Wager v. Moore ( 2019 )


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    RACHEL WAGER v. ALEXANDRIA MOORE ET AL.
    (AC 40329)
    Sheldon, Moll and Seeley, Js.
    Syllabus
    The plaintiff pedestrian sought to recover damages from the defendant for
    negligence for injuries she sustained when she was struck by a motor
    vehicle operated by the defendant. After the jury returned a verdict in
    favor of the defendant, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to
    set aside the verdict and rendered judgment in accordance with it, from
    which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:
    1. The plaintiff could not prevail in her claim that the trial court erred when
    it denied her motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, which
    was based on her claim that there was insufficient evidence to support
    a finding of contributory negligence, the record having contained ample
    evidence that the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence was
    a substantial factor in causing her injuries: there was evidence that the
    plaintiff was not in a designated crosswalk at the time of the collision,
    although there was a crosswalk approximately 750 feet down the road-
    way that would have been visible to the plaintiff and which she previously
    had used, that it was dark at the time of the collision and the plaintiff was
    wearing dark clothing, which the jury reasonably could have concluded
    would have made it difficult for the defendant to see her, that the plaintiff
    had ‘‘popped out’’ in front of the defendant’s vehicle, that the area of
    the collision was flat and straight and that the plaintiff was intoxicated
    at the time of the collision, from which the jury could have inferred
    that the plaintiff walked or ran into the path of the defendant’s vehicle
    and failed to yield the right-of-way to the defendant, that had the plaintiff
    been paying attention or keeping a proper lookout, she would have seen
    the defendant’s vehicle in sufficient time to avoid the collision, and that
    the plaintiff was not exercising reasonable care to avoid harm to herself;
    moreover, the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff’s negli-
    gence far exceeded the defendant’s negligence, as there was evidence
    that the plaintiff had consumed approximately nine alcoholic drinks
    shortly before the collision and that she was captured on camera having
    difficulty standing and walking, whereas there was evidence that the
    defendant had consumed one alcoholic drink one and one-half hours
    before the collision and did not appear inebriated, and the defendant
    testified that she was not speeding and was paying attention to the
    roadway.
    2. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
    contributory negligence when such a charge was not supported by the
    evidence was unavailing; the record contained sufficient evidence of
    the plaintiff’s contributory negligence to support the court’s instruction,
    including evidence that the plaintiff was intoxicated, did not cross at a
    designated crosswalk and was wearing dark clothing when she suddenly
    appeared in the roadway.
    3. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly
    failed to instruct the jury on the relevant statutes governing the parties’
    respective duties, which was based on her claim that once the court
    instructed the jury on a pedestrian’s duties pursuant to the applicable
    statutes (§§ 14-300b [a] and 14-300c [b]), its refusal to charge the jury
    on the duties that a driver owes to pedestrians pursuant to the applicable
    statutes (§§ 14-300d and 14-300i) constituted error: the court incorpo-
    rated the duties of pedestrians identified in §§ 14-300b (a) and 14-200c
    (b) in its charge on contributory negligence, and the duties of drivers
    in relation to pedestrians identified in §§ 14-300d and 14-300i in its charge
    on negligence, the fact that the jury found the defendant 10 percent
    negligent indicated that the jury understood that the defendant owed a
    duty of care notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence, and, therefore,
    the court adequately instructed the jury regarding the defendant’s duty
    to exercise reasonable care; moreover, although the instructions were
    not a model of clarity, jury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect
    or technically accurate, so long as they are correct in law, adapted to
    the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury, and there was not
    a reasonable possibility the court’s charge misled the jury.
    4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motions
    for a mistrial and to set aside the verdict, in which she claimed that
    she was prejudiced by the admission into evidence of certain improper
    hearsay evidence during the videotaped deposition testimony of the
    defendant’s expert toxicologist, M, who commented in the video that
    the plaintiff had stated that she recalled walking across the roadway,
    even though the parties did not dispute that the plaintiff did not recall
    the accident and had agreed that M’s comment would be excluded
    from the recording shown to the jury; immediately after the recording
    containing M’s comment was played for the jury, the plaintiff’s counsel
    corrected M, explaining that his statement was based on a police officer’s
    mistaken interpretation of a comment by the plaintiff’s mother, M admit-
    ted that he was mistaken, and the court gave the jury an instruction,
    which it was presumed to have followed, to ignore any comments indicat-
    ing that the plaintiff remembered the collision shortly after the jury
    viewed the recording.
    Argued February 5—officially released October 22, 2019
    Procedural History
    Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
    dants’ negligence, and for other relief, brought to the
    Superior Court in the judicial district of New London;
    thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew the action as to the
    defendant Mitchell College; subsequently, the matter
    was tried to the jury before Cole-Chu, J.; thereafter,
    the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial;
    verdict for the named defendant; subsequently, the
    court denied the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the ver-
    dict and rendered judgment in accordance with the
    verdict, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court;
    thereafter, the court, Cole-Chu, J., denied the plaintiff’s
    motion for articulation. Affirmed.
    Cynthia C. Bott, with whom, on the brief, was J.
    Craig Smith, for the appellant (plaintiff).
    Laura Pascale Zaino, with whom, on the brief, was
    Lewis S. Lerman, for the appellee (named defendant).
    Opinion
    SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Rachel Wager, appeals from
    the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury
    trial, in favor of the defendant Alexandria Moore1 in an
    action to recover damages for injuries that she sus-
    tained when she was struck by a vehicle operated by
    the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
    trial court erred when it (1) denied the plaintiff’s motion
    to set aside the verdict on the basis of insufficient evi-
    dence to support the jury’s finding of contributory negli-
    gence,2 (2) instructed the jury on contributory negli-
    gence when such a charge was not supported by the
    evidence, (3) failed to instruct the jury on law essential
    to the plaintiff’s claim regarding the defendant’s negli-
    gence, and (4) denied the plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial
    and later motion to set aside the verdict, which were
    based on the improper introduction of hearsay evidence
    against her at trial. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    The jury was presented with the following evidence
    on which to base its verdict. At approximately 10:30
    p.m. on February 4, 2011, the defendant was driving in
    the southbound lane on Montauk Avenue in New Lon-
    don, near the campus of Mitchell College, when her
    vehicle collided with the plaintiff, a student at the col-
    lege who was crossing Montauk Avenue on foot when
    the collision occurred.3 The plaintiff had started on the
    east side of the road and crossed the entire northbound
    lane before, walking westward, she entered the south-
    bound lane and proceeded to the point where the colli-
    sion occurred.
    The plaintiff was not in a designated crosswalk at
    the time of the collision, although there was a marked
    crosswalk approximately 750 feet from the point of
    impact. The marked crosswalk was visible from the
    collision site, and a person crossing Montauk Avenue
    where the plaintiff attempted to cross it could have
    been able to use that marked crosswalk by walking
    northward to it on the sidewalk running on the east
    side of Montauk Avenue. The plaintiff was aware of the
    marked crosswalk and previously had used it to walk
    across Montauk Avenue. There were no cars parked on
    either side of Montauk Avenue at the time of the colli-
    sion, but snowbanks then lined both sides of the street.
    At the time of the collision, the plaintiff was wearing
    a black jacket, dark jeans, and gold boots. The plaintiff
    was unable to remember anything about the collision
    or the period of time immediately before it.
    The defendant testified that at the time of the collision
    she was driving to a friend’s house located in New
    London. She further testified that at the time, she was
    not speeding and she was not distracted.4 According to
    the defendant, she was paying extra attention to the
    roadway because she was looking for a street sign. The
    defendant stated that the collision occurred when the
    plaintiff ‘‘popped out in front of [her car].’’ The defen-
    dant knew she had hit something because she heard a
    thump, so she stopped her vehicle. She did not realize
    her vehicle had hit a person until after she had exited
    the vehicle and looked back in the roadway. No one
    else witnessed the collision.
    The plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert, Kris-
    topher Seluga, testified that Montauk Avenue was flat
    and straight in the area of the collision and that the
    line of sight in that area was over 700 feet. He further
    testified that a person standing where he believed the
    plaintiff had been at the time of the collision would
    have been able to see the headlights of an oncoming
    vehicle prior to deciding whether or not to cross the
    road. Seluga also testified that the plaintiff should have
    been able to see the headlights of the defendant’s vehi-
    cle and detect its presence on the roadway before the
    defendant would have been able to see the plaintiff.
    As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was thrown
    forward and landed approximately 42 feet south of the
    point of impact. When the initial emergency personnel
    arrived at the scene, the plaintiff was unconscious. The
    plaintiff was transported to Lawrence & Memorial Hos-
    pital in New London. Later that evening, she was trans-
    ferred to Yale New Haven Hospital via Life Star helicop-
    ter due to the severity of her injuries, which included
    multiple fractures, lacerations, and a traumatic brain
    injury.
    A blood test performed at the hospital approximately
    thirty minutes after the collision revealed that the plain-
    tiff had a blood alcohol level of 170 milligrams per
    deciliter, or .17 percent, which is equivalent to a .15
    percent whole blood alcohol content measurement.
    Charles McKay, a toxicologist, testified that a .15 per-
    cent whole blood alcohol content measurement from
    a person of the plaintiff’s size would represent more
    than nine standard alcoholic beverages consumed in a
    short period of time.5 Earlier on the night of the colli-
    sion, the plaintiff had shared a bottle of rum with six
    to eight friends in a dormitory at Mitchell College. The
    plaintiff appeared inebriated by 8:30 p.m., and she had
    trouble walking and needed help getting across campus.
    Footage from a surveillance camera on campus showed
    the plaintiff struggling to walk and stand on her own.
    The plaintiff admitted that everything appears slower
    and her judgment sometimes is impaired when she is
    intoxicated. McKay testified that as blood alcohol con-
    centration rises in a person, it can lead to errors in
    judgment and processing of thoughts, a decrease in
    motor skills, and an inability to pay attention to multiple
    stimuli. According to McKay, the plaintiff’s blood alco-
    hol concentration of .15 significantly would have
    impacted her cognitive functioning (i.e., her ability to
    perceive and respond) and her motor functioning.
    Sergeant Lawrence Keating of the New London Police
    Department testified that while speaking with the defen-
    dant at the scene of the collision, he smelled alcohol
    on her breath. The defendant informed the police that
    she had consumed one alcoholic drink—a martini—
    approximately ninety minutes earlier. The police then
    administered a field sobriety test, which the defendant
    passed. One of the defendant’s coworkers, who was
    with her shortly before the collision, testified that when
    she last saw the defendant she was acting normally.
    In 2013, the plaintiff brought this action against the
    defendant. The operative amended complaint, which
    the plaintiff filed on November 13, 2015, alleged various
    injuries the plaintiff sustained as a result of the collision
    and that those injuries were caused by the negligence
    of the defendant in one or more of the following ways:
    she operated a motor vehicle while under the influence
    of an intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes
    § 14-227a (a); she operated a motor vehicle in a reckless
    manner in violation of General Statutes § 14-222; she
    operated a motor vehicle at an unreasonably high rate
    of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a; she
    failed to keep a proper lookout; she failed to properly
    control her vehicle; she failed to brake; she failed to
    yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian already in the
    roadway; she failed to swerve to avoid striking the plain-
    tiff; she operated her vehicle at an unreasonable speed
    under the circumstances; and she otherwise failed to
    drive as a reasonable and prudent driver under the same
    or similar circumstances.
    On March 3, 2016, the defendant filed an answer to
    the plaintiff’s operative complaint. The defendant also
    asserted, by way of special defense, that any injuries
    alleged by the plaintiff were proximately caused by her
    own negligence. Specifically, the defendant alleged that
    the plaintiff was negligent in one or more of the follow-
    ing ways: she failed to utilize the crosswalk in violation
    of General Statutes § 14-300b (a); she failed to yield the
    right-of-way to the defendant in violation of General
    Statutes § 14-300b (a); she left a place of safety and
    walked or ran into the path of the defendant’s vehicle,
    causing an immediate hazard to herself, in violation of
    General Statutes § 14-300c (b); she ‘‘walked upon the
    roadway while under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
    rendering herself a hazard in violation of General Stat-
    utes [§ 14-300c (b)]’’; she was inebriated, intoxicated,
    or impaired by the consumption of alcohol, and, as a
    result, walked or ran into the path of the defendant’s
    vehicle; she failed to stop or wait for the defendant’s
    vehicle to pass before entering the roadway, although
    by a reasonable and proper exercise of her faculties,
    she could and should have done so; she chose to cross
    the street while her ability to do so was impaired by
    the consumption of alcohol; she failed to keep a reason-
    able and proper lookout for vehicles on the roadway;
    and she failed to be attentive to her surroundings,
    including vehicles on the roadway. The plaintiff filed a
    reply generally denying the allegations in the special
    defense.
    Following a six day trial, the jury returned a verdict
    for the defendant and found the issues in the defen-
    dant’s special defense in favor of the defendant. The jury
    found that the plaintiff ‘‘was more than 50 [percent]—
    specifically 90 [percent]—contributorily negligent in
    causing the subject accident on February 4, 2011, and
    her resulting injuries and damages, compared to the 10
    [percent] total negligence of the defendant.’’6 The trial
    court denied the plaintiff’s subsequent motion to set
    aside the verdict and for a new trial. This appeal fol-
    lowed. Additional facts and procedural history will be
    set forth as necessary.
    I
    The plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in
    denying her motion to set aside the verdict and for a
    new trial because the evidence was insufficient to sup-
    port the jury’s finding of contributory negligence. Spe-
    cifically, the plaintiff argues that there was not suffi-
    cient evidence to remove the jury’s finding that she
    was more than 50 percent negligent from the realm of
    speculation. The plaintiff argues that there was insuffi-
    cient evidence from which the jury reasonably could
    have found that the plaintiff’s alleged negligence was
    ‘‘causally connected to the collision.’’ The plaintiff also
    contends that the defendant failed to present sufficient
    evidence from which the jury reasonably could have
    found that the plaintiff breached a duty of care as speci-
    fied in the defendant’s special defense. We disagree
    with the plaintiff and conclude that insofar as the jury’s
    verdict was based on its finding of contributory negli-
    gence, the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
    ‘‘A party challenging the validity of the jury’s verdict
    on grounds that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
    port such a result carries a difficult burden. In reviewing
    the soundness of a jury’s verdict, we construe the evi-
    dence in the light most favorable to sustaining the ver-
    dict. . . . We do not ask whether we would have
    reached the same result. [R]ather, we must determine
    . . . whether the totality of the evidence, including rea-
    sonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury’s ver-
    dict . . . . If the jury could reasonably have reached its
    conclusion, the verdict must stand.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Gagliano v. Advanced Specialty Care,
    P.C., 
    329 Conn. 745
    , 754–55, 
    189 A.3d 587
    (2018).
    ‘‘The . . . judgment [will be reversed] only if we find
    that the [fact finder] could not reasonably and legally
    have reached [its] conclusion. . . . We apply this famil-
    iar and deferential scope of review, however, in light
    of the equally familiar principle that the [defendant]
    must produce sufficient evidence to remove the [fact
    finder’s] function of examining inferences and finding
    facts from the realm of speculation.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Reyes v. Chetta, 
    143 Conn. App. 758
    ,
    765, 
    71 A.3d 1255
    (2013). ‘‘Moreover, with respect to
    the trial court’s refusal to set aside the verdict, we
    accord great deference to the vantage of the trial judge,
    who possesses a unique opportunity to evaluate the
    credibility of witnesses. . . . The concurrence of the
    judgments of the [trial] judge and the jury . . . is a
    powerful argument for upholding the verdict.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman
    Catholic Diocesan Corp., 
    317 Conn. 357
    , 371, 
    119 A.3d 462
    (2015).
    ‘‘[I]t is [the] function of the jury to draw whatever
    inferences from the evidence or facts established by
    the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .
    Because [t]he only kind of an inference recognized by
    the law is a reasonable one . . . any such inference
    cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or conjecture.
    . . . It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny [inference]
    drawn must be rational and founded upon the evidence.
    . . . However, [t]he line between permissible inference
    and impermissible speculation is not always easy to
    discern. When we infer, we derive a conclusion from
    proven facts because such considerations as experi-
    ence, or history, or science have demonstrated that
    there is a likely correlation between those facts and the
    conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling,
    the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation
    between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a
    different conclusion is more closely correlated with the
    facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less
    reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts
    and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it
    speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a
    matter of judgment. . . .
    ‘‘[P]roof of a material fact by inference from circum-
    stantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude
    every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence
    produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in
    the probability of the existence of the material fact. . . .
    Thus, in determining whether the evidence supports a
    particular inference, we ask whether that inference is
    so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . . In other
    words, an inference need not be compelled by the evi-
    dence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably
    susceptible of such an inference. Equally well estab-
    lished is our holding that a jury may draw factual infer-
    ences on the basis of already inferred facts. . . .
    Finally, it is well established that a [defendant] has the
    same right to submit a weak [special defense] as he
    has to submit a strong one.’’ (Emphasis in original;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Procaccini v. Law-
    rence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., 
    175 Conn. App. 692
    ,
    716–17, 
    168 A.3d 538
    , cert. denied, 
    327 Conn. 960
    , 
    172 A.3d 801
    (2017).
    To prove contributory negligence, the defendant
    must prove that the plaintiff’s negligence was a proxi-
    mate cause of or a substantial factor in the resulting
    harm. See Opotzner v. Bass, 
    63 Conn. App. 555
    , 566,
    
    777 A.2d 718
    (court properly instructed jury that it must
    determine whether plaintiff’s negligence was substan-
    tial factor in bringing about collision), cert. denied, 
    257 Conn. 910
    , 
    782 A.2d 134
    (2001), and cert. denied, 
    259 Conn. 930
    , 
    793 A.2d 1086
    (2002). Put another way, ‘‘the
    defendant must . . . prove by a fair preponderance of
    the evidence that the plaintiff was in fact negligent.’’
    Hackling v. Casbro Construction of Rhode Island, 
    67 Conn. App. 286
    , 294 n.4, 
    786 A.2d 1214
    (2001).
    In the present case, when the court instructed the
    jury, it stated in relevant part: ‘‘The defendant’s special
    defense is that, if the plaintiff sustained any injuries or
    damages as alleged in her complaint, then said injuries
    or damages were proximately caused by her own care-
    lessness and negligence at said time and place, in one
    or more of the following ways: One, she crossed the
    street at a place other than the available crosswalk and
    failed to yield the right-of-way to the defendant; two,
    she left a place of safety and walked or ran into the
    path of the defendant’s vehicle, causing a hazard; three,
    she walked upon the roadway while under the influence
    of alcohol, rendering herself a hazard; four, she was
    inebriated, intoxicated, or impaired by the consumption
    of alcohol and, as a result, walked or ran into the path
    of the defendant’s vehicle; five, she failed to keep a
    reasonable and proper lookout for vehicles on the road-
    way; six, she failed to be attentive to her surroundings,
    including vehicles in the roadway.’’
    First, we address the plaintiff’s assertion that there
    was insufficient evidence from which the jury reason-
    ably could have found that her alleged negligence was
    ‘‘causally connected to the collision.’’ Contrary to the
    plaintiff’s contention,7 we conclude that the record con-
    tains ample evidence that the plaintiff was negligent as
    alleged in each of the six specifications pleaded in the
    special defense, on which the trial court charged the
    jury, and that such negligence was a substantial factor
    in causing her injuries. Specifically, there was evidence
    that the plaintiff was not in a designated crosswalk at
    the time of the collision, although such a crosswalk
    was located approximately 750 feet down the road. The
    crosswalk would have been visible to the plaintiff from
    where she began to cross the roadway, and she was
    aware of that crosswalk, having used it previously.
    Additionally, at the time of the collision, it was dark
    outside and the plaintiff was wearing dark clothing,
    which the jury reasonably could have concluded would
    have made it difficult for the defendant to see her. On
    the basis of the defendant’s testimony that she never
    saw the plaintiff and that the plaintiff ‘‘popped out’’ in
    front of her vehicle, the jury reasonably could have
    inferred that the plaintiff walked or ran into the path
    of the defendant’s vehicle and that she failed to yield
    the right-of-way to the defendant.
    Moreover, the jury heard extensive evidence—in the
    form of expert and lay testimony—of the plaintiff’s
    intoxication at the time of the collision. The plaintiff’s
    blood alcohol content was .15 percent approximately
    thirty minutes after the collision. An individual of the
    plaintiff’s size would have had to consume nine stan-
    dard alcoholic drinks over a short period of time imme-
    diately before her blood was drawn to reach this level
    of intoxication. The plaintiff admitted that when she is
    intoxicated, things appear slower to her and her judg-
    ment can be impaired. Indeed, friends of the plaintiff
    who observed her prior to the collision stated that she
    struggled to stand and to navigate campus.8
    The plaintiff argues that intoxication alone does not
    constitute negligence and, therefore, the evidence of
    her intoxication is insufficient to support a finding of
    contributory negligence. Our Supreme Court has stated:
    ‘‘Even if [the jury] found [that the plaintiff] was intoxi-
    cated, that would not constitute contributory negli-
    gence as a matter of law. . . . [T]he mere fact that
    [the plaintiff] was intoxicated . . . would not prevent
    recovery but its importance in the case would be that
    if true it would strengthen the probability of the defen-
    dants’ claim [of contributory negligence].’’ Kupchunos
    v. Connecticut Co., 
    129 Conn. 160
    , 163, 
    26 A.2d 775
    (1942); see also Craig v. Dunleavy, 
    154 Conn. 100
    , 105–
    106, 
    221 A.2d 855
    (1966) (concluding that trial court
    properly found that defendant failed to prove plaintiff’s
    decedent was contributorily negligent because defen-
    dant presented no evidence other than plaintiff’s intoxi-
    cation in support of his claim). Unlike in Craig, where
    the only evidence of contributory negligence in the
    record was the intoxication of the plaintiff’s decedent,
    in the present case the defendant did not rely exclu-
    sively on evidence of the plaintiff’s intoxication in sup-
    port of her claim of contributory negligence. Craig v.
    
    Dunleavy, supra
    , 105–106. There also was evidence that
    the plaintiff ‘‘popped out’’ into the roadway at night
    dressed in dark clothing. On the basis of this evidence,
    the jury reasonably could have concluded that the plain-
    tiff, while intoxicated, ‘‘popped out’’ into the roadway
    at night dressed in dark clothing, thereby rendering
    herself a hazard. Similarly, the jury reasonably could
    have inferred that the plaintiff, while intoxicated,
    walked or ran into the path of the defendant’s vehicle.
    Moreover, in Craig, the defendant failed to offer evi-
    dence to indicate how the intoxication of the plaintiff’s
    decedent contributed to the automobile accident at
    issue. Craig v. 
    Dunleavy, supra
    , 
    154 Conn. 105
    –106. In
    the present case, there was circumstantial evidence that
    the plaintiff’s intoxication contributed to the collision
    through her admission that when she is intoxicated her
    judgment can become impaired. Further, on the basis
    of the expert testimony of the toxicologist, a jury rea-
    sonably could have determined that the level of her
    intoxication would have negatively impacted her ability
    to perceive and respond to a motor vehicle in the road
    due to a significant decrease in her cognitive function-
    ing and motor skills. The evidence of the plaintiff’s
    intoxication strengthened the probability that she was
    contributorily negligent rather than serving as per se
    evidence of her negligence.
    Finally, there was evidence that Montauk Avenue was
    flat and straight in the area of the collision and that a
    person standing in that area would have been able to
    see an oncoming vehicle prior to deciding whether or
    not to cross the road. Thus, the jury reasonably could
    have concluded that had the plaintiff been paying atten-
    tion or keeping a proper lookout, she would have seen
    the defendant’s vehicle in sufficient time to avoid the
    collision.
    On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the
    jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff was
    not exercising reasonable care to avoid harm to herself
    as alleged in each of the six specifications alleged in
    the special defense, as charged by the trial court, and
    as a result, her negligence was a substantial factor in
    bringing about her injuries.
    Second, we address the plaintiff’s claim that there
    was not sufficient evidence to remove from the realm
    of speculation the jury’s finding she was more than 50
    percent negligent. We conclude, to the contrary, that
    the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to sus-
    taining the verdict, establishes that the jury reasonably
    could have found that the plaintiff’s negligence far
    exceeded the defendant’s negligence.
    At trial, there was evidence that the plaintiff con-
    sumed approximately nine alcoholic drinks shortly
    before the collision and she was captured on a campus
    surveillance camera having difficulty standing and
    walking without assistance. The toxicologist testified
    that the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content was .15 shortly
    after the collision and that this level of intoxication
    would have significantly impaired her ability to perceive
    and respond to her surroundings, negatively impacted
    her judgment, and resulted in decreased motor skills.
    By comparison, there was evidence that the defendant
    consumed one alcoholic drink, one and one half hours
    prior to the collision, and did not appear to be inebri-
    ated, as demonstrated by her successful completion
    of a field sobriety test shortly after the collision. The
    defendant testified that at the time of the collision she
    was not speeding and she was paying extra attention
    to the roadway. Additionally, the jury was presented
    with evidence that the plaintiff would have been able
    to see headlights from the defendant’s vehicle before
    entering the roadway and before the defendant would
    have been able to see the plaintiff, who was wearing
    dark clothing at the time.
    Whether we would have reached a contrary conclu-
    sion regarding the relative negligence of the parties
    had we been seated as the jury is not relevant to our
    determination in this case. See, e.g., Procaccini v. Law-
    rence & Memorial Hospital, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    175 Conn. App. 716
    (it is not function of reviewing court to sit as seventh
    juror when considering claims of evidentiary suffi-
    ciency). Our inquiry is limited to whether the jury rea-
    sonably could have reached its finding on the basis of
    the evidence before it, including any inferences reason-
    ably drawn therefrom. We conclude, on the basis of
    our review of the evidence introduced at trial, that the
    jury’s finding that the plaintiff was more than 50 percent
    negligent was reasonably supported by the evidence.
    II
    The plaintiff’s second claim is that the court erred in
    instructing the jury on contributory negligence because
    the instruction was not supported by the evidence pre-
    sented at trial. We disagree.
    The following additional facts are relevant to the
    resolution of this claim. On March 24, 2016, during the
    charge conference, the plaintiff’s counsel objected to
    a proposed charge on contributory negligence, arguing
    that there was not sufficient evidence to support such
    a finding by the jury. The court overruled this objection
    and instructed the jury on contributory negligence.
    ‘‘The standard we use in reviewing evidentiary mat-
    ters, including the sufficiency of the evidence to submit
    a claim to the jury, is abuse of discretion. . . . Accord-
    ingly, great weight is given to the trial court’s decision
    and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of
    its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial court’s
    ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it did.
    . . . Issues that are not supported by the evidence
    should not be submitted to the jury.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Villa v. Rios, 
    88 Conn. App. 339
    , 346,
    
    869 A.2d 661
    (2005). ‘‘The trial court should not submit
    to the jury any issue that is foreign to the facts in
    evidence or for which no evidence was offered. . . .
    In reviewing a claim that there was insufficient evidence
    to support an instruction, the reviewing court must
    consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
    upholding the instruction.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Morales, 
    172 Conn. App. 329
    , 343,
    
    160 A.3d 383
    , cert. denied, 
    327 Conn. 988
    , 
    175 A.3d 1244
    (2017).
    ‘‘It has long been recognized that it is the duty of a
    pedestrian to exercise reasonable care, not only to
    avoid known dangers, but to discover those to which
    his conduct might expose him, and to be watchful of
    his surroundings. . . . Drivers, however, are not held
    to as high a degree of care to anticipate the presence
    of pedestrians in the roadway outside of crosswalks.
    . . . Indeed, [w]hile a pedestrian may ordinarily cross
    a street at any place, it is the law that in doing . . .
    so he is bound to exercise care commensurate to the
    increased danger incident to being in a place where
    pedestrians do not usually go, and, consequently, where
    drivers need not take the same precaution in anticipa-
    tion of their presence that they are required to take at
    regular crossings.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Schupp v. Grill, 
    27 Conn. App. 513
    , 518–19, 
    607 A.2d 1155
    (1992). Even ‘‘having the
    right of way would not justify [a pedestrian] in being
    oblivious to the circumstances and failing to exercise
    care commensurate with the situation. . . . One who
    has the right of way is still under a duty to exercise
    reasonable care.’’ (Citations omitted.) Drobish v.
    Petronzi, 
    142 Conn. 385
    , 387, 
    114 A.2d 685
    (1955). It
    is for the trier of fact to determine if the pedestrian
    exercised ‘‘that amount of care as to lookout which a
    reasonably prudent person would have exercised under
    the same circumstances.’’ Labbee v. Anderson, 
    149 Conn. 58
    , 61, 
    175 A.2d 370
    (1961).
    Similarly, ‘‘[t]he question of proximate causation
    . . . belongs to the trier of fact because causation is
    essentially a factual issue. . . . It becomes a conclu-
    sion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable
    [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is
    room for a reasonable disagreement the question is
    one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppedge v. Travis,
    
    187 Conn. App. 528
    , 534, 
    202 A.3d 1116
    (2019).
    As discussed in part I of this opinion, the record
    contains sufficient evidence of each of the six specifica-
    tions of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence as
    charged by the trial court, including that the plaintiff
    did not cross at the designated crosswalk, she was
    wearing dark clothing when she suddenly appeared in
    the road, and she was intoxicated. See, e.g., Schupp v.
    
    Grill, supra
    , 
    27 Conn. App. 518
    (more than sufficient
    evidence to support contributory negligence charge
    where decedent running on double yellow line in middle
    of unlighted road at night toward defendant’s vehicle).
    On the basis of this evidence, construed in the light most
    favorable to upholding the instruction, we conclude
    that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
    court’s instruction to the jury on contributory neg-
    ligence.
    III
    The plaintiff next claims that the court erred when
    it failed to instruct the jury on relevant statutes govern-
    ing the parties’ respective duties. Specifically, the plain-
    tiff argues that once the court instructed the jury on a
    pedestrian’s duties under General Statutes §§ 14-300b
    (a)9 and 14-300c (b),10 its refusal to charge the jury on
    the countervailing duties that a driver owes to pedestri-
    ans on the roadway under General Statutes §§ 14-300d11
    and 14-300i12 constituted error. We disagree.
    The following additional facts are relevant to the
    resolution of this claim. On March 21, 2016, the plaintiff
    filed an amended request to charge regarding the defen-
    dant’s special defense of contributory negligence. The
    plaintiff proposed that the court instruct the jury as to
    the defendant’s specific claims of the plaintiff’s negli-
    gence and then immediately instruct the jury that
    ‘‘[t]here [were] three provisions of the Connecticut Gen-
    eral Statutes which address the duty of a driver to
    avoid pedestrians . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The
    plaintiff requested that the court read the text of §§ 14-
    300c (pedestrian use of road and sidewalks), 14-300d
    (operator of vehicle required to exercise due care to
    avoid pedestrian), and 14-300i (vehicle operator to exer-
    cise reasonable care when near vulnerable user on pub-
    lic way).
    On March 24, 2016, during a charge conference, the
    plaintiff objected to the court instructing the jury on
    §§ 14-300b (a) and 14-300c (b), while excluding instruc-
    tions on §§ 14-300d and 14-300i from the charge, stating:
    ‘‘I don’t see a specific charge with regard to [§§] 14-
    300d or [14-300i], which . . . says that notwithstanding
    all of the foregoing sections that are actually being
    charged, [§§ 14-300b (a) and 14-300c (b),] that it doesn’t
    excuse a driver who fails to use due care, and a driver
    who fails to use due care is still at fault. So at least
    . . . minimally, that principle should be charged.’’ The
    plaintiff emphasized that §§ 14-300b, 14-300c, 14-300d,
    and 14-300i should be charged ‘‘in principle only.’’ The
    court stated: ‘‘The reason I am not including [§ 14-300d
    or § 14-300i] is that, having removed the specific statu-
    tory references on the other items, I believe that . . .
    the law . . . in [§ 14-300d or § 14-300i is] . . .
    included in the other instructions. . . . Particularly, in
    the plaintiff’s described claims.’’
    Later on March 24, 2016, the court instructed the jury
    on negligence and contributory negligence. With regard
    to contributory negligence, the court instructed: ‘‘[T]he
    plaintiff, like the defendant, also had a duty to exercise
    the care which a reasonably prudent person would use
    under the circumstances. A plaintiff can be negligent if
    she does something which a reasonably prudent person
    would not have done under similar circumstances, or
    fails to do that which a reasonably prudent person
    would have done under similar circumstances.’’
    The court went on to state six possible ways in which
    the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was contributor-
    ily negligent: ‘‘One, she crossed the street at a place
    other than the available crosswalk and failed to yield
    the right-of-way to the defendant; two, she left a place of
    safety and walked or ran into the path of the defendant’s
    vehicle, causing a hazard; three, she walked upon the
    roadway while under the influence of alcohol, rendering
    herself a hazard; four, she was inebriated, intoxicated,
    or impaired by the consumption of alcohol and, as a
    result, walked or ran into the path of the defendant’s
    vehicle; five, she failed to keep a reasonable and proper
    lookout for vehicles on the roadway; six, she failed to
    be attentive to her surroundings, including vehicles in
    the roadway.’’
    ‘‘Our review of the [plaintiff’s] claim requires that we
    examine the [trial] court’s entire charge to determine
    whether it is reasonably possible that the jury could
    have been misled by the omission of the requested
    instruction. . . . While a request to charge that is rele-
    vant to the issues in a case and that accurately states
    the applicable law must be honored, a [trial] court need
    not tailor its charge to the precise letter of such a
    request. . . . If a requested charge is in substance
    given, the [trial] court’s failure to give a charge in exact
    conformance with the words of the request will not
    constitute a ground for reversal. . . . As long as [the
    instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues
    and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will
    not view the instructions as improper.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. Euclides L., 189 Conn.
    App. 151, 160–61, 
    207 A.3d 93
    (2019); see also State v.
    Campbell, 
    328 Conn. 444
    , 528–29, 
    180 A.3d 882
    (2018)
    (individual jury instructions not to be judged in artificial
    isolation or critically dissected in microscopic search
    for possible error, but reviewed in context of overall
    charge).
    The plaintiff argues that the court ‘‘never instructed
    the jury in line with § 14-300d that the defendant-motor-
    ist would not be relieved of the duty to exercise due
    care to avoid the collision despite the alleged failure
    to utilize the crosswalk by the plaintiff-pedestrian.’’ The
    plaintiff further claims that ‘‘[t]he jurors needed to be
    instructed that even if [the plaintiff] had a duty to cross
    the street at a particular place which was allegedly
    breached—despite that circumstance—the defendant
    . . . still had the duty to exercise reasonable care and
    would not be absolved of potential liability because of
    that circumstance.’’
    In the present case, the court incorporated the duties
    of pedestrians identified in §§ 14-300b (a) and 14-200c
    (b) in its charge on contributory negligence. See part
    III of this opinion. Likewise, the court incorporated the
    duties of drivers in relation to pedestrians identified in
    §§ 14-300d and 14-300i in its charge on negligence. As
    requested by the plaintiff during the charge conference,
    the court did not reference these statutes. The court
    instructed the jury regarding the relevant common law
    elements of negligence, stating in part: ‘‘[E]ach driver
    of a motor vehicle has a duty to drive that vehicle in
    such a way as to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm to
    other people. Each driver of a motor vehicle has a duty
    to exercise reasonable care towards others whenever
    the driver’s actions, together with any reasonably fore-
    seeable actions of others, make it likely that harm to
    another will result if the driver fails to exercise that
    reasonable care.’’ The court went on to provide the jury
    with additional instructions on negligence as it related
    to the defendant’s actions.
    Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s argument that
    the court failed to instruct the jury on a driver’s duties
    in relation to pedestrians under §§ 14-300d and 14-300i,
    the court instructed the jury on these statutes in essence
    when it stated: ‘‘The law recognizes that a person’s
    conduct can still be negligent if her conduct involves
    an unreasonable risk of harm when the conduct is com-
    bined with the foreseeable conduct of another person,
    such as the plaintiff stopping her car due to traffic, or
    someone, a driver, stopping a car due to traffic, or a
    force of nature.’’ While this instruction did not conform
    precisely to the language proposed by the plaintiff, it
    is axiomatic that the court ‘‘need not tailor its charge to
    the precise letter of such a request.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Euclides 
    L., supra
    , 189 Conn.
    App. 161.
    The plaintiff argues that the court’s instructions failed
    to make clear that, even if the plaintiff was negligent
    in violating any of the pedestrian statutes, the defendant
    still had a continuing affirmative duty of care. The fact
    that the jury found the driver 10 percent negligent, how-
    ever, indicates that the jury understood that the defen-
    dant owed the plaintiff a duty of care notwithstanding
    the plaintiff’s negligence.
    Mindful of our obligation to construe the court’s
    charge as a whole, we conclude that the court ade-
    quately instructed the jury regarding the defendant’s
    duty to exercise reasonable care. Furthermore,
    although the instructions at issue were not a model of
    clarity, we are cognizant of the fact that ‘‘[j]ury instruc-
    tions need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically
    accurate, so long as they are correct in law, adapted
    to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v.
    Vanech, 
    266 Conn. 822
    , 832, 
    836 A.2d 394
    (2003). On
    the basis of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that
    there is any reasonable possibility that the trial court’s
    charge misled the jury.
    IV
    The plaintiff’s final claim is that the trial court erred
    in denying her motion for a mistrial and posttrial motion
    to set aside the verdict, which were based on the intro-
    duction of hearsay evidence against her toward the
    end of the trial during the videotaped testimony of the
    defendant’s toxicology expert. Specifically, the plaintiff
    argues that ‘‘the defendant’s introduction of [certain
    hearsay comments] . . . was highly prejudicial to [her]
    and deprived her of a fair trial’’ and that the trial court’s
    instruction relating thereto did not cure the prejudice.13
    We disagree.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are relevant to the resolution of this claim. During the
    trial, the defendant presented testimony of Charles
    McKay, an expert toxicologist. McKay was deposed
    prior to trial, and a videotaped recording of his testi-
    mony was played for the jury during trial on March
    23, 2016.
    At one point in the deposition, McKay made com-
    ments that indicated that the plaintiff recalled the colli-
    sion. Prior to trial, the parties agreed that these com-
    ments, which were based on hearsay, would be
    excluded from the recording that was shown to the
    jury. Throughout the trial, it was undisputed that the
    plaintiff did not recall the collision. When the recording
    was shown to the jury, however, it included McKay’s
    comments indicating that the plaintiff recalled the colli-
    sion as part of the following exchange between the
    plaintiff’s counsel and McKay:
    ‘‘Q. And you therefore have no idea . . . how long
    [the plaintiff] was in that street that evening before she
    was hit by [the defendant]?
    ‘‘A. She said she was walking across the street, but
    I don’t know how long she was in that process.
    ‘‘Q. Where did she say she was walking across the
    street? Where did you get that from?
    ‘‘A. It was from [the plaintiff’s] deposition that she
    was walking across the street and she saw the light,
    [but] thought she could make it . . . across the
    street . . .
    ‘‘Q. Okay, that was not in her deposition, doctor, with
    all due respect. You’re getting that, again, from the
    police report based on a statement that her mother said
    she made in the hospital that was confused by the
    police. My question is did you ever hear an indication
    directly from [the plaintiff] as to what she was doing
    that night?
    ‘‘A. Oh, in terms of her activities on the street, no,
    not in her deposition. She described several things she
    did back and forth with going to different friends’ rooms
    and things like that, but she didn’t recall the crash
    event itself.’’
    Immediately after the recording was shown, the jury
    was excused. When the jury returned to the courtroom,
    the court instructed the jury as follows: ‘‘[T]here was
    a statement in the course of Dr. McKay’s testimony that
    was not admissible, and I need to correct the record
    in that regard, in this way: It is agreed between the
    parties that [the plaintiff] has no recollection of any of
    the events preceding the collision in question. There-
    fore, you are to disregard any comments or statements
    attributed to her regarding the collision.’’
    Despite the court’s instruction to disregard McKay’s
    comments about the plaintiff’s recollection of the colli-
    sion, the plaintiff’s counsel moved for a mistrial,
    arguing: ‘‘[I]n this kind of situation, an instruction . . .
    simply is not enough. It was suggested by Dr. McKay
    that [the plaintiff] . . . may or may not have seen
    [something] immediately prior to getting hit in the road-
    way in this case . . . when she has clearly stated time
    and again that she has no recollection of those events.
    Dr. McKay’s testimony seemed to suggest she, in fact,
    did have recollection of the events, and that she some-
    how saw the defendant’s vehicle in the roadway right
    . . . before getting hit and saw it speed up and just
    simply couldn’t make it [to the other side of the street].
    . . . [T]his type of evidence, which was agreed to be
    kept out, is clearly inadmissible in the first place,
    because it’s hearsay about three times over. It was a
    statement contained in a police report that both sides
    agreed was not admissible and should not be allowed
    in . . . . [T]hat type of misleading evidence is obvi-
    ously also prejudicial to the plaintiff, intimates that
    somehow, [the] plaintiff . . . could have made it
    across the road or darted out into the road and saw
    the vehicle and was aware of the vehicle . . . . It’s
    impossible in a situation like [this] . . . to un-ring a
    bell . . . .’’
    The defendant’s counsel responded: ‘‘I think that the
    remedy . . . agreed upon is sufficient. I don’t think
    this warrants a mistrial. . . . [The jury] just heard an
    instruction . . . . They heard [the plaintiff]. . . .
    Everybody denied any knowledge on the part of [the
    plaintiff], and I think [the jury] believe[s] her, so I don’t
    think that they’re not going to listen to this instruction,
    so I would oppose a mistrial.’’
    The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial,
    stating: ‘‘I believe that . . . it’s premature to grant a
    motion for mistrial, and I don’t regard the agreed three-
    sentence statement that I . . . read . . . as being the
    only way to address that. The fact of the matter is that
    we don’t know whether it’ll have the slightest effect
    . . . .’’
    Thereafter, on March 31, 2016, the plaintiff filed a
    motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial
    pursuant to Practice Book §§ 16-35 and 16-37, in which
    she argued, inter alia: ‘‘The trial court erred in refusing
    to grant a mistrial due to the admission of the video-
    taped statement of Dr. McKay regarding causation, as
    this testimony relied on three levels of hearsay, and as
    the parties had agreed Dr. McKay would not testify
    concerning causation . . . .’’ The court denied this
    motion on April 5, 2017.
    On May 18, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for articu-
    lation ‘‘of the decision of the trial court . . . denying
    her posttrial motion to set aside the verdict and for a
    new trial . . . .’’ The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that
    ‘‘the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when
    inadmissible, prejudicial hearsay was introduced during
    the defendant’s presentation of the videotaped trial tes-
    timony of . . . Dr. McKay.’’ On August 7, 2017, the
    court denied the plaintiff’s motion for articulation, stat-
    ing the following with regard to the plaintiff’s claim
    that the court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial on
    the basis of McKay’s statement: ‘‘[T]he court perceives
    no error in refusing to grant a mistrial because unwel-
    come testimony was included in the video testimony
    of [McKay] at trial. When the motion for mistrial was
    first made, the court found the curative instruction to
    the jury—an instruction to which plaintiff’s counsel
    agreed—adequate for the reasons stated on the record.
    The court still perceived no error in denying a mistrial
    when it was again requested as part of the motion for
    a new trial because, even in hindsight, the court believes
    the curative instruction was proper and sufficient.’’
    ‘‘The standard for review of an action upon a motion
    for a mistrial is well established. While the remedy of
    a mistrial is permitted under the rules of practice, it is
    not favored. [A] mistrial should be granted only as a
    result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a
    character that it is apparent to the court that because
    of it a party cannot have a fair trial . . . and the whole
    proceedings are vitiated. . . . On appeal, we hesitate
    to disturb a decision not to declare a mistrial. The trial
    judge is the arbiter of the many circumstances which
    may arise during the trial in which his function is to
    assure a fair and just outcome. . . . In [our] review of
    the denial of a motion for mistrial, [we recognize] the
    broad discretion that is vested in the trial court to decide
    whether an occurrence at trial has so prejudiced a party
    that he or she can no longer receive a fair trial. The
    decision of the trial court is therefore reversible on
    appeal only if there has been an abuse of discretion.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazier v. Signa-
    ture Pools, Inc., 
    159 Conn. App. 12
    , 40, 
    123 A.3d 1
    , cert.
    denied, 
    319 Conn. 933
    , 
    125 A.3d 207
    (2015).
    The denial of a motion to set aside the verdict is also
    reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See
    Froom Development Corp. v. Developers Realty, Inc.,
    
    114 Conn. App. 618
    , 626, 
    972 A.2d 239
    , cert. denied,
    
    293 Conn. 922
    , 
    980 A.2d 909
    (2009). ‘‘The trial court
    possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict
    which, in the court’s opinion, is against the law or evi-
    dence. . . . [The trial court] should not set aside a
    verdict where it is apparent that there was some evi-
    dence upon which the jury might reasonably reach [its]
    conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where
    the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and
    palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was
    made by the jury in the application of legal principles
    . . . .’’ 
    Id., 625. ‘‘If
    curative action can obviate the prejudice, the dras-
    tic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holley, 
    327 Conn. 576
    , 630, 
    175 A.3d 514
    (2018). ‘‘[I]n cases tried to a jury
    . . . curative instructions can overcome the erroneous
    effect of statements that a jury should not have heard.
    . . . Because curative instructions often remedy the
    prejudicial impact of inadmissible evidence . . . [w]e
    have always given great weight to such instructions in
    assessing claimed errors. . . . Thus, [a] jury is nor-
    mally presumed to disregard inadmissible evidence
    brought to its attention unless there is an overwhelming
    probability that the jury will not follow the trial court’s
    instructions and a strong likelihood that the inadmissi-
    ble evidence was devastating to the [plaintiff]. . . .
    Consequently, the burden is on the [plaintiff] to estab-
    lish that, in the context of the proceedings as a whole,
    the stricken testimony was so prejudicial, notwithstand-
    ing the court’s curative instructions, that the jury rea-
    sonably cannot be presumed to have disregarded it.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boutilier,
    
    144 Conn. App. 867
    , 876–77, 
    73 A.3d 880
    , cert. denied,
    
    310 Conn. 925
    , 
    77 A.3d 139
    (2013).
    In the present case, the court did not abuse its discre-
    tion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial and
    motion to set aside the verdict. Immediately after
    McKay’s comment indicating that the plaintiff recalled
    walking across the street, the plaintiff’s counsel cor-
    rected him, explaining that his statement was based on
    a police officer’s mistaken interpretation of a comment
    by the plaintiff’s mother. McKay admitted, during the
    deposition, that he was indeed mistaken, stating: ‘‘[The
    plaintiff] didn’t recall the crash event itself.’’ (Empha-
    sis added.)
    Even after the jury heard McKay correct the misstate-
    ment during his deposition, the court instructed the
    jury to ignore any comments that indicated that the
    plaintiff remembered the collision. The court’s instruc-
    tion was given shortly after the jury viewed the
    recording, meaning that the jurors did not have an
    opportunity to ruminate on the comment. Moreover,
    this court presumes that a jury will follow curative
    instructions, unless there is a strong probability that it
    will not do so. See State v. 
    Boutilier, supra
    , 144 Conn.
    App. 876–77. In the present case, the plaintiff failed to
    point to any indicia that the jury did not follow the
    court’s instruction to ignore McKay’s comments.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
    its discretion when it denied the plaintiff’s motion for
    a mistrial and motion to set aside the verdict.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The plaintiff also brought this action against the defendant Mitchell
    College but withdrew the action as against it. Our references in this opinion
    to the defendant are to Alexandria Moore.
    2
    ‘‘[A]lthough Connecticut has adopted the doctrine of comparative negli-
    gence; see General Statutes § 52-572h (b); our statutes retain the term con-
    tributory negligence. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 52-114 and 52-572h (b).’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stafford v. Roadway, 
    312 Conn. 184
    ,
    185 n.3, 
    93 A.3d 1058
    (2014). Therefore, although the briefs filed in this
    appeal use the term comparative negligence, we use the term contributory
    negligence throughout this opinion.
    3
    In the area where the collision occurred, Montauk Avenue is two lanes,
    with northbound traffic in one lane and southbound traffic in the other.
    4
    The defendant’s cell phone records showed that she was not using her
    cell phone when the collision occurred.
    5
    McKay explained that a standard alcoholic drink is one that contains
    one and one-half ounces of 80 proof alcohol.
    6
    General Statutes § 52-572h (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In causes of
    action based on negligence, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery
    in an action by any person or the person’s legal representative to recover
    damages resulting from personal injury . . . if the negligence was not
    greater than the combined negligence of the person . . . against whom
    recovery is sought.’’
    7
    The plaintiff contends that ‘‘[t]here was no evidence [the plaintiff] failed
    to yield the right-of-way (Special Defense no. 1); walked or ran in the path
    of [the defendant’s] car (Special Defense nos. 2, 4); rendered herself a hazard
    (Special Defense nos. 2, 3); failed to keep a proper lookout or be attentive
    (Special Defense nos. 5, 6).’’ (Footnote omitted.) The plaintiff also argues
    that the defendant ‘‘failed to introduce any evidence that the conduct alleged
    in the special [defense]—e.g., [the plaintiff’s] alleged inattentiveness, alcohol
    consumption—was causally connected to the collision.’’
    8
    The statements by the plaintiff’s friends that the plaintiff struggled to
    stand and navigate campus were made to a campus safety officer and were
    referred to during the testimony of toxicologist Charles McKay.
    9
    General Statutes § 14-300b (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each pedestrian
    crossing a roadway at any point other than within a crosswalk marked as
    provided in subsection (a) of section 14-300 or any unmarked crosswalk or
    at a location controlled by police officers shall yield the right of way to
    each vehicle upon such roadway. . . .’’
    10
    General Statutes § 14-300c (b) provides: ‘‘No pedestrian shall suddenly
    leave a curb, sidewalk, crosswalk or any other place of safety adjacent to
    or upon a roadway and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so
    close to such pedestrian as to constitute an immediate hazard to such
    pedestrian. No pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug
    to a degree which renders himself a hazard shall walk or stand upon any
    part of a roadway.’’
    11
    General Statutes §14-300d sets forth the duties of drivers in relation to
    pedestrians, providing in relevant part: ‘‘Notwithstanding any provision of
    the general statutes or any regulations issued thereunder, sections . . . 14-
    300b to 14-300e, inclusive, or any local ordinance to the contrary, each
    operator of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any
    pedestrian . . . and shall give a reasonable warning by sounding a horn or
    other lawful noise emitting device to avoid a collision . . . .’’
    12
    General Statutes §14-300i (b), which also relates to the duties of drivers
    in relation to pedestrians, provides: ‘‘Any person operating a motor vehicle
    on a public way who fails to exercise reasonable care and causes the serious
    physical injury or death of a vulnerable user on a public way, provided such
    vulnerable user has shown reasonable care in such user’s use of the public
    way, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars.’’ Pedestrians are
    included in the statute’s definition of a ‘‘vulnerable user.’’ See General Stat-
    utes § 14-300i (a).
    13
    The plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
    the defendant’s introduction of the inadmissible hearsay was invited by the
    plaintiff because the plaintiff’s counsel failed to request that the portion of
    the recording at issue be edited out before the recording was shown to the
    jury. Because we conclude that the comments did not deprive the plaintiff
    of a fair trial and that any prejudice was cured by the court’s instruction,
    we need not address this argument.