Tunick v. Tunick ( 2022 )


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    STEPHEN M. TUNICK v. BARBARA TUNICK ET AL.
    (AC 45085)
    Moll, Seeley and Lavine, Js.
    Syllabus
    The plaintiff, who was a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust, which
    included a corpus of, inter alia, antique automobiles, sought damages
    from the defendants, his sisters, B and R, and from D, the administrator
    of the estate of S, the plaintiff’s mother, in connection with the adminis-
    tration of the trust. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that B and S, who
    had been cotrustees of the trust, had breached their fiduciary duties to
    him. D and B filed motions to strike the counts that alleged that a contract
    had been breached, which the trial court granted, and, thereafter, the
    defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment on the ground
    that the plaintiff’s claims were time barred pursuant to the three year
    tort statute of limitations (§ 52-577). While the motions for summary
    judgment were pending, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint that added
    a count against B sounding in unjust enrichment, alleging that B, by a
    continuing course of conduct, breached the trust agreement by, inter
    alia, misappropriating and diverting assets, principal and income from
    the plaintiff. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment
    filed by R and D, having determined that they met their burden of
    showing that the plaintiff’s claims were time barred by § 52-577. The
    trial court also granted in part the motion for summary judgment filed
    by B; the count of unjust enrichment was not adjudicated in that ruling.
    The court determined that there was no evidentiary basis for the plain-
    tiff’s claims that the statute of limitations in § 52-577 was tolled by the
    continuous course of conduct doctrine, and it concluded that no genuine
    issues of material fact existed as to when the plaintiff’s cause accrued
    and when his action was commenced. On the plaintiff’s prior appeal to
    this court, this court affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary
    judgment in favor of R and D but did not address on the merits the
    plaintiff’s challenges to the trial court’s rendering of summary judgment
    in part in favor of B, reasoning that a final judgment as to B was lacking
    because the unjust enrichment count of the complaint remained pending.
    Thereafter, the trial court granted B’s motion to strike the unjust enrich-
    ment count on the ground that it was time barred by § 52-577, and the
    plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:
    1. The trial court improperly granted B’s motion to strike the unjust enrich-
    ment count of the revised complaint on the ground that it was time
    barred by § 52-577: a claim of unjust enrichment sounds neither in tort
    nor in contract but is an equitable claim for relief, not subject to any
    statute of limitations, and, instead, is subject to the equitable doctrine
    of laches; moreover, B’s argument that § 52-577 applied because the
    unjust enrichment claim contained tort like allegations was unsupported
    by our jurisprudence.
    2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
    granted B’s motion for summary judgment, that court having determined
    that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether § 52-577
    was tolled by the operation of the continuing course of conduct doctrine;
    in the present case, B’s alleged failure to account for antique automobiles
    and unspecified automobile parts did not constitute a continuous series
    of events that gave rise to a cumulative injury, and the plaintiff failed
    to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to
    whether B committed a continuous breach of the fiduciary duty she
    owed to remainder beneficiaries that resulted in an enhanced injury to
    the plaintiff.
    Argued October 11—officially released December 20, 2022
    Procedural History
    Action for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, and
    for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
    judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Truglia,
    J., granted the motions to strike filed by the defendant
    Richard S. DiPreta et al.; thereafter, the plaintiff filed
    an amended complaint; subsequently, the court granted
    in part the motion for summary judgment filed by the
    named defendant, granted the motions for summary
    judgment filed by the defendant Roberta G. Tunick et
    al. and rendered judgment thereon, from which the
    plaintiff appealed to this court, Keller, Elgo and Lavery,
    Js.; subsequently, the court, Truglia, J., denied the
    plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment, and the plaintiff
    filed an amended appeal to this court, which dismissed
    the appeal in part and affirmed the judgment in all other
    respects; thereafter, the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe,
    judge trial referee, granted the named defendant’s
    motions to strike and for summary judgment and ren-
    dered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
    appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further pro-
    ceedings.
    William W. Taylor, for the appellant (plaintiff).
    Christina M. Volpe, with whom, on the brief, was
    Thomas P. O’Dea, Jr., for the appellee (named defen-
    dant).
    Opinion
    LAVINE, J. The plaintiff, Stephen M. Tunick, appeals
    from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of
    the defendant Barbara Tunick.1 On appeal, the plaintiff
    contends that the court improperly granted the defen-
    dant’s (1) motion to strike and (2) motion for summary
    judgment. We agree with the first claim and disagree
    with the second claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part
    and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.
    In Tunick v. Tunick, 
    201 Conn. App. 512
    , 517–22, 
    242 A.3d 1011
     (2020), cert. denied, 
    336 Conn. 910
    , 
    244 A.3d 561
     (2021), this court detailed the facts, as gleaned from
    the pleadings, affidavits, and other proof submitted,
    viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, which
    we now summarize. In 1981, David H. Tunick (settlor)
    established the David H. Tunick revocable trust (trust).
    
    Id., 517
    . The trust corpus included, among other things,
    antique automobiles. 
    Id.
     The primary beneficiaries of
    the trust were the settlor and his wife, Sylvia G. Tunick
    (Sylvia), and their three children—the plaintiff, the
    defendant, and Roberta G. Tunick (Roberta)—who
    were named as remainder beneficiaries. 
    Id.
     The plaintiff
    and the defendant initially were appointed as cotrustees
    of the trust, and, in 1993, the trust was amended to
    include Sylvia as a third cotrustee. 
    Id.
     The trust provided
    in relevant part that Sylvia would become the sole pri-
    mary beneficiary of the trust upon the settlor’s death
    and that all income and principal of the trust would be
    used for her benefit. 
    Id.
     The trust further provided that,
    upon Sylvia’s death, the plaintiff, the defendant, and
    Roberta would receive equal shares of the remaining
    trust property. 
    Id.
     The settlor died in 1997, leaving Sylvia
    as the sole primary beneficiary of the trust. 
    Id.
     In 2004,
    Sylvia and the defendant filed an application with the
    Probate Court to remove the plaintiff as a trustee. 
    Id.
    The court removed him as a trustee, ordering that he
    deliver any property belonging to the trust to the
    remaining trustees and that the antique automobiles be
    sold. 
    Id.,
     517–18. Sylvia and the defendant acted as
    cotrustees of the trust from July 7, 2004, until June 11,
    2013, when the Probate Court issued an order removing
    them as cotrustees.2 
    Id., 518
    . Sylvia died in 2015, and
    Richard S. DiPreta was appointed as the administrator
    of her estate. 
    Id.
    The plaintiff thereafter commenced the present
    action in 2016 and alleged the following in his twelve
    count second revised complaint: breach of fiduciary
    duty against the defendant and Sylvia;3 conversion, civil
    theft in violation of General Statutes § 52-564, and fraud-
    ulent misrepresentation against the defendant, Sylvia,
    and Roberta; and breach of contract against the defen-
    dant. The defendant filed a motion to strike the breach
    of contract count, arguing that it was legally insufficient
    as a matter of law because a trust is not a contract. The
    defendant also filed a motion for summary judgment,
    in which she argued that the counts against her alleging
    breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil theft, and
    fraudulent misrepresentation were time barred pursu-
    ant to the three year tort statute of limitations, General
    Statutes § 52-577.4 The defendant also argued that she
    was entitled to summary judgment on the breach of
    contract count. Roberta and DiPreta filed separate
    motions for summary judgment and argued that the
    counts against them were time barred by § 52-577. In
    his memorandum of law in opposition to the three
    motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued,
    among other things, that the time limitation in § 52-577
    was tolled by a continuing course of conduct.
    The court, Truglia, J., granted the defendant’s motion
    to strike the breach of contract count. While the
    motions for summary judgment were pending, the plain-
    tiff filed a third revised complaint, which, notably, omit-
    ted the breach of contract claim against the defendant
    and added a claim of unjust enrichment in its place. The
    court, Truglia, J., thereafter, granted the defendant’s
    motion for summary judgment on the counts in the
    second revised complaint against the defendant alleging
    breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil theft, and
    fraudulent misrepresentation. In response to a motion
    for articulation filed by the plaintiff, the court clarified
    that it had not rendered summary judgment as to the
    new twelfth count of the third revised complaint, which
    alleged unjust enrichment. The court granted in full the
    motions for summary judgment filed by Roberta and
    DiPreta.
    Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claim-
    ing, among other things, that genuine issues of material
    fact existed as to whether the claims in his complaint
    were time barred under § 52-577. Tunick v. Tunick,
    supra, 
    201 Conn. App. 516
    –17. This court affirmed the
    trial court’s judgment granting the motions for summary
    judgment filed by Roberta and DiPreta and dismissed
    the portion of the plaintiff’s appeal challenging the trial
    court’s granting in part the defendant’s motion for sum-
    mary judgment. 
    Id.,
     522–24. In 2021, the plaintiff filed
    a fifth revised complaint, which alleged, in count twelve,
    unjust enrichment.5 The defendant moved to strike the
    unjust enrichment count of the fifth revised complaint,
    arguing that it was time barred by § 52-577. The court,
    Radcliffe, J., granted the motion. Thereafter, pursuant
    to Practice Book § 10-44, the defendant filed a motion
    for judgment on the stricken unjust enrichment count,
    which was the remaining count of the complaint
    directed to the defendant that was not disposed of by
    the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for sum-
    mary judgment.6 The court granted the motion and ren-
    dered judgment in favor of the defendant. This appeal
    followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
    be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted
    the defendant’s motion to strike the unjust enrichment
    count of the fifth revised complaint on the ground that
    it was time barred by § 52-577. We agree.
    In the twelfth count of the fifth revised complaint,
    the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached her
    fiduciary duties under the trust agreement by, among
    other things, failing to turn over trust assets, and
    thereby unjustly enriched herself to the detriment of
    the plaintiff.7 In granting the motion to strike, the court
    determined that the three year tort statute of limitations
    in § 52-577 applied so as to bar the unjust enrichment
    claim, as it did not allege a contractual dispute but,
    rather, involved allegations of tortious conduct.
    ‘‘Whether a particular action is barred by the statute of
    limitations is a question of law to which we apply a
    plenary standard of review.’’ Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
    v. Owen, 
    88 Conn. App. 806
    , 814, 
    873 A.2d 1003
    , cert.
    denied, 
    275 Conn. 902
    , 
    882 A.2d 670
     (2005).
    Generally, a motion to strike is not the proper proce-
    dural vehicle for raising a claim that an action is time
    barred by the lapse of a statute of limitations. Forbes
    v. Ballaro, 
    31 Conn. App. 235
    , 239–40, 
    624 A.2d 389
    (1993). In the present case, however, we turn our focus
    away from procedural concerns to an even more funda-
    mental issue. In Reclaimant Corp. v. Deutsch, 
    332 Conn. 590
    , 
    211 A.3d 976
     (2019), our Supreme Court held that
    ‘‘unjust enrichment is not a legal claim sounding in
    either tort or contract—it is an equitable claim for relief.
    As an equitable claim, its timeliness is not subject to a
    statute of limitations but, rather, to the equitable doc-
    trine of laches.’’ 
    Id., 613
    ; see 
    id.
     (for purposes of laches,
    courts in equitable proceedings may look by analogy
    to statute of limitations but are not obligated to adhere
    to those limitations). The court concluded that unjust
    enrichment claims are not barred by the three year
    limitation period in § 52-577. Id., 614.
    We agree with the plaintiff that his claim for unjust
    enrichment against the defendant is not subject to a
    statute of limitations. The defendant’s argument—that
    § 52-577 applies because the unjust enrichment count
    contains tort like allegations of breaches of fiduciary
    duties—is creative, but unavailing. Reclaimant Corp.
    makes no exception to its holding that unjust enrich-
    ment claims are not bound by a statute of limitations.
    A claim of unjust enrichment, which sounds neither in
    tort nor in contract, is an equitable claim for relief that
    is not subject to any statute of limitations, including
    § 52-577. Id., 613–14. Because the unjust enrichment
    count was not a tort claim and was not time barred by
    § 52-577, we conclude that the court improperly granted
    the motion to strike on that basis.
    II
    The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
    granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
    as to the counts of the second revised complaint8 alleg-
    ing breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil theft, and
    fraudulent misrepresentation because genuine issues
    of material fact exist as to whether § 52-5779 was tolled
    by the continuing course of conduct doctrine. We dis-
    agree.
    We begin with the standard of review and relevant
    legal principles. When reviewing a decision of a trial
    court to grant a motion for summary judgment, ‘‘[t]he
    facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings . . . .
    Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment
    shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits
    and any other proof submitted show that there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
    deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
    must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the nonmoving party. . . . Our review of the trial
    court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for
    summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Tunick v. Tunick, supra,
    
    201 Conn. App. 532
    ‘‘The continuing course of conduct doctrine operates
    to delay the commencement of the running of an other-
    wise applicable statute of limitations. . . . When pre-
    sented with a motion for summary judgment under the
    continuous course of conduct doctrine, [the court] must
    determine whether there is a genuine issue of material
    fact with respect to whether the defendant: (1) commit-
    ted an initial wrong upon the plaintiff; (2) owed a contin-
    uing duty to the plaintiff that was related to the alleged
    original wrong; and (3) continually breached that duty.
    . . . Although the question of whether a party’s claim
    is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of
    law, the issue of whether a party engaged in a continuing
    course of conduct that tolled the running of the statute
    of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact.’’
    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id.,
     535–36.
    In ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the
    trial court determined that the three year limitation
    period in § 52-577 commenced in 2013 and had expired
    by the time the plaintiff commenced the action in 2017.
    In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the relevant
    limitation period was tolled under the continuing course
    of conduct doctrine, the court reasoned in its memoran-
    dum of decision that ‘‘[t]he gravamen of the plaintiff’s
    complaint is that [the defendant] and [Sylvia’s estate]
    are liable to him for breach of fiduciary duties as trust-
    ees. Through a continuing course of conduct, beginning
    in 1997 and ending in 2013, the plaintiff alleges that
    [the defendant] and Sylvia, acting alone or together,
    improperly dissipated trust assets by prematurely dis-
    tributing funds out of the trust to themselves, thereby
    intentionally misappropriating and diverting principle,
    income and assets that should have passed to him as
    a remainderman of that trust. He also alleges that [the
    defendant] and Sylvia engaged in self-dealing and/or
    intentionally and carelessly handled the trust assets.’’
    As to the defendant and Sylvia, who were both trustees
    and against whom the plaintiff alleged claims for breach
    of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil theft, and fraudulent
    misrepresentation, the court stated: ‘‘[T]he court agrees
    that all of the plaintiff’s allegations of wrongdoing in
    the complaint describe conduct by [the defendant, Syl-
    via, and Roberta] from 1997 to 2013. . . . The plaintiff
    does not contest [their] assertions that [the defendant]
    and [Sylvia] ceased acting as trustees in June, 2013. . . .
    In short, [the defendant, DiPreta and Roberta] have met
    their preliminary burden of showing that the plaintiff’s
    claims are time barred by the three year statute of
    limitations under § 52-577. The burden now shifts to
    the plaintiff to show that genuine issues of material fact
    exist upon which the trier of fact could conclude that
    the statute of limitations has been tolled to May 5, 2017,
    the date of service. . . . [T]he court rejects all the toll-
    ing arguments advanced by the plaintiff. . . . The court
    . . . finds no evidentiary basis for the plaintiff’s claims
    that the statute of limitations is tolled by the continuous
    course of conduct doctrine . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.)
    In the plaintiff’s previous appeal, this court did not
    address on the merits the plaintiff’s challenge to the
    trial court’s rendering of summary judgment in part in
    favor of the defendant, reasoning that a final judgment
    was lacking because the unjust enrichment count of
    the complaint remained pending.10 Tunick v. Tunick,
    supra, 
    201 Conn. App. 522
    –24. In affirming the trial
    court’s granting of the motions for summary judgment
    filed by Roberta and DiPreta, this court rejected the
    plaintiff’s argument that genuine issues of material fact
    existed as to whether § 52-577 was tolled by the opera-
    tion of the continuing course of conduct doctrine.
    Id., 531–53.
    In addressing the plaintiff’s claim that the court
    improperly granted the motion for summary judgment
    filed by DiPreta as to the claims concerning Sylvia, who,
    for purposes of the unjust enrichment claim, is situated
    similarly to the defendant, this court in the previous
    appeal determined that the trial court properly had
    determined that the application of the continuing
    course of conduct doctrine was not warranted. Id., 534–
    49. This court determined that, because Sylvia had
    served as a trustee from 1993 to June 11, 2013, she
    owed a continuing fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, as a
    remainder beneficiary of the trust, to account for trust
    assets and that her duty did not end immediately upon
    her removal as a trustee on June 11, 2013. Id., 537–42.
    We noted, however, regarding the third prong of the
    continuing course of conduct doctrine, that the relevant
    question was ‘‘whether the plaintiff has presented an
    evidentiary basis to establish a genuine issue of material
    fact as to whether Sylvia and the estate continually
    breached the fiduciary duty to account for trust assets
    following her removal as a trustee in 2013.’’ Id., 542.
    This court determined that the pleadings contained no
    specific allegations of a continuing breach of a fiduciary
    duty after Sylvia’s removal as a trustee in June, 2013,
    except with respect to the issue of antique automobiles
    and parts, and that ‘‘the failure to account for the two
    antique automobiles and unspecified automobile parts
    does not constitute a continuous series of events that
    give rise to a cumulative injury.’’ Id., 548. This court
    determined that the plaintiff had not established the
    existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding
    whether Sylvia and DiPreta committed a continuous
    breach of the fiduciary duty owed to remainder benefici-
    aries that resulted in an enhanced injury to him and
    concluded that the court properly determined that the
    application of the continuing course of conduct doc-
    trine was not warranted. Id., 541–49.
    In the present appeal, the plaintiff argues that genuine
    issues of material fact exist as to whether § 52-577 was
    tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine and
    focuses on the defendant’s alleged failure to account
    for antique automobiles and parts to support his con-
    tention. We disagree with the plaintiff and are not per-
    suaded by his argument that the continuing course of
    conduct doctrine applies as to the defendant because,
    unlike Sylvia, the defendant ‘‘is still alive and has the
    ability to retain an auto[s] of her choosing . . . .’’ The
    alleged injury is the same as to both Sylvia and the
    defendant. As with Sylvia, the only specific allegations
    made by the plaintiff of a continuing breach of a fidu-
    ciary duty owed to him by the defendant after she
    ceased being a trustee in June, 2013, concerned the
    failure to account for antique automobiles and parts.
    The reasoning stated in Tunick for why the trial court
    properly determined that the continuing course of con-
    duct doctrine did not operate to toll § 52-577 as to Sylvia,
    applies also to the defendant. As this court reasoned
    in Tunick with respect to Sylvia, we now conclude in
    the present appeal as to the defendant that the alleged
    failure to account for antique automobiles and unspeci-
    fied automobile parts does not constitute a continuous
    series of events that give rise to a cumulative injury
    and the plaintiff has not established the existence of a
    genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defen-
    dant committed a continuous breach of the fiduciary
    duty she owed to remainder beneficiaries that resulted
    in an enhanced injury to the plaintiff. See Tunick v.
    Tunick, supra, 
    201 Conn. App. 548
    –49. Accordingly, we
    conclude that the court properly determined that the
    application of the continuing course of conduct doc-
    trine was not warranted as to the defendant.
    The judgment is reversed only with respect to the
    granting of the defendant’s motion to strike count
    twelve of the plaintiff’s fifth revised complaint and the
    case is remanded for further proceedings according to
    law; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The plaintiff initially commenced this action against his sisters, Barbara
    Tunick and Roberta G. Tunick (Roberta). Also named as defendants were
    Richard S. DiPreta, coadministrator of the estate of the plaintiff’s mother,
    Sylvia G. Tunick, who died in 2015, and Edward Axelrod, coadministrator
    of the estate of Sylvia G. Tunick. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew the
    action as against Axelrod, and the court’s rendering of summary judgment
    in favor of Roberta and DiPreta previously was affirmed by this court. See
    Tunick v. Tunick, 
    201 Conn. App. 512
    , 517–22, 
    242 A.3d 1011
     (2020), cert.
    denied, 
    336 Conn. 910
    , 
    244 A.3d 561
     (2021). Consequently, Barbara Tunick
    is the only defendant participating in this appeal. For clarity, in this opinion
    we refer to Barbara Tunick as the defendant.
    2
    The Probate Court appointed Richard J. Margenot as the successor
    trustee.
    3
    The claims concerning Sylvia were brought against DiPreta, in his capac-
    ity as administrator of Sylvia’s estate, and relate to actions taken by Sylvia
    as cotrustee of the trust.
    4
    General Statutes § 52-577 provides that ‘‘[n]o action founded upon a tort
    shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission
    complained of.’’
    5
    In this complaint, the plaintiff also alleged against the defendant, for
    purposes of preservation of rights for appellate review, breach of fiduciary
    duty, conversion, civil theft and misrepresentation/fraud.
    6
    Practice Book § 10-44 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Within fifteen days after
    the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been
    stricken may file a new pleading; provided that in those instances where
    an entire complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count in a
    complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint has been stricken, and the party
    whose pleading or a count thereof has been so stricken fails to file a new
    pleading within that fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon
    motion, enter judgment against said party on said stricken complaint, coun-
    terclaim or cross complaint, or count thereof. . . .’’ See also Lavette v.
    Stanley Black Decker, Inc., 
    213 Conn. App. 463
    , 469 n.6, 
    278 A.3d 1072
     (2022)
    (‘‘As a general rule, [a]fter a court has granted a motion to strike, the plaintiff
    may either amend his pleading [pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44] or, on
    the rendering of judgment, file an appeal. . . . The choices are mutually
    exclusive [as] [t]he filing of an amended pleading operates as a waiver of
    the right to claim that there was error in the sustaining of the [motion to
    strike] the original pleading.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
    7
    ‘‘Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that
    the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay
    the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to
    the plaintiffs’ detriment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schirmer v.
    Souza, 
    126 Conn. App. 759
    , 763, 
    12 A.3d 1048
     (2011).
    8
    A final disposition was rendered on all counts of the underlying complaint
    by the court’s granting of a partial summary judgment as to the defendant
    on the second revised complaint and by the striking of the unjust enrichment
    count against the defendant on the fifth revised complaint. See footnote 10
    of this opinion. Accordingly, we address in this appeal the plaintiff’s claims
    regarding the court’s decisions as to the defendant on both the second
    revised complaint and fifth revised complaint.
    9
    See footnote 4 of this opinion.
    10
    In the present appeal, the plaintiff argues that, if we reverse the judgment
    of the court granting the defendant’s motion to strike, then we cannot review
    his second claim due to the lack of a final judgment. In striking the unjust
    enrichment count and subsequently rendering judgment thereon, the trial
    court rendered judgment on the remaining count of the complaint directed
    to the defendant that was not disposed of by the court’s granting of the
    defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
    Because there has been a final disposition as to all counts of the underlying
    complaint, a final judgment exists for purposes of appeal. See Krausman
    v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
    195 Conn. App. 682
    , 687, 
    227 A.3d 91
     (2020) (‘‘an
    appeal challenging an order issued during the pendency of a civil action
    ordinarily must wait until there has been a final disposition as to all counts
    of the underlying complaint’’).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC45085

Filed Date: 12/20/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/19/2022