Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht ( 2014 )


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    ZBIGNIEW ROZBICKI v. EUGENE M.
    GISSELBRECHT ET AL.
    (AC 35744)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Bishop, Js.
    Argued March 14—officially released September 16, 2014
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Litchfield, Roche, J. [summary judgment]; Danaher, J.
    [motion for contempt, motion to disqualify].)
    Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, self-represented, the appel-
    lant (plaintiff).
    Ruth Nadeau Dwyer, with whom was J. Michael
    Sconyers, for the appellees (defendants).
    Opinion
    BEACH, J. The plaintiff, Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, the
    original executor of the estate of Kathleen M. Gissel-
    brecht, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
    granting the motion for contempt of the defendant,
    Eugene M. Gisselbrecht, individually and as the succes-
    sor executor of the estate of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht,
    his sister.1 The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred
    in (1) ruling on a motion for contempt at a time when
    the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter; (2)
    finding him in contempt for violating an interlocutory
    discovery order that had not been incorporated into
    the judgment file; and (3) denying a motion to recuse
    itself. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history, as
    revealed by the record, are relevant to this appeal. In
    2007, the plaintiff was the executor of the subject estate
    under the will of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht. Because of
    certain conduct of the plaintiff, he was removed for
    cause from the position of executor in June, 2009. In
    March, 2010, the plaintiff brought this action against
    the defendant, individually and in his capacity as the
    successor executor. In his third revised complaint, the
    plaintiff claimed that the defendant breached his fidu-
    ciary duty as executor by depleting the assets of the
    estate, leaving insufficient funds to pay to the plaintiff
    his bequest under the will and his fiduciary fees. He
    also sought attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant
    filed an answer and special defenses claiming that the
    plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limita-
    tions, the doctrine of election of remedies, res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, and the statute of frauds.
    In August, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for a
    protective order requesting that the court issue an order
    preventing the self-represented plaintiff from continu-
    ing his deposition of the defendant, which had begun
    on July 19, 2011. He argued that the plaintiff was emo-
    tionally involved in the matter, and was using the depo-
    sition process to harass the defendant. The court denied
    the motion, but added that the defendant could have
    the deposition videotaped at his own expense, and that
    the defendant could seek additional assistance from
    the court, including the cost of the videotaping or any
    other appropriate remedy, if the conduct complained
    of was apparent in the videotape of the next deposition.
    On December 5, 2011, the court, Danaher, J., after view-
    ing the videotape at the request of the parties, issued
    a decision regarding a motion for compliance filed by
    the defendant, and found that the plaintiff’s continua-
    tion of the deposition of the defendant was conducted
    in a manner that served unreasonably to harass, embar-
    rass, oppress, and annoy the defendant, and that there
    would be no further deposition of the defendant. On
    December 15, 2011, the defendant filed a motion
    requesting the court to issue an order requiring the
    plaintiff to reimburse him $675.32 for costs associated
    with videotaping the plaintiff’s deposition of the defen-
    dant. On January 3, 2012, the court granted the motion,
    ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs for videotaping
    the deposition in the amount of $675.32 within thirty
    days. On January 23, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion
    to vacate the order, and the court denied the motion
    two days later.
    Meanwhile, in August, 2011, the defendant had filed
    a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the
    plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limita-
    tions, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute
    of frauds. On December 19, 2011, the court, Roche, J.,
    granted the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff
    filed a motion to reargue or reconsider the judgment
    on January 9, 2012; the motion was denied on January
    11, 2012. The plaintiff filed a motion for extension of
    time in which to appeal on January 23, 2012, which
    was granted.
    On February 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed an appeal
    from the trial court’s summary judgment. The plaintiff
    included as an issue in that appeal the January 3, 2012
    order of payment. We dismissed the appeal on April
    24, 2012. On October 10, 2012, our Supreme Court
    denied the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal.
    Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht, 
    307 Conn. 917
    , 
    54 A.3d 181
    (2012).
    On January 16, 2013, the defendant filed a proposed
    judgment file, which included the court’s granting of
    his motion for summary judgment and the January 3,
    2012 order to pay the cost of videotaping the deposition.
    On February 6, 2013, the court, Trombley, J., deter-
    mined that a judgment file was not necessary because
    a valid and binding order of Judge Danaher was issued
    on January 3, 2012, which ‘‘remains in effect ordering
    the plaintiff, an officer of this court, to pay to the defen-
    dant the sum of $675.32.’’ The plaintiff filed an objection
    to that ruling, seeking its vacation, on February 27, 2013,
    which was overruled by the court on March 11, 2013.
    On March 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for
    contempt, claiming that the plaintiff had not complied
    with the court’s January 3, 2012 order to pay the video-
    taping fee of $675.32 within the allotted time, and sought
    as damages the $675.32 in costs plus $2500 in attorney’s
    fees. On May 9, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to
    dismiss the defendant’s motion for contempt, arguing
    that the court lacked personal and subject matter juris-
    diction to rule on the motion for contempt after sum-
    mary judgment was rendered, on December 19, 2011.
    The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, and
    on May 30, 2013, the court, Danaher, J., issued a memo-
    randum of decision regarding the defendant’s motion
    for contempt, in which it found that the plaintiff was
    in wilful contempt of the court’s clear and unambiguous
    order to pay to the defendant $675.32 within thirty days.
    The court ordered the plaintiff to pay $675.32 to the
    defendant’s counsel within two weeks.
    On May 28, 2013, the day on which the motion for
    contempt was argued on the short calendar, the plaintiff
    filed a motion for disqualification of Judge Danaher,
    which was denied. This appeal followed.
    I
    We first address the plaintiff’s claims regarding the
    jurisdiction of the trial court to act on various motions.
    Although the plaintiff divides his argument into two
    issues, the claims are somewhat related, in that all
    involve the timing of the various rulings regarding the
    costs of videotaping against the backdrop of the court’s
    rulings on the merits of the case and the appeal process
    on the merits. We have considered all of the plaintiff’s
    claims, but organize their discussion somewhat dif-
    ferently.
    Our review of the jurisdictional issues is plenary. ‘‘We
    have long held that because [a] determination regarding
    a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question
    of law, our review is plenary. . . . Subject matter juris-
    diction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate
    the type of controversy presented by the action before
    it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits
    of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . . ’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferguson Mechani-
    cal Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 
    282 Conn. 764
    , 770–71,
    
    924 A.2d 846
     (2007).
    A
    The plaintiff claims that the trial court lacked jurisdic-
    tion to rule on the motion for contempt, which was
    filed approximately eleven months after the appeal on
    the merits of the summary judgment was dismissed.
    We agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to find
    the plaintiff in contempt unless the contempt order was
    an exercise of the trial court’s inherent jurisdiction to
    enforce its orders. We assume, for the purpose of this
    subpart of the opinion, that the January 3, 2012 ruling
    of the court ordering the payment of the videotaping
    costs was valid, and that the court had the authority
    to make the order at the time it was made.2
    The Superior Court has the inherent authority to
    enforce its orders. See AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
    v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 
    260 Conn. 232
    , 246, 
    796 A.2d 1164
     (2002); see also Bauer v. Bauer, 
    308 Conn. 124
    , 130, 
    60 A.3d 950
     (2013). ‘‘[E]ven in the absence of
    a finding of contempt, the trial court has broad discre-
    tion to make whole any party who has suffered as a
    result of another party’s failure to comply with a court
    order.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay
    Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission,
    supra, 243.
    Although ordinarily our trial courts lack jurisdiction
    to act in a case after the passage of four months from
    the date of judgment; see General Statutes § 52-212a;
    there are exceptions. One exception arises when the
    exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to effectuate prior
    judgments or otherwise enforceable orders. Our
    Supreme Court has explained the continuing jurisdic-
    tion exception to § 52-212a as follows: ‘‘We reject [a]
    hypertechnical understanding of the trial court’s contin-
    uing jurisdiction to effectuate prior judgments. We con-
    clude, instead, that the trial court’s continuing
    jurisdiction is not separate from, but, rather, derives
    from, its equitable authority to vindicate judgments.
    . . . Moreover, we hold that such equitable authority
    . . . [derives] from its inherent powers.’’ (Emphasis
    omitted; footnote omitted.) AvalonBay Communities,
    Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 
    260 Conn. 243
    . ‘‘[T]he trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to effec-
    tuate its prior judgments, either by summarily ordering
    compliance with a clear judgment or by interpreting an
    ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate
    the judgment as interpreted, is grounded in its inherent
    powers, and is not limited to cases wherein the non-
    compliant party is in contempt, family cases, cases
    involving injunctions, or cases wherein the parties have
    agreed to continuing jurisdiction.’’ Id., 246 (continuing
    jurisdiction existed in case where trial court ordered
    planning and zoning commission to impose only reason-
    able and necessary conditions on approval of appli-
    cant’s affordable housing application); see also Papa
    v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 
    186 Conn. 725
    ,
    737, 
    444 A.2d 196
     (1982) (recognizing ‘‘the inherent
    power of the court to coerce compliance with its
    orders’’); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn, 
    148 Conn. App. 1
    , 
    85 A.3d 1
     (2014) (continuing jurisdiction existed
    where as part of judgment of strict foreclosure bank
    was required to send notice to nonappearing defendants
    before filing certificate of foreclosure and bank falsely
    certificated to court that notice requirement had been
    satisfied). ‘‘In a contempt proceeding, even in the
    absence of a finding of contempt, a trial court has broad
    discretion to make whole a party who has suffered as
    a result of another party’s failure to comply with the
    court order.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Clement v. Clement, 
    34 Conn. App. 641
    ,
    647, 
    643 A.2d 874
     (1994).
    The trial court in the present case had ordered the
    plaintiff to pay videotaping costs to the defendant. The
    plaintiff had never complied with the order. The passage
    of time itself did not serve to deprive the court of juris-
    diction to enforce its order.
    The plaintiff, however, has raised several related chal-
    lenges to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction; these may
    be addressed more summarily. One is that the court
    lost jurisdiction by virtue of General Statutes § 51-183b,
    which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny judge of
    the Superior Court . . . who has the power to render
    judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil
    cause, shall have power to continue such trial and shall
    render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty
    days from the completion date of the trial of such civil
    cause. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The court heard the
    motion on May 28, 2013, and granted it on May 30, 2013,
    two days later. The primary purpose of § 51-183b is to
    compel timely completion of matters in the trial court;
    see, e.g., Building Supply Corp. v. Lawrence Brunoli,
    Inc., 
    40 Conn. App. 89
    . 96–97, 
    669 A.2d 620
    , cert. denied,
    
    236 Conn. 929
    , 
    674 A.2d 1326
     (1996); and the trial court
    in the present case could hardly have acted more effi-
    ciently. The effort to peg the starting point of the 120
    day period to the judgment on the merits, or perhaps
    to the argument on the motion for summary judgment,
    is entirely inconsistent with the concept of continuing
    jurisdiction to enforce judgments and orders.
    An additional argument raised by the plaintiff is that
    the court’s order to pay the costs of videotaping was
    not specifically included in the judgment file, and, there-
    fore, was not part of the judgment that the court had
    continuing jurisdiction to enforce. This contention fails
    for at least two reasons: the judgment file is ministerial;
    see, e.g., Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 
    277 Conn. 526
    ,
    529 n.1, 
    893 A.2d 389
     (2006); and the contempt order
    related to an independent order of the court, issued
    shortly after judgment, in any event.
    B
    Part I A of this opinion is predicated on the assump-
    tion that the January 3, 2012 order was issued within
    the jurisdiction of the trial court. The plaintiff claims
    that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue the
    order. He contends that the order was an interlocutory
    discovery order, which ordinarily would be subsumed
    in the judgment, rather than an independent judicial
    order, and that it was issued after judgment was ren-
    dered on the merits, so that it was not properly sub-
    sumed in the judgment in any event. In the unusual
    circumstances of this case, we disagree.
    The timing in this case was complicated by the paral-
    lel short calendar scheduling of the motions regarding
    payment for discovery costs and the motion for sum-
    mary judgment. Significantly, the motions regarding the
    order of the payment of the videotaping costs no longer
    directly concerned the preparation of evidence for trial,
    but, rather, involved the payment of costs. Ordinarily,
    orders regarding what may be discoverable, the sched-
    uling of discovery, and related matters do conclude
    with the judgment, and ordinarily such orders are not
    immediately appealable, but, rather, may be raised as
    issues on appeal.3 The order for payment, however, was
    not an order directing the progress of discovery toward
    trial, but, rather, was an independent order to effectuate
    the authority of the court. In the unusual circumstances
    of this case, the order properly served as the predicate
    for the order of contempt.4
    The facts of this case are analogous to those of CFM
    of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 
    239 Conn. 375
    , 400–
    404, 
    685 A.2d 1108
     (1996), overruled in part on other
    grounds by State v. Salmon, 
    250 Conn. 147
    , 154–55,
    
    735 A.2d 333
     (1999). There, the plaintiff’s attorney was
    ordered to pay $10,000 to the defendant as sanctions
    for bad faith behavior. Our Supreme Court held that
    the sanction was a final judgment for the purpose of
    appeal because the order was not dependent on further
    proceedings and the amount would be owed irrespec-
    tive of the eventual outcome of the case; the rights
    affected were solely between the attorney and the
    defendant.5 See also Bryant v. Bryant, 
    228 Conn. 630
    ,
    636, 
    637 A.2d 1111
     (1994).
    The second subsidiary issue is whether, in the circum-
    stances of this case, the court had the authority to rule
    on the defendant’s motion for order after its granting
    of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. At
    the time the court granted the motion for summary
    judgment on December 19, 2011, the defendant’s motion
    for order, which had been filed on December 15, 2011,
    was pending. Less than two weeks after granting the
    motion for summary judgment on December 19, 2011,
    the court ruled on the defendant’s pending motion for
    order on January 3, 2012.
    At the time of the court’s January 3, 2012 ruling on
    the motion for order, the trial court was fully engaged
    in managing the case, and no appeal had yet been filed.
    As noted previously, motions for reargument of trial
    court rulings and decisions were pending. On January
    23, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for an extension
    of time to file an appeal on the ground that the trial
    court had yet to rule ‘‘on discovery motions which shall
    be included in the issues on appeal.’’ The motion was
    granted, and the plaintiff included on appeal issues
    regarding the court’s ruling on the motion for order
    of payment.
    Ordinarily, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
    motions until the expiration of four months from the
    date of judgment. Kim v. Magnotta, 
    249 Conn. 94
    , 107,
    
    733 A.2d 80
     (1999); see also Rocque v. Light Sources,
    Inc., 
    275 Conn. 420
    , 432–33, 
    881 A.2d 230
     (2005). Espe-
    cially in light of the practical circumstances in this case,
    we see no reason why the court did not have the author-
    ity to rule on outstanding motions. The order that
    formed the predicate for the contempt order, then, was
    properly granted by the trial court.
    II
    The plaintiff claims that the court, Danaher, J.,
    improperly denied his motion for judicial disqualifica-
    tion on the ground of bias. We disagree.
    ‘‘In reviewing a claim of judicial bias, this court
    employs a plain error standard of review. . . . The
    standard to be employed is an objective one, not the
    judge’s subjective view as to whether he or she can be
    fair and impartial in hearing the case. . . . Any conduct
    that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the
    circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s impar-
    tiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for
    the judge’s disqualification.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Com-
    mittee v. Burton, 
    299 Conn. 405
    , 416, 
    10 A.3d 507
     (2011);
    see also Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 (a).
    The plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied
    his May 28, 2013 motion for judicial disqualification.
    He essentially argues that the court improperly failed
    to refer the motion to another judge and improperly
    denied the motion when the court exhibited bias toward
    him, as evidenced by the court’s adverse rulings. He also
    claims that the court called him ‘‘a liar.’’ We disagree.
    A hearing before another judge was not required in
    this case. In order to require an evidentiary hearing
    before another judge on a motion for disqualification,
    the party asserting bias of the trial judge must ‘‘state
    facts on the record which, if true, give fair support to
    his claim. If those facts, taken as true, give that fair
    support, the party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
    on those facts before another judge.’’ Szypula v. Szy-
    pula, 
    2 Conn. App. 650
    , 656, 
    482 A.2d 85
     (1984). The
    facts alleged in this case, however, do not give fair
    support to the claim of judicial bias.
    The plaintiff’s claim of judicial bias was based essen-
    tially on claims that Judge Danaher had exhibited bias
    by issuing rulings adverse to him. ‘‘It is axiomatic, how-
    ever, that an adverse or unfavorable ruling is not, in
    itself, evidence of judicial bias against a litigant.’’
    Traystman v. Traystman, 
    141 Conn. App. 789
    , 803, 
    62 A.3d 1149
     (2013). The plaintiff also asserts that the court
    exhibited bias by calling him a liar ‘‘in a deposition
    controversy in a companion case.’’ There is nothing in
    the record before us showing that Judge Danaher called
    the plaintiff a liar. In his appellate brief, the plaintiff
    has cited transcript excerpts in which Judge Danaher
    stated that he believed that a claim made by the plaintiff,
    to the effect that the court had not read a document
    prepared by the plaintiff, was false. Characterizing a
    claim as false is different from calling someone a liar.
    We have thoroughly reviewed the materials presented
    and conclude that, although relations may have been
    strained; compare Traystman v. Traystman, supra,
    803; Judge Danaher did not act improperly in denying
    the plaintiff’s motion for judicial disqualification.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    We refer to Eugene M. Gisselbrecht in both capacities as the defendant.
    2
    The issue whether the court had the jurisdiction to make the order on
    January 3, 2012, will be discussed in the following subpart of this opinion.
    3
    The plaintiff correctly asserts that most discovery orders are interlocu-
    tory and not immediately appealable. The issuance of a contempt order may
    alter the situation. See Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat, 
    250 Conn. 488
    ,
    498, 
    736 A.2d 851
     (1999). Here, we are not directly concerned with the
    question of whether the order for payment was independently appealable,
    because the appeal has been taken from the subsequent order of contempt.
    4
    The analysis is complicated by the fact that the self-represented party
    was also an attorney. Ordinarily, findings of contempt where nonparties are
    involved are reviewed by means of writs of error.
    5
    Similar to the present case, the sanctions order was deemed to be equiva-
    lent to a judgment, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further
    proceedings on a contempt action. CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury,
    supra, 
    239 Conn. 404
    .