Kinity v. US Bancorp ( 2022 )


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    ISAAC KINITY v. US BANCORP ET AL.
    (AC 44106)
    Elgo, Clark and Sheldon, Js.
    Syllabus
    The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, B Co. and I
    Co., in connection with certain steps taken by the defendants involving
    the plaintiff’s mortgaged property. B Co. was the servicer of a residential
    loan to the plaintiff under a note secured by a mortgage on his property.
    I Co. issued an insurance policy to the plaintiff covering the mortgaged
    property against loss, as required by the mortgage. After the plaintiff
    became delinquent on his mortgage payments, an inspection was com-
    pleted on the mortgaged property. The resulting inspection report noted
    that the property appeared to be vacant. B Co. advised I Co. of the
    possible vacancy, and that there might be a change of risk, and also
    sought assurances from the plaintiff that he either still occupied the
    property or had procured sufficient insurance to cover it against loss
    because the current insurance policy did not provide coverage if the
    property was vacant. Although the plaintiff still occupied the property,
    B Co.’s receipt of information to the contrary led I Co. to cancel the
    insurance policy and refund a portion of the premium. Following a
    conversation with the plaintiff, I Co. reinstated the policy and invoiced
    the plaintiff for the refunded portion of the premium. When the premium
    for the reinstated policy was never paid, B Co. procured a more costly
    lender placed insurance policy at the plaintiff’s expense. The plaintiff
    eventually provided B Co. with evidence that he had obtained his own
    insurance coverage for the property and the lender placed policy was
    cancelled. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an action against a trade name
    of B Co., and, after that company was defaulted for failure to appear,
    judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. When B Co. learned of
    that action, it filed a motion to open and vacate the default judgment.
    The trial court granted B Co.’s motion and the action was dismissed
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The
    plaintiff then commenced the second action against B Co. under the
    accidental failure of suit statute (§ 52-592) and continuing course of
    conduct doctrine to recover damages on several theories of liability for
    injuries and losses, later moving successfully to cite in I Co. B Co. and
    I Co. then filed separate motions for summary judgment, which the trial
    court granted on the grounds that none of the plaintiff’s untimely claims
    was saved by the accidental failure of suit statute or the continuing
    course of conduct doctrine and were barred by the applicable statutes
    of limitations, and that the plaintiff’s remaining claims failed as a matter
    of law, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Thereafter, the plaintiff
    filed an amended appeal from a postjudgment order of the trial court
    granting I Co.’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement it had reached
    with the plaintiff. Held:
    1. The trial court did not err in granting I Co.’s motion to enforce a settlement
    agreement:
    a. The trial court properly exercised its authority under Audubon Parking
    Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (
    225 Conn. 804
    )
    (Audubon) to enforce the settlement agreement: even though the plaintiff
    did not raise his unpreserved claim that a trial court lacked authority
    to summarily enforce a settlement agreement formed postjudgment dur-
    ing the pendency of an appeal, review was appropriate in the exercise
    of this court’s supervisory powers under Blumberg Associates World-
    wide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc. (
    311 Conn. 123
    ), as
    the record was adequate for review, all parties had an opportunity to
    be heard on the issue as both parties filed supplemental briefs on this
    issue, there was no unfair prejudice to any party as I Co. did not assert
    that it would have presented additional evidence or proceeded differently
    if the claim had been raised in the trial court, and the party who benefitted
    from the application of this court’s supervisory powers, the plaintiff,
    could not prevail, thus, review of the claim did not prejudice I Co. and
    provided the plaintiff with a sense of finality that the plaintiff otherwise
    would not have had if this court declined to review the claim; moreover,
    the trial court was not deprived of its authority to enforce a settlement
    agreement simply because the action that the agreement settled was on
    appeal, as a settlement reached by the parties postjudgment and during
    the pendency of an appeal is a settlement within the framework of the
    original lawsuit under Audubon; furthermore, under Waldman v. Beck
    (
    101 Conn. App. 669
    ), the court had the authority to order the precise
    form of relief agreed to by the parties, in this case not a judgment in
    favor of a party, but rather the withdrawal of the action.
    b. The trial court properly concluded that a clear, unambiguous, and
    enforceable agreement had been reached between the plaintiff and I Co.
    to settle the dispute between them in this action: upon a thorough review
    of the record, the court’s finding concerning the mutual assent of the
    parties to the terms of the agreement was not clearly erroneous as the
    plaintiff’s attorney never expressly stated to I Co.’s attorney in their
    e-mail communications that the settlement agreement was contingent
    upon reaching a global settlement that included B Co., and the fleeting
    references by the plaintiff’s attorney to negotiations with B Co. were
    not enough to convey to a reasonable person in the position of the
    attorney for I Co. that the agreement was contingent; moreover, the
    court did not err in finding that the settlement agreement was supported
    by valid consideration, as the court found that the terms of the settlement
    agreement clearly and unambiguously established that I Co. would pay
    the plaintiff $10,000 in exchange for his release of all claims against it.
    c. Because the trial court did not err in granting I Co.’s motion to enforce
    the settlement agreement, this court did not address the plaintiff’s claims
    concerning the trial court’s granting I Co.’s motion for summary judg-
    ment.
    2. The trial court properly granted B Co.’s motion for summary judgment:
    a. The trial court did not err in concluding that § 52-592 was inapplicable
    and therefore could not save the plaintiff’s otherwise untimely claims;
    the communications between the plaintiff and B Co. and B Co.’s belated
    appearance in the original action filed by the plaintiff were insufficient
    to create a genuine issue of material fact that B Co. had actually received
    the summons and complaint and thereby had actual or effective notice
    of the original action, as pursuant to Rocco v. Garrison (
    268 Conn. 541
    )
    and Dorry v. Garden (
    313 Conn. 516
    ), an action is commenced within
    the meaning of § 52-592 when a defendant receives actual or effective
    notice of the action, within the time period prescribed by law, by way
    of receipt of the summons and complaint, and the plaintiff failed to
    provide the court with any evidence that B Co. itself had actual or
    effective notice of the original action by way of receipt of the summons
    and complaint as in Rocco and Dorry, and there was no evidence that
    service was ever made on B Co.
    b. The trial court did not improperly conclude that the continuing course
    of conduct doctrine was inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claims and there-
    fore could not toll the applicable statutes of limitations: there was no
    genuine issue of material fact regarding whether B Co. owed a continuing
    duty to the plaintiff as the relationship between the parties was at arm’s
    length and commercial in nature, and there was no special relationship
    between the plaintiff and B Co. which gave rise to such a continuing
    duty; moreover, although the court found for the purpose of deciding B
    Co.’s motion for summary judgment that an implied in fact contract
    existed between the parties, this court has held that a mere contractual
    relationship does not create a fiduciary or confidential relationship, as
    the relationship between B Co. and the plaintiff lacked the unique degree
    of trust and confidence found in a special or fiduciary relationship;
    furthermore, B Co., as a servicer of the loan, had a right to further its
    own interests and therefore was under no duty to represent the interests
    of the plaintiff.
    c. The trial court did not improperly conclude that the plaintiff’s claim
    of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed as a matter
    of law as there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether B
    Co. acted in bad faith: because the plaintiff became delinquent on his
    mortgage payments, B Co. conducted a property inspection of the mort-
    gaged property, the resulting inspection report indicated that the property
    might be vacant, B Co. then informed I Co. that the property might be
    vacant and, in its letter to I Co. informing it of such, there was a clear
    indication of uncertainty as to the occupancy status of the property, B
    Co. sent numerous letters to the plaintiff stating that it believed the
    property to be vacant, it was required to inform I Co. of this belief, and
    the plaintiff should have contacted I Co. with information regarding the
    occupancy status of the property, and these actions all indicated that B
    Co. was not acting in bad faith; moreover, the plaintiff pointed to no
    evidence supporting his claim that B Co. had acted in bad faith, and his
    argument that B Co. twice failed to pay the premium on his insurance
    policy was plainly contradicted by evidence provided by B Co.
    Argued January 20—officially released June 7, 2022
    Procedural History
    Action for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation,
    and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
    judicial district of New Haven, where State Automobile
    Mutual Insurance Company and Patrons Mutual Insur-
    ance Company of Connecticut were cited in as party
    defendants; thereafter, the court, Wilson, J., granted
    the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and
    rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
    appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Wilson,
    J., granted the motion to enforce a settlement agree-
    ment filed by the defendant State Automobile Mutual
    Insurance Company et al., and the plaintiff filed an
    amended appeal. Affirmed.
    Elio Morgan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
    Pierre-Yves Kolakowski, for the appellees (named
    defendant et al.).
    Deborah Etlinger, with whom, on the brief, was Erin
    Canalia, for the appellees (defendant State Automobile
    Mutual Insurance Company et al.).
    Opinion
    SHELDON, J. This case arises from actions taken
    by the defendants, US Bank NA and US Bancorp,1 as
    servicer of a residential loan from People’s Bank
    (lender) to the plaintiff, Isaac Kinity, and his wife, Jane
    Kinity2 (borrowers), under a note secured by a mortgage
    on the borrowers’ residential property, and by the
    defendants, Patrons Mutual Insurance Company of Con-
    necticut and State Automobile Mutual Insurance Com-
    pany,3 the insurance company that issued an insurance
    policy (original policy) to the plaintiff covering the
    mortgaged property against loss, as required by the
    mortgage, upon being informed that the property might
    be vacant. Concerned that the lender’s financial interest
    in maintaining the condition and value of the property
    might be compromised if the property were vacant,
    because in that event the plaintiff’s original policy might
    not cover the risk, the bank advised the insurance com-
    pany of the possible vacancy and sought assurances
    from the borrowers, either that they still occupied the
    property or that they had procured sufficient insurance
    to cover it against loss. Ultimately, although the borrow-
    ers still occupied the property, the bank’s receipt of
    information to the contrary led to the cancellation of
    the original policy, the later reinstatement of the policy,
    the eventual cancellation of the reinstated policy due
    to nonpayment of the premium, and the bank’s procure-
    ment of a more costly lender placed insurance policy
    (LPI policy) at the plaintiff’s expense.
    After initially filing an action against a trade name
    of the bank (original action), which was dismissed for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a trade name
    cannot lawfully be sued, and for lack of personal juris-
    diction due to insufficient service of process, the plain-
    tiff commenced the present action against the bank
    under the putative authority of the accidental failure
    of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592, and the contin-
    uing course of conduct doctrine, to recover damages
    on several theories of liability for injuries and losses
    he allegedly sustained as a result of the bank’s actions.
    The plaintiff later moved successfully to cite in the
    insurance company defendants, and filed a series of
    amended complaints against both the insurance com-
    pany defendants and the bank defendants, seeking simi-
    lar relief against both, on similar theories of liability.4
    The defendants answered the plaintiff’s complaint by
    denying all claims of liability and damages against them
    and asserting as special defenses that all but one of the
    plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes
    of limitations. In anticipation of the latter special
    defense, the plaintiff pleaded in his operative complaint
    that all of his otherwise untimely claims were saved
    by the accidental failure of suit statute and/or by the
    continuing course of conduct doctrine.
    After the trial court granted the defendants’ separate
    motions for summary judgment on the grounds that
    none of the plaintiff’s untimely claims was saved by
    the accidental failure of suit statute or the continuing
    course of conduct doctrine, and thus that all of them
    were barred by applicable statutes of limitations, and
    that his remaining claims failed as a matter of law, the
    plaintiff appealed to this court. On appeal, the plaintiff
    claims, inter alia, that the trial court erred in ruling that
    (1) the accidental failure of suit statute did not save
    any of his untimely claims because his original action
    was never ‘‘commenced,’’ and thus could not be saved
    under the authority of that statute, (2) the continuing
    course of conduct doctrine did not apply to any of his
    untimely claims because there was no special relation-
    ship between himself and any defendant that would
    impose a continuing duty to him on any defendant,
    (3) the bank defendants and the insurance company
    defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law on the plaintiff’s claims of breach of the covenant
    of good faith and fair dealing against them, and (4) the
    insurance company defendants were entitled to judg-
    ment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claim of negli-
    gent misrepresentation against them.5
    Thereafter, while this appeal was pending, the plain-
    tiff filed an amended appeal from a postjudgment order
    of the trial court granting the insurance company defen-
    dants’ motion to enforce settlement agreement, claim-
    ing that (1) the court had no authority to summarily
    enforce such an agreement after the case it purported
    to settle had gone to judgment, and (2) even if it had
    such authority, it could not exercise that authority in
    this case because the parties had not entered into a
    clear, unambiguous, and enforceable settlement agree-
    ment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and its
    postjudgment order enforcing the settlement agree-
    ment.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to our resolution of this appeal. In October, 2003,
    the borrowers took out a loan with the lender in the
    amount of $111,500 to purchase a parcel of real property
    located at 473-475 Elm Street in New Haven (property).6
    The loan was secured by a mortgage on the property
    given by the borrowers to the lender. The mortgage
    note was subsequently endorsed to the Connecticut
    Housing Finance Authority (CHFA). The bank contin-
    ued thereafter to service the loan on behalf of CHFA.
    The mortgage required the borrowers to insure the
    property against loss and provided that if the borrowers
    failed to maintain the required coverage, the lender was
    authorized to obtain insurance coverage at its option
    and at the borrowers’ expense. The mortgage also pro-
    vided that the borrowers were required to make peri-
    odic payments to the lender. These payments included
    funds to be held in escrow by the bank for payment of
    the insurance policy premium. In accordance with these
    requirements, the plaintiff purchased a hazard insur-
    ance policy for the property from Norcom Insurance,
    an agent of the insurance company.7
    In 2013, the borrowers became delinquent on their
    mortgage payments. As a result, the borrowers were
    mailed a letter, dated August 2, 2013, notifying them of
    the delinquency.8 The letter also advised the borrowers
    that property inspections would be completed on all
    delinquent loans. On October 28, 2013, such a property
    inspection was completed on the borrowers’ mortgaged
    property. The resulting inspection report noted that the
    property appeared to be vacant. The following day, on
    October 29, 2013, the bank mailed the borrowers a
    letter, notifying them of the inspection report and its
    consequences as follows: ‘‘In accordance with the provi-
    sion of your Mortgage or Deed of Trust, property inspec-
    tions are required on all delinquent loans. We recently
    received a property inspection report which stated that
    your property is vacant and/or unsecured. Please note
    that servicing guidelines require that we notify your
    insurance holder and advise them that your property
    may be vacant. You should contact your insurance
    agency and provide them with the current occupancy
    status of the property.’’
    Thereafter, on October 30, 2013, the bank mailed a
    letter to the insurance company, advising it that the
    property might be vacant and, therefore, that there
    might be a change of risk. The bank also mailed a letter
    to the borrowers, advising them that it had contacted
    the insurance company and that the current insurance
    policy did not provide coverage if the property was
    vacant. The letter stated: ‘‘If we do not receive evidence
    of acceptable coverage, we will obtain insurance on
    your behalf. You will be required to bear the cost of
    this insurance either through an existing escrow
    account and/or an adjustment in your monthly mortgage
    payment.’’
    On the basis of the letter it received from the bank,
    the insurance company issued a notice of cancellation,
    dated November 6, 2013, in which it informed the plain-
    tiff that the policy would be cancelled, effective Decem-
    ber 14, 2013, due to the change in the condition of the
    risk. On September 18, 2013, the bank disbursed funds
    to the insurance company in the amount of $1547 for
    the annual premium on the insurance policy. Because
    the premium had already been paid, however, the insur-
    ance company informed the plaintiff, in the notice of
    cancellation, that a refund in the amount of $1243 would
    be issued to him for a portion of the unearned premium.
    The insurance company issued a check, dated Novem-
    ber 12, 2013, for $1243 and mailed it to the plaintiff.
    The plaintiff asserts that he never received the refund
    check from the insurance company. The insurance com-
    pany’s records indicate that the check was never
    cashed.
    On November 11, 2013, the insurance company
    learned that the property was not in fact vacant when
    the plaintiff spoke with an agent of the insurance com-
    pany on the phone and stated that he was still residing
    at the property. As a result, the insurance company
    immediately reinstated the insurance policy, and mailed
    a letter to the plaintiff, notifying him of the reinstate-
    ment. No lapse in coverage had occurred between the
    issuance of the notice of cancellation and the date of
    reinstatement of the policy, because the cancellation
    was not to have become effective until December 14,
    2013. Because the insurance company had issued a
    refund to the plaintiff in the amount of $1243, the notice
    of reinstatement included an invoice for that refunded
    portion of the premium. The premium for the reinstated
    policy was never paid. Consequently, on December 19,
    2013, the insurance company sent a notice to the plain-
    tiff informing him that the premium for the reinstated
    policy was past due and that the policy would be can-
    celled on January 6, 2014, if payment of the premium
    was not received by that date. Ultimately, because the
    premium so invoiced was not received by January 6,
    2014, the insurance company cancelled the reinstated
    policy.
    On January 8, 2014, the bank received notice of the
    policy’s cancellation from the insurance company and,
    in turn, informed the borrowers, via a mailed letter,
    of the cancellation. The letter specified that it was a
    requirement of the mortgage that homeowners insur-
    ance be maintained on the property and requested that
    the borrowers or their agent send evidence of accept-
    able coverage or notice of reinstatement of the previous
    policy. The letter further stated that if the bank did not
    receive a response from the borrowers or their agent,
    it would obtain insurance for the property on behalf of
    the borrowers, and that the borrowers would be
    required to bear the cost of such insurance. The letter
    finally advised the borrowers that the bank could not
    guarantee that the coverage under such a policy would
    be comparable to that which they had under their previ-
    ous policy. Two additional letters to the same effect,
    dated January 13, 2014, and February 17, 2014, respec-
    tively, were sent to the borrowers. The bank alleges
    that it never received a response from the borrowers
    to any of its letters concerning their obligation under
    the mortgage to renew or replace the previous policy
    after it was cancelled.
    The bank purchased an LPI policy for the property
    from Voyager Indemnity Insurance Company, which
    became effective on January 6, 2014, and remained in
    effect until January 6, 2015. The annual premium on
    the LPI policy was $4891.12. In conjunction with its
    purchase of the LPI policy, the bank issued a letter
    addressed to the borrowers, dated April 2, 2014, which
    stated that the bank had purchased insurance for the
    property and had billed the annual premium for it to
    the borrowers. The letter strongly recommended that
    the borrowers obtain their own insurance coverage for
    the property, but advised them that until they provided
    evidence of such coverage, the LPI policy would remain
    in effect.
    On or about December 9, 2014, the borrowers finally
    provided the bank with evidence that they had obtained
    their own insurance coverage for the property. As a
    result, the bank sent a letter to the borrowers, dated
    December 12, 2014, stating that the LPI policy had been
    cancelled, effective December 9, 2014, and informing
    the borrowers that $4514.63 would be charged to their
    account for the LPI policy premium for the period of
    time during which the LPI policy was in effect.
    On April 1, 2015, the plaintiff filed a summons and
    complaint in the Superior Court for the judicial district
    of New Haven, in which he pleaded a single claim of
    negligent infliction of emotional distress against ‘‘US
    Bank Home Mortgage Company’’ based on the bank’s
    purchase of the LPI policy.9 See Kinity v. US Bank
    Home Mortgage Company, Superior Court, judicial dis-
    trict of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (origi-
    nal action). On June 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion
    for default for failure to appear. The motion was granted
    by the clerk’s office on June 24, 2015. On July 16, 2015,
    the plaintiff filed an amended complaint pleading addi-
    tional claims against the same defendant on the basis
    of the bank’s purchase of the LPI policy, sounding in
    negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of
    the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
    General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. A hearing in damages
    was held on September 30, 2015, after which the court
    rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount
    of $38,759.12 plus taxable costs of $580.99.
    On November 7, 2016, the bank filed its first appear-
    ance in the action and filed a motion to open and vacate
    the default judgment, which the court granted. Also on
    November 7, 2016, the bank filed a motion to dismiss,
    in which it claimed that the court lacked both subject
    matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. On Febru-
    ary 6, 2017, the court granted the bank’s motion to
    dismiss the original action for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction because the named defendant was a mere
    trade name that lacked the capacity to sue or be sued,
    and lack of personal jurisdiction for lack of service of
    process.
    On April 18, 2017, the plaintiff filed the present action
    against the bank defendants. The plaintiff subsequently
    filed, and the court granted, motions to cite in the insur-
    ance company defendants. The operative complaint is
    the plaintiff’s seventh amended complaint, purportedly
    filed pursuant to § 52-592 and the continuing course of
    conduct doctrine. The complaint asserts claims sound-
    ing in negligent misrepresentation (counts one, eight,
    nine, and ten), negligent infliction of emotional distress
    (counts four, seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen), fraud
    (counts three, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen), violations
    of CUTPA (counts two, eleven, twelve, and thirteen),
    violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Prac-
    tices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq.
    (counts five and six), and breach of the implied cove-
    nant of good faith and fair dealing (counts seven,
    twenty, twenty-one, and twenty-two).
    The bank defendants and the insurance company
    defendants filed answers and special defenses in which
    they denied that § 52-592 and the continuing course
    of conduct doctrine applied to the action. They also
    asserted, by way of special defenses, that the complaint
    failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted
    and that all but one of the claims were barred by the
    applicable statutes of limitations. The plaintiff then filed
    replies denying the bank defendants’ special defenses.
    On February 27, 2019, the insurance company defen-
    dants filed a motion for summary judgment. Shortly
    thereafter, on February 28, 2019, the bank defendants
    also filed a motion for summary judgment. On March
    16, 2020, the court granted both motions for summary
    judgment, concluding that all of the plaintiff’s claims
    were either time barred or failed as a matter of law.
    On May 15, 2020, the plaintiff appealed to this court
    from the court’s judgment granting the defendants’
    motions for summary judgment.
    While the plaintiff’s appeal was pending before this
    court, the insurance company, on September 1, 2020,
    filed a motion in the trial court to enforce a settlement
    agreement, asserting that it had reached a settlement
    agreement with the plaintiff on June 29, 2020. The court
    held an evidentiary hearing on the motion pursuant
    to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v.
    Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 
    225 Conn. 804
    , 
    626 A.2d 729
    (1993) (Audubon). On August 3, 2021, the court granted
    the insurance company’s motion to enforce. The plain-
    tiff then filed an amended appeal on August 16, 2021,
    in which he challenges the court’s postjudgment order
    granting the insurance company’s motion to enforce
    settlement agreement.
    Additional facts and procedural history will be set
    forth as necessary.
    I
    We begin by addressing the plaintiff’s appeal from
    the judgment of the trial court granting the insurance
    company’s motion to enforce settlement agreement.
    The plaintiff claims that the court erred by (1) exercis-
    ing authority under Audubon Parking Associates Ltd.
    Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 
    225 Conn. 804
    , to enforce a settlement agreement, and (2) conclud-
    ing that a clear, unambiguous, and enforceable agree-
    ment had been reached between the plaintiff and the
    defendant insurance company to settle the dispute
    between them in this action. We disagree.
    The following additional facts are relevant to this
    claim. Attorney Elio Morgan was retained by the plain-
    tiff to handle the plaintiff’s appeal. Attorney Deborah
    Etlinger represented the insurance company during the
    proceedings before the trial court and on appeal.
    Numerous e-mails were exchanged between these
    appellate counsel that are relevant to our determination
    of the existence of an enforceable settlement agree-
    ment. We begin by setting forth these relevant commu-
    nications.
    On June 3, 2020, Morgan sent an e-mail to Etlinger,
    seeking to discuss a potential settlement. On June 8,
    2020, Etlinger replied, stating that she had been author-
    ized to extend a settlement offer of $10,000 to the plain-
    tiff in exchange for the full and final settlement of all
    of his claims against the insurance company defendants
    in this action. In his response e-mail sent the same day,
    Morgan stated that he would discuss the settlement
    offer with the plaintiff. Morgan did so, e-mailing the
    plaintiff later that day to inform him that the insurance
    company had made him an offer in the amount of
    $10,000 in exchange for his release of all claims against
    it in this action. Morgan made clear in his e-mail to the
    plaintiff that the offer ‘‘would not include the bank.’’
    On June 11, Morgan sent a follow-up e-mail to the
    plaintiff, asking him what he was looking for in this
    matter. On June 14, 2020, the plaintiff responded that
    he was seeking Morgan’s advice regarding the proposed
    settlement. Morgan then provided the plaintiff with his
    phone number and asked the plaintiff to call him the
    following day. A phone conversation occurred between
    Morgan and the plaintiff on June 25, 2020. The conversa-
    tion is memorialized in an e-mail dated the same day.
    In the e-mail, Morgan advised the plaintiff that pursuing
    a settlement agreement was in his best interest. He
    reiterated that the insurance company defendants had
    offered to settle the plaintiff’s claims against them for
    $10,000. Morgan also noted that the bank defendants
    had made a settlement offer10 of $4500 plus a recommen-
    dation of loss mitigation11 in exchange for the plaintiff’s
    release of all claims against them. Morgan notified
    Etlinger via e-mail that he was still working with his
    client on the settlement offer but was hopeful that the
    matter would settle.
    Four days later, on June 29, 2020, Morgan again spoke
    on the phone with the plaintiff regarding the insurance
    company defendants’ settlement offer.12 After speaking
    with the plaintiff, Morgan e-mailed Etlinger, stating: ‘‘I
    received the go-ahead from my client. He understands
    that it will be [$10,000] with no admission and release
    of all claims. You may send me a release. Thank you.’’
    In response, Etlinger thanked Morgan for confirming
    that the plaintiff had accepted the $10,000 settlement
    offer and stated that a release would be prepared for
    Morgan’s review.
    Etlinger sent the release to Morgan on July 6, 2020.
    Later that same day, Morgan raised some concerns
    about the last paragraph of the proposed release, which
    provided: ‘‘Releasor further agrees that he will cause a
    withdrawal of this action as to the Releasees to be filed
    in the Connecticut Appellate Court and the Connecticut
    Superior Court.’’ Specifically, Morgan expressed con-
    cern that the release would require the plaintiff to with-
    draw the Superior Court action, which assertedly would
    require the opening of the Superior Court judgment.
    After further discussion, however, counsel agreed that
    the written terms of the release would remain the same
    and that the plaintiff would withdraw his appeal and
    file a copy of the withdrawal with the Superior Court
    without needing to open the Superior Court judgment.
    Etlinger then asked Morgan whether any lawyers would
    be listed as payees on the settlement check from the
    insurance company. Morgan replied in the negative. The
    July 6, 2020 e-mail exchange concluded with Etlinger
    stating that she would tell the insurance company to
    issue the check to the plaintiff and that she was ‘‘look[-
    ing] forward to receiving the executed [r]elease.’’ Mor-
    gan sent the release to the plaintiff via e-mail later that
    same day.
    On July 31, 2020, the plaintiff sent an e-mail to Morgan
    in which he raised concerns about settling with the
    insurance company defendants. Specifically, the plain-
    tiff stated that he was apprehensive about how a settle-
    ment with those defendants might affect his ability to
    settle with the bank defendants. The plaintiff stated
    that he was ‘‘of the opinion that there ha[d] to be some
    signs of hope about the position of the [bank] before
    signing the [insurance company] settlement, otherwise
    . . . the [bank] may become difficult in the negotiations
    after my settlement with the [insurance company].’’
    Morgan responded later in the day, advising the plaintiff
    that he did not share the plaintiff’s concerns because,
    in his view, there were two different sets of liabilities.
    Morgan clarified that the plaintiff could continue the
    appeal against the bank defendants even if he settled
    with the insurance company defendants. Morgan fur-
    ther advised the plaintiff that his claim against the insur-
    ance company defendants was weak, and not the main
    cause of the plaintiff’s problems.
    On August 6, 2020, Morgan contacted Etlinger, again
    via e-mail, stating: ‘‘My negotiations with [the bank]
    [are] taking longer than expected. That puts me under
    the gun as far as the deadline for [the] brief. I will be
    filing a motion for extension of time today. I assume
    you have no reason to object but let me know. My client
    is in the hospital. If we have to, we’ll withdraw the
    case against your client. Please let me know.’’ Etlinger
    replied, stating: ‘‘We have no objection to your request
    for an extension to file the brief. We have the settlement
    check and are prepared to tender it upon our receipt
    of the properly executed settlement document by the
    [p]laintiff. Alternatively do you want to go ahead and
    withdraw the claims against our clients? I am sorry
    to hear that [the plaintiff] is in the hospital.’’ Morgan
    thereafter responded that he would ‘‘prefer a global
    settlement,’’ but if that was not possible he would ‘‘go
    the alternate route.’’ The plaintiff, the next day, filed a
    motion for extension of time to file his appellate brief,
    which stated, in relevant part: ‘‘In early June, the [plain-
    tiff] decided to pursue settlement with all the parties
    in lieu of continued litigation. Significant progress has
    been made. An agreement has been reached with one
    of the [defendants]. The delay in reaching an agreement
    with the other [defendant] is due in large part to circum-
    stances beyond the parties’ control. The requested time
    will afford the parties the opportunity to conclude an
    agreement which will include withdrawal of this
    appeal.’’ This statement also was included in the plain-
    tiff’s motion for leave to permit the filing of a late brief
    filed on August 21, 2020 with this court.
    On August 19, 2020, Morgan met with the plaintiff
    and the plaintiff’s wife to discuss the concerns the plain-
    tiff had raised in his July 31, 2020 e-mail. On August
    24, 2020, Morgan e-mailed Etlinger, as follows, regard-
    ing his discussions with the plaintiff: ‘‘After a period
    of illness, I finally got to meet with [the plaintiff] on
    Thursday and fully discussed this and gave him a dead-
    line. Unfortunately, I must inform you that [the plaintiff]
    called me on Friday to inform me that he will not sign
    the proposed agreement. He was not able to obtain the
    global agreement he wants. He has instructed me to
    move forward with the appeal. Sorry for the inconve-
    nience.’’ Etlinger replied: ‘‘As stated in my [e-mail]
    below, the parties have a binding settlement agreement.
    We will be filing a [m]otion to [e]nforce the settlement
    agreement entered into by the parties.’’
    The insurance company filed its motion to enforce
    settlement agreement on September 1, 2020. The plain-
    tiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion.
    An evidentiary hearing on the motion was held over
    the course of four days. At the hearing, Morgan testified
    that the settlement with the insurance company was
    contingent upon settlement with the bank. Morgan
    pointed to the statements in his e-mail exchange with
    Etlinger that referenced a global settlement agreement,
    arguing that these references evidenced that the agree-
    ment was contingent. Morgan, however, conceded that
    this contingency was never communicated in full to
    Etlinger. Etlinger testified that her understanding,
    based upon the e-mail exchanges between her and Mor-
    gan, was that the agreement was not contingent.
    Etlinger testified, ‘‘[t]here was absolutely nothing that
    indicated to me that the settlement that I had reached
    on behalf of my clients was contingent upon whatever
    negotiations were happening with [the bank] . . . .’’
    The court ultimately granted the insurance com-
    pany’s motion to enforce settlement agreement on
    August 3, 2021. In its memorandum of decision, the
    court concluded, ‘‘based upon a fair preponderance of
    the evidence, that Attorney Morgan had either actual
    or apparent authority to enter into the settlement agree-
    ment on behalf of the plaintiff with the defendants.
    The court further conclude[d] that there was a clear,
    undisputed, and unambiguous agreement entered into
    by the parties, and that said agreement was not contin-
    gent upon the plaintiff reaching an agreement with the
    codefendant bank.’’ The amended appeal followed.
    A
    The plaintiff first claims that the court erred by pur-
    porting to exercise authority under Audubon Parking
    Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc.,
    supra, 
    225 Conn. 804
    , to enforce a settlement agree-
    ment. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that a trial court
    lacks the authority to summarily enforce a settlement
    agreement formed postjudgment during the pendency
    of an appeal. Under the plaintiff’s view, a trial court only
    has the authority to summarily enforce a settlement
    agreement that is reached while the case is pending in
    the trial court. We disagree.
    1
    At the outset, the insurance company defendants
    argue that the issue of whether Audubon authorizes
    the summary enforcement of a settlement agreement
    reached postjudgment, during the pendency of an
    appeal, is not properly before us. The insurance com-
    pany argues, and we agree, that the plaintiff did not
    raise this issue before the trial court, and thus that the
    claim is unpreserved. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case
    law and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate]
    court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial.
    . . . [O]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances
    can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional
    or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in
    the trial court. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious:
    to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has
    not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial
    court or the opposing party to address the claim—
    would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair
    to both the trial court and the opposing party. . . .
    We also have recognized, however, that, although a
    reviewing court is not bound to consider claims that
    were not raised at trial, it has the authority to do so in
    its discretion, an authority that is limited neither by
    statute nor by procedural rules.’’ (Citations omitted;
    emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &
    Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 
    311 Conn. 123
    , 142–43, 
    84 A.3d 840
     (2014) (Blumberg).
    Our Supreme Court has enumerated the circum-
    stances under which a reviewing court may consider
    unpreserved claims raised by a party: ‘‘(1) where the
    issue involves a question of subject matter jurisdiction;
    (2) where the issue involves a constitutional violation
    reviewable under State v. Golding, 
    213 Conn. 233
    , 239–
    40, 
    567 A.2d 823
     (1989), holding modified by In re Yasiel
    R., 
    317 Conn. 773
    , 781, 
    120 A.3d 1188
     (2015); (3) where
    the issue is subject to reversal under the plain error
    doctrine; and (4) where review is appropriate in the
    exercise of the court’s supervisory powers.’’ (Footnote
    omitted.) Matos v. Ortiz, 
    166 Conn. App. 775
    , 788, 
    144 A.3d 425
     (2016), citing Blumberg Associates Worldwide,
    Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 
    311 Conn. 161
    –64. In Matos, this court was faced with the
    issue of whether Audubon extended to the summary
    enforcement of agreements reached outside the frame-
    work of, and before the start of, the relevant litigation.
    Matos v. Ortiz, supra, 787. As in Matos, the plaintiff
    here failed to raise the issue before the trial court. See
    id., 787–88. In those circumstances, this court con-
    cluded that ‘‘the Audubon issue must be reached and
    decided . . . as an exercise of this court’s supervisory
    powers.’’ Id., 788.
    As in Matos, we conclude that, in the instant case,
    review is appropriate in the exercise of this court’s
    supervisory powers. ‘‘It is well settled that [a]ppellate
    courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over
    the administration of justice. . . . The exercise of our
    supervisory powers is an extraordinary remedy to be
    invoked only when circumstances are such that the
    issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a constitu-
    tional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness,
    not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also
    for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a
    whole. . . . We recognize that this court’s supervisory
    authority is not a form of free-floating justice, unteth-
    ered to legal principle. . . . Rather, the rule invoking
    our use of supervisory power is one that, as a matter
    of policy, is relevant to the perceived fairness of the
    judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends
    itself to the adoption of a procedural rule that will
    guide lower courts in the administration of justice in
    all aspects of the [adjudicatory] process. . . . Indeed,
    the integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying
    principle behind the seemingly disparate use of [this
    court’s] supervisory powers.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Yasiel R., supra,
    
    317 Conn. 789
    –90.
    In Blumberg, our Supreme Court laid out a four part
    test for determining the circumstances under which a
    reviewing court may consider unpreserved claims
    raised by a party pursuant to our supervisory powers.
    See Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &
    Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 
    311 Conn. 155
    –61.
    ‘‘We recently reemphasized the fact that three criteria
    must be met before we will consider invoking our super-
    visory authority. . . . First, the record must be ade-
    quate for review. . . . Second, all parties must be
    afforded an opportunity to be heard on the issue. . . .
    Third, an unpreserved issue will not be considered
    where its review would prejudice a party. . . . If these
    three threshold considerations are satisfied, the
    reviewing court next considers whether one of the fol-
    lowing three circumstances exists: (1) the parties do
    not object; (2) the party that would benefit from the
    application of this court’s supervisory powers cannot
    prevail; or (3) a claim of exceptional circumstances is
    presented that justifies deviation from the general rule
    that unpreserved claims will not be reviewed.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted.) In re Yasiel R., supra, 
    317 Conn. 790
    .
    ‘‘[U]nless all parties agree to review of the unpreserved
    claim or the party raising the claim cannot prevail, the
    reviewing court should provide specific reasons, based
    on the exceptional circumstances of the case, to justify
    a deviation from the general rule that unpreserved
    claims will not be reviewed.’’ Blumberg Associates
    Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut,
    Inc., supra, 160–61.
    We conclude that these four requirements are met.
    First, the record is adequate for review. See id., 155
    (‘‘the record must be adequate for review, such that
    there is no need for additional trial court proceedings
    or factual findings’’). Here, the unpreserved issue is a
    pure question of law—whether Audubon extends to
    the summary enforcement of a settlement agreement
    reached postjudgment during the pendency of an
    appeal. See Ayantola v. Board of Trustees of Technical
    Colleges, 
    116 Conn. App. 531
    , 538, 
    976 A.2d 784
     (2009)
    (‘‘a question of law is [a]n issue to be decided by the
    judge, concerning the application or interpretation of
    the law’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted)); State v. Ledbetter, 
    41 Conn. App. 391
    , 394–95,
    
    676 A.2d 409
     (1996) (‘‘to determine whether the record
    is adequate for review, we must consider the specific
    claim raised, and whether the record provided is ade-
    quate for meaningful review of that claim’’), aff’d, 
    240 Conn. 317
    , 
    692 A.2d 713
     (1997). Therefore, there would
    be no need for additional trial court proceedings or
    factual findings.
    Second, all parties have had an opportunity to be
    heard on the issue. See Blumberg Associates World-
    wide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc.,
    supra, 
    311 Conn. 156
     n. 24 (‘‘[f]undamental fairness
    dictates that a party must be afforded the opportunity
    to address an unpreserved claim on appeal’’). On Octo-
    ber 4, 2021, the parties filed a joint motion with this
    court seeking permission to file supplemental briefs on
    the issue of whether the trial court properly determined
    that a clear, unambiguous, enforceable agreement was
    reached. This court granted the motion. In his supple-
    mental brief, the plaintiff raised for the first time the
    issue of whether Audubon extends to the summary
    enforcement of agreements reached postjudgment dur-
    ing the pendency of an appeal. When the insurance
    company defendants filed their brief, they likewise
    addressed this issue. Thereafter, when the case was
    before the court for oral argument, the issue was fully
    discussed. Thus, both parties were afforded the oppor-
    tunity to be heard on the issue.
    Third, there is no unfair prejudice to any party. See
    
    id.,
     156–57 (‘‘[p]rejudice may be found . . . when a
    party demonstrates that it would have presented addi-
    tional evidence or that it otherwise would have pro-
    ceeded differently if the claim had been raised at trial’’).
    Here, the insurance company defendants do not assert
    that they would have presented additional evidence or
    would have proceeded differently if the claim had been
    raised in the trial court.
    We thus turn to the fourth requirement and conclude
    that ‘‘the party that would benefit from the application
    of this court’s supervisory powers cannot prevail
    . . . .’’ In re Yasiel R., supra, 
    317 Conn. 790
    ; see also
    Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &
    Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 
    311 Conn. 157
    –58
    (‘‘[r]eview of an unpreserved claim may be appropriate
    . . . when . . . the party who raised the unpreserved
    claim cannot prevail’’ (citation omitted; footnote omit-
    ted; internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘Reviewing an
    unpreserved claim when the party that raised the claim
    cannot prevail is appropriate because it cannot preju-
    dice the opposing party and such review presumably
    would provide the party who failed to properly preserve
    the claim with a sense of finality that the party would
    not have if the court declined to review the claim.’’
    Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &
    Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 158 n. 28. As dis-
    cussed subsequently in this opinion, the plaintiff cannot
    prevail on his claim that Audubon does not extend to
    the summary enforcement of a settlement agreement
    reached postjudgment during the pendency of an
    appeal. Therefore, our review of this claim cannot preju-
    dice the insurance company defendants and will pro-
    vide the plaintiff with a sense of finality that the plaintiff
    otherwise would not have if we declined to review
    this claim.
    2
    We thus turn to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that
    the trial court lacked authority pursuant to Audubon
    to summarily enforce a settlement agreement entered
    into postjudgment while the appeal was pending in this
    court. Our courts never have addressed whether Audu-
    bon extends to a settlement agreement reached post-
    judgment during the pendency of an appeal and thus,
    this issue presents a question of first impression.
    Whether Audubon applies is a pure question of law to
    which we apply plenary review. See Gershon v. Back,
    
    201 Conn. App. 225
    , 244, 
    242 A.3d 481
     (2020) (‘‘[t]he
    plenary standard of review applies to questions of law’’),
    cert. granted, 
    337 Conn. 901
    , 
    252 A.3d 364
     (2021); Matos
    v. Ortiz, supra, 
    166 Conn. App. 791
     (explaining that
    whether Audubon applies is ‘‘a pure question of law’’).
    In Audubon, our Supreme Court shaped a procedure
    by which a trial court could summarily enforce a settle-
    ment agreement to settle litigation. Audubon Parking
    Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc.,
    supra, 
    225 Conn. 812
    . The court held that ‘‘a trial court
    may summarily enforce a settlement agreement within
    the framework of the original lawsuit as a matter of
    law when the parties do not dispute the terms of the
    agreement.’’ (Emphasis added.) 
    Id.
    In coming to this conclusion, the court in Audubon
    relied on federal precedent, specifically that ‘‘[a] trial
    court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a
    settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms
    of the agreement are clear and unambiguous. . . .
    Agreements that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes
    enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in many situations
    enforceable by entry of a judgment in the original suit.
    A court’s authority to enforce a settlement by entry of
    judgment in the underlying action is especially clear
    where the settlement is reported to the court during
    the course of a trial or other significant courtroom
    proceedings. . . . Due regard for the proper use of
    judicial resources requires that a trial judge proceed
    with entry of a settlement judgment after affording the
    parties an opportunity to be heard as to the precise
    content and wording of the judgment, rather than
    resume the trial and precipitate an additional lawsuit
    for breach of a settlement agreement. This authority
    should normally be exercised whenever settlements are
    announced in the midst of a trial.’’ (Citations omitted;
    emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
    811–12. The court went on to explain the policy reasons
    behind its decision: ‘‘Summary enforcement is not only
    essential to the efficient use of judicial resources, but
    also preserves the integrity of settlement as a meaning-
    ful way to resolve legal disputes. When parties agree
    to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the
    right to avoid a trial.’’ (Emphasis in original.) 
    Id., 812
    .
    This court has cautioned against the use of authority
    pursuant to Audubon outside of the proper context.
    ‘‘The key element with regard to the settlement agree-
    ment in Audubon . . . [was] that there [was] no factual
    dispute as to the terms of the accord. Generally, [a]
    trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily
    a settlement agreement as a matter of law [only] when
    the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous
    . . . and when the parties do not dispute the terms of
    the agreement. . . . The rule of Audubon effects a deli-
    cate balance between concerns of judicial economy on
    the one hand and a party’s constitutional rights to a
    jury and to a trial on the other hand. . . . To use the
    Audubon power outside of its proper context is to deny
    a party these fundamental rights and would work a
    manifest injustice.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Reiner v. Reiner, 
    190 Conn. App. 268
    , 277, 
    210 A.3d 668
     (2019).
    The procedure established in Audubon has since
    been expanded. In Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partner-
    ship, LLP, 
    298 Conn. 495
    , 
    4 A.3d 288
     (2010), our
    Supreme Court extended Audubon to permit the court
    to resolve issues of fact raised in connection with a
    motion to enforce a settlement agreement. In Acker-
    man, the court explained that when a party breaches
    a contract, the nonbreaching party may bring a suit for
    specific performance of the contract. 
    Id.,
     533–34. An
    action for specific performance, the court explained,
    invokes the equitable powers of the trial court and
    where the remedy is equitable, there is no right to a
    jury trial. 
    Id., 533
    . The court thus concluded that the
    plaintiffs ‘‘had no right to a jury trial on issues raised
    in connection with enforcement of the settlement agree-
    ment. Even if certain factual matters were disputed,
    the motion to enforce was essentially equitable in
    nature and, consequently, the court was entitled to use
    its equitable powers to resolve the dispute without a
    jury.’’ 
    Id.,
     534–35.
    Thereafter, in Matos, this court examined the outer
    limits of a court’s power to summarily enforce a settle-
    ment agreement. Matos v. Ortiz, supra, 
    166 Conn. App. 796
    –809. In that case, this court addressed whether
    Audubon applied to agreements reached before and
    outside the framework of the litigation as to which a
    settlement agreement was sought to be enforced. 
    Id.
    The court began its analysis by explaining that ‘‘what
    began in Audubon as a summary judgment motion by
    another name has evolved into an exception to the
    jury right, allowing the court—rather than the jury—to
    resolve factual disputes en route to disposing of an
    action as barred by a release of claims, even in the
    face of a jury demand.’’ Id., 798. The court noted that
    ‘‘Audubon itself—the first case to recognize a right to
    enforce summarily an agreement to settle litigation—
    was entirely consistent with the jury’s historical func-
    tion, because it held only that a court could summarily
    enforce such an agreement as a matter of law and did
    not hold that the court could decide issues of fact. . . .
    The procedure used in Audubon was identical to that
    of a motion for summary judgment.’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 800. The court
    noted, however, that Ackerman had ‘‘extended Audu-
    bon to permit the court to resolve not just issues of
    law, but also issues of fact’’; id., 801; and that, ‘‘[i]n so
    holding, the court in Ackerman implicitly approved a
    line of Audubon progeny that had empowered trial
    courts to find facts where necessary to summarily
    enforce a settlement agreement.’’ Id., 802.
    The court in Matos held that ‘‘for a contract to be
    an agreement to settle litigation subject to Audubon
    enforcement, it must be reached after that litigation
    commenced.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 805. The court
    explained, ‘‘[w]e reach this conclusion because the
    commencement of an action first invokes the authority
    of the court, which then acquires its own interest in
    enforcing any settlement reached. The summary
    enforcement power recognized in Audubon and prog-
    eny is grounded in the court’s own interest in managing
    the matters before it. That interest comprises both the
    court’s interest in efficient docket management . . .
    and the court’s interest in the integrity of judicial pro-
    ceedings . . . . In the majority of cases where settle-
    ment agreements have been summarily enforced pursu-
    ant to Audubon, the agreement at issue was either read
    directly into the record or otherwise reported to the
    court. In the cases where a settlement agreement was
    not directly presented to the court in full, it nevertheless
    was in some sense placed before the court during pend-
    ing litigation. . . . We have never extended Audubon
    to agreements that, when made, remained wholly out-
    side the court’s domain because no one had yet invoked
    the court’s jurisdiction through service of a summons
    and complaint. That initial invocation of the court’s
    authority distinguishes an agreement to settle litiga-
    tion—which may be summarily enforced by Audubon
    motion—from a preemptive release of claims—which
    may be enforced through a motion for summary judg-
    ment or by presentation at trial as a special defense.
    When an agreement is made to settle a matter pending
    before the court—i.e., after the litigation has com-
    menced—the swifter remedy of Audubon summary
    enforcement is justified to protect the integrity of the
    judicial process. We thus conclude that, to qualify as an
    agreement to settle litigation for purposes of Audubon-
    style summary enforcement, an agreement must be
    reached after the relevant litigation commenced.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 805–808.
    The plaintiff first contends that the trial court was
    deprived of its authority to render judgment pursuant
    to Audubon because the settlement was reached post-
    judgment while an appeal was pending. Specifically,
    the plaintiff contends that, although the agreement was
    reached after the relevant litigation commenced, as
    required by Matos, the court lacked authority to sum-
    marily enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to
    Audubon because the case was no longer pending in
    the trial court, and thus there was no trial to avoid. We
    disagree.
    In Audubon, as previously noted, the court held that
    ‘‘a trial court may summarily enforce a settlement agree-
    ment within the framework of the original lawsuit’’
    rather than ‘‘precipitate an additional lawsuit for breach
    of a settlement agreement.’’ (Emphasis added; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Audubon Parking Associ-
    ates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra,
    
    225 Conn. 812
    . The court in Audubon also emphasized
    that the court’s authority to enforce a settlement agree-
    ment was ‘‘especially clear where the settlement is
    reported to the court during the course of a trial or
    other significant courtroom proceedings.’’ (Emphasis
    added; internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 811
    . We
    also note that ‘‘courts have summarily enforced releases
    pursuant to Audubon only when they were parts of
    agreements to end litigation, reached during that litiga-
    tion. Audubon itself referred to [a]greements that end
    lawsuits . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Matos v. Ortiz, supra, 
    166 Conn. App. 797
    . A settlement reached by the parties postjudg-
    ment and during the pendency of an appeal is a settle-
    ment within the framework of the original lawsuit. In
    the present case, the parties entered a settlement agree-
    ment to end the litigation, and did so in the course
    of that litigation. An appeal is a significant courtroom
    proceeding and a settlement agreement reached while
    an appeal is pending does not only end that proceeding,
    but in so doing, ends all related future proceedings in
    the lawsuit, either on remand in the event of a reversal
    or in ancillary proceedings required to perfect the
    record on appeal or to make or clarify prior orders or
    findings in anticipation of appellate review. Thus, we
    conclude that the court is not deprived of its authority
    to enforce a settlement agreement simply because the
    action that the agreement settles is on appeal.
    The plaintiff also contends that the court’s authority
    pursuant to Audubon and its progeny is limited to the
    authority to render judgment in the original action in
    accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.
    We disagree. The court’s authority pursuant to Audubon
    is to ‘‘summarily enforce a settlement agreement within
    the framework of the original lawsuit as a matter of
    law . . . .’’ Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partner-
    ship v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 
    225 Conn. 812
    ;
    see also Vance v. Tassmer, 
    128 Conn. App. 101
    , 117,
    
    16 A.3d 782
     (2011) (explaining that court’s authority
    pursuant to Audubon is ‘‘limited to enforcing the undis-
    puted terms of the settlement agreement that are clearly
    and unambiguously before it’’ (internal quotation marks
    omitted)), appeal dismissed, 
    307 Conn. 635
    , 
    59 A.3d 170
    (2013); Waldman v. Beck, 
    101 Conn. App. 669
    , 673–74,
    
    922 A.2d 340
     (2007) (same).
    In Waldman v. Beck, 
    supra,
     
    101 Conn. App. 671
    , the
    plaintiff filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement
    in which the plaintiff alleged that the parties had
    reached an agreement to settle the matter, whereby the
    defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $20,000 and the
    plaintiff agreed to discharge the defendant from liabil-
    ity. After the hearing on the motion to enforce, the court
    rendered a written judgment granting the plaintiff’s
    motion and entering an award in the amount of $20,000.
    Id., 672. On appeal, the defendant argued that the terms
    of the agreement provided that the plaintiff would with-
    draw the action against the defendant and that no judg-
    ment would enter against him. Id., 673. This court con-
    cluded that the trial court had ‘‘improperly exercised
    its discretion by rendering sua sponte a judgment that
    contradicted the terms of the settlement agreement,
    which the court had the power to enforce.’’ Id., 674.
    The court explained that ‘‘[w]here the terms of an undis-
    puted settlement agreement have been reported on the
    record during the course of a significant courtroom
    proceeding, it is especially clear that the court has the
    authority to enforce a settlement by entry of judgment in
    the underlying action . . . . Nevertheless, the court’s
    authority in such a circumstance is limited to enforcing
    the undisputed terms of the settlement agreement that
    are clearly and unambiguously before it, and the court
    has no discretion to impose terms that conflict with
    the agreement. . . . [I]n determining the details of
    relief, the judge may not award whatever relief would
    have been appropriate after an adjudication on the mer-
    its, but only those precise forms of relief that are either
    agreed to by the parties . . . or fairly implied by their
    agreement.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 673–74. The court
    thus affirmed the court’s order granting the plaintiff’s
    motion to enforce settlement agreement but reversed
    the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id., 674.
    We therefore disagree with the plaintiff’s contention
    that the only mechanism for enforcing the agreement
    was to enter judgment in the lawsuit that the parties
    had thereby agreed to settle. Rather, pursuant to Wald-
    man, the court had the authority to order the precise
    form of relief agreed to by the parties. In this case, as
    in Waldman, the form of relief agreed to by the parties
    was not a judgment in favor of a party, but rather, the
    withdrawal of the action.
    A number of policy considerations also support our
    conclusion that Audubon applies to a settlement agree-
    ment reached postjudgment and during the pendency
    of an appeal. First, as our Supreme Court explained in
    Audubon, summary enforcement is ‘‘essential to the
    efficient use of judicial resources . . . .’’ Audubon
    Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay &
    Stubbs, Inc., supra, 
    225 Conn. 812
    ; see also Matos v.
    Ortiz, supra, 
    166 Conn. App. 806
     (explaining that court
    has interest in ‘‘efficient docket management’’). In
    Audubon, the court emphasized how this procedure
    permits a court to summarily enforce a settlement
    agreement and avoid further litigation rather than
    resume the matter before it and precipitate an addi-
    tional lawsuit for breach of a settlement agreement.
    Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bar-
    clay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 812. Permitting a court to
    summarily enforce a settlement agreement postjudg-
    ment while the matter is on appeal accomplishes these
    same objectives; further litigation can be avoided. The
    potential litigation thereby avoided is fourfold: the
    appeal itself; further ancillary proceedings in the trial
    court while the appeal remains pending; further pro-
    ceedings in the trial court should the judgment be
    reversed and the case be remanded for a new trial or
    other further proceedings; and an additional lawsuit for
    breach of the settlement agreement.
    This conclusion also preserves the integrity of settle-
    ment as a meaningful way to resolve legal disputes,
    protecting the integrity of the judicial process. See id.,
    812 (‘‘[s]ummary enforcement . . . preserves the
    integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to resolve
    legal disputes’’); see also Matos v. Ortiz, supra, 
    166 Conn. App. 808
     (‘‘[w]hen an agreement is made to settle
    a matter pending before the court—i.e., after the litiga-
    tion has commenced—the swifter remedy of Audubon
    summary enforcement is justified to protect the integ-
    rity of the judicial process’’ (emphasis in original)). The
    party seeking enforcement of a settlement agreement
    should not be deprived of the ability to file a motion
    to enforce simply because the matter thereby settled
    is on appeal when the parties reach an agreement.
    We therefore conclude that a trial court has the
    authority pursuant to Audubon to summarily enforce
    a settlement agreement reached by the parties postjudg-
    ment, during the pendency of an appeal.
    B
    The plaintiff also claims that the trial court’s decision
    to grant the insurance company defendants’ motion to
    enforce settlement agreement was clearly erroneous
    because the evidence does not establish the existence of
    a final, unambiguous, and binding agreement between
    them. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the court’s
    decision was clearly erroneous because (1) there was
    no meeting of the minds as to the nature of the agree-
    ment, and (2) even if there was an agreement, that
    agreement is unenforceable. We disagree.
    As explained in Audubon, ‘‘[a] trial court has the
    inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement
    agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the
    agreement are clear and unambiguous.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Hogan v. Lagosz, 
    124 Conn. App. 602
    , 613, 
    6 A.3d 112
     (2010), cert. denied, 
    299 Conn. 923
    ,
    
    11 A.3d 151
     (2011). When a party challenges ‘‘the trial
    court’s legal conclusion that the agreement was sum-
    marily enforceable, we must determine whether that
    conclusion is legally and logically correct and whether
    [it finds] support in the facts set out in the memorandum
    of decision . . . . In addition, to the extent that the
    [party’s] claim implicates the court’s factual findings,
    our review is limited to deciding whether such findings
    were clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly
    erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to
    support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
    support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
    is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
    take has been committed. . . . In making this determi-
    nation, every reasonable presumption must be given
    in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.
    1
    The plaintiff argues that the evidence does not estab-
    lish the existence of an enforceable agreement because
    there was no meeting of the minds as to the nature of
    the agreement. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the
    settlement agreement was contingent upon the plaintiff
    reaching an agreement with the bank to achieve a global
    settlement. We disagree.
    ‘‘Whether a meeting of the minds has occurred is a
    factual determination.’’ M.J. Daly & Sons, Inc. v. West
    Haven, 
    66 Conn. App. 41
    , 48, 
    783 A.2d 1138
    , cert. denied,
    
    258 Conn. 944
    , 
    786 A.2d 430
     (2001). We therefore apply
    the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Hogan
    v. Lagosz, supra, 
    124 Conn. App. 613
    .
    ‘‘A settlement agreement is a contract among the
    parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wittman
    v. Intense Movers, Inc., 
    202 Conn. App. 87
    , 98, 
    245 A.3d 479
    , cert. denied, 
    336 Conn. 918
    , 
    245 A.3d 803
     (2021).
    ‘‘In order to form a binding and enforceable contract,
    there must exist an offer and an acceptance based on
    a mutual understanding by the parties. . . . The mutual
    understanding must manifest itself by a mutual assent
    between the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Platt v. Tilcon Connecticut, Inc., 
    196 Conn. App. 564
    , 577, 
    230 A.3d 854
    , cert. denied, 
    335 Conn. 917
    ,
    
    230 A.3d 643
     (2020). In other words, ‘‘[i]n order for an
    enforceable contract to exist, the court must find that
    the parties’ minds had truly met. . . . If there has been
    a misunderstanding between the parties, or a misappre-
    hension by one or both so that their minds have never
    met, no contract has been entered into by them and
    the court will not make for them a contract which they
    themselves did not make. . . . Meeting of the minds
    is defined as mutual agreement and assent of two par-
    ties to contract to substance and terms. It is an agree-
    ment reached by the parties to a contract and expressed
    therein, or as the equivalent of mutual assent or mutual
    obligation. . . . This definition refers to fundamental
    misunderstandings between the parties as to what are
    the essential elements or subjects of the contract. It
    refers to the terms of the contract, not to the power of
    one party to execute a contract as the agent of another.’’
    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Tedesco v. Agolli, 
    182 Conn. App. 291
    , 307–308, 
    189 A.3d 672
    , cert. denied, 
    330 Conn. 905
    , 
    192 A.3d 427
     (2018).
    Importantly, however, ‘‘[m]utual assent is to be
    judged only by overt acts and words rather than by the
    hidden, subjective or secret intention of the parties.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Computer
    Reporting Service, LLC v. Lovejoy & Associates, LLC,
    
    167 Conn. App. 36
    , 45, 
    145 A.3d 266
     (2016); see
    Ravenswood Construction, LLC v. F.L. Merritt, Inc.,
    
    105 Conn. App. 7
    , 12, 
    936 A.2d 679
     (2007) (‘‘[i]n the
    formation of contracts . . . it was long ago settled that
    secret, subjective intent is immaterial, so that mutual
    assent is to be judged only by overt acts and words
    rather than by the hidden, subjective or secret intention
    of the parties’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
    also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Proctor, 
    324 Conn. 245
    , 267–68, 
    152 A.3d 470
     (2016) (‘‘We have recog-
    nized, consistent with the objective theory of contracts,
    that [t]he making of a contract does not depend upon
    the secret intention of a party but upon the intention
    manifested by his words or acts, and on these the other
    party has a right to proceed. . . . Although [t]he phrase
    meeting of the minds is . . . commonly used by the
    courts to determine whether there has been mutual
    assent, it has been described as a misnomer because
    the minds of the parties to a contract need not, in fact,
    subjectively meet; rather . . . objective assent is all
    that is required.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.))
    Thus, ‘‘[i]n construing the agreement . . . the deci-
    sive question is the intent of the parties as expressed.
    . . . The intention is to be determined from the lan-
    guage used, the circumstances, the motives of the par-
    ties and the purposes which they sought to accomplish.
    . . . Furthermore, [p]arties are bound to the terms of
    a contract even though it is not signed if their assent
    is otherwise indicated.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in
    original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wittman v.
    Intense Movers, Inc., supra, 
    202 Conn. App. 98
    –99.
    In its well reasoned memorandum of decision, the
    court stated that it had ‘‘conducted a hearing to deter-
    mine if the parties had reached a meeting of the minds
    for settlement. The parties’ intent to settle is clearly
    evidenced in the parties’ words, acts, and e-mails setting
    forth the terms . . . . After [a] settlement inquiry was
    made by the plaintiff’s counsel, an offer was made to
    the plaintiff to settle his claims against the [insurance
    company] defendants for $10,000 and the plaintiff
    through counsel, who had authority to do so, accepted
    the offer.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘[t]he credible
    evidence [did] not support the plaintiff’s claim’’ that the
    settlement agreement was contingent upon a settlement
    with the bank defendants. The court explained that
    ‘‘[n]owhere in the evidence [did] the plaintiff expressly
    state that the settlement was to be contingent upon
    settlement with the bank. Attorney Morgan’s fleeting
    reference in a few e-mails that he would prefer a global
    settlement, and that he was in continued negotiations
    with the bank does not defeat the mutual assent
    between the parties that an agreement had been
    reached for $10,000. . . . The evidence establishes that
    on June 29, 2020, Attorney Morgan e-mailed Attorney
    Etlinger, and accepted the settlement offer without any
    contingencies.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in origi-
    nal.)
    Upon our thorough review of the record, we cannot
    conclude that the court’s finding concerning the mutual
    assent of the parties to the terms of the agreement was
    clearly erroneous. As the trial court aptly described,
    Morgan never expressly stated to Etlinger in their e-mail
    communications that the settlement agreement was
    contingent upon reaching a global settlement that
    included the bank. Morgan’s fleeting references to his
    negotiations with the bank were not enough to convey
    to a reasonable person in Etlinger’s position that the
    agreement was contingent. See Connecticut Light &
    Power Co. v. Proctor, supra, 
    324 Conn. 268
     (explaining
    that proper inquiry is what reasonable person would
    have understood in circumstances). Morgan’s subjec-
    tive intent for the agreement to be contingent upon
    reaching a settlement with the bank is immaterial to
    the determination of mutual assent. See Computer
    Reporting Service, LLC v. Lovejoy & Associates, LLC,
    supra, 
    167 Conn. App. 46
    –47 (‘‘[t]he existence of a hid-
    den or subjective intent on the part of one party to a
    contract does not render a finding of mutual assent
    clearly erroneous’’). We therefore conclude that the
    court did not err in concluding that the parties had a
    meeting of the minds and a settlement agreement was
    formed when Morgan e-mailed Etlinger on June 29,
    2020, stating: ‘‘I received the go-ahead from my client.
    He understands that it will be [$10,000] with no admis-
    sion and release of all claims. You may send me a
    release. Thank you.’’ These overt acts and words estab-
    lish objective assent to a settlement agreement for
    $10,000 that was not contingent upon an agreement
    with the bank.
    2
    We next turn to the plaintiff’s argument that, even if
    the parties reached a settlement agreement, the agree-
    ment is unenforceable because it imposes a condition
    on the plaintiff that is legally impossible to satisfy or
    fulfill. We disagree.
    As previously noted, the last paragraph of the release
    provided: ‘‘Releasor further agrees that he will cause a
    withdrawal of this action as to the Releasees to be filed
    in the Connecticut Appellate Court and the Connecticut
    Superior Court.’’ The plaintiff essentially argues that
    this clause renders the agreement unenforceable
    because ‘‘a case cannot be withdrawn after judgment
    was entered unless the judgment is first opened and
    the case restored to pending or pleading status.’’ Mor-
    gan raised concerns about this clause in the release,
    namely that the release required the plaintiff to with-
    draw the Superior Court action, which assertedly would
    require the opening of the Superior Court judgment.
    After further discussion, however, counsel agreed that
    the written terms of the release would remain the same
    and that the plaintiff would withdraw his appeal and
    file a copy of the withdrawal with the Superior Court
    without needing to open the Superior Court judgment.
    The plaintiff contends that the requirement that he with-
    draw the action is a ‘‘legal impossibility,’’ and therefore,
    the agreement is not enforceable and the plaintiff’s
    assent to releasing all claims against the insurance com-
    pany defendants cannot serve as valid consideration.
    The plaintiff acknowledges, however, that the parties
    agreed to ‘‘ ‘live with the language,’ ’’ yet contends that
    this agreement between counsel does not render the
    settlement agreement enforceable. We are unper-
    suaded.
    ‘‘A release is an agreement to give up or discharge a
    claim. . . . It terminates litigation or a dispute and [is]
    meant to be a final expression of settlement. . . . A
    release acts like a contract and, as with any contract,
    requires consideration, voluntariness and contractual
    capacity.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Viera v. Cohen, 
    283 Conn. 412
    , 427–28, 
    927 A.2d 843
     (2007). ‘‘The doctrine of consideration is funda-
    mental in the law of contracts, the general rule being
    that in the absence of consideration an executory prom-
    ise is unenforceable. . . . Put another way, [u]nder the
    law of contract, a promise is generally not enforceable
    unless it is supported by consideration. . . . [C]onsid-
    eration is [t]hat which is bargained-for by the promisor
    and given in exchange for the promise by the promisee
    . . . . We also note that [t]he doctrine of consideration
    does not require or imply an equal exchange between
    the contracting parties. . . . Consideration consists of
    a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment
    to the party to whom the promise is made.’’ (Citations
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thoma v.
    Oxford Performance Materials, Inc., 
    153 Conn. App. 50
    , 55–56, 
    100 A.3d 917
     (2014). ‘‘Forbearance from suit
    is, of course, valid consideration for a contract if the
    claim on which the suit was threatened was valid and
    enforceable. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a general rule of law
    that forbearance to prosecute a cause of action, where
    the right is honestly asserted under the belief that it is
    substantial, although it may in fact be wholly
    unfounded, is a valuable consideration which will sup-
    port a promise.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Dick v. Dick, 
    167 Conn. 210
    , 225, 
    355 A.2d 110
     (1974).
    ‘‘Whether an agreement is supported by consider-
    ation is a factual inquiry reserved for the trier of fact
    and subject to review under the clearly erroneous stan-
    dard. . . . The conclusion drawn from the facts so
    found, i.e., whether a particular set of facts constitutes
    consideration in the particular circumstances, is a ques-
    tion of law . . . and, accordingly, is subject to plenary
    review.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials,
    Inc., supra, 
    153 Conn. App. 55
    .
    Applying the governing law to the present case, we
    conclude that the court did not err in finding that the
    settlement agreement was supported by valid consider-
    ation. As discussed previously, the court found that the
    evidence clearly established that on June 29, 2020, the
    parties had entered into a settlement agreement—the
    terms of which clearly and unambiguously established
    that the insurance company defendants would pay the
    plaintiff $10,000 in exchange for his release of all claims
    against them. Per the terms of this agreement, the insur-
    ance company defendants would provide consideration
    in the form of $10,000 while the plaintiff would provide
    consideration in the form of his promise to release the
    insurance company defendants from all claims.
    Although Morgan raised concerns about the written
    terms of the release and he and Etlinger discussed those
    concerns, those discussions did not alter the time at
    which the parties entered into the agreement. See Witt-
    man v. Intense Movers, Inc., supra, 
    202 Conn. App. 99
    (‘‘[T]he fact that parties engage in further negotiations
    to clarify the essential terms of their mutual undertak-
    ings does not establish the time at which their undertak-
    ings ripen into an enforceable agreement . . . [and we
    are aware of no authority] that assigns so draconian a
    consequence to a continuing dialogue between parties
    that have agreed to work together. We know of no
    authority that precludes contracting parties from engag-
    ing in subsequent negotiations to clarify or to modify
    the agreement that they had earlier reached. . . . More
    important . . . [when] the general terms on which the
    parties indisputably had agreed . . . included all the
    terms that were essential to an enforceable agreement
    . . . [u]nder the modern law of contract . . . the par-
    ties . . . may reach a binding agreement even if some
    of the terms of that agreement are still indefinite.’’ (Cita-
    tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Fur-
    thermore, the e-mail exchanges between the parties
    clearly indicate that after the settlement agreement had
    been reached, Morgan consented to Etlinger’s proposal
    that the written terms of the release would remain the
    same and that the plaintiff would withdraw his appeal
    and file a copy of the withdrawal with the Superior
    Court without opening the Superior Court judgment.
    As a result, we conclude that the settlement agreement
    between the parties was enforceable and supported by
    adequate consideration.
    II
    We next turn to the plaintiff’s appeal from the judg-
    ment of the trial court granting both the bank defen-
    dants’ and the insurance company defendants’ motions
    for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the
    court did not err in granting the insurance company
    defendants’ motion to enforce settlement agreement,
    we do not address the plaintiff’s claims concerning the
    insurance company defendants, namely, that the insur-
    ance company defendants were not entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claims of negligent
    infliction of emotional distress and negligent misrepre-
    sentation, and that the court erred in determining the
    date on which the action commenced against the insur-
    ance company for purposes of the statute of limitations.
    As to the bank defendants, the plaintiff claims that
    the court improperly concluded that (1) § 52-592 was
    inapplicable in this case, (2) the continuing course of
    conduct doctrine was inapplicable in this case, and (3)
    the bank defendants were entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law on the plaintiff’s claims for breach of the
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We disagree.
    The record before the court, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party,
    reveals the following relevant facts and procedural his-
    tory. As previously noted, in the original action, the
    plaintiff filed a summons and complaint in the Superior
    Court in the judicial district of New Haven on April 1,
    2015, alleging a single claim of negligent infliction of
    emotional distress against ‘‘US Bank Home Mortgage
    Company’’ based upon the bank’s purchase of the LPI
    policy. The summons listed the address of ‘‘US Bank
    Home Mortgage Company’’ as 17500 Rockside Road,
    Bedford, Ohio, 44146-2099. According to the marshal’s
    return, on February 26, 2015, and again on March 20,
    2015, the marshal sent the summons and complaint via
    U.S. certified mail, return receipt requested, to ‘‘US
    Bank Home Mortgage Company,’’ care of ‘‘The Secre-
    tary,’’ at 17500 Rockside Road, Bedford, Ohio, 44146-
    2099. No return receipts were filed in the original
    action.13 The case was assigned docket number NNH-
    CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
    On June 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for
    default for failure to appear. The motion was granted
    by the clerk’s office on June 24, 2015. On July 16, 2015,
    the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding claims
    of negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of
    CUTPA. A hearing in damages was held on September
    30, 2015, after which the court rendered judgment in
    favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $38,759.12 plus
    taxable costs of $580.99.
    On November 7, 2016, the bank filed a motion to
    open and vacate the judgment, which the court granted.
    Also on November 7, 2016, the bank filed a motion to
    dismiss, in which it claimed that the court lacked both
    subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
    The bank argued that the court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction because ‘‘US Bank Home Mortgage Com-
    pany’’ is a trade name, and therefore a nonexistent
    entity, which has no independent legal rights to assert
    or protect and lacks any capacity to be sued. The bank
    argued, in the alternative, that even if the court had
    subject matter jurisdiction over the action, it lacked
    personal jurisdiction over the bank because the bank
    had not been served in accordance with Connecticut
    law.
    On February 6, 2017, the court granted the bank’s
    motion to dismiss. The court concluded that it lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction because ‘‘US Bank Home
    Mortgage Company’’ is a trade name, not a legal entity.
    The court also concluded that the plaintiff failed to
    effect service on the bank, explaining that ‘‘[w]hile the
    court may presume delivery from the attestation that
    the marshal placed the documents in the U.S. mail, no
    such presumption can be drawn with regard to the issue
    of receipt.’’ As a result of the lack of service of process,
    the court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over
    the bank. The plaintiff did not appeal from the judgment
    of dismissal.
    The plaintiff commenced the present action against
    the bank defendants on March 22, 2017. The operative
    complaint asserted claims against the bank sounding
    in negligent misrepresentation, negligent infliction of
    emotional distress, fraud, violations of CUTPA, and
    breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing. The bank asserted special defenses, claiming,
    inter alia, that all claims, except the good faith and fair
    dealing claim, were barred by applicable statutes of
    limitations.
    On February 28, 2019, the bank filed a motion for
    summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff’s
    CUTPA, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
    and negligent misrepresentation claims were all barred
    by applicable statutes of limitations. As to the plaintiff’s
    claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing, the bank argued that the plaintiff could not
    establish that claim because he had presented no evi-
    dence that the bank had acted in bad faith.
    The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to
    the motion for summary judgment, arguing that his
    claims had been brought in timely fashion under (1)
    § 52-592, (2) the continuing course of conduct doctrine,
    and/or (3) the fraudulent concealment statute, General
    Statutes § 52-595. The plaintiff also contended that the
    evidence submitted to the court in opposition to the
    bank defendants’ motion raised at least a genuine issue
    of material fact as to whether the bank had acted in
    bad faith.
    In response, the bank argued that § 52-592 was inap-
    plicable in this case because the original action was
    never ‘‘commenced’’ within the meaning of the statute,
    that the continuing course of conduct doctrine was
    inapplicable because the plaintiff could not establish
    that the bank owed a continuing duty to the plaintiff
    that was related to the alleged original wrong, and that
    the evidence did not establish fraudulent concealment.
    Oral argument was held on July 1, 2019.
    The court granted the bank’s motion for summary
    judgment on March 16, 2020. The court concluded that
    there was no genuine issue of material fact that the
    plaintiff’s CUTPA, fraud, negligent infliction of emo-
    tional distress, and negligent misrepresentation claims
    were all barred by applicable statutes of limitations.
    The court also concluded, under the facts presented on
    the motion construed in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff, that (1) § 52-592 did not save the plaintiff’s
    untimely claims because the original action was never
    ‘‘commenced’’ for the purposes of the statute, (2) the
    continuing course of conduct doctrine did not apply to
    any of the plaintiff’s untimely claims because there was
    no fiduciary relationship between the bank and the
    plaintiff that would give rise to such a continuing duty
    on their part toward the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff
    could not establish his claim of fraudulent concealment.
    The court further found, in relation to the plaintiff’s
    claim of the breach of the covenant of good faith and
    fair dealing, that ‘‘the evidence demonstrate[d] that, on
    multiple occasions, the [bank] defendants notified the
    plaintiff of issues that would impact his hazard insur-
    ance coverage, and encouraged him to get in contact
    with the [bank] defendants and/or [the insurance com-
    pany] to clarify any discrepancies.’’ Therefore, the court
    concluded, summary judgment was proper on that
    claim as well. This appeal followed.
    We begin our analysis by setting forth the well settled
    standard of review of a motion for summary judgment.
    ‘‘In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who
    has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any
    issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that
    the moving party for summary judgment has the burden
    of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all
    the material facts, which, under applicable principles
    of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter
    of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.
    To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing
    that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes
    any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue
    of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the
    movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
    favorable to the opponent. . . . When documents sub-
    mitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
    fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
    fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
    documents establishing the existence of such an issue.
    . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, how-
    ever, the opposing party must present evidence that
    demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual
    issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing
    party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed
    issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to
    establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore,
    cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court
    under Practice Book § [17-45].14. . . Our review of the
    trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary
    judgment is plenary.’’ (Footnote added; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the
    Northeast, Inc., 
    285 Conn. 1
    , 10–11, 
    938 A.2d 576
     (2008).
    ‘‘[I]n the context of a motion for summary judgment
    based on a statute of limitations special defense, [the
    defendants] typically [meet their] initial burden of
    showing the absence of a genuine issue of material
    fact by demonstrating that the action had commenced
    outside of the statutory limitation period. . . . When
    the plaintiff asserts that the limitations period has been
    tolled by an equitable exception to the statute of limita-
    tions, the burden normally shifts to the plaintiff to estab-
    lish a disputed issue of material fact in avoidance of
    the statute. . . . Put differently, it is then incumbent
    upon the party opposing summary judgment to establish
    a factual predicate from which it can be determined,
    as a matter of law, that a genuine issue of material
    fact exists.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Iacurci v. Sax, 
    313 Conn. 786
    , 799, 
    99 A.3d 1145
     (2014).
    ‘‘A material fact is a fact which will make a difference
    in the result of the case. . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather
    than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure.
    . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact
    when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . .
    [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact,
    but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vestuti v. Miller,
    
    124 Conn. App. 138
    , 142, 
    3 A.3d 1046
     (2010).
    A
    The plaintiff argues that, in granting the bank defen-
    dants’ motion for summary judgment, the court erred in
    concluding that § 52-592 was inapplicable and therefore
    could not save the plaintiff’s otherwise untimely
    CUTPA, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
    and negligent misrepresentation claims.15 Specifically,
    the plaintiff contends that the court’s conclusion (1) is
    based upon an insufficient factual record, and (2) is
    inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s decision in
    Rocco v. Garrison, 
    268 Conn. 541
    , 
    848 A.2d 352
     (2004).
    We disagree.
    We begin our analysis with an examination of our
    case law interpreting § 52-592. Section 52-592 (a) pro-
    vides in relevant part: ‘‘If any action, commenced within
    the time limited by law, has failed one or more times
    to be tried on its merits because of insufficient service
    or return of the writ due to unavoidable accident or
    the default or neglect of the officer to whom it was
    committed, or because the action has been dismissed
    for want of jurisdiction . . . the plaintiff . . . may
    commence a new action . . . for the same cause at
    any time within one year after the determination of the
    original action or after the reversal of the judgment.’’
    (Emphasis added.) ‘‘When a suit has been started sea-
    sonably, the statute extends the [s]tatute of [l]imitations
    for a period of one year after the determination of the
    original action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Davis v. Family Dollar Store, 
    78 Conn. App. 235
    , 240,
    
    826 A.2d 262
     (2003), appeal dismissed, 
    271 Conn. 655
    ,
    
    859 A.2d 25
     (2004).
    ‘‘Deemed a saving statute, § 52-592 enables plaintiffs
    to bring anew causes of action despite the expiration
    of the applicable statute of limitations.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc.,
    
    179 Conn. App. 196
    , 204, 
    180 A.3d 595
     (2018). The statute
    ‘‘is remedial in its character. It was passed to avoid
    hardships arising from an unbending enforcement of
    limitation statutes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Rosario v. Hasak, 
    50 Conn. App. 632
    , 637, 
    718 A.2d 505
     (1998).
    This court has cautioned that, ‘‘[a]lthough § 52-592 is
    remedial in nature, passed to avoid hardships arising
    from an unbending enforcement of limitation statutes
    . . . it should not be construed so liberally as to render
    statutes of limitation[s] virtually meaningless. . . .
    [B]y its plain language, [§ 52-592] is designed to prevent
    a miscarriage of justice if the [plaintiff fails] to get a
    proper day in court due to the various enumerated
    procedural problems. . . . It was adopted to avoid
    hardships arising from an unbending enforcement of
    limitation statutes. . . . Its purpose is to aid the dili-
    gent suitor. . . . Its broad and liberal purpose is not
    to be frittered away by any narrow construction. The
    important consideration is that by invoking judicial aid,
    a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a present
    purpose to maintain his rights before the courts.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis
    v. Family Dollar Store, supra, 
    78 Conn. App. 240
    .
    In Davis, this court was faced with the question of
    whether the plaintiff could bring a new action under
    § 52-592 when the original action was never com-
    menced. Id., 236. The plaintiff in Davis attempted to
    commence an action by delivering a writ of summons
    and complaint to a sheriff to be served on the defendant.
    Id. Service, however, was never made on the defendant
    and the writ of summons and complaint were returned
    to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff then commenced a
    second action, purportedly pursuant to § 52-592, after
    the applicable statute of limitations period had expired.
    Id. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
    claiming that § 52-592 could not save the plaintiff’s
    untimely action because no service of process was
    attempted in the original action and, therefore, the origi-
    nal action was never commenced. Id. The trial court
    granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
    holding that ‘‘there [was] no prior action, commenced
    or otherwise, upon which a determination has been
    made. . . . [P]rocess was not served upon the defen-
    dant nor returned to the court. . . . [N]o proceeding
    was commenced prior to the initiation of the instant
    action. Courts which have considered whether an origi-
    nal action was commenced for purposes of § 52-592
    recognize that [there] must be a preceding disposition
    of a prior action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id., 236–37.
    On appeal, this court explained that ‘‘[t]he [plaintiff]
    must satisfy all of the criteria in § 52-592 in order to
    prevail’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 242;
    and that ‘‘[t]he language of § 52-592 requires a plaintiff
    to have commenced an original action before the statute
    can be applied to save a subsequent action.’’ (Emphasis
    in original.) Id., 239–40. The court explained that,
    ‘‘[w]ithout the existence of a prior action, the plaintiff
    cannot invoke the protection of § 52-592. Section 52-
    592 requires that the initial suit be commenced within
    the time limited by law. . . . [A]n action is commenced
    not when the writ is returned but when it is served upon
    the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
    240–41. The court concluded that ‘‘[b]ecause the writ
    of summons and complaint were never served on the
    defendant, the original action did not commence and,
    therefore, § 52-592 [did] not authorize another action
    to be filed or to extend any statute of limitations.’’ Id.,
    241. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the
    trial court, reasoning that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff, here, has not
    fulfilled the requirements of § 52-592. The original
    action was not commenced, resulting in an unseason-
    able suit. Although the statute is remedial, the language
    is clear and unambiguous. Section 52-592 (a) provides
    in relevant part: If any action, commenced within the
    time limited by law, has failed . . . the plaintiff . . .
    may commence a new action . . . . Without the com-
    mencement of an original action, no action exists for the
    statute to save.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Id., 242.
    The applicability of § 52-592 was further clarified in
    our Supreme Court’s decision in Rocco v. Garrison,
    supra, 
    268 Conn. 541
    . In Rocco, the plaintiffs followed
    the procedures established by rule (4) (d) (2) of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a plain-
    tiff to request that the defendant waive formal service.
    
    Id.,
     545–46. The plaintiffs sent the summons and com-
    plaint to the defendant’s home address via certified
    mail. Id., 546. The plaintiffs received a return receipt
    from the United States Postal Service indicating that
    the papers had been delivered to the defendant at her
    address four days prior to the expiration of the applica-
    ble statute of limitations. Id. The defendant, however,
    did not waive formal service of process and the statute
    of limitations lapsed before the plaintiff could effectu-
    ate formal service of process. Id. The defendant subse-
    quently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
    that the plaintiffs had not commenced their action prior
    to the expiration of the statute of limitations and the
    court granted the motion. Id. The plaintiffs then com-
    menced a second action pursuant to § 52-592. Id. The
    defendant, however, moved for summary judgment,
    alleging that the original action had not been com-
    menced within the meaning of § 52-592 due to lack of
    proper service, and, thus, that § 52-592 did not apply
    and could not save the second action from being barred
    by the statute of limitations. Id., 547. The trial court
    granted the defendant’s motion and the plaintiffs
    appealed. Id.
    On appeal, the defendant argued that ‘‘the commence-
    ment of an action under Connecticut law occurs when
    the writ is served upon the defendant, and that an action
    is not commenced if the defendant is not served prop-
    erly.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 547–48. Our Supreme
    Court disagreed with the defendant’s argument, stating
    that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s interpretation of § 52-592 would
    render a key portion of that statute meaningless. If the
    savings statute requires effective commencement of the
    original action, and commencement requires valid ser-
    vice of process, as the defendant argues, then any failure
    of service of process would require us to conclude that
    no action had been commenced and that the statute
    does not apply. This would render superfluous one of
    the principal purposes of the savings statute, namely,
    to save those actions that have failed due to insufficient
    service of process. Moreover, the language of § 52-592
    distinguishes between the commencement of an action
    and insufficient service of process by providing that the
    action may fail following its commencement because
    of insufficient service. To accept the view that improper
    or insufficient service defeats such an action would
    undermine the statute’s clear and unambiguous mean-
    ing and preclude the filing of a second action. We there-
    fore conclude that the term commenced, as used in
    § 52-592 to describe an initial action that has failed . . .
    to be tried on its merits because of insufficient service
    . . . cannot be construed to mean good, complete and
    sufficient service of process, as the defendant con-
    tends.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Id., 550–51.
    The court instead agreed with the plaintiffs’ con-
    tention that their original action was ‘‘commenced’’ in
    a timely manner for purposes of § 52-592 ‘‘when the
    defendant received clear and unmistakable notice of
    that action upon delivery of the summons, complaint
    and related materials pursuant to rule 4 (d) (2).’’ Id.,
    547. The court noted that ‘‘under the law of our state,
    an action is commenced not when the writ is returned
    but when it is served upon the defendant.’’ (Footnote
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 549.
    The court concluded that the original action was ‘‘ ‘com-
    menced’ ’’ within the meaning of § 52-592 ‘‘when the
    defendant received effective notice of that action’’
    within the time period prescribed by the applicable
    statute of limitations. Id., 551. In so holding, the court
    stated: ‘‘The defendant does not dispute that the plain-
    tiffs’ counsel sent her a written request to waive the
    required service of process. Moreover, the record con-
    tains evidence, and the defendant does not dispute, that
    the plaintiffs’ counsel sent by certified mail each of the
    other items required under rule 4 (d) (2) to effect service
    of process, including the summons and complaint, two
    copies of the notice regarding the waiver of formal
    service and an envelope with sufficient postage for
    return of the signed waiver. Finally, the record reveals
    that the plaintiffs’ counsel received a return receipt
    from the United States Postal Service indicating that
    the items had been delivered to the defendant at her
    . . . home four days before the two year statute of
    limitations had expired. A review of the record thus
    discloses that, although the plaintiffs’ counsel did not
    serve a formal summons upon the defendant within
    the time period prescribed by the applicable statute of
    limitations, all of the requirements of rule 4 (d) (2) were
    satisfied and all of the necessary papers to obtain a
    waiver of formal service were delivered to the defen-
    dant. That the defendant failed to sign and return the
    waiver does not detract from the fact that the plaintiffs’
    original action was commenced, for purposes of the
    savings statute, when the defendant received actual
    notice of the action within the time period prescribed
    by the statute of limitations. Thus, in our view, although
    the original action was not commenced in a timely
    manner under the applicable statute of limitations due
    to insufficient service of process, it nevertheless was
    commenced for purposes of the savings statute.
    ‘‘By following the procedure set forth in rule 4 (d)
    (2) to obtain a waiver of formal service from the defen-
    dant, the plaintiffs, for all practical purposes, also satis-
    fied the requirements of state law pertaining to formal
    service of process. In Connecticut, an action is com-
    menced when the writ, summons and complaint have
    been served upon the defendant. . . . In the present
    case, the summons, a copy of the complaint and a notice
    of the action were delivered to the defendant by certi-
    fied mail four days before the expiration of the statute
    of limitations. Moreover, the plaintiffs filed the com-
    plaint in the [federal] District Court, as required under
    the federal rules, prior to the issuance of the signed
    and sealed summons. . . . Accordingly, there is ample
    support for our conclusion that the original action was
    commenced in a timely manner within the meaning
    of the savings statute.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 552–53.
    The court therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment
    granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
    Id., 559.
    Subsequently, in Dorry v. Garden, 
    313 Conn. 516
    ,
    525, 
    98 A.3d 55
     (2014), our Supreme Court was again
    tasked with interpreting the language ‘‘commenced
    within the time limited by law’’ within § 52-592 (a). In
    Dorry, the plaintiff sent a writ, summons and complaint
    to a marshal by overnight delivery and requested that
    the defendants be served in hand. Id., 520. The marshal
    attempted to serve the defendants but rather than serv-
    ing the defendants in hand, the marshal left copies of the
    writ, summons and complaint in various professional
    or hospital offices. Id. The marshal then erroneously
    indicated on the return that each defendant had been
    served in hand. Id. The trial court dismissed the claims
    against the defendants due to improper service. Id. The
    plaintiff then commenced a second action pursuant to
    § 52-592. Id. The defendants thereafter filed motions
    for summary judgment, or in the alternative, dismissal,
    under the applicable statutes of limitations. Id. The trial
    court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed
    the action ‘‘on the ground that, although the present
    action was commenced within one year of the dismissal
    of the first action, because the defendants were not
    properly served within the statute of limitations, the
    trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the case. In
    doing so, the trial court determined that § 52-592 did
    not apply to save the plaintiff’s action because the first
    action was not commenced for purposes of that stat-
    ute.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Id., 520–21.
    On appeal to our Supreme Court, the plaintiff
    asserted that ‘‘the trial court improperly determined
    that § 52-592 did not operate to save the present action
    because it had not commenced within the time limited
    by law due to improper service. Specifically, the plaintiff
    claim[ed] that, under Rocco . . . the first action was
    commenced within the time limited by law because
    each of the defendants had effective notice within the
    statute of limitations.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Id., 524. The defendants asserted
    in response that ‘‘the trial court properly determined
    that § 52-592 did not operate to save the present action
    because it had not been commenced within the time
    limited by law . . . . Specifically, the defendants
    assert[ed] that Rocco [did] not apply to the facts of the
    . . . case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
    The court noted that in interpreting the language of
    § 52-592 (a), it was bound by its previous interpretations
    of the language and the purpose of the statute, namely
    the court’s analysis in Rocco. Id., 526. The court in Dorry
    recognized that the court in Rocco made clear that
    ‘‘ ‘commenced within the time limited by law’ ’’ could
    not mean effectuating proper service, and that effective
    notice to a defendant is sufficient. Id., 529. The court
    in Dorry explained: ‘‘[I]n Rocco, this court explicitly
    explained that the plaintiffs’ original action was com-
    menced, for purposes of the savings statute, when the
    defendant received actual notice of the action within
    the time period prescribed by the statute of limitations.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 530.
    The court concluded that, as to the first two defen-
    dants, the original action was commenced against them
    because they had effective notice of the action within
    the time period prescribed by the applicable statute of
    limitations. Id., 530. The court explained, ‘‘it is undis-
    puted that the plaintiff’s counsel sent the writ, summons
    and complaint to a marshal . . . by overnight delivery
    and requested that the marshal effect in hand service
    on the defendants. The evidence further demonstrates
    that, despite indicating on the return of service that she
    effected in hand service, the marshal actually left copies
    of the writ, summons and complaint at the business
    addresses of the defendants. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
    produced evidence demonstrating that [the first two
    defendants] became aware of the first action and
    received a copy of the writ, summons and complaint
    . . . within the statute of limitations.’’ Id., 529.
    The court also concluded that the original action had
    commenced against the third and fourth defendants. Id.,
    530–31. The court explained, ‘‘[a]s we have previously
    explained herein, the savings statute allows for an
    action to be saved if it was commenced within the
    time limited by law, even if improper service was made
    within that time, if the defendant had effective notice
    during that time period.’’ Id., 532. The court concluded
    that it was clear that these defendants had ‘‘received
    effective notice within the time period limited by law’’
    and therefore that ‘‘the trial court improperly deter-
    mined that the savings statute did not operate to save
    the plaintiff’s second action against those four defen-
    dants.’’ Id., 535. Having set forth the law that governs
    our analysis, we turn to the plaintiff’s claims on appeal.
    The plaintiff first contends that the court’s conclusion
    that § 52-592 did not apply to save the plaintiff’s action
    is inconsistent with Rocco. Specifically, the plaintiff con-
    tends that a genuine issue of material fact remains as
    to whether the bank defendants received actual notice
    of the original action. We disagree.
    As previously noted, ‘‘the party seeking summary
    judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence
    of any material fact . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Kidder v. Read, 
    150 Conn. App. 720
    , 728, 
    93 A.3d 599
     (2014). In support of their motion for summary
    judgment, the bank defendants relied on the marshal’s
    return of service in the original action. The return,
    which was attached to the bank defendants’ motion for
    summary judgment, establishes that the summons and
    complaint were mailed to an address that was not the
    official address of the bank. The bank defendants also
    noted in their motion for summary judgment that no
    evidence of return receipts, confirming the delivery of
    the summons and complaint to that address, were ever
    provided to the court. The bank defendants therefore
    argued that the plaintiff had not shown that the original
    action was ‘‘ ‘commenced’ ’’ within the meaning of
    § 52-592.
    ‘‘Although the party seeking summary judgment has
    the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material
    fact . . . a party opposing summary judgment must
    substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is
    a genuine issue of material fact together with the evi-
    dence disclosing the existence of such an issue. . . .
    The party opposing summary judgment must present a
    factual predicate for [the party’s] argument to raise a
    genuine issue of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Kidder v. Read, supra, 
    150 Conn. App. 728
    . In the
    plaintiff’s objection to the bank defendants’ motion for
    summary judgment, the plaintiff asserted that the defen-
    dants had actual notice of the original action. We con-
    clude that the plaintiff has failed to present evidence
    sufficient to show that there was a genuine issue of
    material fact regarding whether the bank had actual or
    effective notice of the original action. Specifically, the
    plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the bank
    had actual or effective notice by way of receipt of the
    summons and complaint as in Rocco and Dorry.
    In Rocco, the defendant did not dispute receiving
    the summons, complaint, and two copies of the notice
    regarding the waiver of formal service. Rocco v. Garri-
    son, supra, 
    268 Conn. 552
    . The evidence in the record
    revealed that the plaintiff had sent the documents via
    certified mail and had received a return receipt indicat-
    ing that the items had been delivered to the defendant’s
    home four days prior to the expiration of the applicable
    statute of limitations. 
    Id.
     The court concluded that,
    although the plaintiffs’ counsel did not serve a formal
    summons upon the defendant within the time period
    prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations, the
    defendant received actual notice of the action within
    that time period by way of receipt of the summons and
    complaint, and therefore the action was commenced
    for purposes of § 52-592. Id. Likewise, in Dorry, the
    plaintiff produced evidence demonstrating that the
    defendants had become aware of the original action by
    way of receipt of a copy of the writ, summons, and
    complaint. Dorry v. Garden, supra, 
    313 Conn. 529
    .
    In both Rocco and Dorry, the court determined that
    the original action had commenced for purposes of § 52-
    592 because, even though service of the summons and
    complaint was defective, the defendants actually
    received the summons and complaint, and thereby got
    actual or effective notice of the action within the time
    period prescribed by the applicable statute of limita-
    tions. In the present case, by contrast, the plaintiff has
    presented no evidence that the bank actually received
    the summons and complaint in the original action. The
    plaintiff nevertheless contends that there is sufficient
    evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as
    to whether the bank had actual or effective notice of
    the original action. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that
    the bank ‘‘had actual notice of the [original] action
    because [counsel for the plaintiff] was contacted by
    [the bank’s] corporate counsel prior to counsel
    appearing.’’ In the plaintiff’s objection to the bank’s
    motion for summary judgment before the trial court,
    the plaintiff similarly argued that there was a genuine
    issue of material fact regarding whether the bank had
    actual notice of the original action because (1) the plain-
    tiff and the bank engaged in communications concern-
    ing the original action, and (2) counsel for the bank
    appeared in the original action. We conclude that nei-
    ther the communications between the plaintiff and the
    bank nor the bank’s appearance in the original action
    were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
    fact as to whether the bank had actual or effective
    notice of the original action.
    On July 7, 2015, the plaintiff sent a letter to the bank
    seeking clarification of the events that had transpired
    with regard to his insurance policy and the amount due
    on his account. Importantly, this letter did not mention
    the original action, which the plaintiff had attempted
    to commence in February and March of 2015, much
    less did it describe or suggest that the plaintiff had
    served the bank with copies of the summons or com-
    plaint in that action. The bank sent the plaintiff a reply
    letter on July 24, 2015, detailing the series of events
    that had occurred with the plaintiff’s insurance policy.
    This letter also failed to mention or to make any refer-
    ence to any pending lawsuit between the parties or to
    any pleadings in such a lawsuit. Thus, neither letter
    was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
    as to the bank’s receipt of actual or effective notice of
    the original action by any means, including, critically,
    by receipt of legal process in that action.
    Further communications also took place between the
    plaintiff and the bank almost one year later in June,
    2016. In particular, on June 27, 2016, the bank sent an
    e-mail to the plaintiff’s counsel memorializing a phone
    conversation that had occurred between the plaintiff’s
    counsel and the bank that morning. The e-mail stated,
    in part: ‘‘As we discussed, I hope that we can find a
    way to resolve your client’s legitimate concerns with
    his mortgage loan and the default judgment that was
    entered against U.S. Bank Home Mortgage Company.
    As I mentioned, we have serious concerns about the
    validity of the judgment to the service of process and
    corporate entity issues.’’ As indicated by this e-mail,
    these communications between the plaintiff and the
    bank occurred after default judgment had already
    entered in the original action. Default judgment entered
    in the original action on October 22, 2015, approxi-
    mately eight months prior to these June, 2016 communi-
    cations.
    On November 7, 2016, the bank filed an appearance in
    the original action. Like the June, 2016 communications,
    the appearance was filed after default judgment was
    entered in the original action. This suggests that the
    bank first became aware of the original action only by
    way of the default judgment.16 Therefore, the June, 2016
    communications and the bank’s appearance were not
    sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as
    to whether the bank had actual or effective notice of
    the original action by way of receipt of the summons
    and complaint, as required by Rocco and Dorry, as
    opposed to by way of the default judgment.
    In sum, we conclude that the communications
    between the plaintiff and the bank, and the bank’s
    belated appearance in the original action were insuffi-
    cient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the
    bank had actually received the summons and complaint,
    and thereby got actual or effective notice of the origi-
    nal action.
    As previously described, § 52-592 requires that the
    original action have been commenced. Pursuant to § 52-
    592, the original action may be commenced by way
    of insufficient or defective service rather than good,
    complete, and sufficient service of process. See Rocco
    v. Garrison, supra, 
    268 Conn. 551
    ; see also Dorry v.
    Garden, supra, 
    313 Conn. 529
    . However, ‘‘[a]n action
    is commenced not when the writ is returned but when
    it is served upon the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Davis v. Family Dollar Store, supra,
    
    78 Conn. App. 241
    . In other words, the action is com-
    menced in a timely manner for purposes of § 52-592
    ‘‘when the defendant receive[s] clear and unmistakable
    notice of that action upon delivery of the summons,
    complaint and related materials . . . .’’ (Emphasis
    added.) Rocco v. Garrison, supra, 
    268 Conn. 547
    ; see
    also Dorry v. Garden, supra, 
    313 Conn. 530
     (‘‘[i]n Rocco,
    this court explicitly explained that the plaintiffs’ original
    action was commenced, for purposes of the savings
    statute, when the defendant received actual notice of
    the action within the time period prescribed by the
    statute of limitations’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted)). Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decisions in
    Rocco and Dorry, an action is commenced within the
    meaning of § 52-592 when a defendant receives actual
    or effective notice of the action, within the time period
    prescribed by law, by way of receipt of the summons
    and complaint.
    Here, as previously noted, the original complaint
    alleged a single claim against ‘‘US Bank Home Mortgage
    Company,’’ a trade name. Furthermore, the summons
    listed the address of ‘‘US Bank Home Mortgage Com-
    pany’’ as 17500 Rockside Road, Bedford, Ohio, 44146-
    2099, which was not the address of the bank’s principal
    place of business. Although the marshal indicated that
    he sent the summons and complaint via U.S. certified
    mail, return receipt requested, to this address, the plain-
    tiff failed to provide the court with any evidence that
    the bank itself had actual or effective notice of the
    original action by way of receipt of the summons and
    complaint as in Rocco and Dorry. The present case is
    thus akin to Davis, where the court was presented
    with no evidence that service was ever made on the
    defendant. See Davis v. Family Dollar Store, supra, 
    78 Conn. App. 236
    .17
    On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude
    that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence
    of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
    defendant had actual or effective notice of the original
    action by way of receipt of the summons and complaint.
    As a result, the court properly determined that § 52-
    592 could not operate to save the plaintiff’s untimely
    claims.18
    B
    The plaintiff next argues that the trial court improp-
    erly concluded that the continuing course of conduct
    doctrine is inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claims and
    therefore could not toll the applicable statutes of limita-
    tions. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court
    erred in concluding that the bank defendants owed no
    continuing duty to the plaintiff. We disagree.
    ‘‘In certain circumstances . . . we have recognized
    the applicability of the continuing course of conduct
    doctrine to toll a statute of limitations. Tolling does not
    enlarge the period in which to sue that is imposed by
    a statute of limitations, but it operates to suspend or
    interrupt its running while certain activity takes place.
    . . . Consistent with that notion, [w]hen the wrong
    sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct,
    the statute does not begin to run until that course of
    conduct is completed. . . . [I]n order [t]o support a
    finding of a continuing course of conduct that may toll
    the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the
    breach of a duty that remained in existence after the
    commission of the original wrong related thereto. That
    duty must not have terminated prior to commencement
    of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a
    wrong. . . . Where [our Supreme Court has] upheld a
    finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation
    of the act or omission relied upon, there has been evi-
    dence of either a special relationship between the par-
    ties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later
    wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior
    act. . . . Furthermore, [t]he doctrine of continuing
    course of conduct as used to toll a statute of limitations
    is better suited to claims where the situation keeps
    evolving after the act complained of is complete . . . .’’
    (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 
    207 Conn. App. 707
    , 753, 
    264 A.3d 130
    , cert. denied, 
    340 Conn. 911
    ,
    
    264 A.3d 94
     (2021).
    ‘‘The test for determining whether the continuing
    course of conduct doctrine should apply has developed
    primarily in negligence cases. For instance, we have
    recognized the continuing course of conduct doctrine
    in claims of medical malpractice. . . . In doing so, we
    noted that [t]he continuing course of conduct doctrine
    reflects the policy that, during an ongoing relationship,
    lawsuits are premature because specific tortious acts
    or omissions may be difficult to identify and may yet
    be remedied. . . . The continuing course of conduct
    doctrine has also been applied to other claims of profes-
    sional negligence in this state. . . .
    ‘‘In these negligence actions, this court has held that
    in order [t]o support a finding of a continuing course
    of conduct that may toll the statute of limitations there
    must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained
    in existence after commission of the original wrong
    related thereto. That duty must not have terminated
    prior to commencement of the period allowed for bring-
    ing an action for such a wrong. . . . Where we have
    upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the
    cessation of the act or omission relied upon, there has
    been evidence of either a special relationship between
    the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some
    later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the
    prior act. . . .
    ‘‘Therefore, a precondition for the operation of the
    continuing course of conduct doctrine is that the defen-
    dant must have committed an initial wrong upon the
    plaintiff. . . . A second requirement for the operation
    of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is that
    there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that
    remained in existence after commission of the original
    wrong related thereto. . . . This court has held this
    requirement to be satisfied when there was wrongful
    conduct of a defendant related to the prior act. . . .
    Such later wrongful conduct may include acts of omis-
    sion as well as affirmative acts of misconduct . . . .
    ‘‘In sum, [i]n deciding whether the trial court properly
    granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
    we must determine if there is a genuine issue of material
    fact with respect to whether the defendant: (1) commit-
    ted an initial wrong upon the plaintiff; (2) owed a contin-
    uing duty to the plaintiff that was related to the alleged
    original wrong; and (3) continually breached that duty.’’
    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, 
    312 Conn. 286
    , 311–13, 
    94 A.3d 553
     (2014). If insufficient evidence
    has been presented to raise a genuine issue of material
    fact as to any of those three necessary elements, the
    availability of the doctrine as a basis for tolling the
    statute of limitations must be rejected as a matter of law.
    The trial court concluded in this case that, ‘‘[a]s an
    initial matter, with regard to the plaintiff’s CUTPA
    claims, the continuing course of conduct doctrine does
    not toll the statute of limitations. See Flannery v. Singer
    Asset Finance Co., LLC, 
    128 Conn. App. 507
    , 514, 
    17 A.3d 509
     (2011), aff’d, 
    312 Conn. 286
    , 
    94 A.3d 553
     (2014)
    (‘[A]s to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim, our Supreme Court
    has stated that the continuing course of conduct doc-
    trine does not toll the three year statute of limitations
    set forth in General Statutes § 42-110g (f)’) . . . .’’ On
    appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge the court’s con-
    clusion that the continuing course of conduct doctrine
    could not apply to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claims.
    As to the plaintiff’s claims of fraud, negligent inflic-
    tion of emotional distress, and negligent misrepresenta-
    tion, the court concluded that there was no genuine
    issue of material fact as to whether the bank defendants
    owed a continuing duty to the plaintiff. The court
    explained that the relationship between the parties was
    ‘‘at arm’s length and commercial in nature.’’ The court
    went on to explain that ‘‘at all relevant times, [the bank]
    serviced the mortgage on the plaintiff’s property. [The
    bank] was not obligated to represent the plaintiff’s inter-
    ests. . . . [T]he parties’ submissions do not contain
    evidence of a unique degree of trust and confidence
    between the plaintiff and the defendant akin to a fidu-
    ciary or special relationship. . . . As such, there was
    no fiduciary relationship between the parties that would
    give rise to a continuing duty on the part of the [bank]
    defendants. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to estab-
    lish that the continuing course of conduct doctrine
    applies to toll the statute of limitations as to any of the
    untimely claims.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.)
    On appeal, the plaintiff concedes that the bank was
    not the mortgagee in relation to the plaintiff’s mortgage
    and acknowledges that the bank’s sole role was to ser-
    vice the mortgage on behalf of CHFA pursuant to a
    servicing agreement between the bank and CHFA. See
    footnote 6 of this opinion. The plaintiff nevertheless
    suggests that the bank owed a continuing duty to the
    plaintiff arising from ‘‘an implied agreement’’ between
    the bank and the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff,
    ‘‘the trial court accepted that an implied agreement
    exist[ed] between the [bank] and the plaintiff. Under
    the agreement the [bank] [was] responsible for collect-
    ing and holding funds in escrow and to disburse the
    escrowed funds for payment of hazard insurance pre-
    mium and tax obligations on behalf of the plaintiff when
    they [became] due and payable. Each party undertook
    their respective responsibilities continuously for ten
    consecutive years. The [bank] breached its duty to the
    plaintiff when it refused to pay the premium to [the
    insurance company] to reinstate the hazard insurance
    policy when payment was requested . . . .’’ We con-
    clude that there was no special relationship between
    the plaintiff and the bank which gave rise to such a
    continuing duty.
    ‘‘Our appellate courts have not defined precisely what
    constitutes a special relationship for purposes of tolling
    because the existence of such a relationship will depend
    on the circumstances that exist between the parties
    and the nature of the claim at issue. Usually, such a
    special relationship is one that is built upon a fiduciary
    or otherwise confidential foundation. A fiduciary or
    confidential relationship is characterized by a unique
    degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one
    of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and
    is under a duty to represent the interests of the other.
    . . . The superior position of the fiduciary or dominant
    party affords him great opportunity for abuse of the
    confidence reposed in him. . . . Fiduciaries appear in
    a variety of forms, including agents, partners, lawyers,
    directors, trustees, executors, receivers, bailees and
    guardians. . . . The fact that one [businessperson]
    trusts another and relies on [that person] to perform [his
    obligations] does not rise to the level of a confidential
    relationship for purposes of establishing a fiduciary
    duty. . . . [N]ot all business relationships implicate the
    duty of a fiduciary. . . . In the cases in which this court
    has, as a matter of law, refused to recognize a fiduciary
    relationship, the parties were either dealing at arm’s
    length, thereby lacking a relationship of dominance and
    dependence, or the parties were not engaged in a rela-
    tionship of special trust and confidence. . . . Accord-
    ingly, a mere contractual relationship does not create
    a fiduciary or confidential relationship.’’ (Internal quo-
    tation marks omitted.) Medical Device Solutions, LLC
    v. Aferzon, supra, 
    207 Conn. App. 761
    –62.
    Furthermore, ‘‘[a]s a general matter, the law does not
    impose a duty on lenders to use reasonable care in its
    commercial transactions with borrowers because the
    relationship between lenders and borrowers is contrac-
    tual and loan transactions are conducted at arm’s
    length.’’ Cenatiempo v. Bank of America, N.A., 
    333 Conn. 769
    , 808, 
    219 A.3d 767
     (2019); see also Saint
    Bernard School of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of America,
    
    312 Conn. 811
    , 836, 
    95 A.3d 1063
     (2014) (‘‘[g]enerally
    there exists no fiduciary relationship merely by virtue
    of a borrower-lender relationship between a bank and
    its customer’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
    Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo, 
    53 Conn. App. 11
    , 19, 
    728 A.2d 1114
     (‘‘[a] lender has the right to further
    its own interest in a mortgage transaction and is not
    under a duty to represent the customer’s interest’’),
    cert. denied, 
    249 Conn. 919
    , 
    733 A.2d 229
     (1999).
    Although the court found, for the purpose of deciding
    the bank’s motion for summary judgment, ‘‘that an
    implied in fact contract existed between the parties,’’
    this court has held that ‘‘a mere contractual relationship
    does not create a fiduciary or confidential relationship.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medical Device
    Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, supra, 
    207 Conn. App. 762
    .
    In the present case, the dealings between the bank
    and the plaintiff did not establish a special or fiduciary
    relationship between them giving rise to a continuing
    duty. The relationship between the bank and the plain-
    tiff lacked the unique degree of trust and confidence
    found in a special or fiduciary relationship. See 
    Id.,
    761–62. The transactions between the parties were con-
    ducted at arm’s length. See Cenatiempo v. Bank of
    America, N.A., supra, 
    333 Conn. 808
    . Furthermore, the
    bank, as the servicer of the loan for CHFA, had a right
    to further its own interests and therefore was under
    no duty to represent the interests of the plaintiff. See
    Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo, supra, 
    53 Conn. App. 19
    .
    We therefore conclude that there was no genuine
    issue of material fact regarding whether the bank owed
    a continuing duty to the plaintiff, and thus that the court
    did not err in concluding that the continuing course of
    conduct doctrine could not apply to toll the statute of
    limitations as to the plaintiff’s otherwise untimely
    claims.
    C
    Finally, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improp-
    erly concluded that the plaintiff’s claim of breach of
    the covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed as a
    matter of law. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that
    a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
    the bank acted in bad faith on the basis of the bank’s
    refusal to pay the premium for the reinstated insurance
    policy based upon its belief that the home was vacant.
    We disagree.
    In the plaintiff’s operative complaint, he alleged that
    the inspection of the property indicated that the prop-
    erty was in fact occupied, but the bank, nevertheless,
    sent a letter to the insurance company stating that the
    property may have been vacant. The plaintiff asserted
    that these actions were taken in bad faith in order
    to initiate the cancellation of the plaintiff’s insurance
    policy and permit the bank to replace it with the more
    expensive LPI policy.
    In their motion for summary judgment, the bank
    defendants argued that they were entitled to summary
    judgment because the plaintiff could not demonstrate
    that the bank had acted in bad faith. The bank defen-
    dants asserted that they were entitled to order an
    inspection of the property pursuant to the terms of the
    mortgage. The bank defendants further asserted that
    the inspection report did in fact indicate that the prop-
    erty was vacant, and, thus, the bank was required, pur-
    suant to servicing guidelines, to inform the insurance
    company of this belief. Furthermore, according to the
    bank defendants, the events that occurred after the
    bank contacted the insurance company were the result
    of the plaintiff’s failure to respond to its numerous let-
    ters.
    In the plaintiff’s objection to the motion for summary
    judgment, the plaintiff argued that the bank had acted
    in bad faith when it failed to pay the premium for the
    plaintiff’s insurance policy in September, 2013, and
    again in December, 2013. According to the plaintiff, the
    bank became aware that the property was not vacant
    on November 21, 2013, yet continued to assert, in bad
    faith, that the house was vacant.
    The court initially noted in its memorandum of deci-
    sion that ‘‘for the purposes of deciding [the] motion,
    the court will conclude that an implied in fact contract
    existed between the parties.’’ The court, however, con-
    cluded that no evidence was presented that established
    that the bank had acted in bad faith. The court explained
    that, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the property
    inspection report listed the status of the property as
    ‘‘partial vacant’’ and had a note stating ‘‘ ‘[v]acant/
    [s]ecure/personal property visible/[e]lectric on/[f]or
    rent posted.’ ’’ Furthermore, in the bank’s October 29,
    2013 letter to the insurance company, the bank stated
    that it believed that the property was vacant and was
    therefore notifying the insurance company of a poten-
    tial change of risk. The court concluded that the letter
    provided no evidence of bad faith because the letter
    clearly indicated uncertainty as to the occupancy status
    of the property. The court also stated that the letters
    sent by the bank to the borrowers indicated that the
    bank was not acting in bad faith because the letters
    stated that (1) the bank believed the property was
    vacant, (2) the bank was required to inform the insur-
    ance company of this belief, and (3) the borrowers
    should contact the insurance company with information
    regarding the occupancy status of the property.
    As to the plaintiff’s argument that the bank failed to
    pay the premium on his insurance policy in September,
    2013, and December, 2013, the court concluded that
    this argument was plainly contradicted by evidence pro-
    vided by the bank. On September 18, 2013, the bank
    disbursed funds to the insurance company in the
    amount of $1547 for the annual premium on the insur-
    ance policy. After that, under the incorrect belief that
    the property was vacant, the insurance company issued
    a refund check in the plaintiff’s name in the amount of
    $1243 for the unearned portion of the premium. Upon
    learning that the property was not in fact vacant, how-
    ever, the insurance company reinstated the policy. The
    insurance company then billed the plaintiff $1243
    because the insurance company had issued the plaintiff
    the refund check in that same amount for the unearned
    portion of the premium. The insurance company’s activ-
    ity list on December 27, 2013, shows that an agent of
    the insurance company called the bank and asked why
    the bill in the amount of $1243 had not been paid. The
    agent noted that the bank claimed that the property
    was vacant and required proof that it was occupied.
    The agent further noted that she had called the plaintiff
    and advised him to call the bank. The court determined
    that this evidence did not show bad faith, but rather,
    supported the bank’s position that the property was
    vacant.
    The court also concluded that the plaintiff’s own self-
    serving affidavit, in which he averred that he had called
    the bank on November 11, 2013 and informed it that
    the property was not vacant, was insufficient to raise
    a genuine issue of material fact on that issue.
    Finally, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s
    assertion that the bank had acted in bad faith was con-
    tradicted by the fact that the bank had sent a letter to
    the plaintiff on January 8, 2014, notifying the plaintiff
    that the reinstated insurance policy had been cancelled,
    that insurance was required per the terms of the mort-
    gage, and that the bank would obtain insurance for
    the property on behalf of the borrowers if proof of
    acceptable coverage was not provided.
    On the basis of the foregoing, the court concluded
    that the plaintiff had failed to offer any concrete evi-
    dence that the bank had acted in bad faith, and thus
    it granted the bank defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment.
    On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court erred
    in concluding that there was not a genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether the bank had acted in bad
    faith. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the bank’s
    ‘‘refusal to pay the lesser reinstatement premium to
    [the insurance company] based on its original, refuted,
    unfounded belief that [the plaintiff’s] home was vacant
    was a deliberate action by [the bank] to create the
    circumstances where it could purchase a forced placed
    policy . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) We disagree.
    ‘‘The relevant legal principles are well established.
    [I]t is axiomatic that the . . . duty of good faith and
    fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a
    contractual relationship. . . . In other words, every
    contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither
    party do anything that will injure the right of the other
    to receive the benefits of the agreement. . . . The cove-
    nant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the
    terms and purpose of the contract are agreed upon
    by the parties and that what is in dispute is a party’s
    discretionary application or interpretation of a contract
    term. . . . To constitute a breach of [the implied cove-
    nant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which
    a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff’s right to
    receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to
    receive under the contract must have been taken in
    bad faith. . . .
    ‘‘Bad faith has been defined in our jurisprudence in
    various ways. Bad faith in general implies both actual
    or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive
    another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or
    some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest
    mistake as to one’s rights or duties, but by some inter-
    ested or sinister motive. . . . Bad faith means more
    than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose.
    . . . [B]ad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction,
    and it may include evasion of the spirit of the bargain
    . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Landry v. Spitz, 
    102 Conn. App. 34
    , 42–43, 
    925 A.2d 334
     (2007). ‘‘[B]ad faith is
    defined as the opposite of good faith, generally implying
    a design to mislead or to deceive another, or a neglect
    or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obli-
    gation not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s
    rights or duties . . . . [B]ad faith is not simply bad
    judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the con-
    scious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose
    or moral obliquity . . . . [I]t contemplates a state of
    mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill
    will.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hutchinson
    v. Farm Family Casualty Ins. Co., 
    273 Conn. 33
    , 42
    n.4, 
    867 A.2d 1
     (2005). ‘‘Absent allegations and evidence
    of a dishonest purpose or sinister motive, a claim for
    breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing is legally insufficient.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Sidorova v. Board of Education, 
    158 Conn. App. 872
    , 892, 
    122 A.3d 656
    , cert. denied, 
    319 Conn. 911
    , 
    123 A.3d 436
     (2015).
    On the basis of our thorough review of the record,
    we conclude that there was no genuine issue of material
    fact as to whether the bank defendants acted in bad
    faith. As the court explained in its thorough and well
    reasoned memorandum of decision, there was no evi-
    dence in the record demonstrating that the bank defen-
    dants had acted in bad faith. Paragraph 9 of the mort-
    gage agreement provides that ‘‘[i]f . . . [b]orrower
    fails to perform the covenants and agreements con-
    tained in this [s]ecurity [i]nstrument . . . then [l]ender
    may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appro-
    priate to protect [l]ender’s interest in the [p]roperty
    and rights under this [s]ecurity [i]nstrument, including
    protecting and/or assessing the value of the [p]roperty,
    and securing and/or repairing the [p]roperty.’’ Because
    the borrowers became delinquent on their mortgage
    payments, the bank conducted a property inspection
    of the borrowers’ mortgaged property. The resulting
    inspection report indicated that the property might be
    vacant by a note stating: ‘‘[v]acant/[s]ecure/personal
    property visible/[e]lectric on/[f]or rent posted.’’ The
    bank then informed the insurance company that the
    property ‘‘may be vacant.’’ The bank also sent numerous
    letters to the plaintiff. These letters included (1) a letter
    dated October 29, 2013, notifying the borrowers that it
    had informed the insurance company that the property
    ‘‘may be vacant’’ and advising him to contact the insur-
    ance company on that subject, (2) a letter dated October
    30, 2013, advising the borrowers that if it did not receive
    evidence of acceptable coverage it would obtain other
    insurance on the borrowers’ behalf, (3) a letter dated
    January 8, 2014, informing the borrowers of the cancel-
    lation of the reinstated insurance policy, requesting that
    they send it evidence of acceptable coverage, and
    informing them that if such evidence was not received,
    the bank would obtain other insurance for the property
    on the borrowers’ behalf, (4) a letter dated January 13,
    2014, to the same effect as the January 8, 2014 letter,
    (5) a letter dated February 17, 2014, to the same effect
    as both the January 8, 2014 and January 13, 2014 letters,
    and (6) a letter dated April 2, 2014, informing the bor-
    rowers that the bank had purchased the LPI policy and
    billed the borrowers for the annual premium.
    Although the plaintiff contends that there was a genu-
    ine issue of material fact as to the issue of bad faith,
    he points to no evidence supporting his claim that the
    bank had acted in bad faith. As previously noted, ‘‘[b]are
    assertions by the nonmovant are not enough to with-
    stand summary judgment. . . . Although the party
    seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing
    the nonexistence of any material fact . . . a party
    opposing summary judgment must substantiate its
    adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue
    of material fact together with the evidence disclosing
    the existence of such an issue.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Macellaio v. Newington
    Police Dept., 
    145 Conn. App. 426
    , 436–37, 
    75 A.3d 78
    (2013). We conclude that the plaintiff has failed to sub-
    mit evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of mate-
    rial fact as to his claim that the bank acted in bad faith.
    The judgment and the postjudgment order enforcing
    the settlement agreement are affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    US Bank NA is a wholly owned subsidiary of US Bancorp. US Bancorp
    and US Bank NA will be referred to collectively as the bank or the bank
    defendants in this opinion.
    2
    Jane Kinity has never been a party to either the underlying action or
    this appeal.
    3
    State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company is the parent company of
    Patrons Mutual Insurance Company of Connecticut. State Automobile
    Mutual Insurance Company and Patrons Mutual Insurance Company of
    Connecticut will be referred to collectively as the insurance company or
    the insurance company defendants in this opinion.
    4
    The insurance company defendants and the bank defendants are herein-
    after, collectively, referred to as the defendants.
    5
    The plaintiff also lists, in his appellate brief, as a claim of error, the
    court’s determination of the date this action commenced against the insur-
    ance company defendants. Because we conclude that the court did not err
    in granting the insurance company defendants’ motion to enforce settlement
    agreement, we do not address this claim.
    6
    The borrowers also took out a loan with the Connecticut Housing Finance
    Authority (CHFA) in the amount of $35,000, secured by a mortgage on
    the property.
    7
    The insurance policy was in the plaintiff’s name alone. The policy covered
    the period from October 3, 2013, to October 3, 2014.
    8
    The plaintiff maintains that he never received any notice from the bank
    regarding the cancellation of his insurance policy and the purchase of the
    LPI policy. The plaintiff, however, does not specifically deny receiving the
    bank’s letters other than those sent on January 13, 2014, February 17, 2014,
    and April 2, 2014, which he does specifically deny receiving.
    9
    The insurance company was not named as a defendant.
    10
    The bank’s settlement offer did not involve the insurance company.
    11
    Morgan explained that if the plaintiff qualified for loss mitigation, the
    bank would modify the plaintiff’s mortgage terms to include his current
    balance. In other words, the bank would essentially add the plaintiff’s debt
    to the balance of the mortgage. Morgan emphasized, however, that there
    was no guarantee the plaintiff would qualify for loss mitigation.
    12
    There is no writing memorializing the substance of this phone conversa-
    tion.
    13
    The plaintiff attached to his objection to the bank’s motion to open
    and vacate judgment what purports to be a return receipt, indicating that
    correspondence was mailed and delivered to ‘‘US Bank Home Mortgage
    Co.’’ on June 28 in Ohio. However, the return receipt was not attached to
    the return of service filed by the marshal. Furthermore, the return date in
    the original action was April 7, 2015. ‘‘US Bank Home Mortgage Co.’’ is a
    trade name, not a legal entity. The court in the present action, in its memoran-
    dum of decision granting the bank’s motion for summary judgment, found
    that ‘‘[n]o return receipts were filed in the original action.’’ On appeal, the
    plaintiff does not challenge this factual finding by the court, nor does he
    argue that the return receipt creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
    whether the bank had actual or effective notice of the original action by
    way of receipt of the summons and complaint of the original action.
    14
    Practice Book § 17-45 (a) provides: ‘‘A motion for summary judgment
    shall be supported by appropriate documents, including but not limited to
    affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written
    admissions and other supporting documents.’’
    15
    It is undisputed that if neither § 52-592 nor the continuing course of
    conduct doctrine applies, the plaintiff’s CUTPA, fraud, negligent infliction
    of emotional distress, and negligent misrepresentation claims are barred by
    the applicable statutes of limitation.
    16
    There is no evidence in the record indicating how the bank became
    aware of the default judgment entered against it. The court granted the
    bank’s motion to open and vacate judgment ‘‘[b]ased upon the fact that the
    address at which the defendant received notice of the judgment in this case
    is different from the address listed in the return of service . . . .’’
    17
    The plaintiff also contends that the court failed to conduct a factual
    inquiry into whether the bank had received actual or effective notice of the
    original action. In so arguing, the plaintiff relies on Ruddock v. Burrowes,
    
    243 Conn. 569
    , 576–77, 
    706 A.2d 967
     (1998). Ruddock, however, provided
    that ‘‘a plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to make a factual showing
    that the prior dismissal was a matter of form in the sense that the plaintiff’s
    noncompliance with a court order occurred in circumstances such as mis-
    take, inadvertence or excusable neglect.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Id., 577. Ruddock requires that, where an action has been terminated
    by way of a disciplinary dismissal, the court must afford a plaintiff, seeking
    to bring a second action pursuant to § 52-592, the opportunity to make a
    factual showing that the disciplinary dismissal was a ‘‘matter of form’’ as
    required by § 52-592. See id., 576–77.
    In the present case, the original action was not terminated by way of a
    disciplinary dismissal. Here, the plaintiff had the opportunity, in its opposi-
    tion to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, to present evidence,
    via affidavits or other supporting documents, to demonstrate the existence
    of a genuine issue of material fact as to actual or effective notice. If he had
    presented such evidence, the plaintiff could have defeated the defendants’
    motions for summary judgment. In the absence of any such evidence, how-
    ever, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden. The plaintiff’s reliance on
    Ruddock is therefore unavailing.
    18
    To the extent that the plaintiff argues that General Statutes § 52-593
    applies to save his CUTPA, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
    and negligent misrepresentation claims, we decline to review this argument
    because it was not raised before the trial court and therefore is not properly
    preserved. See Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC, 
    306 Conn. 391
    , 399, 
    50 A.3d 316
    (2012) (‘‘[i]t is well established that a claim must be distinctly raised at trial
    to be preserved for appeal’’).