State v. Guerrera ( 2019 )


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    STATE v. GUERRARA—CONCURRENCE
    McDONALD, J., concurring. I fully agree with the
    majority’s determination that the factual premise of the
    argument of the defendant, Michael Anthony Guerrera,
    that the 1552 locked audio recordings in the possession
    of the Department of Correction were part of the state’s
    investigatory file, is not supported by the record. I write
    separately solely to address an argument asserted by
    the state that would have been problematic had the
    records been part of that investigatory file.
    As the majority notes, one ground on which the state
    and the department sought to quash the subpoena was
    that compliance with it would place an unreasonable
    burden on the department. The state represented that
    the review necessary before the recordings could be
    released to the defendant could take between 200 and
    1000 hours, depending on the length of the calls. Any
    such burden, however, is inconsequential in relation to
    a defendant’s right to favorable evidence that could
    potentially result in him avoiding years, not hours, of
    imprisonment. As the majority notes, the state’s obliga-
    tion under Brady1 does not vary depending on how
    convenient or inconvenient it is for the state to comply
    with its duty to provide exculpatory evidence to the
    defendant.2 See footnote 16 of the majority opinion;
    see, e.g., Emmett v. Ricketts, 
    397 F. Supp. 1025
    , 1043
    (N.D. Ga. 1975) (stating, in context of ‘‘voluminous mass
    of files, tapes and documentary evidence’’ in state’s
    possession, that ‘‘the prosecutor retains the constitu-
    tional obligation of initially screening the materials
    before him and handing over to the defense those items
    to which the defense is unquestionably entitled under
    Brady’’). In my view, the state’s argument about how
    unduly burdensome a review of 1552 recordings would
    be rings particularly hollow in light of the case law that
    addresses vastly greater numbers of records.
    Finally, had the state limited its request to the depart-
    ment to those time periods that were most likely to
    produce relevant evidence, rather than making an
    unlimited, open-ended request, any perceived burden
    could have been greatly reduced without compromis-
    ing the state’s investigation. If the state is concerned
    about the burden of review, then it should tailor its
    requests accordingly.
    I therefore respectfully concur.
    1
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 87, 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L. Ed. 2d 215
    (1963).
    2
    In the age of electronic records, prosecution records can run into the
    millions, yet the government is not relieved of its Brady obligations merely
    because the records accumulated in its investigation are voluminous. See,
    e.g., United States v. Warshak, 
    631 F.3d 266
    , 295 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing
    17 million pages of electronic evidence included in prosecutor’s file); United
    States v. Skilling, 
    554 F.3d 529
    , 576 (5th Cir. 2009) (quantifying prosecutor’s
    case file as ‘‘several hundred million pages of documents’’), aff’d in part
    and vacated in part on other grounds, 
    561 U.S. 358
    , 
    130 S. Ct. 2896
    , 177 L.
    Ed. 2d 619 (2010); United States v. W. R. Grace, 
    401 F. Supp. 2d 1069
    , 1080
    (D. Mont. 2005) (referencing more than 3 million pages of discovery in
    prosecution’s file).