Rousseau v. Perricone ( 2014 )


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    ROBERT ROUSSEAU v. MADELEINE PERRICONE
    (AC 34957)
    Beach, Bear and West, Js.
    Argued November 19, 2013—officially released March 25, 2014
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Hartford, Abery-Wetstone, J.)
    Daniel J. Klau, for the appellant (defendant).
    Daniel D. Dwyer, with whom were Robert Rousseau,
    self-represented, Jon L. Schoenhorn and, on the brief,
    Timothy J. Fitzgerald, for the appellee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    BEACH, J. In this marital dissolution action, the
    defendant, Madeleine Perricone, challenges certain
    property distribution and orders entered by the trial
    court in its judgment dissolving her marriage to the
    plaintiff, Robert Rousseau. The defendant claims that
    the court erred (1) by failing to strike the testimony of
    a certain witness after he refused to answer certain
    questions on cross-examination; (2) by not ordering the
    plaintiff to repay to her $500,000 that the defendant had
    transferred to him; (3) in ordering her to release the
    plaintiff and to hold him harmless from a pending civil
    action she had commenced in the trial court; and (4)
    in imposing a sanction on her for a discovery violation
    that her attorney allegedly committed. We affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
    procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
    appeal. The parties met in November, 2006, through a
    dating service and married in July, 2007. They did not
    commingle assets during the marriage except for invest-
    ments in various cosmetics companies located in Cali-
    fornia.
    The plaintiff had multiple business interests that pre-
    dated his marriage to the defendant. His principal busi-
    ness was Preferred Display Incorporated (Preferred
    Display), which manufactured displays for the cosmet-
    ics industry and had a worldwide customer base. The
    parties initially resided in a modest four bedroom ranch
    style home in Glastonbury. The defendant later pur-
    chased a larger home on Drumlin Road in Glastonbury.
    Prior to their marriage, the parties traveled to Califor-
    nia and had business discussions with various persons
    in the cosmetics industry, including Harry Haralambus.
    The defendant invested approximately $2 million and
    the plaintiff invested approximately $2.5 million in Cali-
    fornia cosmetics companies. As of the last day of trial,
    neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had seen a return
    on their investments.
    The court did not find any merit to the defendant’s
    claims that she made investments in the California cos-
    metics companies because of fraud, duress or undue
    influence on the part of the plaintiff. The court found
    that the investments were risky and that both the plain-
    tiff and the defendant voluntarily made what turned
    out to be bad investments. The court also imposed a
    $25,000 sanction on the defendant for failure to comply
    with discovery orders. This appeal followed. Additional
    facts will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The defendant claims that the court erred in failing
    to strike the testimony of Haralambus after he refused
    to answer certain questions on cross-examination.
    We disagree.
    Haralambus testified on direct examination that he
    had interests in cosmetics companies in California. The
    plaintiff and the defendant had invested in at least one
    of the same companies. Haralambus wanted to enhance
    the value of the companies by combining them into a
    holding company. He testified that ‘‘[t]he holding com-
    pany had been set up. However, the problem was that
    in order to complete the process, we had to have this
    discussion with each individual shareholder and get a
    decision from them as to whether they wanted to swap
    their stock in an individual entity with the appropriate
    amount of stock in the holding company. . . . [I]t was
    important to have everybody interested in the holding
    company, because that way, we could act in unity.’’
    Haralambus testified that other investors in California
    were ‘‘on board’’ with the holding company idea. He
    stated that both the plaintiff and the defendant delayed
    making decisions. Haralambus indicated that he was
    ‘‘frustrate[d]’’ by being ‘‘put in this hold pattern by two
    very important shareholders.’’ He testified that the
    plaintiff damaged his chance of recovering on his invest-
    ment when ‘‘he failed to vote . . . to move forward.’’
    He also testified that the defendant harmed her chance
    of recovering on her investment by failing, as did the
    plaintiff, ‘‘to move forward with what was agreed and
    arranged upon.’’
    On cross-examination,        the   following   colloquy
    occurred:
    ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Do you have documents
    concerning the consolidation or merger of these
    entities?
    ‘‘[Haralambus]: The proper final consolidation has
    not occurred, because it’s being held up by two share-
    holders or more. Correctly speaking, one shareholder,
    Madeleine, LLC.1 . . .
    ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Can you tell me which
    ones have?
    ‘‘[Haralambus]: It’s confidential information.
    ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I–the wit-
    ness has to be instructed to answer.
    ‘‘The Court: You need to answer the question.
    ‘‘[Haralambus]: I’d be breaching confidentiality
    agreements if I did.’’
    The defendant’s counsel argued that ‘‘[t]his is all
    about the decision by [the plaintiff] to call [Haralambus]
    to testify that because of [the defendant’s] refusal to
    cooperate and become part of a roll up into a holding
    company, that the whole thing is now unprofitable and
    that now . . . Haralambus is in trouble. And I have an
    opportunity here . . . to check [Haralambus’] credibil-
    ity to see whether or not what he’s saying to the court is
    credible.’’ The court suggested that Haralambus answer
    the following question: ‘‘Out of all the shareholders and
    investors that you have that you wanted to consolidate
    into this holding company, has everybody signed
    agreements to do so, but the two people sitting in the
    courtroom?’’ To which Haralambus answered in the
    negative. The court then asked: ‘‘So, it would be fair to
    say that the failure to consolidate everything into this
    holding company and the impact that it’s had on the
    business isn’t solely the result of these two people in this
    courtroom?’’ Haralambus answered: ‘‘That may well be
    so, Your Honor.’’ The defendant’s counsel informed the
    court that he wanted to know how many companies
    voted against consolidation into a holding company and
    which ones. Haralambus explained that those questions
    place him in a difficult position in which he is ‘‘losing
    the ability to defend myself and those companies from
    legal assault.’’ The defendant’s counsel agreed to
    address the question of the confidentiality agreement
    at a later date.
    At his next court appearance, Haralambus was repre-
    sented by counsel. Haralambus’ counsel requested that
    the court conduct an in camera review of the confidenti-
    ality agreement. The court did so. The defendant’s coun-
    sel again stated that he wanted to question Haralambus
    regarding the identity of the entities that had not wanted
    to consolidate, because such testimony ‘‘impeaches the
    witness’ testimony further.’’ The court stated: ‘‘He’s
    already said that there are other entities or people that
    did want to roll up. You’ve made your point.’’ The court
    concluded that the agreement was ‘‘between people
    who are not part of this case, not present in this court-
    room, and they’re entitled to their confidentiality. Addi-
    tionally, the court’s going to make a finding that there
    is no relevance of this to the present case.’’ The defen-
    dant’s counsel orally moved for a mistrial and to strike
    Haralambus’ testimony. He argued that the court’s rul-
    ing that the confidentiality agreement barred Haralam-
    bus from disclosing the identities of the other entities
    involved in the consolidation effort adversely affected
    his ability to cross-examine Haralambus. The court
    denied both motions.2
    The defendant argues that ‘‘[b]eyond the parties
    themselves, there is no witness more central to the
    financial shenanigans in this case than . . . Haralam-
    bus. . . . The plaintiff offered the testimony of Hara-
    lambus to shift blame for the defendant’s loss of her
    investment away from Haralambus’ and the plaintiff’s
    financial shenanigans and onto the defendant for refus-
    ing to participate in the consolidation or ‘roll up’ of the
    individual companies into a single holding company,
    which allegedly would have enhanced the overall value
    of the companies. . . . Haralambus testified on direct
    examination that all of the investors had agreed to the
    consolidation of the cosmetic companies into a holding
    company except the defendant, and that her refusal
    was responsible for the lack of financial success of the
    enterprise.’’3 (Emphasis omitted.) The defendant argues
    that the court’s failure to permit cross-examination on
    a ‘‘critical issue’’ was erroneous and deprived her of
    her due process rights.
    ‘‘In determining whether a defendant’s right of cross-
    examination has been unduly restricted, we consider
    the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field
    of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions
    that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-
    examination viewed in relation to the issues actually
    litigated at trial. . . . Although it is axiomatic that the
    scope of cross-examination generally rests within the
    discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaning-
    ful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry consti-
    tutes an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Corriveau v. Corriveau, 
    126 Conn. App. 231
    ,
    236–37, 
    11 A.3d 176
    , cert. denied, 
    300 Conn. 940
    , 
    17 A.3d 476
     (2011).
    The court did not abuse its discretion in not permit-
    ting inquiry into the identity of other investors in the
    California cosmetics companies venture. Testimony
    was elicited from Haralambus that there were persons
    or entities other than the parties that did not agree to
    consolidate, and Haralambus agreed that it ‘‘may well
    be’’ that the failure to consolidate was not solely the
    result of the parties’ actions. The identity of the other
    investors that were not in favor of consolidation was
    not material to the issue of the defendant’s claim of
    financial misconduct on the part of the plaintiff or to any
    impeachment of the witness. Furthermore, the cross-
    examination of Haralambus was extensive and is
    reported on more than 150 pages of transcript. It cov-
    ered a variety of issues involving the ‘‘roll up’’ and other
    financial aspects of the California cosmetics companies
    venture. We conclude that the court did not abuse its
    discretion4 in not permitting inquiry into the identities
    of other investors involved in the consolidation dis-
    cussions.
    II
    The defendant next claims that the court erred by
    not ordering the plaintiff to repay $500,000 that she had
    transferred to him. We disagree.
    ‘‘We review financial awards in dissolution actions
    under an abuse of discretion standard. . . . In order
    to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion,
    we must find that the court either incorrectly applied
    the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.
    . . . In making those determinations, we allow every
    reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the correct-
    ness of [the trial court’s] action.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin, 
    93 Conn. App. 618
    , 624, 
    889 A.2d 902
    , aff’d, 
    280 Conn. 632
    , 
    910 A.2d 963
     (2006).
    The court found that the plaintiff began investing in
    the California cosmetics companies in August, 2008,
    and that most of the money had been transferred from
    the plaintiff’s checking account. The court found that
    two sources of the deposits into the plaintiff’s checking
    account, in turn, were wire transfers from the defen-
    dant’s UBS account in the amount of $250,000 each.
    The court did not find any basis for the defendant’s
    claim that she made investments in the California cos-
    metics companies because of fraud, duress or undue
    influence on the part of the plaintiff. The court empha-
    sized that both parties had been warned that the invest-
    ments were risky and that neither had realized a return
    on the investments as of the last day of trial. The court
    further found that the defendant ‘‘blamed her husband
    and scores of others for her decisions and took no
    personal responsibility.’’
    The defendant claims that she did not authorize the
    wire transfers into the plaintiff’s account and that, ‘‘[i]n
    a calculated and convoluted manner,’’ the $500,000 was
    transferred through various companies and ended up
    in the hands of Haralambus. She concludes that ‘‘[t]he
    plaintiff was clearly double dealing with Haralambus
    to the disadvantage of the defendant . . . Haralambus
    got his money, the plaintiff got his investment and [the
    defendant] lost her money.’’
    The defendant’s interpretation of events was not what
    was found by the trial court. The court’s finding that
    the $500,000 was part of the defendant’s knowing invest-
    ment in the California cosmetics companies venture
    was not clearly erroneous.5 See, e.g., Miller v. Guimar-
    aes, 
    78 Conn. App. 760
    , 766–67, 
    829 A.2d 422
     (2003)
    (trial court’s factual findings reviewed under clearly
    erroneous standard). The court did not abuse its discre-
    tion in declining to award to the plaintiff the $500,000
    that she had invested in a business venture.
    III
    Prior to the trial in this action, the defendant had
    initiated a separate action against the plaintiff, Pre-
    ferred Display and others. She claimed to have been
    harmed by essentially the same financial transactions
    that were subjects of dispute in the present action. The
    defendant claims, in this appeal, that the court erred
    in ordering her to release the plaintiff and to hold him
    harmless regarding the pending civil action in the trial
    court. We disagree.
    The question central to the resolution of this issue
    is whether the pending civil action is ‘‘property’’ subject
    to distribution under General Statutes § 46b-81. Our
    standard of review of claims involving statutory inter-
    pretation is plenary. See Lopiano v. Lopiano, 
    247 Conn. 356
    , 363, 
    752 A.2d 1000
     (1998).
    The trial court stated that it had ‘‘examined the civil
    ferred Display] and numerous others. The allegations
    raised against the plaintiff and [Preferred Display] are
    more specific and detailed but essentially the same
    allegations raised by the defendant in the dissolution
    action.’’6 The court determined that pursuant to Lopi-
    ano, the civil action was an asset that the court could
    properly consider in the mosaic of its property division.
    The court ordered that ‘‘[t]he defendant shall release
    and hold the plaintiff and his company [Preferred Dis-
    play] indemnified and harmless from any and all claims
    of action pending in Hartford Superior Court captioned
    Perricone v. Rousseau, bearing docket number HHD-
    CV-11-6027402-S. In addition, the defendant shall be
    responsible for 100% of [the] plaintiff’s legal fees in
    defending the civil action if [the] plaintiff and/or his
    company remain parties to that action.’’
    In Lopiano v. Lopiano, supra, 
    247 Conn. 363
    , our
    Supreme Court held that a personal injury award is a
    property interest encompassed within the meaning of
    ‘‘property’’ under § 46b-81 and therefore available for
    distribution in a marital dissolution action. In reaching
    this conclusion, the court examined the definition of
    ‘‘property’’ under § 46b-81. Id., 363–66. ‘‘The distribution
    of assets in a dissolution action is governed by § 46b-
    81, which provides in pertinent part that a trial court
    may assign to either the husband or the wife all or any
    part of the estate of the other. . . . In fixing the nature
    and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the
    court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party
    . . . shall consider’’ various factors relevant to the
    property distribution. (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Id., 363–64. ‘‘There are three stages of analysis
    regarding the equitable distribution of each resource:
    first, whether the resource is property within § 46b-
    81 to be equitably distributed (classification); second,
    what is the appropriate method for determining the
    value of the property (valuation); and third, what is the
    most equitable distribution of the property between the
    parties (distribution).’’ Id., 364. In defining the term
    ‘‘property’’ in Lopiano, our Supreme Court stated:
    ‘‘Rather than narrow the plain meaning of the term
    property from its ordinarily comprehensive scope, in
    enacting § 46b-81, the legislature acted to expand the
    range of resources subject to the trial court’s power of
    division, and did not intend that property should be
    given a narrow construction. . . . [O]ur broad defini-
    tion of property was not entirely without limitation, and
    that property under § 46b-81 includes only interests that
    are presently existing, as opposed to mere expectan-
    cies.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Id., 365–66.
    Our Supreme Court in Mickey v. Mickey, 
    292 Conn. 597
    , 618–19, 
    974 A.2d 641
     (2009), further explained:
    ‘‘The legislature has not seen fit to define [the] critical
    term [property within the meaning of § 46b-81], leaving
    it to the courts to determine its meaning through appli-
    cation on a case-by-case basis. Neither § 46b–81 nor
    any other closely related statute defines property or
    identifies the types of property interests that are subject
    to equitable distribution in dissolution proceedings.
    . . . As we noted previously, this court has generally
    taken a rather broad and comprehensive view of the
    meaning of the term property for purposes of equitable
    distribution. . . . We have not erased altogether, how-
    ever, the limitations inherent in the term. We continue
    to recognize that the marital estate divisible pursuant
    to § 46b–81 refers to interests already acquired, not to
    expected or unvested interests, or to interests that the
    court has not quantified. . . . Our cases thus have gen-
    erally divided the various contested property interests
    under § 46b–81 by characterizing them as either pres-
    ently existing and enforceable and, therefore, distribut-
    able . . . or mere expectancies immune from equitable
    distribution.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.)7
    The cause of action in Perricone v. Rousseau, supra,
    Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6027402-S, is ‘‘prop-
    erty’’ for the purpose of § 46b-81. ‘‘There is no doubt
    that a right in action, [when] it comes into existence
    under common-law principles, and is not given by stat-
    ute as a mere penalty or without equitable basis, is as
    much property as any tangible possession . . . .’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silver v. Silver, 
    112 Conn. App. 145
    , 150, 
    151 A. 524
     (1930); see also Lopiano
    v. Lopiano, supra, 
    247 Conn. 370
     (right of action charac-
    terized as property under § 46b-81). ‘‘The value of the
    chose in action, on the other hand, determined at least
    in part by the party’s chances of prevailing, may be
    unknown, and, indeed, the action may turn out to be
    worthless. Nevertheless, that fact is irrelevant to its
    classification as a property interest. See, e.g., Bender
    v. Bender, [
    258 Conn. 733
    , 749–50, 
    785 A.2d 197
     (2001)]
    (classification stage distinct from valuation stage in
    analyzing potential interests for equitable distribu-
    tion).’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Mickey v. Mickey, 
    supra,
     
    292 Conn. 624
     n.20;
    see also Massa v. Nastri, 
    125 Conn. 144
    , 147, 
    3 A.2d 839
     (1939) (‘‘[a] right of action . . . is a vested property
    interest, before as well as after judgment’’).
    As discussed previously, Lopiano mandates a three
    stage inquiry. The first issue is whether the item in
    question is properly characterized as property. If it is
    property, the next issues are valuation and equitable
    distribution. The remaining issues are easily resolved.
    In the present case, the court had no need to resolve
    the issue of valuation, because no proceeds of the civil
    action could flow directly or indirectly from the plaintiff
    to the defendant pursuant to the court’s order. If, on the
    other hand, the defendant should recover any proceeds
    independently from any defendant other than the plain-
    tiff or Preferred Display in the civil action, she would
    be entitled to keep for herself all of those assets. Simi-
    larly, the court did not abuse its discretion in the distri-
    bution of the proceeds of the right of action. Anything
    the defendant could recover from third parties was hers;
    nothing was to come from the plaintiff and he was to
    be made whole for any future litigation costs regarding
    the civil action. In light of the court’s determination
    that there had been no financial manipulation, which
    finding is not clearly erroneous, the order regarding the
    civil case was well within the court’s discretion and
    served to maintain the status quo of the overall prop-
    erty mosaic.
    Finally, the defendant argues that even if the pending
    civil action was property for purposes of § 46b-81, the
    order at issue was not a property distribution order
    because it did not transfer title or ownership of property
    from the defendant to the plaintiff. We disagree. Most,
    if not all, divisions of property pursuant to § 46b-81
    leave some property in the hands of its owner. Although
    some property may be transferred from one spouse to
    the other, § 46b-81 does not require that to occur in all
    cases. The order concerning the civil action preserved
    the status quo regarding the court’s other orders con-
    cerning the subject property and avoided what the court
    viewed as an inequitable result. There was no abuse
    of discretion.
    IV
    The defendant last claims that the court erred in
    imposing a sanction of $25,000 in attorney’s fees for a
    discovery violation that was allegedly committed by
    her attorney. The defendant argues that (1) the court’s
    finding of a discovery violation on the part of her attor-
    ney was clearly erroneous; (2) even if that finding was
    not clearly erroneous, the court erred in imposing a
    sanction on the defendant because of the alleged con-
    duct of her attorney in not producing a computer disc
    to the plaintiff; and (3) the $25,000 sanction imposed
    had no basis in the evidence. We disagree.
    ‘‘[T]he common law rule in Connecticut, also known
    as the American Rule, is that attorney’s fees and ordi-
    nary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed
    to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory
    exception.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ber-
    zins v. Berzins, 
    306 Conn. 651
    , 657, 
    51 A.3d 941
     (2012).
    One limited exception to that rule in dissolution actions
    ‘‘provide[s] a trial court with the discretion to award
    attorney’s fees to an innocent party who has incurred
    substantial attorney’s fees due to the egregious litiga-
    tion misconduct of the other party when the trial court’s
    other financial orders have not adequately addressed
    that misconduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id., 658, quoting Ramin v. Ramin, 
    281 Conn. 324
    , 351,
    
    915 A.2d 790
     (2007). A trial court has ‘‘the discretion
    to award attorney’s fees to a party who incurs those
    fees largely due to the other party’s egregious litigation
    misconduct . . . .’’ Ramin v. Ramin, 
    supra, 353
    . The
    term ‘‘egregious litigation misconduct’’ is limited to dis-
    covery misconduct. Berzins v. Berzins, supra, 658.
    The court noted that the plaintiff began requesting
    discovery from the defendant in 2011, and that the court
    entered discovery orders in March, June, July and Sep-
    tember, 2011. The court found that the defendant failed
    to comply with these court orders, in that attorney
    billing records and certain bank records were not fully
    produced. The court noted that the defendant’s attorney
    had testified that a UBS computer disc containing finan-
    cial records was not produced because, even though
    the requested material had been clearly described, the
    attorney did not think that it contained material that
    the plaintiff wanted. The court stated that ‘‘[i]t is not
    up to the defendant to decide what information is rele-
    vant to the preparation of the plaintiff’s case.’’ In Sep-
    tember, 2011, a fine of $50 per day, doubling daily, was
    imposed on the defendant for noncompliance. The trial
    court noted that because the orders were never fully
    complied with through the end of the trial, the sanction
    would be more than the defendant’s net worth. The
    court found that the defendant had had the ability to
    comply with the court orders regarding discovery, that
    the defendant and her lawyers were fully aware of the
    orders, and that they wilfully failed to comply with
    them. The court imposed a sanction of $25,000 on the
    defendant for failing to comply with the discovery
    orders.
    First, the defendant argues that the court erred in
    finding that her prior attorney, Carlo Forzani, commit-
    ted a discovery violation. In support of her argument,
    she cites the testimony of Forzani and argues that, once
    Forzani was aware that the plaintiff wanted the UBS
    computer disc, he provided it to him. Although the
    court, as trier of fact, can reject any portion of testimony
    it deems not credible; see Jay v. A & A Ventures, LLC,
    
    118 Conn. App. 506
    , 514, 
    984 A.2d 784
     (2009); Forzani’s
    testimony was not necessarily inconsistent with the
    court’s finding that some documents were not produced
    in a timely fashion after the court had ordered them to
    be produced. Additionally, some documents were never
    produced despite the fact that they were available. In
    the portion of testimony cited by the defendant, Forzani
    stated that it never occurred to him to give the plaintiff
    the UBS computer disc, and, after the court ordered
    him to do so, he encountered a delay because ‘‘Staples
    didn’t want to do all this work.’’ Further, the defendant
    contests only the court’s finding of a discovery violation
    with respect to the UBS computer disc, but apparently
    does not contest the finding with respect to the attorney
    billing records, Citizen Bank records, and Valley Bank
    records, which the court also determined were not fully
    produced despite the court’s clear order. Accordingly,
    we conclude that the court’s finding of a discovery
    violation was not clearly erroneous.
    Second, the defendant argues that, even if the court’s
    finding of a violation was not erroneous, the violation
    was not attributable to her and ‘‘[t]he trial court
    expressly found that Attorney Forzani, not the defen-
    dant, decided not to produce the computer disc to the
    plaintiff.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The court’s finding of
    a violation did not rest solely on the issue of the UBS
    computer disc, but as stated previously, concerned
    other documents, such as bank account records, as
    well. The court’s finding of a violation as to these
    remaining items remains unchallenged. Furthermore,
    regardless of the court’s finding that Forzani did not
    think that the plaintiff wanted the UBS computer disc,
    the court’s finding that ‘‘[t]he defendant and her lawyers
    were fully aware of the court orders and wilfully failed
    to comply with the court orders’’ remains unchallenged.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Third, the defendant argues that ‘‘the $25,000 sanction
    appears to be a number that the court pulled out of
    the air.’’ ‘‘A trial court may rely on its own general
    knowledge of the trial itself to supply evidence in sup-
    port of an award of attorney’s fees. . . . The amount
    of attorney’s fees to be awarded rests in the sound
    discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed
    on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discre-
    tion. . . . Sound discretion, by definition, means a dis-
    cretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or wilfully, but
    with regard to what is right and equitable under the
    circumstances and the law . . . .’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Food Studio, Inc. v.
    Fabiola’s, 
    56 Conn. App. 858
    , 865, 
    747 A.2d 7
     (2000).
    The court was familiar with the history of the case
    and the extent of attorney activity. In its discussion of
    the sanction for discovery abuse, the court referenced
    attorney’s fees in the amount of $25,553.91 for dealing
    with the defendant’s incomplete financial records. We
    hold that, in the circumstances of this case, a sanction
    in the amount of $25,000 was reasonable. The court
    did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of
    the sanction.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The court found that the plaintiff and defendant were 49 percent owners
    of Madeleine, LLC.
    2
    The defendant argues that the court erred in denying her oral motions
    for a mistrial and to strike Haralambus’ testimony. Because we conclude
    that the court did not impermissibly limit the cross-examination of Haralam-
    bus, we determine that the court did not err in denying these motions.
    3
    On direct examination, however, Haralambus also placed blame for the
    lack of financial success on the plaintiff.
    4
    The court apparently attached some importance to the confidentiality
    agreement. Because of the lack of materiality of the issue of identity, the
    court did not need to determine the weight, if any, to be accorded to any
    expectation of privacy created by the agreement.
    5
    For example, Arnaldo Marinelli, a friend of the parties who was involved
    in the California cosmetics company venture, testified that the defendant
    was aware of the wire transfers, that she ‘‘jumped in, gave [the plaintiff]
    6
    Perricone v. Rousseau, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
    Docket No. CV-11-6027402-S, was brought against multiple defendants,
    including the plaintiff in this matter and Preferred Display. The allegations
    against the plaintiff include: that he had manipulated the defendant into
    investing in the California venture, had caused her to replace her attorney,
    and had convinced her to acquire a certain home in Glastonbury. She claimed
    that the plaintiff had deceptively had her execute an equity loan on the
    Glastonbury property in the amount of $800,000. The court in the present
    dissolution action determined that the plaintiff had exercised no undue
    influence or duress and had committed no fraud in the context of the failed
    California investments, that there was no merit to the defendant’s claims
    that the plaintiff had deprived her of legal counsel, that the plaintiff had
    been the driving force behind the purchase of the Glastonbury home, and
    that the defendant failed to meet her burden of proof to show that the
    plaintiff had not repaid the defendant in full for the home equity line of
    credit taken out on the Glastonbury property.
    7
    In Mickey v. Mickey, 
    supra,
     
    292 Conn. 625
    –33, our Supreme Court dis-
    cussed Bender v. Bender, 
    258 Conn. 733
    , 
    785 A.2d 197
     (2001), in which a
    middle ground, not relevant to the present case, was carved out.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC34957

Judges: Beach, Bear, West

Filed Date: 3/25/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/3/2024