Levine v. 418 Meadow Street Associates, LLC ( 2016 )


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    BARBARA LEVINE v. 418 MEADOW STREET
    ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL.
    (AC 36919)
    Sheldon, Keller and Flynn, Js.
    Argued October 13, 2015—officially released March 15, 2016
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Fairfield, Tyma, J.)
    Michael S. Lynch, for the appellants (plaintiff and
    counterclaim defendant).
    Andrew M. McPherson, with whom, on the brief, was
    William J. Kupinse, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
    Opinion
    FLYNN, J. The plaintiff and counterclaim defendant,
    Barbara Levine, and the counterclaim defendant, Steven
    Levine, appeal from the judgment of the trial court,1 in
    favor of the defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs, 418
    Meadow Street Associates, LLC (Meadow), Michael
    Weinshel, and Mark Wynnick.2 Barbara and Steven
    Levine claim that the court erred by denying their
    motions to set aside, and for remittitur of, the jury
    verdict. We conclude that despite any perceived imper-
    fections in the appeal form, we have jurisdiction to
    adjudicate this appeal, and on the basis of the limited
    record before us, that the appellants have not shown
    that the court abused its discretion in denying their
    motions. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    The record reveals the following procedural history
    and facts which the jury reasonably could have found.
    The underlying action arose out of the ownership of a
    commercial building located at 418 Meadow Street in
    Fairfield (property). Barbara Levine and her husband,
    Steven Levine, formed the limited liability company,
    Meadow, in November, 1998, for the purpose of acquir-
    ing and operating the property, which included an
    income-producing building. Barbara and Steven Levine
    were each 50 percent members of Meadow at the time
    of its formation; Meadow’s only asset was the property.
    On or about June 1, 2005, Weinshel and Wynnick collec-
    tively purchased Steven Levine’s 50 percent interest
    in Meadow, thereby becoming members with Barbara
    Levine. Weinshel purchased 33.33 percent of Meadow
    at a cost of $222,400.46, and Wynnick purchased 16.66
    percent at a cost of $41,666.67.
    Prior to and subsequent to the time Weinshel and
    Wynnick became members of Meadow, it had tenants
    which were associated with Steven Levine.3 After June,
    2005, Meadow began having difficulty collecting rents
    from those tenants. Steven Levine subsequently filed
    for bankruptcy in October, 2005.
    The members agreed to a Restated Operating
    Agreement for Meadow designating Weinshel and Ste-
    ven Levine as comanagers. The agreement required the
    members’ approval of all leases. The relationship
    between the Levines and Weinshel and Wynnick deteri-
    orated during and after 2005, due to disagreements
    regarding management and operations of the building.
    Steven Levine signed a lease as comanager of Meadow
    with One Solution Services, LLC (One Solution), effec-
    tive July 1, 2006. However, he represented to Weinshel
    and Wynnick that there was not a current lease between
    Meadow and One Solution, but rather that negotiations
    were continuing regarding a new lease. Meanwhile,
    although Meadow was attempting to collect unpaid rent
    from One Solution as a holdover tenant, Steven Levine
    directed One Solution’s bookkeeper to ignore requests
    from Weinshel and Wynnick for payment of rent to
    Meadow.
    Meadow subsequently brought actions against the
    aforementioned tenants to obtain rents owed, which
    Barbara Levine opposed. Meadow brought two separate
    actions against One Solution for nonpayment of rents
    and received judgments of $41,000 and $60,000 against
    One Solution, which remained unsatisfied. Evidence
    introduced during trial demonstrated that One Solution
    owed Meadow $82,451.48. Meadow also brought an
    action against Steven Levine for wrongful withholding
    of security deposits, and received a judgment of
    $20,762.83 plus costs of $139.40. Barbara Levine also
    executed affidavits for the purpose of assisting One
    Solution and Steven Levine to open judgments entered
    against them in favor of Meadow. Additionally, Meadow
    brought an action against Clean Air Group, Inc. (Clean
    Air) for payment of rent, but at the time of trial in the
    present action there was no judgment entered in the
    case. Evidence introduced during this trial demon-
    strated that Clean Air owed Meadow $100,048.57.
    Meadow also brought an action against Eco Ion Tech-
    nologies, LLC, resulting in a settlement agreement
    under which Meadow was to receive $50,000. However,
    Meadow received only $30,000 and placed a garnish-
    ment on Clean Air to secure the remaining $20,000, but
    Clean Air did not pay Meadow any money related to
    the garnishment.
    The property was initially valued between $3.4 mil-
    lion and $3.55 million, and was subject to a mortgage
    of approximately $2.5 million held by People’s Bank.
    Meadow subsequently defaulted on the mortgage for
    the property, and, ultimately in May, 2008, Meadow’s
    interest in the property was extinguished when the bank
    obtained a foreclosure judgment against Meadow and
    a sale was ordered. An appraisal performed on May 28,
    2009, valued the property at $2 million at the time the
    final foreclosure judgment was entered. In December,
    2009, the property sold at a foreclosure sale for
    $1,550,000.
    The action that generated the counterclaims at issue
    in this appeal was commenced in September, 2007,
    when Barbara Levine brought suit seeking dissolution
    of Meadow and claimed money damages, alleging that
    Weinshel and Wynnick breached fiduciary duties owed
    to her, and that as a result she suffered damages. Weins-
    hel and Wynnick denied the claims and filed counter-
    claims against Barbara and Steven Levine, claiming that
    the Levines breached fiduciary and other duties owed
    to them, causing them to suffer money damages. In
    their amended counterclaims, Weinshel and Wynnick
    alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, breaches of statutory
    duties under General Statutes § 34-141, and violation
    of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
    General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Barbara Levine filed
    a second amended complaint against the defendants
    on September 24, 2012, in which she sought dissolution
    of Meadow and a winding up of the affairs of the com-
    pany. Barbara also alleged that Weinshel and Wynnick
    breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    and their fiduciary duties owed to her under the
    operating agreement.4
    Following trial, the jury returned its verdict and found
    against Barbara Levine on her breach of fiduciary duty
    claims as well as her breach of the covenant of good
    faith and fair dealing claims. The jury further found
    for Weinshel and Wynnick on their counterclaims that
    Barbara and Steven Levine breached fiduciary duties
    as well as statutory duties owed to them under § 34-
    141, but rejected their CUPTA counterclaim against the
    Levines. The jury awarded damages to Weinshel and
    Wynnick in the amounts of $222,400 and $41,667,
    respectively, on their breach of fiduciary duty and statu-
    tory duty claims.
    Barbara and Steven Levine subsequently filed a
    motion to set aside the verdict and a motion for remitti-
    tur of the verdict, to which the defendants filed objec-
    tions. The court, Tyma, J., denied both motions without
    issuing written memoranda of decision. This appeal
    followed.
    I
    As a preliminary matter, the defendants argue that we
    should decline to review Barbara and Steven Levine’s
    appeal because they have not properly invoked this
    court’s jurisdiction. The defendants assert that this
    court lacks jurisdiction because Barbara and Steven
    Levine did not file an appeal form indicating that they
    sought review of the court’s decisions denying their
    motions to set aside the verdict and for remittitur of
    the verdict. We disagree and conclude that this court
    has jurisdiction to review this appeal.
    Because the subject matter jurisdiction of this court
    is challenged, we commence our review by addressing
    that claim. ‘‘Whenever a claim of lack of jurisdiction is
    brought to the court’s attention, it must be resolved
    before the court can proceed.’’ Gallant v. Cavallaro, 
    50 Conn. App. 132
    , 134, 
    717 A.2d 283
    , cert. denied, 
    247 Conn. 936
    , 
    722 A.2d 1216
     (1998), cert. denied, 
    528 U.S. 1005
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 500
    , 145 L. Ed. 2d. 386 (1999). ‘‘It is
    axiomatic that unless the jurisdiction of this court is
    properly invoked, we cannot exercise our appellate
    jurisdiction.’’ Rocque v. DeMilo & Co., 
    85 Conn. App. 512
    , 527, 
    857 A.2d 976
     (2004). ‘‘[I]n determining whether
    a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presump-
    tion favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Pritchard v. Pritchard, 
    281 Conn. 262
    , 275, 
    914 A.2d 1025
     (2007).
    ‘‘The right to an appeal is not a constitutional one. It
    is but a statutory privilege available to one who strictly
    complies with the statutes and rules on which the privi-
    lege is granted.’’ Chanosky v. City Building Supply
    Co., 
    152 Conn. 449
    , 451, 
    208 A.2d 337
     (1965). However,
    our Supreme Court stated in Pritchard v. Pritchard,
    
    supra,
     
    281 Conn. 275
    , that ‘‘the forms for appeals and
    amended appeals do not in any way implicate appellate
    subject matter jurisdiction. They are merely the formal,
    technical vehicles by which parties seek to invoke that
    jurisdiction. Compliance with them need not be perfect;
    it is the substance that matters, not the form.’’ Cf.
    Rocque v. DeMilo & Co., supra, 
    85 Conn. App. 527
     (claim
    not listed on appeal form but raised initially in appellate
    brief distinguished from technical defect and consid-
    ered ‘‘a defect of substantive dimension that implicates
    this court’s jurisdiction to entertain the claim’’).
    The appeal form, JD-SC-28, indicates that the appeal
    is taken from the ‘‘motion to dismiss granted in favor
    of defendants (see jury verdict (#174), memorandum
    of decision (#196); and judgment of dismissal (#197).’’
    Although the appeal form does not indicate that Barbara
    and Steven Levine have appealed from the court’s deci-
    sions denying the motions to set aside the verdict or
    for remittitur, their intention to appeal from those deci-
    sions was made clear in the preliminary statement of
    issues filed with this court. That preliminary statement
    of issues included, in relevant part: ‘‘Did the trial court
    err in failing to set aside the jury verdict where the
    damages awarded to the counterclaim plaintiffs Michael
    Weinshel and Mark Wynnick were not supported by the
    evidence at trial, and were not in conformance with
    Connecticut law of damages.’’
    ‘‘In accordance with [its] policy not to exalt form
    over substance, [our Supreme Court has] been reluctant
    to dismiss appeals for technical deficiencies in an appel-
    lant’s appeal form. See State v. Findlay, 
    198 Conn. 328
    ,
    329 n.2, 
    502 A.2d 921
    , cert. denied, 
    476 U.S. 1159
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 2279
    , 
    90 L. Ed. 2d 721
     (1986) (disregarding error
    on appeal form mistakenly indicating that appeal was
    being taken from jury verdict rather than judgment,
    concluding that defect in form is not jurisdictional in
    nature); see also Brown v. Rosen, 
    36 Conn. App. 206
    ,
    210, 
    650 A.2d 568
     (1994) (disregarding appellant’s fail-
    ure to indicate on appeal form that appeal was being
    taken from final judgment).’’ Rocque v. DeMilo & Co.,
    supra, 
    85 Conn. App. 527
    . Barbara and Steven Levine
    referenced the jury verdict itself on the appeal form,
    which can be interpreted as an intention to appeal from
    the judgment. See State v. Kurvin, 
    186 Conn. 555
    , 556
    n.1, 
    442 A.2d 1327
     (1982) (‘‘[a]lthough the defendant
    purported to appeal from the verdict rather than the
    judgment as required by General Statutes § 52-263, this
    defect in form not being jurisdictional in nature . . .
    may be disregarded’’ [citation omitted]).
    In Pritchard v. Pritchard, 
    supra,
     
    281 Conn. 275
    –76,
    our Supreme Court held that although the wrong judg-
    ment date was listed on the appeal form, it was clear
    from the attached amended preliminary statement of
    issues that the appeal was intended to be taken from
    the correct judgment date. The court distinguished
    Rocque v. DeMilo & Co., supra, 
    85 Conn. App. 527
    ,
    noting that in Rocque, the ‘‘claim was not raised in
    the defendants’ preliminary statement of issues, but
    appear[ed] for the first time in their appellate brief.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pritchard v. Pritch-
    ard, 
    supra, 275
    . Here, as in Pritchard, the intent of
    Barbara and Steven Levine to appeal from the court’s
    decision denying their motion to set aside the verdict
    was apparent from the preliminary statement of issues.
    See 
    id., 262
    . It is a fair inference from what the Levines
    did state in their preliminary statement of issues,
    namely, that the verdict was not in accordance with
    the evidence at trial, that if the entire verdict were not
    set aside, that they sought review of their motion for
    remittitur, claiming that its amount should at least be
    lessened. In State v. Lanasa, 
    141 Conn. App. 685
    , 687
    n.1, 
    62 A.3d 572
    , cert. denied, 
    308 Conn. 945
    , 
    66 A.3d 885
     (2013), although the appeal form indicated that the
    defendant was appealing from the denial of a motion
    for waiver of fees and costs, which is not an appealable
    judgment, subject matter jurisdiction existed on appeal
    because it was clear from the preliminary statement of
    issues that the defendant was challenging the judgment
    of conviction. Therefore, despite the imprecise lan-
    guage used on the appeal form, viewing the substance
    of Barbara and Steven Levine’s amended appeal, they
    have sufficiently invoked this court’s jurisdiction, and
    we will review their claims on appeal.
    II
    We next turn to the merits of the Levines’ appeal.
    They claim that the court erred by denying their motions
    to set aside, and for remittitur of, the jury verdict. We
    are not persuaded.
    We first address the defendants’ argument that the
    record for reviewing Barbara and Steven Levine’s
    claims is inadequate. The defendants argue that the trial
    court’s judgment should be affirmed because the case
    of Murcia v. Geyer, 
    151 Conn. App. 227
    , 230, 
    93 A.3d 1189
    , cert. denied, 
    314 Conn. 917
    , 
    100 A.3d 406
     (2014),
    is analogous to the present case. We agree that Murcia
    is relevant to our inquiry, however, we disagree that the
    record is so inadequate as to prevent review. Instead, as
    in Murcia, we review the appellants’ claims on the
    limited record provided. See 
    id.,
     231 n.1. Given our duty
    to make every reasonable presumption in favor of the
    correctness of the court’s decision; 
    id., 231
    ; our review
    of the limited record before us leads us to conclude
    that the court acted reasonably and did not abuse its
    discretion in denying their motions to set aside, and
    for remittitur of, the verdict.
    In the present case, we do not decline to review
    Barbara and Steven Levine’s claims, rather we review
    the claims on the record provided. See 
    id.
     Nor is our
    resolution founded solely upon the failure of Barbara
    and Steven Levine to seek an articulation, but also upon
    their failure to procure memoranda of decision.5 See 
    id.
    When reviewing both a motion to set aside the verdict
    and a motion for remittitur, the trial judge must review
    the evidence from the viewpoint of sustaining the ver-
    dict. Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 
    303 Conn. 276
    ,
    281, 
    32 A.3d 318
     (2011); Kregos v. Stone, 
    88 Conn. App. 459
    , 468, 
    872 A.2d 901
    , cert. denied, 
    275 Conn. 901
    , 
    882 A.2d 672
     (2005). On such an appeal, ‘‘the conclusion of
    the trial court from the vantage point of the trial bench
    cannot be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of
    discretion. . . . An appellate court cannot retry the
    facts of a case or pass upon the credibility of the wit-
    nesses. . . . The trial court’s refusal to set aside a ver-
    dict is entitled to great weight and every reasonable
    presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.
    . . . If, on the evidence, the jury could reasonably have
    decided as they did, [the reviewing court] will not find
    error in the trial court’s acceptance of the verdict
    . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Malmberg v. Lopez, 
    208 Conn. 675
    , 679, 
    546 A.2d 264
     (1988).
    Appellate review of motions for remittitur is even
    more restrictive. Remittitur should be both rare and
    exceptional. ‘‘[R]eview of the trial court’s grant of
    remittitur is dictated by, on the one hand, the high bar
    that must be met before a trial judge may set aside a
    jury verdict, and, on the other hand, the necessarily
    broad authority that the trial judge has to oversee the
    trial process. The right of trial by jury is of ancient
    origin, characterized by Blackstone as the glory of the
    English law and the most transcendent privilege which
    any subject can enjoy . . . . [Our Supreme Court has]
    repeatedly . . . stated that the award of damages, in
    particular, is a matter peculiarly within the province of
    the trier of facts. . . . For that reason, [our Supreme
    Court has] consistently . . . held that a court should
    exercise its authority to order a remittitur rarely—only
    in the most exceptional of circumstances.’’ (Citations
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saleh v.
    Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, supra, 
    303 Conn. 280
    .
    When considering a motion to set aside a verdict,
    Malmberg teaches us that the evidence before the jury
    is vital. See Malmberg v. Lopez, supra, 
    208 Conn. 679
    –80.
    There was abundant evidence from which the jury could
    have concluded that Barbara and Steven Levine
    engaged in a long pattern of self-dealing and obstructive
    conduct that frustrated the purpose of successfully
    operating Meadow, whose sole purpose was the owner-
    ship of the single commercial building. There was also
    evidence from which a jury might have concluded that
    the defendants, Weinshel and Wynnick, lost invest-
    ments of $222,400.46 and $41,666.67, respectively,
    which were irretrievable when the property that was
    Meadow’s sole asset was foreclosed by People’s Bank.
    In Murcia, this court stated that ‘‘pursuant to Practice
    Book § 64-1 (a), the court was required to state, either
    orally or in writing, a decision that encompassed its
    conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties
    and the factual basis therefor. . . . If an oral decision
    is rendered, a signed transcript of the oral decision
    should be created and filed for use in any appeal. If
    the court fails to file an oral or written decision, the
    appellant, who has the duty to provide an adequate
    record for appellate review; see Practice Book § 61-10;
    must file a notice to that effect with the appellate clerk
    in accordance with Practice Book § 64-1 (b).’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Murcia v. Geyer, supra, 
    151 Conn. App. 230
    . In the present case, the court’s denial
    of Barbara and Steven Levine’s motions to set aside,
    and for remittitur of, the verdict thereby rendering judg-
    ment in accordance with the jury verdict, constituted
    an appealable issue pursuant to General Statutes § 52-
    263.6 Similar to Murcia, the court in this case did not file
    written memoranda of decision explaining its rulings on
    Barbara and Steven Levine’s motions, nor did it prepare
    and sign a transcript of any oral rulings. See id. Also
    analogous to Murcia, Barbara and Steven Levine failed
    to file a notice with the appellate clerk’s office pursuant
    to Practice Book § 64-1, or a motion requesting the
    court to articulate the factual and legal basis for its
    ruling. See id.; see also Practice Book § 66-5.
    This court, in Murcia, concluded that although ‘‘the
    record . . . include[d] the trial transcript, [it could not]
    readily identify any portion of it that encompasse[d] the
    court’s factual findings with respect to the defendants’
    claim . . . .’’ Murcia v. Geyer, supra, 
    151 Conn. App. 230
    . In any review of a motion to set aside the verdict
    and/or a motion for remittitur, given the deference our
    standard of review requires to the trial court’s decision,
    it is especially important to know what evidence before
    the jury justified the verdict in the court’s mind. Similar
    to Murcia, in the present case, although we have the
    trial transcript, there is no indication of the specific
    facts which the court found reasonably supported the
    denial of Barbara and Steven Levine’s motions to set
    aside, and for remittitur of, the verdict.7 See 
    id.
    The essence of the defendants’ claim briefed on
    appeal is that the jury could not have awarded damages
    for the defendants’ capital contributions to Meadow
    because the complaint only referenced, in all of its
    counts, losses due to the foreclosure of Meadow’s prop-
    erty by People’s Bank, and the value of the property at
    the time of foreclosure was less than the amount of the
    mortgage at the time of foreclosure. However, it was
    possible for the jury to have found that Meadow’s prop-
    erty became less valuable, not enough rent was col-
    lected to satisfy mortgage payments, and the property
    was subsequently foreclosed because of the self-dealing
    and obstructive behavior of Barbara and Steven Levine.
    The jury also could have concluded that the defendants,
    Weinshel and Wynnick, lost the entire amount of their
    investments in Meadow when the property was fore-
    closed. Therefore, it would have been reasonable for
    the jury to conclude that absent the self-dealing and
    obstructive behavior of Barbara and Steven Levine,
    Meadow’s property might not have been foreclosed,
    and the defendants, Weinshel and Wynnick, would not
    have lost their investments in Meadow.
    We are ‘‘[c]ognizant that we must make every reason-
    able presumption in favor of the correctness of the
    court’s decision . . . .’’ 
    Id.,
     230–31. Therefore, on the
    basis of our review of the limited record provided to
    us, we conclude that the Levines have not shown that
    the court acted unreasonably or abused its discretion
    in denying their motions to set aside, and for remittitur
    of, the verdict thereby rendering judgment in favor of
    the defendants on their counterclaims, in accordance
    with the jury verdict. See 
    id., 231
    .
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The defendants, who were also counterclaim plaintiffs, originally filed
    a cross appeal, but later withdrew it.
    2
    Although both Weinshel and Wynnick were also counterclaim plaintiffs,
    we refer to them throughout the opinion as the defendants.
    3
    The tenants associated with Steven Levine were (1) One Solution Ser-
    vices, LLC, (One Solution), (2) Clean Air Partners, LLC, now known as Clean
    Air Group, Inc., (Clean Air), and (3) Eco Ion Technologies, LLC (Eco). Prior
    to filing for bankruptcy, Steven Levine had an ownership interest in Indoor
    Air Quality Partners, LLC, which had an ownership of 34 percent in Eco.
    Steven Levine also had an ownership interest in One Solution, which he
    sold to third parties, who then sold to his father. Although it is unclear what
    Steven Levine’s job title was at One Solution, from 2005, until the date of
    foreclosure, he received compensation and loans from One Solution. Steven
    Levine has an ownership interest of approximately 20 percent in Clean Air,
    and also received compensation from Clean Air from 2005, until the date
    of the foreclosure.
    4
    These claims were tried to a jury before the court, Tyma, J., in September,
    2012, and the parties and court agreed that the statutory dissolution claims
    would be tried at a later date to the court. In November, 2013, the defendants
    filed a motion to dismiss the remaining counts of the complaint, which the
    court granted on May 16, 2014. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal.
    5
    ‘‘Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-10, which was amended October 18,
    2012, to take effect January 1, 2013, this court will not decline to review a
    claim on appeal solely on the basis of a party’s failure to seek an articulation.
    See Practice Book § 61-10 (b). As stated in the commentary to the rule,
    however, the new subsection (b) that was created by the amendment was
    not intended to preclude this court from declining to review an issue where
    the record is inadequate for reasons other than solely the failure to seek
    an articulation, such as, for example, the failure to procure the trial court’s
    decision pursuant to [Practice Book §] 64-1 (b) . . . . Practice Book § 61-
    10, commentary. . . . Gordon v. Gordon, [
    148 Conn. App. 59
    , 68 n.10, 
    84 A.3d 923
     (2014)].
    ‘‘The new subsection also in no way alters the responsibility of an appellant
    to ensure that the appellate record is perfected for proper presentation of
    all claims raised. See Macricostas v. Kovacs, 
    67 Conn. App. 130
    , 133, 
    787 A.2d 64
     (2001) (The duty to provide this court with a record adequate for
    review rests with the appellant. . . . It is incumbent upon the appellant to
    take the necessary steps to sustain its burden of providing an adequate record
    for appellate review. Practice Book § [60-5] . . . . It is not the function of
    this court to find facts. . . . Our role is . . . to review claims based on a
    complete factual record developed by a trial court. . . . Without the neces-
    sary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any
    decision made by us respecting [the defendant’s claims] would be entirely
    speculative. . . . Where the transcript does not reveal the basis of the
    court’s factual conclusion, we will not review the appellant’s claims. . . .
    ‘‘In the present case, we do not decline to review the defendants’ claim,
    rather we review the claim on the record provided. Nor is our resolution
    founded solely upon the defendants’ failure to seek an articulation, but upon
    their failure to procure a memorandum of decision.’’ (Citation omitted;
    emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murcia v. Geyer,
    supra, 
    151 Conn. App. 231
     n.1.
    6
    General Statutes § 52-263 states: ‘‘Upon the trial of all matters of fact in
    any cause or action in the Superior Court, whether to the court or jury, or
    before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding
    is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or
    judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial, including
    the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict, he may appeal to the court
    having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of such judge,
    or from the decision of the court granting a motion to set aside a verdict,
    except in small claims cases, which shall not be appealable, and appeals
    as provided in sections 8-8 and 8-9.’’
    7
    At oral argument before this court, counsel for Barbara and Steven
    Levine made the following representations about matters that Judge Tyma
    had put on the record. ‘‘And Judge Tyma made it very clear that he thought
    the jury did a very good job. He thought they got it right, and he said that
    on the record. And so he said he’s going to deny the motions for that reason.
    He thought the jury did a very good job and they got it right. . . . [Judge
    Tyma] explained only that he thought that the jury awarded damage where
    damage wasn’t—was appropriate under the circumstances. He thought the
    jury fairly assessed the situation and did not agree with me that only a
    nominal damage should be awarded.’’ However, we were not provided with
    a transcript or record of any of this.
    Barbara and Steven Levine supplied records of the trial in the Superior
    Court for the following dates: September 19, 2012; September 20, 2012;
    September 25, 2012; September 27, 2012; September 28, 2012; and October
    2, 2012. All of these dates preceded the dates of the motions to set aside,
    and for remittitur of, the verdict, which were both dated October 12, 2012.
    We were provided no transcripts for proceedings in the Superior Court
    before Judge Tyma after October 12, 2012, that would shed light on his
    reasoning for refusing to set aside the verdict and denying any remittitur
    of its amount.