State v. Samuel M. ( 2015 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SAMUEL M.*
    (AC 36789)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Sullivan, Js.
    Argued December 1, 2014—officially released August 18, 2015
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Windham, geographical area number eleven, Seeley, J.)
    Bryan P. Fiengo, with whom, on the brief, was
    Michael A. Blanchard, for the appellant (defendant).
    Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state’s attorney, with
    whom, on the brief, were Patricia M. Froehlich, state’s
    attorney, and Andrew J. Slitt, assistant state’s attorney,
    for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    SHELDON, J. The defendant, Samuel M., appeals
    from the judgment of conviction rendered against him
    on two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in
    violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2) and one
    count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General
    Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2) in connection with a series of
    incidents involving his minor cousin, J. The incidents
    were alleged to have occurred ‘‘on or about June, 2009,’’
    when the defendant was fourteen years old and J was
    ten years old. Based upon the classifications of the
    charged offenses and the state’s allegation that the
    defendant had committed them after reaching the age
    of fourteen, the defendant’s case was transferred from
    the docket for juvenile matters (juvenile docket) to the
    regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes
    § 46b-127 (a) (1).1 As a result of the transfer, the defen-
    dant was tried, convicted and sentenced as an adult.
    On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence
    was insufficient to support his conviction of any of the
    charged offenses due to severe inconsistencies in J’s
    testimony at trial; and (2) the trial court erred in denying
    his motion to dismiss the amended information, under
    which he was prosecuted as an adult, and to transfer
    his case to the juvenile docket, based upon the state’s
    failure to prove that he committed any of the offenses
    of which he was convicted after attaining the age of
    fourteen.2 We disagree with the defendant that the evi-
    dence was insufficient to support his conviction due to
    alleged inconsistencies in J’s trial testimony. We agree
    with the defendant, however, that the state failed to
    prove that he was at least fourteen years old at the
    time of the offenses, and thus conclude that the court
    improperly denied his motion to dismiss the amended
    information and to transfer the matter to the juvenile
    docket.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to this appeal. The defendant and J are first cousins
    who are approximately four years apart in age.3 The
    defendant, who is the older of the two boys, was born
    on September 17, 1994. J was born on December 31,
    1998.4 At the time of the alleged assaults, J’s and the
    defendant’s families resided across the street from one
    another in Windham County. The grandparents of J and
    the defendant, R and G,5 lived on the same street and
    within walking distance of the two homes. During the
    school year, J and his older brother spent Tuesday and
    Thursday afternoons at their grandparents’ house while
    their parents were at work. On the days that the defen-
    dant did not have basketball or baseball practice after
    school, he spent the afternoons at his grandparents’
    house as well, along with his three siblings. Because
    of their close proximity, the families frequently met for
    dinner on Sundays and occasionally vacationed
    together. The children also played together after school
    and during the summer months.
    In the second to last week of June, 2009, J’s mother,
    S, woke up early one morning, at about 5 a.m., and
    went downstairs to gather her things to prepare to go
    to work. At that time, she observed that her cell phone,
    which had been placed on the charger in the living
    room, appeared to be lit up as if it had recently been
    in use. Given the early morning hour, this struck her
    as odd and prompted her to look through the contents
    of the cell phone. Upon doing so, she discovered a text
    message between J and one of his friends. S continued
    to search the contents of her cell phone and discovered
    a photograph of J’s penis. S immediately woke J, who
    was still sleeping, and demanded that he explain the
    photograph. J admitted that he had taken the photo-
    graph of his penis, claiming that he had done so at
    the defendant’s request.6 Upon further questioning, J
    disclosed that there had been sexual activity between
    him and the defendant, but he did not say when the
    activity had occurred. Following this conversation, S
    terminated all contact between J and the defendant.
    Several weeks later, in September, 2009, S convened
    a family meeting to make J’s grandparents, R and G,
    and the defendant’s family aware of what had taken
    place. J’s aunt also attended the meeting, and at that
    time she spoke privately with J concerning his allega-
    tions against the defendant. J confirmed to his aunt that
    there had been activity of a ‘‘sexual nature’’ between
    him and the defendant.
    S did not report the matter to the police. Instead, she
    arranged for J to see a therapist. More than one year
    later, in August, 2010, J’s therapist reported the alleged
    sexual abuse to the Department of Children and Fami-
    lies. The department then referred the matter to the
    state police. Detective Patrick Dragon, of the eastern
    district major crime squad, was assigned to investigate
    the referral. Psychologist Mary Cheyne conducted a
    video recorded forensic interview of J.7 During the inter-
    view, J, who was then eleven years old, described seven
    separate incidents involving sexual contact initiated by
    the defendant. According to J, the sexual abuse began
    ‘‘around my end of my fourth grade year.’’ The incidents
    were alleged to have occurred on Tuesday and Thursday
    afternoons when J and the defendant were in their
    grandparents’ care but out of their sight and immediate
    supervision. J recalled that on five occasions, he and
    the defendant performed fellatio on one another. When
    asked to describe the incidents, J stated that the defen-
    dant ‘‘would make me suck his penis first, and then,
    like, to pay back, he would suck mine.’’ On two other
    occasions J and the defendant allegedly performed anal
    sex on one another. On each occasion, J claimed the
    defendant had forced him to submit to the sexual acts
    by threatening him with a baseball bat.8 According to
    J, ‘‘[the defendant] said, if you tell anyone, I’m going
    to hurt you . . . so, me, only being in fourth grade,
    and him, being, like, what, twelve, no, like, thirteen,
    actually, I believed him.’’
    At the conclusion of the interview, Cheyne attempted
    to get clarification about the timing of the assaults.9 J
    stated that the first incident occurred in the autumn
    of his fourth grade year and that the sexual activity
    continued ‘‘for a whole year’’ until the ‘‘first day of
    autumn’’ of his fifth grade year. When asked which
    month he thought the last incident occurred, J stated
    that he believed it was October ‘‘because in the forest
    the leaves were starting to change and fall off.’’ Near
    the conclusion of the interview, J stated that the activity
    had occurred over a span of three months in the middle
    of his fourth grade year.
    On the basis of these facts and interviews with mem-
    bers of J’s family, a juvenile arrest warrant for the defen-
    dant was issued on December 2, 2011, charging him
    with sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury
    to a child. The juvenile arrest warrant and juvenile sum-
    mons and complaint alleged that the date of the offense
    was ‘‘on or about June, 2009,’’ which corresponded with
    S’s discovery of the photograph on her cell phone. On
    January 10, 2012, the defendant’s case was transferred
    from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket
    pursuant to the mandatory transfer provision, § 46b-
    127 (a).10 The state subsequently filed an amended infor-
    mation charging the defendant with fourteen counts of
    sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk
    of injury to a child in connection with seven separate
    incidents. Seven counts alleged sexual assault by use
    of force in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (1). Seven counts
    alleged sexual assault of a victim under the age of thir-
    teen when the defendant was more than two years older
    than the victim in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2). The
    fifteenth count charged the defendant with risk of injury
    to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2), alleging that
    the defendant had contact with the intimate parts of a
    child under the age of sixteen years. The state alleged
    that each of the seven incidents had occurred on or
    about June, 2009. The state alleged that the defendant
    had illegal contact with J’s intimate parts ‘‘on or about
    divers dates from in June, 2009 . . . .’’
    The defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges and
    elected a jury trial. The defendant’s trial commenced
    on July 11, 2013, and concluded on July 17, 2013. The
    state called six witnesses in its case-in-chief and rebut-
    tal case. The substantive evidence against the defendant
    was limited to J’s testimony.11 J, who was fourteen years
    old at the time of trial, testified that in June, 2009, he
    was attending middle school. He testified as to seven
    incidents of sexual assault that had taken place when
    he was ‘‘nine or ten’’ years old, that occurred ‘‘maybe
    a month apart,’’ on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons.
    On redirect examination, J stated that he could not
    recall with any certainty when the incidents occurred.
    At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, the defendant
    moved the court to dismiss the charges or to render a
    judgment of acquittal on the ground that the state had
    failed to establish a time frame for the assaults. Defense
    counsel argued: ‘‘[It is] problematic . . . the lack of a
    time frame . . . . Now, in our opinion that becomes
    important because while the state has alleged that June
    of 2009 is an operative time, there is some testimony
    that it happened somewhere when he was in fourth
    grade, but there [has] been no evidence put before this
    court as to when [J] was in fact in fourth grade. . . .
    [T]he best information that I recall is that when [J] was
    talking about particular ages at about which time this
    happened, it would have been either nine or ten. Now,
    with his birthday being in 1998, he’s nine in 2007 and ten
    in 2008, that poses a problematic issue . . . because
    of the fact that up until September [17] of 2008, [the
    defendant] was a minor and not subject to the transfer
    statute, which kicked in when he [attained] the age of
    fourteen. Since there’s not a sufficient enough clarity
    as to the timing of this particular incident, Your Honor,
    it is—it could be an absolute situation, this . . . matter
    should not be before this court and, as such, this matter
    should be dismissed.’’
    The defendant also argued that acquittal was man-
    dated because of the factual inconsistencies as to timing
    on the basis of facts adduced through the testimony of
    the state’s witnesses and the time frame alleged as a
    predicate for the charges.
    In response, the state argued, inter alia, that ‘‘we’re
    talking about details. . . . The state’s evidence was
    presented not just by the—by [J], but by [S] and by his
    aunt. The state is not required to establish with preci-
    sion . . . when the crime occurred. The descripting
    term of on or about is there for a reason. The court’s
    instructions to the jury are [going to] explain that. I
    believe that the state is not required to make that precise
    time known to the jury and, again, the—talking about
    details that a child is attempting to remember about
    something that happened four years ago.’’ The state
    averred that S’s testimony concerning her discovery of
    the photograph of J’s penis on her cell phone and J’s
    disclosure, in the second to last week of June ‘‘put the
    time frame into proper context.’’ The court denied the
    motion for a judgment of acquittal, but reserved judg-
    ment on it only as to counts eleven and twelve. At the
    close of evidence the court rendered a judgment of
    acquittal on two counts on other grounds.12 The court
    did not directly address the defendant’s motion to dis-
    miss, stating, ‘‘I do note . . . your arguments on the
    time frame issue. I do not think that that matter is
    part of a judgment of acquittal argument for [these]
    purposes. It may be another argument or another
    motion.’’ The defendant did not further pursue the issue
    at that time.
    The defendant called six witnesses in his defense.
    Two of the defendant’s witnesses testified concerning
    the time frame of the alleged assaults. The defendant’s
    father testified as to alibi evidence concerning the
    defendant’s after-school sports schedule, which
    included basketball practices scheduled on Tuesday
    and Thursday afternoons in the 2008–2009 school year.
    The defendant and J’s grandmother, R, who watched
    the boys after school on the days the assaults allegedly
    took place, testified that she was diagnosed with cancer
    on June 13, 2008, and underwent surgery and, thus,
    could not ‘‘recall ever watching them all—not all the
    time’’ beyond July, 2008.13
    At the close of evidence, on July 16, 2013, the defen-
    dant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing, inter
    alia, that J’s testimony had failed to establish a time
    frame for the charged offenses that conformed to the
    dates alleged in the information.14 On that score, the
    defendant argued that ‘‘with all [of] the divergent evi-
    dence’’ as to timing, the jury had no reasonable basis
    from which to infer that the incidents occurred on or
    about June, 2009. The court denied the defendant’s
    motion for a judgment of acquittal. At that time, the
    court also considered and summarily denied the defen-
    dant’s motion to transfer, predicated on the same argu-
    ment, moving the court to transfer the defendant’s case
    to the juvenile docket pursuant to § 46b-127 (a) (2)15 on
    the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over him.16
    In the court’s final charge to the jury, the counts were
    identified by the location of the incident, and each count
    was alleged to have occurred on or about June, 2009.
    The jury was instructed: ‘‘[T]he state does not have to
    prove the exact date of the offense charged beyond a
    reasonable doubt, only that the alleged acts as charged
    occurred on or about divers dates in June, 2009.’’
    The jury found the defendant guilty of three counts
    of first degree sexual assault in violation of § 53a-70
    (a) (2), based on the more than two year age difference
    between the defendant and J, and one count of risk of
    injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2), based
    on illegal contact with J’s intimate parts. The jury found
    the defendant not guilty of three counts of sexual
    assault in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2) and all six
    remaining counts of sexual assault by use of force in
    violation of § 53a-70 (a) (1).
    Following the jury’s verdict, the defendant filed a
    ‘‘motion to dismiss information and motion to transfer,’’
    and a motion for a judgment of acquittal, contending
    that the state’s failure to establish an operative time
    frame for the offenses mandated either that the case
    be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and transferred
    back to the juvenile docket or that the defendant be
    acquitted of the charges. The court granted the defen-
    dant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on one count
    of sexual assault in the first degree. On each of the
    three counts of which the defendant was found guilty,
    the court imposed the mandatory minimum five year
    sentence, to run concurrently, plus five years special
    parole, with lifetime sex offender registration.17 The
    court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. This
    appeal followed.
    I
    We first address the defendant’s claim that J’s testi-
    mony cannot support the conviction. More particularly,
    the defendant directs our attention to various portions
    of J’s testimony, which, he maintains, are ‘‘so fantastic
    that one must reach a conclusion of fabrication.’’ He
    further claims that the split verdict demonstrates that
    the jury compromised its verdict. This claim merits
    little discussion.
    ‘‘The standard of appellate review of a denial of a
    motion for a judgment of acquittal has been settled by
    judicial decision. . . . The issue to be determined is
    whether the jury [reasonably could have] concluded,
    from the facts established and the reasonable infer-
    ences which could be drawn from those facts, that
    the cumulative effect was to establish guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt. . . . The facts and the reasonable
    inferences stemming from the facts must be given a
    construction most favorable to sustaining the jury’s ver-
    dict. . . . It is established case law that when a defen-
    dant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we
    apply a twofold test. We first review the evidence . . .
    in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s ver-
    dict. We then determine whether, upon the facts thus
    established and the inferences reasonably drawn . . .
    the jury [reasonably could] have concluded that the
    cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Turner, 
    133 Conn. App. 812
    ,
    842–43, 
    37 A.3d 183
    , cert. denied, 
    304 Conn. 929
    , 
    42 A.3d 390
    (2012).
    As this court has noted, ‘‘it is not the province of
    appellate courts to make determinations of credibility,
    as that is the right and purpose of the jury.’’ State v.
    Caracoglia, 
    95 Conn. App. 95
    , 128, 
    895 A.2d 810
    , cert.
    denied, 
    278 Conn. 922
    , 
    901 A.2d 1222
    (2006). The jury
    was free to credit or reject J’s testimony and, indeed,
    the jury’s verdict demonstrates that it did reject a vast
    portion of J’s testimony. Moreover, contrary to the
    defendant’s contention, the jury’s determination that
    the defendant did not commit some of the alleged
    crimes does not mandate a similar conclusion as to the
    remaining charges. See State v. Arroyo, 
    292 Conn. 558
    ,
    585, 
    973 A.2d 1254
    (2009) (our law permits factually
    and logically inconsistent verdicts), cert. denied, 
    559 U.S. 911
    , 
    130 S. Ct. 1296
    , 
    175 L. Ed. 2d 1086
    (2010). The
    evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s con-
    victions.
    II
    A
    The defendant next claims that the state’s failure to
    prove that the crimes occurred in the time frame
    alleged, after he had attained the age of fourteen, left
    the trial court without jurisdiction and, thus, the infor-
    mation should be dismissed and the matter transferred
    to the juvenile docket for further proceedings. We agree.
    To fully understand the defendant’s claim on appeal,
    an examination of the relevant statutory framework is
    necessary. The Superior Court for Juvenile Matters has
    exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings con-
    cerning delinquent children18 subject to certain excep-
    tions that have been carved out under the juvenile
    transfer statute, § 46b-127.19 ‘‘The current revision of
    § 46b-127 provides for three types of transfers of a case
    that charges a juvenile with an offense: (1) mandatory
    transfers from the docket for juvenile matters to the
    regular criminal docket of the Superior Court (manda-
    tory transfer provision); General Statutes (Supp. 2014)
    § 46b-127 (a); (2) discretionary transfers from the
    docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal
    docket of the Superior Court (discretionary transfer
    provision); General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 46b-127 (b);
    and (3) transfers of cases of youths age sixteen or
    seventeen from the youthful offender docket, regular
    criminal docket of the Superior Court or any docket
    for the presentment of defendants in motor vehicle
    matters, to the docket for juvenile matters (youthful
    offender transfer provision). General Statutes (Supp.
    2014) § 46b-127 (f).’’ (Footnote omitted.) In re Tyriq
    T., 
    313 Conn. 99
    , 105–106, 
    96 A.3d 494
    (2014).
    This case concerns the mandatory transfer provision,
    § 46b-127 (a). Pursuant to § 46b-127 (a), the transfer of
    a child to the regular criminal docket is mandatory if
    the child is charged with having committed a class A
    or class B felony after he or she has attained the age
    of fourteen. The child’s age on the date of the offense,
    as alleged in the state’s information, determines the
    child’s eligibility to be prosecuted as an adult. See Gen-
    eral Statutes § 46b-127 (a). If probable cause has been
    found that the child committed the offense, the case is
    transferred to the adult docket by operation of law.20
    ‘‘Upon the effectuation of the transfer, such child shall
    stand trial and be sentenced, if convicted, as if such
    child were eighteen years of age. . . . If the action is
    dismissed or nolled or if such child is found not guilty
    of the charge for which he was transferred . . . the
    child shall resume such child’s status as a juvenile until
    such child attains the age of eighteen years.’’ General
    Statutes § 46b-127 (c).
    Against this background, the defendant argues that
    under § 46b-127 (a), mandatory transfer is authorized
    only if the commission of the offense occurred after
    the child attained the age of fourteen. Accordingly, the
    defendant claims that his age at the time of the offense
    is a jurisdictional fact that served to trigger criminal
    proceedings on the adult docket and the criminal penal-
    ties that follow, which, in his case, include felony con-
    victions of serious sexual offenses and lifetime
    registration as a sex offender. Given the significantly
    enhanced consequences related to his age, he argues,
    there must be proof to establish beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the crimes occurred after his fourteenth
    birthday. On this score, the defendant contends that
    the state offered ‘‘exceedingly vague and nebulous’’ tes-
    timony to support its allegation that the crimes occurred
    ‘‘on or about June, 2009 . . . .’’ Because our juvenile
    statutes contain no provision for the transfer of children
    under the age of fourteen, he argues, the court lacked
    jurisdiction and, thus, erred in denying his motion to
    dismiss and to transfer.
    The state argues that the defendant’s jurisdictional
    claim must fail because as a constitutional court of
    general jurisdiction, the court had the authority to adju-
    dicate the offenses at issue. The state further argues
    that the uncontested evidence at trial established that
    the defendant was fourteen years old at the time of the
    commission of the crimes.
    The state is correct that in 1978, the Court of Common
    Pleas and Juvenile Court were merged with the Superior
    Court. See General Statutes § 51-164s. Thus, ‘‘[t]his state
    has a unified court system. . . . [A]ll criminal and civil
    matters, including juvenile matters, fall within the sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Juvenile
    matters are comprised of a civil session and a criminal
    session; all proceedings concerning delinquent children
    are heard in the criminal session for juvenile matters.
    General Statutes § 46b-121 (a). For ease of reference,
    we refer to the Superior Court for juvenile matters as
    juvenile court and to the Superior Court for regular,
    or adult, criminal matters as criminal court.’’ State v.
    Ledbetter, 
    263 Conn. 1
    , 4–5 n.9, 
    818 A.2d 1
    (2003). As
    a result of our unified court system, ‘‘[r]ather than impli-
    cating subject matter jurisdiction, issues relating to
    transfers between the juvenile and the regular criminal
    docket involve considerations that are analogous to
    those of the law of venue.’’ State v. Kelley, 
    206 Conn. 323
    , 332, 
    537 A.2d 483
    (1988); accord In re Matthew F.,
    
    297 Conn. 673
    , 691, 
    4 A.3d 248
    (2010).
    Although ‘‘General Statutes § 51-164s . . . merg[ed]
    the Juvenile Court and the Superior Court, the legisla-
    ture has preserved a separate system for the disposition
    of cases involving juveniles accused of wrongdoing.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Prudencio O.,
    
    229 Conn. 691
    , 696, 
    643 A.2d 265
    (1994); see also General
    Statutes § 46b-121.21 General Statutes § 46b-145 pro-
    vides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o child shall be prose-
    cuted for an offense before the regular criminal docket
    of the Superior Court except as provided in section
    46b-127. . . .’’ Thus, ‘‘[t]he General Assembly . . . has
    expressed a preference for shielding children from
    criminal liability except in clearly circumscribed situa-
    tions.’’ State v. Torres, 
    206 Conn. 346
    , 360, 
    538 A.2d 185
    (1988).
    Although the same criminal statutes apply to adult
    and juvenile criminal matters, juvenile matters are gov-
    erned by different procedures.22 The difference in treat-
    ment accorded to children accused of wrongdoing
    attaches the moment the child enters the juvenile justice
    system. 
    Id. ‘‘Whenever a
    child is brought before a judge
    of the Superior Court, such judge shall immediately
    have the case proceeded upon as a juvenile matter.
    . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-133 (b). The process that
    ensues thereafter reflects the goal of the juvenile justice
    system, which is not criminal punishment, but rather,
    ‘‘individualized supervision, care, accountability and
    treatment . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-121h; see also
    Kent v. United States, 
    383 U.S. 541
    , 554, 
    86 S. Ct. 1045
    ,
    
    16 L. Ed. 2d 84
    (1966) (‘‘The objective of juvenile court
    proceedings is to determin[e] the needs of the child
    and of society rather than adjudicat[e] criminal con-
    duct. The objectives are to provide measures of guid-
    ance and rehabilitation . . . not to fix criminal
    responsibility, guilt and punishment.’’). The measures
    employed to achieve this aim and to protect the privacy
    of the child include a predisposition investigation by a
    juvenile probation officer (General Statutes § 46b-134);
    the separation of juvenile matters from other business
    of the superior court whenever practicable; (General
    Statutes § 46b-121 [a]); and confidential proceedings
    (General Statutes § 46b-121 [b]).
    Moreover, where the juvenile court determines that
    the juvenile offender has violated a criminal statute,
    the result is a conviction of delinquency rather than a
    felony conviction. General Statutes §§ 46b-140 and 46b-
    141; see also State v. 
    Ledbetter, supra
    , 
    263 Conn. 1
    4
    (‘‘[a] delinquency petition does not charge a child with
    having committed a crime and . . . adjudication of a
    juvenile offense is not a conviction . . . and does not
    permit the imposition of criminal sanctions’’ [internal
    quotation marks omitted]). A finding that the child has
    committed a delinquent act, unlike a felony conviction,
    does not carry with it the loss of civil rights and privi-
    leges. In addition, the sanctions that are imposed as a
    result of conviction are less severe in cases of delin-
    quency. Juvenile incarceration takes place at the Juve-
    nile Training School; General Statutes § 46b-140 (j); the
    purpose of which is to rehabilitate and educate the
    child, rather than to exact criminal punishment. The
    term of sentence for a juvenile is also restricted by
    statute. See General Statutes § 46b-141.
    Finally, a juvenile offender is given a significant bene-
    fit not readily available to adults who have been con-
    victed of violating the law—upon discharge from the
    juvenile justice system, the juvenile is afforded a clean
    slate. Juvenile matters are sealed to all but the victim,
    with some limited exceptions for public administration,
    and dispositional orders are not available to the public.
    General Statutes § 46b-124. A juvenile offender’s long-
    term anonymity is equally preserved, as he may petition
    for the erasure of records. General Statutes § 46b-146.
    Observing the differences in procedure attendant to
    juvenile and adult matters and noting the clear legisla-
    tive intent to shield children who do not meet the statu-
    tory criteria under § 46b-145 from the less forgiving
    adult adjudication and sentencing, our Supreme Court,
    in State v. 
    Torres, supra
    , 
    206 Conn. 346
    , held that a
    defendant transferred to the regular criminal docket
    under § 46b-127 was entitled to be returned to the
    docket for juvenile matters on his motion to dismiss
    once the court determined that there was no probable
    cause for the murder charge that prompted his transfer.
    
    Id., 348; but
    see State v. Cuffee, 
    32 Conn. App. 759
    ,
    763–64, 
    630 A.2d 621
    (1993) (upholding conviction
    where defendant was transferred on murder charge,
    and requested jury instruction on lesser included
    offense and was convicted of that offense). Notably,
    the court in Torres declined to address ‘‘questions about
    the validity of a subsequent conviction . . . as a result
    of a full trial or a plea of guilty.’’23 State v. 
    Torres, supra
    ,
    360 n.17.
    In State v. Angel C., 
    245 Conn. 93
    , 
    715 A.2d 652
    (1998),
    our Supreme Court again considered the mandatory
    transfer provision under § 46b-127 (a), addressing con-
    stitutional challenges to the then newly enacted legisla-
    tion eliminating the defendant’s right to a hearing prior
    to transfer to the adult court. Our Supreme Court held
    that the statute did not violate procedural or substantive
    due process.24 In so deciding, the court noted that the
    legislature had taken steps to ensure that the protec-
    tions conferred on juveniles are not lost if the child
    is transferred pursuant to § 46b-127 (a) and it is later
    determined that the child should not have been subject
    to the transfer statute. 
    Id., 121–22. ‘‘If
    charges against
    a juvenile who was transferred to the criminal docket
    pursuant to § 46b-127 (a) are dismissed, § 46b-127 (c)
    mandates that the juvenile shall resume his or her juve-
    nile status.’’ (Footnote omitted.) 
    Id., 126. In
    light of the statutory framework and the relevant
    authorities, we conclude that if the statutory age criteria
    defining the grounds for transfer under § 46b-127 (a)
    cease to be met, the defendant may not be prosecuted,
    convicted, and sentenced as an adult. The law precludes
    the adult criminal prosecution of children under the
    age of fourteen. See General Statutes §§ 46b-145 and
    46b-127 (a). ‘‘It is clear that what in an adult would be
    a crime, yet when done by a juvenile is a delinquency
    and punishable not as in the case of an adult but in a
    manner provided in the Juvenile Court Act.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elbert, 
    115 Conn. 589
    ,
    
    162 A. 769
    (1932). A defendant subject to the mandatory
    transfer provision may contest the trial court’s authority
    over him and upon the court’s granting of his motion to
    dismiss resume his juvenile status. See General Statutes
    § 46b-127 (c). ‘‘To determine otherwise would contra-
    vene the legislature’s intent that [juveniles] accused
    of wrongdoing be accorded different treatment from
    adults.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jan
    Carlos D., 
    297 Conn. 16
    , 25–26, 
    997 A.2d 471
    (2010),
    overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Elson,
    
    311 Conn. 726
    , 747–48, 754, 
    91 A.3d 862
    (2014); State
    v. 
    Torres, supra
    , 
    206 Conn. 361
    .
    B
    We next turn to the defendant’s related contention
    that the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, as
    a ‘‘jurisdictional prerequisite’’ to be tried and sentenced
    as an adult, must be established by proof beyond a
    reasonable doubt. As noted, the crux of the defendant’s
    argument is that the state’s assertion that he was over
    the age of fourteen at the time of the crimes has signifi-
    cant consequences, including criminal felony convic-
    tions, lengthy incarceration with an adult inmate
    population, and lifetime registration as a sex offender.25
    ‘‘The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake
    interests of immense importance, both because of the
    possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction
    and because of the certainty that he would be stigma-
    tized by the conviction.’’ In re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    ,
    363, 
    90 S. Ct. 1068
    , 
    25 L. Ed. 2d 368
    (1970). We agree
    with the defendant that the gravity of an adult criminal
    conviction, as compared to the penalty that attaches
    in the adjudication of a juvenile, is substantial.26 The
    punishment meted out for the criminal wrongdoing of
    adults is imposed on the theory that such punishment
    has a deterrent effect. Historically, however, there has
    been an acknowledgment in this state, mirrored in the
    common law, that children are ‘‘incapable of forming
    criminal intent and not of an age where the threat of
    punishment could serve as a deterrent.’’ 2 W. LaFave,
    Substantive Criminal Law (2d Ed. 2003) § 9.6 (a); see In
    re Tyvonne M., 
    211 Conn. 151
    , 156, 
    558 A.2d 661
    (1989).
    At common law, an offender’s age was, in some
    instances, the determinative factor between guilt and
    innocence. For children under the age of seven, there
    was a conclusive presumption that such offenders were
    incapable of committing a crime. State v. 
    Elbert, supra
    ,
    
    115 Conn. 593
    . Between the ages of seven and fourteen,
    there was a rebuttable presumption that the child was
    incapable of committing a crime. 
    Id. Children in
    this
    age bracket were presumed not to have the capacity
    to discern between good and evil. 2 Z. Swift, A System
    of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1796) p. 368.
    The state was thus tasked with overcoming the pre-
    sumption by proving the child’s ‘‘vicious will’’; 
    id., p. 367;
    and ability to understand the wrongfulness of his
    conduct. 
    Id., pp. 367–68.
    Those fourteen and over, how-
    ever, were subject to the same criminal laws as adults
    and could be held criminally responsible. In re Tyvonne
    
    M., supra
    , 
    211 Conn. 156
    ; see 4 W. Blackstone Commen-
    taries on the Laws of England (1769) pp. 23–24; 3 E.
    Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (Thomas ed.
    1826) p. 571; W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law (1972)
    § 46, p. 351; 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State
    of Connecticut (1823) p. 361. ‘‘The law recognized that
    while a child may have actually intended to perform a
    criminal act, children in general could not reasonably
    be presumed capable of differentiating right from
    wrong. . . . The presumptions of incapacity were cre-
    ated to avoid punishing those who, because of age,
    could not appreciate the moral dimensions of their
    behavior, and for whom the threat of punishment would
    not act as a deterrent.’’ (Citation omitted.) In re
    Tyvonne 
    M., supra
    , 156.
    In State v. 
    Elbert, supra
    , 
    115 Conn. 589
    , Chief Justice
    Maltbie, one of the chief proponents of juvenile reform
    at the time, explained that the establishment of our
    juvenile justice system and the legislature’s authority
    to preclude the criminal adult prosecution of offenders
    falling under a certain age pursuant to our juvenile
    statutes corresponded to the rule at common law. ‘‘The
    age of one who has committed a particular act forbidden
    by law has always been an element necessary to make
    that act a crime.’’ 
    Id., 593; see
    also 2 Z. Swift, supra,
    p. 361.
    The establishment of the juvenile justice system and
    the informal and rehabilitative treatment of children
    falling below the age designated by statute to be subject
    to adult penalties negated the utility and, thus, the need
    for the infancy defense in juvenile delinquency proceed-
    ings. See In re Tyvonne 
    M., supra
    , 
    211 Conn. 161
    . ‘‘[T]he
    child found delinquent is not perceived as a criminal
    guilty of one or more offenses, but rather as a child in
    need of guidance and rehabilitative services. In effect,
    the statutes regulating juvenile misconduct represent a
    system-wide displacement of the common law.’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id. It stands
    to reason, however, that when the state
    seeks to prosecute and convict a child for felony
    offenses, the state bears the burden of establishing the
    child’s eligibility to be tried and sentenced as an adult.
    Thus, to be punishable as a criminal offense in adult
    court, the offense must be shown to have occurred on
    or after the defendant’s fourteenth birthday, and this
    must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.27
    C
    In the present case, then, the issue is whether the
    court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dis-
    miss, in which he claimed that the court lacked the
    authority to convict and sentence him as an adult. This
    court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.
    State v. Davis, 
    76 Conn. App. 653
    , 669, 
    820 A.2d 1122
    (2003). As indicated previously, the defendant raised
    the jurisdictional question concerning his age three
    times: at the close of the state’s case-in-chief, at the
    close of evidence, and postverdict.28 The court permit-
    ted the parties to brief and argue the issue on October
    15, 2013, the date of the defendant’s sentencing. At that
    time, the defendant also filed a motion for a judgment
    of acquittal, in support of which he argued that the
    state had failed to prove that the incidents in connection
    with which he had been found guilty had occurred on
    or about June, 2009. At the start of the hearing, the
    court noted that the defendant’s motions presented
    interrelated claims with respect to the timing of the
    offenses. The court orally ruled on both motions, grant-
    ing in part and denying in part the motion for a judgment
    of acquittal, and denying the motion to dismiss. With
    respect to the motion for a judgment of acquittal, the
    court determined that the evidence reasonably permit-
    ted a jury finding that two of the incidents had occurred
    on or about June, 2009. The court concluded, however,
    that the evidence did not reasonably permit a jury find-
    ing that one of the incidents had occurred during that
    time period and, thus, it acquitted the defendant on
    that count. The court denied the defendant’s motion to
    dismiss without further elaboration. On the basis of the
    record, it is evident that in ruling on the defendant’s
    motion to dismiss, the court relied on its reasoning in
    denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal as to
    the three counts.
    Because the time frame of each of the incidents is
    central to the trial court’s ruling and the defendant’s
    claim on appeal, we first turn our focus to J’s testimony
    describing the assaults. For ease of reference in the
    discussion of the defendant’s claim, we set forth the
    corresponding counts as identified in the court’s jury
    instructions.
    Counts One and Two: Behind Grandparents’ Barn
    J testified that in June, 2009, he was in middle school.
    On Tuesday and Thursday afternoons, he took a school
    bus home to his grandparents’ house after school. With
    respect to the first incident, the prosecutor adduced
    evidence that ‘‘there [came] a time when something
    happened with [the defendant].’’ J testified that he and
    the defendant were playing behind the barn on their
    grandparents’ property. The defendant asked J if he
    wanted to play the ‘‘psychiatrist game.’’ J agreed to play.
    The defendant then pulled down his pants and told J
    to suck his penis. J performed fellatio on the defendant,
    and then the defendant reciprocated by performing fel-
    latio on J. They stopped when their grandmother called
    them inside for dinner. J testified that, in this instance,
    and the incidents that followed, he did what the defen-
    dant told him to do because the defendant threatened
    to beat him with a bat.
    Counts Three and Four: Behind Defendant’s
    House Near Train Tracks
    The prosecutor adduced evidence that, ‘‘after the first
    incident,’’ on two occasions, J and the defendant
    engaged in sexual activity in the woods behind the
    defendant’s house. On the first occasion, the defendant
    and J, who had been playing with a group of friends,
    walked away from the group and into the woods, toward
    the train tracks. The defendant told J to stand near a
    tree, where he removed J’s shirt and shorts and pre-
    tended to tie him to the tree. J testified that the defen-
    dant then walked away and ‘‘pretended that we . . .
    crashed from a plane or something.’’ When the defen-
    dant returned, the defendant and J performed fellatio
    on one another. They stopped when their friends called
    out looking for them.
    Counts Five and Six: Behind Defendant’s
    House in Woods near Rock
    Regarding the second instance in which the defen-
    dant and J engaged in sexual activity in the woods
    behind the defendant’s house, J testified that they
    walked farther into the woods. There, they sat on a
    rock and performed fellatio on one another. The sexual
    activity stopped when the defendant’s father called
    for them.
    Counts Seven and Eight: Defendant’s Basement
    J testified that, on another occasion, he and the defen-
    dant were at the defendant’s house. The defendant’s
    father, who worked the night shift and thus was home
    during the day, was taking a shower upstairs. The defen-
    dant told J to follow him down the stairs into the base-
    ment. It was dark there, and ‘‘everything was like
    concrete and metal . . . .’’ Once downstairs, J and the
    defendant removed their clothing and sat in a small
    sandbox. The defendant, using baby oil to lubricate his
    penis, inserted it into J’s anus. After two minutes, J
    inserted his penis into the defendant’s anus. They
    stopped when they the heard the water from the
    upstairs shower stop running.
    Counts Nine and Ten: J’s Bedroom
    J testified that on another occasion, something simi-
    lar to the sexual activity in the basement occurred in
    his bedroom. On a day that J was dropped off at his
    grandparents’ house, he walked to his house to feed
    his cats and clean the litter box. As he was finishing and
    washing his hands, he looked up and saw the defendant
    standing at the door. The defendant unlocked the door
    with a spare key that was kept at their grandparents’
    house and came inside. The defendant then ‘‘pushed’’
    J up the stairs, where the engaged in anal intercourse
    and performed fellatio on one another. They stopped
    when their grandmother called the house looking for
    them. J testified that he knew it was his grandmother
    calling because the telephone in his house had a caller
    identification feature that announced the name of the
    caller after a series of rings.
    Counts Eleven and Twelve: Grandparents’ Barn
    The prosecutor adduced evidence that there was
    ‘‘another time’’ that ‘‘something of this nature’’ hap-
    pened. J testified that, on that occasion, the defendant
    told him that he found ‘‘something cool . . . .’’ The
    defendant then led him into their grandparents’ barn,
    shut the doors, and put him on a couch. There, the
    defendant pulled down J’s pants and ‘‘licked [his] butt.’’
    J then did the same thing to the defendant. After five
    minutes, they heard their grandfather calling them
    inside and stopped.
    Counts Thirteen and Fourteen: J’s Basement
    The prosecutor asked J if he could recall another
    occasion when ‘‘something of this sort of nature
    occurr[ed] in another location . . . .’’ J testified that
    ‘‘it was another time that I was doing my chores. I had
    finished cleaning the cat box. And this time it was before
    the other time that . . . it happened at my house.’’ J
    testified that the defendant came in ‘‘right after I had
    finished washing my hands, and he brought me down-
    stairs.’’ The defendant allegedly pushed J onto a pile
    of clothing, pulled down his pants, and ‘‘licked [his]
    butt.’’ J testified that the defendant stopped after five
    minutes because he did not want their grandmother to
    call the house again, prompting the prosecutor to ask,
    ‘‘So, this happened after the other time in your bedroom
    . . . .’’ J responded in the affirmative.
    On the basis of the above-described testimony, the
    jury returned a verdict of guilty on count two, of which
    the defendant subsequently was acquitted by the court;
    guilty on count six and guilty on count ten, both of
    which alleged first degree sexual assault; and guilty on
    count fifteen, which alleged risk of injury to a child.
    The court acquitted the defendant on counts eleven and
    twelve at the close of the state’s case-in-chief and, thus,
    those counts were not submitted to the jury. The jury
    found the defendant not guilty on all other charges. As
    a consequence, five of the seven incidents described
    by J were rejected as bases for criminal liability by the
    jury or the court. The two incidents remaining, which
    are the subject of the conviction on appeal, include the
    incident involving fellatio behind the defendant’s house
    in the woods near the rock, and the incident in J’s
    bedroom involving fellatio and/or anal intercourse.29
    Thus, the issue is whether the evidence supports a con-
    clusion that these two incidents took place after the
    defendant’s fourteenth birthday, as is required to con-
    vict and sentence him as an adult.
    As illustrated by J’s testimony, the questions posed
    to him by the prosecutor centered on the location and
    the conduct involved in each of the charges, not the
    time frame. When the prosecutor did try to clarify when
    the assaults took place, J suggested that the incidents
    happened over a wide-ranging period of time, as demon-
    strated by the following exchange between the prosecu-
    tor and J concerning the incident behind the defendant’s
    house, near the train tracks. The prosecutor asked J
    whether this incident occurred in the same time frame
    as the first incident:
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And was this . . . around
    the same time frame [as the first incident]?
    ‘‘[J]: Relatively.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: When do you think this occurred?
    ‘‘[J]: Fall.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Of what year?
    ‘‘[J]: Two thousand ten, maybe.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. . . . [W]hat grade were
    you in?
    ‘‘[J]: That year I would be in seventh grade.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. Let me . . . let me just ask
    you this: how old were you when this was happening?
    ‘‘[J]: Nine or ten.’’30
    The testimony of S and Detective Dragon established
    that the crimes were reported to the police in August,
    2010, more than one year after J began counseling in
    June, 2009. J testified that there was no contact between
    him and the defendant following S’s discovery of the
    photograph of his penis. S testified that she discovered
    the photograph in June, 2009. J’s aunt also confirmed
    that he had disclosed the sexual abuse to her in June,
    2009. Thus, to the extent that J testified that the sexual
    activity was still ongoing in the fall of 2010, after it had
    been reported to the police, his statement appears to
    be inaccurate, as established by his later statement that
    the incidents took place when he was nine or ten
    years old.
    On cross-examination, J’s uncertainty concerning the
    time frame of the assaults was equally patent:
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And you also indicated that these
    [incidents] happened [when you were] about nine or
    ten and [the defendant] was two years older than you.
    So, this would have happened when [the defendant]
    was twelve or thirteen; isn’t that true?
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah.
    ***
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I’d like to talk to you a little bit
    about . . . with respect to the time frame that you
    claimed all this happened; okay? When you first started
    talking, you made a mention that this all started at
    the end of fourth grade. Is that what your testimony
    is today?
    ‘‘[J]: Yes.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And then you talked about, it
    happened maybe a month apart?
    ‘‘[J]: Yes.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So, you’re claiming all this
    happened within a month?
    ‘‘[J]: No.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: So, what is your claim with
    respect to when you claim this happened?
    ‘‘[J]: Could you explain?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: When do you claim this
    happened?
    ‘‘[J]: What are we talking about? Like, everything?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes.
    ‘‘[J]: I meant that it all took place, like—not just, like,
    in a month. Like, a month in between each incident.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: So, you’re claiming it was once
    a month. That’s your claim here today.
    ‘‘[J]: Yes.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: . . . Now, you remember talk-
    ing to [Cheyne] in August of 2010.
    ‘‘[J]: Yes.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Is that correct? And do you
    remember telling her one time that it started in the end
    of fourth grade. Is that what you remember telling her?
    ‘‘[J]: Yes.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Do you remember telling her that
    the last it happened was October of fifth grade?
    ‘‘[J]: No.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And do you remember
    telling her that—okay, so, if it started [at] the end of
    fourth grade, you would agree with me that’s June,
    right?
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And the beginning of fifth
    grade is—is October, you said, I think; right?
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: All right. So, that’s, what, a four
    month period; is that fair?
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Do you remember telling
    [Cheyne] on another occasion that sometimes it hap-
    pened in the fall, sometimes it happened in the winter,
    sometimes it happened in the spring? Do you remember
    all that talk?
    ‘‘[J]: Yes.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Would you agree with me
    that between June and October is not in the spring?
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah.’’
    In considering this testimony, we note that there was
    no evidence presented by the state to establish J’s age
    or the year when he attended fourth or fifth grade.
    Consequently, to the extent that his testimony focused
    on crimes that occurred when he attended those grade
    levels, there is no basis to determine how old J—and
    by extension, the defendant—was at that time.
    There was little attempt by the state to establish a
    more specific time frame or time line of events, as
    demonstrated by the following exchange between the
    prosecutor and J on redirect examination:
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: [D]o you know—do you know all
    the dates when all these different things happened with
    any degree of certainty?
    ‘‘[J]: No.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And you’re how—again, you’re
    fourteen years old today?
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: That was your testimony? And
    back—back when this happened, you would have been
    about eleven? Ten or eleven?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Objection. He testified he was
    nine or ten at the time of the incidences. . . .
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Nine or ten?
    ‘‘The Court: That’s true.
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah. . . .
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So, several years ago.
    ‘‘[J]: Yeah.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And back when you were that age,
    did you carry a calendar around with you?
    ‘‘[J]: No.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Did you have a watch with you?
    ‘‘[J]: No.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Did you have an iPhone with you
    that had the dates on it?
    ‘‘[J]: No.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Did you make a journal that—
    where you wrote down the dates every time your cousin
    assaulted you?
    ‘‘[J]: No.’’
    Pursuant to this court’s careful review of the record,
    the testimony established that J was nine or ten years
    old at the time of the assaults. Within that two year
    time frame, there is a seven month span of time in
    which the assaults may have occurred, according to J’s
    testimony. Within that seven month time frame, there
    are two incidents underlying the defendant’s convic-
    tion. From this evidence, the court deemed it possible
    for the jury to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    that these two incidents took place, as charged, on
    or about June, 2009, and, thus, after the defendant’s
    fourteenth birthday.
    Court’s Ruling
    At the outset of the hearing, the court noted that ‘‘to
    be tried as an adult, the defendant must have been
    fourteen years old when the criminal conduct occurred.
    In this case the evidence established that the defendant
    turned fourteen on September 17, 2008. There is no
    doubt that being tried as an adult exposes the defendant
    to greater punishment than if he had been tried as a
    juvenile.’’ The court, in considering the evidence at trial,
    stated that it was ‘‘trouble[ed]’’ by the state’s allegation
    that the assaults had taken place in June, 2009. Specifi-
    cally, the court stated: ‘‘The state is given lots of leeway
    in terms of specificity in charging child sexual assault
    cases. If the state had simply alleged on or about 2009,
    then we would not have an issue here. But by charging
    on or about June, 2009 . . . and then the court, in
    instructing that the state must prove beyond a reason-
    able doubt that on or about the dates specified in the
    information the defendant engaged in sexual inter-
    course with [J], these seven incidences reasonably
    could not have occurred on or about June of 2009; in
    other words, how can seven instances that did not occur
    within the same month, but about a month apart, all
    have occurred about June of 2009?’’
    The court reasoned that although there was no direct
    testimony to establish that the assaults took place in
    June, 2009, the testimony did establish that S discovered
    the photograph of J’s penis on her cell phone in the
    second to last week of June, 2009. The court concluded
    that this evidence, coupled with J’s testimony that the
    assaults occurred when he was nine or ten, permitted
    an inference that the abuse was still occurring in
    June, 2009.
    The court reasoned that J ‘‘also testified that the
    different incidences were maybe a month apart . . . .
    On cross-examination he clarified that these incidences
    did not occur within one month, but, like, a month in
    between each incident. . . . He also testified he did
    not know when the dates were with certainty. . . . [J’s]
    mother found the picture on the cell phone in late June
    of 2009. While there’s no direct testimony as to whether
    the acts occurred close in time to when [S] found the
    [photograph on her] cell phone, an inference can be
    made that they did, since [J] testified he was nine or
    ten when the acts occurred.
    ‘‘The fact that he said he was nine or ten when these
    acts were happening—he was ten in June of 2009—in
    mind with the fact that [J] testified he took a picture
    of his penis at the defendant’s request and [S] found
    the picture in June of 2009, a reasonable inference can
    be drawn that sexual activity was still occurring
    between [J] and the defendant in June of 2009.’’ (Empha-
    sis added.)
    On the basis of its determination that the conduct was
    ongoing in June, 2009, and that the incidents occurred
    about one month apart, the court concluded that the
    incident that J described as having occurred first, the
    incident behind the grandparents’ barn, could not have
    taken place in June, 2009. The court thus acquitted
    the defendant on count two.31 The court ruled that the
    conduct at issue in the remaining counts—particularly,
    the incident involving fellatio in the woods behind the
    defendant’s house on the rock and the incident involv-
    ing fellatio and/or anal sex in J’s bedroom—could have
    taken place in the June, 2009 time frame. Thus, the court
    sustained the defendant’s conviction on those counts.
    Undergirding the court’s analysis is the notion that
    the jury found, based on the court’s instruction, that
    the crimes occurred ‘‘on or about June of 2009,’’ which
    it appears to have construed to mean that the jury
    determined that the crimes occurred in June, 2009.
    There are two problems with the court’s assumption.
    First, without any instruction by the court defining the
    descriptor, ‘‘on or about,’’ this could be taken to mean,
    consistent with the testimony presented, that the inci-
    dents took place over a wide-ranging period of time.
    Indeed, the state appears to have proceeded to trial
    with that mindset. Second, the jury was instructed that
    the state was not required to prove when the incidents
    occurred. Specifically, the jury was instructed: ‘‘The
    state does not have to prove the exact date of the
    offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, only that
    the alleged act as charged occurred on or about June,
    2009.’’ For these reasons, the instruction was an
    improper basis for the court’s determination that the
    jury had made a finding as to the time frame of the
    offenses of which it found the defendant guilty.
    We turn next to the court’s related conclusion that
    an inference could be drawn that the acts occurred ‘‘on
    or about June, 2009,’’ on the basis of S’s discovery of
    the photograph in the second to last week of June. The
    defendant argues, and we agree, that the discovery of
    the photograph is an untenable basis for the inference
    drawn by the court that, the crimes occurred in the
    time frame alleged.
    The evidence concerning S’s discovery of the photo-
    graph is as follows. S testified that she discovered the
    photograph of J’s penis on her cell phone in June, 2009.
    She testified that she looked at her cell phone because
    it was lit up, which she thought was unusual given the
    early morning hour. She found a text message, or ‘‘small
    conversation,’’ between J and his friends, which
    prompted her to search the contents of her cell phone.
    She then found the photograph of J’s penis. After dis-
    covering the photograph, she woke up J, who admitted
    that he had taken the photograph of his penis and
    claimed that he had done so at the defendant’s request.
    The photograph, however, which was not introduced
    into evidence, had no connection to the charges, which
    were premised on allegations that the defendant
    engaged in sexual intercourse with J and that he had
    illegal contact with J’s intimate parts. There was no
    testimony suggesting when the photograph was taken.
    There was no testimony that the photograph had been
    found in connection with a communication between
    the defendant and J. The state did not present evidence
    pertaining to the cell phone records of S. To be clear,
    the only evidence linking the photograph to the defen-
    dant at all was J’s testimony that he took the photograph
    of himself at the defendant’s request. Moreover, the
    testimony of S expressly foreclosed any connection
    between her discovery of the photograph and the time
    frame of the offenses. When S was questioned regarding
    her conversation with J immediately following her dis-
    covery of the photograph, she was unable to provide
    any information about the timing of the assaults:
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And did he indicate to you
    when the activity occurred?
    ‘‘[S]: He—I did not receive a lot of details. . . .
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So, you didn’t—you didn’t—you
    didn’t get a lot of detail—you didn’t get any more infor-
    mation?
    ‘‘[S]: No.’’
    In short, S’s testimony concerning the discovery of
    the photograph in her cell phone in June, 2009, and J’s
    subsequent admission to S as a result of that discovery,
    has no bearing on when the assaults took place. The
    trial court’s determination that an inference could be
    made that the acts were then occurring because J nar-
    rowed the time frame of the assaults to a two year time
    period, when he was nine or ten, and S discovered a
    photograph on her cell phone when he was ten, is simply
    unsupportable.
    The only thing that the evidence reasonably tended
    to support is that there were seven incidents, over a
    period of several months, when J was nine or ten. The
    window of time in which the assaults could have
    occurred, on the basis of this testimony, extended from
    J’s ninth birthday, on December 31, 2007, to the date
    of the discovery of the photograph in June, 2009, when S
    terminated all contact between the boys. The defendant
    turned fourteen on September 17, 2008. Contrary to
    the court’s determination, however, there is no way to
    determine when these incidents began or ended within
    that window of time—and there is certainly no basis
    to conclude that any of them took place on or after
    September 17, 2008. Although the prosecutor appeared
    initially to lead J’s testimony with the June, 2009 time
    frame as a marker, J testified that the incidents took
    place over several months, making it impossible for the
    incidents to have commenced and ended in June, 2009.
    In the forensic interview, which was offered by the
    state, in part, to corroborate J’s testimony as to the
    timing of the assaults, J stated that the incidents
    spanned several months, almost one year, in a different
    time frame, beginning in the fall of fourth grade. There
    again, however, no year was mentioned. In the inter-
    view, J also suggested that the defendant was twelve
    or thirteen at the time of the assaults—a fact that J
    confirmed on cross-examination.
    Finally, because there is limited evidence as to the
    sequence of the incidents, even if one were to try to
    affix a starting point to that sequence, there are several
    hundred possible permutations of these events, making
    it impossible to determine which incident occurred
    when.32 This, of course, is of critical importance here
    because the defendant was acquitted of all charges in
    connection with five of the seven incidents. In conclu-
    sion, there is no way to determine, without resorting
    to speculation and conjecture, whether the defendant
    engaged in the sexual misconduct underlying the
    offenses of which the jury found him guilty on or after
    his fourteenth birthday.
    While the original warrant, alleging that the acts
    occurred in June, 2009, may have been facially sufficient
    for a mandatory transfer to the regular criminal docket
    pursuant to § 46b-127 (a), the evidence to support the
    state’s allegations as to the time frame of the defen-
    dant’s alleged conduct was woefully deficient. The state
    failed to establish, by any burden of proof, that the
    defendant was at least fourteen years old when he
    engaged in the conduct underlying the convicted
    offenses. Hence, the court had no authority to render
    judgment against him as an adult offender. Accordingly,
    we conclude that the court erred in denying the defen-
    dant’s motion to dismiss the amended information and
    transfer his case back to the juvenile docket.33
    The judgment of conviction is vacated and the case
    is remanded to the trial court with direction to grant
    the motion to dismiss the amended information and to
    transfer the matter back to the juvenile docket for fur-
    ther proceedings in that forum according to law.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
    (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
    appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
    for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
    order of the Appellate Court.
    1
    Although § 46b-127 has been the subject of several amendments since
    the time of the alleged crimes and the defendant’s transfer from the juvenile
    docket to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, those amend-
    ments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. For convenience, we
    refer to the current revision of § 46b-127.
    2
    Alternatively, the defendant claims that the court committed error as to
    certain evidentiary rulings, thereby entitling him to a new trial. The defendant
    has offered scant analysis to support these claims and has failed to assert
    or argue how the court erred in its rulings. ‘‘Where a claim is asserted in
    the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the
    brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed
    to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelib v. Connecticut
    Housing Finance Authority, 
    100 Conn. App. 351
    , 353, 
    918 A.2d 288
    (2007).
    We thus decline to consider these claims.
    3
    The defendant’s mother is the sister of J’s father.
    4
    The state introduced evidence of the defendant’s and J’s birth dates to
    establish the age differential between the defendant and J under § 53a-70
    (a) (2), which provides that a person is guilty of sexual assault in the first
    degree when such person ‘‘engages in sexual intercourse with another person
    and such other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more
    than two years older than such person . . . .’’
    5
    R and G are the parents of the defendant’s mother and J’s father.
    6
    S later deleted the photograph. J testified that he sent the photograph
    of his penis to the defendant. There was no evidence at trial concerning
    S’s cell phone records, the defendant’s cell phone records, or the alleged
    transmission of any photograph.
    7
    The parties stipulated to the introduction of the forensic interview at
    trial for a limited purpose—the defendant, on the ground that J’s statements
    during the interview were materially inconsistent with his statements at
    trial, and the state on the ground that J’s statements were materially consis-
    tent. During deliberations, the jury asked to see and was shown the forensic
    interview in its entirety a second time.
    8
    J described a red, plastic bat, a wooden bat, a wooden bat engraved
    with his initials, a blue metal bat with a black handle, and a blue metal bat
    with a gray handle.
    9
    The colloquy on that subject was as follows:
    ‘‘Cheyne: You said that these incidents happened during on Tuesdays and
    Thursdays during track practice, after track practice?
    ‘‘J: Yeah, after track practice and sometimes when track practice and
    track, like, was over during the winter. Like, every time that he, like, did
    it, it would be in a different month. Like, it started in autumn, went to
    winter, summer, spring. He did it for a whole year, I think.
    ‘‘Cheyne: Okay, it started in autumn when you were in fourth grade?
    ‘‘J: Yes.
    ‘‘Cheyne: Okay. And went and continued through?
    ‘‘J: Winter . . .
    ‘‘Cheyne: Winter you were still in the fourth grade?
    ‘‘J: No, winter, it was, um, the, like, the middle of fourth grade.
    ‘‘Cheyne: Winter was the middle of fourth grade, and then spring was the
    end of fourth grade?
    ‘‘J: Yeah: And then summer of fourth grade, and then the autumn of
    fifth grade.
    ‘‘Cheyne: Autumn of fifth grade. Okay, the autumn of fifth grade. And
    what was the last time?
    ‘‘J: The last time was, like, the first day of autumn, I think. . . .
    ‘‘Cheyne: The very last time, what month do you think, what month was it?
    ‘‘J: I would have to say, like, maybe October.
    ‘‘Cheyne: Tell me what makes you say it’s October.
    ‘‘J: Well, because in the forest the leaves were starting to change and
    fall off.
    ‘‘Cheyne: And this was October of fifth grade?
    ‘‘J: Yeah.’’
    10
    The transfer order contains the following notation: ‘‘[p]rosecutor reports
    date of incident is June, 2009 . . . [the defendant’s] date of birth is [Septem-
    ber 17, 1994]. Probable cause was found on [December 2, 2011]. Case is
    transferred to the adult court . . . .’’
    11
    S and J’s aunt testified as to their conversations with J following his
    disclosure. The court instructed the jury that it could consider this evidence
    to corroborate the fact that at a certain point in time J made a complaint
    or statement to S and his aunt concerning the assaults.
    12
    The court rendered a judgment of acquittal on two counts for lack of
    proof of the element of penetration.
    13
    At trial, the defense argued that this ‘‘uncontroverted testimony’’ served
    to undermine J’s testimony as to the time frame of the alleged assaults, and
    undercut any claim that the alleged assaults took place after the defendant’s
    fourteenth birthday, which, as noted previously, was September 17, 2008.
    Review of the record, however, reveals that S testified concerning J’s after-
    school schedule in 2009 and testified that he went to his grandmother’s
    house after school.
    14
    The defendant also argued that J’s ‘‘wildly inconsistent’’ testimony could
    not support a guilty verdict.
    15
    On appeal, the state correctly points out that § 46b-127 (a) (2) permits
    transfer only on motion of the prosecution and is limited to certain offenses.
    16
    The court stated: ‘‘I’m going to deny the motion at this point in time
    and note that under Practice Book § 42-56, should there be a conviction,
    the defense is permitted to file what’s called a motion in arrest of judgment.’’
    17
    The defendant is not currently incarcerated. After imposition of the
    sentence, the trial court released the defendant on bond pending appeal.
    18
    General Statutes § 46b-120 (1) defines ‘‘child’’ in relevant part as ‘‘any
    person under eighteen years of age . . . .’’
    19
    General Statutes § 46b-127 provides: ‘‘(a) (1) The court shall automati-
    cally transfer from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal
    docket of the Superior Court the case of any child charged with the commis-
    sion of a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect
    prior to April 25, 2012, a class A or B felony or a violation of section 53a-
    54d, provided such offense was committed after such child attained the age
    of fourteen years and counsel has been appointed for such child if such
    child is indigent. Such counsel may appear with the child but shall not be
    permitted to make any argument or file any motion in opposition to the
    transfer. The child shall be arraigned in the regular criminal docket of the
    Superior Court at the next court date following such transfer, provided any
    proceedings held prior to the finalization of such transfer shall be private
    and shall be conducted in such parts of the courthouse or the building in
    which the court is located that are separate and apart from the other parts
    of the court which are then being used for proceedings pertaining to adults
    charged with crimes.
    ‘‘(2) A state’s attorney may, at any time after such arraignment, file a
    motion to transfer the case of any child charged with the commission of a
    class B felony or a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section
    53a-70 to the docket for juvenile matters for proceedings in accordance
    with the provisions of this chapter.
    ‘‘(b) (1) Upon motion of a prosecutorial official, the superior court for
    juvenile matters shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the case of
    any child charged with the commission of a class C, D or E felony or an
    unclassified felony shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters
    to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. The court shall not
    order that the case be transferred under this subdivision unless the court
    finds that (A) such offense was committed after such child attained the age
    of fourteen years, (B) there is probable cause to believe the child has
    committed the act for which the child is charged, and (C) the best interests
    of the child and the public will not be served by maintaining the case in
    the superior court for juvenile matters. In making such findings, the court
    shall consider (i) any prior criminal or juvenile offenses committed by the
    child, (ii) the seriousness of such offenses, (iii) any evidence that the child
    has intellectual disability or mental illness, and (iv) the availability of services
    in the docket for juvenile matters that can serve the child’s needs. Any
    motion under this subdivision shall be made, and any hearing under this
    subdivision shall be held, not later than thirty days after the child is arraigned
    in the superior court for juvenile matters.
    ‘‘(2) If a case is transferred to the regular criminal docket pursuant to
    subdivision (1) of this subsection, the court sitting for the regular criminal
    docket may return the case to the docket for juvenile matters at any time
    prior to a jury rendering a verdict or the entry of a guilty plea for good cause
    shown for proceedings in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
    ‘‘(c) Upon the effectuation of the transfer, such child shall stand trial and
    be sentenced, if convicted, as if such child were eighteen years of age. Such
    child shall receive credit against any sentence imposed for time served in
    a juvenile facility prior to the effectuation of the transfer. A child who has
    been transferred may enter a guilty plea to a lesser offense if the court finds
    that such plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. Any child transferred to
    the regular criminal docket who pleads guilty to a lesser offense shall not
    resume such child’s status as a juvenile regarding such offense. If the action
    is dismissed or nolled or if such child is found not guilty of the charge for
    which such child was transferred or of any lesser included offenses, the
    child shall resume such child’s status as a juvenile until such child attains
    the age of eighteen years.
    ‘‘(d) Any child whose case is transferred to the regular criminal docket
    of the Superior Court who is detained pursuant to such case shall be in the
    custody of the Commissioner of Correction upon the finalization of such
    transfer. A transfer shall be final (1) upon the arraignment on the regular
    criminal docket until a motion filed by the state’s attorney pursuant to
    subsection (a) of this section is granted by the court, or (2) upon the
    arraignment on the regular criminal docket of a transfer ordered pursuant
    to subsection (b) of this section until the court sitting for the regular criminal
    docket orders the case returned to the docket for juvenile matters for good
    cause shown. Any child whose case is returned to the docket for juvenile
    matters who is detained pursuant to such case shall be in the custody of
    the Judicial Department.
    ‘‘(e) The transfer of a child to a Department of Correction facility shall
    be limited as provided in subsection (d) of this section and said subsection
    shall not be construed to permit the transfer of or otherwise reduce or
    eliminate any other population of juveniles in detention or confinement
    within the Judicial Department or the Department of Children and Families.
    ‘‘(f) Upon the motion of any party or upon the court’s own motion, the
    case of any youth age sixteen or seventeen, except a case that has been
    transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant
    to subsection (a) or (b) of this section, which is pending on the youthful
    offender docket, regular criminal docket of the Superior Court or any docket
    for the presentment of defendants in motor vehicle matters, where the youth
    is charged with committing any offense or violation for which a term of
    imprisonment may be imposed, other than a violation of section 14-227a or
    14-227g, may, before trial or before the entry of a guilty plea, be transferred
    to the docket for juvenile matters if (1) the youth is alleged to have committed
    such offense or violation on or after January 1, 2010, while sixteen years
    of age, or is alleged to have committed such offense or violation on or after
    July 1, 2012, while seventeen years of age, and (2) after a hearing considering
    the facts and circumstances of the case and the prior history of the youth,
    the court determines that the programs and services available pursuant
    to a proceeding in the superior court for juvenile matters would more
    appropriately address the needs of the youth and that the youth and the
    community would be better served by treating the youth as a delinquent.
    Upon ordering such transfer, the court shall vacate any pleas entered in the
    matter and advise the youth of the youth’s rights, and the youth shall (A)
    enter pleas on the docket for juvenile matters in the jurisdiction where the
    youth resides, and (B) be subject to prosecution as a delinquent child. The
    decision of the court concerning the transfer of a youth’s case from the
    youthful offender docket, regular criminal docket of the Superior Court or
    any docket for the presentment of defendants in motor vehicle matters shall
    not be a final judgment for purposes of appeal.’’
    20
    Whenever a child is brought before the Superior Court on charges, the
    court must first determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
    the child has committed the acts alleged. See General Statutes §§ 46b-128
    (a) and 46b-133 (c). The order to transfer is a ministerial act performed by
    the juvenile court judge. In 1995, the legislature eliminated the previous
    requirement that transfer to the adult docket occur only after an evidentiary
    hearing and the issuance of certain written findings by the juvenile court
    judge to support the transfer order; see In re Edwin N., 
    215 Conn. 277
    , 280,
    
    575 A.2d 1016
    (1990) (valid transfer requires written findings after hearing);
    following the amendment of the transfer statute by No. 95-225 of the 1995
    Public Acts, § 46b-127 (a) (1) ‘‘prohibits the juvenile court from participating
    in any meaningful manner with respect to the transfer of those individuals
    at the time of the automatic transfer.’’ State v. Angel C., 
    245 Conn. 93
    , 115,
    
    715 A.2d 652
    (1998). Under the current law, ‘‘counsel may appear with the
    child but shall not be permitted to make any argument or file any motion
    in opposition to the transfer. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-127 (a) (1).
    21
    General Statutes § 46b-121 (a) (2) provides: ‘‘Juvenile matters in the
    criminal session include all proceedings concerning delinquent children
    within this state and persons eighteen years of age and older who are under
    the supervision of a juvenile probation officer while on probation or a
    suspended commitment to the Department of Children and Families, for
    purposes of enforcing any court orders entered as part of such probation
    or suspended commitment.’’
    22
    Our Supreme Court has held that adult and juvenile matters are not
    coextensive proceedings under Connecticut law. See State v. 
    Ledbetter, supra
    , 
    263 Conn. 4
    (confessions law governing juvenile proceeding inapplica-
    ble in adult proceeding); In re Jan Carlos D., 
    297 Conn. 16
    , 25, 
    997 A.2d 471
    (2010) (speedy information provision under General Statutes § 54-1f [a]
    not applicable to juvenile summons and complaint), overruled in part on
    other grounds by State v. Elson, 
    311 Conn. 726
    , 747–48, 754, 
    91 A.3d 862
    (2014); In re Prudencio 
    O., supra
    , 
    229 Conn. 698
    –99 (sixty day period for
    provision of probable cause hearing under General Statutes § 54-46a not
    applicable to juvenile proceedings).
    23
    In Torres, the trial court ruled that the state had failed to establish
    probable cause to proceed with the murder charge that had precipitated
    the defendant’s transfer to adult court. State v. 
    Torres, supra
    , 
    206 Conn. 350
    . The state then filed a substitute information charging the defendant
    with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. 
    Id. After the
    defendant
    unsuccessfully moved the court to dismiss his case or transfer it back to
    juvenile court, he pleaded nolo contendere to the substitute charge and was
    sentenced accordingly. 
    Id. 24 The
    court in Angel C. distinguished Kent v. United 
    States, supra
    , 
    383 U.S. 541
    , where the United States Supreme Court held that a transfer statute
    that deprives a juvenile of his or her right to be tried in juvenile court
    without a hearing constituted a violation of due process. Our Supreme Court
    reasoned that the statute at issue in Kent vested original and exclusive
    jurisdiction in the juvenile court and permitted it to waive jurisdiction and
    transfer to the regular docket only after a full investigation. State v. Angel
    
    C., supra
    , 
    245 Conn. 107
    . By contrast, our mandatory transfer provision
    denies the accused his or her juvenile status ab initio on the basis of the
    delineated statutory criteria, i.e., the defendant’s age and the alleged commis-
    sion of certain offenses. 
    Id. Under §
    46b-127 (a), the juvenile court does not
    have exclusive jurisdiction, nor is it given a waiver. 
    Id., 114–15. Accordingly,
    ‘‘a juvenile who is at least fourteen years of age and charged with certain
    offenses has no constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in juvenile status.’’
    
    Id., 121. 25
          The defendant further argues that the United States Supreme Court’s
    holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    , 
    147 L. Ed. 2d
    435 (2000) constitutionally dictates that the defendant’s age, at the time
    of the offense, be established. More specifically, he claims that his age is
    an element that increases the punishment and, thus, pursuant to Apprendi,
    there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a jury finding
    that the crimes in question occurred after he reached the age of fourteen.
    We are not of the view that Apprendi supports the defendant’s claim. In
    Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that ‘‘any fact that increases the penalty
    for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
    to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ 
    Id., 490. Apprendi
    does
    not stand for the broad proposition advanced by the defendant that any
    factual determination that is causally related to a subsequent penalty
    imposed must be decided by a jury.
    26
    Among the most common collateral consequences of a felony conviction
    are disenfranchisement, denial of federal benefits, including housing and
    student loans, registration as a sex offender, and limits on firearm posses-
    sion. The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates has compiled a
    database, the National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction,
    to serve as a guide to defense attorneys and prosecutors in advising and
    charging decisions. The database lists more than sixteen thousand manda-
    tory collateral consequences for state and federal convictions. See American
    Bar Association, ‘‘National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Criminal
    Conviction,’’ available at http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/
    description/ (last visited August 6, 2015).
    27
    Our conclusion is consistent with what is already the practice in this
    state—the state is foreclosed from prosecuting in adult court conduct that
    occurred before the accused’s fourteenth birthday. See State v. Taylor G.,
    
    315 Conn. 734
    , 766–67, 
    110 A.3d 338
    (2015) (state amended information
    because defendant could not be charged as juvenile for conduct occurring
    prior to fourteenth birthday); State v. Davis, 
    76 Conn. App. 653
    , 668 n.16,
    
    820 A.2d 1122
    (2003) (same).
    28
    The state does not contest that the defendant’s jurisdictional claim
    is preserved.
    29
    There was no specific unanimity instruction or interrogatories requested
    or given as to the defendant’s conduct underlying the criminal charges in
    counts nine and ten, the incident in J’s bedroom. Thus, it is unclear whether
    the jury found that the defendant committed anal intercourse or fellatio.
    Accordingly, we refer to the conduct as the court’s instruction did, ‘‘fellatio
    and/or anal intercourse.’’
    30
    J became nine years old on December 31, 2007.
    31
    On that score, the court stated, ‘‘Even in taking into account that [J]
    was only giving his best estimate and that he was . . . fourteen years old
    at the time of his testimony, he was testifying to events that allegedly
    occurred when he was ten years old; it’s hard to reconcile the first sexual
    act . . . as having occurred on or about June of 2009, based upon the
    evidence presented.’’
    32
    More particularly, we note that the incident behind the grandparents’
    barn is a fixed point in the sequence of the events, as J identified it as the
    ‘‘first incident.’’ With respect to the two incidents in the woods behind the
    defendant’s house, J confirmed that the incident near the rock came after
    the incident near the train tracks. J first suggested that the incident in his
    bedroom occurred before the incident in the defendant’s basement. He later
    stated that the incident in his bedroom occurred after the incident in the
    defendant’s basement. With respect to the remaining incidents, there is no
    indication at all as to their sequence in the chain of events.
    33
    Alternatively, the defendant seeks an acquittal on the asserted basis
    that no jury reasonably could have found that the crimes occurred on or
    about June, 2009. The defendant concedes that the timing of the offense is
    not an element of the crimes, but argues that ‘‘it must be shown with
    some baseline level of precision where the date of [the] offense would be
    prejudicial to the defendant.’’ In support of his claim, the defendant directs
    our attention to State v. Morales, 
    45 Conn. App. 116
    , 
    694 A.2d 1356
    (1997),
    appeal dismissed, 
    246 Conn. 249
    , 
    714 A.2d 677
    (1998), on which the trial
    court relied in acquitting the defendant of count two.
    In Morales, the defendant was charged with sexual assault in the first
    degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2) ‘‘at some unknown time between the
    fall, 1989, and June, 1990 . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 133. The
    state’s evidence at trial failed to establish that the assaults occurred
    in the time frame alleged. 
    Id., 136. Subdivision
    (2) of § 53a-70 (a) did not
    become effective until October 1, 1989. 
    Id., 133. Accordingly,
    this court
    held that the defendant’s conviction of sexual assault in the first degree
    constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution.
    
    Id., 133–36. This
    court found, however, that sufficient evidence had been
    presented to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant had committed the acts constituting the crime of sexual assault
    in the second degree, the law proscribing the defendant’s conduct prior to
    the enactment of subdivision (2), and a lesser included offense of sexual
    assault in the first degree. 
    Id., 136. Accordingly,
    the defendant’s case was
    remanded for resentencing on that charge. 
    Id. Although the
    issue in Morales was also one of the sufficiency of the
    evidence as to the time frame of the offenses, Morales does not support
    the defendant’s contention that an acquittal is the appropriate remedy here.
    Although we conclude that the state did not pursue these charges in the
    appropriate venue, we are nonetheless satisfied that there is sufficient evi-
    dence to support the jury’s guilty findings as to the elements of the convicted
    offenses; therefore, an acquittal on this basis is not justified.