State v. Dotson ( 2015 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TILDEN DOTSON
    (AC 36340)
    Beach, Prescott and Foti, Js.
    Argued October 27, 2014—officially released January 6, 2015
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Tolland, geographical area number nineteen, Mullarkey,
    J. [motion to suppress]; Simo´n, J. [judgment].)
    Brendan R. Putman, for the appellant (defendant).
    Jacob L. McChesney, special deputy assistant state’s
    attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Matthew C.
    Gedansky, state’s attorney, and Andrew Reed Durham,
    assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    PER CURIAM. The defendant, Tilden Dotson, appeals
    from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
    conditional plea of nolo contendere, of operating a
    motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
    liquor or drugs, in violation of General Statutes § 14-
    227a. The defendant claims that the court erred in deny-
    ing his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of
    the trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant. On August 10, 2012, Officer Bryan Sembersky of
    the Vernon Police Department executed a Terry1 stop
    of the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant was arrested
    and charged with driving under the influence of intox-
    icating liquor or drugs in violation of § 14-227a.2 The
    defendant was also charged in a part B information
    with having previously been convicted of operating a
    motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
    liquor or drugs in violation of § 14-227a. The defendant
    filed a motion to suppress any and all evidence obtained
    as a result of the stop.
    After an evidentiary hearing, the court, Mullarkey,
    J., denied the defendant’s motion. The court found that
    the defendant drove on Franklin Street in Vernon at ‘‘a
    higher than normal rate of speed and stopped very close
    before two emergency stop signs that were placed in
    the road to guard a downed power line.’’ The court
    continued: ‘‘Even when facing these two stop signs,
    police protective tape and the rear overhead flashing
    lights of a police cruiser, the defendant failed to heed
    the flashlight beam shined on him by the officer.
    Instead, the defendant made a ‘K’ turn during which his
    front tire mounted the sidewalk in violation of General
    Statutes § 14-250a. The defendant then drove off in the
    opposite direction to his original path.’’ The court found
    that the preceding undisputed facts ‘‘provided the offi-
    cer with more than reasonable and articulable suspicion
    to stop the defendant’s vehicle before it left the neigh-
    borhood.’’ Following the denial of his motion to sup-
    press, the defendant entered conditional pleas of nolo
    contendere to the charge of operating a motor vehicle
    under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in
    violation of § 14-227a and on the part B charge of having
    previously been convicted of violating § 14-227a. The
    defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment,
    execution suspended after five months, followed by
    two years probation with various conditions. This
    appeal followed.
    ‘‘[O]ur standard of review of a trial court’s findings
    and conclusions in connection with a motion to sup-
    press is well defined. A finding of fact will not be dis-
    turbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the
    evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . .
    [When] the legal conclusions of the court are chal-
    lenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine
    whether they are legally and logically correct and
    whether they find support in the facts set out in the
    court’s [ruling] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) State v. Ocasio, 
    112 Conn. App. 737
    , 742–43, 
    963 A.2d 1109
    , cert. denied, 
    292 Conn. 904
    , 
    973 A.2d 106
    (2009).
    ‘‘A stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, [
    392 U.S. 1
    , 21–22,
    
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    (1968)], is legal if three
    conditions are met: (1) the officer must have a reason-
    able suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring,
    or is about to occur; (2) the purpose of the stop must
    be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the
    detention must be reasonable when considered in light
    of its purpose. . . . The United States Supreme Court
    has further defined reasonable suspicion for a traffic
    stop as requiring some minimal level of objective justifi-
    cation for making the stop. . . . Because a reasonable
    and articulable suspicion is an objective standard, we
    focus not on the actual state of mind of the police
    officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the
    information available to and known by the police, would
    have had that level of suspicion.’’ (Citations omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cyrus, 
    297 Conn. 829
    , 837–38, 
    1 A.3d 59
    (2010). An officer may
    conduct a Terry stop based on a traffic infraction. State
    v. Dukes, 
    209 Conn. 98
    , 122, 
    547 A.2d 10
    (1988).
    The defendant takes issue with the first component
    of the three part test for a Terry stop and argues that
    the court erred in determining that the officer had a
    reasonable suspicion that he had committed a traffic
    infraction or other motor vehicle violation. He argues
    that ‘‘[t]here is not a single motor vehicle violation to
    be found in the court’s factual findings . . . .’’
    The court found that the front tire of the defendant’s
    vehicle mounted the sidewalk in violation of § 14-250a.
    Section 14-250a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No per-
    son shall operate any motor vehicle upon . . . any pub-
    lic sidewalk except to cross such sidewalk to enter or
    leave adjacent areas . . . . (c) Violation of any provi-
    sion of this section shall be an infraction.’’
    The defendant argues that he did not commit a motor
    vehicle infraction when, in the process of turning his
    vehicle around, the front tire of his vehicle mounted
    the sidewalk. The defendant does not challenge the
    court’s finding that his front tire mounted the sidewalk.
    Rather, he relies on the exception to § 14-250a that
    permits a motorist to cross a sidewalk if leaving an
    adjacent area. He argues that this was ‘‘exactly what
    the defendant was doing.’’
    The court reasonably could have found that the
    exception did not apply because the defendant was not
    leaving or entering an adjacent area such as a driveway.
    Moreover, the court found that the facts of the case
    ‘‘provided the officer with more than reasonable and
    articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle
    before it left the neighborhood.’’ Under the totality of
    all the circumstances, as found by the trial court, the
    court properly concluded that the police entertained
    a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal
    activity was afoot.3 Accordingly, the court did not err
    in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    1
    See Terry v. Ohio 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    (1968).
    2
    The defendant was also charged with failure to stay within the traffic
    lane in violation of General Statutes § 14-236 (1). The state entered a nolle
    prosequi with respect to that charge.
    3
    The defendant argues that certain of the court’s factual findings were
    erroneous. We disagree. The only fact that was in dispute at the time of the
    hearing, as noted by the court, was whether the defendant’s tire that mounted
    the sidewalk also went onto the homeowner’s lawn; the court concluded
    that it did not.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC36340

Filed Date: 1/6/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/1/2015