McKeon v. Lennon ( 2015 )


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    MARIA F. MCKEON v. WILLIAM P. LENNON
    (AC 34078)
    (AC 34710)
    (AC 35204)
    Gruendel, Lavine and Mullins, Js.
    Argued December 8, 2014—officially released February 17, 2015
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Tolland, Suarez, J.)
    Maria F. McKeon, self-represented, the appellant
    (plaintiff).
    Proloy K. Das, with whom was Debra C. Ruel, for
    the appellee (defendant).
    Opinion
    GRUENDEL, J. In these consolidated appeals, the
    plaintiff, Maria F. McKeon, appeals from several judg-
    ments of the trial court rendered in relation to the
    judgment dissolving her marriage to the defendant, Wil-
    liam P. Lennon. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
    court improperly (1) granted the defendant’s motion
    for modification of child support, (2) denied the her
    motion for modification of child support, (3) modified
    the defendant’s child support obligation (AC 34078),
    (4) denied the her motion for a finding of contempt
    (AC 35204), and (5) denied her motion for attorney’s
    fees (AC 34710). We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
    the judgments of the trial court.
    These appeals arise from of a series of postjudgment
    motions related to the parties’ 2007 dissolution of mar-
    riage. The plaintiff and defendant were married on
    August 29, 1981. During their twenty-six year marriage,
    the parties had three children. In 2005, the plaintiff
    initiated an action for dissolution of marriage. On
    December 31, 2007, the court rendered judgment dis-
    solving the marriage (dissolution judgment) and
    entered various orders.
    In the dissolution judgment, the court made several
    relevant factual findings. The court found that the
    defendant was a vice president at Electric Boat, earning
    a base salary of $225,420, an annual bonus, stock
    options, restricted stock awards, and a pension. The
    court found that the plaintiff was a highly skilled and
    capable corporate attorney, who in the past had some-
    times earned in excess of the defendant’s salary. In the
    years leading up to the divorce, the plaintiff had worked
    part-time in order to be the primary caregiver to their
    three children. Despite working part-time, she had been
    able to earn gross income of $78,500 from mid-July,
    2007 through December 12, 2007.
    The court issued various orders in connection with
    the dissolution judgment, including: child custody, divi-
    sion of assets of the marriage, and alimony and child
    support. First, the dissolution judgment set out a parent-
    ing plan regarding the parties’ two minor children. The
    parties were to share joint legal custody of the children,
    but the plaintiff’s home would serve as the children’s
    primary residence. Next, the dissolution judgment
    ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $439 per week
    in child support for the parties’ two minor children.
    The dissolution judgment also ordered the parties to
    each pay 50 percent of the cost of the children’s child
    care, their after school care and transportation, and
    their private school tuition. The judgment ordered the
    parties to share all costs over $150 for the children’s
    extracurricular activities, while the plaintiff was
    ordered to pay for all costs under $150.
    The dissolution judgment also awarded alimony to
    the plaintiff in the amount of $900 per week for a period
    of fourteen years. This order was modifiable, but not
    terminable, upon the plaintiff’s remarriage or cohabita-
    tion. The court awarded the plaintiff additional alimony
    in the form of an irrevocable interest in the defendant’s
    future annual employment bonuses, executive stock
    options, and awards of restricted stock. The plaintiff
    was to receive 50 percent of the defendant’s bonuses,
    stock options, and restricted stock awarded in 2008,
    2009, and 2010. The plaintiff was to then receive 40
    percent of the defendant’s bonuses earned in 2011, 2012,
    and 2013, and receive 30 percent awarded to him in
    each year from 2014 through 2021.
    In May, 2008, fewer than six months after the dissolu-
    tion judgment was rendered, the plaintiff filed a motion
    for modification in which she requested, inter alia, that
    child support be raised from $439 per week to $1700
    per week. On June 10, 2008, the court denied the motion
    without a hearing. From that judgment, the plaintiff
    appealed to this court, which heard argument on the
    matter on November 18, 2010.1 McKeon v. Lennon, 
    131 Conn. App. 585
    , 
    27 A.3d 436
    , cert. denied, 
    303 Conn. 901
    , 
    31 A.3d 1178
    (2011). On appeal, this court con-
    cluded that the trial court improperly denied the plain-
    tiff’s motion without first conducting a hearing, and,
    therefore, we reversed the judgment and remanded the
    matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 
    Id., 599–600, 614–15.
    That opinion was released on Septem-
    ber 27, 2011.
    While the appeal of the 2008 motion for modification
    was pending before this court, the plaintiff filed another
    motion for modification of child support with the trial
    court on April 22, 2010. The plaintiff’s motion requested
    the court to increase the defendant’s child support obli-
    gation in light of the plaintiff’s increased expenses, her
    decreased net income, and the defendant’s increased
    income since the dissolution judgment. On July 14, 2010,
    the defendant filed his own motion for modification of
    child support on the basis that one of their two minor
    children had turned eighteen years old and had gradua-
    ted high school. The court scheduled a hearing on both
    motions in May, 2011.
    On May 25, May 26, and June 1, 2011, the trial court
    held a contested hearing on the plaintiff’s and the defen-
    dant’s motions for modification. On October 20, 2011,
    the court issued a memorandum of decision granting
    the defendant’s 2010 motion for modification and deny-
    ing the plaintiff’s 2010 motion for modification. The
    court ordered the defendant’s child support obligation
    to be reduced from $439 per week to $400 per week.
    This modification reflected the change from support
    for two minor children, to support for only one minor
    child. From this judgment, the plaintiff appealed (AC
    34078).
    On April 25, 2012, pursuant to this court’s remand,
    the trial court held a contested hearing on the plaintiff’s
    2008 motion for modification. Prior to the hearing, the
    plaintiff had also filed a motion for attorney’s fees and
    a motion for contempt. At the hearing, the parties pre-
    sented evidence on all three motions. As a result of the
    complicated procedural history of this case, the court
    was required to determine whether it could consider
    all changes in circumstances since the 2007 dissolution
    judgment, or whether it was limited to looking back to
    only 2011, when the court ruled on the 2010 motions
    for modification.
    In November, 2012, the court issued its memorandum
    of decision, denying the plaintiff’s motion for modifica-
    tion of child support, motion for attorney’s fees, and
    motion for contempt. In doing so, the court considered
    the circumstances of the parties going back to the 2007
    dissolution judgment. Further, the court found that the
    2011 child support modification order was in accor-
    dance with the child support guidelines and remained
    equitable and appropriate given the circumstances of
    the case. From these judgments, the plaintiff also
    appealed (AC 34710 and AC 35204).
    We now consider each of the plaintiff’s three consoli-
    dated appeals (AC 34078, AC 34710, and AC 35204).
    Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
    as necessary.
    I
    The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in con-
    cluding that there had been a substantial change of
    circumstances with regard to the defendant’s motion
    for modification and that there had been no substantial
    change with regard to the plaintiff’s motion. We
    disagree.
    We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard
    of review. ‘‘The scope of our review of a trial court’s
    exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations
    cases is limited to the questions of whether the [trial]
    court correctly applied the law and could reasonably
    have concluded as it did. . . . In determining whether
    a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic
    relations matters, we allow every reasonable presump-
    tion in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Nev-
    ertheless, we may reverse a trial court’s ruling on a
    modification motion if the trial court applied the wrong
    standard of law. . . .’’
    ‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-86 (a) governs the modifica-
    tion or termination of an alimony or support order after
    the date of a dissolution judgment.2 When . . . the dis-
    puted issue is [child support], the applicable provision
    of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which provides that a final
    order . . . may be modified by the trial court upon a
    showing of a substantial change in the circumstances
    of either party. . . . Under that statutory provision, the
    party seeking the modification bears the burden of dem-
    onstrating that such a change has occurred. . . . To
    obtain a modification, the moving party must demon-
    strate that circumstances have changed since the last
    court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable
    to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of
    changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a
    party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire
    as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modifi-
    cation of the existing order.’’ (Citations omitted; foot-
    note omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Olson
    v. Mohammadu, 
    310 Conn. 665
    , 671–72, 
    81 A.3d 215
    (2013). We now review the court’s conclusions as to
    whether there was a substantial change in circum-
    stances.
    A
    The plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied
    her motion for modification of child support, pursuant
    to § 46b-86 (a), when it concluded that she had failed
    to meet her burden of establishing a substantial change
    of circumstances. We disagree.
    ‘‘A party moving for a modification of a child support
    order must clearly and definitely establish the occur-
    rence of a substantial change . . . .’’ Weinstein v.
    Weinstein, 
    104 Conn. App. 482
    , 492, 
    934 A.2d 306
    (2007),
    cert. denied, 
    285 Conn. 911
    , 
    943 A.2d 372
    (2008). As the
    power to modify is limited to adapting the order to
    changes in circumstances, the court must limit its
    inquiry to a comparison between the current conditions
    and the conditions at the time of the last order. Borkow-
    ski v. Borkowski, 
    228 Conn. 729
    , 738, 
    638 A.2d 1060
    (1994).
    At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff presented evi-
    dence seeking to establish her claim of a change in
    circumstances. She provided financial affidavits indi-
    cating her inability to earn income consistent with her
    earning capacity. She also testified and presented exhib-
    its showing an increase in her expenses. Finally, she
    presented evidence demonstrating that the defendant
    had a sharp increase in his income since the dissolution
    judgment. In an October, 2011 memorandum of deci-
    sion, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not
    established a substantial change in circumstances and
    supported its conclusion with several factual findings.
    First, the court found that the plaintiff’s earning
    capacity had remained the same since the dissolution
    judgment. In 2007, the court found that the plaintiff was
    an experienced corporate attorney who, at the time,
    was able to earn gross income of $78,500 over part of
    the year while recovering from a fractured pelvis and
    spending time attending to the divorce litigation.
    Accordingly, the dissolution court assigned her a
    $100,000 earning capacity on the basis of her ability to
    work ten hours per week at a rate of $200 per hour.
    See Elia v. Elia, 
    99 Conn. App. 829
    , 833, 
    916 A.2d 845
    (2007) (in certain circumstances, court may base finan-
    cial awards on earning capacity rather than actual
    income earned). At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff
    claimed that in the years after the dissolution judgment,
    her actual earnings had fallen well short of her assigned
    earning capacity. As the court aptly noted, however,
    there had been no change in the plaintiff’s skill, educa-
    tion, or ability to justify a change to her earning capac-
    ity. The court found that the plaintiff continued to work
    on a part-time basis as a freelance attorney. As earning
    capacity is ‘‘an amount which a person can realistically
    be expected to earn considering such things as his [or
    her] vocational skills, employability, age and health’’;
    (internal quotation marks omitted) Weinstein v.
    Weinstein, 
    280 Conn. 772
    , 764, 
    911 A.3d 1077
    (2007);
    the plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating a change
    to one or more of those factors. See Angle v. Angle, 
    100 Conn. App. 763
    , 773–74, 
    920 A.2d 1018
    (2007) (affirming
    trial court’s determination that defendant’s postdivorce
    incarceration was not substantial change to his earning
    capacity); see also Wanatowicz v. Wanatowicz, 
    12 Conn. App. 616
    , 619, 
    533 A.2d 239
    (1987) (reversing trial
    court’s order because defendant’s postdivorce alcoholic
    condition was not substantial change affecting his earn-
    ing capacity). As the plaintiff’s ability to earn remained
    largely the same since the dissolution judgment, the
    court properly found no substantial change in the plain-
    tiff’s earning capacity.
    The court next found that the plaintiff had failed to
    establish a significant increase in her expenses. At the
    May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff submitted evidence indi-
    cating that she incurred weekly transportation costs
    of $275.55, while the defendant incurred costs of only
    $71.55. The plaintiff also submitted a summary of
    expenses for the parties’ youngest child, which totaled
    $63,401.31. The plaintiff, however, failed to submit any
    evidence to support her claim that these expenses rep-
    resented a change in conditions since the dissolution
    judgment. Simply submitting the actual expenses to the
    court does not, by itself, support the claim that she has
    incurred costs greater than were originally contem-
    plated in the dissolution judgment. See Borkowski v.
    
    Borkowski, supra
    , 
    228 Conn. 738
    (‘‘moving party must
    demonstrate circumstances have change since the last
    court order’’). In fact, the 2007 dissolution judgment
    did order the plaintiff to bear a significant share of the
    maintenance costs of the minor children. The dissolu-
    tion judgment stated that ‘‘[t]he costs of extracurricular
    activities and books . . . over $150 shall be shared
    equally between the parents with the [plaintiff] paying
    for anything less than $150.’’ The dissolution judgment
    also ordered the parties to share equally the cost of their
    younger son’s private high school tuition. The tuition
    represented $34,200, or more than half of the plaintiff’s
    claimed 2011 expenses. As these costs were properly
    considered in the dissolution judgment, the court cor-
    rectly concluded that they did not constitute a change
    in circumstances.
    Finally, the court found that although the defendant’s
    base salary and bonuses had increased since the disso-
    lution judgment, the increase was not substantial. The
    court found that the defendant’s salary had increased
    from $225,000 on the date of the dissolution judgment
    to $260,000. The court also found that the defendant’s
    annual bonus had increased from $115,000, on the date
    of the dissolution judgment, to $175,000. Recently, in
    Dan v. Dan, 
    315 Conn. 1
    , 10,         A.3d       (2014), our
    Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘an increase in the sup-
    porting spouse’s income, standing alone, ordinarily will
    not justify the granting of a motion to modify an alimony
    award.’’ In support of this conclusion, the court noted
    that the purpose of alimony is to ‘‘ensure the continued
    enjoyment of the standard of living that he or she
    enjoyed during the marriage . . . .’’ 
    Id., 11. Similarly,
    in
    the context of support obligations, our appellate courts
    have acknowledged that children ‘‘should receive the
    same proportion of parental income as he or she would
    have received if the parents lived together.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Jenkins v. Jenkins, 
    243 Conn. 584
    , 594, 
    704 A.2d 231
    (1998), citing Child Support
    and Arrearage Guidelines, Preamble, § (c), p. ii. As both
    alimony and child support orders are subject to the
    same modification requirements under § 46b-86 (a), we
    conclude that, under Dan, the plaintiff must show addi-
    tional circumstances, beyond the defendant’s increased
    income, to establish a substantial change in circum-
    stances justifying a modification of child support.
    ‘‘[T]he purpose of a child support order is to provide
    for the care and well-being of minor children, and not
    to equalize the available income of divorced parents
    . . . .’’ Battersby v. Battersby, 
    218 Conn. 467
    , 473, 
    590 A.2d 427
    (1991). As a result, we conclude that the court
    did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
    the plaintiff had not established a substantial change
    in circumstances in regard to her 2010 motion for modi-
    fication of child support.3
    In April 25, 2012, the court held a contested hearing
    on the plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification. At this
    hearing, the plaintiff again argued that she had been
    unable to earn income consistent with her earning
    capacity, that her living expenses had increased, and
    that the defendant’s income had increased substan-
    tially. In November, 2012, the court denied her motion
    because she had failed to show a substantial change
    in circumstances. In its memorandum of decision, the
    court followed the same analysis used in its October,
    2011 decision. In addition, the court found that, due to
    inconsistencies, the plaintiff’s financial affidavit was
    not credible.4 As it is the exclusive province of the trier
    of fact to resolve credibility determinations, the court
    properly determined that the plaintiff’s financial affida-
    vit should be given little weight, given the various incon-
    sistencies it found. See State v. Ortiz, 
    95 Conn. App. 69
    , 81, 
    895 A.2d 834
    , cert. denied, 
    280 Conn. 903
    , 
    907 A.2d 94
    (2006). We conclude that the court did not
    abuse its discretion when it determined that the plaintiff
    had not established a substantial change in circum-
    stances in regard to her 2008 motion for modification
    of child support.
    B
    We now turn to the defendant’s motion for modifica-
    tion. In July, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for
    modification of child support on ground that one of the
    parties’ two sons had turned eighteen years old and
    had graduated from high school. In October, 2011, the
    court granted this motion on the basis that a child
    reaching the age of majority constituted a substantial
    change in circumstances. On appeal, the plaintiff argues
    that the court had no legal basis for its conclusion.5
    We disagree.
    ‘‘[T]he purpose of a child support order is to provide
    for the care and well-being of minor children.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Rostad v. Hirsch, 148 Conn.
    App. 441, 460, 
    85 A.3d 1212
    , 1225, cert. granted on other
    grounds, 
    311 Conn. 948
    , 949, 
    91 A.3d 463
    (2014). ‘‘It is
    . . . axiomatic that support for a minor child extends
    to age eighteen only . . . .’’ Lowe v. Lowe, 47 Conn.
    App. 354, 357, 
    704 A.2d 236
    (1997); see also General
    Statutes § 1-1d. Finally, it is well established that a child
    attaining the age of majority constitutes a substantial
    change in circumstances, justifying the modification of
    a support order. Irizzary v. Irizzary, 
    29 Conn. App. 368
    , 
    614 A.2d 868
    (1992).
    Here, the court found that the parties’ older son, had
    reached the age of majority on November 19, 2009.
    This finding was properly supported by the dissolution
    judgment, in which the court found, by a preponderance
    of the evidence, that the parties’ older son was born
    on November 19, 1991. Therefore, the court did not
    abuse its discretion in concluding that the defendant
    had established a substantial change in circumstances.6
    II
    Upon concluding that the court did not abuse its
    discretion in reaching the threshold determination that
    a substantial change in circumstances had occurred,
    we now turn to the court’s decision to reduce the defen-
    dant’s support order from $439 per week to $400 per
    week. Specifically on appeal, the plaintiff claims that
    the court improperly excluded various components of
    the defendant’s income, improperly relied on the defen-
    dant’s child support guidelines worksheet, and improp-
    erly deviated from the child support guidelines.
    ‘‘Once a trial court determines that there has been a
    substantial change in the financial circumstances of
    one of the parties, the same criteria that determine an
    initial award of alimony and support are relevant to the
    question of modification. . . . These require the court
    to consider, without limitation, the needs and financial
    resources of each of the parties and their children, as
    well as such factors as health, age and station in life.
    . . . In making its determination of the applicability of
    these criteria, the trial court has broad discretion; the
    test is whether the court could reasonably conclude
    as it did. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Hardisty v. Hardisty, 
    183 Conn. 253
    , 258–60,
    
    439 A.2d 307
    (1981). Under this standard of review, we
    now consider the plaintiff’s various claims.
    A
    The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
    excluded restricted stock and stock options when cal-
    culating the defendant’s gross income. We disagree.
    The following procedural history is relevant to this
    claim. The 2007 dissolution judgment allocated both
    the defendant’s current and future restricted stock and
    stock options as part of the property distribution. The
    plaintiff received an irrevocable 50 percent interest in
    all stock options and restricted stock that had been
    awarded, granted, or credited to the defendant prior
    to the dissolution judgment. In addition, the judgment
    stated that the stock options and restricted stock would
    be ‘‘divided as part of the property settlement and shall
    not be alimony or child support.’’ The dissolution judg-
    ment also awarded the plaintiff a 50 percent interest
    in any restricted stock or stock option awarded to the
    defendant in 2008, 2009, 2010, or 2011.
    In its October 2011 memorandum of decision, the
    court found that, since the dissolution, the defendant
    had exercised stock options in the amount of $190,361.
    The court excluded this amount from the defendant’s
    income because it already was subject to the court’s
    property distribution orders.
    Once property is distributed in accordance with a
    dissolution decree, the court ceases to have jurisdiction
    over that property. Smith v. Smith, 
    249 Conn. 265
    , 276,
    
    752 A.2d 1023
    (1999). Furthermore, courts may not con-
    sider the liquidation of awarded property as income.
    Simms v. Simms, 
    25 Conn. App. 231
    , 234, 
    593 A.2d 161
    ,
    cert. denied, 
    220 Conn. 911
    , 
    597 A.2d 335
    (1991). When
    the conversion of property reflects gains or profit, this
    increase in value is also not considered income unless
    it is shown to reflect a steady stream of income. Id.;
    see Gay v. Gay, 
    266 Conn. 641
    , 647, 
    835 A.2d 1
    (2003)
    (sale of capital asset in particular year not consid-
    ered income).
    The plaintiff argues that restricted stock and stock
    options are a form of deferred compensation that must
    be included as income under the child support guide-
    lines. This argument, however, fails because the plain-
    tiff did not present evidence showing which, if any, of
    the restricted stock or stock options were awarded to
    the defendant postdissolution. As we have held, stock
    options awarded at the time of dissolution do not consti-
    tute income when they are later exercised; see Denley
    v. Denley, 
    38 Conn. App. 349
    , 353–54, 
    661 A.2d 628
    (1995); therefore, it was the plaintiff’s burden to distin-
    guish between stock awarded prejudgment and stock
    awarded postjudgment. There was no evidence that the
    stock options exercised by the defendant were awarded
    after the dissolution and, therefore, not a part of the
    property distribution. With regard to the restricted
    stock, there was evidence before the court indicating
    that it was part of the property distribution. At the May,
    2011 hearing, the defendant testified that his employer
    awards him restricted stock each year, but that the
    stock does not vest and transfer to him until four years
    later. As that hearing was held fewer than four years
    after the 2007 dissolution judgment, it was reasonable
    for the court to conclude that all restricted stock had
    been part of the original property distribution. Because
    our review is limited to whether the court’s conclusions
    are reasonable; Hardisty v. 
    Hardisty, supra
    , 
    183 Conn. 260
    ; we conclude that the court did not abuse its discre-
    tion in excluding stock options and restricted stock
    from the defendant’s income calculation.
    B
    The plaintiff next claims that the court erred when
    it failed to include dividend and interest income in
    determining the defendant’s gross income. We decline
    to address the merits of this claim because the plaintiff
    has inadequately briefed it.
    ‘‘We are not obligated to consider issues that are
    not adequately briefed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Con-
    necticut Siting Council, 
    286 Conn. 57
    , 87, 
    942 A.2d 345
    (2008). The plaintiff’s brief provides minimal citation
    to authority and no analysis as applied to the facts of
    this case. See O’Connell, Flaherty & Attmore, LLC v.
    Doody, 
    124 Conn. App. 1
    , 8, 
    3 A.3d 969
    (2010). Further-
    more, the plaintiff’s brief makes no reference as to the
    amount of dividend or interest income, or whether there
    had been a material change in that income source since
    2007. Accordingly, we decline to address this claim
    on appeal.
    C
    The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
    deviated from the child support guidelines when it
    imputed to her a $100,000 earning capacity. We
    disagree.
    In the 2007 dissolution judgment, the court found
    that the plaintiff had an earning capacity of $100,000.
    The court explained its findings by stating that ‘‘[d]uring
    the course of the marriage, the [plaintiff] worked full-
    time as a corporate attorney, sometimes earning in
    excess of the [defendant’s] salary. . . . She is highly
    skilled and capable. She is presently working as a free-
    lance corporate attorney . . . at $200 per hour . . . .
    From mid-July, 2007 to Dec[ember] 12, 2007, she earned
    $78,500 [in] gross [income], while undergoing recovery
    from a fractured pelvis and spending many days and
    hours attending to this ongoing litigation. . . . If she
    billed 500 hours per year over fifty weeks or ten hours
    per week, she would gross $100,000.’’
    In denying the plaintiff’s motion for modification, the
    court found that the plaintiff had failed to show that
    her earning capacity had changed substantially since
    the dissolution judgment. The court stated in its memo-
    randum of decision that she reported $177,400 in gross
    income from 2008, $95,550 in gross income from 2009,
    and $115,412 in gross income from 2010. The court
    also stated that these ‘‘gross income levels have been
    achieved since the date of judgment by working part-
    time.’’ Because the plaintiff had not established a sub-
    stantial change in her earning capacity, the court
    imputed this income in calculating the modified child
    support order.
    Upon concluding that the plaintiff remained capable
    of earning $100,000 by working full-time, the court cor-
    rectly applied the earning capacity from the original
    dissolution judgment. See Borkowski v. 
    Borkowski, supra
    , 
    228 Conn. 738
    . The court found that the plaintiff
    continued to be a highly skilled corporate attorney,
    capable of working on a full-time basis. As a result, the
    court did not abuse its discretion when it imputed an
    earning capacity to the plaintiff.
    D
    The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly
    excluded from its financial calculations certain
    employee perquisites and recurring gifts received by
    the defendant. We disagree.
    With respect to the factual predicates for modifica-
    tion of a child support order, our standard of review is
    clear. ‘‘This court may reject a factual finding if it is
    clearly erroneous, in that as a matter of law it is unsup-
    ported by the record, incorrect, or otherwise mistaken.
    . . . This court, of course, may not retry a case. . . .
    The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with
    its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented
    in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observa-
    tions of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses
    and parties, which is not fully reflected in the cold,
    printed record which is available to us. Appellate review
    of a factual finding, therefore, is limited both as a practi-
    cal matter and as a matter of the fundamental difference
    between the role of the trial court and an appellate
    court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doody v.
    Doody, 
    99 Conn. App. 512
    , 516–17, 
    914 A.2d 1058
    (2007).
    At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff sought to prove
    that the defendant had received $59,484 in perquisites
    from his employer and $27,972 in recurring gifts in the
    form of free rent from his sister. The court found that
    in each instance, the plaintiff had not met her burden
    of proof. In its October 20, 2011 memorandum of deci-
    sion, the court explained its reasoning for excluding
    both sources from the calculation of the defendant’s
    income. First, the court explained that, under § 46b-
    215a-1 (11) (A) (vi) of the Regulations of Connecticut
    State Agencies, employment perquisites are to be con-
    sidered income for the purposes of child support to
    the extent that they represent ‘‘basic maintenance or
    special need such as food, shelter or transportation
    provided on a recurrent basis in lieu of or in addition
    to salary or wages.’’ The court then noted that although
    the plaintiff had submitted an exhibit showing that the
    defendant had received $59,484 in employer contribu-
    tions, there was no evidence showing how much of
    those contributions constituted food, shelter, transpor-
    tation, or other basic needs. Second, the court found
    that the defendant was currently residing, rent free, at
    his sister’s home in Hartford during the winter months,
    while residing at his cottage in Stonington, which was
    awarded to him in the dissolution judgment, during the
    summer months.
    At the May, 2011 hearing, the plaintiff presented evi-
    dence that in 2007, the defendant had rent and utility
    expenses of $27,972 from an apartment that he had
    rented at that time. On that basis, the plaintiff argued
    that a rent free apartment constituted a regularly recur-
    ring gift, valued at $27,972 per year. The court disagreed
    and made several findings in support of its conclusion.
    The court found that the defendant’s $27,972 in
    expenses included not only rental fees for an apartment,
    but also maintenance expenses related to the upkeep
    of the Stonington cottage, which he had been awarded
    in the dissolution judgment. The court also found that
    the $27,972 in expenses were incurred over the entire
    year, while the defendant only lived with his sister dur-
    ing the winter months. Finally, the court found that the
    plaintiff had presented no evidence indicating the rental
    value of an apartment in the defendant’s sister’s neigh-
    borhood in Hartford. Upon our review, we find nothing
    in the record to undermine our confidence in the court’s
    factual findings, and defer to its sound judgment in
    reaching its conclusions.
    E
    The plaintiff next claims that the court, in modifying
    the defendant’s child support obligation, improperly
    relied upon the defendant’s child support guidelines
    worksheet (worksheet). Specifically, the plaintiff
    asserts that the court relied on an ‘‘unsworn’’ worksheet
    and that the financial information on the defendant’s
    worksheet was unsupported by the evidence. We find
    both of these arguments unpersuasive.
    Practice Book § 25-30 (e) requires parties with minor
    children to ‘‘file a completed child support and arrear-
    age guidelines worksheet at the time of any hearing
    concerning child support . . . .’’ In addition to this
    requirement, the parties are also required to submit to
    the court certain sworn statements concerning income,
    expenses, assets and liabilities. See Practice Book § 25-
    30 (e); Gentile v. Carneiro, 
    107 Conn. App. 630
    , 654,
    
    946 A.2d 871
    (2008). The plaintiff incorrectly argues on
    appeal that our rules of practice require all worksheets
    to be sworn. We do not construe § 25-30 to be so restric-
    tive. The defendant correctly filed a completed work-
    sheet, as well as a sworn financial affidavit and other
    documentation, in compliance with our rules of
    practice.
    The plaintiff’s next claim is that the defendant’s work-
    sheet was not supported by the evidence. A court may
    not rely on a worksheet unless it is based on some
    underlying evidence. See Aley v. Aley, 
    101 Conn. App. 220
    , 229, 
    922 A.2d 184
    (2007). In Aley, this court reversed
    a child support order based exclusively on a worksheet
    that had no evidentiary basis. 
    Id., 229–30. In
    that case,
    the defendant did not attend the dissolution proceed-
    ings and had failed to submit a financial affidavit. 
    Id., 228–29. Further,
    the plaintiff provided no testimony,
    nor did she submit any documentary evidence regarding
    the defendant’s income. 
    Id. As a
    result, this court con-
    cluded that the worksheet was the only basis for the
    trial court’s determination of the defendant’s income.
    
    Id., 229. In
    contrast to Aley, the defendant in the present
    case provided testimony regarding his income, a finan-
    cial affidavit, and other documentary evidence in sup-
    port of his child support worksheet. Because the
    worksheet was based on underlying evidence, it was
    reasonable for the court to rely on it when determining
    the financial position of the parties.
    Finally, the plaintiff makes two additional claims
    regarding the use of the defendant’s worksheet. First,
    the plaintiff argues that the court should not have
    excluded certain sources of the defendant’s income on
    the one hand, while also allowing him to deduct federal
    taxes paid on those sources in determining his net
    income. This argument, however, is inconsistent with
    the plain language of the worksheet, which explicitly
    instructed the defendant to deduct ‘‘Federal income tax
    (based on all allowable exemptions, deductions and
    credits).’’ As there is no distinction made between fed-
    eral taxes paid on gross cash income and other forms
    of income, we decline to follow the plaintiff’s logic.
    Second, the plaintiff argues that the court incorrectly
    deducted $73 per week for health insurance even
    though she testified that her actual insurance costs were
    $153 per week. Even if we agreed with the plaintiff, the
    $153 deduction would have no impact on the presump-
    tive child support amount as the combined net income
    of the parties would still be greater than $4000 per
    week. See part II F of this opinion. Although the record
    is void of any support for court’s finding that the plain-
    tiff’s health insurance cost was $73, we conclude that
    this error is harmless because it is evident that the
    court’s analysis would reach the same result.7 See Tay-
    lor v. Taylor, 
    17 Conn. App. 291
    , 293, 
    551 A.2d 1285
    (1989).
    F
    Having concluded that the court did not abuse its
    discretion in determining the financial standing of the
    parties, we now consider whether the court properly
    modified the child support order from $439 per week
    to $400 per week. The plaintiff argues that this modifica-
    tion amounted to an improper deviation from the child
    support guidelines (guidelines). The defendant argues
    that the modification was well within the guidelines
    and, therefore, did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
    We agree with the defendant.
    The following additional facts are relevant to this
    claim. In its October, 2011 memorandum of decision,
    the court found that the parties had a combined net
    weekly income of $6440, with the defendant earning
    $5175 per week, and the plaintiff having imputed earn-
    ings of $1260 per week. The court also found that one
    of the parties’ children had reached the age of majority,
    and that the defendant was obligated to provide support
    for only one child under the age of majority. After con-
    sidering all of the relevant factors set forth in General
    Statutes §§ 46b-84 and 46b-86, and the guidelines, the
    court then ordered a reduction of child support from
    $439 per week to $400 per week.
    In determining the appropriate amount of child sup-
    port, courts are provided with state guidelines and an
    accompanying schedule. See Regs., Conn. State Agen-
    cies § 46b-215a-2b (f). ‘‘[T]he schedule sets forth a pre-
    sumptive     percentage       and    resultant    amount
    corresponding to specific levels of combined net weekly
    income; the schedule begins at $50 and continues in
    progressively higher $10 increments, terminating at
    $4000. . . . [Our Supreme Court] has recognized that
    the guidelines nonetheless apply to combined net
    weekly income in excess of that maximum amount. See
    Maturo v. Maturo, [
    296 Conn. 80
    , 94–95, 
    995 A.2d 1
    (2010)] ([the guidelines] provide that all child support
    awards must be made in accordance with the principles
    established therein to ensure that such awards promote
    equity, uniformity and consistency for children at all
    income levels . . .); see also Misthopoulos v. Mistho-
    poulos, [
    297 Conn. 358
    , 367, 
    999 A.2d 721
    (2010)] (rely-
    ing on Maturo for this principle); Tuckman v. Tuckman,
    [
    308 Conn. 194
    , 205–206, 
    61 A.3d 449
    (2013)] (same).
    Indeed, the regulations direct that, [w]hen the parents’
    combined net weekly income exceeds $4,000, child sup-
    port awards shall be determined on a case-by-case
    basis, and the current support prescribed at the $4,000
    net weekly income level shall be the minimum presump-
    tive amount. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b
    (a) (2).
    ‘‘While the regulations clearly demarcate the pre-
    sumptive minimum amount of the award in high
    income cases, they do not address the maximum per-
    missible amount that may be assigned under a proper
    exercise of the court’s discretion. In order to provide
    some guidance to the trial courts on this matter without
    unduly encroaching on the purposeful decision of the
    legislative branch not to prescribe an amount or method
    for calculating that maximum amount, this court has
    remained mindful that the guidelines . . . indicate that
    such awards should follow the principle expressly
    acknowledged in the preamble [to the guidelines] and
    reflected in the schedule that the child support obliga-
    tion as a percentage of the combined net weekly income
    should decline as the income level rises. . . . Mistho-
    poulos v. 
    Misthopoulos, supra
    , 
    297 Conn. 368
    . We there-
    fore have determined that child support payments . . .
    should presumptively not exceed the [maximum] per-
    cent [set forth in the schedule] when the combined net
    weekly income of the family exceeds $4000, and, in
    most cases, should reflect less than that amount. See
    Maturo v. 
    Maturo, supra
    , 
    296 Conn. 96
    .’’ (Citation omit-
    ted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Dowling v. Szymczak, 
    309 Conn. 390
    , 400–401, 
    72 A.3d 1
    (2013).
    In the present case, the court properly applied the
    guidelines consistent with our regulations and case law.
    The parties earned a combined weekly income of over
    $4000. This meant that, pursuant to the guidelines, the
    presumptive floor of child support for one child was
    $473 per week. The presumptive ceiling, consistent with
    the holding of Dowling, was to be no more than 11.83
    percent of the parties’ combined net weekly income.
    As the court found that the parties had a combined
    income of $6440 per week, the presumptive ceiling was
    determined to be $761 per week. The court then deter-
    mined that the defendant’s income represented 80 per-
    cent of the combined income, and, therefore, his
    obligation should be limited to 80 percent of the total
    amount of child support. Thus, the court reduced the
    defendant’s child support range by 20 percent to a ‘‘floor
    of $378 and a ceiling of $608.’’ We must conclude then,
    that the court’s decision to modify the support order
    to $400 per week was well within the guidelines and,
    therefore, was not an abuse of discretion.
    III
    The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
    failed to find the defendant in contempt for wilfully
    violating its order. We disagree.
    The following additional facts are relevant to our
    resolution of this claim. In 2011, this court remanded
    the plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification of child
    support for an evidentiary hearing. See McKeon v. Len-
    
    non, supra
    , 
    131 Conn. App. 599
    –600. The trial court
    scheduled the hearing for April 25, 2012. On April 13,
    2012, the plaintiff served notice on the defendant,
    requiring him to attend a deposition scheduled for April
    20, 2012. On April 19, 2012, at 2 p.m., the court held a
    discovery hearing where, at its conclusion, the defen-
    dant was ordered to bring his tax returns, bank records,
    and financial affidavits to the deposition. At the time,
    the defendant was traveling for business and did not
    return until late that night. On April 20, 2012, the defen-
    dant attended the deposition, but did not produce the
    ordered documents. On April 25, 2012, the plaintiff filed
    a motion for contempt against the defendant alleging
    that his failure to produce court-ordered financial docu-
    ments prejudiced her ability to prepare for the hearing.
    At the April 25, 2012 hearing, the court heard argu-
    ment on the plaintiff’s motion for contempt. The defen-
    dant admitted that he had not produced the required
    documents at the deposition, but stated that he was
    unable to produce the documents because of the short
    period of time between the order and the deposition.
    After hearing from both sides, the court asked the plain-
    tiff if she was ‘‘claiming that [she was] somewhat preju-
    diced because [she did not have] enough time to prepare
    with all that information that [she] requested [and if
    she was] asking for more time?’’ The plaintiff did not
    request a continuance and stated that she would like
    to proceed with the hearing on the 2008 motion for mod-
    ification.
    On November 20, 2012, the court denied the plaintiff’s
    motion for contempt. In its memorandum of decision,
    the court found that although the defendant had not
    complied with the court’s order, his noncompliance was
    not wilful.
    We begin our analysis by setting forth the appropriate
    legal standard. ‘‘A finding of contempt is a question of
    fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gil v. Gil, 
    94 Conn. App. 306
    , 311, 
    892 A.2d 318
    (2006). ‘‘We review
    the court’s factual findings in the context of a motion
    for contempt to determine whether they are clearly
    erroneous.’’ Dionne v. Dionne, 
    115 Conn. App. 488
    , 494,
    
    972 A.2d 791
    (2009). ‘‘For the court to properly find a
    party in contempt, that party’s noncompliance with the
    court’s order must be willful.’’ Brody v. Brody, 
    145 Conn. App. 654
    , 665, 
    77 A.3d 156
    (2013). A finding of
    noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of
    contempt. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 
    92 Conn. App. 212
    ,
    214, 
    883 A.2d 1260
    (2005).
    In the present case, the court found that although the
    defendant had been noncompliant with the discovery
    order, he had not been wilfully noncompliant. In sup-
    port of this conclusion, the court found that the discov-
    ery order had been issued on the afternoon before the
    scheduled deposition. On the day prior to the deposi-
    tion, the defendant had been traveling for business and
    did not arrive at home until late that night. The court
    found that on the day of the deposition, the defendant
    went to work and then went directly to the deposition.
    As a result, the court reasonably concluded that ‘‘[i]t
    was not possible for the defendant to produce the
    ordered documents in such short notice.’’ As the court’s
    findings were clearly supported by the evidence, we
    conclude that the court properly denied the plaintiff’s
    motion for contempt.
    IV
    The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court erred when
    it denied her motion for appellate attorney’s fees. The
    plaintiff argues that because of errors in calculating
    the defendant’s income, the court based its denial on
    inaccurate financial information. We disagree.
    In support of her claim, the plaintiff reasserts the
    same arguments that we addressed in part II of this
    opinion. The plaintiff does not allege any other indepen-
    dent basis for reversal; she only argues that if her other
    claims are remanded for further consideration, then her
    motion for attorney’s fees should also be remanded.
    This argument might have merit if we agreed with the
    plaintiff on her earlier claims. Earlier in this opinion,
    however, we concluded that the court properly calcu-
    lated the financial positions of the parties. Conse-
    quently, we reject the plaintiff’s claim that the court
    improperly denied her motion for attorney’s fees.
    The judgments are affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    That appeal, AC 30068, was consolidated with four other appeals filed
    by the plaintiff, AC 30067, AC 30069, AC 30070, and AC 30636.
    2
    General Statutes § 46b-86 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless and to
    the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the
    periodic payment of permanent alimony or support . . . may, at any time
    thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by the court upon
    a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or
    upon a showing that the final order for child support substantially deviates
    from the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a,
    unless there was a specific finding on the record that the application of the
    guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate. There shall be a rebuttable
    presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen per cent from the child
    support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen per cent
    or more from the guidelines is substantial. Modification may be made of
    such support order without regard to whether the order was issued before,
    on or after May 9, 1991. In determining whether to modify a child support
    order based on a substantial deviation from such child support guidelines
    the court shall consider the division of real and personal property between
    the parties set forth in the final decree and the benefits accruing to the
    child as the result of such division. After the date of judgment, modification
    of any child support order issued before, on or after July 1, 1990, may be
    made upon a showing of such substantial change of circumstances, whether
    or not such change of circumstances was contemplated at the time of
    dissolution. By written agreement, stipulation or decision of the court, those
    items or circumstances that were contemplated and are not to be changed
    may be specified in the written agreement, stipulation or decision of the
    court. . . . If a court, after hearing, finds that a substantial change in circum-
    stances of either party has occurred, the court shall determine what modifica-
    tion of alimony, if any, is appropriate, considering the criteria set forth in
    section 46b-82.’’
    3
    The plaintiff cites several cases in which our appellate courts have upheld
    findings of a substantial change in circumstances on the basis of an increase
    in the defendant’s income. See, e.g., Schwarz v. Schwarz, 
    124 Conn. App. 472
    , 478–79, 
    5 A.3d 548
    (upholding trial court’s finding that 20 percent
    increase in gross income was a substantial change), cert denied, 
    299 Conn. 909
    , 
    10 A.3d 525
    (2010); Serby v. Serby, 
    4 Conn. App. 398
    , 401, 
    494 A.2d 617
    (1985) (upholding 20 percent increase in gross income was substantial
    change). We disagree, however, with the plaintiff’s conclusion that these
    cases require us to reverse the court’s denial of her motion. The cited cases
    considered the question of whether to uphold the court’s conclusion of a
    substantial change in circumstances, while in the present case we are asked
    to review the court’s determination that the plaintiff had failed to establish
    a substantial change. ‘‘An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s
    orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion
    or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the
    facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its
    broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable
    presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Cleary v. Cleary, 
    103 Conn. App. 798
    , 800, 
    930 A.2d 811
    (2007).
    4
    The court found several inconsistencies between the plaintiff’s financial
    affidavit and her supporting documents. First, the plaintiff estimated her
    weekly income using only income she had been paid and omitted $10,000
    in income that was earned, but not yet received. Next, she claimed weekly
    expenses of $9684. In support of this claim, she submitted exhibits claiming
    that she had paid a total of $219,515 in credit card bills from May, 2011
    through April, 2012. After reviewing the documents, however, the court
    concluded that the credit card bills were from November, 2010 through
    May, 2012. The court also found that the plaintiff’s affidavit overestimated
    her monthly credit card debt payment by $7441.63. Finally, the court noted
    that the 2007 dissolution judgment found that the parties’ marital home had
    $85,000 worth of furnishings. The plaintiff’s most recent financial affidavit
    claimed only $3000 worth of furnishings.
    5
    We note that the plaintiff previously had argued before the trial court
    that ‘‘Connecticut law does not permit the court to order support for a child
    over the age of majority except through education support orders or medical
    insurance.’’ At that time, she was challenging an order from the dissolution
    judgment that required her to pay maintenance costs for her adult daughter’s
    car. On appeal, she now takes the opposite position that the court has no
    authority to reduce child support on the basis that their older son had
    reached the age of majority.
    6
    The plaintiff additionally argues that the court abused its discretion
    when it found a substantial change in circumstances without requiring the
    defendant to rebut the presumption that reductions in child support of less
    than 15 percent are not substantial. She bases this argument on § 46b-86
    (a), which provides in relevant part that any deviation of less than 15 percent
    from the child support guidelines is not substantial. The plaintiff’s reliance
    on § 46b-86 (a), however, is misplaced. The reference to a 15 percent pre-
    sumption does not apply to a substantial change in circumstances but,
    rather, applies to situations where the final order deviated substantially
    from the child support guidelines. See Schwarz v. Schwarz, 
    124 Conn. App. 472
    , 477, 
    5 A.3d 548
    , cert. denied, 
    299 Conn. 909
    , 
    10 A.3d 525
    (2010).
    7
    Under the plaintiff’s argument, her net income would be reduced by
    $153 in health insurance costs, rather than by $73. This reduction would
    leave her with a net income of $1180 per week, while the defendant’s income
    would remain at $5175 per week. The parties would then have a total weekly
    income of $6355, with the defendant earning 81.43 percent and the plaintiff
    earning 18.57 percent. Applying these percentages to the child support guide-
    lines, we calculate the presumptive range of support to be between $385
    and $612 per week. Following the plaintiff’s argument results in a range
    that is substantially the same as the range calculated by the court in its
    October, 2011 memorandum of decision ($378 to $608). Thus, even if we
    adopted the plaintiff’s argument, we would still conclude that the court’s
    order of $400 per week in child support was squarely within the presumptive
    range of the child support guidelines.