Rosa v. Commissioner of Correction , 171 Conn. App. 428 ( 2017 )


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    VINCENTE ROSA v. COMMISSIONER OF
    CORRECTION
    (AC 37573)
    Lavine, Mullins and Harper, Js.
    Argued September 20, 2016—officially released March 14, 2017
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Tolland, Cobb, J.)
    David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appel-
    lant (petitioner).
    Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
    whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attor-
    ney, and Erika L. Brookman, senior assistant state’s
    attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
    Opinion
    HARPER, J. The petitioner, Vincente Rosa, appeals
    following the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus. The habeas court granted certification to appeal
    on the petitioner’s claims that it improperly concluded
    that his criminal trial counsel, Bruce Lorenzen, did not
    provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing (1)
    to adequately advise the petitioner regarding plea
    offers, (2) to move for a mistrial regarding potential
    juror bias, and (3) to prepare and adequately argue for
    sentence mitigation with testimony from petitioner’s
    family. After reviewing the petitioner’s brief, we con-
    clude that the petitioner has failed to brief adequately
    the first and third issues and, accordingly, we decline
    to review these claims.1 Regarding the petitioner’s
    remaining claim, we conclude that the court properly
    determined that the petitioner’s counsel did not provide
    ineffective assistance, and, accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment of the habeas court.
    The following facts found by the habeas court and
    procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the
    petitioner’s claims.2 The petitioner’s conviction arises
    from events that occurred on December 23, 2002, during
    which he fatally shot Orlando Ocasio in what can be
    fairly described as a drug deal gone wrong. State v.
    Rosa, 
    104 Conn. App. 374
    , 375, 
    933 A.2d 731
     (2007),
    cert. denied, 
    286 Conn. 906
    , 
    944 A.2d 980
     (2008). The
    petitioner was arrested for this killing on or about
    December 27, 2002. He was charged with murder in
    violation of General Statues § 53a-54a, felony murder
    in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, criminal use
    of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-216,
    and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of
    General Statutes § 53a-217. The principal evidence
    against the petitioner was his confession to shooting
    the victim.
    The petitioner elected a trial by jury. During delibera-
    tions on March 16, 2005, the jury sent a note to the court
    in which the members of the jury expressed concern for
    their safety. The note was not entered into evidence at
    the habeas proceeding; however, the transcript con-
    taining the trial court’s discussion of this note with the
    parties is a part of the habeas record. The trial court
    stated that ‘‘most of the jurors feel that if they deliver
    an unfavorable verdict towards the [petitioner], that the
    family may have—whatever—retribution as we exit the
    court property. Every time we have left, [the petition-
    er’s] family has been outside the lobby of the court-
    house. They also expressed they haven’t bothered
    anybody.’’ After discussing the jury’s note with the par-
    ties, the trial court addressed the jury on the record
    and attempted to assuage their fears by explaining that
    the court had never seen an incident of violence against
    a juror in more than thirty years in criminal court. The
    jury also was told that if a serious safety concern arose,
    the state would provide judicial marshals as escorts
    and ‘‘whatever precautions that [the jurors] feel are
    necessary.’’ At no time during these events did Lorenzen
    move for a mistrial on the ground that the jury’s note
    indicated potential juror bias.
    Thereafter, on March 17, 2005, the jury found the
    petitioner guilty of felony murder and criminal use of
    a firearm, and the court found him guilty of criminal
    possession of a firearm. On June 3, 2005, he was sen-
    tenced to a total effective sentence of fifty-four years
    of incarceration.3
    On February 14, 2014, the petitioner filed the opera-
    tive petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, as is
    relevant here,4 that Lorenzen’s deficient performance
    in failing to move for a mistrial based on juror bias
    deprived the petitioner of his right to the effective assis-
    tance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984),
    and its progeny. At the habeas trial, the petitioner pre-
    sented the testimony of, among others, Lorenzen. The
    habeas court’s factual findings regarding this claim
    expressly were tied to its credibility determination of
    Lorenzen’s testimony. In particular, the habeas court
    found that ‘‘the credible evidence produced at trial
    established that . . . Lorenzen’s decision not to move
    for a mistrial after the jurors’ note was a tactical deci-
    sion.’’ The court credited Lorenzen’s testimony that he
    believed that there was a possibility that the petitioner
    might win an acquittal from this particular jury, and he
    wished to protect that chance by not seeking a mistrial.
    The habeas court noted that this is the type of strategic
    decision that reviewing courts are reluctant to second-
    guess. Finally, the court also concluded that the peti-
    tioner failed to prove that there was a reasonable proba-
    bility that a motion for a mistrial would have been
    granted. For these reasons, the court denied the petition
    on December 5, 2014.
    On December 19, 2014, the habeas court granted the
    petition for certification to appeal from the denial of
    the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal,
    the petitioner contends that the habeas court erred in
    concluding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently
    in that Lorenzen made a sound strategic decision not
    to seek a mistrial when the jurors had expressed con-
    cerns for their safety in rendering a verdict against
    the petitioner. He argues, in essence, that the state’s
    evidence against the petitioner was so strong that the
    habeas court should not have credited Lorenzen’s testi-
    mony that he believed an acquittal was possible with
    this jury and that he chose not to seek a mistrial in
    order to preserve the chance of receiving an acquittal
    from this jury.5 We disagree.
    ‘‘It is well settled that in reviewing the denial of a
    habeas petition alleging the ineffective assistance of
    counsel, [t]his court cannot disturb the underlying facts
    found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erro-
    neous, but our review of whether the facts as found by
    the habeas court constituted a violation of the petition-
    er’s constitutional right to effective assistance of coun-
    sel is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Gerald W. v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    169 Conn. App. 456
    , 465,     A.3d      (2016).
    It is well settled that ‘‘[i]n order to establish an ineffec-
    tive assistance of counsel claim a petitioner must meet
    the two-pronged test enunciated in Strickland v. Wash-
    ington, 
    [supra,
     
    466 U.S. 687
    ]. Specifically, the claim
    must be supported by evidence establishing that (1)
    counsel’s representation fell below an objective stan-
    dard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient per-
    formance prejudiced the defense because there was a
    reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceed-
    ings would have been different had it not been for the
    deficient performance. . . . Because both prongs of
    Strickland must be demonstrated for the petitioner to
    prevail, failure to prove either prong is fatal to an inef-
    fective assistance claim.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Robinson v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    167 Conn. App. 809
    , 817, 
    144 A.3d 493
    ,
    cert. denied, 
    323 Conn. 925
    , 
    149 A.3d 982
     (2016).
    ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is
    no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
    although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
    court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
    firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Newland v. Com-
    missioner of Correction, 
    322 Conn. 664
    , 706, 
    142 A.3d 1095
     (2016). ‘‘It is not enough to merely point to evi-
    dence in the record that contradicts the court’s find-
    ings.’’ Marquez v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    170 Conn. App. 231
    , 238,        A.3d     (2017).
    The petitioner argues that it was improper for the
    habeas court to conclude that failing to move for a
    mistrial was a sound strategic decision and not deficient
    performance. The petitioner asserts that the state’s case
    was so strong that it was doubtful the jury could acquit
    the petitioner. Because this verdict was so unlikely, the
    petitioner asserts it could not have been a sound tactical
    decision to choose not to make a meritorious motion
    for a mistrial out of a desire to protect this remote
    possibility. We find this argument unpersuasive, partic-
    ularly in light of the fact that the petitioner actually
    was acquitted of the murder charge.
    The petitioner fails to address the habeas court’s
    express crediting of Lorenzen’s testimony. The petition-
    er’s argument would require this court to reverse that
    credibility determination, which we should not and will
    not do. See State v. Francione, 
    136 Conn. App. 302
    ,
    312, 
    46 A.3d 219
     (‘‘[a]n appellate court does not retry
    the case or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses’’
    [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 
    306 Conn. 903
    , 
    52 A.3d 730
     (2012). Our review of the habeas
    record supports the court’s conclusion that the choice
    not to move for a mistrial was a sound tactical decision.
    It was a deliberate decision made by Lorenzen after
    discussing various strategic options with his cocounsel.
    They determined that there remained a possibility that
    the jury would acquit the petitioner and sought to avoid
    losing that possibility. Instead, as planned, they pre-
    served the issue in a motion for a new trial after the jury
    returned a guilty verdict on three of the four charges. We
    agree with the habeas court that this process reveals
    that ‘‘[t]his decision was strategic in nature,’’ and that it
    was the result of the exercise of reasonable professional
    judgment, which we decline to second-guess.6 See
    Smith v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    148 Conn. App. 517
    , 531, 
    85 A.3d 1199
     (reviewing courts do not, with
    benefit of hindsight, second-guess tactical and strategic
    decisions of counsel arrived at with benefit of experi-
    ence, deliberation, and professional judgment), cert.
    denied, 
    312 Conn. 901
    , 
    91 A.3d 908
     (2014).
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
    habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus because the petitioner failed to establish
    that Lorenzen performed deficiently.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    ‘‘[A] claim must be raised and briefed adequately in a party’s principal
    brief, and the failure to do so constitutes the abandonment of the claim.’’
    State v. Elson, 
    311 Conn. 726
    , 766, 
    91 A.3d 862
     (2014). In addressing his
    first claim, that counsel failed to adequately advise him regarding sentencing,
    the petitioner fails to attack, as he must, the factual findings of the habeas
    court on which its decision rested. Rather, he states in conclusory fashion
    that those findings are ‘‘incorrect.’’ He proceeds to argue the issue by citing
    only to evidence the court found incredible without addressing this credibil-
    ity determination, which is beyond our review. See State v. Francione, 
    136 Conn. App. 302
    , 312, 
    46 A.3d 219
     (‘‘[a]n appellate court does not retry the
    case or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses’’ [internal quotation marks
    omitted]), cert. denied, 
    306 Conn. 903
    , 
    52 A.2d 730
     (2012). Moreover, it is
    not enough merely to point to evidence in the record that contradicts the
    court’s findings when other evidence in the record supports the court’s
    findings. The petitioner must show that a review of the entire record will
    leave this court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been committed. See State v. Krijger, 
    313 Conn. 434
    , 446, 
    97 A.3d 946
     (2014).
    Turning to his third claim, that the failure to present the testimony of the
    petitioner’s family at sentencing was deficient performance, we similarly
    decline to review the claim for failure to brief the claim adequately. The
    petitioner claims that the testimony of his family members would have been
    beneficial to the petitioner because those relatives could have provided
    more accurate information about the petitioner, including details of his
    alleged learning disabilities. Nevertheless, he fails to attack the dispositive
    finding of the habeas court that the petitioner failed to present any credible
    evidence in support of his claim. Without attacking this finding, the petitioner
    cannot prevail on this claim.
    2
    This court’s opinion in the petitioner’s direct appeal provides a full
    exposition of the facts that the jury reasonably could have found at the
    criminal trial. See State v. Rosa, 
    104 Conn. App. 374
    , 375, 
    933 A.2d 731
     (2007),
    cert. denied, 
    286 Conn. 906
    , 
    944 A.2d 980
     (2008). Much of this information is
    not relevant to the narrow issue before the court here.
    3
    The petitioner’s sentence consisted of fifty-two years of incarceration on
    the felony murder conviction to be followed consecutively by two concurrent
    sentences of two years each for the criminal use of a firearm and criminal
    possession of a firearm convictions.
    4
    The petition contained numerous other claims that were either with-
    drawn prior to the habeas trial, are not raised in this appeal, or were
    raised but which we have declined to review due to inadequate briefing.
    See footnote 1 of this opinion.
    5
    Within the petitioner’s briefing of his mistrial claim, he appears to include
    a claim that Lorenzen was prejudicially deficient in failing to voir dire the
    jury to determine the extent of any bias after the jury sent its note to the
    trial court. This is a distinct claim from the petitioner’s mistrial claim and
    was neither raised in the operative habeas petition nor ruled on by the
    habeas court. ‘‘A reviewing court will not consider claims not raised in the
    habeas petition or decided by the habeas court.’’ Henderson v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, 
    129 Conn. App. 188
    , 198, 
    19 A.3d 795
    , cert. denied,
    
    303 Conn. 901
    , 
    31 A.3d 1177
     (2011). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner
    intended to raise this claim here, we decline to review it.
    6
    We need not reach the question of whether the petitioner suffered preju-
    dice because the failure to prove either prong of the Strickland standard
    is determinative of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
    See Jones v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    152 Conn. App. 110
    , 115, 
    96 A.3d 1271
    , cert. denied, 
    314 Conn. 931
    , 
    102 A.3d 83
     (2014).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC37573

Citation Numbers: 157 A.3d 654, 171 Conn. App. 428, 2017 Conn. App. LEXIS 69

Judges: Lavine, Mullins, Harper

Filed Date: 3/14/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024