WiFiLand, LLP v. Hudson ( 2014 )


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    WIFILAND, LLP v. MARY HUDSON ET AL.
    (AC 34977)
    (AC 36100)
    Keller, Prescott and Sullivan, Js.
    Argued May 27—officially released September 23, 2014
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Stamford-Norwalk, Genuario, J.)
    Christopher G. Winans, for the appellant-appellee
    (plaintiff).
    David P. Burke, for the appellees-appellants
    (defendants).
    Opinion
    PRESCOTT, J. This consolidated appeal arises from
    a breach of contract action brought by the plaintiff,
    WiFiLand, LLP, against the defendants Mary Hudson,
    George Hudson, and St. Louis RV Park.1 The plaintiff
    appeals, and the defendants cross appeal, from the judg-
    ment rendered after a trial to the court in favor of the
    plaintiff and awarding it $1 in nominal damages, and
    from the court’s subsequent order awarding the plaintiff
    $5000 in attorney’s fees. The defendants also appeal
    from the court’s judgment denying their motion to
    enforce a postjudgment settlement agreement. As to the
    judgment on the complaint and the subsequent award
    of attorney’s fees, the defendants claim that the court
    improperly found that the defendants breached the par-
    ties’ agreement;2 and the plaintiff claims that the court
    improperly (1) failed to consider the parties’ stipulation
    regarding damages and (2) awarded only $5000 in attor-
    ney’s fees.3 The defendants additionally claim that the
    court failed to find that there was an enforceable post-
    judgment settlement agreement. We affirm the judg-
    ments of the trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff pro-
    vides wireless internet services to recreational vehicle
    (RV) parks and campgrounds throughout the United
    States. The defendants operate an RV park in St. Louis,
    Missouri, where RV owners can rent space on a daily,
    weekly, or monthly basis. In March, 2010, the parties
    entered into a ‘‘license agreement’’ (agreement), in
    which the plaintiff agreed to install various equipment
    on the defendants’ property, as well as provide wireless
    internet services to the defendants’ RV park so that
    its customers could purchase internet access during
    their stay.
    The plaintiff arranged for a third party technician,
    Terry Mitchell, to install the plaintiff’s equipment on the
    defendants’ premises, and the defendants were satisfied
    with the plaintiff’s services until late April, 2010.
    Between late April and June, 2010, during the defen-
    dants’ busy season, several of the defendants’ guests
    experienced trouble accessing and using the internet,
    and communicated their dissatisfaction to both the
    defendants and the plaintiff. In late June, 2010, the sys-
    tem stopped working altogether for a short period of
    time.
    Internet service subsequently was restored, but a
    variety of issues continued to exist. On several
    instances thereafter, the defendants informed the plain-
    tiff that their customers were not satisfied with the
    quality of the internet service provided. The defendants
    made various good faith efforts to attempt to improve
    the internet service at the park, but, notwithstanding
    those efforts and multiple communications between the
    plaintiff and the defendants, the defendants were never
    satisfied with the quality of the internet service.
    In late October, 2010, there was another more
    extended internet outage. At the plaintiff’s request,
    Mitchell returned to the defendants’ facility to investi-
    gate the issue. After investigating, Mitchell communi-
    cated to the defendants that there was nothing he could
    do to get the system to operate correctly.
    On or about November 26, 2010, Mary Hudson, on
    behalf of the defendants, sent a letter to the plaintiff
    stating: ‘‘Be advised that there is no contract nor was
    one executed. You have ten days to remove your equip-
    ment.’’4 In response, on December 7, 2010, the plaintiff
    sent a second letter to the defendants notifying them
    that it considered the defendants to be in material
    breach of the agreement, for, among other things, termi-
    nating the agreement without providing proper ade-
    quate notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged
    breach.
    The plaintiff initiated this action and filed a one count
    complaint dated January 18, 2011, alleging breach of
    contract. The action subsequently was tried to the court,
    Genuario, J. In its May 7, 2012 memorandum of deci-
    sion, the court concluded that the defendants had
    breached the agreement by ‘‘insisting [that] the plaintiff
    remove its equipment without providing the plaintiff
    with the [forty-five] day period in which to cure any
    failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with the
    material provisions of the agreement.’’ The court also
    found that the plaintiff had failed to prove actual dam-
    ages or that it was entitled to liquidated damages pursu-
    ant to the liquidated damages clause of the agreement.
    Accordingly, the court ordered the defendants to pay
    $1 in nominal damages.
    The plaintiff then filed a motion for attorney’s fees
    on May 17, 2012, requesting the court to order the defen-
    dants to pay more than $50,000 in attorney’s fees. The
    court scheduled this motion for an evidentiary hearing
    several times, but, after several continuances, the par-
    ties consented to the court deciding the issue on the
    basis of the affidavits, exhibits and memoranda on file.
    On May 29, 2012, before the court decided the motion
    for attorney’s fees, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue
    and for reconsideration of the underlying claim, seeking
    both the right to reargue and the opportunity to offer
    further evidence on damages. In its motion to reargue,
    the plaintiff contended that the court should have
    awarded it $23,281.08 in damages because, according
    to the plaintiff, the defendants had stipulated at trial
    as to this amount of damages. The court granted the
    motion to reargue and held a hearing on July 9, 2012.
    After hearing argument from all parties, the court
    affirmed its prior decision ordering the defendants to
    pay $1 in nominal damages.
    On August 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed this appeal,
    challenging the award of only nominal damages, and,
    on September 10, 2012, the defendants cross-appealed,
    challenging the court’s finding that they breached the
    agreement.
    On May 6, 2013, the court granted the plaintiff’s
    motion for attorney’s fees and ordered the defendants
    to pay $5000. The parties then amended their appeal and
    cross appeal to challenge the award of attorney’s fees.
    While those appeals were pending, the parties
    entered into settlement negotiations. On July 19, 2013,
    the defendants filed a motion to enforce an alleged
    agreement between the parties to settle the underlying
    breach of contract case, the plaintiff’s appeal and the
    defendants’ cross appeal. On September 9, 2013, the
    court held an evidentiary hearing on that matter, and,
    thereafter, denied the defendants’ motion to enforce
    the alleged settlement agreement. The defendants filed
    a timely appeal from that ruling on September 26, 2013,
    and, on October 22, 2013, the defendants moved to
    consolidate that appeal with the earlier amended appeal
    and amended cross appeal relating to the court’s origi-
    nal judgment and award of attorney’s fees. This court
    granted the defendants’ motion to consolidate on Octo-
    ber 28, 2013. Additional facts will be set forth as nec-
    essary.
    I
    We first address the defendants’ claim that the court
    improperly found that they had breached the parties’
    agreement by terminating it without providing the plain-
    tiff with forty-five days written notice and an opportu-
    nity to cure the alleged breach. The defendants argue
    that because they terminated the agreement solely on
    the basis of the internet system’s failure to function and
    provide internet service for their customers properly,
    rather than on any claimed breach of the agreement by
    the plaintiff, no forty-five day notice and opportunity
    to cure was required. We conclude that the court’s find-
    ing that the defendants breached the agreement was
    not clearly erroneous.
    ‘‘Ordinarily, the determination of whether a contract
    has been materially breached is a question of fact, sub-
    ject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . .
    A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
    evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
    although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
    court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
    firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’
    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Strouth v. Pools by Murphy & Sons, Inc., 
    79 Conn. App. 55
    , 59–60, 
    829 A.2d 102
     (2003).
    In the present matter, paragraph twelve of the
    agreement, titled ‘‘Default,’’ provides in relevant part:
    ‘‘(a) In the event of [the plaintiff’s] default in compliance
    with any material provision of this [agreement], [the
    defendants] may, at [their] option, upon [forty-five]
    days written notice, terminate this [agreement]. . . .
    (c) In the event of [plaintiff’s] failure to comply with
    any material provision of this [agreement], which failure
    is not cured within forty-five . . . days after receipt of
    written notice thereof from [the defendants] . . . [the
    defendants] may, at [their] option, terminate this
    [agreement].’’ (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, pursu-
    ant to the clear and unambiguous terms of the
    agreement, before the defendants could terminate the
    parties’ agreement on the basis of a failure to receive
    any agreed upon services pursuant to a material provi-
    sion of the agreement, the defendants were required to
    give the plaintiff forty-five days written notice and an
    opportunity to cure the service issues.
    The defendants do not claim that the language of
    paragraph twelve is ambiguous or that the court misin-
    terpreted that provision in ruling in favor of the plaintiff.
    They also do not claim that the November 26, 2010
    letter, which requested that the plaintiff remove its
    equipment, thereby terminating services, substantially
    complied with the notice and cure provisions of para-
    graph twelve. Rather, the defendants argue that para-
    graph twelve was inapplicable because they were not
    terminating the agreement due to a breach and their
    letter did not expressly state that the plaintiff was in
    material breach of the agreement. Alternatively, even if
    applicable, the defendants argue that they were excused
    from complying with the notice and cure provisions of
    paragraph twelve because doing so under the circum-
    stances would have been futile.
    The defendants’ first argument lacks merit. The
    November 26, 2010 letter consisted of two sentences:
    ‘‘Be advised that there is no contract nor was one exe-
    cuted. You have ten days to remove your equipment.’’
    In considering the defendants’ intent in sending the
    November 26, 2010 letter, the court took into account
    Mary Hudson’s trial testimony that the first statement
    was a mistake and that the defendants in fact under-
    stood that their agreement with the plaintiff remained in
    effect, but that they wanted to terminate that agreement
    because of the poor quality of the internet service being
    provided. Thus, the defendants sought to terminate the
    agreement on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to pro-
    vide the quality of internet service agreed upon. The
    defendants certainly were entitled to terminate the
    agreement on that basis provided that they also com-
    plied with paragraph twelve’s notice requirement and
    the plaintiff failed to remedy the situation within forty-
    five days of receiving the written notice of termination.
    Nothing in paragraph twelve required the defendants
    to expressly state in their notice letter that they sought
    to terminate the agreement on the basis of a material
    breach by the plaintiff, and, thus, their decision to avoid
    stating such did not excuse their obligation to comply
    with the notice provision.
    As for the defendants’ second argument—that giving
    the requisite notice would have been futile and ‘‘[t]he
    law does not require the performance of a futile act’’;
    Luttinger v. Rosen, 
    164 Conn. 45
    , 47, 
    316 A.2d 757
    (1972); the court disagreed, and found on the basis of
    the evidence presented that proper notice would not
    necessarily have been futile. The defendants have failed
    to persuade us that the court’s finding was clearly
    erroneous.
    With respect to the defendants’ futility claim, the
    court found: ‘‘The evidence indicates that the system
    was operational at least to some extent and that the
    reasons for the lack of satisfaction of many of the cus-
    tomers had never been determined. A [forty-five] day
    cure period might well have resulted in more effort on
    the part of the plaintiff to finally address and resolve
    the issue. While the evidence certainly reveals growing
    dissatisfaction with the system on the part of the defen-
    dants, and a growing dissatisfaction, and perhaps even
    condescension, on the part of the plaintiff with the
    defendants, the evidence also reveals that, prior to the
    November [26, 2010] notice sent by the defendants, the
    parties did respond to each other’s communications.’’
    Because there is ample evidence in the record that
    supports the subordinate facts upon which the court
    based its decision, and because we are not left with a
    ‘‘definite and firm conviction’’ that the court committed
    an error in this case; Strouth v. Pools by Murphy &
    Sons, Inc., supra, 
    79 Conn. App. 559
    –60; we conclude
    that the court’s finding regarding futility was not clearly
    erroneous. In sum, we reject the defendants’ claim that
    the court improperly found that they had breached the
    parties’ agreement.
    II
    We turn next to the plaintiff’s claim that, in awarding
    only nominal damages, the court improperly failed to
    consider the parties’ alleged stipulation regarding dam-
    ages. The plaintiff argues that the parties stipulated on
    the record that the gross revenue the plaintiff would
    have collected over the remainder of the agreement
    would have been $23,281.08, and that that amount
    would be the appropriate amount of damages, pursuant
    to the agreement’s liquidated damages clause, if the
    plaintiff prevailed on its claim of breach of contract.
    The plaintiff, therefore, argues that the court’s decision
    awarding the plaintiff only nominal damages is inconsis-
    tent with the stipulation between the parties, and, thus,
    should be reversed. We disagree.
    The following facts are necessary for our resolution
    of this claim. In its case-in-chief, the plaintiff called
    John Borg, its managing partner, to discuss, inter alia,
    the average gross monthly revenue the plaintiff made
    during the six months that the plaintiff’s equipment was
    installed at the defendants’ facility. To support Borg’s
    testimony, the plaintiff entered into evidence a docu-
    ment prepared for use at trial detailing the plaintiff’s
    calculation of the average gross monthly revenue over
    the six months preceding the termination of the
    agreement and its calculation of the damages due under
    the agreement based on that figure.
    During Borg’s testimony on the figures and calcula-
    tions, the following exchange occurred between the
    court and counsel for the defendants:
    ‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Your Honor, just to save
    the court time, I’m going to stipulate to all of this. I’m
    still going to object to the exhibit.
    ‘‘The Court: I understand.
    ‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: But I will stipulate to all
    the mathematical computations. I will agree that if the
    mathematical computations were correct, the number
    would [be] $23,281.08. Are you going to offer it now?
    ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Thank you . . . .
    ‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Okay, stipulating.
    ‘‘The Court: Seventy-six months, and it’s 23,000?
    ‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: [$23,281.08] would be
    the damages per the contract based on this exhibit.
    Now I’m going to object to this exhibit.’’
    Following the conclusion of evidence on the second
    day of trial, the court, sua sponte, noted that a term
    seemed to be missing in the liquidated damages clause
    of the agreement. The clause provided: ‘‘Upon termina-
    tion by [the plaintiff] for [c]ause pursuant to this sec-
    tion, [plaintiff] shall be entitled to elect, in lieu of money
    damages, an award of liquidated damages in the lesser
    amount of [f]ifty [t]housand [d]ollars ($50,000.00) or
    the amount of average monthly during the six-month
    period preceding the termination realized by [the plain-
    tiff] for the provision of [c]ommunications [s]ervices
    multiplied by the number of months remaining in the
    then-current term for each such breach or violation.’’
    (Emphasis added.) The court found that there was a
    missing term between the words ‘‘monthly’’ and
    ‘‘during.’’
    In its brief submitted after trial, the plaintiff argued
    that the missing term was gross revenues. The defen-
    dants, however, argued that the clause lacked a material
    term, which made it ambiguous, and, therefore, it
    should not be applied. In any event, the court reasoned
    in its memorandum of decision that the clause should
    be construed against the plaintiff as the party who
    drafted the contract. See Sturman v. Socha, 
    191 Conn. 1
    , 9, 
    463 A.2d 527
     (1983) (‘‘[i]t is generally accepted
    . . . that when two or more meanings may fairly be
    given to language in a contract, the language is to be
    construed against the one who drew it . . . and, like-
    wise, the language of a contract is typically construed
    most strongly against the party whose language it is and
    for whose benefit it was inserted’’ [citation omitted]).
    The court found that the plaintiff drafted the
    agreement and that its construction would ‘‘tend to
    award the plaintiff damages in excess of the profit it
    would have realized in absence of a breach.’’ In light of
    those findings, the court determined that the plaintiff’s
    interpretation of the agreement was not equitable or
    fair, and concluded that the plaintiff did not prove that
    it was entitled to receive damages under the liquidated
    damages clause. Additionally, the court concluded that
    the plaintiff also failed to prove actual damages and,
    thus, awarded the plaintiff nominal damages of $1.
    At the hearing on the motion to reargue, the plaintiff
    argued that the parties had stipulated that the damages
    under the agreement would be the average monthly
    gross revenue, which equaled $23,281.08. The court con-
    cluded that ‘‘the stipulation was to the mathematical
    calculations set forth in a contested exhibit and nothing
    else.’’ We now turn to the plaintiff’s claim.
    We begin our discussion of the plaintiff’s claim with
    our well established standard of review. ‘‘[A] stipulation
    of the parties is to be regarded and construed as a
    contract. . . . In giving meaning to the terms of a con-
    tract, we have said that a contract must be construed
    to effectuate the intent of the contracting parties. . . .
    We review the court’s determination of the parties’
    intent, when the language of the stipulation is ambigu-
    ous, as we would review a factual conclusion. . . . We
    will uphold the court’s factual findings unless those
    findings are clearly erroneous. . . .
    ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is
    no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
    although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
    court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
    and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed
    . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Certain Under-
    writers at Lloyd’s of London, 
    110 Conn. App. 668
    , 675,
    
    955 A.2d 1206
     (2008).
    After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
    court’s finding that the parties’ stipulation was limited
    only ‘‘to the mathematical calculations set forth in a
    contested exhibit’’ is not clearly erroneous. As the
    record plainly reflects, counsel for the defendants spe-
    cifically stated that he only agreed to ‘‘all the mathemati-
    cal computations,’’ and that ‘‘[$23,281.08] would be the
    damages per the contract based on this exhibit.’’
    (Emphasis added.) This stipulation must be read in
    context with counsel’s repeated objection to the admis-
    sibility of the exhibit as a whole. Under these circum-
    stances, the statement of the counsel for the defendants
    agreeing to the accuracy of the calculations in the
    exhibit cannot be fairly construed to mean that the
    defendants were conceding that the exhibit was admis-
    sible or that the figure in the exhibit established the
    proper amount of damages under the liquidated dam-
    ages clause. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that
    the court’s finding regarding the extent of the parties’
    stipulation is clearly erroneous. The plaintiff’s claim,
    therefore, fails.
    III
    The plaintiff also claims that the court abused its
    discretion by awarding only $5000 in attorney’s fees.
    The plaintiff argues that the agreement provided that
    the prevailing party in a breach of contract action is
    entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,
    that it was the prevailing party, and that the evidence
    submitted demonstrated that the plaintiff’s legal bills
    totaled more than $50,000. More specifically, the plain-
    tiff argues that the court improperly considered the
    conduct of the parties and the history of the proceedings
    to determine whether the amount of attorney’s fees
    requested by the plaintiff was reasonable. Accordingly,
    the plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion
    and requests that we reverse the court’s order, and
    remand the case for a proper calculation of attorney’s
    fees. We disagree.
    The following additional facts are necessary for our
    review of this claim. In its May 6, 2013 order granting
    the plaintiff an award of attorney’s fees, the court noted
    that it ‘‘considered the nature of the litigation . . . the
    conduct of the parties . . . the history of the proceed-
    ings . . . the hourly rates charged by the plaintiff’s
    counsel and the amount of hours billed, and the results
    obtained.’’ The court then found that this case was ‘‘a
    one count breach of contract claim’’ and that ‘‘both
    parties share[d] responsibility for the failure of the con-
    tractual relationship.’’ The court also found that ‘‘prior
    claims of the plaintiff far exceed[ed] any reasonable
    expectations or basis’’ and that the plaintiff ‘‘fail[ed] to
    follow its own contractual provision requiring good
    faith efforts at resolution as a precondition to litiga-
    tion.’’ In light of those findings, the court awarded the
    plaintiff $5000 in attorney’s fees.
    ‘‘Our standard of review of the plaintiff’s claim is well
    defined. An award of attorney’s fees is not a matter of
    right. Whether any award is to be made and the amount
    thereof lie within the discretion of the trial court, which
    is in the best position to evaluate the particular circum-
    stances of a case. . . . A court has few duties of a
    more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees.
    The issue grows even more delicate on appeal; we may
    not alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the trial
    court has clearly abused its discretion, for the trial court
    is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of
    each case. . . . Because the trial court is in the best
    position to evaluate the circumstances of each case,
    we will not substitute our opinion concerning counsel
    fees or alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the
    trial court has clearly abused its discretion.’’ (Citations
    omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) LaMontagne v. Musano, Inc., 
    61 Conn. App. 60
    , 63–64, 
    762 A.2d 508
     (2000).
    With respect to the relevant legal principles, we have
    often explained that Connecticut adheres to the ‘‘Ameri-
    can rule’’ regarding attorney’s fees. Total Recycling Ser-
    vices of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling
    Services, LLC, 
    308 Conn. 312
    , 326, 
    63 A.3d 896
     (2013).
    ‘‘Under the American rule, in the absence of statutory
    or contractual authority to the contrary, a successful
    party is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees or other
    ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation . . . .
    There are few exceptions. For example, a specific con-
    tractual term may provide for the recovery of attorney’s
    fees and costs . . . or a statute may confer such
    rights.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) 
    Id.,
     326–27. Paragraph twenty-seven of the
    agreement, entitled ‘‘Disputes; Rights and Remedies;
    Attorneys Fees’’ provides in relevant part, ‘‘The prevail-
    ing party in any lawsuit or action based on this
    [a]greement shall, in addition to any other relief granted
    therein, be entitled to its reasonable attorney[’s] fees
    and costs.’’
    If a contractual provision allows for reasonable attor-
    ney’s fees, ‘‘[t]here are several general factors which
    may properly be considered in determining the amount
    to be allowed as reasonable compensation to an attor-
    ney. These factors are summarized in [rule 1.5 (a) of
    the Rules of Professional Conduct].’’ O’Brien v. Seyer,
    
    183 Conn. 199
    , 206, 
    439 A.2d 292
     (1981); see also Crest
    Plumbing & Heating Co. v. DiLoreto, 
    12 Conn. App. 468
    , 480, 
    531 A.2d 177
     (1987). These factors include:
    the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty
    of the questions involved; the skill requisite to perform
    the legal service properly; the fee customarily charged
    in the locality for similar legal services; the amount
    involved and the results obtained; the time limitations
    imposed by the client; the experience, reputation and
    ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services,
    and whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Rules of
    Professional Conduct 1.5 (a).
    The commentary to rule 1.5 provides that the factors
    specified in the rule, however, are not exclusive. ‘‘[W]e
    have explained previously courts . . . may rely on
    their general knowledge of what has occurred at the
    proceedings before them to supply evidence in support
    of an award of attorney’s fees.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Total Recycling Services of Connecti-
    cut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC,
    supra, 
    308 Conn. 327
    .
    In the present case, the court considered the nature
    of the litigation, the conduct of the parties, the history
    of the proceedings, the hourly rates charged by the
    plaintiff’s counsel and the amount of hours billed, and
    the results obtained. Although the plaintiff asserts that
    the court is not legally authorized to rely on certain of
    those factors, the plaintiff has not cited, nor have we
    found, any authority that suggests that the court’s con-
    sideration of any of these factors is not permitted. To
    the contrary, we conclude that the factors directly relate
    to the question of what is a ‘‘reasonable’’ attorney’s fee
    award under the agreement and the circumstances of
    this case.
    As the trial court recognized, although the plaintiff
    technically prevailed on its breach of contract claim,
    its victory was essentially Pyrrhic. Additionally, given
    the simplicity of the legal claims, the shared fault in
    the breakdown of the contractual relationship and the
    plaintiff’s failure to adhere to the agreement’s provision
    requiring prelitigation dispute resolution, we cannot
    conclude that the court abused its discretion in award-
    ing the plaintiff only minimal attorney’s fees. Accord-
    ingly, the plaintiff’s claim fails.
    IV
    Finally, we address the defendants’ claim that the
    court erred by denying their motion to enforce a settle-
    ment agreement. The defendants argue that the court
    improperly concluded, following an evidentiary hearing
    held pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd.
    Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 
    225 Conn. 804
    ,
    
    626 A.2d 729
     (1993), that the settlement agreement was
    not enforceable. We disagree.
    The following facts are relevant to this appeal. During
    the pendency of the appeal and cross appeal, the parties
    engaged in settlement discussions. In response to an
    offer from the defendants, plaintiff’s counsel sent the
    following correspondence, which provided in relevant
    part: ‘‘[The plaintiff] has agreed to accept the offer to
    resolve the pending. . . actions for [an undisclosed
    dollar amount]5 subject to the following: [the plaintiff]
    requires a confidentiality agreement—drafted by [the
    defendants]—regarding the settlement. The agreement
    will bind [defense counsel and the defendants].’’ (Foot-
    note added.)
    On June 3, 2013, the defendants sent the plaintiff a
    draft settlement agreement that included a confidential-
    ity provision for its review. On June 4, 2013, the plaintiff
    responded that it no longer wished ‘‘to pursue the settle-
    ment of this matter at the [undisclosed dollar amount].’’
    The defendants filed a motion to enforce the settle-
    ment agreement on July 19, 2013. The defendants
    claimed that, subsequent to sending the plaintiff the
    settlement agreement with the proposed confidentiality
    provision, but prior to the plaintiff’s June 4, 2013 corre-
    spondence, both parties received a letter from the plain-
    tiff’s former counsel claiming a ‘‘charging lien on any
    counsel fees and other funds payable to the [plaintiff]’’
    as a result of the present case. The defendants argued
    that it was the notice of the lien, rather than any real
    objection to the draft of the proposed confidentiality
    provision, that caused the plaintiff to unreasonably
    refuse to accept the confidentiality provision.
    Following the evidentiary hearing on the motion to
    enforce the settlement agreement, the court made the
    following findings on the record: ‘‘I’m going to deny the
    [defendants’] motion to enforce the alleged settlement
    agreement. It seems to me that the plaintiff reserved to
    itself the right to approve a confidentiality [provision].
    Consistent with [the plaintiff’s] testimony and e-mails,
    [the plaintiff] did not obligate [itself] to be reasonable
    in the approval of the confidentiality [provision], nor did
    [the plaintiff] obligate itself to respond with specifics
    as to how the confidentiality [provision] would satisfy
    the plaintiff.
    ‘‘In fact, consistent with the e-mails, the whole point
    was to put 100 percent of the burden on the drafter,
    and if the drafter couldn’t satisfy . . . the plaintiff, the
    plaintiff would have the right to reject [the settle-
    ment agreement].
    ‘‘[T]here is just not sufficient evidence before me
    from which I can make a finding that the confidentiality
    [provision], which clearly was an essential component
    of the settlement agreement, was ever approved, and
    there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to
    respond in detail as to how the confidentiality [provi-
    sion] should be altered in order to gain its approval.
    [The plaintiff] particularly reserved to [itself] the right
    to get an agreement without cost that would satisfy
    [its] needs.
    ‘‘[The plaintiff] didn’t get it. [It] rejected what was
    sent . . . whether other things impacted that or didn’t
    impact that I don’t know, and I don’t think there’s
    enough evidence before me from which I can make
    such a finding.’’ The court then denied the defendants’
    motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
    We begin by setting forth our standard of review.
    Because the defendants do not challenge the underlying
    facts found by the court, but essentially challenge the
    court’s legal conclusion that there was not an enforce-
    able settlement agreement, ‘‘we must determine
    whether that conclusion is legally and logically correct
    and whether it finds support in the facts set out in the
    memorandum of decision.’’ Nanni v. Dino Corp., 
    117 Conn. App. 61
    , 64–65, 
    978 A.2d 531
     (2009); see also
    Bowman v. 1477 Central Avenue Apartments, Inc., 
    203 Conn. 246
    , 256, 
    524 A.2d 610
     (1987).
    The court found that the confidentiality provision
    was an essential component of the settlement
    agreement and that the plaintiff never approved the
    confidentiality provision drafted by the defendants. The
    court further found that the plaintiff reserved the right
    to reject the confidentiality provision and that the plain-
    tiff did not obligate itself to respond with specifics as
    to how the confidentiality provision must be amended
    to satisfy the plaintiff. The defendants do not challenge
    those findings.
    We, therefore, conclude that the court’s conclusion
    that there was not an enforceable settlement agreement
    is legally and logically correct and is supported by the
    facts set forth by the court on the record. A court may
    only enforce a settlement agreement ‘‘when the terms
    of the agreement are clear and unambiguous . . . and
    when the parties do not dispute the terms of the
    agreement.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Thomsen v. Aqua Massage International,
    Inc., 
    51 Conn. App. 201
    , 204, 
    721 A.2d 137
     (1998), cert.
    denied, 
    248 Conn. 902
    , 
    732 A.2d 178
     (1999). The court
    found that the parties had failed to agree to the terms
    of the confidentiality provision, which was an essential
    part of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, it was
    proper for the court to conclude that the settlement
    agreement was not enforceable.
    The judgments are affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    St. Louis RV Park is a Missouri general partnership. George Hudson and
    Mary Hudson were the two general partners of the partnership during all
    relevant periods.
    2
    The defendants also claim that if we conclude that the court improperly
    found that they breached the agreement, the court’s decision to award the
    plaintiff attorney’s fees must also be reversed. Because we conclude that
    the court did not err in finding that the defendants breached the agreement,
    we need not disturb the award of attorney’s fees on the basis of the defen-
    dants’ claim.
    3
    Although the court rendered judgment on the complaint in favor of the
    plaintiff, it is aggrieved for purposes of this appeal because the court did
    not grant all of the damages and attorney’s fees that the plaintiff sought.
    See Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc. v. Gurski, 
    47 Conn. App. 478
    , 481, 
    705 A.2d 566
     (1998) (although prevailing party generally not
    aggrieved for purposes of appeal, prevailing party can be aggrieved if relief
    awarded falls short of relief sought).
    4
    During her testimony, Mary Hudson conceded that there was a contract
    and that the first sentence of her letter was a mistake. She reiterated her
    belief, however, that the quality of the internet service was poor and that
    she wanted the equipment removed.
    5
    The dollar amount of the settlement has been redacted by agreement
    of the parties in deference to the plaintiff’s request for confidentiality with
    respect to the settlement, and because the dollar amount of the alleged
    settlement is not germane to our analysis.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC34977, AC36100

Filed Date: 9/23/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014