Randolph v. Mambrino ( 2022 )


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    GORDON RANDOLPH v. DONNA MAMBRINO ET AL.
    (AC 42742)
    Alvord, Elgo and Palmer, Js.
    Syllabus
    Pursuant to statute (§ 52-595), if a person fraudulently conceals the existence
    of a cause of action, that cause of action shall be deemed to accrue
    against such person when the person entitled to bring an action thereon
    first discovers its existence.
    The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of various crimes
    in connection with his role in an armed robbery, filed a petition for a
    new trial, claiming that he was entitled to a new trial because several
    newly discovered letters written by an individual named ‘‘Iris S.’’ con-
    tained evidence establishing his innocence and that the respondents,
    a senior assistant state’s attorney and the state of Connecticut, had
    possession of the letters and knowledge of their contents at the time
    of his guilty plea but purposefully failed to disclose them to him. The
    respondents asserted as a special defense that the petition was time
    barred because it was not filed within the applicable three year statute
    of limitations (§ 52-582). The petitioner filed an amended petition for a
    new trial claiming, inter alia, that the limitation period was tolled by
    § 52-595 as a result of the respondents’ fraudulent concealment of the
    letters. Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion for summary judg-
    ment, arguing that there was no dispute between the parties that the
    petition was untimely under § 52-582 and that the petitioner’s tolling
    claim failed as a matter of law because he had not adduced facts suffi-
    cient to permit a finding of fraudulent concealment. The trial court
    granted the motion and rendered summary judgment in favor of the
    respondents. In reaching its decision, the court, relying on Turner v.
    State (
    172 Conn. App. 352
    ), and Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp. (
    207 Conn. 204
    ), concluded that the limitation period set forth in § 52-582 is jurisdic-
    tional in nature and, therefore, not subject to the tolling provision of
    § 52-595. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification,
    appealed to this court. Held:
    1. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the tolling provision of § 52-595
    applies to the three year limitation period of § 52-582, and, therefore,
    that limitation period may be tolled by proof of fraudulent concealment:
    this court concluded that the trial court’s reliance on Turner and Fichera
    was misplaced, as the principal issue in this case, namely, whether the
    legislature intended that the limitation period of § 52-582 may be tolled
    by proof of fraudulent concealment pursuant to the tolling provision of
    § 52-595, was not addressed in Turner, and our Supreme Court’s decision
    in Fichera had no bearing on that issue; moreover, given the plain and
    encompassing language of § 52-595, it must be deemed to apply to any
    limitation period that does not expressly disclaim its applicability, and,
    because § 52-582 contains no such disclaimer, its limitation period may
    be tolled upon a showing of fraudulent concealment pursuant to § 52-
    595; furthermore, this court could discern no policy consideration that
    would prompt the legislature to deny the petitioner the benefit of that
    tolling provision and to conclude otherwise would be to impute to the
    legislature an intent to countenance such fraudulent concealment, a
    bizarre and wholly inequitable result that should not be attributed to
    that body.
    2. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the alternative ground
    that the respondents were entitled to summary judgment because the
    petitioner failed to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there
    was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claim that the
    limitation period of § 52-582 was tolled by the respondents’ fraudulent
    concealment of the letters: the petitioner inadequately briefed the issue
    of the sufficiency of his showing of fraudulent concealment, as he relied
    entirely on a patently meritless, if not frivolous, legal argument, the
    substance of which was set forth in two sentences, and, although he
    had a second opportunity to address the issue in a reply brief, he failed
    to do so; moreover, it was apparent that the evidence proffered by
    the petitioner in opposition to the respondents’ motion for summary
    judgment, namely, the letters, was inadequate for that purpose, as the
    letters were not authenticated and, therefore, could not be relied on as
    probative evidence, the petitioner never identified the author of the
    letters with any particularity, there was nothing in the record to corrobo-
    rate the content of the letters, and there was no proof that the respon-
    dents received the letters or, if they did, that they concealed them from
    the petitioner for the purpose of preventing him from seeking a new trial.
    Argued February 9—officially released October 25, 2022
    Procedural History
    Amended petition for a new trial following the peti-
    tioner’s conviction of the crimes of robbery in the first
    degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree
    and kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm,
    brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
    Hartford, where the court, Hon. John F. Mulcahy, Jr.,
    judge trial referee, granted the respondents’ motion for
    summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
    from which the petitioner, on the granting of certifica-
    tion, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Gordon Randolph, self-represented, the appellant
    (petitioner).
    Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, former
    state’s attorney, and Debra A. Collins, senior assistant
    state’s attorney, for the appellees (respondents).
    Opinion
    PALMER, J. The self-represented petitioner, Gordon
    Randolph, appeals from the summary judgment ren-
    dered by the trial court in favor of the respondents,
    Donna Mambrino and the state of Connecticut, and its
    subsequent dismissal of his petition for a new trial.
    On appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court
    incorrectly concluded that General Statutes § 52-595,1
    which provides for the tolling of the statute of limita-
    tions applicable to a particular cause of action upon
    proof by the party bringing the action that the defendant
    fraudulently concealed the existence of the cause of
    action, does not toll the three year limitation period of
    General Statutes § 52-5822 applicable to petitions for a
    new trial brought under General Statutes § 52-270.3 We
    agree with the petitioner that the trial court incorrectly
    determined that § 52-595 does not apply to § 52-582.
    We also conclude, however, that the respondents are
    entitled to summary judgment because the petitioner,
    who alleges that the respondents intentionally con-
    cealed exculpatory evidence from him in violation of
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 87, 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L. Ed. 2d 215
     (1963), has failed to demonstrate that the
    facts, viewed most favorably to sustaining his claim
    under § 52-595, are sufficient to satisfy the stringent
    requirements of that tolling provision. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history regarding
    both the petitioner’s underlying conviction and the pres-
    ent action are relevant to this appeal. With respect to
    the petitioner’s conviction, the trial court explained:
    ‘‘On August 24, 2012, Hartford police responded to an
    armed robbery in progress at [a restaurant] on Brainard
    Road. Upon arrival, a vehicle was observed leaving the
    area, it was followed by the police across local streets,
    it proceeded on to the highway, and the vehicle crashed
    while exiting the interstate. The petitioner was the
    driver; a passenger in the vehicle subsequently impli-
    cated the petitioner in the armed robbery. Inculpatory
    items of evidence were found in the vehicle. The peti-
    tioner was arrested on August 24, 2012, and charged
    with robbery in the first degree, conspiracy [to commit
    robbery in the first degree], and kidnapping [in the]
    second degree with a firearm. [On July 11, 2013, the
    petitioner] pleaded guilty [pursuant to a plea agree-
    ment] to all counts . . . [following] an exhaustive can-
    vass [and a presentence investigation report] was
    ordered . . . .’’ He was sentenced on October 17, 2013,
    in accordance with that agreement to a total effective
    term of imprisonment of twenty-two years. The peti-
    tioner was represented, at all relevant times, by a public
    defender, R. Bruce Lorenzen. Mambrino, a senior assis-
    tant state’s attorney, was involved in the prosecution
    of the case for the state.
    The petitioner then filed a petition for a new trial
    dated October 7, 2016, alleging that several letters writ-
    ten by someone named ‘‘Iris S.’’ contained evidence
    establishing his innocence in his criminal case and that
    the respondents had possession of the letters and
    knowledge of their contents at the time of his guilty
    plea but purposefully failed to disclose them to him. In
    their amended answer to the petition, the respondents
    asserted that the petitioner had ‘‘failed to allege any-
    thing identifiable that could not have been discovered
    earlier by the exercise of due diligence, that would be
    material on a new trial, that is not merely cumulative
    nor is likely to produce a different result in a new trial,’’
    thereby failing to satisfy any of the requirements for a
    petition for a new trial enumerated by our Supreme
    Court in Asherman v. State, 
    202 Conn. 429
    , 434, 
    521 A.2d 578
     (1987). The respondents also alleged, by way
    of a special defense, that the petition was time barred
    because it was not filed within three years from the
    date of the petitioner’s sentencing as required under
    § 52-582.4 In an amended petition for a new trial, the
    petitioner maintained that § 52-582 was tolled by § 52-
    595 as a result of the respondents’ fraudulent conceal-
    ment of the ‘‘Iris S.’’ letters, which, he further claimed,
    violated his constitutional rights under Brady.
    The respondents subsequently filed a motion for sum-
    mary judgment, arguing that there was no dispute
    between the parties that the petitioner had not served
    the respondents within the time frame mandated by
    § 52-582. The respondents further argued that the peti-
    tioner’s tolling claim failed as a matter of law because
    he had not adduced facts sufficient to permit a finding
    of fraudulent concealment.
    At a hearing on the respondents’ motion, the court
    voiced concerns over whether the question of the
    court’s subject matter jurisdiction had been properly
    addressed. The court then noted that it had provided
    the parties with several cases to review on that point,
    including Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 
    207 Conn. 204
    ,
    
    541 A.2d 472
     (1988), and Turner v. State, 
    172 Conn. App. 352
    , 
    160 A.3d 398
     (2017). At the hearing, the respondents
    maintained that the court in Turner ‘‘was very explicit
    in . . . conclud[ing] that the [three year] limitation
    period set forth in [§] 52-582 . . . is jurisdictional in
    nature,’’ such that the trial court in the present case
    lacked jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s untimely
    petition for any reason after the expiration of that
    period. The petitioner countered that neither Fichera
    nor Turner mandated the conclusion that § 52-582 can-
    not be tolled by proof of fraudulent concealment under
    § 52-595.
    On September 27, 2018, the court granted the respon-
    dents’ motion for summary judgment. The court relied
    in large part on this court’s determination in Turner
    that § 52-582 is jurisdictional in nature and not subject
    to equitable tolling. See Turner v. State, 
    supra,
     
    172 Conn. App. 370
    . The court also noted that, although
    Turner did not rule on whether § 52-595 applies to § 52-
    582, it ‘‘provide[d] guidance’’ by citing to Fichera, in
    which our Supreme Court concluded, under the facts
    of that case, that § 52-595 was unavailable to the plaintiff
    as a matter of law to toll General Statutes § 42-110g (f),
    the three year statute of limitations for claims under
    the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
    General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.5 See Fichera v. Mine
    Hill Corp., 
    supra,
     
    207 Conn. 216
    –17. The court therefore
    concluded that the petitioner’s failure to bring his peti-
    tion within three years of his sentence operated as a
    jurisdictional bar to consideration of his petition for a
    new trial. The court thus dismissed the petition, and
    this appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
    history will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    On appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court
    incorrectly concluded that the three year limitation
    period of § 52-582 cannot be tolled by application of
    § 52-595. In response, the respondents contend that the
    trial court properly held that the limitation period of
    § 52-582 is jurisdictional in nature and therefore not
    subject to tolling under § 52-595.6 Specifically, the
    respondents, relying on the analyses in Turner and
    Fichera, argue that there is ‘‘a clear legislative intent
    not to have § 52-595 apply to toll the statute of limita-
    tions for a petition for a new trial.’’ We agree with the
    petitioner and, accordingly, conclude that the three year
    limitation period of § 52-582 may be tolled by a showing
    of fraudulent concealment pursuant to § 52-595.
    We begin by noting that ‘‘[t]his court’s standard of
    review for a motion for summary judgment is well estab-
    lished. Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary
    judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
    affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
    trial court must view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seek-
    ing summary judgment has the burden of showing the
    absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which,
    under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle
    him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party
    opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary
    foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
    issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather than
    issue-determination, is the key to the procedure. . . .
    [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when
    ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . [Its]
    function is not to decide issues of material fact, but
    rather to determine whether any such issues exist. . . .
    Our review of the decision to grant a motion for sum-
    mary judgment is plenary. . . . We therefore must
    decide whether the court’s conclusions were legally
    and logically correct and find support in the record.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contrac-
    tors, Inc. v. 50 Morgan Hospitality Group, LLC, 
    211 Conn. App. 724
    , 730–31, 
    273 A.3d 726
     (2022).
    ‘‘Summary judgment may be granted where the claim
    is barred by the statute of limitations.’’ Doty v. Mucci,
    
    238 Conn. 800
    , 806, 
    679 A.2d 945
     (1996). ‘‘Typically, in
    the context of a motion for summary judgment based
    on a statute of limitations special defense, a defendant
    . . . meets its initial burden of showing the absence of
    a genuine issue of material fact by demonstrating that
    the action had commenced outside of the statutory
    limitation period. . . . Then, if the plaintiff claims the
    benefit of a provision that operates to extend the limita-
    tion period, the burden . . . shifts to the plaintiff to
    establish a disputed issue of material fact in avoidance
    of the statute. . . . In these circumstances, it is incum-
    bent upon the party opposing summary judgment to
    establish a factual predicate from which it can be deter-
    mined, as a matter of law, that a genuine issue of mate-
    rial fact [as to the timeliness of the action] exists.’’
    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Doe v. West Hartford, 
    328 Conn. 172
    , 192, 
    177 A.3d 1128
     (2018).
    It is also necessary to set forth certain legal principles
    concerning §§ 52-270 and 52-595. A petition for a new
    trial brought in accordance with § 52-270 is governed
    by the standard set forth by our Supreme Court in
    Asherman v. State, 
    supra,
     
    202 Conn. 434
    , pursuant to
    which ‘‘a court is justified in granting [such] a petition
    . . . when it is satisfied that the evidence offered in
    support thereof: (1) is newly discovered such that it
    could not have been discovered previously despite the
    exercise of due diligence; (2) would be material to the
    issues on a new trial; (3) is not cumulative; and (4) is
    likely to produce a different result in the event of a
    new trial.’’ Shabazz v. State, 
    259 Conn. 811
    , 820–21, 
    792 A.2d 797
     (2002). In addition to these specific elements,
    our Supreme Court has observed that ‘‘a court’s deci-
    sion on the petition should be guided by the more gen-
    eral principle that a new trial will be warranted on
    the basis of newly discovered evidence only where an
    injustice was done . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Id., 821. Although a petition for a new trial
    ‘‘does not furnish a substitute for, or an alternative to, an
    ordinary appeal,’’ it is available to remedy an injustice
    when, in light of ‘‘newly discovered evidence . . . that
    . . . could not have been discovered and produced at
    the former trial by the exercise of proper diligence,’’
    considerations of ‘‘equity and good conscience’’
    demand that ‘‘relief against [the] judgment . . . be
    granted.’’ State v. Grimes, 
    154 Conn. 314
    , 325, 
    228 A.2d 141
     (1966); see also Rizzo v. Pack, 
    15 Conn. App. 312
    ,
    315–16, 
    544 A.2d 252
     (1988). ‘‘The salutary purpose of
    [a petition for a new trial] is that if a party has a meritori-
    ous defense and has been deprived of [a] reasonable
    opportunity to present it, he ought to be permitted to
    make it upon another trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Grimes, 
    supra, 325
    . This ‘‘opportunity
    for a new trial when new evidence comes to light pro-
    vides a [criminal] defendant [a] . . . critical proce-
    dural mechanism for remedying an injustice.’’ Seebeck
    v. State, 
    246 Conn. 514
    , 531, 
    717 A.2d 1161
     (1998); see
    also Holliday v. State, 
    111 Conn. App. 656
    , 662–63, 
    960 A.2d 1101
     (2008) (same), cert. denied, 
    291 Conn. 902
    ,
    
    967 A.2d 112
     (2009).
    With respect to the limitation period applicable to a
    petition for a new trial, our Supreme Court has
    explained: ‘‘[T]he scope of review of a trial court’s deci-
    sion to grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
    evidence is limited to whether the trial court abused
    its discretion. . . . A critical limitation on the exercise
    of the trial court’s discretion in passing upon such a
    petition for a new trial, however, is the statute of limita-
    tions [set forth in § 52-582]. . . .
    ‘‘The three year statute of limitations on a petition
    for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
    the product of the legislature’s balancing of the interests
    of the petitioner against the interests of the public and
    the state. The petitioner’s interest is in attempting to
    establish that he is probably not guilty and that, there-
    fore, the verdict in his criminal trial should be over-
    turned. The state’s interests are in preserving the finality
    of judgments, in not degrading the properly prominent
    place given to the original trial as the forum for deciding
    the question of guilt or innocence within the limits of
    human fallibility, and in the fact that in many cases an
    order for a new trial may in reality reward the accused
    with complete freedom from prosecution because of
    the debilitating effect of the passage of time on the
    state’s evidence. . . .
    ‘‘Indeed, one of the principal purposes of any statute
    of limitations is to enhance the reliability of fact-finding,
    based upon the common sense notions that the unrelia-
    bility of fact-finding increases with the passage of time
    . . . and that it is wise public policy to minimize that
    degree of unreliability by barring the fact-finding pro-
    cess after the applicable limitations period. . . .
    ‘‘Thus, for a petition for a new trial, within the three
    year limitations period, the petitioner’s interests trump
    those of the public and the state. Beyond that period,
    however, the interests of the public and the state trump
    those of the petitioner.’’ (Citations omitted.) Sum-
    merville v. Warden, 
    229 Conn. 397
    , 426–27, 
    641 A.2d 1356
     (1994).7
    With respect to fraudulent concealment under § 52-
    595, ‘‘[t]he question before us is whether the [petitioner]
    [has] adduced any credible evidence that [the respon-
    dents] fraudulently concealed the existence of the [peti-
    tioner’s] cause of action. To meet this burden, it was
    not sufficient for the [petitioner] to prove merely that
    it was more likely than not that the [respondents] had
    concealed the cause of action. Instead, the [petitioner]
    had to prove fraudulent concealment by the more exact-
    ing standard of clear, precise, and unequivocal evi-
    dence. . . . Under our case law, to prove fraudulent
    concealment, the [petitioner] [was] required to show:
    (1) [the respondents’] actual awareness, rather than
    imputed knowledge, of the facts necessary to establish
    the [petitioner’s] cause of action; (2) the [respondents’]
    intentional concealment of these facts from the [peti-
    tioner]; and (3) the [respondents’] concealment of the
    facts for the purpose of obtaining delay on the [petition-
    er’s] part in filing a complaint on [his] cause of action.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medical Device
    Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 
    207 Conn. App. 707
    , 745–46,
    
    264 A.3d 130
    , cert. denied, 
    340 Conn. 911
    , 
    264 A.3d 94
    (2021). ‘‘[Additionally], the [respondents’] actions must
    have been directed to the very point of obtaining the
    delay [in filing the action] of which [the respondents]
    afterward [seek] to take advantage by pleading the stat-
    ute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 746.
    The rationale underlying § 52-595 is readily apparent,
    namely, to prevent a party from engaging in fraud to
    conceal a cause of action until the statute of limitations
    applicable to that action has expired. As the United
    States Supreme Court explained in the seminal case of
    Bailey v. Glover, 
    88 U.S. 342
    , 
    22 L. Ed. 636
     (1874), the
    fraudulent concealment doctrine ‘‘is founded in a sound
    and philosophical view of the principles of statutes
    of limitation. They were enacted to prevent frauds; to
    prevent parties from asserting rights after the lapse of
    time had destroyed or impaired the evidence from
    which would show that such rights never existed, or
    had been satisfied, transferred, or extinguished, if they
    ever did exist. To hold that by concealing a fraud . . .
    until such time as the party committing the fraud could
    plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make
    the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means
    by which it is made successful and secure.’’ Id., 349. In
    general terms, then, the fraudulent concealment doc-
    trine, like other related doctrines, is based on the equita-
    ble principle that ‘‘no man may take advantage of his
    own wrong.’’ Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Termi-
    nal, 
    359 U.S. 231
    , 232, 
    79 S. Ct. 760
    , 
    3 L. Ed. 2d 770
    (1959); see also General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 
    18 N.Y.2d 125
    , 127, 
    219 N.E.2d 169
    , 
    272 N.Y.S.2d 337
     (1966)
    (‘‘[t]he principle that a wrongdoer should not be able
    to take refuge behind the shield of his own wrong is a
    truism’’).
    Of course, ascertaining the interrelationship between
    §§ 52-582 and 52-595 gives rise to a question of the
    intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Quarry Knoll II Corp.
    v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 
    256 Conn. 674
    ,
    731–32, 
    780 A.2d 1
     (2001) (interpretation of two interre-
    lated statutory provisions requires determination of leg-
    islative intent). More specifically, we must determine
    whether the legislature intended that the limitation
    period of the former is subject to the tolling provision
    of the latter.
    With these principles in mind, we turn to the trial
    court’s decision in the present case. In concluding that
    proof of fraudulent concealment under § 52-595 does
    not apply to the three year limitation period of § 52-
    582, the trial court relied largely on Turner v. State,
    supra, 
    172 Conn. App. 352
    , in which this court held that
    § 52-582 erects a subject matter jurisdictional bar to
    consideration of a petition for a new trial that has not
    been filed within that three year period. Id., 370. We
    further explained in Turner that, for purposes of an
    untimely petition, the jurisdictional nature of § 52-582
    deprives a trial court of the authority to entertain a claim
    of equitable tolling; id., 359–60; which we characterized
    therein ‘‘as a doctrine that includes notions of ‘waiver,
    consent, or estoppel, that is, as an equitable principle
    to excuse untimeliness.’ ’’ Id., 360 n.8, quoting Williams
    v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 
    67 Conn. App. 316
    , 320 n.9, 
    786 A.2d 1283
     (2001). As the
    court in Turner expressly recognized, however, it was
    not deciding whether proof of fraudulent concealment
    under § 52-595 would suffice to toll the limitation period
    of § 52-582, a question that we decided to ‘‘leave . . .
    for another day when the issue is squarely before us’’;
    Turner v. State, supra, 358 n.6; because the petitioner
    in that case had not alleged fraudulent concealment. Id.
    Although acknowledging that the court in Turner
    explicitly declined to address the issue of whether § 52-
    595 applies to § 52-582, the trial court concluded that
    the consideration that was deemed determinative in
    Turner with respect to equitable tolling, namely, the
    jurisdictional nature of § 52-582, is also the critical con-
    sideration with respect to the applicability of § 52-595
    to § 52-582. In support of its reasoning in this regard, the
    trial court noted that, in Turner, this court ‘‘provide[d]
    guidance’’ by citing to Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra,
    
    207 Conn. 216
    , which held that reaching the merits of
    a fraudulent concealment claim brought outside the
    statute of limitations, in the context of a CUTPA claim,
    ‘‘would defeat the legislative intention expressed in
    § 42-110g (f) to bar actions for CUTPA violations after
    the lapse of more than three years from their occur-
    rence.’’ The trial court viewed that statute, which the
    court in Fichera held could not be tolled by § 52-595,
    as jurisdictional and ‘‘textually comparable’’ to § 52-
    582, and ultimately determined that this court’s conclu-
    sion in Turner—that the three year limitation period
    of § 52-582 is jurisdictional in nature and, therefore,
    principles of equitable tolling do not operate to toll that
    provision—is equally applicable to the statutory tolling
    available for fraudulent concealment under § 52-595.
    We are not persuaded that Turner controls the out-
    come of this case. Although it is true that, in Turner,
    this court held that § 52-582 is subject matter jurisdic-
    tional, the court found that factor determinative only
    with respect to the applicability of equitable tolling,
    that is, tolling predicated on the equitable common-law
    authority of the court itself. See Turner v. State, supra,
    
    172 Conn. App. 360
    –61. In such cases, involving a legisla-
    tively created jurisdictional time limitation, the court
    does not have the power to permit the tolling of the
    limitation provision under its equitable or discretionary
    authority. See 
    id., 360
     (‘‘[o]ur Supreme Court [in Wil-
    liams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportuni-
    ties, 
    257 Conn. 258
    , 269, 
    777 A.2d 645
     (2001)] has made
    clear that a court lacks the authority to apply the doc-
    trine of equitable tolling or otherwise exercise discre-
    tionary authority to extend a limitations period if the
    applicable statute of limitations constitutes a limit on
    the court’s subject matter jurisdiction’’). That constraint
    on the court’s authority, however, is not at issue when,
    as here, the question presented is not whether the court
    itself has the power to authorize the tolling or extension
    of a statute of limitations, but, rather, whether a broadly
    applicable tolling provision promulgated by the legisla-
    ture operates to toll the limitation period. In other
    words, the fact that the three year limitation period of
    § 52-582 is jurisdictional in nature reflects an intent by
    the legislature that a court shall not have the power to
    allow for the tolling of that period in the exercise of
    its equitable authority. Although that three year period
    no doubt operates as an important limitation on the
    availability of a petition for a new trial, we must decide,
    as a matter of statutory interpretation, whether the leg-
    islature intended that the limitation period may be tolled
    by proof of fraudulent concealment under § 52-595, an
    issue not addressed in Turner.
    We also conclude that the trial court’s reliance on
    Fichera was misplaced. Fichera involved a claim of,
    inter alia, fraudulent concealment under § 52-595 in the
    context of an alleged CUTPA violation. Fichera v. Mine
    Hill Corp., supra, 
    207 Conn. 213
    . In rejecting the plain-
    tiff’s claim that § 52-595 tolled § 42-110g (f),8 the three
    year statute of limitations applicable to CUTPA claims,
    the court concluded only that the tolling claim was
    unavailable under the particular facts of that case
    because the deceptive or fraudulent practice alleged in
    support of that tolling claim was the very same conduct
    that comprised the alleged CUTPA violation. Id., 216–17.
    The court explained that, under such facts, ‘‘[w]e are
    convinced that . . . application [of § 52-595] here
    would defeat the legislative intention expressed in § 42-
    110g (f) to bar actions for CUTPA violations after the
    lapse of more than three years from their occurrence.
    Since CUTPA violations are defined in General Statutes
    § 42-110b to include ‘deceptive acts or practices in the
    conduct of any trade or commerce,’ it is evident that
    the legislature intended that the perpetrators of such
    fraudulent practices, as well as other CUTPA violators,
    should be permitted to avail themselves of the statute
    of limitations defense provided by § 42-110g (f). . . .
    We conclude, therefore, that those who violate CUTPA
    by committing ‘deceptive acts,’ as the trial court found
    the defendants to have done, were intended by the
    legislature to have the same protection that § 42-110g
    (f) affords to other CUTPA violators, such as those who
    engage in ‘unfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair
    . . . practices in the conduct of any trade or business.’
    General Statutes § 42-110b (a).’’ Fichera v. Mine Hill
    Corp., supra, 216–17. No such potential conflict exists
    between §§ 52-582 and 52-595. Moreover, although the
    trial court was guided by Fichera because, like § 52-
    582, § 42-110g (f) is jurisdictional, the court in Fichera
    never even referred to § 42-110g (f) as jurisdictional in
    nature, let alone did its analysis depend on any such
    characterization.9 Thus, Fichera has no bearing on
    whether proof of fraudulent concealment under § 52-
    595 tolls the limitation period of § 52-582.10
    Nevertheless, the respondents argue that, if the legis-
    lature had intended for § 52-582 to be tolled by fraudu-
    lent concealment, it could have said so in § 52-582.
    The respondents borrow this argument from Turner,
    in which the court reasoned that the legislature could
    have included express exceptions for equitable tolling
    in § 52-582 if it intended for such exceptions to apply
    to that three year limitation provision. See Turner v.
    State, supra, 
    172 Conn. App. 364
    –65. The flaw in the
    respondents’ argument is that the legislature already
    has enacted a tolling provision for fraudulent conceal-
    ment, § 52-595, which contains no limiting language and,
    therefore, by its plain terms is applicable generally to
    all statutes of limitations. Consequently, there would
    be no reason for the legislature to amend § 52-582 to
    include an exception for fraudulent concealment
    because there already is such a provision in the General
    Statutes. Thus, no inference that § 52-595 is inapplicable
    to § 52-582 may by drawn merely because the legislature
    has not amended § 52-582 to add a tolling provision for
    fraudulent concealment.
    Contrary to the respondents’ contention, the intent
    of the legislature that § 52-595 applies to § 52-582 is
    apparent from the straightforward language and evident
    purpose of those statutory sections.11 As stated pre-
    viously, there is no language in § 52-595 to indicate that
    its application is restricted only to certain statutes of
    limitations and not to others. Rather, § 52-595 provides,
    in broadly applicable terms, for the tolling of the limita-
    tion period applicable to a cause of action ‘‘[i]f any
    person’’ who is liable to such an action by another
    ‘‘fraudulently conceals from him the existence of’’ that
    cause of action. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, there is
    nothing in the wording of § 52-582 to indicate that the
    legislature intended to exempt that limitation period
    from the operation of § 52-595 and thereby reward a
    respondent for his own misconduct in fraudulently con-
    cealing evidence that would warrant a new trial. It is
    axiomatic that ‘‘[w]e will not read into a [statute] words
    or limitations that are not there’’; Putnam Park Apart-
    ments, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 
    193 Conn. App. 42
    , 51, 
    218 A.3d 1127
     (2019); see also Tower
    v. Miller Johnson, Inc., 
    67 Conn. App. 71
    , 78, 
    787 A.2d 26
     (2001) (‘‘[w]e will not read into clearly expressed
    legislative provisions which do not find expression in
    its words’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); because
    ‘‘[w]e are bound to interpret legislative intent by refer-
    ring to what the legislative text contains, not what it
    might have contained.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Gamez-Reyes v. Biagi, 
    136 Conn. App. 258
    , 274,
    
    44 A.3d 197
    , cert. denied, 
    306 Conn. 905
    , 
    52 A.3d 731
    (2012). There is no justification for deviating from this
    well established principle in the present case.
    Indeed, our Supreme Court made this very point with
    respect to § 52-595 in Connell v. Colwell, 
    214 Conn. 242
    ,
    
    571 A.2d 116
     (1990), wherein the court addressed a
    claim brought by the plaintiff, the administratrix of the
    estate of her late husband, alleging that the defendant
    physician had committed malpractice in failing to diag-
    nose her husband’s cancer. 
    Id.,
     243–44. The trial court
    granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
    concluding that the action was time barred by the rele-
    vant statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584,12
    notwithstanding the plaintiff’s contention that the appli-
    cable limitation period was tolled under § 52-595 by
    virtue of the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the
    cause of action. Id., 243. On appeal, our Supreme Court
    concluded that the trial court properly granted the
    motion on the basis of its determination, inter alia, that
    the evidence did not support the plaintiff’s claim of
    fraudulent concealment. Id., 250. In doing so, however,
    the court rejected the defendant’s contention, raised at
    oral argument, ‘‘that the fraudulent concealment excep-
    tion to the statute of limitations, contained in . . . § 52-
    595, will not save actions brought beyond the three year
    repose period contained in . . . § 52-584.’’ Id., 245–46
    n.4. The court explained its conclusion as follows: ‘‘The
    defendant was unable, however, to articulate how the
    language of § 52-595 was to be construed to provide
    the selective application he suggests. We find no merit
    to the defendant’s argument. Section 52-595 provides
    that causes of action fraudulently concealed by a defen-
    dant will ‘accrue against such person so liable therefor
    at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon
    first discovers its existence.’ . . . ‘It is clear that, when
    the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
    we need look no further than the words themselves
    because we assume that the language expresses the
    legislature’s intent.’ American Universal Ins. Co. v.
    DelGreco, 
    205 Conn. 178
    , 193, 
    530 A.2d 171
     (1987). Since
    fraudulent concealment will cause an action to accrue
    upon the date of discovery rather than on ‘the date of
    the act or omission complained of,’ as specified in § 52-
    584, we conclude that the exception contained in § 52-
    595 constitutes a clear and unambiguous general
    exception to any statute of limitations that does not
    specifically preclude its application.’’ (Emphasis
    altered.) Connell v. Colwell, 
    supra,
     
    214 Conn. 246
     n.4.
    The court in Connell could not have been clearer:
    given the plain and encompassing language of § 52-595,
    it must be deemed to apply to any limitation period
    that does not expressly disclaim its applicability.
    Because § 52-582 contains no such disclaimer, its three
    year limitation period may be tolled upon a showing of
    fraudulent concealment in accordance with § 52-595.
    This conclusion makes a great deal of sense when
    considered in light of the important purpose of a peti-
    tion for a new trial and the rationale underlying the
    fraudulent concealment doctrine codified in § 52-595.
    As discussed previously, a petition for a new trial is
    available, within certain time limits, only when newly
    discovered evidence casts serious doubt on the legiti-
    macy of a previous judgment. See, e.g., Skakel v. State,
    
    295 Conn. 447
    , 468, 501 n.41, 
    991 A.2d 414
     (2010).
    Indeed, in a criminal case, a petition for a new trial
    may be granted only when the petitioner has established
    that a second trial is necessary ‘‘to avoid an injustice,’’
    a standard that is not met unless evidence that is newly
    discovered—and which, despite the exercise of due
    diligence, could not have been discovered in time for
    its use in the original trial—‘‘would be likely to result
    in the acquittal of the petitioner . . . .’’ 
    Id., 468
    . More-
    over, under § 52-582, a petitioner who can meet this
    demanding standard has only three years within which
    to file a petition, a time frame that reflects a legislative
    judgment that, during that three year period, the con-
    victed petitioner’s interest in showing that he is proba-
    bly not guilty on the basis of evidence that was unavail-
    able at the time of trial trumps the state’s interest in
    preserving the finality of the judgment and avoiding the
    adverse effect of the passage of time on the state’s
    evidence. See Summerville v. Warden, supra, 
    229 Conn. 426
    –27. This balancing of interests lies at the heart of
    the legislative scheme providing for the filing of a peti-
    tion for a new trial within three years of the original
    judgment.
    When, however, a party engages in fraud to conceal
    evidence that would support a petition for a new trial—
    that is, evidence that likely would result in a different
    outcome following a second trial—the offending party
    has effectively skewed that legislative balance in his
    favor by curtailing or even eliminating the opportunity
    afforded a petitioner under § 52-582 to vindicate his
    right to seek a new trial for a period of three years
    following the original judgment. In such a case, it seems
    self-evident that it is manifestly unfair and unjust to
    permit that party to benefit from his own fraudulent
    conduct. It is that unfairness that § 52-595 was designed
    to thwart by affording the petitioner the right to file a
    petition for a new trial three years from the date of the
    discovery of the evidence, thereby negating the adverse
    effect of the fraudulent concealment. If a petitioner can
    establish the stringent elements of § 52-595—that is, he
    can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
    party against whom the petition is brought, acting with
    actual knowledge of the facts necessary to establish
    the petitioner’s cause of action, intentionally concealed
    those facts for the very purpose of subverting the peti-
    tioner’s ability to file a timely petition—we can think
    of no policy consideration that would prompt the legis-
    lature to deny the petitioner the benefit of that tolling
    provision. In fact, to conclude otherwise would be to
    impute to the legislature an intent to countenance—
    indeed, to encourage—such fraudulent concealment, a
    bizarre and wholly inequitable result that should not
    be attributed to that body; see, e.g., State v. Rivera, 
    250 Conn. 188
    , 200, 
    736 A.2d 790
     (1999) (‘‘[w]e decline to
    read statutes so as to reach bizarre or absurd results’’);
    especially when, as here, the language and evident pur-
    pose of the relevant statutory provisions point decid-
    edly in the opposite direction.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
    fraudulent concealment tolling provision of § 52-595
    applies to the three year limitation period of § 52-582.
    Consequently, we must address the respondents’ alter-
    native ground for affirmance regarding the sufficiency
    of the petitioner’s evidence to support a claim under
    § 52-595.
    II
    As an alternative ground to affirm the summary judg-
    ment rendered by the trial court in their favor, the
    respondents maintain that the petitioner has failed to
    demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the petitioner, there is a genuine issue of
    material fact in dispute that would entitle him to a
    trial on his claim under § 52-595. We agree with the
    respondents.
    Some additional facts and procedural history are nec-
    essary to our resolution of this issue. With respect to
    the merits of the petitioner’s claim under § 52-595, the
    memorandum of decision of the trial court granting the
    respondents’ motion for summary judgment sets forth
    the following facts relevant to the evidence that the
    petitioner claims is newly discovered and was fraudu-
    lently concealed by the respondents. ‘‘The petitioner
    . . . an unrepresented litigant, filed a petition for a new
    trial . . . in two counts alleging, first, that [he] received
    a written statement from an ‘Iris [S.],’ which ‘verifies’
    that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crimes with which
    he was charged, and to which he was ‘forced’ to plead
    guilty’’ and that ‘‘had the ‘Iris [S.]’ letter(s) been dis-
    closed, the petitioner would not have entered pleas of
    guilty to the charges and would have opted for a trial,
    and second, that the respondents ‘knew or should have
    known the facts of the case.’ ’’
    In his opposition to the respondents’ motion for sum-
    mary judgment, the petitioner, citing § 52-595, claimed
    that ‘‘the statute of limitations [relative to his petition
    for a new trial, § 52-582] was tolled due to fraudulent
    concealment of the ‘Iris [S.] letters’ by the respondents.
    Specifically, the petitioner claim[ed] that the ‘letters’
    annexed to the opposition to a former motion to dismiss
    were unknown to him until November 15, 2015, which
    was roughly eleven months before the running of the
    [§] 52-582 time limitation.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
    In a footnote, the court added: ‘‘By way of back-
    ground, certain undisputed facts serve to place the pur-
    ported ‘Iris [S.] letters’ in perspective. . . . All five of
    the handwritten statements (‘letters’) attached to the
    petitioner’s original opposition [to the respondents’
    motion to dismiss] are unsigned; four are undated. The
    first (in the order presented) bears an upper right hand
    corner notation: ‘6:30 P.M. 1/18/13.’ It reads: ‘To Prose-
    cutor Donna Mambrino’ and begins by reciting ‘My
    name is Iris.’ While the one page document contains
    certain details, and considerable hearsay, the portion
    claimed by the petitioner as particularly probative is
    the recitation that, on August 24, 2012, while she (‘Iris’)
    was in a car at a Brainard Road gas station, waiting to
    meet one Kelly Cooper, a vehicle pulled up in front of
    her ‘real fast’ and [Cooper’s] friend ‘Ty’ exited the driver
    seat of that vehicle and entered her car. Somebody from
    a moving truck that was leaving the gas station, who
    she later learned was the petitioner, got into the vehicle
    ‘Ty’ had exited, and drove it until it ‘crashed off the
    highway.’
    ‘‘The four other unsigned statements or ‘letters’ are,
    as stated, undated, and do not contain the name ‘Iris’
    or ‘Iris [S.]’; they can be summarized . . . as follows:
    [1] follow-up letter to . . . Mambrino referring to the
    document dated January 18, 2013, and inquiring about
    what happened to . . . Cooper and his friend ‘Ty’; it
    also states that the prosecutor has not called her back,
    expresses concern for her safety, and indicates [that]
    she is still living in Massachusetts; [2] ‘letter’ to Attorney
    . . . Lorenzen advising that the statement dated Janu-
    ary 18, 2013, had been sent to . . . Mambrino and
    enclosing a copy thereof; [3] similar letter with enclo-
    sure (statement dated January 18, 2013) to Judge [Joan
    K.] Alexander; and [4] similar letter with enclosure
    (statement dated January 18, 2013) to the petitioner.
    ‘‘The petitioner characterizes the Iris [S.] documents
    as ‘exoneration’ evidence; in [the court’s] view, the Iris
    [S.] documents are of a decidedly inculpatory character:
    the purported author does not claim to have been an
    eyewitness to the armed robbery, her January 18, 2013
    ‘letter’ places the petitioner in proximity to the scene
    immediately following the robbery, and serves to con-
    firm his participation in the alleged getaway.’’
    Although describing the ‘‘Iris S.’’ letters in its memo-
    randum of decision in order to provide context for the
    petitioner’s claim, the trial court did not reach the mer-
    its of the respondents’ claim that those letters are insuf-
    ficient to defeat their motion for summary judgment.
    The trial court concluded, rather, that the three year
    limitation period of § 52-582 had expired before the
    petitioner commenced his petition for a new trial
    because, as a matter of law, that limitation period could
    not be tolled by proof of fraudulent concealment under
    § 52-595. On appeal, however, the petitioner relies on
    those letters to support his contention, made in
    response to the respondents’ alternative ground for
    affirmance, that he is entitled to a trial on his fraudulent
    concealment claim. In his brief to this court, however,
    the petitioner fails to explain why those letters are
    sufficient to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact
    such that summary judgment is inappropriate. Instead,
    his sole argument—the sum total of which comprises
    less than one full page of his brief—is that the respon-
    dents are estopped from contesting the sufficiency of
    the letters because, in their motions to dismiss the peti-
    tion for a new trial, the respondents did not ‘‘seek to
    introduce evidence outside of the record to controvert
    or contradict the facts [alleged in the] petitioner’s com-
    plaint.’’ This result is required, according to the peti-
    tioner, because ‘‘[a] motion to dismiss is a responsive
    pleading that admits all facts well pleaded especially
    when it does not seek to introduce evidence outside of
    the record to deny or rebut the facts of the allegations,’’
    and the respondents therefore must be deemed to have
    ‘‘admitted to all the facts of the allegations in the peti-
    tioner’s amended petition for a new trial. Because of
    this, the trial court was not permitted to make a finding
    to the contrary.’’13
    This argument is plainly lacking in merit because ‘‘[a]
    motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face
    of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . .
    When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question
    raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider
    the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable
    light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts
    to be those alleged in the complaint, including those
    facts necessarily implied from the allegations, constru-
    ing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.
    . . . The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which
    are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must
    be decided upon that alone.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Pickard v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction
    Services, 
    210 Conn. App. 788
    , 792–93, 
    271 A.3d 178
    (2022). This is in marked contrast to a motion for sum-
    mary judgment, which requires the production of evi-
    dence so that the court can determine whether there
    is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. See, e.g.,
    Day v. Seblatnigg, 
    341 Conn. 815
    , 825, 
    268 A.3d 595
    (2022). Consequently, the failure of the respondents to
    dispute the allegations of the petition for a new trial
    in connection with their motions to dismiss does not
    constitute an admission of those facts for purposes of
    their motion for summary judgment, and there is noth-
    ing whatsoever in our law to support the petitioner’s
    assertion otherwise.
    Moreover, in the respondents’ brief to this court, filed
    following the petitioner’s submission of his brief, the
    respondents explained, with citation to case law, why
    they are not deemed to have admitted the petition’s
    allegations merely because they elected not to challenge
    those allegations for purposes of their motions to dis-
    miss, which did not depend on the veracity of the allega-
    tions of the petition. Nevertheless, the respondents also
    set forth the arguments as to why, in their view, the
    ‘‘Iris S.’’ letters were insufficient from an evidentiary
    perspective to defeat their motion for summary judg-
    ment. Although he could have done so, the petitioner
    failed to file a reply brief addressing the respondents’
    arguments.
    We recognize that the petitioner is a self-represented
    party and that, ‘‘[a]lthough self-represented parties are
    not excused from complying with relevant rules of pro-
    cedural and substantive law, [i]t is the established pol-
    icy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-
    represented] litigants and when it does not interfere
    with the rights of other parties to construe the rules
    of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented]
    party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gutierrez
    v. Mosor, 
    206 Conn. App. 818
    , 835, 
    261 A.3d 850
    , cert.
    denied, 
    340 Conn. 913
    , 
    265 A.3d 926
     (2021). Thus, ‘‘like
    the trial court, [this court] will endeavor to see that
    such a litigant shall have the opportunity to have his
    case fully and fairly heard so far as such latitude is
    consistent with the just rights of any adverse party.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.
     Nonetheless,
    ‘‘[a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some
    latitude, the right of self-representation provides no
    attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of
    procedural and substantive law’’; (internal quotation
    marks omitted) C. B. v. S. B., 
    211 Conn. App. 628
    , 630,
    
    273 A.3d 271
     (2022); and ‘‘[w]e repeatedly have stated
    that [w]e are not required to review issues that have
    been improperly presented to this court through an
    inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere
    abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid aban-
    doning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.
    . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of
    issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in
    the brief without substantive discussion or citation of
    authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a
    reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . con-
    sider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
    must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
    briefs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.
    In the present case, the petitioner’s brief with respect
    to the sufficiency of his showing of fraudulent conceal-
    ment is inadequate because he relies entirely on what
    fairly may be characterized as a patently meritless, if
    not frivolous, legal argument, the substance of which
    is set forth in two sentences. Although the petitioner
    had a second opportunity to address that sufficiency
    issue in a reply brief, he did not do so. Even if the
    petitioner is afforded considerable leeway by virtue of
    his self-represented status, it cannot reasonably be said
    that he has adequately briefed this issue.
    Moreover, it is apparent that the evidence proffered
    by the petitioner in support of his opposition to the
    respondents’ motion for summary judgment, namely,
    the ‘‘Iris S.’’ letters, is inadequate for that purpose. First,
    as the respondents point out, the letters have never
    been authenticated. ‘‘This court has made clear that
    [the] rules [of practice] would be meaningless if they
    could be circumvented by filing [unauthenticated docu-
    ments] in support of or in opposition to summary judg-
    ment. . . . Therefore, before a document may be con-
    sidered by the court [in connection with] a motion for
    summary judgment, there must be a preliminary show-
    ing of [the document’s] genuineness, i.e., that the prof-
    fered item of evidence is what its proponent claims it
    to be. . . . Documents in support of or in opposition
    to a motion for summary judgment may be authenti-
    cated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to
    . . . the addition of an affidavit by a person with per-
    sonal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and
    accurate representation of what its proponent claims
    it to be.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Anderson v. Dike, 
    187 Conn. App. 405
    , 411–12,
    
    202 A.3d 448
    , cert. denied, 
    331 Conn. 910
    , 
    203 A.3d 1245
    (2019). In the absence of some kind of authentication,
    the letters cannot reasonably be relied on as probative
    evidence.14
    Furthermore, the petitioner has never identified ‘‘Iris
    S.’’ with any particularity, and there is nothing in the
    record to corroborate the content of the letters she
    purportedly wrote. Indeed, there is no proof that the
    respondents received the letters, and the petitioner has
    made no showing that, if they did receive the letters,
    they concealed them from the petitioner for the purpose
    of preventing him from seeking a new trial. For all these
    reasons, the petitioner has failed to present evidence
    sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact
    with respect to his claim that the three year limitation
    period of § 52-582 was tolled by the respondents’ fraud-
    ulent concealment of the letters.15 Accordingly, the
    respondents are entitled to summary judgment.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    General Statutes § 52-595 provides: ‘‘If any person, liable to an action
    by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of
    such action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such
    person so liable therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon
    first discovers its existence.’’
    2
    General Statutes § 52-582 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No petition for
    a new trial in any civil or criminal proceeding shall be brought but within
    three years next after the rendition of the judgment or decree complained
    of . . . .’’
    3
    General Statutes § 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
    Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for . . .
    the discovery of new evidence . . . .’’
    4
    ‘‘The three year period [of § 52-582] begins to run from the date of
    rendition of judgment by the trial court; Varley v. Varley, 
    181 Conn. 58
    , 61,
    
    434 A.2d 312
     (1980); which, in a criminal case, is the date of imposition of
    the sentence by the trial court. State v. Coleman, 
    202 Conn. 86
    , 89, 
    519 A.2d 1201
     (1987).’’ Holliday v. State, 
    111 Conn. App. 656
    , 663, 
    960 A.2d 1101
    (2008), cert. denied, 
    291 Conn. 902
    , 
    967 A.2d 112
     (2009).
    5
    We discuss both Fichera and Turner at greater length in part I of this opin-
    ion.
    6
    The respondents also contend, as an alternative ground for affirming
    the judgment of the trial court, that, even if § 52-595 applies to § 52-582, the
    petitioner has failed to present facts sufficient to establish a genuine issue
    of material fact with respect to his claim of fraudulent concealment under
    § 52-595. We discuss that alternative ground in part II of this opinion.
    7
    Although the court in Summerville spoke in terms of the filing of a
    petition for a new trial in the context of a challenge to a judgment of
    conviction following a trial, there is no dispute that such a petition may be
    brought, as it was here, in the context of a claim challenging a judgment
    of conviction rendered after a guilty plea. Moreover, although Summerville
    was decided in the context of a petition for a new trial in a criminal case,
    such a petition may also be brought in a civil case. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Pack,
    supra, 
    15 Conn. App. 315
     (‘‘[t]he procedure for procuring a new trial by
    petition, whether in a civil or criminal case, is authorized by § 52-270’’).
    8
    This court has concluded that § 42-110g (f) is jurisdictional in nature.
    Avon Meadow Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Bank of Boston Connecticut,
    
    50 Conn. App. 688
    , 700, 
    719 A.2d 66
    , cert. denied, 
    247 Conn. 946
    , 
    723 A.2d 320
     (1998), and cert. denied, 
    247 Conn. 946
    , 
    723 A.2d 320
     (1998).
    9
    Indeed, in 1988, when Fichera was decided, no appellate court of this
    state had held that § 42-110g (f) is jurisdictional in nature. As we have
    indicated, subsequently, in 1998, this court determined that it is. See footnote
    8 of this opinion.
    10
    In this connection, it bears noting that our Supreme Court has expressly
    reserved the question of whether CUTPA’s three year limitation period of
    § 42-110g (f) may be equitably tolled. See Normandy v. American Medical
    Systems, Inc., 
    340 Conn. 93
    , 112 n.18, 
    262 A.3d 698
     (2021) (‘‘[h]ere, we again
    do not need to reach the issue of whether the CUTPA limitation period may
    be tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine because we conclude
    that there is no factual predicate for the application of that doctrine’’). If
    our Supreme Court were of the view that, under Fichera, statutory tolling
    for fraudulent concealment is unavailable for CUTPA claims generally, it
    seems apparent that the court in Normandy would have had no difficulty
    in concluding that equitable tolling is also jurisdictionally barred under
    CUTPA. No doubt the court has not done so because Fichera did not hold
    that § 52-595 is inapplicable for purposes of CUTPA, only that that tolling
    provision did not apply under the specific facts of that case.
    11
    We note that there is no reported legislative history for the fraudulent
    concealment statute, which first was enacted in 1874. See General Statutes
    (1875 Rev.) tit. 19, c. 18, § 20.
    12
    General Statutes § 52-584 provides in relevant part: ‘‘No action to recover
    damages for injury to the person . . . caused . . . by malpractice of a
    physician . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when
    the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
    care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be
    brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission com-
    plained of . . . .’’
    13
    The foregoing represents the entirety of the petitioner’s argument as to
    why the letters are sufficient to require a trial on his fraudulent conceal-
    ment claim.
    14
    The petitioner was granted permission by the trial court to subpoena
    ‘‘Iris S.’’ Although the petitioner asserted that he received the letters from
    ‘‘Iris S.’’ and not the respondents, it appears that he did not know her last
    name or address, thereby rendering him unable to secure her presence or
    testimony.
    15
    As the respondents acknowledge, because the petitioner’s fraudulent
    concealment claim regarding newly discovered evidence also gives rise to
    a Brady claim, the petitioner’s right to a new trial may be vindicated by
    virtue of a petition for a new trial; see State v. McCoy, 
    331 Conn. 561
    , 598,
    
    206 A.3d 725
     (2019) (‘‘newly discovered Brady claims may . . . be brought
    by way of a petition for a new trial up to three years after sentencing’’);
    and via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In fact, while the present
    case was pending in the trial court, the petitioner filed a habeas petition
    based on the same alleged Brady violation that he has raised here. He
    subsequently withdrew that claim, however, without explanation. We
    express no view with respect to any aspect of any such habeas claim that
    the petitioner might seek to commence in the future.
    Finally, it bears noting that, in cases that do not involve an alleged constitu-
    tional violation, a petition for a new trial will almost invariably be the only
    relief available to an individual seeking a new trial on the basis of newly
    discovered evidence. This is true, of course, with respect to both criminal
    and civil cases.