Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center v. Malley , 189 Conn. App. 68 ( 2019 )


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    SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL
    CENTER v. EDWARD MALLEY ET AL.
    (AC 40619)
    Alvord, Sheldon and Eveleigh, Js.
    Syllabus
    The plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, T and E, to collect
    a debt for unpaid medical expenses incurred by E. L, an attorney, filed
    an appearance and answer on behalf of both defendants, although he
    had filed motions to withdraw his appearance on behalf of T that were
    denied by the court. After L informed the court that he was prepared
    to stipulate to a judgment on behalf of E, the court asked how it should
    proceed with regard to T, to which the plaintiff’s counsel responded
    that it should render a default judgment. L said nothing in response to
    that request from the plaintiff’s counsel, and the court thereupon ren-
    dered a default judgment against T in the same amount as the stipulated
    judgment against E. On T’s appeal to this court, held that the default
    judgment rendered against T was improper and constituted plain error:
    the trial court erred when it entered a default against T because it clearly
    lacked a basis to do so, as the court acknowledged that although T was
    not present in court on the scheduled trial date, she did not have to be
    present because her counsel, L, was present and had appeared on her
    behalf, and despite L’s prior attempts to withdraw his appearance on
    behalf of T, the court did not grant any of his motions to withdraw and,
    at the time of the court’s entry of a default against T, T was still repre-
    sented by L; moreover, the consequences of the court’s error were so
    grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust, as T was
    unable to challenge her liability for E’s medical expenses, the erroneous
    entry of a default against T was the sole basis for the court’s rendering
    of a substantial judgment against her, the entry of a default against
    T implicated her due process rights in that she was deprived of her
    opportunity to be heard on the merits of the case, and the unwarranted
    rendering of a default judgment against T was likely to undermine public
    confidence in the judiciary because the court’s actions deviated from
    established rules and procedures and denied T’s due process rights.
    Argued January 8—officially released April 2, 2019
    Procedural History
    Action to collect a debt, brought to the Superior Court
    in the judicial district of New Britain, where the court,
    Young, J., rendered judgment for the plaintiff in accor-
    dance with a stipulation of the parties as against the
    named defendant; thereafter, the court rendered a
    default judgment against the defendant Tracy Malley,
    from which the defendant Tracy Malley appealed to
    this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
    Michael S. Taylor, with whom was Brendon P. Lev-
    esque, for the appellant (defendant Tracy Malley).
    Opinion
    EVELEIGH, J. The defendant Tracy Malley1 appeals
    from the default judgment rendered against her in favor
    of the plaintiff, Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Cen-
    ter, in this action to collect a debt for unpaid medical
    expenses incurred by Edward Malley. On appeal, the
    defendant claims that there was no basis for the entry
    of a default against her, and, therefore, the rendering
    of the default judgment was improper.2 The plaintiff,
    who prevailed before the trial court, did not file a brief,
    therefore, this appeal was considered on the basis of
    the defendant’s brief, argument, appendix and record
    only. We agree with the defendant and reverse the judg-
    ment of the trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim on
    appeal. In June, 2016, the plaintiff commenced the pre-
    sent action by serving a complaint, in which it claimed
    $37,913.27 for unpaid medical services it had provided
    to Edward Malley on five occasions between February
    12, 2015, and July 15, 2015. Further, the plaintiff alleged
    that, under General Statutes § 46b-37,3 the defendant
    was liable for the unpaid medical services rendered to
    Edward Malley.
    In July, 2016, Attorney Jon C. Leary filed an appear-
    ance on behalf of the defendant and Edward Malley.
    Leary also filed an answer on behalf of both individuals
    on August 26, 2016. On three occasions, however, Leary
    filed motions with the court for permission to withdraw
    his appearance on behalf of the defendant. The clerk
    of court rejected Leary’s first two motions to withdraw,
    and the third motion was marked off by the court and
    not again considered until the scheduled trial date.
    On June 14, 2017, Leary informed the court that he
    was prepared to stipulate to a judgment on behalf of
    Edward Malley, and he further indicated that he had
    unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his appearance
    on behalf of the defendant and that he had been unable
    to communicate with her. The court responded: ‘‘I can’t
    just grant you your motion to withdraw as counsel today
    . . . because we don’t have notice of that being heard
    today with [the defendant].’’ The court went on to state:
    ‘‘Nevertheless, although [the defendant] has no obliga-
    tion to be here, she’s not here to defend herself.’’
    Leary read into the record a stipulation for judgment
    against Edward Malley in the amount of $38,355.15 plus
    costs in the amount of $441.89. The court then asked
    how it should proceed with regard to the defendant, to
    which the plaintiff’s counsel responded that it should
    render a default judgment. Leary said nothing in
    response to this request from the plaintiff’s counsel. The
    court thereupon entered a default against the defendant
    and, immediately thereafter, rendered a default judg-
    ment against the defendant in the same amount as the
    stipulated judgment against Edward Malley. This
    appeal followed.
    ‘‘We first briefly discuss our standard of review of
    the defendant’s claim. To the extent that the defendant
    challenges the court’s authority to enter a default, our
    review is plenary. . . . We also engage in plenary
    review with regard to the construction of any relevant
    statutory provisions or rules of practice. . . . Finally,
    provided we determine that the court had that authority
    to act, we review its exercise of that authority under
    an abuse of discretion standard.’’ (Citations omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank
    National Trust Co. v. Bertrand, 
    140 Conn. App. 646
    ,
    655–56, 
    59 A.3d 864
    , cert. dismissed, 
    309 Conn. 905
    ,
    
    68 A.3d 661
     (2013). When, however, the court lacks
    authority to default a party, its entry of a default is
    erroneous as a matter of law and, thus, constitutes an
    abuse of discretion. People’s United Bank v. Bok, 
    143 Conn. App. 263
    , 272–73, 
    70 A.3d 1074
     (2013).
    Because the defendant’s claims were not raised
    below, we must at the outset also address the issue
    of reviewability. The defendant argues that ‘‘this court
    should reverse because the trial court’s entry of default
    against [her] constitutes plain error.’’ We agree with
    the defendant.
    ‘‘Codified in Practice Book § 60-5, [t]he plain error
    doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is
    a rule of reversibility. . . . It is a doctrine that should
    be invoked sparingly and only on occasions requiring
    the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . Suc-
    cess on such a claim is rare. Plain error review is
    reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the
    existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the
    fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the
    judicial proceedings. . . .
    ‘‘We engage in a two step analysis in reviewing claims
    of plain error. First, we must determine whether the
    trial court in fact committed an error and, if it did,
    whether that error was indeed plain in the sense that
    it is patent [or] readily discernable on the face of a
    factually adequate record, [and] also . . . obvious in
    the sense of not debatable. . . . [T]his inquiry entails
    a relatively high standard, under which it is not enough
    for the defendant simply to demonstrate that his posi-
    tion is correct. Rather, the party seeking plain error
    review must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety
    was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant
    the extraordinary remedy of reversal. . . . Because [a]
    party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has
    demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result
    in manifest injustice . . . under the second prong of
    the analysis we must determine whether the conse-
    quences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamen-
    tally unfair or manifestly unjust.’’ (Citations omitted;
    emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty, 131 Conn.
    App. 270, 273–74, 
    26 A.3d 704
    , cert. denied, 
    302 Conn. 948
    , 
    31 A.3d 383
     (2011).
    Addressing the first prong of plain error analysis, we
    conclude that the court erred when it entered a default
    against the defendant because it clearly lacked a basis
    to do so. ‘‘The failure to follow a procedural rule pre-
    scribing court procedures can also constitute plain
    error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Corona, 
    69 Conn. App. 267
    , 274, 
    794 A.2d 565
    , cert.
    denied, 
    260 Conn. 935
    , 
    802 A.2d 88
     (2002). One of the
    rules that governs the court’s entry of a default against
    a party is Practice Book § 17-19, which provides in
    relevant part: ‘‘If a party . . . fails without proper
    excuse to appear in person or by counsel for trial, the
    party may be nonsuited or defaulted by the judicial
    authority.’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘[O]ur rules of practice
    do not require parties to be present for trial in civil
    cases, but permit them, rather, to appear through coun-
    sel . . . .’’ Housing Authority v. Weitz, 
    163 Conn. App. 778
    , 782–83, 
    134 A.3d 749
     (2016) (reversing court’s entry
    of default against defendant on basis of defendant’s
    failure to appear for trial when her counsel was pre-
    sent). In fact, in this case the court acknowledged that
    the defendant did not have to be present for the sched-
    uled trial because her counsel was present, stating that
    ‘‘she has no obligation to be here . . . .’’
    Despite Leary’s attempts to withdraw his appearance
    for the defendant prior to the scheduled trial date, the
    court did not grant any of his motions to withdraw. At
    the time of the court’s entry of a default against the
    defendant, therefore, Leary still represented her in this
    action. See Practice Book § 3-10 (e) (‘‘[t]he attorney’s
    appearance for the party shall be deemed to have been
    withdrawn upon the granting of the motion’’). Leary
    admitted as much at the beginning of the hearing held
    on June 14, 2017, the scheduled trial date, when he
    introduced himself and stated that he was present ‘‘on
    behalf of both defendants.’’ (Emphasis added.) Because
    the defendant’s counsel was present at that time, it was
    not proper for the court to enter a default against her
    on the basis of her failure to appear.4
    Turning to the second prong of plain error analysis,
    we conclude that the consequences of the error are so
    grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly
    unjust. The consequences of the error were grievous
    for the defendant, in that she was unable to challenge
    her liability for Edward Malley’s medical expenses. The
    court’s erroneous entry of a default against the defen-
    dant was the sole basis for the court’s rendering of a
    substantial judgment against her. Moreover, the entry
    of a default against the defendant implicated her due
    process rights, as she was thereby deprived of her
    opportunity to be heard on the merits of the case. See,
    e.g., Perugini v. Giuliano, 
    148 Conn. App. 861
    , 883–84,
    
    89 A.3d 358
     (2014) (‘‘A fundamental premise of due
    process is that a court cannot adjudicate any matter
    unless the parties have been given a reasonable oppor-
    tunity to be heard on the issues involved . . . . It is a
    fundamental tenet of due process of law . . . that per-
    sons whose . . . rights will be affected by a court’s
    decision are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time
    and in a meaningful manner.’’ [Internal quotation
    marks omitted.]).
    As part of plain error analysis, courts assess whether
    the error is likely to undermine public confidence in
    the judiciary. See, e.g., Schimenti v. Schimenti, 
    181 Conn. App. 385
    , 392, 
    168 A.3d 739
     (2018). In the present
    case, the unwarranted entry of a default and the render-
    ing of a default judgment against the defendant are
    likely to undermine public confidence in the judiciary
    because those actions deviated from established rules
    and procedures and denied the defendant’s due pro-
    cess rights.
    The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The trial court also rendered a judgment by stipulation against Edward
    Malley. Edward Malley is not a party in the present appeal. All references
    to the defendant, therefore, are to Tracy Malley.
    2
    The defendant also argues that even if the entry of default was proper,
    the trial court’s rendering of a default judgment immediately after the entry
    of default was improper. Because we conclude that it was plain error for
    the court to enter a default against the defendant, we need not address
    this claim.
    3
    General Statutes § 46b-37 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[I]t shall be the
    joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family, and both shall be
    liable for . . . [t]he reasonable and necessary services of a physician or
    dentist . . . .’’
    4
    It is worth noting that a party may also be defaulted for failure to plead
    according the rules and orders of the court; see General Statutes § 52-121,
    Practice Book §§ 10-18, 17-31, and 17-32; failure to comply with discovery
    requests; see Practice Book § 13-14; and failure to comply with a court
    order; see Practice Book § 17-19. There is nothing in the record to suggest
    the defendant acted in a manner that justified the entry of a default against
    her on any of these bases.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC40619

Citation Numbers: 206 A.3d 241, 189 Conn. App. 68

Judges: Alvord, Sheldon, Eveleigh

Filed Date: 4/2/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024