, pursuant to
which the plaintiff would be eligible for benefits under
§ 7-433c, or in accordance with the definition provided
by § 7-425 (5). Section 7-425 provides in relevant part:
‘‘The following words and phrases as used in this part,
except as otherwise provided, shall have the follow-
ing meanings:
***
‘‘(5) ‘Member’ means any regular employee or elective
officer receiving pay from a participating municipality
. . . who has been included by such municipality in
the pension plan as provided in section 7-427, but shall
not include any person who customarily works less
than twenty hours a week if such person entered
employment after September 30, 1969, any police officer
or firefighter who will attain the compulsory retirement
age after less than five years of continuous service in
fund B . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Although the Appellate Court’s construction of the
statutes at issue was reasonable for purposes of the
§ 1-2z analysis given the broad construction that we
extend to § 7-433c; see footnote 11 of this opinion; the
issue before us in this appeal is ultimately resolved by
the language of the statutes when considered in context,
particularly in the absence of legislative history to pro-
vide square support for the proposition that the legisla-
ture did not intend the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-
425 (5) to apply. When statutory language, even if ambig-
uous for purposes of § 1-2z, provides greater support for
an interpretation of the statute than does the legislative
history, we must yield to the implications of the statu-
tory language, particularly when the legislative history
is more general in nature and does not furnish any
evidence of legislative intent with respect to the specific
point of law at issue.12 See Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn.
665, 687–88, 5 A.3d 932 (2010) (‘‘we see no evidence in
the legislative history to undermine the construction to
which the text itself is most conducive’’); cf. State v.
Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577–78, 816 A.2d 562 (2003)
(emphasizing that, even under purposive approach to
statutory interpretation that preceded enactment of § 1-
2z, language remains ‘‘the most important factor to be
considered,’’ and that ‘‘the more strongly the bare text
supports such a meaning, the more persuasive the extra-
textual sources of meaning will have to be in order to
yield a different meaning’’). That language compels the
conclusion that the meaning of ‘‘member,’’ as used in
§ 7-433c, is controlled by § 7-425 (5), given the relation-
ship between § 7-433c and other statutes and the cardinal
principle of interpretation ‘‘that the legislature, in
amending or enacting statutes, always [is] presumed to
have created a harmonious and consistent body of law
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commis-
sion on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Edge Fit-
ness, LLC, 342 Conn. 25, 36, 268 A.3d 630 (2022).
First, § 7-425 clearly and unambiguously provides
that, ‘‘except as otherwise provided,’’ it governs the
meanings of the statutes in part II of chapter 113 (title
7) of the General Statutes, which provides for the estab-
lishment of the retirement fund as a voluntary system
in which municipalities may elect to participate to pro-
vide for their employees’ retirement benefits. See Gen-
eral Statutes § 7-427 (a). We must presume that the
legislature acted consciously when it codified § 7-433c
in that part, with its governing definitions. As one lead-
ing authority on statutory interpretation emphasizes,
‘‘in the construction of a particular code section, atten-
tion should be given to the entire chapter, or even the
entire code, to determine the purpose and objective of
the legislature in organizing the material. Under some
circumstances the placement or rearrangement of code
sections may be helpful to determine [the] proper con-
struction of the statute. When sections originally enacted
independently are consolidated into a single chapter of a
code, they are ordinarily read together as a single act.’’
(Footnotes omitted.) 1A N. Singer & J. Singer, Suther-
land Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th Ed. 2009)
§ 28:11, p. 637; see, e.g., Unite New Mexico v. Oliver, 438
P.3d 343, 352 (N.M. 2019) (transfer of statute governing
straight ticket voting out of chapter giving New Mexico
secretary of state authority over form of ballot sug-
gested that secretary was not authorized to decide ques-
tions relating to straight ticket voting). The text of § 7-
433c expressly recognizes the logical and factual rela-
tionship between heart and hypertension benefits and
retirement benefits in multiple places. See General Stat-
utes § 7-433c (a) (obligating ‘‘[the] municipal employer’’
of eligible police officer or firefighter, or ‘‘the municipal
or state retirement system under which [the eligible
police officer or firefighter] is covered,’’ to pay death
or disability benefits under statute and providing that
such ‘‘benefits . . . shall be in lieu of any other benefits
which such policeman or fireman or his dependents
may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer
under the provisions of chapter 568 or the municipal
or state retirement system under which he is covered’’).
Given this relationship, we must assume that this place-
ment was intentional, particularly in view of the avail-
ability of other logically suitable codification options,
such as within the related provisions of the Workers’
Compensation Act.13 Cf. Genesky v. East Lyme, supra,
275 Conn. 252 n.9 (‘‘[a]lthough an award of benefits
under § 7-433c is not a workers’ compensation award,
the Workers’ Compensation Act is used as a ‘procedural
avenue’ for the administration of benefits under § 7-
433c’’).
Thus, consistent with § 1-2z, we turn to the precept
that, ‘‘[when] the legislature has specifically defined an
operative term used within a statute, we are bound to
accept that definition . . . unless to do so would create
an irrational result that could not have been intended
by the legislature.’’ (Citation omitted.) Weinberg v. ARA
Vending Co., 223 Conn. 336, 349, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992);
see id., 350 (it was not irrational to apply statutory
definition of ‘‘compensation’’ to allow double recovery
via both payment of benefits under Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act and award of federal Veterans Administration
benefits because ‘‘the legislature rationally could have
intended to prohibit double recovery under [General
Statutes] § 31-349 (a) only to the extent that an employee
may not recover twice for the same injury under the
. . . Workers’ Compensation Act’’); see also, e.g.,
McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn.
144, 156, 12 A.3d 948 (2011) (‘‘[b]ecause the legislature
has not defined motor vehicle violation, but has defined
violation, we conclude that it is reasonable to apply the
definition of violation to the phrase motor vehicle vio-
lation’’).
We disagree with the plaintiff’s argument that § 7-
433c functions as an implied exception to § 7-425 (5).
This interpretation of § 7-433c as implying a different
definition of the word ‘‘member’’ is belied by the fact
that the legislature expressly provided therein for an
independent definition of a different term, namely, ‘‘munici-
pal employer.’’ The legislature specifically stated in § 7-
433c (a) that the term ‘‘municipal employer,’’ as used
therein, would be defined by § 7-467; see footnote 10
of this opinion; which provides the definitions applica-
ble to the statutes governing collective bargaining between
municipalities and their employees. The legislature’s
failure to provide a different definition of ‘‘member’’ in
§ 7-433c is telling, insofar as the referenced provision,
§ 7-467, has a subsection that provides its own definition
of ‘‘employee’’ that excludes certain part-time employ-
ees.14 Particularly given the codification of § 7-433c in
the municipal retirement statutes, it is evident that, had
the legislature desired to incorporate a different defini-
tion of ‘‘member’’ for purposes of eligibility, it could
have done so. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC, supra, 342 Conn.
36 (‘‘the legislature’s inclusion of a [bona fide occupa-
tional qualification] exception in [General Statutes]
§ 46a-60 (b) (1) demonstrates that the legislature could
have provided such an exception in the public accom-
modation statute but consciously elected not to do so’’).
Similarly, had the legislature desired to provide more
flexibility with respect to the eligibility of firefighters
for benefits under § 7-433c, such as by using the more
inclusive word ‘‘firefighter’’ as in the related workers’
compensation statutes; see General Statutes § 31-275
(1) (A) (i) (defining, ‘‘[f]or a police officer or firefighter,
[the phrase] ‘in the course of his employment’’); it could
have done so by using broader terminology. See, e.g.,
Stafford v. Roadway, 312 Conn. 184, 194, 93 A.3d 1058(2014) (noting ‘‘[the] well settled principle of statutory
construction that the legislature knows how to convey
its intent expressly . . . or to use broader or limiting
terms when it chooses to do so’’ (citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Alternatively, the legisla-
ture could have used more flexible phrasing in the
definition, as it did when it added the qualifier, ‘‘unless
the context otherwise provides,’’ with respect to the
definitions applicable to the workers’ compensation
statutes. General Statutes § 31-275; see Vincent v. New
Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 788, 941 A.2d 932 (2008) (under
General Statutes § 31-306, specific definition of ‘‘the
term ‘compensation’ is expressly limited to payments
for burial expenses and weekly payments that represent
a percentage of the deceased employee’s average weekly
earnings’’).
We recognize that the plaintiff, as a part-time fire-
fighter, performed the same tasks as the full-time fire-
fighters employed by the town. This similarity in job
function does not, however, mean that the town was
required to pay its part-time firefighters benefits under
§ 7-433c. As this court held in concluding that a full-
time constable employed by a town was not ‘‘a regular
member of a paid municipal police department’’ eligible
for benefits under § 7-433c, ‘‘there is a difference between
a paid municipal police department and a constabulary,
and the town has chosen to ensure public safety by
establishing a constabulary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Genesky v. East Lyme, supra, 275 Conn. 252–
53. Thus, the legislature’s use of certain terminology to
describe those officials who are eligible for benefits
under § 7-433c is controlling, notwithstanding the simi-
larity in those officers’ job functions.
We similarly disagree with the plaintiff’s contention
that the Appellate Court’s decision in Bucko v. New
London, supra, 13 Conn. App. 566, supports his eligibil-
ity for benefits under § 7-433c. In that case, the Appel-
late Court held that the hiring of a police officer in a
temporary capacity, with his mild hypertension diagno-
sis having occurred prior to his promotion to a perma-
nent position, did not render him ineligible for benefits
under § 7-433c. See id., 567–69, 571. The Appellate Court
rejected the city’s argument that the police officer’s
initial temporary appointment put him ‘‘outside the eligi-
bility requirements of § 7-433c,’’ observing that ‘‘[n]owhere
in § 7-433c is there a requirement that any appointment
to the regular police force must be a ‘permanent’ appoint-
ment. The qualifiers ‘permanent’ or ‘temporary’ are not
mentioned in the statute; the only stated prerequisite
to the collection of benefits is that the claimant must
be a ‘regular member of a paid municipal police depart-
ment.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 570. The Appellate
Court’s decision in Bucko is inapposite because that
case did not involve the construction of the word ‘‘mem-
ber,’’ as used in § 7-433c, and did not consider the effect
the number of hours per week the claimant worked had
on his eligibility for benefits.15
Finally, we disagree with the plaintiff’s argument that
incorporating the definition of ‘‘member’’ from § 7-425
(5) means that only those firefighters or police officers
whose employers have elected to participate in the
retirement fund may qualify for benefits under § 7-433c.
Specifically, the plaintiff observes that § 7-425 defines
a ‘‘member’’ as one who ‘‘receiv[es] pay from a partici-
pating municipality’’; General Statutes § 7-425 (5); and
defines the phrase ‘‘participating municipality’’ sepa-
rately, as ‘‘any municipality that has accepted this part,
as provided in section 7-427 . . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 7-425 (2). As the Appellate Court observed in determin-
ing that this interpretation of the language of §§ 7-425
(5) and 7-433c would lead to an absurd result; see Clark
v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., supra, 206 Conn.
App. 242; applying the definition to this extent could
have significant effects with respect to the eligibility of
firefighters or police officers who are employed by some
of Connecticut’s largest municipalities, some of which—
such as New Haven and Stamford—are not participating
municipalities. See Office of the State Comptroller,
Retiree Resources, ‘‘Who Is in CMERS? Participating
Municipalities,’’ available at https://www.osc.ct.gov/rbsd/
cmers/plandoc/MasterTownListSept132016.pdf (last visited
June 14, 2023); see also Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie
Fire Department, supra, 241. We do not, however, agree
that this result necessarily follows from our holding
that the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-425 (5) controls
under § 7-433c with respect to the hourly requirement
for eligibility. First, § 7-425 (5) uses punctuation to
phrase separately its exclusion of ‘‘any person who
customarily works less than twenty hours a week if
such person entered employment after September 30,
1969,’’ from its description of a ‘‘member’’ as one who
‘‘receiv[es] pay from a participating municipality . . . .’’
Second, the language of § 7-433c is—at best—ambigu-
ous with respect to the issue of whether a firefighter
or police officer must be employed by a ‘‘participating
municipality,’’ given the ample references in § 7-433c
to the retirement system under which the employee is
covered, which is broader in concept than a simple
reference to the retirement fund. See General Statutes
§ 7-433c (a) (referring to ‘‘the municipal or state retire-
ment system under which [the member] is covered’’
(emphasis added)). Moreover, the independent defini-
tion in § 7-433c (a) of the term ‘‘municipal employer’’
by reference to § 7-467, as the entity liable to pay the
benefits, is itself broader than ‘‘participating municipal-
ity.’’ Accordingly, we conclude that applying the hourly
eligibility requirement in the definition of ‘‘member’’ in
§ 7-425 (5) to § 7-433c will not necessarily lead to an
absurd result.
To the extent ‘‘our analysis of the plain and unambigu-
ous statutory text of [§§ 7-425 (5) and 7-433c] may lead
to a result that might well have been unintended by the
legislature . . . this effect is not a reason to depart
from the plain and unambiguous statutory text . . . .’’
(Citation omitted.) Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC, supra, 342 Conn.
42–43. Should the legislature desire to clarify the mean-
ing of § 7-433c to make it plain that any paid firefighter
is eligible for benefits under that statute, it may certainly
do so, given its role as ‘‘the policy-making branch of our
government.’’16 Id., 43; see, e.g., International Business
Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 135–36, 355
A.2d 236 (1974) (The court observed that policy argu-
ments with respect to a use tax on certain tangible
personal property ‘‘might better be advanced before
the General Assembly. Questions of policy are for its
consideration. We can . . . take the statutes [only] as
they have been enacted.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
Because the commissioner did not apply the correct
legal standard in failing to make a finding as to whether
the plaintiff had customarily worked the requisite twenty
hours per week prior to his hiring as a full-time fire-
fighter, the plaintiff is entitled to have the commissioner
decide that factual issue.17 Further proceedings are
therefore required to determine his eligibility for bene-
fits under § 7-433c. See, e.g., Deschenes v. Transco, Inc.,
288 Conn. 303, 323–24, 953 A.2d 13 (2008) (concluding
that ‘‘additional fact-finding proceedings [were] required
because the record . . . [did] not permit us to uphold
the decision of the board under the correct legal stan-
dard, and also [did] not permit us to direct judgment
in favor of the defendants because [despite the exis-
tence of evidence in the record] the commissioners
[did] not [make] any findings with respect to the appor-
tionment or proportional reduction . . . of the plain-
tiff’s benefits’’ (citation omitted)); cf. Sullins v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 315 Conn. 543, 564, 108 A.3d 1110(2015) (concluding that commissioner’s existing find-
ings permitted court to remand case to board with direc-
tion to make award in accordance with those findings).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the decision of the Compensation Review Board
and to remand the case to the board for it to reverse
the commissioner’s decision and to remand the case to
the commissioner for further proceedings according
to law.
In this opinion McDONALD, D’AURIA, MULLINS and
ALEXANDER, Js., concurred.
* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this
court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D’Auria,
Mullins, Ecker and Alexander. Although Chief Justice Robinson was not
present at oral argument, he has read the briefs and appendices, and listened
to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision.
1
General Statutes § 7-433c provides: ‘‘(a) Notwithstanding any provision
of chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special act or ordinance
to the contrary, in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire
department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department
who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service,
which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart
disease, suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of
health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his
temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents,
as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal employer compensation
and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided
under chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury
which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was suffered
in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment, and from the
municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, he or his
dependents, as the case may be, shall receive the same retirement or survivor
benefits which would be paid under said system if such death or disability
was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of
his employment, and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope
of his employment. If successful passage of such a physical examination
was, at the time of his employment, required as a condition for such employ-
ment, no proof or record of such examination shall be required as evidence
in the maintenance of a claim under this section or under such municipal
or state retirement systems. The benefits provided by this section shall be
in lieu of any other benefits which such policeman or fireman or his depen-
dents may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer under the
provisions of chapter 568 or the municipal or state retirement system under
which he is covered, except as provided by this section, as a result of any
condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease
resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disabil-
ity. As used in this section, ‘municipal employer’ has the same meaning as
provided in section 7-467.
‘‘(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section,
those persons who began employment on or after July 1, 1996, shall not be
eligible for any benefits pursuant to this section.’’ (Emphasis added.)
2
As the Appellate Court observed, the ‘‘defendant Connecticut Interlocal
Risk Management Agency appeared before the commissioner but did not
appear before the board [or] file a brief in the present appeal.’’ Clark v.
Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., 206 Conn. App. 223, 224 n.1, 261 A.3d
97 (2021).
3
We granted the town’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the
following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court incorrectly determine that the
definition of the term ‘member’ in General Statutes § 7-425 (5) is inapplicable
to . . . § 7-433c?’’ Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., 338 Conn. 916,
259 A.3d 1181 (2021).
4
‘‘We note that General Statutes . . . § 31-275d (a) (1), effective as of
October 1, 2021, provides in relevant part that ‘[w]herever the words ‘‘work-
ers’ compensation commissioner,’’ ‘‘compensation commissioner’’ or ‘‘com-
missioner’’ are used to denote a workers’ compensation commissioner in
[several enumerated] sections of the [G]eneral [S]tatutes, [including sections
contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act, § 31-275 et seq.] the words
‘‘administrative law judge’’ shall be substituted in lieu thereof . . . .’
‘‘As all events underlying this appeal occurred prior to October 1, 2021,
we will refer to the workers’ compensation commissioner [whose decisions
are at issue] in this matter as the commissioner . . . .’’ Arrico v. Board of
Education, 212 Conn. App. 1, 4 n.4, 274 A.3d 148 (2022).
5
General Statutes § 7-425 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following words
and phrases as used in this part, except as otherwise provided, shall have
the following meanings:
***
‘‘(5) ‘Member’ means any regular employee or elective officer receiving
pay from a participating municipality . . . who has been included by such
municipality in the pension plan as provided in section 7-427, but shall not
include any person who customarily works less than twenty hours a week
if such person entered employment after September 30, 1969, any police
officer or firefighter who will attain the compulsory retirement age after
less than five years of continuous service in fund B . . . .’’
Although § 7-425 was the subject of a technical amendment in 2021; see
Public Acts 2021, No. 21-40, § 4; that amendment has no bearing on the
merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current
revision of the statute.
6
For purposes of brevity, we recite only the most salient facts and proce-
dural history. For a full recitation, including the parties’ arguments before the
commissioner, the board, and the Appellate Court, see Clark v. Waterford,
Cohanzie Fire Dept., supra, 206 Conn. App. 226–36.
7
‘‘In his findings and award, the commissioner found that, while the
plaintiff was a part-time firefighter, the number of hours he worked per
week was consistent and was affected by the time of year, as well as the
vacation, sick time, and any injuries sustained by the full-time staff. Some
weeks he was assigned to work multiple shifts, and other weeks he was
not assigned to work. As a part-time employee of the town, the plaintiff did
not receive any holiday or vacation pay or benefits toward a pension. In
1997, the town employed the plaintiff as a full-time firefighter and paid him
accordingly. Part-time and full-time firefighters were paid by the town, and
their duties were the same.’’ Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., supra,206 Conn. App. 228.
8
The board determined that the ‘‘evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff
was assigned shifts on an irregular basis and that his assignments depended
on circumstances that varied according to the time of year and the internal
staffing requirements of the [town fire] department and did not provide an
adequate basis for determining the number of hours the plaintiff worked.
Although the board found the commissioner’s use of the word consistent
to describe the number of hours the plaintiff worked to be ‘inartful,’ it found
that the balance of the commissioner’s findings accurately reflected the
plaintiff’s testimony.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie
Fire Dept., supra, 206 Conn. App. 231.
9
One member of the board, William J. Watson III, dissented, agreeing with
the town’s statutory arguments, based on the plain language and codification
placement of the provisions at issue, that the definition of ‘‘member’’ in § 7-
425 (5) controlled eligibility for benefits under § 7-433c. Given the record
before the board, the dissenting member concluded that the plaintiff’s claim
was not compensable because ‘‘the factual circumstances of the [plaintiff’s]
employment [did not] satisfy the statutory requirements of § 7-433c.’’
10
General Statutes § 7-467 (1) provides: ‘‘ ‘Municipal employer’ means any
political subdivision of the state, including any town, city, borough, district,
district department of health, school board, housing authority or other
authority established by law, a private nonprofit corporation which has a
valid contract with any town, city, borough or district to extinguish fires
and to protect its inhabitants from loss by fire, and any person or persons
designated by the municipal employer to act in its interest in dealing with
municipal employees . . . .’’
11
We acknowledge the town’s argument that, in providing for heart and
hypertension benefits, § 7-433c is special ‘‘ ‘bonus legislation,’ ’’ the eligibility
for which must be strictly construed under the board’s decision in Gaudett
v. Bridgeport Police Dept., No. 6337, CRB 4-19-7 (September 8, 2021), rev’d,
218 Conn. App. 720, 293 A.3d 351 (2023). In Gaudett, the board followed
the strict construction approach with respect to eligibility for benefits under
§ 7-433c that it first articulated in Genesky v. East Lyme, No. 4600, CRB 8-
02-12 (December 8, 2003), aff’d, 275 Conn. 246, 881 A.2d 114 (2005). See
Gaudett v. Bridgeport, supra, No. 6337, CRB 4-19-7. The board’s decision
in Genesky relied on the axiom that statutory provisions that are in deroga-
tion of the common law must be strictly construed, in support of the proposi-
tion that the ‘‘original intent of the legislation was to provide a remedy to
qualifying persons without the need to prove traditional elements of causa-
tion under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Thus, the eligibility requirements
set out in the statute must be strictly construed.’’ Genesky v. East Lyme,
supra, No. 4600, CRB 8-02-12.
This strict approach to the interpretation of § 7-433c conflicts with three
decades of case law from this court, beginning with Szudora v. Fairfield,
214 Conn. 552, 573 A.2d 1 (1990), which acknowledged its nature as a special
bonus for qualified police officers and firefighters but considered § 7-433c
to be analogous to ‘‘workers’ compensation legislation, [which] because
of its remedial nature, should be broadly construed in favor of disabled
employees.’’ Id., 557–58; see, e.g., Coughlin v. Stamford Fire Dept., 334
Conn. 857, 863, 224 A.3d 1161 (2020); Holston v. New Haven Police Dept.,
supra, 323 Conn. 613; Carriero v. Naugatuck, supra, 243 Conn. 761–62.
Indeed, the concurring opinion in this court’s decision in Genesky, in which
the majority affirmed the decision of the board in that case, expressly applied
that broader construction in considering whether a constable was ‘‘a member
of ‘a paid municipal police department’ ’’ eligible for § 7-433c benefits. Gen-
esky v. East Lyme, supra, 275 Conn. 268–69 (Borden, J., concurring); see
id., 278–79 (Borden, J., concurring) (concluding that statute was ambiguous
for purposes of § 1-2z, in part based on ‘‘[the] judicial interpretive maxim
regarding § 7-433c [that] supports a broad interpretation of the phrase
‘municipal police department’ as applied to the facts of [that] case’’); cf. id.,
253–54 (majority opinion followed § 1-2z without reference to any rules of
construction). Because the town does not ask us to overrule or to otherwise
limit this body of case law, we continue to follow this rule of broad construc-
tion in determining questions of eligibility for benefits under § 7-433c.
12
Thus, we emphasize that the legislative history of the statute does not
illuminate the meaning of the word ‘‘member’’ or suggest that the definition
in the chapter does not apply. Numerous cases provide a detailed review of
the ‘‘rather tumultuous’’ history of ‘‘Connecticut’s statute providing benefits for
police and fire personnel who suffer from hypertension or heart disease,’’
including decisions from this court considering the constitutionality of its
various iterations. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. East Haven,
208 Conn. 576, 580, 546 A.2d 243 (1988); see, e.g., Bergeson v. New London,
supra, 269 Conn. 777 n.10; Morgan v. East Haven, supra, 580–81; Plainville v.
Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 667–69, 425 A.2d 131 (1979); see
also Grover v. Manchester, supra, 168 Conn. 86, 88–89 (‘‘[the] outright bonus’’
provided by current version of statute to qualifying police and fire personnel
was not unconstitutional taking); Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143,
285 A.2d 318 (1971) (conclusive presumption in 1969 version of statute violated
due process clauses of Connecticut and United States constitutions).
To the extent the dissent relies on the legislative history of § 7-433c in support
of the proposition that the legislature intended to provide a broad benefit to
all paid firefighters and police officers in Connecticut, without qualification,
we respectfully disagree. See part III of the dissenting opinion. In our view,
the generalized statements of purpose on which the dissent relies are not
sufficiently persuasive on this point to counter the weight of the statutory
language.
13
We acknowledge that ‘‘the codification of a public act of the state is an
administrative duty of the legislative commissioners’’ under General Statutes
§ 2-56 (g) and that, although it ‘‘is within their discretion to arrange and codify
public acts . . . they are not lawmakers.’’ Fava v. Arrigoni, 35 Conn. Supp.
177, 178, 402 A.2d 356 (1979); see id., 179 (defining terms of General Statutes
(Rev. to 1979) § 52-563a, enacted as § 6 of No. 75-637 of the 1975 Public Acts
(P.A. 75-637), ‘‘in a manner consistent with other sections of P.A. 75-637,’’ with
this ‘‘construction . . . made more obvious by the omission of any definitions
in chapter 925 of the General Statutes, the chapter in which § 6 of P.A. 75-637
(§ 52-563a) is found’’). Nevertheless, we deem the placement of § 7-433c to be
instructive in its interpretation given both (1) the presumption that the legisla-
ture is aware of the law and decisions construing it, and (2) the long-standing
codification of heart and hypertension benefits in chapter 113, governing munici-
pal retirement benefits, both before and after the enactment of § 7-433c as § 1
of No. 524 of the 1971 Public Acts, particularly given the reference therein to
the definition of ‘‘municipal employer’’ in § 7-467. See, e.g., Stone v. East Coast
Swappers, LLC, 337 Conn. 589, 606–607, 255 A.3d 851 (2020) (stating presump-
tion); Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 667–68, 425 A.2d 131(1979) (emphasizing amendments to make state retirement system applicable
to heart and hypertension benefits); Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143,
285 A.2d 318 (1971) (invalidating conclusive presumption in General Statutes
(Rev. to 1969) § 7-433a); cf. McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300
Conn. 144, 159, 12 A.3d 948 (2011) (‘‘The plaintiff seems to assert that a breach
of [General Statutes] § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation simply because of
its placement within the motor vehicle chapter. We disagree. At the time § 14-
227a was originally enacted in 1963, the Penal Code did not exist. See Public Acts
1963, No. 616, § 1. The Penal Code was not adopted until 1969, approximately
six years after the legislature decided to criminalize [operating] under the
influence in § 14-227a. Because the Penal Code did not exist at the time the
legislature adopted § 14-227a, its placement within the motor vehicle statutes
has no impact on determining legislative intent.’’).
14
See General Statutes § 7-467 (2) (‘‘ ‘[e]mployee’ means any employee of a
municipal employer, whether or not in the classified service of the municipal
employer, except elected officials, administrative officials, board and commis-
sion members, certified teachers, part-time employees who work less than
twenty hours per week on a seasonal basis, department heads and persons
in such other positions as may be excluded from coverage under sections 7-
467 to 7-477, inclusive, in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 7-471’’
(emphasis added)).
15
We similarly disagree with the plaintiff’s reliance on our recent decision
in Holston v. New Haven Police Dept., supra, 323 Conn. 607. In Holston, we
held that a police officer’s failure to assert a timely claim for hypertension
benefits did not bar his separate, otherwise timely, claim for heart disease
benefits, notwithstanding the link between his hypertension and heart disease.
See id., 615–16. Holston is inapposite because that case did not concern the
effect of a particular police officer’s employment status on his eligibility for
benefits under § 7-433c, and we were not called on to construe the term
‘‘member’’ when we stated that the plain language of § 7-433c has five health
related requirements and ‘‘contains no other requirements to qualify for its
benefits.’’ Id., 616–17.
16
Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the dissent’s emphasis on the
novelty of the claim in this appeal, relative to the existence of § 7-433c, as
counseling in favor of the plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute. See parts I
and III of the dissenting opinion. The relative novelty of the defendants’ claim
tells us that this is not a case in which the issue is new to the appellate
courts, but one in which the commission has had a time-tested administrative
construction of § 7-433c, to which we would customarily defer. See, e.g., Crandle
v. Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission, 342 Conn. 67, 83–84,
269 A.3d 72 (2022). Thus, to the extent the legislature deems our interpretation
of § 7-433c to be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, it remains free
to address that via the adoption of clarifying legislation that ‘‘in effect construes
and clarifies a prior statute [and that] must be accepted as the legislative
declaration of the meaning of the original act. . . . An amendment that is
intended to clarify the original intent of an earlier statute necessarily has
retroactive effect.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Praisner v. State, 336
Conn. 420, 429, 246 A.3d 463 (2020); see id. (‘‘[t]o determine whether the
legislature enacted a statutory amendment with the intent to clarify existing
legislation, we look to various factors, including, but not limited to (1) the
amendatory language . . . (2) the declaration of intent, if any, contained in
the public act . . . (3) the legislative history . . . and (4) the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the amendment, such as, whether it was enacted
in direct response to a judicial decision that the legislature deemed incorrect
. . . or passed to resolve a controversy engendered by statutory ambiguity’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
17
As was discussed several times during oral argument before this court,
the town’s claims presented a novel legal issue under § 7-433c with respect to
the plaintiff’s burden of proof. In light of his interpretation of § 7-433c, and the
inconclusive evidence in the record, the commissioner ultimately deemed it
unnecessary to decide this factual question in either his memorandum of
decision or in acting on the town’s motions for articulation and to correct.