State v. Greer ( 2022 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANIEL GREER
    (AC 43726)
    Bright, C. J., and Elgo and DiPentima, Js.
    Syllabus
    Convicted of four counts of risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed
    to this court. The defendant, a rabbi, was a teacher at and served as
    the dean of a private, Orthodox Jewish high school. The victim, E,
    attended the school for four years, commencing in 2001. E alleged that,
    during his sophomore year, when he was fourteen and fifteen years old,
    he and the defendant met at least once a week to engage in various
    sexual acts. The defendant continued to engage in sexual acts with E
    after he turned sixteen years old. In 2016, E reported the sexual abuse
    to the police. The defendant was arrested and charged with four counts
    each of sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child.
    At trial, the state introduced uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant
    to a provision (§ 4-5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence regarding a
    sexual relationship between the defendant and R, a former student at
    the school, and the defendant’s relationship with E after his sixteenth
    birthday. Following R’s testimony, the court provided a limiting instruc-
    tion to the jury. After the close of evidence at trial, defense counsel
    moved for a judgment of acquittal as to the charges of sexual assault
    in the second degree on the ground that the prosecution was barred by
    the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2001) § 54-193a, as amended by Public
    Acts 2002, No. 02-138, § 1) of limitations because E had not notified a
    police officer or state’s attorney within five years of the commission of
    the offense. The state conceded that the charges were barred, and the
    trial court granted the motion for a judgment of acquittal. Thereafter,
    the state filed a new information limited to the four counts of risk of
    injury to a child. In its final instructions to the jury, the court instructed in
    relevant part regarding misconduct evidence: ‘‘It is for you to determine
    whether the defendant committed any uncharged sexual misconduct
    . . . .’’ The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant filed postver-
    dict motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, claiming, inter
    alia, that the limitation period applicable to the charges of sexual assault
    in the second degree should also apply to the risk of injury charges
    because the charges were based on the same conduct. The trial court
    denied the motions, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held:
    1. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of
    acquittal as to the risk of injury charges: our courts previously have
    concluded that risk of injury to a child and sexual assault are separate
    and distinct offenses; moreover, contrary to the defendant’s assertion,
    the requirement that a victim notify a police officer or state’s attorney
    of an offense within five years of its commission was limited by the
    plain and unambiguous language of § 54-193a to charges of sexual assault
    in the second degree pursuant to statute (§ 53a-71 (a) (1)); furthermore,
    if the legislature had intended the additional reporting requirement to
    also apply to charges of risk of injury under the applicable statute (§ 53-
    21 (a) (2)), it would have stated so expressly, and, accordingly, for the
    court to expand the requirement to violations of § 53-21 (a) (2) would be
    contrary to the presumed intent of the legislature; additionally, applying
    different statutes of limitations to the two sets of charges would not
    lead to an absurd or unworkable result, as two criminal statutes can
    be construed to proscribe the same conduct and a defendant may be
    prosecuted under either.
    2. The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the evidence of uncharged
    misconduct: the defendant adequately preserved his challenge to the
    trial court’s instructions regarding the uncharged misconduct evidence
    involving the defendant’s continued sexual acts with E after E turned
    sixteen by stating in his request to charge that, ‘‘[a]s to any evidence
    of uncharged misconduct,’’ the state had the burden to prove such
    conduct by clear and convincing evidence; moreover, the trial court
    instructed that it was for the jury ‘‘to determine’’ whether the defendant
    engaged in the acts of uncharged misconduct and, contrary to the defen-
    dant’s assertions, there was no meaningful distinction between an
    instruction that a jury may consider prior misconduct evidence if it
    ‘‘believes’’ such evidence, which our Supreme Court endorsed in State
    v. Cutler (
    293 Conn. 303
    ) and which is used in the Connecticut Criminal
    Jury Instructions, and the trial court’s use of the word ‘‘determine’’;
    accordingly, the trial court’s instructions regarding the uncharged mis-
    conduct were not deficient.
    Argued February 28—officially released July 19, 2022
    Procedural History
    Substitute information charging the defendant with
    four counts each of the crimes of sexual assault in the
    second degree and risk of injury to a child, brought to
    the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven,
    geographical area number twenty-three, and tried to
    the jury before Alander, J.; thereafter, the court,
    Alander, J., granted the defendant’s motion for a judg-
    ment of acquittal as to the four counts of sexual assault
    in the second degree; verdict of guilty of four counts
    of risk of injury to a child; subsequently, the court,
    Alander, J., denied the defendant’s postverdict motions
    for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial and rendered
    judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which
    the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Richard Emanuel, with whom was David T. Grud-
    berg, for the appellant (defendant).
    Timothy F. Costello, senior assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, former
    state’s attorney, and Maxine Wilensky and Karen A.
    Roberg, senior assistant state’s attorneys, for the appel-
    lee (state).
    Opinion
    BRIGHT, C. J. The defendant, Daniel Greer, appeals
    from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
    trial, of four counts of risk of injury to a child in violation
    of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defen-
    dant claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that
    the statute of limitations applicable to sexual assault
    in the second degree under General Statutes (Rev. to
    2001) § 54-193a, as amended by Public Acts 2002, No.
    02-138, § 1 (effective May 23, 2002) (P.A. 02-138),1 did
    not apply to the risk of injury charges and (2) declined
    to instruct the jury to apply a standard of proof to
    determine whether certain prior misconduct occurred.
    We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
    the trial court.
    The jury reasonably could have found the following
    facts. The defendant, who is a rabbi, founded Yeshiva of
    New Haven, Inc. (yeshiva), a private, Orthodox Jewish
    school, and served as a dean, rabbi, and teacher at the
    yeshiva. The victim, E,2 attended the yeshiva for high
    school, beginning his freshman year in August or Sep-
    tember, 2001, when he was thirteen years old. E’s birth-
    day is in October, and he turned fourteen years old
    during his freshman year. Shortly after the school year
    began, E was expelled from the yeshiva, but he was
    allowed to return to complete his freshman year after
    spending a few weeks at home.
    In 2002, when he was fourteen years old, E returned
    to the yeshiva for his sophomore year. At some point
    during the beginning of the school year, the defendant
    told E to meet him at an apartment adjacent to the
    school, and E complied. At the apartment, the defendant
    offered E a can of nuts and an alcoholic drink, either
    wine or hard liquor, in a red Solo cup. They proceeded
    to drink and talk about E’s family and his future, and
    E began to get emotional and his head felt ‘‘fuzzy . . . .’’
    At some point, the defendant touched E’s thigh or
    crotch area and attempted to kiss him on the lips. When
    E pulled away and asked the defendant what he was
    doing, the defendant said that ‘‘[i]t wasn’t a big deal
    and that this is what he does to his kids.’’ Nothing
    further transpired, and E returned to his dormitory.
    After the initial incident at the apartment, E and the
    defendant met at least once a week during his sopho-
    more year at various locations—often in New Haven
    or at a motel in Branford—and engaged in oral or anal
    sex. During these encounters, the defendant and E often
    would consume alcohol. E acknowledged that ‘‘the
    encounters meld together’’ but was ‘‘very sure’’ that he
    and the defendant engaged in anal and oral sex during
    his sophomore year, during which time he was fourteen
    and fifteen years old. He testified that, during that
    period, he and the defendant frequently performed oral
    sex on each other, that he performed anal sex on the
    defendant ‘‘many’’ times, and that, when the defendant
    attempted to perform anal sex on E, E forced him to
    stop because it was too painful. After these encounters,
    E would feel ‘‘shame, guilt, [and] confusion.’’ At the
    yeshiva, the defendant gave E preferential treatment
    and would not yell at him as he regularly did with
    other students. When E attempted to end the sexual
    relationship, the defendant stopped giving him prefer-
    ential treatment and became ‘‘nasty’’ instead of ‘‘nice
    and charming . . . .’’ The defendant continued to
    engage in sexual acts with E after he turned sixteen
    years old in October, 2003.
    After graduating in 2005, E went to an Orthodox
    yeshiva in Israel to continue his Jewish studies and met
    S, his future wife, while staying there. In 2006, E told
    S that the defendant had molested him during high
    school, but he did not provide any details about the
    abuse. In the summer of 2006, E returned to Connecticut
    and met the defendant at the Branford motel, where
    they had their last sexual encounter.
    In December, 2007, E and S were married, and the
    defendant was one of the witnesses at the ceremony,
    which is a position of honor. E explained that he gave
    the defendant this honor because he respected the
    defendant and ‘‘still felt part of the New Haven commu-
    nity . . . .’’ For several years following their marriage,
    E and S would travel to New Haven for Jewish holidays,
    where they would share meals with members of the
    yeshiva community, including the defendant. When E
    and S had a son in June, 2010, E asked the defendant
    to hold the baby during the circumcision, which is also
    a position of honor.
    In 2013, E and S bought a house in New Jersey, and
    E found a rabbi in that community. Around that time,
    E stopped traveling to New Haven and communicating
    with the defendant. At some point before 2016, E dis-
    closed the abuse to his therapist and two family friends,
    one of whom was working at the yeshiva. In May, 2016,
    E filed a civil action in federal court against the defen-
    dant seeking money damages stemming from the sexual
    abuse. In August, 2016, while the civil action was pend-
    ing, E reported the sexual abuse to the New Haven
    Police Department.
    On July 26, 2017, the defendant was arrested and
    charged with four counts of sexual assault in the second
    degree under General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1)3 and four
    counts of risk of injury to a child under § 53-21 (a) (2).4
    In the operative long form information, the state alleged
    that the charged conduct occurred when E was fourteen
    and fifteen years old, ‘‘at the city of New Haven on divers
    dates between 2002 up to October 27, 2003 . . . .’’ As
    the state acknowledged at oral argument before this
    court, the sexual assault and risk of injury charges were
    premised on the same conduct—anal intercourse and
    fellatio.5
    The case proceeded to a jury trial, and, at the close
    of evidence, defense counsel moved for a judgment of
    acquittal as to the charges of sexual assault in the sec-
    ond degree on the ground that the prosecution was
    barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 54-
    193a because E had not notified a police officer or
    state’s attorney within five years after the commission
    of the offense. After a brief recess, the state conceded
    that the sexual assault charges are barred under § 54-
    193a, and the court granted the motion for a judgment
    of acquittal as to the four counts of sexual assault in
    the second degree (counts one, three, five, and seven).
    Thereafter, the state filed a new information limited to
    the four counts of risk of injury to a child, and the jury
    found the defendant guilty of those charges.
    The defendant filed postverdict motions for a judg-
    ment of acquittal and a new trial. In the memorandum
    of law in support of the motions, the defendant claimed,
    inter alia, that the same limitation period applicable to
    sexual assault in the second degree should apply to the
    risk of injury charges because all of the charges were
    based on the same conduct.6 After hearing argument,
    the court rejected the defendant’s statute of limitations
    claim and denied the motions. Thereafter, the court
    sentenced the defendant to twenty years of incarcera-
    tion, execution suspended after twelve years, followed
    by ten years of probation. This appeal followed. Addi-
    tional facts will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The defendant first claims that the same limitation
    period that applied to the charges of sexual assault in
    the second degree also applies to the risk of injury
    charges, which were based on the same conduct and
    proved by the same evidence. We are not persuaded.
    As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard
    of review and the legal principles that guide our analy-
    sis. The defendant’s statute of limitations claim presents
    an issue of statutory construction. ‘‘Issues of statutory
    construction present questions of law, over which we
    exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commis-
    sion, 
    199 Conn. App. 115
    , 121, 
    235 A.3d 526
    , cert. denied,
    
    335 Conn. 959
    , 
    239 A.3d 320
     (2020); see also State v.
    George J., 
    280 Conn. 551
    , 562–63, 
    910 A.2d 931
     (2006)
    (statute of limitations claims raise questions of statu-
    tory construction subject to plenary review), cert.
    denied, 
    549 U.S. 1326
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 1919
    , 
    167 L. Ed. 2d 573
     (2007).
    ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
    tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
    of the legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that
    meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to con-
    sider the text of the statute itself and its relationship
    to other statutes. If, after examining such text and con-
    sidering such relationship, the meaning of such text is
    plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
    unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the mean-
    ing of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When
    a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look
    for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and
    circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legisla-
    tive policy it was designed to implement, and to its
    relationship to existing legislation and common law
    principles governing the same general subject matter
    . . . .
    ‘‘[I]t is reasonable to presume that, by rejecting the
    underlying premise [of a prior decision], the legislature
    also . . . express[es] its disapproval of [the court’s
    prior] conclusion . . . . The legislature can reject the
    underlying premise of a decision by changing or deleting
    a provision on which the court relied. This is especially
    true when that provision exists elsewhere in the statu-
    tory scheme. For instance, [when] a statute, with refer-
    ence to one subject, contains a given provision, the
    omission of such provision from a similar statute con-
    cerning a related subject . . . is significant to show
    that a different intention existed. . . . This tenet of
    statutory construction ensures that statutes [are] con-
    strued, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or
    word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant, and
    that every sentence, phrase and clause is presumed to
    have a purpose.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc., 
    313 Conn. 535
    , 542–43, 
    98 A.3d 808
     (2014).
    ‘‘The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit
    exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed
    period of time following the occurrence of those acts
    the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanc-
    tions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individu-
    als from having to defend themselves against charges
    when the basic facts may have become obscured by the
    passage of time and to minimize the danger of official
    punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such
    a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encour-
    aging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate
    suspected criminal activity. . . . Indeed, it is because
    of the remedial nature of criminal statutes of limita-
    tion[s] that they are to be liberally interpreted in favor
    of repose.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Skakel, 
    276 Conn. 633
    , 677, 
    888 A.2d 985
    , cert. denied, 
    549 U.S. 1030
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 578
    , 
    166 L. Ed. 2d 428
     (2006).
    In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin with the text of
    § 54-193a, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Notwith-
    standing the provisions of section 54-193, no person
    may be prosecuted for any offense, except a class A
    felony, involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or
    sexual assault of a minor except within thirty years
    from the date the victim attains the age of majority or
    within five years from the date the victim notifies any
    police officer or state’s attorney acting in such police
    officer’s or state’s attorney’s official capacity of the
    commission of the offense, whichever is earlier, pro-
    vided if the prosecution is for a violation of subdivision
    (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-71 . . . the victim
    notified such police officer or state’s attorney not later
    than five years after the commission of the offense.’’
    General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 54-193a, as amended
    by P.A. 02-138.
    Thus, for an offense involving sexual abuse, sexual
    exploitation, or sexual assault of a minor, the statute
    of limitations is the earlier of (1) thirty years from the
    date the victim reaches eighteen years old or (2) five
    years from the date the victim notifies law enforcement
    or a state’s attorney of the offense. See General Statutes
    (Rev. to 2001) § 54-193a, as amended by P.A. 02-138. The
    legislature, however, provided a further requirement
    for a violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1), which involves sexual
    intercourse between a victim at least age thirteen but
    under age sixteen and an actor at least three years
    older, that the victim notify a police officer or prosecu-
    tor within five years after the offense is committed. See
    General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 54-193a, as amended
    by P.A. 02-138. That reporting requirement is at issue
    in the present case.
    It is undisputed that E did not report the defendant’s
    conduct to the police within five years of its occurrence.
    In fact, it was for this reason that the court granted the
    judgment of acquittal as to the sexual assault charges.
    The defendant argues that, because the sexual assault
    and risk of injury charges were based on the same
    conduct, ‘‘it would be illogical and unreasonable to
    apply a greater limitation period to that same conduct
    when it is simultaneously prosecuted under the risk
    of injury statute—a statute that does not require proof
    of sexual intercourse or penetration, and which can be
    violated simply by proof of over the clothes contact
    with the intimate parts of the perpetrator or the intimate
    parts of the child victim. Such a bizarre or irrational
    result was undoubtedly neither intended nor foreseen
    by the legislature . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original; foot-
    note omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
    response, the state asserts that the plain and unambigu-
    ous statutory language defeats the defendant’s claim
    because, ‘‘where the legislature expressly has pro-
    scribed a shorter statute of limitations for one way of
    committing a crime . . . a reviewing court cannot pre-
    sume that it also intended to extend that limitation to
    other crimes not specifically named.’’7 We agree with
    the state.
    As a preliminary matter, we note that ‘‘[o]ur courts
    have addressed the relationship between risk of injury
    to a child and the various degrees of sexual assault
    in the context of double jeopardy claims on several
    occasions, each time concluding that the two crimes
    do not constitute the same offense. In State v. Bletsch,
    [
    281 Conn. 5
    , 28–29, 
    912 A.2d 992
     (2007)], for example,
    [our Supreme Court] . . . concluded that, under the
    charging instruments in that case, the crimes of sexual
    assault in the second degree under . . . § 53a-71 (a),
    and risk of injury to a child under § 53-21 (a) (2), do
    not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy
    purposes because the language of the statutes makes
    it possible to have ‘sexual intercourse’ under § 53a-71
    (a) without touching the victim’s ‘intimate parts’ under
    § 53-21 (a) (2), and vice versa.’’ State v. Alvaro F., 
    291 Conn. 1
    , 7, 
    966 A.2d 712
    , cert. denied, 
    558 U.S. 882
    ,
    
    130 S. Ct. 200
    , 
    175 L. Ed. 2d 140
     (2009). Accordingly,
    although the underlying conduct giving rise to the
    charges in the present case is the same, sexual assault
    in the second degree and risk of injury to a child are
    separate and distinct offenses.
    Notwithstanding this fact, the defendant, relying on
    State v. George J., 
    supra,
     
    280 Conn. 571
    –76, contends
    that the same statute of limitations should apply to both
    offenses. In George J., the defendant claimed that his
    prosecutions for two counts of risk of injury to a child
    were time barred under General Statutes (Rev. to 1993)
    § 54-193, which provided the statute of limitations for
    nonclass A felony offenses generally. Id., 571. The defen-
    dant argued that General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-
    193a, as amended by Public Acts 1993, No. 93-340, § 11
    (P.A. 93-340), which provided an extended statute of
    limitations ‘‘ ‘for any offense involving sexual abuse,
    sexual exploitation or sexual assault of a minor,’ ’’
    applied ‘‘only to offenses for which sexual abuse, sexual
    exploitation or sexual assault of a minor is an element
    of the crime, and that risk of injury is not such an
    offense because conduct other than sexual acts against
    minors is encompassed within that offense.’’ Id. At the
    time of the offense, General Statutes (Rev. to 1993)
    § 53-21 did not include subsection (2), which was added
    in 1995 to address sexual contact with a minor child.
    Id., 573–74 and n.15.
    In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the court noted
    that ‘‘the legislature has created an extended limitations
    period to allow child sexual abuse victims, who may
    be unable to come forward at the time the offense has
    occurred, a reasonable opportunity to report the abuse.
    It would thwart that purpose and create disharmony to
    apply the extended statute of limitations to a sexual
    assault offense, but apply the general limitations period
    of five years from the date of the offense to a risk
    of injury charge involving the same conduct. The law
    prefers rational and prudent statutory construction, and
    we seek to avoid interpretations of statutes that pro-
    duce odd or illogical outcomes.’’ Id., 574–75.
    The defendant contends that ‘‘the ‘odd or illogical
    outcome’ that the George J. court sought to avoid,
    would occur here if the court allowed the risk of injury
    convictions to stand—convictions based on the same
    essential conduct underlying the time barred sexual
    assault charges. . . . Where, as here, the alleged viola-
    tions of § 53-21 (a) (2) are based on the same conduct
    forming the basis for the sexual assault charges under
    § 53a-71 (a) (1), the same five year statute should apply.’’
    (Footnote omitted.) We disagree.
    In George J., our Supreme Court sought to determine
    whether the extended statute of limitations for sex
    offenses against minors applied to the risk of injury
    statute despite the fact that General Statutes (Rev. to
    1993) § 53-21 did not include a sexual element of the
    offense. State v. George J., 
    supra,
     
    280 Conn. 573
    . In
    rejecting the state’s contention that General Statutes
    (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a ‘‘clearly’’ applied to risk of
    injury to a child, the court explained that ‘‘the meaning
    of the statute is not plain and unambiguous, because
    it does not refer expressly either to the crime of risk
    of injury or to the statute addressing that crime, and
    there is more than one reasonable construction based
    solely on the text of the statute. Indeed, because the
    crime of risk of injury does not necessarily involve
    sexual abuse, we certainly cannot conclude that [Gen-
    eral Statutes (Rev. to 1993)] § 54-193a becomes unam-
    biguous by looking to the crime charged in the present
    case.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Id., 563 n.8. Nevertheless, after considering
    the specific language the legislature chose to use in
    General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a, the legislative
    policy underlying the statute, and the bill analysis pre-
    pared by the Office of Legislative Research (OLR), the
    Supreme Court concluded that the extended statute of
    limitations applied to risk of injury charges that were
    based on sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual exploi-
    tation of a minor. Id., 572–76.
    Specifically, the court first noted that, at the time of
    the defendant’s conduct, ‘‘[i]t [was] well established
    that [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53-21’s] proscrip-
    tion on actions that create a risk of ‘impair[ing]’ the
    ‘health or morals’ of a child encompasses a broad range
    of acts, including sexual acts against minors.’’ Id., 572.
    The court then defined the question before it as
    ‘‘whether, by creating an extended statute of limitations
    for ‘any offense . . . involving sexual abuse, sexual
    exploitation or sexual assault of a minor’ . . . General
    Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a, as amended by P.A.
    93-340, § 11; the legislature intended that the statute
    apply to any such conduct or only to such conduct
    when it expressly is prescribed as an element of the
    offense.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. George J.,
    
    supra,
     
    280 Conn. 573
    . The court answered that question
    by comparing General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a
    with other criminal statutes of limitations: ‘‘[General
    Statutes (Rev. to 1993) §] 54-193a is one of three criminal
    statutes of limitations. Notably, in both of the other
    statutes of limitations, the legislature specifically has
    provided the statutory provisions to which the limita-
    tions period applies; see General Statutes § 54-193b;8
    or has delineated the statutory provisions or classes of
    offenses that are excluded from the limitations period.
    See General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193. By con-
    trast, in § 54-193a, the legislature did not cite specific
    statutes to which the expanded limitations period
    applies; rather, it used a broad descriptive phrase, ‘any
    offense[s] involving . . . .’ General Statutes (Rev. to
    1993) § 54-193a, as amended by P.A. 93-340, § 11. It
    is difficult to imagine how the legislature could have
    phrased the statute more expansively and yet still lim-
    ited its reach to sexual acts against children.’’ (Footnote
    in original; footnote omitted.) State v. George J., 
    supra,
    573–74. The court concluded that its interpretation was
    consistent with OLR’s analysis of the public act, which
    was codified at § 54-193a. Id., 575.
    As noted previously in this opinion, the court also
    discussed the legislative policy underlying General Stat-
    utes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a and concluded that
    applying the extended statute of limitations to a sexual
    assault offense but not to a risk of injury offense based
    on the same conduct would thwart the policy behind
    the statute, create disharmony, and produce odd or
    illogical outcomes. Id., 574–75. It is this policy statement
    on which the defendant relies to argue that it would
    create similar disharmony to apply the reporting
    requirement in § 54-193a to violations of § 53a-71 (a)
    (1) but not to risk of injury violations based on the
    same conduct.
    The problem with the defendant’s argument is that
    it ignores the plain and unambiguous language of the
    statute. The legislature specifically identified § 53a-71
    (a) (1) as the sole statute to which the additional
    reporting requirement applies. General Statutes (Rev.
    to 2001) § 54-193a, as amended by P.A. 02-138. Given the
    plain and unambiguous statutory language, we cannot
    expand § 54-193a’s limited exception for a prosecution
    of sexual assault in the second degree under § 53a-71
    (a) (1) and apply it to a risk of injury charge under § 53-
    21 (a) (2). Indeed, to do so ‘‘would contravene the
    doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the
    expression of one thing is the exclusion of another—
    [under which] we presume that when the legislature
    expresses items as part of a group or series, an item
    that was not included was deliberately excluded. . . .
    Put differently, it is well settled that [w]e are not permit-
    ted to supply statutory language that the legislature
    may have chosen to omit.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Mayer v. Historic District
    Commission, 
    325 Conn. 765
    , 776, 
    160 A.3d 333
     (2017).
    Furthermore, our conclusion is consistent with the
    reasoning in George J., in which our Supreme Court
    expressly relied on the fact that the legislature did not
    limit the expanded statute of limitations in General
    Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a to specific criminal
    statutes. State v. George J., 
    supra,
     
    280 Conn. 573
    –74. It
    further noted that this was in stark contrast to other
    statutes of limitations that either were limited to spe-
    cific statutes or excluded specific statutes from their
    operation. Id., 573. Relevant to the present case, the
    legislature did not provide that the additional reporting
    requirement applied to any offense involving sexual
    intercourse with another person between the ages of
    thirteen and sixteen when the defendant is more than
    three years older than such person. Instead, the legisla-
    ture specifically limited the application of the reporting
    requirement to only ‘‘a violation of subdivision (1) of
    subsection (a) of section 53a-71 . . . .’’ General Stat-
    utes (Rev. to 2001) § 54-193a, as amended by P.A. 02-
    138. Consistent with our Supreme Court’s conclusion
    in George J., we conclude that, had the legislature
    intended a different application of the statute, it readily
    could have so provided. See State v. George J., 
    supra, 574
    .
    Finally, we are not persuaded that applying a different
    statute of limitations to the two sets of charges in the
    present case leads to an absurd or unworkable result.
    As this court has recognized, ‘‘[t]wo criminal statutes
    can be construed to proscribe the same conduct and a
    defendant can be prosecuted under either.’’ Evans v.
    Commissioner of Correction, 
    47 Conn. App. 773
    , 780–
    81, 
    709 A.2d 1136
    , cert. denied, 
    244 Conn. 921
    , 
    714 A.2d 5
     (1998). Although the defendant suggests that the legis-
    lature intended for the reporting requirement to apply
    to the conduct giving rise to a prosecution of sexual
    assault in the second degree, as noted previously in this
    opinion, such an intent is not reflected in the statutory
    language.
    As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[o]ur statute
    of limitations distinguishes between offenses according
    to their severity, and there is nothing inconsistent in
    the fact that some prosecutions are barred where others
    are not. We further believe that confidence in our judi-
    cial system would be severely eroded if serious charges
    were dismissed by the courts for reasons of judicial
    policy, when the legislature, through the statute of limi-
    tations, has manifested an intent that they be prose-
    cuted.’’ State v. Ellis, 
    197 Conn. 436
    , 476, 
    497 A.2d 974
    (1985). In the present case, we are persuaded that the
    legislature, by establishing an extended statute of limi-
    tations for ‘‘any offense . . . involving sexual abuse,
    sexual exploitation or sexual assault of a minor,’’ has
    manifested an intent that charges of risk of injury to a
    child should be prosecuted, so long as the prosecution
    occurs within the extended statute of limitations.
    (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 54-
    193a, as amended by P.A. 02-138; see also State v. George
    J., 
    supra,
     
    280 Conn. 574
     (‘‘[i]t is difficult to imagine how
    the legislature could have phrased [General Statutes
    (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a] more expansively and yet still
    limited its reach to sexual acts against children’’). The
    fact that the legislature identified a single statutory
    exception to that extended statute of limitations for a
    prosecution of sexual assault in the second degree does
    not indicate a contrary intent.
    In sum, the legislature carved out a single exception
    to the extended statute of limitations under § 54-193a
    for the prosecution of a violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1).
    Had the legislature intended for the same exception to
    apply to § 53-21 (a) (2), it would have stated so
    expressly. Consequently, we conclude that § 54-193a is
    unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
    results. Therefore, the court properly denied the defen-
    dant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the risk
    of injury charges.9
    II
    The defendant next claims that the court, in its mid-
    trial and final instructions to the jury, improperly failed
    to provide the jury with a standard of proof to apply
    in determining whether the defendant had committed
    acts of uncharged misconduct. In response, the state
    argues that the defendant’s challenge to the court’s
    instruction as to the evidence of uncharged misconduct
    with E is unpreserved and unreviewable and that the
    court properly instructed the jury regarding the evi-
    dence of uncharged sexual misconduct with another
    student, R. We conclude that the defendant’s claim is
    preserved and that the court properly instructed the
    jury.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are relevant to the defendant’s claim. Before trial, the
    state filed a motion to introduce uncharged misconduct
    evidence pursuant to § 4-5 of the Connecticut Code
    of Evidence.10 The state sought to introduce evidence
    regarding a sexual relationship between the defendant
    and R, a former student who attended the yeshiva in
    2008, and the defendant’s sexual relationship with E
    after E’s sixteenth birthday. Following oral argument,
    the court granted the state’s motion, determining that
    the defendant’s uncharged sexual misconduct with R
    was admissible to establish the defendant’s propensity
    to commit the type of sexual misconduct with which
    he was charged under § 4-5 (b) of the Connecticut Code
    of Evidence and that the continuation of the defendant’s
    sexual relationship with E was admissible to show the
    defendant’s common plan or scheme to have continu-
    ous sexual relations with E under § 4-5 (c).11
    At trial, the state presented testimony from E regard-
    ing incidents that occurred after his sixteenth birthday.
    Before the state elicited that testimony, the court pro-
    vided a limiting instruction to the jury.12 The state also
    presented testimony from R regarding incidents of
    uncharged sexual misconduct. R testified that, in 2008,
    when he was thirteen or fourteen years old, the defen-
    dant had tutored him at the yeshiva. R recounted that
    the defendant frequently would touch R’s crotch to get
    R’s attention and that, when R attempted to position
    himself in such a way to avoid that contact, the defen-
    dant would touch R’s ‘‘butt’’ instead. R also testified
    regarding one particular incident where, after he told
    the defendant that he received a good grade, the defen-
    dant drove him to a local park to celebrate. When they
    arrived at the park, they sat on a bench, and the defen-
    dant pulled out a bottle of wine, two plastic cups, and
    a can of nuts. After drinking some of the wine, R began
    to feel dizzy and decided to eat some of the nuts. R
    testified that, while he was eating the nuts, the defen-
    dant was ‘‘trying to, like, French kiss me and I was
    trying to keep my mouth shut.’’ When R became upset,
    the defendant ‘‘got all embarrassed and said, like, ‘oh,
    I’m out of line, it must be the alcohol.’ ’’ The defendant
    then brought R back to the school.
    Following R’s testimony, the court provided the fol-
    lowing limiting instruction to the jury: ‘‘The state is
    claiming that the defendant engaged in other sexual
    . . . misconduct with someone other than [E], particu-
    larly with . . . [R]. The defendant has not been charged
    with any offense related to this alleged conduct. In a
    criminal case such as this in which the defendant is
    charged with a crime involving sexual misconduct, evi-
    dence of the defendant’s commission of other sexual
    misconduct is admissible and may be considered to
    prove that the defendant had the propensity or tendency
    to engage in the type of criminal sexual behavior with
    which he is charged. However, evidence of prior mis-
    conduct on its own is not sufficient to prove that the
    defendant is guilty of the crimes charged in the informa-
    tion. It is for you to determine whether the defendant
    committed any uncharged sexual misconduct and, if
    so, the extent, if any, to which that evidence establishes
    that the defendant had the . . . propensity or tendency
    to engage in criminal sexual behavior. Please bear in
    mind as you consider this evidence that at all times
    the state has the burden of proving that the defendant
    committed each of the elements of the offenses which
    he is charged in the information, and I remind you that
    the defendant is not on trial for any act, conduct or
    offense not charged in the information.’’
    Before the charge conference, the defendant filed a
    written request to charge regarding uncharged sexual
    misconduct, which provided in relevant part: ‘‘It is for
    you to determine whether the state has proven by clear
    and convincing evidence whether the defendant com-
    mitted the alleged uncharged sexual misconduct. If you
    find that the state has met that standard, then you may
    determine the extent, if any, to which that evidence
    establishes that the defendant had a propensity or ten-
    dency to engage in criminal sexual behavior. Bear in
    mind as you consider this evidence that, at all times,
    the state has the burden of proving that the defendant
    committed each of the elements of the offense charged
    in the information. As to any evidence of uncharged
    misconduct, the state’s burden is to prove that conduct
    by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
    At the charge conference, the following exchange
    occurred between the court and defense counsel:
    ‘‘The Court: . . . [Y]ou’re asking me to tell the jury
    that any uncharged sexual misconduct has to be proven
    by clear and convincing evidence.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Correct.
    ‘‘The Court: Do you have any authority for that?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: It’s cited, Your Honor. It’s out-
    of-state authority. . . .
    ‘‘The Court: And this says ‘but see [State v. Cutler,
    
    293 Conn. 303
    , 
    977 A.2d 209
     (2009), overruled in part
    on other grounds by State v. Elson, 
    311 Conn. 726
    , 
    91 A.3d 862
     (2014)],’ is that contrary authority?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Absolutely. Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Okay. So you’re asking me to overrule
    the Connecticut Supreme Court. . . . Your request is
    duly filed. That’s not the law in the state of Connecticut
    and it’s not—
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: A journey of a million miles, Your
    Honor, begins with but a single step.
    ‘‘The Court: No, I—I understand you may be pre—
    preserving for appellate review; I have no quarrel
    with that.’’
    Shortly thereafter, while discussing the portion of the
    court’s draft charge regarding evidence of the continu-
    ing sexual relationship between E and the defendant,
    which was titled ‘‘Evidence of Other Misconduct,’’
    defense counsel requested that the court instruct the
    jury that ‘‘[i]t is for you to determine, one, whether the
    state has proven such acts occurred . . . [and] [t]wo,
    if proven, whether they established what the state seeks
    to establish . . . .’’ Defense counsel explained that
    ‘‘[t]he way this is drafted it assumes that it has been
    proven; it doesn’t really leave to the jury to determine.
    It essentially says, look, I, the judge, have admitted
    those, here’s how you’re supposed to use this, okay.’’
    When the prosecutor asked defense counsel to repeat
    himself, the court explained that ‘‘[h]e wants to empha-
    size that the state has to prove that these acts occurred.’’
    An exchange between the court and defense counsel
    followed:
    ‘‘The Court: How . . . is it not clear when it says it is
    for you to determine; one, whether such acts occurred?
    How . . . does that assume that they’ve been proven?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Because it’s—it’s the burden of
    the state to—to prove it. . . . Okay, they have to prove
    it. . . . What I asked for earlier was a standard by
    which they can determine whether it was proven, that’s
    a—a flaw in our scheme for these—for addressing these
    types of cases. The court, having rejected my request
    and anticipating—
    ‘‘The Court: No, it’s not a flaw, it’s that you want a
    higher standard than the law requires. It’s not that there
    isn’t a standard, the standard is preponderance of the
    evidence, you gotta prove these facts by the preponder-
    ance of the evidence this—this uncharged misconduct
    or other misconduct; you have to prove the elements
    of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And you have to—my position
    is that the state has to prove these by some standard,
    okay, and—and the way this is phrased without putting
    it that way essentially there’s an imprimatur from the
    court that these things are valid and have been proven.
    ‘‘The Court: Yeah, I don’t read it that way . . . .’’
    The court denied the defendant’s requests and subse-
    quently instructed the jury regarding the uncharged mis-
    conduct evidence as follows: ‘‘The state has submitted
    evidence that the defendant engaged in sexual miscon-
    duct with [R]. The defendant has not been charged
    in this case with any offenses related to this alleged
    conduct. In a criminal case such as this in which the
    defendant is charged with a crime involving sex—sex-
    ual misconduct, evidence of the defendant’s commis-
    sion of other sexual misconduct is admissible and may
    be considered to prove that the defendant had the pro-
    pensity or a tendency to engage in the type of criminal
    sexual behavior with which he is charged. However,
    evidence of prior misconduct on its own is not sufficient
    to prove the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in
    the information. It is for you to determine whether the
    defendant committed any uncharged sexual miscon-
    duct and, if so, the extent, if any, to which that evidence
    establishes that the defendant had the propensity or a
    tendency to engage in criminal sexual behavior. Bear
    in mind as you consider this evidence that, at all times,
    the state has the burden of proving that the defendant
    committed each of the elements of the offenses charged
    in the information. I remind you that the defendant is
    not on trial for any act, conduct or offense not charged
    in the information.
    ‘‘The state has also presented that the defendant con-
    tinued to have sexual relations with [E] after [E]
    reached the age of sixteen . . . . This evidence has
    not been admitted to prove the bad character of the
    defendant or the defendant’s tendency to commit crimi-
    nal acts and it cannot be used by you for such purposes.
    Such evidence has been admitted for a limited purpose
    only. This evidence was admitted to show or explain
    the full extent of the sexual relationship be—between
    the defendant and [E] and to show a common plan or
    scheme by the defendant to have continuous sexual
    relations with [E]. The evidence may be used by you
    only for those purposes. It is for you to determine, one,
    whether such acts occurred and, two, if they occurred,
    whether they establish what the state seeks to estab-
    lish.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    A
    We first address whether the defendant preserved
    his claim of instructional error regarding the evidence
    of uncharged misconduct with E. The state claims that,
    in his written request to charge, ‘‘the defendant only
    asked the court to instruct that the state had to prove
    by clear and convincing evidence ‘alleged uncharged
    sexual misconduct’ admitted to prove ‘that the defen-
    dant had a propensity or tendency to engage in criminal
    sexual behavior.’ ’’ Significantly, however, the second
    to last sentence of the request to charge provided: ‘‘As
    to any evidence of uncharged misconduct, the state’s
    burden is to prove that conduct by clear and convincing
    evidence.’’ (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the court
    understood the scope of the defendant’s request to
    charge because the court explained: ‘‘It’s not that there
    isn’t a standard, the standard is preponderance of the
    evidence, you gotta prove these facts by the preponder-
    ance of the evidence this—this uncharged misconduct
    or other misconduct . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Conse-
    quently, we conclude that the defendant adequately pre-
    served his challenge to the court’s instructions as to
    the uncharged misconduct evidence involving E. See
    State v. Ramon A. G., 
    336 Conn. 386
    , 395, 
    246 A.3d 481
    (2020) (‘‘[b]ecause the sine qua non of preservation is
    fair notice . . . the determination of whether a claim
    has been properly preserved will depend on a careful
    review of the record to ascertain whether the claim on
    appeal was articulated below with sufficient clarity to
    place the trial court on reasonable notice of that very
    same claim’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    B
    Having determined that the defendant preserved his
    claim that the court improperly failed to provide the
    jury with a standard by which to determine whether
    the acts of uncharged misconduct occurred, we now
    consider its merits.
    We begin our analysis with the standard of review.
    ‘‘When reviewing the challenged jury instruction . . .
    we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge
    to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as
    a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by
    its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a
    court’s charge is not whether it is as accurate upon
    legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort
    but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in
    such a way that injustice is not done to either party
    under the established rules of law. . . . As long as [the
    instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues
    and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will
    not view the instructions as improper.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. Arroyo, 
    292 Conn. 558
    ,
    566, 
    973 A.2d 1254
     (2009), cert. denied, 
    559 U.S. 911
    ,
    
    130 S. Ct. 1296
    , 
    175 L. Ed. 2d 1086
     (2010).
    In State v. Cutler, 
    supra,
     
    293 Conn. 303
    , our Supreme
    Court addressed a claim similar to the defendant’s claim
    in the present case. In Cutler, the defendant claimed
    that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury
    to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard in
    considering uncharged misconduct evidence. 
    Id., 315
    .
    The challenged instructions provided: ‘‘You may con-
    sider such evidence if you believe it, and further find
    that it logically and rationally supports the issue for
    which it is being offered by the state, but only as it may
    bear on the issue of intent. On the other hand, if you
    don’t believe such evidence, or even if you do, if you
    find that it does not logically and rationally support the
    issue for which [it] is being offered by the state, namely
    the defendant’s intent, then you may not consider the
    testimony for any purpose.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) 
    Id., 316
    .
    Our Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant and
    concluded ‘‘that it is not necessary that a trial court
    instruct the jury that it must find, by a preponderance
    of the evidence, that prior acts of misconduct actually
    occurred at the hands of the defendant. Instead, a jury
    may consider prior misconduct evidence for the proper
    purpose for which it is admitted if there is evidence
    from which the jury reasonably could conclude that the
    defendant actually committed the misconduct.’’ (Foot-
    note omitted.) 
    Id., 322
    . The court explained that the
    trial court’s ‘‘use of the word ‘believe’ comports with the
    requirement that a jury may consider prior misconduct
    evidence if there is evidence from which it reasonably
    could conclude that the defendant committed the acts.
    . . . [I]t is clear that the trial court’s use of the word
    ‘believe’ is not only correct in law, but also sufficiently
    guides the jury as to its consideration of the prior mis-
    conduct evidence. If the jury believes the prior miscon-
    duct evidence, it follows logically that there is evidence
    from which the jury reasonably could conclude that the
    defendant committed the prior acts of misconduct.’’ 
    Id.,
    322–23.13
    In the present case, the defendant notes that the
    ‘‘believe’’ instruction endorsed in Cutler is used in the
    Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions14 and by Con-
    necticut judges when instructing on uncharged miscon-
    duct. He argues that, in the present case, he ‘‘did not
    even get the benefit of the (lower than a preponderance)
    ‘believe’ standard, which has its own deficiencies.
    Instead, the jury was allowed to make its decisions
    (on whether the defendant committed any misconduct)
    unfettered by any uniform standard. . . . The court’s
    instructional omission was patently erroneous.’’
    (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) We disagree.
    Here, the court instructed that it was for the jury
    ‘‘to determine’’ whether the defendant engaged in the
    uncharged misconduct. We discern no meaningful dis-
    tinction between the ‘‘believe’’ standard endorsed in
    Cutler and the court’s use of the word ‘‘determine’’ in
    the present case. For that reason, we are not persuaded
    that the court’s instructions were deficient. If anything,
    ‘‘determine’’ is a stronger standard than ‘‘believe.’’ When
    used as a transitive verb, ‘‘believe’’ means ‘‘to consider
    to be true or honest’’ or ‘‘to accept the word or evidence
    of’’ or ‘‘to hold as an opinion . . . .’’ Merriam-Webster’s
    Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 112. In the same
    context, ‘‘determine’’ means ‘‘to settle or decide by
    choice of alternatives or possibilities’’ or ‘‘to find out
    or come to a decision about by investigation, reasoning,
    or calculation . . . .’’ Id., p. 340. Thus, ‘‘believe’’ con-
    notes, at least to some extent, subjective and emotional
    reasoning, whereas ‘‘determine’’ connotes more objec-
    tive and logical reasoning. Accordingly, we find no error
    in the court’s instructions to the jury that it must deter-
    mine that something occurred rather than believe that it
    occurred. Consequently, we conclude that our Supreme
    Court’s decision in Cutler controls and, therefore, that
    the court properly instructed the jury regarding the
    uncharged misconduct evidence.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The legislature repealed § 54-193a effective October 1, 2019. Unless other-
    wise indicated, all references to § 54-193a in this opinion are to the 2001
    revision of the statute, as amended by P.A. 02-138.
    2
    In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
    victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the
    victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained.
    See General Statutes § 54-86e.
    3
    General Statutes § 53a-71 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
    guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in
    sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen
    years of age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more
    than three years older than such other person . . . .
    ‘‘(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the
    victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and
    any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of
    imprisonment of which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be
    suspended or reduced by the court.’’
    Although § 53a-71 has been the subject of several amendments since the
    defendant’s commission of the crime that formed the basis of his conviction;
    see, e.g., Public Acts 2004, No. 04-130, § 1 (establishing additional form of
    sexual assault when actor is twenty years old or older and stands in position
    of power, authority or supervision); Public Acts 2007, No. 07-143, § 1 (increas-
    ing, from two to three years, age difference between teenagers required for
    older individual to be guilty of sexual assault in second degree); those
    amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. Accordingly, in
    the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
    4
    General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who
    . . . (2) has contact with the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65,
    of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen
    years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual
    and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child
    (2) of this subsection . . . .’’
    Although § 53-21 has been the subject of several amendments since the
    defendant’s commission of the crimes that formed the basis of his conviction;
    see, e.g., 2007 Public Acts, No. 07-143, § 4 (establishing five year mandatory
    minimum sentence for violation of § 53-21 (a) (2) when victim is under
    thirteen years old); 2013 Public Acts, No. 13-297, § 1 (adding additional form
    of risk of injury); those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this
    appeal. Accordingly, in the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current
    revision of the statute.
    5
    Counts one, three, five, and seven alleged that the defendant violated
    § 53a-71 (a) (1) by engaging in the following conduct: ‘‘anal intercourse—
    Daniel Greer’s penis with [E’s] anus’’ (count one); ‘‘fellatio—Daniel Greer’s
    penis in [E’s] mouth’’ (count three); ‘‘anal intercourse—[E’s] penis in Daniel
    Greer’s anus’’ (count five); and ‘‘fellatio—[E’s] penis in Daniel Greer’s mouth’’
    (count seven). Counts two, four, six, and eight alleged that the defendant
    violated § 53-21 (a) (2) based on the following contact between the defendant
    and E: ‘‘Daniel Greer’s genital area with [E’s] anus’’ (count two); ‘‘Daniel
    Greer’s genital area with [E’s] mouth’’ (count four); ‘‘[E’s] genital area with
    Daniel Greer’s anus’’ (count six); and ‘‘[E’s] penis in Daniel Greer’s mouth’’
    (count eight).
    6
    Although the defendant’s memorandum stated that it was filed in support
    of both his motion for a new trial and his motion for a judgment of acquittal,
    it addressed only the defendant’s claim that the risk of injury charges should
    be dismissed for the same reason that the sexual assault charges were
    dismissed. Thus, on the basis of the statute of limitations issue raised, the
    defendant sought a judgment of acquittal and not a new trial.
    7
    The state also contends that the defendant waived this claim by failing
    to raise it at trial. We disagree.
    In State v. Golodner, 
    305 Conn. 330
    , 355–56, 
    46 A.3d 71
     (2012), the defen-
    dant filed postverdict motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial,
    asserting that one count of the substituted information was barred by the
    applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, ‘‘stating
    that the defendant had failed to raise the statute of limitations defense in
    a timely manner . . . .’’ Id., 356. On appeal, the state argued ‘‘that the
    defendant waived an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations
    by raising it for the first time after the conclusion of trial.’’ Id. In rejecting
    the state’s waiver argument, our Supreme Court noted that a waiver of a
    statute of limitations defense must be voluntary and intelligent and held
    that ‘‘[t]here [was] nothing to suggest a voluntary waiver on the part of the
    defendant . . . . His motion for acquittal based on the statute of limitations
    would suggest the contrary.’’ Id., 359.
    In the present case, as in Golodner, the defendant raised the statute
    of limitations defense in postverdict motions and, therefore, he did not
    voluntarily waive it. Although the state argues that Golodner is distinguish-
    able because it involved an amendment to the information and, therefore,
    the statute of limitations defense was unavailable before trial; see id., 355–56;
    we are not persuaded that this fact had any bearing on the court’s holding
    in Golodner. In fact, the court agreed with the defendant’s argument in
    Golodner that Practice Book § 41-8’s ‘‘use of the phrase ‘if made prior to
    trial’ suggests that the motion does not have to be made before trial.’’ (Empha-
    sis added.) Id., 356; see also Practice Book § 41-8 (statute of limitations
    defense ‘‘shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the
    information’’).
    The state also contends that the present case should be controlled by
    State v. Pugh, 
    176 Conn. App. 518
    , 535, 
    170 A.3d 710
    , cert. denied, 
    327 Conn. 985
    , 
    175 A.3d 43
     (2017), in which this court held that, because the defendant
    failed to assert the statute of limitations defense at trial, ‘‘the defendant is
    deemed to have waived such defense and is, therefore, barred from raising
    it on appeal.’’ Unlike the present case, however, the defendant in Pugh failed
    to raise the statute of limitations claim before the trial court and sought to
    raise it for the first time on appeal. See 
    id.
     Therefore, the claim in Pugh
    was unpreserved. Accordingly, we conclude that Pugh is distinguishable
    and that Golodner is controlling.
    8
    ‘‘General Statutes [Rev. to 2005] § 54-193b provides: ‘Notwithstanding
    the provisions of sections 54-193 and 54-193a, a person may be prosecuted
    for a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-
    72b not later than twenty years from the date of the commission of the
    offense, provided (1) the victim notified any police officer or state’s attorney
    acting in such police officer’s or state’s attorney’s official capacity of the
    commission of the offense not later than five years after the commission
    of the offense, and (2) the identity of the person who allegedly committed
    the offense has been established through a DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
    profile comparison using evidence collected at the time of the commission
    of the offense.’ Although § 54-193b was enacted in 2000; see Public Acts
    2000, No. 00-80, § 1; we nonetheless find it useful in discerning the type of
    language that the legislature could have used in 1995 had it intended that
    § 54-193a have a more limited, specific reach.’’ State v. George J., 
    supra,
    280 Conn. 573
     n.16.
    9
    The defendant also claims that, ‘‘[i]f this court has any reasonable doubt
    about the proper scope of § 54-193a, relief should be granted as a matter
    of lenity.’’ ‘‘[T]he touchstone of this rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.
    . . . [W]e . . . [reserve] lenity for those situations in which a reasonable
    doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the
    language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the
    statute.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Palmenta, 
    168 Conn. App. 37
    , 47, 
    144 A.3d 503
    , cert. dismissed, 
    323 Conn. 930
    , 
    150 A.3d 230
     (2016), and cert. denied, 
    323 Conn. 931
    , 
    150 A.3d 231
    (2016). Here, because we conclude that the statute is not ambiguous and
    that it does not lead to absurd or unworkable results, we have no reason
    to resort to the rule of lenity. See 
    id.
     (‘‘[b]ecause we conclude that, after
    full resort to the process of statutory construction, there is no reasonable
    doubt as to the meaning of the statute, we need not resort to the rule of
    lenity’’); see also General Statutes § 1-2z (when meaning of text of statute
    ‘‘is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
    extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered’’).
    10
    Section 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant
    part: ‘‘(a) General Rule. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person
    is inadmissible to prove the bad character, propensity, or criminal tendencies
    of that person except as provided in subsection (b).
    ‘‘(b) When evidence of other sexual misconduct is admissible to prove
    propensity. Evidence of other sexual misconduct is admissible in a criminal
    case to establish that the defendant had a tendency or a propensity to engage
    in aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct if: (1) the case involves
    aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct; (2) the trial court finds that
    the evidence is relevant to a charged offense in that the other sexual miscon-
    duct is not too remote in time, was allegedly committed upon a person
    similar to the alleged victim, and was otherwise similar in nature and circum-
    stances to the aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct at issue in the
    case; and (3) the trial court finds that the probative value of the evidence
    outweighs its prejudicial effect.
    ‘‘(c) When evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible. Evidence
    of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other
    than those specified in subsection (a), such as to prove intent, identity,
    malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident,
    knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an element of the crime, or to
    corroborate crucial prosecution testimony. . . .’’
    11
    The court explained that, ‘‘[t]o the extent that the subsequent sexual
    activity between the defendant and [E] is not viewed as misconduct, the
    issue becomes one of relevancy. . . . Evidence that the defendant and [E]
    had a sexual relationship after the alleged sexual misconduct in this case
    is probative of the full nature of their relationship and the prior sexual
    misconduct as well as the reason why [E] did not immediately report the
    sexual misconduct to the police.’’
    12
    The court stated: ‘‘You’re now going to be hearing evidence where . . .
    the witness is going to claim that he had sexual relations with the defendant
    after he turned sixteen. . . . [The defendant is] not charged with any crimes
    related to that, but you will be hearing about that.
    ‘‘It’s not being offered to show the bad character of the defendant, it’s
    not being offered to show his propensity to commit crimes. It’s being offered
    to show—it’s being offered for a limited purpose; one, to show the complete
    nature of relationship between this witness and the defendant, and the
    state’s also offering it to show that the defendant had in his mind a common
    plan to continue to have sexual relations and to have sexual relationships
    with [E]. I’ll give you further instructions on this when I give you my final
    instructions on the law that applies to this case.’’
    13
    In State v. Ortiz, 
    343 Conn. 566
    , 601–602,         A.3d     (2022), which
    was decided after the present appeal had been argued, our Supreme Court
    reaffirmed its holding in Cutler. The court explained that, in Cutler, it had
    expressly rejected a claim that the trial court was required to instruct the
    jury that it must find prior misconduct evidence to be proven by a heightened
    standard and emphasized that ‘‘it saw no reason to impose on trial courts
    a jury instruction that requires jurors to consider the properly admissible
    prior misconduct evidence at a higher standard.’’ (Emphasis in original;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
     602 n.13.
    14
    With respect to evidence of uncharged misconduct, the model jury
    instructions provide in relevant part: ‘‘You may consider such evidence if
    you believe it and further find that it logically, rationally and conclusively
    supports the issue[s] for which it is being offered by the state, but only as
    it may bear on the issue[s] [for which it was admitted]. . . .’’ Connecticut
    Criminal Jury Instructions 2.6-5, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Crimi-
    nal/Criminal.pdf (last visited July 11, 2022).