Kaminsky v. Commissioner of Emergency Services & Public Protection , 188 Conn. App. 109 ( 2019 )


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    JOSEPH W. KAMINSKY JR. v. COMMISSIONER
    OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND
    PUBLIC PROTECTION ET AL.
    (AC 40546)
    Sheldon, Keller and Moll, Js.
    Syllabus
    The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant Commissioner of
    Emergency Services and Public Protection, seeking a declaratory ruling
    that certain firearms were improperly seized and withheld from him by
    the defendant and, thus, that he was entitled to the return of those
    firearms. The plaintiff never obtained a certificate of possession or
    registered the three firearms at issue as assault weapons as required
    by Connecticut law, and the sole basis of the defendant’s refusal to
    return the three firearms at issue was that they were never properly
    registered as assault weapons. The plaintiff claimed that because the
    subject firearms were manufactured prior to September 13, 1994, they
    were exempt from the registration requirement under statute (§ 53-
    202m). The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for a declaratory
    ruling and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff
    appealed to this court. On the basis of its interpretation of § 53-202m,
    the trial court had concluded that the plaintiff’s firearms were not legally
    held by him because they were not exempt from the transfer or registra-
    tion requirements for assault weapons. Held that the plaintiff’s claim
    that the trial court erred in denying his request for a declaratory judgment
    was unavailing, the trial court having properly determined in a well
    reasoned memorandum of decision that the plaintiff was required to
    obtain a certificate of possession for certain of his assault weapons,
    which he failed to do, and, thus, that the guns at issue were contraband
    and not legally held by the plaintiff, who was not entitled to their return.
    Argued December 3, 2018—officially released February 26, 2019
    Procedural History
    Action for a declaratory judgment to determine
    whether certain firearms were improperly seized and
    withheld from the plaintiff, and for other relief, brought
    to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland
    and tried to the court, Bright, J.; judgment for the
    named defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to
    this court. Affirmed.
    Rachel M. Baird, for the appellant (plaintiff).
    James Belforti, assistant attorney general, with
    whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, former attor-
    ney general, and Stephen R. Sarnoski, assistant attorney
    general, for the appellee (named defendant Commis-
    sioner).
    Opinion
    SHELDON, J. The plaintiff, Joseph W. Kaminsky, Jr.,
    appeals from the trial court’s judgment, rendered after a
    trial without a jury, denying his request for a declaratory
    judgment holding that certain firearms were improperly
    seized and withheld from him by the defendant, the
    Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Pro-
    tection,1 and thus that he is entitled to the return of
    those firearms.2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
    trial court erred in denying his request on the basis of its
    misinterpretation of the applicable statutory provisions.
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The following procedural history and facts, as found
    by the trial court, are relevant to our disposition of this
    appeal. The plaintiff has been a collector and dealer of
    firearms licensed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
    and Firearms (ATF) since 1988. While reviewing the
    plaintiff’s application to renew his federal firearms
    license in 2011, the ATF discovered that he had a felony
    conviction in 1964 and, therefore, that he was ineligible
    to have such a license or to possess any firearms. The
    ATF contacted the Connecticut State Police to alert
    them that the plaintiff was likely in illegal possession
    of firearms. In December, 2011, after being notified by
    state and local police that he was ineligible to possess
    any firearms, the plaintiff surrendered fifty-nine fire-
    arms to authorities. Three of those firearms, a B-West
    Arms AK-47-type rifle (AK-47), a Group Industries Uzi
    submachine gun (Uzi), and a SWD Cobray-11 subma-
    chine gun (M-11), are at issue in this appeal.
    The firearms in question were all manufactured, and
    thereafter acquired by the plaintiff, prior to September
    13, 1994. The plaintiff properly registered the Uzi and
    the M-11 as machine guns under both state and federal
    law, but he neglected to register the AK-47 as a machine
    gun. The plaintiff also never obtained a certificate of
    possession or registered the three firearms as assault
    weapons as required by Connecticut law. The Uzi and
    the M-11 each have a ‘‘selective-fire’’ mode that allows
    them to be fired in either automatic or semiautomatic
    mode, and the AK-47 firearm is explicitly listed under
    General Statutes § 53-202a as an assault weapon.
    On August 6, 2014, the plaintiff brought an action
    pursuant to General Statutes § 52-291 seeking a declara-
    tory ruling that the three firearms at issue had been
    improperly seized and withheld from him and that he
    was entitled to their return. The sole basis for the defen-
    dant’s refusal to return the three firearms was that they
    were never properly registered as assault weapons pur-
    suant to Connecticut law.3 During the two day trial
    beginning on August 23, 2016, the plaintiff argued, in
    relevant part, that because the three firearms in ques-
    tion were manufactured prior to September 13, 1994,
    they are exempt from any registration requirement
    under General Statutes § 53-202m. The defendant dis-
    agreed, arguing that the plain language of § 53-202m
    exempts only specific categories of assault weapons
    from the registration requirement and that the plaintiff’s
    firearms did not qualify for such exemptions, thereby
    making their possession without registration illegal and
    subjecting them to seizure and destruction as contra-
    band. The court agreed with the defendant and, thus,
    ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to the declara-
    tory relief he requested. This appeal followed.
    The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court
    erred in its interpretation of § 53-202m by finding that
    only certain assault weapons manufactured prior to
    September 13, 1994, are exempt from registration there-
    under. The plaintiff argues that No. 13-220 of the 2013
    Public Acts (P.A. 13-220), as codified in the current
    revision of § 53-202m, is ambiguous because it refers
    to and incorporates by reference certain preexisting
    statutory provisions that were no longer in force and
    effect when the statute was enacted. Therefore, the
    plaintiff urges us to consider extratextual evidence in
    the form of an October 11, 2013 letter from Reuben
    Bradford, the former Commissioner of Emergency Ser-
    vices and Public Protection, declaring that it was the
    intent of the legislature in passing § 11 of P.A. 13-220
    to exclude all assault weapons manufactured before
    September 13, 1994, from the statute’s transfer restric-
    tions and registration requirements. We disagree with
    the plaintiff’s interpretation of the applicable statu-
    tory provisions.
    ‘‘Statutory interpretation presents a question of law
    for the court. . . . Our review is, therefore, plenary.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russo Roofing, Inc.
    v. Rottman, 
    86 Conn. App. 767
    , 775, 
    863 A.2d 713
    (2005).
    ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
    tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
    of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
    determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
    statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
    including the question of whether the language actually
    does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
    General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
    text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
    statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
    such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
    unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
    results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
    statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to deter-
    mine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in
    context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable
    interpretation.’’ Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of
    Information Commission, 
    298 Conn. 703
    , 720, 
    6 A.3d 763
    (2010).
    We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant
    statutory language. General Statutes § 53-202c crimi-
    nalizes the possession of an assault weapon unless oth-
    erwise permitted by General Statutes §§ 53-202a
    through 53-202k and 53-202o. ‘‘[A]ny property, the pos-
    session of which is prohibited by any provision of the
    general statutes’’ is considered contraband under Gen-
    eral Statutes § 54-36a (a).
    Section 53-202c (c) exempts those individuals who,
    prior to July 1, 1994, lawfully possessed an assault
    weapon prior to October 1, 1993, from its prohibition
    against the possession of such weapons if the person
    otherwise complies with §§ 53-202a through 53-202k.
    To comply with General Statutes § 53-202d, any person
    who lawfully possesses an assault weapon must obtain
    a certificate of possession from the Department of
    Emergency Services and Public Protection. However,
    § 53-202m provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding any provision of
    the general statutes, sections 53-202a to 53-202l, inclu-
    sive, shall not be construed to limit the transfer or
    require the registration of an assault weapon as defined
    in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section
    53-202a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised
    to January 1, 2013, provided such firearm was legally
    manufactured prior to September 13, 1994.’’
    We agree with the well reasoned decision of the trial
    court and thus adopt the following relevant portion
    of its memorandum of decision: ‘‘Section 53-202m, as
    amended, clearly limits the exemptions from transfer
    limitations and registration requirements to those
    assault weapons defined in subdivision (3) or (4) of
    subsection (a) of § 53-202a of the General Statutes, revi-
    sion of 1958, revised to January 1, 2013. Based on this
    express language, one must look at the definitions of
    assault weapon in § 53-202a as that statute existed on
    January 1, 2013. Only those weapons that fall within
    subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) are exempt
    from the registration requirement. Thus, the operative
    language is that adopted in Public Acts 2001, No. 130
    § 1, the last revision of § 53-202a as of January 1, 2013.
    Under that statute, subdivision (3) of subsection (a)
    defines, in relevant part, an assault weapon as [a]ny
    semiautomatic firearm not listed in subdivision (1) of
    this subsection that meets the following criteria . . . .
    Thus, to fall within subdivision (3) or (4), the semiauto-
    matic firearm, or part thereof, must not be listed in
    subdivision (1) of subsection (a).
    ‘‘The problem for the plaintiff is that the Uzi, M-11,
    and AK-47 fall squarely within subdivision (1), which
    defines assault weapon as [a]ny selective-fire firearm
    capable of fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire
    at the option of the user or any of the following specified
    semiautomatic firearms . . . Avtomat Kalashnikov
    AK-47 type. P.A. 01-130. The Uzi and M-11 are selective-
    fire firearms capable of fully automatic or semiauto-
    matic fire at the option of the user. The AK-47 is an
    AK-47 type firearm. Because these firearms are listed
    either by name or feature in subdivision (1), by defini-
    tion they cannot fall under subdivisions (3) and (4).
    Consequently they are not entitled to the exemption
    from registration set forth in § 53-202m, as amended.
    The fact that Commissioner Bradford reached a differ-
    ent conclusion does not change the court’s analysis. An
    agency’s interpretation is not entitled to deference if it
    is plainly inconsistent with the clear language of the
    statute. See Med-Trans of Connecticut v. Dept. of Public
    Health & Addiction Services, 
    242 Conn. 152
    , 168, 
    699 A.2d 142
    (1997). That is the case here.
    ***
    ‘‘The law is clear in that the plaintiff was required to
    obtain a certificate of possession for the Uzi, M-11, and
    AK-47 as assault weapons. The plaintiff failed to do so
    from 1993 when the requirement was first enacted until
    2011 when the guns were seized from him. The guns
    were thus not legally held by the plaintiff. They are
    contraband and the plaintiff is not entitled to their
    return.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) It would serve no useful purpose for this court
    to engage in any additional discussion. See, e.g., Wood-
    ruff v. Hemingway, 
    297 Conn. 317
    , 321, 
    2 A.3d 857
    (2010); Samakaab v. Dept. of Social Services, 178 Conn.
    App. 52, 54, 
    173 A.3d 1004
    (2017).
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The complaint named as an additional defendant the Chief of Coventry
    Police Department, Town of Coventry. The plaintiff withdrew the action as
    to that defendant. We refer to the Commissioner of Emergency Services
    and Public Protection as the defendant in this opinion.
    2
    In particular, the plaintiff’s petition requested that three of six firearms
    in the custody of the Connecticut State Police and twenty-four firearms of
    unknown location be returned to him. The trial court found that the plaintiff
    failed to prove the existence or location of the twenty-four firearms. The
    plaintiff does not address these firearms in his brief and, therefore, has
    abandoned any claim as to the twenty-four firearms on appeal. See Solek
    v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    107 Conn. App. 473
    , 476, 
    946 A.2d 239
    , cert.
    denied, 
    289 Conn. 902
    , 
    957 A.2d 873
    (2008).
    3
    In 2013, the plaintiff received a full pardon from the 1964 conviction
    and had all of his federal, state, and local firearms licenses and permits
    reinstated, thus rendering him otherwise eligible to possess certain firearms.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC40546

Citation Numbers: 203 A.3d 1252, 188 Conn. App. 109

Judges: Sheldon, Keller, Moll

Filed Date: 2/26/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/18/2024