Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. State ( 2022 )


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    SCHAGHTICOKE TRIBAL NATION V. STATE—CONCURRENCE
    PALMER, J., concurring. I agree with, and join, the
    majority opinion. I write separately only to note my
    agreement, in addition, with the determination of the
    trial court that the plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation,
    does not have standing with respect to its claims of a
    breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants, the state
    of Connecticut and the Commissioner of Energy and
    Environmental Protection.
    As the majority has explained, the trial court properly
    rejected the plaintiff’s claims seeking just compensation
    for the state’s alleged unconstitutional taking of land
    that the plaintiff contends belongs to it, concluding
    that sovereign immunity bars those claims because the
    plaintiff has no cognizable property right in that land.
    See Tamm v. Burns, 
    222 Conn. 280
    , 284, 
    610 A.2d 590
    (1992) (‘‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss on the ground
    of sovereign immunity, a complaint must allege suffi-
    cient facts to support a finding of a taking of land in a
    constitutional sense’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted)). With respect to the plaintiff’s fiduciary claims,
    the trial court thereafter dismissed those claims upon
    concluding that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring
    them for essentially the same reason that the plaintiff
    cannot prevail on its underlying takings claims, that is,
    because the plaintiff has no ownership interest in the
    property that it claims the state took from it. On appeal,
    the majority has not addressed the trial court’s conclu-
    sion regarding standing, electing, instead, to affirm the
    court’s dismissal of the fiduciary claims on the ground
    of sovereign immunity. I agree with the majority’s con-
    clusion in that regard because, as this court discussed
    in Bloom v. Dept. of Labor, 
    93 Conn. App. 37
    , 
    888 A.2d 115
    , cert. denied, 
    277 Conn. 912
    , 
    894 A.2d 992
     (2006),
    equitable claims against the state that have been
    brought for the sole purpose of facilitating a money
    judgment against the state are barred by sovereign
    immunity to the same extent that the money judgment
    itself is barred by that doctrine. Id., 41.
    Nevertheless, I also agree with the trial court’s hold-
    ing that the plaintiff has an insufficient interest in the
    land at issue for standing purposes. To establish stand-
    ing, a party must make at least a threshold or colorable
    showing of aggrievement. See, e.g., May v. Coffey, 
    291 Conn. 106
    , 112, 
    967 A.2d 495
     (2009). For present pur-
    poses, ‘‘aggrievement requires a two part showing. First,
    a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal
    interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as
    opposed to a general interest that all members of the
    community share. . . . Second, the party must also
    show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuri-
    ously affected that specific or legal interest.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Lazar v. Ganim, 
    334 Conn. 73
    , 85, 
    220 A.3d 18
     (2019). Having correctly concluded
    that the plaintiff lacked a property interest sufficient
    to support a takings claim because the state, not the
    plaintiff, owns the land, the trial court also correctly
    concluded that the plaintiff has not made a colorable
    showing that it is entitled to the equitable relief it seeks
    in connection with that takings claim. For that reason,
    as well, I agree with the majority that the trial court
    properly dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, including
    its fiduciary claims.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC43811

Filed Date: 9/27/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/26/2022