Sanle Zhang v. 56 Locust Rd., LLC , 177 Conn. App. 420 ( 2017 )

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SANLE ZHANG ET AL. v. 56 LOCUST ROAD, LLC
(AC 38853)
Lavine, Mullins and West, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs sought to quiet title to certain real property. The trial court
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on their complaint and in favor of
the defendant in part on a counterclaim it had filed, from which the
defendant appealed and the plaintiffs cross appealed to this court. The
trial court had found in the plaintiffs’ favor on their claim of adverse
possession and, with respect to the counterclaim, granted the defendant
an easement by necessity over the disputed area. On appeal, the defen-
dant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly found in favor
of the plaintiffs on their claim of adverse possession, and on cross appeal,
the plaintiffs claimed that the court erred in granting the defendant the
easement by necessity. Held that the trial court having fully and accu-
rately addressed the relevant issues in its memorandum of decision,
and having set forth a proper statement of the facts and applicable law,
further discussion by this court was not necessary, and the judgment
was affirmed.
Argued May 24—officially released October 17, 2017
Procedural History
Action to quiet title to certain real property allegedly
acquired by adverse possession, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed a counter-
claim; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court,
Povodator, J.; judgment for the plaintiffs on the com-
plaint and in part for the defendant on the counterclaim,
from which the defendant appealed and the plaintiffs
cross appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Michael J. Cacace, with whom was Ronald E. Kowal-
ski II, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).
Richard E. Castiglioni, with whom were Bridgitte
E. Mott and, on the brief, Jonathan J. Kelson, for the
appellees-appellants (plaintiffs).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The defendant, 56 Locust Road, LLC,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court quieting
title to a disputed area of land in favor of the plaintiffs,
Sanle Zhang and Yanpin Li, and granting the defendant
a ten foot easement by necessity over the easterly por-
tion of the disputed area. The plaintiffs cross appeal
from the portion of the judgment in which the court
granted the defendant the easement by necessity. On
appeal, the defendant claims: (1) because the plaintiffs’
predecessors in title did not convey, either orally or by
deed, their interest in the disputed area, the trial court
erred in finding in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim
of adverse possession; (2) the trial court failed to bal-
ance the equities in this case by rejecting the defen-
dant’s equitable defenses; (3) General Statutes §§ 47-
37 and 52-575 are unconstitutional because they permit
a taking of property without just compensation; and
(4) the easement granted by the court may not provide
meaningful access to the defendant because the court
specifically subjected the easement to the town’s land
use regulations.1 The plaintiffs claim on cross appeal
that the court erred in granting the defendant an ease-
ment by necessity.
Having examined the appellate record and having
considered the briefs and the arguments of the parties,
we conclude that the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed. The trial court fully and accurately
addressed the issues relevant to the parties’ appeals
and, in its memorandum of decision, set forth a proper
statement of both the facts and the applicable law.
Any further discussion by this court would serve no
useful purpose.
The judgment is affirmed.
1
In its fourth claim, the defendant argues: ‘‘If the defendant is unable to
secure the necessary municipal approvals . . . it [will] have no way to
access the larger, nearly three acre, portion of the now severed 56 Locust
Road property. Such a result would completely frustrate the trial court’s
order and would be contrary to Connecticut precedent requiring that the
defendant be permitted to access its now landlocked property.’’ (Emphasis
added.) We conclude that this claim is premature and, therefore, unreview-
able. ‘‘It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury
is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and
indeed may never transpire.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail,
LLC v. Weston, 140 Conn. App. 136, 155, 57 A.3d 905, cert. denied, 308
Conn. 915, 61 A.3d 1102 (2013); see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v.
Matschke, 111 Conn. App. 462, 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) (‘‘the rationale
behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance
of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree-
ments . . . [and we therefore] must be satisfied that the case before [us]
does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some
event that has not and indeed may never transpire’’ [internal quotation marks
omitted]), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 909, 964 A.2d 544 (2009).