Shefelbine v. Commissioner of Correction ( 2014 )


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    SCOTT SHEFELBINE v. COMMISSIONER
    OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34666)
    Beach, Sheldon and Peters, Js.
    Argued February 19—officially released May 13, 2014
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Tolland, Newson, J.)
    Jonathan Ross Sills, for the appellant (petitioner).
    Michael Proto, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
    on the brief, was Matthew C. Gedansky, state’s attorney,
    for the appellee (respondent).
    Opinion
    PETERS, J. In this appeal from the habeas court’s
    denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
    petitioner argues that the guilty pleas he entered for
    various charges resulting from sexual misconduct with
    minors were not knowing and voluntary because his
    pretrial counsel, the sentencing judge, and the prosecu-
    tor failed to apprise him properly of the terms of the
    plea agreement. We disagree and affirm the judgment
    of the habeas court.
    On November 16, 2009, the petitioner, Scott Shefel-
    bine, filed a two count petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of pretrial coun-
    sel and violation of due process for insufficiency of
    canvass with respect to his guilty pleas for three counts
    of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of
    General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), three counts of sexual
    assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Stat-
    utes § 53a-73a (a) (2), five counts of risk of injury to a
    child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2),
    three counts of delivery of alcohol to a minor in viola-
    tion of General Statutes § 30-86, one count of assault
    in the third degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-
    61, and one count of unlawful restraint in the second
    degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-96. The
    habeas court later permitted the petitioner to amend
    his petition to add a count alleging prosecutorial impro-
    priety. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correc-
    tion, denied the allegations and raised the special
    defense of procedural default for the counts alleging
    insufficiency of canvass and prosecutorial impropriety.
    Following an evidentiary hearing, the court rejected the
    respondent’s special defense, but denied the amended
    petition for a writ of habeas corpus on all grounds.
    Following the court’s granting of certification, the peti-
    tioner appealed.
    The habeas court, in its memorandum of decision,
    described the factual background of the case. ‘‘The peti-
    tioner . . . was the defendant in ten cases pending in
    the judicial district of Tolland at Rockville. The sum
    and substance of the evidence the state was prepared
    to present in these many cases if they had gone to trial
    was that the petitioner was a thirty-one year old man
    who used the Internet, his job at a local high school,
    and other available resources, to seek out girls under
    the age of sixteen. By intentionally modifying his per-
    sonal appearance, such as by wearing a hairpiece to
    cover his male-pattern baldness, and by his words, the
    petitioner would misrepresent his age to these girls,
    and their parents in some cases, to be between seven-
    teen and nineteen years of age. He would eventually
    engage in, or attempt to engage in, sexual conduct with
    these underage girls, sometimes forcefully, and pro-
    vided a number of them with alcohol in order to advance
    these intentions.
    ‘‘During all proceedings in the criminal court relevant
    to this petition, the petitioner was represented by Attor-
    neys Jeffrey Denner and Richard Brad Bailey of Denner
    Pellegrino, LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts . . . pursu-
    ant to a written retainer agreement. On October 20,
    2008, the petitioner entered guilty pleas to the [afore-
    mentioned charges]. Pursuant to the plea agreement,
    the court . . . sentenced the petitioner to a total effec-
    tive sentence of thirty-five years, suspended after
    twenty years of incarceration, followed by ten years
    of probation.’’
    At the habeas trial, the petitioner’s claims concerned
    the circumstances in which he entered his guilty pleas.
    Alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficiency
    of canvass, and prosecutorial impropriety, the peti-
    tioner argued that his guilty pleas were not made know-
    ingly and voluntarily. Over the course of several days,
    the habeas court heard testimony from the petitioner,
    the petitioner’s father, Attorney Bailey, and the prosecu-
    tor. The court also heard testimony from competing
    expert witnesses regarding the effectiveness of pretrial
    counsel’s representation. Following the hearings, the
    court denied the petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus, finding that there was no impropriety on the
    part of his pretrial counsel, the sentencing judge, or the
    prosecutor, and that the petitioner’s guilty pleas were
    knowing and voluntary.
    On appeal, the petitioner challenges the habeas
    court’s findings rejecting his claims of ineffective assis-
    tance of counsel, insufficiency of canvass, and prosecu-
    torial impropriety. He also challenges various
    evidentiary rulings by the habeas court. We affirm the
    judgment of the court.
    I
    The petitioner challenges the habeas court’s finding
    that he had failed to prove ineffective assistance of
    counsel on three grounds. He maintains that pretrial
    counsel (1) failed to explain the elements of the relevant
    offenses adequately, (2) misrepresented the terms of
    the plea agreement regarding the petitioner’s mother,
    and (3) labored under a conflict of interest. We are
    not persuaded.
    A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to
    adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all criti-
    cal stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland v. Wash-
    ington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 686, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984). Our Supreme Court has recognized that
    pretrial negotiations implicating the decision of
    whether to plead guilty constitute a critical stage in
    criminal proceedings and that plea bargaining is an
    integral component of the criminal justice system.
    Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    234 Conn. 139
    ,
    153, 
    662 A.2d 718
     (1995). A habeas petitioner who seeks
    to vacate a guilty plea on the ground of ineffective
    assistance of counsel must prove that (1) pretrial coun-
    sel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness and (2) the deficient representation was
    prejudicial in that the petitioner, but for the deficient
    representation, would not have pleaded guilty and
    instead would have insisted on going to trial. 
    Id.,
     155–57.
    ‘‘It is well established that when analyzing a claim of
    ineffective assistance, counsel is strongly presumed to
    have rendered adequate assistance and made all signifi-
    cant decisions in the exercise of reasonable profes-
    sional judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    83 Conn. App. 543
    , 551, 
    851 A.2d 313
    , cert. denied, 
    271 Conn. 914
    , 
    859 A.2d 569
     (2004).
    The factual findings made by the habeas court regard-
    ing pretrial counsel’s representation of the petitioner
    will not be disturbed absent a showing that they were
    clearly erroneous. Banks v. Commissioner of Correc-
    tion, 
    147 Conn. App. 331
    , 338, 
    82 A.3d 658
     (2013). The
    court’s ultimate determination as to whether these find-
    ings satisfy the legal standard for ineffective assistance
    of counsel, however, is subject to plenary review. 
    Id.
    A
    First, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
    improperly found that pretrial counsel had adequately
    advised him of the elements of the offenses to which
    he was pleading guilty. Specifically, he maintains that
    counsel did not explain the differences between sexual
    intercourse and sexual contact, including the difference
    in age of consent, and did not apprise him of the manner
    in which each of these distinctions would affect the
    state’s case with respect to the alleged victims.
    In support of these contentions, the petitioner cites
    the transcript of the sentencing proceeding where his
    guilty pleas were entered, highlighting certain remarks
    that arguably suggest that he did not completely under-
    stand the charges to which he was pleading guilty. In
    particular, he draws our attention to the following collo-
    quy wherein pretrial counsel interrupted the petitioner
    as he appeared to be seeking clarification of the
    charges:
    ‘‘The Court: And the final thing I want to ask you is,
    I’m not asking you whether you agree that you engaged
    in the acts that were described by the state’s attorney,
    but I want you to understand that the pleas to which
    you’ve entered guilty today are for offenses that were
    described by the state’s attorney today. Do you under-
    stand that’s what you’re pleading guilty to, what she
    described?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: ‘‘Again, it’s a little foggy and con-
    fused, but I suppose—
    ‘‘[Pretrial Counsel]: ‘‘Your Honor, what I believe the
    [petitioner] is attempting to articulate now is that he
    definitely pleads guilty to the saying that the elements
    of the charges alleged have in fact been met by the
    state’s attorney, but he doesn’t necessarily agree with
    all the details.
    ‘‘The Court: I understand, I’m not asking him whether
    he agrees he committed these offenses. I’m asking him
    if he understands that the offenses described by the
    state’s attorney today, that’s what he’s pleading guilty
    to. He understands?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yeah.’’
    It is well established that we defer to the habeas
    court’s findings as to pretrial counsel’s representation.
    Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    147 Conn. App. 338
    . The court found that the totality of the tran-
    script clearly showed that ‘‘the petitioner had a full
    understanding of the nature and elements of the
    offenses to which he was pleading . . . .’’ The court
    expressly credited the testimony of Attorney Bailey that
    he had ‘‘discussed the elements of each offense with the
    petitioner thoroughly and on more than one occasion in
    preparation for the plea date.’’ Given these findings,
    supported by substantial evidence in the record, we
    cannot conclude that pretrial counsel’s representation
    of the petitioner was deficient in this respect.
    B
    Next, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
    improperly found that pretrial counsel did not misrepre-
    sent the terms of the plea agreement regarding the
    conduct of the petitioner’s mother. Specifically, he
    maintains that pretrial counsel told him that if he
    pleaded guilty, his mother would not be charged with
    any crime in conjunction with his proceedings.
    The following additional facts, as found by the habeas
    court, are relevant to this claim. The state’s investiga-
    tion of the petitioner produced evidence that the peti-
    tioner’s mother, Gail Shefelbine, may have spoken
    directly to the petitioner’s victims or their parents and
    misrepresented that he was a teenager. There was also
    evidence that the petitioner brought some of the victims
    to the Shefelbine home with his mother’s knowledge.
    This conduct may have exposed the mother to criminal
    liability as an accessory to or a conspirator in commit-
    ting some of the petitioner’s crimes. It is undisputed
    that, as part of the petitioner’s plea agreement, the state
    agreed not to pursue charges against the mother for
    this conduct.
    The dispute at the habeas proceedings, and on appeal,
    about the terms of the plea agreement concerns the
    mother’s exposure to perjury charges. After the peti-
    tioner was initially arrested, he was released on bond
    subject to certain conditions. When the state learned
    that the petitioner was in violation of these conditions,
    a bond revocation hearing was held at which the peti-
    tioner’s mother testified for the defense. It was later
    revealed that she had provided materially false testi-
    mony and documentation at the hearing and a warrant
    was issued for her arrest on nine counts of perjury.
    State’s Attorney Elizabeth Leaming, the prosecutor in
    the petitioner’s case, was in possession of the arrest
    warrant on the day that she participated in the petition-
    er’s sentencing hearing, but the mother was not arrested
    until about a month later. The mother ultimately
    pleaded guilty to one count of perjury.
    The petitioner claims that the state’s prosecution of
    his mother for perjury violated the terms of the plea
    agreement as he understood them at the time he pleaded
    guilty. The petitioner relies on the transcript of the
    sentencing proceeding to support this claim:
    ‘‘The Court: [W]ere there any other promises made
    to get you to plead guilty besides the recommended
    sentence?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: That they were [not] going to
    charge my mother?1
    ‘‘The Court: Is that—was that part of the—
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: There was a representation made,
    Your Honor, as part of—that the state is not intending
    to prosecute the mother as an accessory or as conspir-
    acy to any of the sexual assaults for which he’s been
    charged.
    ‘‘The Court: Are there other charges that are not being
    pursued that are going to be nolled?
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: That’s correct. Any open counts,
    and I believe there is one open file that the state will
    enter a nolle.
    ‘‘The Court: Okay. Any other terms of the agreement?
    That’s as far as the agreement goes, the sentences, the
    charges, and there’s no pursuit of these other charges—
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Correct.
    ‘‘The Court: —against his mother.
    ‘‘[Pretrial Counsel]: And, Your Honor, there’s also an
    agreement that there will be no further prosecutions
    based—arising out of these investigations or based on
    any information from the state’s attorney at this time.
    ‘‘The Court: Is that correct?
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Actually, that is true, Your Honor,
    I apologize. I did put that in writing to counsel, and
    that’s accurate.’’ (Footnote added.)
    The petitioner argues that his unqualified comment
    that his mother was not going to be charged suggests
    that he believed that she would not be prosecuted for
    any crimes arising from the proceedings against him,
    including perjury.
    Although the transcript is ambiguous as to what the
    petitioner understood in regard to his mother’s expo-
    sure to a perjury charge, the habeas court’s findings of
    fact are clear. The court found that pretrial counsel
    specifically informed the petitioner that perjury charges
    were being pursued against his mother, that negotia-
    tions to have the charges dropped as part of the plea
    agreement had been fruitless, and that the deal would
    therefore not include any agreement in regard to per-
    jury. The court found that the petitioner nonetheless
    chose to proceed with the guilty pleas. The court
    expressly found that the petitioner lacked credibility in
    his assertion that he had not been apprised of the per-
    jury charges. The petitioner has not persuaded us to
    disturb these findings of fact.
    C
    Next, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
    improperly found that pretrial counsel did not labor
    under a conflict of interest. Specifically, he argues that
    pretrial counsel’s representation was ineffective
    because the flat fee paid by the petitioner acted as a
    disincentive for pretrial counsel to pursue a trial.2
    In order to provide the effective assistance to which a
    criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled, defense
    counsel must be free from any conflict of interest. Day
    v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    118 Conn. App. 130
    ,
    136, 
    983 A.2d 869
     (2009), cert. denied, 
    294 Conn. 930
    ,
    
    986 A.2d 1055
     (2010). ‘‘Our Supreme Court has estab-
    lished the proof requirements where a habeas corpus
    petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel
    because of a claimed conflict of interest. Where . . .
    the [petitioner] claims that his counsel was burdened
    by an actual conflict of interest . . . the [petitioner]
    need not establish actual prejudice. . . . Where there
    is an actual conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed
    because counsel [has] breach[ed] the duty of loyalty,
    perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties. Moreover,
    it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense
    of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.
    . . . In a case of a claimed conflict of interest, therefore,
    in order to establish a violation of the sixth amendment
    the [petitioner] has a two-pronged task. He must estab-
    lish (1) that counsel actively represented conflicting
    interests and (2) that an actual conflict of interest
    adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.
     136–37.
    ‘‘An actual conflict of interest is more than a theoreti-
    cal conflict. . . . [T]he possibility of conflict is insuffi-
    cient to impugn a criminal conviction. . . . A conflict
    is merely a potential conflict of interest if the interests
    of the [petitioner] may place the attorney under incon-
    sistent duties at some time in the future. . . . To dem-
    onstrate an actual conflict of interest, the petitioner
    must be able to point to specific instances in the record
    which suggest impairment or compromise of his inter-
    ests for the benefit of another party. . . . A mere theo-
    retical division of loyalties is not enough.’’ (Citations
    omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    127 Conn. App. 538
    , 550, 
    15 A.3d 658
    , 666 (2011), aff’d,
    
    308 Conn. 456
    , 
    64 A.3d 325
     (2013). Whether the circum-
    stances of pretrial counsel’s representation, as found
    by the habeas court, amount to an actual conflict of
    interest is a question of law of which our review is
    plenary. See Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    87 Conn. App. 568
    , 585, 
    867 A.2d 70
    , cert. denied, 
    273 Conn. 930
    , 
    873 A.2d 997
     (2005).
    Here, the petitioner paid pretrial counsel a $300,000
    retainer for the entire representation, without regard
    to whether the case was resolved by plea agreement
    or trial. The petitioner now argues that a bifurcated fee,
    with one fee for pretrial representation and a separate
    fee in the case of trial, would have been the proper
    arrangement to avoid a conflict of interest. Under the
    circumstances of this case, we are not persuaded that
    an actual conflict of interest existed. The habeas court
    found that ‘‘[pretrial] counsel did a yeoman’s job in all
    respects on the petitioner’s behalf in these matters.’’
    Having failed to show that the fee arrangement ham-
    pered pretrial counsel’s representation, the petitioner
    cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel on this ground.
    II
    The petitioner next claims that the habeas court
    improperly found that the sentencing judge’s plea can-
    vass was sufficient. Specifically, he argues that the
    judge, in the face of apparent confusion and hesitance
    by the petitioner, failed to ensure that the petitioner
    fully understood all aspects of the plea agreement, and
    that his pleas were knowing and voluntary. We
    disagree.3
    ‘‘To be valid, guilty pleas must be made knowingly
    and voluntarily. [T]he trial court judge bears an affirma-
    tive, nondelegable duty to clarify the terms of a plea
    agreement. [U]nless a plea of guilty is made knowingly
    and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due
    process and is therefore voidable. . . . When a defen-
    dant pleads guilty, he waives important fundamental
    constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-
    incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to
    confront his accusers. . . . These considerations
    demand the utmost solicitude of which courts are capa-
    ble in canvassing the matter with the accused to make
    sure he has a full understanding of what the plea con-
    notes and its consequences. . . . We, therefore,
    require the trial court affirmatively to clarify on the
    record that the defendant’s guilty plea was made intelli-
    gently and voluntarily. . . . In order to make a knowing
    and voluntary choice, the defendant must possess an
    understanding of the law in relation to the facts, includ-
    ing all relevant information concerning the sentence.
    . . . The defendant must also be aware of the actual
    value of any commitments made to him by the court
    . . . because a realistic assessment of such promises
    is essential in making an intelligent decision to plead
    guilty. . . . A determination as to whether a plea has
    been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an
    examination of all of the relevant circumstances. . . .
    [W]e conduct a plenary review of the circumstances
    surrounding [a] plea to determine if it was knowing and
    voluntary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Almedina v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    109 Conn. App. 1
    , 5–6, 
    950 A.2d 553
    , cert. denied, 
    289 Conn. 925
    , 
    958 A.2d 150
     (2008).
    The petitioner argues that the transcript of the sen-
    tencing proceeding demonstrates that he lacked a fun-
    damental understanding of the plea bargain process
    and was confused about the crimes to which he was
    pleading guilty and the terms of the agreement.4 He
    further maintains that the following colloquy suggests
    that he was coerced by pretrial counsel into pleading
    guilty and that the sentencing judge had a duty to inquire
    further in light of his hesitance:
    ‘‘The Court: Has anyone threatened or forced you
    into pleading guilty?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: I suppose badgering doesn’t fall
    under that.
    ‘‘The Court: Well, it depends on what the nature of
    the statement is. I understand that it may have taken
    a lot of discussions, but I’m talking about has anyone
    threatened, said if you didn’t plead guilty and accept this
    recommendation, certain other things would happen to
    you, and I’m not talking about explaining what might
    happen after a trial, what possibilities that you’re facing.
    I’m talking about threats that if you don’t accept this
    recommendation, then certain other specific ill events
    would happen to you. Anything of that nature?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Reluctantly, no.’’
    In reviewing the habeas court’s conclusion that the
    petitioner’s guilty pleas were made knowingly and vol-
    untarily, we review the entire record. See Almedina v.
    Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    109 Conn. App. 5
    –6. The court expressly found that ‘‘the petitioner had
    a full understanding of what he was pleading to, the
    elements of the offenses, and the terms of the plea
    agreement’’ and that he was made aware by pretrial
    counsel of his mother’s possible exposure to arrest on
    perjury charges. Further, the petitioner has failed to
    identify any evidence in the record that he was coerced
    to plead guilty. Rather, the habeas court found that
    pretrial counsel performed admirably in their role repre-
    senting the petitioner. Given these findings, supported
    by substantial evidence in the record, we agree with
    the habeas court’s conclusion that the sentencing judge
    was under no obligation to inquire further into the peti-
    tioner’s state of mind.
    III
    Next, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
    improperly found no impropriety on the part of the
    prosecutor. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor
    had a duty to clarify the terms of the plea agreement
    to the petitioner when he expressed confusion as to
    his mother’s criminal exposure at the time of his guilty
    pleas. He also argues that the prosecutor should have
    notified him of the outstanding warrant for his mother’s
    arrest on charges of perjury. We are not persuaded.5
    Our review of claims of prosecutorial impropriety
    involves a two step analytical process. First, we must
    examine whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred.
    Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    141 Conn. App. 430
    , 439, 
    63 A.3d 540
    , cert. denied, 
    308 Conn. 940
    , 
    66 A.3d 882
     (2013). Second, if an impropriety has
    occurred, we then must consider whether it violated
    the petitioner’s constitutional due process right to a
    fair trial. 
    Id.
    At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor unambigu-
    ously stated that, as part of the plea agreement, the
    state was not intending to prosecute the petitioner’s
    mother as an accessory or as a conspirator for any of
    the crimes with which the petitioner had been charged.
    Furthermore, the habeas court expressly found that
    the prosecutor had already informed the petitioner’s
    pretrial counsel of the warrant’s existence at the time
    the petitioner pleaded guilty. Any confusion the peti-
    tioner may have had as to his mother’s exposure to
    perjury charges therefore cannot be attributed to the
    prosecutor’s conduct. Thus, it is apparent that no prose-
    cutorial impropriety occurred.
    IV
    Finally, the petitioner challenges several evidentiary
    rulings made by the habeas court. The petitioner argues
    that the court improperly (1) restricted the petitioner’s
    examination of the prosecutor regarding her behavior
    at the sentencing proceeding, (2) restricted the petition-
    er’s examination of his father and Attorney Bailey
    regarding the terms of the plea agreement, and (3)
    refused to allow the testimony of a private investigator
    offered to impeach pretrial counsel under the residual
    exception to the hearsay rule.
    The rulings with which the petitioner takes issue are
    of the type left within the sound discretion of the habeas
    court. See Corbett v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    133 Conn. App. 310
    , 318, 
    34 A.3d 1046
     (2012) (‘‘Unless an
    evidentiary ruling involves a clear misconception of the
    law, the [habeas] court has broad discretion in ruling
    on the admissibility . . . of evidence. . . . The
    [habeas] court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be
    overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the
    court’s discretion.’’ [Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.]). After a careful review of the record, we are not
    persuaded that the habeas court abused its discretion
    in regard to these evidentiary matters.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    Although the transcript reads ‘‘That they were going to charge my
    mother,’’ all parties at the habeas proceedings agreed that either the tran-
    script was erroneous or that the petitioner had misspoken.
    2
    The petitioner also claims that pretrial counsel labored under a conflict
    of interest in that they had a financial interest in representing the petitioner’s
    mother on the perjury charges against her and therefore were motivated to
    hastily resolve the petitioner’s case. The habeas court concluded that there
    was no evidence whatsoever to support this allegation, and the petitioner
    has failed to identify anything in the record that would give us cause to
    question that conclusion.
    3
    We note that, typically, when a habeas petitioner has failed to file a
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea or to challenge the validity of the plea
    on direct appeal, a habeas challenge to the validity of the plea based on a
    claim of insufficient canvass by the trial court is subject to procedural
    default. See Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    286 Conn. 477
    , 489,
    
    944 A.2d 340
     (2008). As the habeas court rejected the defense of procedural
    default in this case, and the respondent has not adequately challenged that
    ruling on appeal, we review the habeas court’s decision as to the claim of
    insufficiency of canvass on the merits. See Almedina v. Commissioner of
    Correction, 
    109 Conn. App. 1
    , 5–6, 
    950 A.2d 553
    , cert. denied, 
    289 Conn. 925
    , 
    958 A.2d 150
     (2008).
    4
    In particular, the petitioner asks us to consider the following portions
    of the transcript:
    ‘‘The Court: All right. Mr. Shelfebine, [I] ask you to stand please. I have
    some questions to make sure you understand what it is you’re doing in
    entering these pleas of guilty . . . . Have you discussed these matters with
    your attorneys?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Are you satisfied with the attorneys’ advice to you? I’m not
    asking you if you’re pleased with the disposition, but I’m asking if you’re
    satisfied with the legal advice they’ve given you.
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: With all due respect, Your Honor, I’m kind of confused
    with all these—throughout the whole process here, but I guess they, they—
    I hired them to tell me what to think, so, yeah, I guess.
    ‘‘The Court: Well, they don’t tell you what to think. They give you legal
    information so that you can make a decision. If you’re confused, you can ask
    your attorneys right now about any matters that are confusing to resolve it.
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: All right. Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: You’re satisfied with the advice they’ve given you?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Sure.
    ‘‘The Court: And if there’s any other matters you’re confused about, this
    is the time to resolve them so that we don’t have a situation where later
    on you’re going to indicate, well, I didn’t really understand it. Do you have
    any other questions you want to ask your attorneys? You ask them. Don’t
    tell me what it is you want to ask them.
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yea, whatever. Yeah, have no questions, Your Honor.
    ‘‘The Court: All right. Did your attorneys explain to you the elements of
    each of these offenses, that is what the state’s attorneys, the prosecutor,
    would have to prove in order to convict you . . . ? Did they explain those
    to you?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yeah, they did.
    ‘‘The Court: Did they explain the maximum penalties to you for each of
    the offenses?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, they did.
    ***
    ‘‘The Court: By pleading guilty, you’re giving up certain rights. . . . Do
    you understand that?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Again, Your Honor, understanding all this and the pro-
    cess is one big confusion for me, but yes, I do.
    ‘‘The Court: What are those—what are you confused about?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: What rights that you’re giving up are you confused about?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: I understand the rights I’m giving up.
    ‘‘The Court: Sir, I don’t want you to just answer yes because you want
    to get this over with. If you have questions about these rights, you can ask
    me, ask your attorneys, and now is the time to do it. So, I give you that
    opportunity right now to ask your attorneys any question or ask me any
    question about the rights that you’re giving up by pleading guilty instead of
    having a trial.
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Do I have to—
    ‘‘The Court: Ask your attorneys.
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Okay. Go ahead with it, yeah, Your Honor.
    ‘‘The Court: You have any more questions to ask?
    ‘‘[The Petitioner]: No, not really.’’
    5
    As with the claim of insufficient canvass, we review this prosecutorial
    impropriety claim on the merits because the respondent has not adequately
    challenged on appeal the habeas court’s rejection of the defense of proce-
    dural default.