State v. Mukhtaar ( 2017 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ABDUL MUKHTAAR
    (AC 40099)
    Mullins, Elgo and Beach, Js.
    Syllabus
    The defendant, who had been convicted of the crime of murder in connection
    with a shooting incident when he was twenty years old, appealed to
    this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to
    correct an illegal sentence. In his motion, he claimed that his brain had
    not developed fully at the time of the crime such that he could not
    comprehend the gravity of his actions, that his chronological age at the
    time of the crime was not representative of his mental age, which was
    not substantially different from that of a juvenile, and that the sentencing
    judge should have afforded him a competency hearing to determine
    whether he could stand trial and aid in his own defense. In support of
    his claim, he sought to have the trial court apply the rationale of Miller
    v. Alabama (
    567 U.S. 460
    ) and its progeny, which recognize that courts
    must consider mitigating evidence of youth and immaturity when sen-
    tencing juvenile offenders, including the offender’s chronological age
    and its hallmark features as mitigating evidence against a severe sen-
    tence such as life imprisonment without parole. The defendant also filed
    a motion to allow an expert psychologist to testify, which the trial court
    denied. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that denial
    of his motion to correct an illegal sentence was improper: because the
    defendant was twenty years old at the time of the crime, the trial court
    was not required under Miller necessarily and expressly to take the
    defendant’s mental state into consideration at sentencing, and although
    he claimed that Miller should be extended to apply to an adult defendant
    whose mental age, at the time of the crime, was not substantially different
    from that of a juvenile, our law categorically limits review pursuant to
    Miller and its progeny to cases in which the defendant was under the
    age of eighteen at the time of the crime; accordingly, the defendant
    having failed to set forth a colorable claim for relief, the trial court did
    not have jurisdiction over his motion to correct an illegal sentence,
    which should have been dismissed rather than denied, and in light of
    the court’s lack of jurisdiction, it did not err in precluding the testimony
    of the defendant’s expert.
    Argued September 25—officially released December 26, 2017
    Procedural History
    Information charging the defendant with the crime
    of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
    district of Fairfield, and tried to the jury before Gor-
    mley, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which
    the defendant appealed to our Supreme Court, which
    affirmed the judgment; thereafter, the court, Devlin,
    J., denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal
    sentence; subsequently, the court, Devlin, J., denied
    the defendant’s motion to allow expert testimony, and
    the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; judg-
    ment directed.
    Abdul Mukhtaar, self-represented, the appellant
    (defendant).
    Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s
    attorney, and Emily Dewey Trudeau, deputy assistant
    state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    BEACH, J. The self-represented defendant, Abdul
    Mukhtaar, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
    denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The
    defendant claims that the trial court abused its discre-
    tion in (1) denying his motion to correct an illegal sen-
    tence and (2) denying his motion to allow an expert
    witness to testify.1 We disagree.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to this appeal.2 On February 14, 1996, the defendant
    shot and killed Terri Horeglad, who was a passenger
    in a car that had stopped at the intersection of Fairfield
    and Iranistan Avenues in Bridgeport. The defendant
    was twenty years old at the time. He subsequently was
    arrested, charged and, following a jury trial, convicted
    of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.
    On September 19, 1997, the trial court sentenced the
    defendant to fifty years imprisonment. On October 21,
    2015, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal
    sentence. Relying on Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    ,
    
    125 S. Ct. 1183
    , 
    161 L. Ed. 2d 1
    (2005), Graham v.
    Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    , 
    130 S. Ct. 2011
    , 
    176 L. Ed. 2d 825
    (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
    , 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    , 
    183 L. Ed. 2d 407
    (2012), the defendant argued
    that his brain had not developed fully at the time of the
    crime such that he could not comprehend the gravity
    of his actions. The defendant claimed that his sentence
    had been imposed in an illegal manner because the
    sentencing judge did not grant him a competency hear-
    ing to determine whether he could stand trial and aid
    in his own defense. Seeking to introduce the testimony
    of a psychologist relevant to his mental state at the
    time of the crime, he also filed a motion to allow an
    expert to testify.
    After argument on May 25, 2016, the trial court, Dev-
    lin, J., denied the defendant’s motion to correct an
    illegal sentence on the basis that Roper, Graham, and
    Miller apply only to individuals who were under the
    age of eighteen at the time of the crime. The court then
    denied as moot the defendant’s motion to allow the
    expert to testify. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
    improperly denied his motion to correct an illegal sen-
    tence on the ground that Miller and its progeny apply
    only to the sentencing of juveniles. The defendant does
    not dispute that, at least literally, the jurisprudence
    applies to juveniles. He claims, however, that the ratio-
    nale underlying the cases is applicable equally to sen-
    tencing of adults whose mentalities at the time of the
    crime were similar to those of juveniles. He asserts that
    the trial court misconstrued his argument as relying on
    the precise holding of Miller when it, in fact, was based
    on the ‘‘brain science’’ underlying that case. At oral
    argument before this court, the defendant clarified that
    he was claiming that his sentence was illegal because
    he was not afforded a competency hearing. He asserted
    that he was relying on Miller only to show that he
    should have been given a competency hearing because
    his mind had not fully developed at the time of the
    crime. The state contends that Miller and its progeny
    do not apply to the defendant because he was older
    than eighteen at the time of the crime. We agree with
    the state and note further that the trial court did not
    misconstrue the defendant’s argument.3
    We begin with the relevant standard of review and
    legal principles. ‘‘We review the [trial] court’s denial of
    [a] defendant’s motion to correct [an illegal] sentence
    under the abuse of discretion standard of review. . . .
    In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discre-
    tion, great weight is given to the trial court’s decision
    and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of
    its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial court’s
    ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Logan, 
    160 Conn. App. 282
    , 287, 
    125 A.3d 581
    (2015), cert. denied,
    
    321 Conn. 906
    , 
    135 A.3d 279
    (2016).
    ‘‘Practice Book § 43-224 sets forth the procedural
    mechanism for correcting invalid sentences, and its
    scope is governed by the common law.’’ State v. Martin
    M., 
    143 Conn. App. 140
    , 144, 
    70 A.3d 135
    , cert. denied,
    
    309 Conn. 919
    , 
    70 A.3d 41
    (2013). ‘‘An illegal sentence
    is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant
    statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant’s right
    against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is inherently
    contradictory. . . . Sentences imposed in an illegal
    manner have been defined as being within the relevant
    statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which vio-
    lates the defendant’s right . . . to be addressed person-
    ally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of
    punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge
    relying on accurate information or considerations solely
    in the record, or his right that the government keep its
    plea agreement promises . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Starks, 
    121 Conn. App. 581
    , 586,
    
    997 A.2d 546
    (2010). A claim that a sentence violated the
    precepts of Miller and its progeny is properly brought
    by means of a motion to correct pursuant to Practice
    Book § 43-22. See, e.g., State v. 
    Logan, supra
    , 160 Conn.
    App. 287–90.
    In State v. Taylor G., 
    315 Conn. 734
    , 
    110 A.3d 338
    (2015), our Supreme Court summarized the holdings in
    Roper, Graham and Miller. ‘‘[A]ll three federal cases
    recognized that, because the eighth amendment prohi-
    bition against cruel and unusual punishment is based
    on the principle that punishment should be graduated
    and proportioned to the offender and the offense, courts
    must consider mitigating evidence of youth and immatu-
    rity when sentencing juvenile offenders. Thus, applying
    this principle, the death penalty is a disproportionate
    sentence for juvenile offenders, regardless of the crime;
    see Roper v. 
    Simmons, supra
    , 
    543 U.S. 573
    –75; life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole is a dis-
    proportionate sentence for juveniles convicted of a non-
    homicide crime; Graham v. 
    Florida, supra
    , 
    560 U.S. 74
    ;
    and mandatory life imprisonment without the possibil-
    ity of parole is a disproportionate sentence for juveniles
    convicted of a homicide, although a sentence of life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole may be
    deemed appropriate following consideration of the
    child’s age-related characteristics and the circum-
    stances of the crime. See Miller v. 
    Alabama, supra
    , [
    567 U.S. 479
    –80] . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v.
    Taylor 
    G., supra
    , 743–44.
    ‘‘Miller logically indicates that, if a sentencing
    scheme permits the imposition of [a life sentence with-
    out parole] on a juvenile homicide offender, the trial
    court must consider the offender’s chronological age
    and its hallmark features as mitigating against such a
    severe sentence.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. Riley, 
    315 Conn. 637
    , 658,
    
    110 A.3d 1205
    (2015), cert. denied,        U.S.    , 136 S.
    Ct. 1361, 
    194 L. Ed. 2d 376
    (2016). ‘‘We use the term
    juvenile offenders to refer to persons who committed
    a crime when they were younger than eighteen years
    of age.’’ 
    Id., 640 n.1;
    see also State v. Taylor 
    G., supra
    ,
    
    315 Conn. 741
    n.7; State v. 
    Logan, supra
    , 160 Conn.
    App. 288 n.11.
    In the present case, the defendant, then twenty years
    old, was not a juvenile at the time of the crime. The
    trial court was therefore not required under Miller nec-
    essarily and expressly to take the defendant’s mental
    state into consideration at sentencing. See State v.
    
    Riley, supra
    , 
    315 Conn. 658
    (‘‘trial court must consider
    the offender’s chronological age and its hallmark fea-
    tures’’ [emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted]). The defendant contends, however, that his
    chronological age, at the time of the crime, was not
    representative of his mental age. In his motion to cor-
    rect, the defendant asserted that Miller should be
    extended to apply to adult defendants whose mental
    age, at the time of the crime, was not substantially
    different from that of juveniles.
    The United States Supreme Court, however, has
    expressly restricted Miller to apply only to those chro-
    nologically under the age of eighteen. See Miller v.
    
    Alabama, supra
    , 
    567 U.S. 465
    (‘‘[w]e therefore hold that
    mandatory life without parole for those under the age
    of [eighteen] at the time of their crimes violates the
    [e]ighth [a]mendment’s prohibition on cruel and
    unusual punishments’’ [emphasis added; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted]); see also 
    Id., 489 (‘‘[b]y
    requiring
    that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime
    incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless
    of their age and age-related characteristics and the
    nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing
    schemes before us violate this principle of proportional-
    ity, and so the [e]ighth [a]mendment’s ban on cruel and
    unusual punishment’’ [emphasis added]).
    In addition, the ‘‘brain science’’ referenced in Miller,
    upon which the defendant seeks to rely, also empha-
    sized the differences between juveniles and adults. See
    
    Id., 471–72 (‘‘[I]n
    Graham, we noted that developments
    in psychology and brain science continue to show fun-
    damental differences between juvenile and adult minds
    . . . . We reasoned that those findings—of transient
    rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess con-
    sequences—both lessened a child’s moral culpability
    and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and
    neurological development occurs, his deficiencies will
    be reformed.’’ [Citation omitted; emphasis added; foot-
    note omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).
    Our Supreme Court has used the term ‘‘juvenile
    offenders’’ under Miller to mean those who are under
    eighteen at the time of the crime. See State v. Taylor
    
    G., supra
    , 
    315 Conn. 741
    n.7; State v. 
    Riley, supra
    , 
    315 Conn. 640
    n.1. Finally, this court recently held that
    ‘‘[e]xpanding the application of Miller to offenders eigh-
    teen years of age or older simply does not comport with
    existing eighth amendment jurisprudence pertaining to
    juvenile sentencing.’’ Haughey v. Commissioner of Cor-
    rection, 
    173 Conn. App. 559
    , 568, 
    164 A.3d 849
    , cert.
    denied, 
    327 Conn. 906
    , 
    170 A.3d 1
    (2017).
    We emphasize that a Superior Court traditionally
    loses jurisdiction over a criminal case once the defen-
    dant begins serving a sentence; a motion to correct
    pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22 is an exception. Few
    categories of claims qualify for consideration under that
    exception. See, e.g., State v. Casiano, 
    122 Conn. App. 61
    , 66–67, 
    998 A.2d 792
    , cert. denied, 
    298 Conn. 931
    ,
    
    5 A.3d 491
    (2010). Our courts have determined that
    sentences of juveniles may qualify, in limited circum-
    stances, if the vicissitudes of youth have not adequately
    been considered at sentencing. The line, however, has
    been brightly drawn at eighteen, and we are not free
    to ignore that bright line. See, e.g., Haughey v. Commis-
    sioner of 
    Correction, supra
    , 
    173 Conn. App. 568
    –69.
    Our law, then, categorically limits review pursuant
    to Miller and its progeny to cases in which the defendant
    was under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
    In State v. Delgado, 
    323 Conn. 801
    , 810–811, 
    151 A.3d 345
    (2016), our Supreme Court held that the Superior
    Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a motion to cor-
    rect that did not state a colorable claim for relief. The
    defendant, in this case, did not set forth a colorable
    claim for relief. Consequently, pursuant to Delgado, the
    trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
    the defendant’s motion to correct. Further, because the
    trial court lacked jurisdiction, it did not err in precluding
    the testimony of the defendant’s expert.
    The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
    with direction to dismiss the defendant’s motion to
    correct an illegal sentence.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The defendant also claims that the court erred in (3) precluding him
    from presenting his psychological evaluation report and a study on racial
    disparity as to sentencing, (4) failing to consider that he was a first-time
    felon and other mitigating factors, (5) failing to vacate his sentence on the
    ground that the same judge had presided over his probable cause hearing
    and his trial, and (6) failing to afford him his rights under the fourteenth
    amendment to the United States constitution. Our conclusions with respect
    to claims one and two are dispositive of claims three and six. Claims four
    and five are not properly before us because the defendant did not raise
    them in the trial court. State v. Boyd, 
    295 Conn. 707
    , 757–58, 
    992 A.2d 1071
    (2010), cert. denied, 
    562 U.S. 1224
    , 
    131 S. Ct. 1474
    , 
    179 L. Ed. 2d 314
    (2011).
    Additionally, claim four was previously addressed in a motion to correct
    an illegal sentence that the defendant filed in 2013. See State v. Mukhtaar,
    Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CR-96-261380 (Sep-
    tember 20, 2013) (
    2013 WL 5614541
    ). Also, claim five was addressed in
    the defendant’s 2008 habeas petition. See Mukhtaar v. Commissioner of
    Correction, 
    158 Conn. App. 431
    , 436 n.4, 
    119 A.3d 607
    (2015).
    2
    See generally Mukhtaar v. Commissioner of 
    Correction, supra
    , 158 Conn.
    App. 431.
    3
    In his motion to correct, the defendant stated that ‘‘[b]ased on the retroac-
    tivity of everyone challenging their sentence for juvenile justice for compe-
    tency hearing under Casiano . . . [t]he defendant also requests a
    competency hearing and a hearing/test to see if at [any time] was the defen-
    dant competent enough to stand trial and aid in his defense of this murder
    charge.’’ He concluded that motion by stating, ‘‘if you have two defendants
    who are both charged with the same murder and they both shot the victim
    to death. But one defendant was [eighteen] years old, and the other defendant
    is [seventeen] years old and both are sentenced to [sixty] years. How can
    you give one parole and the other no parole, when brain science supports the
    fact that neither defendant’s brain’s frontal lobe was not fully developed?’’
    At oral argument before this court, however, the defendant claimed that
    the lack of a competency hearing itself rendered his sentence illegal. There
    is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant appeared less than
    competent at sentencing such that the sentencing judge should have held
    a competency hearing.
    As did the trial court, however, we understand the defendant to claim
    that a competency hearing would have revealed that he qualifies for the
    sentencing mandates of Miller v. 
    Alabama, supra
    , 
    567 U.S. 460
    . Put another
    way, we view the defendant’s somewhat elusive claim to be that his claim
    of immaturity at the time of the crime makes him eligible to file a motion
    to correct and a competency hearing would have provided evidence of
    such immaturity.
    4
    Practice Book § 43-22 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may at any time
    correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a
    sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an
    illegal manner.’’
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC40099

Judges: Mullins, Elgo, Beach

Filed Date: 12/26/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024