In re Corey C. ( 2020 )


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    beginning of this opinion is the date the opinion was
    released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
    beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion
    motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially
    released’’ date appearing in the opinion.
    This opinion is subject to revisions and editorial
    changes, not of a substantive nature, and corrections
    of a technical nature prior to publication in the
    Connecticut Law Journal.
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    IN RE COREY C., JR.*
    (AC 43478)
    Keller, Prescott and Pellegrino, Js.
    Syllabus
    The respondent father appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial
    court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child.
    The father claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that
    he failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, as
    required by statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)), that would encourage the
    belief that, within a reasonable time, he could assume a responsible
    position in the child’s life. He further claimed that the Department of
    Children and Families did not make reasonable efforts to reunify him
    with the child. The child previously had been adjudicated neglected,
    committed to the care and custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner
    of Children and Families, and, thereafter, placed with foster parents.
    During the neglect proceeding, the father was issued specific steps to
    take to bring about his reunification with the child. As part of its efforts
    to reunify the father with the child, the department referred the family
    to a therapeutic family time program to improve their parenting skills
    and ability to interact with each other and with the child. A worker
    with that program provided the parents with materials on the effects
    of thirdhand smoke and reviewed the materials with them in their weekly
    meetings in order to address the effects of the mother’s heavy smoking
    on the child’s asthmatic condition. The trial court found that the depart-
    ment had made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the father
    but that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts. Held:
    1. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that,
    under the totality of the facts and circumstances, the department made
    reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent father with the child and
    that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from its reunification efforts:
    a. The department offered the parents adequate feedback with respect
    to their participation in the therapeutic family time program, as a worker
    assigned to the respondent’s family provided feedback after each of
    nine weekly visits with the parents and the child and participated with
    a department social worker in two other meetings to review their prog-
    ress with regard to parenting skills, and, contrary to the father’s asser-
    tion, the parents were provided educational tools to help them stop
    smoking, which were reviewed with them, and were advised how their
    smoking adversely affected the child’s health, as it was explained to
    the father that the smell of smoke in clothes and hair could trigger the
    child’s asthma, the father was told that the child’s pediatrician had
    reported that thirdhand smoke from the parents’ visits with the child
    was impacting the child’s health, and the child’s pulmonologist deter-
    mined that thirdhand smoke from the parents’ clothes and belongings
    aggravated the child’s symptoms during a visit on the day that the parents
    told a therapeutic family time worker that they were quitting smoking;
    furthermore, the father admitted that he and the mother repeatedly were
    urged to stop smoking, the parents’ several representations that they
    were attempting to quit or had quit smoking undermined the father’s
    claim that the department should have recognized a need for further
    intervention, and, as there was no evidence that the father asked the
    department for smoking cessation services, his failure to request such
    services undermined his claim that those services were part of what
    the department should have provided as part of its reasonable efforts
    to reunify him with the child.
    b. This court did not need to reach the merits of the respondent father’s
    claim that the trial court improperly found that he was unable or unwill-
    ing to benefit from the department’s reasonable efforts to reunify him
    with the child, as the trial court’s finding that the department made
    reasonable efforts was sufficient to satisfy § 17a-112 (j).
    2. The respondent father could not prevail on his claim that the evidence
    was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that he failed to
    rehabilitate himself, which was based on his assertion that the court’s
    factual predicates for that conclusion were clearly erroneous: the court’s
    subordinate factual findings were supported by the evidence and the
    rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, as the father’s eight minute
    struggle to put the child in a car seat, which was observed by the
    psychologist who had evaluated him, and which is a basic parenting
    skill, raised concerns about and shed light on his ability to adequately
    care and provide for a child, the father was unable or unwilling to change
    the mother’s smoking habits, as he was aware that he and the mother
    did not adhere to instructions about the dangers smoking posed to the
    child but failed to disclose that lack of compliance, the father had a
    sporadic history with individual counseling, as he discontinued his ther-
    apy for a significant period of time, despite its having been a requirement
    of the specific steps he was issued, the court made no suggestion that
    the father suffered from past mental health diagnoses and substance
    abuse at the time of the trial, the father had no clear parenting plan for
    the child if reunification were to occur, despite having discussed day
    care for the child while he was at work, as there was no evidence as
    to which day care the child would attend or who would pay for it
    or provide transportation, and the mother, who worked as a live-in
    companion, provided no clear idea about what her employment would
    consist of, the parents had a history of difficulties together and failed
    to complete couples counseling, their Facebook pages contained allega-
    tions of infidelity and discussion of potential separation, and department
    workers witnessed several arguments between them, the evidence at
    trial that related to the mother and to the father’s involvement with and
    knowledge of her significant parenting issues was relevant to whether
    he had rehabilitated, as he demonstrated poor judgment and undermined
    any prospect of the child’s being reunified with him by failing to develop
    a plan to protect him from the mother’s deficient parenting, and the
    parents’ continued smoking or the father’s tolerance of the mother’s
    smoking created an unacceptably risky home environment for the child
    that was indicative of an inability to prioritize the child’s needs.
    3. The respondent father could not prevail on his claim that the trial court,
    in its adjudicatory findings, improperly compared his suitability as a
    parent, and that of the mother, to that of the foster parent; the court
    used the comparison between the foster parent and the father and the
    mother to highlight the child’s emotional and developmental needs, as
    the majority of the court’s comparison involved the mother, the court’s
    reference to the lack of warmth the child showed with the mother
    compared with that he showed with the foster parent was made on the
    basis of what the therapeutic family time professionals determined were
    the child’s specific needs, and the court’s comparison, when viewed as
    a whole, focused on the child’s needs and the inability of the father and
    mother to meet those needs.
    Argued March 2—officially released June 8, 2020**
    Procedural History
    Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
    lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
    respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
    Court in the judicial district of New London, Juvenile
    Matters at Waterford, and tried to the court, Driscoll,
    J.; thereafter, the court denied the respondent father’s
    motion to revoke the commitment of the minor child
    to the petitioner; judgment terminating the respondents’
    parental rights, from which the respondent father
    appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the
    appellant (respondent father).
    Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general, with
    whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
    eral, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general,
    for the appellee (petitioner).
    Opinion
    KELLER, J. The respondent, Corey C., appeals from
    the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental
    rights with respect to his biological minor son, Corey
    C., Jr., pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)
    (i).1 The respondent claims that the court improperly
    (1) concluded that the Department of Children and Fam-
    ilies (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify
    him with Corey and that he was unable or unwilling to
    benefit from the department’s reunification efforts, (2)
    concluded that he failed to achieve such a degree of
    personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
    that, within a reasonable time, considering Corey’s age
    and needs, the respondent could assume a responsible
    position in Corey’s life, and (3) compared his suitability
    as a parent, and that of Corey’s biological mother, to
    that of Corey’s foster parent during the adjudicatory
    phase of the termination proceeding. We affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    The record reveals the following relevant facts and
    procedural history. Corey was born on September 28,
    2017. On October 4, 2017, the petitioner, the Commis-
    sioner of Children and Families (commissioner), filed
    a neglect petition and obtained an ex parte order of
    temporary custody of Corey. In the neglect petition, the
    commissioner alleged predictive neglect, given the fact
    that the parents were married and living together, had
    an unstable relationship, mental health and substance
    abuse issues, and the mother had failed to care safely
    for her first two children. The order of temporary cus-
    tody was sustained by agreement. On March 6, 2018,
    the respondent and the mother submitted written pleas
    of nolo contendere, and Corey was adjudicated
    neglected and committed to the care and custody of
    the commissioner. Prior to and following Corey’s com-
    mitment, the department provided services to the
    respondent and the mother.
    Subsequently, a petition to terminate parental rights
    was brought against the respondent and the mother.
    On April 11 and May 2, 2019, a termination of parental
    rights trial was held before the trial court, Driscoll,
    J. The court granted the petition and terminated the
    parental rights of the respondent and the mother.2
    In its memorandum of decision, the court found the
    following adjudicative facts under the clear and con-
    vincing evidence standard of proof: ‘‘[Corey] was born
    on September 28, 2017, to the . . . mother and [the]
    respondent. [The] [m]other had two older children, both
    of whom were removed from [the] mother’s care.
    Guardianship of [the] mother’s firstborn was trans-
    ferred to [the] maternal grandmother, with whom [the]
    mother has a conflicted relationship. [The] [m]other’s
    parental rights [as to] her second son were terminated
    with [the] mother’s consent, and the child was adopted
    by a relative of [Corey’s] father. [The respondent] is
    not the biological father of the adopted child but was
    [the] mother’s boyfriend and emotional support
    throughout the termination and adoptive process. [The]
    [m]other lost both children due to concerns about her
    mental health, her parental shortcomings, and her his-
    tory of substance abuse.
    ‘‘[The] [m]other, by history, has mental health diagno-
    ses, including bipolar disorder with psychotic features,
    anxiety, depression, and obsessive compulsive disor-
    der. She was inconsistent in her mental health treatment
    and medication management. She also has a history of
    substance abuse, including opiates, heroin, marijuana,
    and K2 [synthetic marijuana]. She has a history of anger
    management issues and threatening behavior. The
    fiancé of the adoptive mother obtained a full, no contact
    protective order against [the] mother, which was in
    effect from February, 2016, until February, 2017.
    ‘‘[The respondent], by history, has mental health diag-
    noses, including bipolar disorder, sociopath, intermit-
    tent explosive disorder, and he has been hospitalized
    psychiatrically on four occasions. [The respondent] has
    a substance abuse history, including Percocet, mor-
    phine, and Klonopin abuse. He, too, has a conflicted
    relationship with his mother. He has a criminal history
    dating back to 2004, with his most recent conviction
    based on an October, 2014 arrest. He completed a five
    year term of probation in July, 2017. He self-reported
    significant health care issues.
    ‘‘Staff from the Lawrence + Memorial Hospital [in
    New London] notified the department that [the] mother
    had given birth to [Corey]. Due to the difficulties the
    parents had in their relationship, their own mental
    health issues, and their lack of parenting skills, an agree-
    ment was made that [the] parents and [Corey] would
    reside with relatives and be supervised at all times with
    [Corey].3 A considered removal meeting was held on
    October 3, 2017. On October 4, 2017, the petitioner filed
    a neglect petition and obtained an ex parte order of
    temporary custody . . . of [Corey] based on . . . pre-
    dictive neglect. [Corey] remained with the relatives.4
    The parents were served, appeared in court, were
    advised of their rights, and appointed counsel. The
    order of temporary custody was sustained by . . .
    agreement. An updated psychological evaluation was
    ordered to be done by [Nancy] Randall [a licensed psy-
    chologist]. [Randall] previously [had] done one of [the]
    mother and the [respondent], [and] then [the] mother’s
    boyfriend, in connection with the prior termination case
    for [the] mother’s second child.
    ‘‘[Randall’s] report was dated February 13, 2018. [Ran-
    dall] found [the] mother’s prior diagnosis of bipolar
    disorder with psychotic features to be appropriate, and
    that [the] mother’s panic disorder had improved and
    [that] there was no current evidence of obsessive com-
    pulsive disorder. [The respondent], due to greatly reduc-
    ing caffeine consumption, had eliminated signs of manic
    functioning, which may have led to a prior bipolar disor-
    der diagnosis. [Randall] felt [that] a more accurate diag-
    nosis was major depressive disorder, in remission. She
    felt [that] both parents were in need of continued indi-
    vidual therapy. [The] [m]other continued psychiatric
    care for medication management. Couples therapy was
    essential. Hands-on parenting was also necessary, with
    a focus for [the] mother on attachment. The parents
    demonstrated limited skills, particularly with the use
    of [Corey’s] car seat. They needed more training in
    understanding their child’s developmental and attach-
    ment needs.5 [Randall] indicated that if the parents were
    able to demonstrate consistent emotional control and
    appropriate judgment, they could move forward toward
    reunification. However, [Corey] could not be left in
    their care if they have incidents of emotional outbursts,
    domestic violence, or [of] becoming too overwhelmed
    to attend to his needs. She felt [that] the reunification
    process should be extended with close monitoring of
    their parenting.6
    ‘‘On March 6, 2018, [the] mother and [the respondent]
    submitted written pleas of nolo contendere, [and Corey]
    was adjudicated neglected and committed to the [care
    and custody of the commissioner] . . . until further
    court order. [Corey] has been in the [commissioner’s]
    care and custody since the October, 2017 order of tem-
    porary custody. The parents were issued specific steps7
    [pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129] to address
    their reunification needs.
    ‘‘[The] [m]other and [the respondent] have met sev-
    eral of their steps. They have maintained consistent
    housing in a one bedroom home. They have maintained
    stable employment, though their employment would
    make a parenting plan difficult. [The respondent] works
    long hours, some weeks up to seventy hours,8 and the
    mother works as a live-in companion in [a] client’s
    home. [The] [m]other stays [at the client’s home] from
    Thursday through Sunday and sleeps in the home. Her
    agency had begun the process of firing [the] mother
    in January, 2019, but reconsidered at the request of
    the client.
    ‘‘The parents indicated that the multiple days of sepa-
    ration every week reduced the likelihood of relationship
    discord. While the parents present as a committed cou-
    ple, they have had a history of difficulties. In 2015, [the]
    mother moved in with another man for approximately
    three months. [The] [m]other describes [the respon-
    dent] as very jealous of any interactions between [the]
    mother and other men. At an intake for Sound Commu-
    nity Services, in August, 2018, [the] mother said her
    long-term goal was . . . ‘becoming a healthier person,
    change myself from cheating to being the wife that
    my husband wants me to be.’ [The] [m]other and [the
    respondent] did not begin couples counseling until July,
    2018. There is no record of successful completion of
    couples counseling. The parents’ Facebook pages
    posted in August, 2018, contain allegations of infidelity
    and potential separation. Several arguments have been
    observed by the department.
    ‘‘[The] [m]other has been inconsistent in her individ-
    ual therapy. She began counseling with Sound Commu-
    nity Services and remained with [it] until February,
    2018, when she discontinued treatment. She resumed
    individual therapy in August, 2018. At the time of trial,
    her history of therapeutic engagement was inconsistent.
    She was doing outpatient therapy approximately one
    time a month, much less than required, and she advised
    [the department] that she did not know her therapist’s
    name. She did appear more emotionally stable, but the
    court has concerns about her insight into her treatment,
    particularly when [the] mother advises providers that
    if she does not reunify with her child, all of this therapy
    would have been a waste of time. This demonstrates a
    lack of insight into her own mental health needs. . . .
    ‘‘[The respondent] also has a history of sporadic com-
    pliance with individual counseling. [Stephanie] Gill-
    Manville was [the respondent’s] clinician [at Sound
    Community Services] from 2013 until [2017]. She, like
    Randall, saw no need for medication for [the respon-
    dent]. [The respondent], without advice, discontinued
    individual therapy in February, 2018, and did not resume
    until October, 2018. He had not been successfully dis-
    charged or released from the reunification step. Since
    October or November, 2018, [the respondent] has
    resumed counseling at Sound Community Services.
    [Peggy Ann Nelson], [the respondent’s] individual thera-
    pist, has included [the] mother in some sessions. [Nel-
    son] said [the respondent] has been candid about diffi-
    culties in their relationship but believes that [the]
    mother and [the respondent] were strongly attached
    and united as a couple. She was unable to opine on
    [the respondent’s] parenting, as she has never seen him
    with [Corey], but she knows he wishes to be an active
    parent. He has not been discharged. It does not appear
    that [the respondent] has sufficient insight into the neg-
    ative effect [that the] mother’s mental health has on
    her parenting, despite [the respondent’s] substantial
    period of individual counseling.
    ‘‘Most important in determining rehabilitation are
    issues relative to parenting and visitation. The parents
    indicated that they had a strong desire to parent [Corey]
    during the critical period of [his] infancy. The depart-
    ment on four separate occasions in November, 2017,
    and December, 2017, offered to the parents an addi-
    tional supervised weekly visit. The parents declined.
    Even more telling, with respect to the parents’ interest
    in [Corey], was the fact that [Corey] was in the relative
    foster home, [which] had adopted [the] mother’s second
    child, and was related to [the respondent]. [The]
    [m]other and [the respondent] were given the opportu-
    nity to call the home to check on [Corey] but failed to
    do so.
    ‘‘The department referred the parents to Kids [Advo-
    cates, LLC], a supervised visitation and parenting educa-
    tion program. The provider reported that the parents
    were essentially passive and that [the] mother, in partic-
    ular, did not make eye contact or interact with [Corey].
    [The] [m]other needed frequent redirection and instruc-
    tions to meet [Corey’s] basic needs and often disre-
    garded the suggestions. [The] [m]other had trouble
    soothing [Corey] when [he was] fussy and often passed
    him to [the respondent]. Limited progress was made
    by the parents. In March, 2018, the department referred
    the family to the Child & Family Agency [of Southeast-
    ern Connecticut, Inc.] for its therapeutic family time
    (TFT) program.9 [Elizabeth Keniston, the TFT commu-
    nity worker assigned to work with the family] noted
    limited to moderate progress.10 It took a long time to
    teach [the] mother not to let [Corey] pick things up off
    the ground and put them in his mouth, with [the] mother
    often attempting to justify the cleanliness of the item.
    [The] [m]other reported her difficulty in soothing a
    fussy baby and expressed a concern that her [post-
    traumatic stress disorder] would kick in11 and put
    [Corey] at risk. [The respondent] expressed a concern
    that all this work would be a waste of time if they didn’t
    get [Corey] back. [Keniston] noted a lack of affect by
    [Corey] in the parents’ company, especially with [the]
    mother. She contrasted this with the warmth and attach-
    ment observed between [Corey] and [the] foster parent.
    At times, [Keniston] had difficulty redirecting [the]
    mother’s attention from [the] mother’s cell phone to
    [Corey]. [The] [m]other complained of having to carry
    [Corey] in the car seat, as it was too heavy for her. [The]
    [m]other asked the worker to carry the baby instead.
    On one visit to the beach, while [Corey] was sitting
    with [the] mother, [he] fell face forward into the sand,
    and it required [the respondent] to tell [the] mother to
    pick up [Corey]. At another outdoor visit, on a cloudy
    day, [Corey] became sunburned, much to the embar-
    rassing chagrin of [Keniston]. [Keniston] noted, how-
    ever, that neither parent assumed any shared responsi-
    bility for the failure to protect [Corey] and apply
    sunscreen. The parents were unable to provide a clear
    plan for [Corey] if reunification occurred. [The respon-
    dent] indicated that [the] mother would never be left
    home unsupervised with [Corey] but did not have a
    reasonable plan for who would supervise [him] while
    he was working up to seventy hours per week. He also
    indicated that the proposal was being done to satisfy the
    department, as he had no concern [about the] mother[’s]
    being alone with [Corey] despite [the] mother’s demon-
    strated, limited parenting skills. [The] [m]other did com-
    plete a brief parenting program with Catholic Charities
    but the court finds no evidence that it was effective.
    ‘‘TFT recommended against reunification and closed
    its file.12 At the conclusion of [the] assessment, [it] deter-
    mined not to proceed further. The major example of
    parenting deficits, which was of great concern to the
    program, and of great concern to the court, was the
    parents’ wholly inadequate response to [Corey’s] medi-
    cal needs. [Corey] has a serious asthmatic condition.
    He is being treated by Nutmeg Pediatric Pulmonary
    Services [in Branford]. The parents have been advised
    that it is particularly important for [Corey] to be in
    a smoke-free atmosphere, which includes eliminating
    secondhand13 smoke exposure transferred from cloth-
    ing or upholstery. He has difficulty breathing, increased
    coughing, and heightened fussiness after visiting with
    his parents. They have been repeatedly urged to stop
    smoking or, if not, to shower and change into clean
    clothes, [to] not [drive] in a car in which they’ve been
    smoking, and to walk to visits for further airing, if neces-
    sary. Despite frequent admonitions, [Corey’s] physical
    reaction to visits indicates ongoing exposure to second-
    hand smoke.14 [The] [m]other insisted that she quit
    smoking as of January, 2019. [Gail Hooper, the depart-
    ment social] worker, credibly testified that she saw
    numerous cigarette butts outside the private entry to
    the parents’ home and smelled . . . stale smoke in the
    home. [Although the] mother testified that she had
    stopped smoking, in her own exhibit G, a clinical sum-
    mary from Sound Community Services of an encounter
    with [the] mother on April 8, 2019, [the] mother dis-
    closed that she was a heavy tobacco smoker from Janu-
    ary 3, 2017, to the present . . . . [The respondent] is
    unable or unwilling to change [the] mother’s smoking
    habits and make the environment safe for [Corey]. This,
    to the court, is the most definitive example of the par-
    ents’ lack of insight into [Corey’s] needs.
    ‘‘Finally, the court can, and does, give added weight
    to the opinions of Randall, who was recognized as an
    expert. In 2018, Randall found both parents to be more
    emotionally stable than when she saw them in 2014,
    but she did not feel [that] either parent was invested
    in the extra work it takes to create an attachment. She
    opined at trial that the parents had not rehabilitated
    and that [Corey] would be at emotional risk if [he were]
    returned to them and at medical risk as well. She testi-
    fied that the TFT program was exactly the kind of pro-
    gram [that the] mother needed. As noted, that program
    recommended against reunification. Randall persua-
    sively testified that the parents are each other’s primary
    supports, and, given their troubled relationship, there
    is increased risk of conflict and fighting. If [the] mother
    were to lose [the respondent’s] support, she could
    become disregulated emotionally, with a potential for
    risk to any child in her care. She said the prognosis for
    reunification was not good and [that] it would not be in
    [Corey’s] best interest to deny him a stable, permanent
    home. Thus, she opined that termination of parental
    rights would be in [Corey’s] best interest. The parents
    love their son and they wish to care for him, but they
    do not demonstrate the essential insight and parental
    skills. Neither parent demonstrates a desire or ability
    to be a single parent. The issue is not whether the
    parents have improved their ability to manage their own
    lives but whether they can manage their son’s needs.
    Willingness does not equate to ability.
    ‘‘The court finds by clear and convincing evidence
    that the department has proven its adjudicatory allega-
    tions, to wit, that it made reasonable efforts to reunify
    [Corey] with [the] mother and [the respondent], that
    [the] mother and [the respondent] are unable or unwill-
    ing to benefit from those efforts, that [Corey] was adju-
    dicated neglected in a prior proceeding and that [the]
    mother and [the respondent] have each failed to achieve
    the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encour-
    age the belief that within a reasonable time, considering
    their child’s age and needs, that either parent could
    assume a responsible position in [Corey’s] life.’’
    (Emphasis omitted; footnotes added.)
    The court set forth findings with respect to the seven
    criteria set forth in § 17a-112 (k).15 With respect to the
    first criterion, the court found: ‘‘The parents were
    offered timely services, including supervised visitation,
    parenting education, psychological evaluation, individ-
    ual and couples counseling, and the TFT program and
    assessment.’’ With respect to the second criterion, the
    court found: ‘‘[The department] made reasonable
    efforts. The parents expressed concerns that the depart-
    ment did not engage in greater feedback from the
    department with respect to the reports of the providers.
    While this might be an optimum strategy, the issue is
    not whether the department made all possible efforts,
    but whether [it] made reasonable efforts. The referrals
    made, especially to TFT, clearly were reasonable.’’ With
    respect to the third criterion, the court found: ‘‘Reunifi-
    cation steps were set by the court on October 4, 2017,
    and March 6, 2018.16 The parents’ attempts and failures
    to comply are noted herein [previously].’’ (Footnote
    added.) With respect to the fourth criterion, the court
    found: ‘‘The parents love their son and wish to reunify.
    They were unable or unwilling to put in the effort at
    attachment. [The] [m]other, in particular, was not
    invested sufficiently. [Corey’s] affect around them was
    flat or fussy and outside his normal behavior. He was
    exposed to physical discomfort when with his parents
    due to secondhand smoke exposure, aggravating his
    asthma. [Corey] is fully bonded to his foster parents,
    with whom he has been placed since March, 2018.’’ With
    respect to the fifth criterion, the court found: ‘‘[Corey]
    is almost two years old, born September 28, 2017.’’ With
    respect to the sixth criterion, the court found: ‘‘The
    parents have maintained reasonable contact with
    [Corey] and the department. The parents have improved
    their personal circumstances favorably, but there is no
    reasonable prospect that they will be able to meet [Cor-
    ey’s] particular needs.’’ With respect to the seventh cri-
    terion, the court found: ‘‘No such prevention was
    shown.’’
    The court then made the following dispositional find-
    ings. ‘‘[Corey] has serious allergy and pulmonary needs.
    The parents are unable or unwilling to take the neces-
    sary measures to meet them. Further, the parents have
    shown limited progress in addressing those needs com-
    mon to all children, specifically, attachment, and the
    child’s interest in sustained growth, development, well-
    being, and continuity and stability of his environment.
    [Corey] is in a placement that can meet his needs and
    wishes to adopt. [Corey’s] attorney advocates for termi-
    nation so [he] can be adopted. As noted, there is a
    distinction between parental love and parental compe-
    tence. The [petitioner] has proven by clear and convinc-
    ing evidence that termination of parental rights is in
    [Corey’s] best interests.
    ‘‘Wherefore, after due consideration of [Corey’s] need
    for a secure, permanent placement, and the totality of
    the circumstances, and having considered all statutory
    criteria, and having found by clear and convincing evi-
    dence that grounds exist to terminate [the] mother[’s]
    and [the respondent’s] parental rights as alleged, and
    that it is in [Corey’s] best interests to do so, and having
    denied [the respondent’s] motion to revoke commit-
    ment, the court orders:
    ‘‘That the parental rights of the . . . mother . . .
    and the respondent father . . . are hereby terminated
    . . . .’’ This appeal followed.
    I
    We first address the respondent’s claim that the court
    improperly concluded that the department made rea-
    sonable efforts to reunify him with Corey and that he
    was unable or unwilling to benefit from the depart-
    ment’s reunification efforts.
    Section ‘‘17a-112 (j) (1) requires that before terminat-
    ing parental rights, the court must find by clear and
    convincing evidence that the department has made rea-
    sonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the
    child with the parent, unless the court finds in this
    proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to
    benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding
    is not required if the court has determined at a hearing
    . . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . . . Thus,
    the department may meet its burden concerning reunifi-
    cation in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made
    such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable
    or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3)
    by a previous judicial determination that such efforts
    were not appropriate. . . . The trial court’s determina-
    tion of this issue will not be overturned on appeal
    unless, in light of all of the evidence in the record, it
    is clearly erroneous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) In re Jonathan C., 
    86 Conn. App. 169
    , 172–73, 
    860 A.2d 305
    (2004).
    Our Supreme Court ‘‘clarified the applicable standard
    of review of an appeal from a judgment of the trial
    court pursuant to § 17a-112 (j). See In re Shane M., 
    318 Conn. 569
    , 587, 
    122 A.3d 1247
    (2015); see also In re
    Gabriella A., 
    319 Conn. 775
    , 789–90, 
    127 A.3d 948
    (2015).
    In those cases, the court clarified that ‘[w]e review the
    trial court’s subordinate factual findings for clear error.
    . . . We review the trial court’s ultimate determination
    that a parent has failed to achieve sufficient rehabilita-
    tion [or that a parent is unable to benefit from reunifica-
    tion services] for evidentiary sufficiency . . . .’ In re
    Gabriella 
    A., supra
    , 789. We conclude that it is appro-
    priate to apply the same standard of review of a trial
    court’s decision with respect to whether the department
    made reasonable efforts at reunification. See id.; see
    also In re Jorden R., 
    293 Conn. 539
    , 558–59, 
    979 A.2d 469
    (2009). Accordingly, we conclude that we must
    review the trial court’s decision in the present case with
    respect to whether the department made reasonable
    efforts at reunification for evidentiary sufficiency.’’ In
    re Oreoluwa O., 
    321 Conn. 523
    , 533, 
    139 A.3d 674
    (2016).
    ‘‘[Section 17a-112] imposes on the department the
    duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite
    the child or children with the parents. The word reason-
    able is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts
    in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged,
    using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Nei-
    ther the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, how-
    ever, defined by our legislature or by the federal act
    from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]eason-
    able efforts means doing everything reasonable, not
    everything possible. . . . The trial court’s determina-
    tion of this issue will not be overturned on appeal
    unless, in light of all of the evidence in the record, it
    is clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) In re G.S., 
    117 Conn. App. 710
    , 716, 
    980 A.2d 935
    ,
    cert. denied, 
    294 Conn. 919
    , 
    984 A.2d 67
    (2009).
    A
    The respondent’s claim that the court improperly
    found that the department made reasonable efforts to
    reunify him with Corey is premised on two arguments.
    First, the respondent argues that the department failed
    to offer any feedback to him and the mother in the TFT
    program, and, second, he argues that the department
    failed to offer any smoking cessation services to either
    of the parents. We disagree that the court improperly
    found that the department failed to make reasonable
    efforts to assist them in quitting smoking.
    The record contains sufficient evidence on which to
    affirm the court’s finding that the department made
    reasonable efforts at reunification with respect to the
    specific factual findings of which the respondent com-
    plains. First, we conclude that the department offered
    both the respondent and the mother adequate feedback
    with respect to their participation and progress in the
    TFT program. Keniston, the TFT community worker
    assigned to supervise and instruct the respondent, the
    mother, and Corey, completed nine TFT visits with the
    parents and Corey and typically also met with the par-
    ents alone each week. At trial, Keniston testified that
    she provided the parents with feedback at each weekly
    visit. A series of detailed reports are in evidence that
    provide considerable detail as to discussions between
    Keniston and the parents. In addition to the weekly
    feedback provided to the parents after visits with Corey,
    the parents also participated in two provider meetings,
    in which Keniston and Hooper reviewed the parents’
    overall progress in the TFT program with respect to
    their parenting skills. Further, Hooper testified that, as
    part of the TFT program, the TFT workers ‘‘actually
    discuss [feedback] with the parents because goals are
    made at the beginning of the service with the parents.
    And then at each session they talk about how they did
    with those goals that were developed with the parents.’’
    We conclude that this evidence demonstrates that the
    respondent and the mother received adequate feedback
    at both provider meetings and weekly meetings with
    Keniston. Accordingly, we disagree with the respon-
    dent’s argument that the department did not make rea-
    sonable efforts to reunify because it failed to offer any
    feedback to him or the mother with respect to their
    progress in the TFT program.
    Second, we also disagree with the respondent’s argu-
    ment that the department did not make reasonable
    efforts to reunify because it failed to offer smoking
    cessation treatment to the respondent and the mother.17
    As aforementioned, the parents’ smoking habits were
    of particular concern to the court, which found, on the
    basis of the evidence before it, that Corey suffers from
    asthma, bronchitis, and gastroesophageal reflux dis-
    ease. There was evidence in a TFT meeting summary
    dated May 11, 2018, of the foster father reporting to the
    attendants at the meeting, which included the respon-
    dent, that following Corey’s weekly TFT visits with the
    respondent and the mother, Corey’s asthma symptoms
    were aggravated and the foster parents had to adminis-
    ter breathing treatments. The meeting’s administrative
    case review facilitator, Cassandra Bunkley, explained
    to the respondent that the lingering smell of smoke in
    clothes and hair can trigger an infant’s asthma. It was
    decided that the parents would not smoke three hours
    prior to the visits and would change their clothes. The
    mother, however, was not present at this meeting. On
    June 11, 2018, Keniston told the parents that Corey’s
    pediatrician had reported to the foster parents that
    thirdhand smoke from visits was impacting Corey’s
    health. She provided them with materials on the effects
    of thirdhand smoke. The mother stated that the reason
    that she and the respondent smoke so much is because
    of the department and the stress that they are going
    through. It was determined that the parents would not
    bring any outside items to the visits, such as clothes
    and toys. Keniston noted that the parents expressed no
    understanding of the reasons for the smoking guidelines
    for visits. On June 18, 2018, the respondent and the
    mother informed Keniston that they were quitting smok-
    ing. There also was evidence that, although the respon-
    dent and the mother did not smoke during their super-
    vised visits with Corey, Corey’s pulmonologist, Regina
    M. Palazzo, after treating Corey for asthma related
    symptoms on October 1, 2018, determined that, during
    a visit that day, thirdhand smoke from the parents’
    clothes and belongings was the cause of Corey’s expo-
    sure and aggravated symptoms. In her report discharg-
    ing the parents from the TFT program, Keniston noted
    that the parents were ‘‘unable to take responsibility for
    the effect smoking has on [Corey] and instead shifted
    [blame to the department].’’
    The respondent argues that the department did not
    provide him or the mother with adequate smoking ces-
    sation services, and, therefore, the department did not
    make reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with
    Corey.18 We disagree with the respondent for several
    reasons. First, in his brief, the respondent concedes
    that he and the mother were ‘‘repeatedly urged to stop
    smoking . . . .’’ Additionally, the evidence reflected
    that the respondent and the mother participated in
    weekly TFT meetings with Keniston. As part of these
    meetings, Keniston provided the respondent and the
    mother with printed material on the effects of thirdhand
    smoke and reviewed the materials with the parents.
    Further, the evidence reflected that the respondent and
    the mother were made aware of the medical issues that
    exposure to smoke particles during their visits could
    cause Corey. Specifically, Keniston advised the respon-
    dent and the mother that Corey’s pediatrician had
    reported to the foster parents that thirdhand smoke
    from the biological parents’ visits was impacting Cor-
    ey’s health. The court found that, despite these attempts
    to change the parents’ smoking habits, the parents
    ‘‘demonstrated little concern and understanding of
    [Corey’s] medical needs in regard to the impact
    [thirdhand] smoke has on [Corey] . . . and instead
    shifted blame to [the department].’’
    Further, the parents represented, in several
    instances, that they were attempting to quit smoking,
    or that they had quit smoking, further undermining the
    respondent’s claim that the department should have
    recognized a need for its further intervention. For exam-
    ple, after Keniston advised the parents of the effects
    of smoking on Corey’s health, the respondent and the
    mother stated that they were going to quit smoking.
    Specifically, the respondent stated that he scheduled
    an appointment with his primary care doctor to discuss
    quitting options. However, despite these assertions, the
    mother represented to Sound Community Services on
    April 8, 2019, that she was a heavy tobacco smoker
    from January 3, 2017, to the present. Further, there was
    evidence that, when Hooper visited the respondent’s
    and the mother’s residence in January, 2019, she noticed
    cigarette butts outside the home and smelled stale
    smoke in the home. As this court previously has held,
    reasonable efforts by the department include doing
    everything ‘‘reasonable,’’ not everything ‘‘possible.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re 
    G.S., supra
    ,
    
    117 Conn. App. 716
    . Here, the evidence reflects that the
    parents were provided with educational tools to stop
    smoking, and, more importantly, they were advised how
    their smoking adversely affected Corey’s health.
    To the extent that the respondent claims that the
    department failed to provide him or the mother with
    any specialized smoking cessation services such as cog-
    nitive behavioral therapy, nicotine replacement ther-
    apy, motivational interviewing or antidepressants, he
    never made this claim at trial. Further, there was no
    evidence before the court that the respondent, who
    signed and agreed with the specific steps, asked the
    department at any time for any of the smoking cessation
    services, which, he contends for the first time, on
    appeal, should have been provided to him. If the respon-
    dent believed that the department was not doing
    enough, he could have moved the court for an order
    directing the department to provide him with smoking
    cessation services. The respondent’s failure to request
    such services undermines his present argument that
    those services were part of what the department should
    have provided as part of its reasonable efforts to reunify
    him with Corey.19 ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law
    and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate]
    court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at
    trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumberg
    Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Con-
    necticut, Inc., 
    311 Conn. 123
    , 142, 
    84 A.3d 840
    (2014).
    This principle was applied in the context of a reasonable
    efforts claim in In re Elijah C., 
    326 Conn. 480
    , 503–504,
    
    165 A.3d 1149
    (2017). In that case, the respondent
    mother claimed for the first time, on appeal, that the
    department should have secured an out-of-state
    assisted living facility for her because none was avail-
    able in this state.
    Id. In rejecting
    this claim, our Supreme
    Court explained that ‘‘the proper place for the respon-
    dent to have raised her claim concerning an out-of-state
    placement was in the trial court, where the issue could
    have been litigated and a factual record developed as
    to whether reasonable reunification efforts required the
    department to search for an out-of-state placement.’’
    Id. ‘‘[O]ur courts
    are instructed to look to the totality of
    the facts and circumstances presented in each individ-
    ual case’’ in deciding whether reasonable efforts have
    been made. In re Unique R., 
    170 Conn. App. 833
    , 856,
    
    156 A.3d 1
    (2017). In this case, the department tailored
    its reunification efforts to help the respondent over-
    come the specific impediments to reunification identi-
    fied by Randall in her updated psychological evaluation
    in 2018. The department monitored the respondent’s
    engagement with his existing therapist, identified a cou-
    ples counselor for the respondent and the mother, and
    referred them to three separate parenting education
    services, including the TFT program, the most intensive
    parenting education service available. The department
    offered to provide the parents with an additional super-
    vised visit every week but they declined. The respon-
    dent ignores the totality of the services in which he
    engaged and narrowly focuses on only two aspects, the
    lack of feedback from TFT and the lack of an offer of
    smoking cessation services. We conclude that the court
    properly considered the totality of the facts and circum-
    stances and correctly determined that the department
    made reasonable efforts to reunify Corey with the
    respondent.
    B
    Next, the respondent argues that the court improp-
    erly found that he was unable or unwilling to benefit
    from the department’s reasonable efforts to reunify him
    with Corey.
    As our discussion of the court’s decision reflects, in
    its analysis under § 17a-112 (j) (1), the court found that
    the department made reasonable reunification efforts.
    Alternatively, the court found that the respondent was
    unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
    ‘‘[T]he [petitioner] must prove [by clear and convincing
    evidence] either that [the department] has made reason-
    able efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent
    is unwilling or unable to benefit from the reunification
    efforts. Section 17a-112 (j) clearly provides that the
    [petitioner] is not required to prove both circumstances.
    Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statu-
    tory element.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) In re Anvahnay S., 
    128 Conn. App. 186
    , 191, 
    16 A.3d 1244
    (2011).
    As previously stated, we conclude that the court prop-
    erly found that the department made reasonable efforts
    to reunify the respondent with Corey. Because, as we
    have explained, this finding is sufficient to satisfy § 17a-
    112 (j), we need not reach the merits of the respondent’s
    argument that the court improperly found that the
    respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
    those reunification efforts.
    II
    The respondent next claims that the court improperly
    concluded that the respondent failed to achieve such
    a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage
    the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering
    Corey’s age and needs, the respondent could assume a
    responsible position in Corey’s life. We disagree.
    Section 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) requires the court to find
    by clear and convincing evidence ‘‘that . . . the child
    (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have
    been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding
    . . . and the parent of such child has been provided
    specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child
    to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed
    to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as
    would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
    time, considering the age and needs of the child, such
    parent could assume a responsible position in the life
    of the child . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    In re Shane 
    M., supra
    , 
    318 Conn. 572
    n.1.
    Our Supreme Court has clarified that ‘‘[a] conclusion
    of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial
    court’s factual findings and from its weighing of the
    facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the
    failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-112 (j)
    (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate standard of
    review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether
    the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon
    the facts established and the reasonable inferences
    drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evi-
    dence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].
    . . . When applying this standard, we construe the evi-
    dence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the
    judgment of the trial court.’’ (Emphasis omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id., 587–88. We
    will not
    disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings unless
    they are clearly erroneous. See
    id., 587. ‘‘Personal
    rehabilitation as used in the statute refers
    to the restoration of a parent to his or her former con-
    structive and useful role as a parent. . . . [Section 17a-
    112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent’s]
    rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the
    particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation
    must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. . . .
    [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation
    [that the parent has] achieved, if any, falls short of that
    which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some
    future date [he] can assume a responsible position in
    [his] child’s life. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the
    critical issue is not whether the parent has improved
    [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether
    [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular
    needs of the child at issue. . . . As part of the analysis,
    the trial court must obtain a historical perspective of
    the respondent’s child caring and parenting abilities,
    which includes prior adjudications of neglect, sub-
    stance abuse and criminal activity.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) In re Christopher L., 
    135 Conn. App. 232
    , 245, 
    41 A.3d 664
    (2012).
    Here, the respondent claims that ‘‘virtually all of the
    factual predicates that the trial court relied upon to
    support its legal conclusion are clearly erroneous,’’ and,
    therefore, that ‘‘there is insufficient evidence to support
    the trial court’s conclusion that the [respondent] failed
    to rehabilitate . . . .’’ Specifically, the respondent high-
    lights eight factual findings, each of which we will
    address in turn. We conclude that the court’s subordi-
    nate factual findings are supported by the evidence and
    the rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, and,
    thus, the respondent has failed to demonstrate that
    there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s
    determination that he failed to rehabilitate.
    First, the respondent challenges as clearly erroneous
    the court’s finding that ‘‘the parents demonstrated lim-
    ited skills, particularly with the use of [Corey’s] car
    seat.’’ The respondent argues that this finding ‘‘does
    not support the trial court’s conclusion that [he] failed
    to rehabilitate because it does not tend to show that
    [he] will not be able to assume a responsible position
    in [Corey’s] life at some future point.’’ In support of his
    argument, the respondent cites to studies highlighting
    the high frequency with which parents misuse child car
    seats.20 We disagree with the respondent and conclude
    that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
    At trial, Randall testified that she observed the
    respondent and the mother struggle for about eight
    minutes trying to put Corey in a car seat. She further
    testified that the respondent sought the aid of one of
    the foster mothers to resolve the issue. Randall testified
    that the parents’ difficulty with the car seat raised more
    general concerns about the parents’ ‘‘ability just to do
    basic kinds of childcare needs because that is a very
    basic need.’’ The evidence thus reflected that a parent’s
    ability to utilize a car seat is a basic parenting skill that,
    when viewed in light of the parents’ other parenting
    skills, sheds light on whether they possess the ability
    to adequately care for a child. Therefore, we disagree
    with the respondent’s argument that his difficulty with
    the car seat does not relate more generally to his ability
    to responsibly provide for Corey. Accordingly, we con-
    clude that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous
    because it was adequately supported by evidence pre-
    sented at trial and the reasonable inferences drawn
    therefrom.
    Second, the respondent challenges as clearly errone-
    ous the court’s finding that he was unable or unwilling
    to change the mother’s smoking habits. Specifically, the
    respondent claims that it is ‘‘fundamentally unfair’’ to
    hold him responsible for the mother’s actions, and he
    also argues that a parent’s failure to stop smoking
    should not be a reason to terminate their parental rights.
    We conclude that the court’s finding was not clearly
    erroneous because the evidence presented at trial sup-
    ported the fact that the mother smoked cigarettes from
    the beginning of the case until the beginning of trial in
    April, 2019. Further, the respondent was aware of the
    dangers that smoking posed to Corey due to his unique
    medical conditions, including asthma, reflux disease,
    and bronchitis. Indeed, through the respondent’s own
    efforts to quit smoking, he demonstrated that he recog-
    nized the adverse effects smoking had on Corey’s
    health. Moreover, even though the parents were given
    specific instructions as to how to avoid exposing Corey
    to thirdhand smoke during their visits at TFT in early
    2018, Corey’s adverse reactions after their visits per-
    sisted well into 2019. If the respondent, who accompa-
    nied the mother to the visits, was aware that he or the
    mother, or both of them, were not adhering to these
    instructions in order to avoid further harm to Corey,
    he exercised poor judgment in failing to disclose that
    lack of compliance to the person supervising the visits.
    Therefore, it was reasonable for the court to consider
    the respondent’s efforts to protect Corey from both his
    and the mother’s smoking with respect to whether the
    respondent failed to rehabilitate. The respondent and
    the mother were married and living together, and, there-
    fore, the mother’s smoking would affect whether the
    respondent could provide Corey with a safe home envi-
    ronment.
    Third, the respondent challenges as clearly erroneous
    the court’s finding that he has a sporadic history with
    individual counseling. We disagree with the respondent
    and conclude that evidence was presented at trial that
    clearly supports the court’s finding. Specifically, at trial,
    Hooper testified that the respondent, despite the fact
    that engaging in individual counseling was one of his
    required specific steps, discontinued his therapy from
    February until October, 2018. This significant gap in
    treatment is sufficient to support the court’s finding
    that the respondent’s history with individual counseling
    was sporadic. The respondent argues that from July
    through October, 2018, he did not need to partake in
    individual counseling because he was engaged in cou-
    ples counseling with the mother, although the court
    found that there was no record of the parents’ success-
    ful completion of counseling. Given the number of
    months in which the respondent was not engaged in
    the requisite individual counseling, a time period during
    which his compliance with specific steps was crucial,
    the court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.
    Fourth, the respondent challenges as clearly errone-
    ous the court’s finding that he, ‘‘by history, has mental
    health diagnoses,’’ as well as a history of substance
    abuse. The respondent does not dispute that he has
    a history of both mental health diagnoses as well as
    substance abuse issues. He also does not dispute that
    adequate evidence was presented at trial to support
    these histories. Rather, the respondent argues that, by
    referencing these histories, the court suggested that
    the respondent still suffered from past mental health
    diagnoses or substance abuse issues at the time of trial.
    Simply put, the court made no such suggestion, and we
    therefore reject the respondent’s claim with regard to
    this finding, as it is not based on the facts found.21
    Fifth, the respondent challenges as clearly erroneous
    the court’s finding that he did not have a clear plan for
    Corey if reunification were to occur. In particular, the
    court stated that the parents’ ‘‘employment would make
    a parenting plan difficult’’ and that ‘‘[the respondent]
    indicated that [the] mother would never be left home
    unsupervised with [Corey] but did not have a reasonable
    plan for who would supervise [him] while he was work-
    ing up to [seventy] hours per week.’’ The respondent
    argues that the evidence presented at trial did not sup-
    port the court’s finding because Hooper testified that
    the respondent had ‘‘talked about possibly having
    [Corey] go into day care while [the respondent is
    working].’’
    At trial, however, no evidence was presented as to
    which day care Corey would attend, who would provide
    the transportation, or who would pay for the childcare.
    Further, the mother testified that, due to her employ-
    ment as a live-in companion, she lived at a client’s home
    from Thursdays through Sundays. Although the mother
    mentioned the possibility of alternate employment or
    an alternate shift, she did not provide any clear idea of
    what her employment would consist of were Corey to
    return home. The parents did not provide a concrete
    plan that would account for the respondent working
    seventy hours per week, including Saturdays and Sun-
    days, and the mother being absent four out of seven
    days of the week. Keniston also expressed concern
    regarding the parents’ incomplete care plan for Corey.
    Specifically, in a TFT appointment summary, she ques-
    tioned ‘‘how realistic the [parents’] plan was and if it
    was beneficial for [Corey] . . . to return home to a
    household where he can’t be alone with his mother.’’
    Further, Randall stated: ‘‘I do not believe . . . that [the
    respondent] would become the only caregiver and that
    [the mother] would not have a significant role in that.
    That goes against really what their relationship is. [The
    respondent] kind of has a tendency to . . . give in to
    [the mother] and to give her what she wants, and I
    believe that if she wanted to take primary care of
    [Corey], that [the respondent] would be pretty likely to
    allow that.’’ On the basis of the evidence presented at
    trial and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn
    from the evidence, we conclude that the court’s finding
    that the respondent did not have an acceptable parent-
    ing plan for Corey was not clearly erroneous.
    Sixth, the respondent challenges as clearly erroneous
    the court’s finding that he and the mother had a ‘‘history
    of difficulties’’ as a couple. We disagree with the respon-
    dent because sufficient evidence was presented at trial
    to support this finding, and, thus, it is not clearly errone-
    ous. The court found that the respondent and the
    mother indicated that the multiple days of separation
    that resulted from their weekly work schedules reduced
    the likelihood of relationship discord and that the par-
    ents’ Facebook pages in August, 2018, contained allega-
    tions of infidelity and a discussion of potential separa-
    tion. Several arguments between the parents had been
    observed by department workers. For example, Randall
    testified that the mother had a history of infidelity while
    she and the respondent were together and that the
    respondent had a history of domestic violence against
    the mother. Hooper also testified that the biological
    parents ‘‘have struggled with being able to resolve con-
    flicts in a positive way’’ and that ‘‘[the respondent]
    reported that he had one time become angry and choked
    [the mother].’’ Randall also testified that the respondent
    and the mother ‘‘tend to get aggravated with each other’’
    and that ‘‘the relationship issues between the two of
    them were a concern’’ for her. She went on to state
    that the respondent is a ‘‘very dependent individual,’’
    that the respondent and the mother ‘‘are very dependent
    on each other’’ and that she has ‘‘continuing concerns
    about the strength of their relationship.’’ On the basis
    of the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable
    inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we conclude
    that the court’s finding that the respondent and the
    mother had a history of difficulties was not clearly
    erroneous.
    Seventh, the respondent challenges as clearly errone-
    ous the court’s findings that relate solely to the mother
    because the respondent argues that they ‘‘simply do not
    apply to the issue of whether [he] failed to rehabilitate.’’
    We disagree. This court has previously held that, despite
    the department’s failure to put in concrete terms any
    requirement that the father change his relationship with
    the mother, the negative relationship between the par-
    ents posed a significant barrier to the father’s rehabilita-
    tion as a parent because he failed fully to appreciate
    the risk that the mother, who suffered from numerous
    impairments that interfered with her parenting, could
    pose to their young child. See In re Albert M., 124 Conn.
    App. 561, 565, 
    6 A.3d 815
    , cert. denied, 
    299 Conn. 920
    ,
    
    10 A.3d 1050
    (2010). Here, similarly, although the
    respondent’s specific steps did not require him to sepa-
    rate from the mother, the respondent was aware that
    if he and the mother were to remain a unified couple,
    the mother’s parenting deficiencies posed a significant
    barrier to reunification. During one of the TFT meetings
    in May, 2018, the respondent was advised that ‘‘the
    department’s permanency plan is adoption due to con-
    cerns of [the mother’s] mental health and the inability
    shown in visits to meet [Corey’s] needs. . . . [The
    respondent] reported that he wouldn’t have married
    [the mother] if he would have known this would happen.
    [The department social worker] explained that even
    though the majority of the concerns are with [the
    mother], the department assesses the parents together
    as one to determine if reunification is appropriate.’’ The
    respondent’s understanding that the mother posed a
    barrier to reunification was further evidenced when he
    told the TFT community worker that he was working
    to create a care plan for Corey ‘‘so [that the mother]
    will not be alone with [Corey].’’22 At trial, when asked
    by counsel for Corey, ‘‘[a]nd if parents are presenting
    as a unified couple, together, would you agree that one’s
    lack of engagement would reflect negatively on the
    other?’’ Randall responded, ‘‘[y]es, I would agree with
    that.’’ Moreover, the respondent was aware that the
    mother had previously lost custody of her other two
    children and that she had reported wanting to ‘‘shake’’
    one of those children. In fact, he was the mother’s
    boyfriend and provided emotional support throughout
    the period when her parental rights as to her second
    child were being terminated. On the basis of the respon-
    dent’s involvement with the mother and his knowledge
    of the mother’s significant parenting issues, the court’s
    findings with respect to the mother were related to
    the issue of whether the respondent had rehabilitated,
    especially because it noted that ‘‘the parents present
    as a committed couple,’’ and ‘‘[n]either parent demon-
    strates a desire or ability to be a single parent.’’
    In determining whether a parent has achieved suffi-
    cient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider
    whether the parent has corrected the factors that led
    to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those
    factors were included in specific steps ordered by the
    court or imposed by the department. See In re Shane
    
    M., supra
    , 
    318 Conn. 586
    . The court in the present case
    dealt with the respondent’s rehabilitation issues by
    accepting the fact that the parents were a firmly com-
    mitted unit. It never ordered that the respondent sepa-
    rate from the mother. In its decision, the court did not
    fault the respondent for not separating from the mother.
    Rather, it faulted him for not having a reasonable plan
    as to who would care for Corey, other than the mother,
    while he was at work seventy hours a week, and for
    being unable or unwilling to change the mother’s smok-
    ing habits to make the home environment safer for
    Corey. It also found that the respondent did not have
    ‘‘sufficient insight into the negative effect [the] mother’s
    mental health has on her parenting, despite [the respon-
    dent’s] substantial period of individual counseling.’’ By
    failing to sufficiently develop a plan to protect Corey
    from the mother’s deficient parenting, the respondent
    demonstrated poor judgment and undermined any pros-
    pect of Corey’s being reunified with him. Regardless
    of the moderate progress that the respondent made
    personally toward complying with some of his specific
    steps, Corey could not be reunited with the respondent
    until the overall environment in the parental home
    would not pose a threat to Corey.
    Therefore, the following evidence presented at trial,
    relating to the mother, was relevant to whether the
    respondent failed to rehabilitate. Randall testified that,
    because of the mother’s post-traumatic stress disorder,
    which led to her feelings of wanting to shake her other
    child, the mother had the potential to be very dangerous
    to a young child in her care. Randall further testified that
    the mother ‘‘is more vulnerable to emotional problems,
    which could result [in] domestic violence, could result
    in her even possibly hurting her child because of her
    own lack of impulse control.’’23 The TFT reports, which
    were introduced into evidence at trial, include a pleth-
    ora of evidence supporting the mother’s inability to
    safely parent Corey. For example, the mother needed
    ‘‘prompting and redirecting’’ with Corey, she let him
    put unsafe and dirty items in his mouth, she spent time
    on her phone instead of interacting with Corey, she
    complained about the weight of the car seat, she did
    not appropriately interact or bond with Corey, and she
    demonstrated a lack of understanding that her smoking
    had adverse effects on Corey’s health. Randall also testi-
    fied that she did not believe that the respondent would
    become the sole caregiver and that the mother would
    not also play a significant role. Randall testified: ‘‘That
    goes against really what their relationship is. He kind
    of has a tendency to . . . give in to her and give her
    what she wants, and I believe that if she wanted to take
    primary care of the baby, that he would be pretty likely
    to allow that.’’ On this record, we conclude that it was
    not improper for the court to determine that the respon-
    dent failed to rehabilitate, in part, due to factual findings
    relating to the mother.
    Eighth, the respondent challenges as clearly errone-
    ous the court’s finding that, ‘‘[d]espite frequent admoni-
    tions, [Corey’s] physical reaction to visits [with his par-
    ents] indicates ongoing exposure to secondhand24
    smoke.’’ (Footnote added.) Preliminarily, the respon-
    dent claims that the petitioner did not introduce any
    expert medical testimony to support the finding that
    Corey’s breathing difficulty and coughing was caused
    by exposure to smoke particles during his visits with the
    parents. Specifically, the respondent refers to language
    from Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 
    79 Conn. App. 78
    , 
    828 A.2d 1260
    (2003), in which this court stated that
    ‘‘[e]xpert medical opinion evidence is usually required
    to show the cause of an injury or disease because the
    medical effect on the human system of the infliction of
    injuries is generally not within the sphere of the com-
    mon knowledge of the [layperson].’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.)
    Id., 88. The
    court went on to state that
    ‘‘[a]n exception to the general rule with regard to expert
    medical opinion evidence is when the medical condition
    is obvious or common in everyday life. . . . Similarly,
    expert opinion may not be necessary as to causation
    of an injury or illness if the plaintiff’s evidence creates
    a probability so strong that a lay jury can form a reason-
    able belief.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.)
    Id., 89. Here,
    the petitioner’s evidence included a report from
    Corey’s pulmonologist, Palazzo, dated October 1, 2018,
    in which she stated that Corey had increased mucous,
    a cough and difficulty breathing on Monday nights into
    Tuesdays, following visits with his biological parents,
    which resulted in the need to administer nasal saline
    and Albuterol. Palazzo’s letter also stated: ‘‘I am con-
    cerned that exposure to [secondhand] smoke from his
    biological parents’ clothes or breath is what is causing
    these issues’’ and that ‘‘[i]t would be my recommenda-
    tion to postpone a visit with his biological parents until
    he has fully recovered from these symptoms.’’ This evi-
    dence supports the court’s finding that Corey’s breath-
    ing difficulties were caused by exposure to thirdhand
    smoke during visits with the respondent and the
    mother. Although Palazzo did not testify, her report
    was admitted into evidence without challenge. Because
    the court did not admit it for a limited purpose, it can be
    used for all purposes, including establishing causation.25
    Even if the letter from Palazzo did not establish causa-
    tion between Corey’s breathing problems and thirdhand
    exposure to smoke particles from the parents, the
    exception from Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    79 Conn. App. 89
    , would apply because the peti-
    tioner’s evidence created a probability so strong that a
    reasonable trier of fact, applying a commonsense evalu-
    ation to the evidence, would be able to form a reason-
    able belief with respect to causation. In addition to the
    letter from Corey’s pulmonologist, Palazzo, the evi-
    dence also included reports from TFT indicating that,
    as early as May, 2018, the foster parents were having
    to administer asthma treatment to Corey after his visits
    and that his pediatrician had advised the foster parents
    that thirdhand smoke could be the issue. In her testi-
    mony, Hooper, the department social worker, stated
    that she visited with Corey both immediately after his
    visits with his biological parents and later in the week
    following those visits. Through these encounters with
    Corey, Hooper was able to determine that, after his
    visits with the respondent and the mother, Corey’s eyes
    were ‘‘runny’’ and ‘‘red’’ and he was ‘‘miserable.’’
    The respondent fails to recognize the much broader
    concern that the court was expressing with respect to
    the parents’ smoking, which the court considered ‘‘[t]he
    major example of the parenting deficits . . . .’’ The
    court went beyond just finding fault with the parents
    for aggravating Corey’s asthma due to the presence of
    thirdhand smoke on their persons during supervised
    visits. Ultimately, even if the thirdhand smoke was pos-
    sibly not the cause of Corey’s adverse reactions after
    the visits, the continued smoking of one or both of
    the parents would create an unacceptably risky home
    environment for a child with the medical issues Corey
    has, and, in the court’s view, the parents’ continued
    smoking, or the respondent’s tolerance of the mother’s
    smoking, indicated an inability to prioritize Corey’s
    medically fragile needs over one’s own.
    On the basis of the evidence presented by the peti-
    tioner and the reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
    from, we conclude that the court’s finding that Corey’s
    physical reaction to his visits with his parents indicates
    exposure to thirdhand smoke was not clearly errone-
    ous. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s subordi-
    nate findings that were challenged by the respondent
    are not clearly erroneous, and, therefore, that the court
    properly determined that the respondent failed to reha-
    bilitate.
    III
    Finally, the respondent claims that the court, in its
    findings in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding,
    improperly compared his suitability as a parent, and
    that of Corey’s biological mother, to that of Corey’s
    foster parent during the adjudicatory phase of the termi-
    nation proceeding. We disagree.
    The respondent takes issue with the following lan-
    guage: ‘‘[The respondent] expressed a concern that all
    this work would be a waste of time if they didn’t get
    [Corey] back. [Keniston] noted a lack of affect by
    [Corey] in the parents’ company, especially with [the]
    mother. She contrasted this with the warmth and
    attachment observed between [Corey] and [the] foster
    parent. At times, [Keniston] had difficulty redirecting
    [the] mother’s attention from [the] mother’s cell phone
    to [Corey].’’ (Emphasis added.) Although the majority
    of the court’s comparison involved the mother, and not
    the respondent, the respondent properly challenges the
    comparison because it references ‘‘the parents’’ and
    because the parents were being reviewed as a unit,
    and, therefore, the mother’s attachment with Corey also
    affected the respondent.
    We first set forth the applicable standard of review.
    ‘‘The interpretation of a trial court’s judgment presents
    a question of law over which our review is plenary.
    . . . As a general rule, judgments are to be construed
    in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . .
    The determinative factor is the intention of the court
    as gathered from all parts of the judgment.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) In re James O., 
    322 Conn. 636
    , 649, 
    142 A.3d 1147
    (2016).
    ‘‘[A] judicial termination of parental rights may not
    be premised on a determination that it would be in the
    child’s best interests to terminate the parent’s rights in
    order to substitute another, more suitable set of adop-
    tive parents.26 Our statutes and [case law] make it crystal
    clear that the determination of the child’s best interests
    comes into play only after statutory grounds for termi-
    nation of parental rights have been established by clear
    and convincing evidence. . . . [A] parent cannot be
    displaced because someone else could do a better job
    raising the child. . . . The court, however, is statutorily
    required to determine whether the parent has achieved
    such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encour-
    age the belief that within a reasonable time, considering
    the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume
    a responsible position in the life of the child . . . .’’
    (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnote added;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Zion R., 
    116 Conn. App. 723
    , 738, 
    977 A.2d 247
    (2009).
    In support of their respective positions, both parties
    cite to our Supreme Court’s decision in In re James
    
    O., supra
    , 
    322 Conn. 636
    . The petitioner relies on the
    majority’s opinion, and the respondent relies on the
    concurring opinion in In re James O., as well as
    attempts to distinguish the majority’s analysis from the
    present case. In In re James O., in concluding that the
    respondent mother had failed to rehabilitate, the court
    held that the trial court did not improperly compare
    the respondent parents with the foster parent of the
    children at issue.
    Id., 652–57. The
    trial court noted that
    the foster parent provided the children with ‘‘an envi-
    ronment that is calm and understanding of the chil-
    dren’s needs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id., 653. Further,
    the court stated that, ‘‘[a]s both [chil-
    dren’s] therapists have made clear, the children have
    needed a caregiver who is calm, patient, able to set
    appropriate limits, willing to participate intensively in
    the children’s therapy, and able to help the children
    with coping skills to manage their anxiety.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.)
    Id. The court
    went on to
    state that the foster mother provided the children with
    such an environment and that she embodied the requi-
    site characteristics of a parent who could meet the
    child’s needs. ‘‘In contrast,’’ the court continued, ‘‘[the
    respondent mother] is volatile and prone to violence,
    unable to set appropriate limits, unwilling to talk with
    the children’s therapists and, therefore, unable to help
    them use coping skills to manage their anxiety and
    ultimately, unwilling to believe the children’s state-
    ments regarding the trauma.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.)
    Id., 653–54. In
    reviewing this language, the
    Supreme Court determined that the trial court’s com-
    parison to the foster mother was not improper because
    it was made ‘‘in light of what the children’s therapists
    have testified are the specific needs of the children.
    . . . The court is basing the level of care needed not
    on what [the foster mother] is providing to the children,
    but on what the children’s therapists have testified the
    children need from a caregiver.’’ (Emphasis omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id., 655. Further,
    ‘‘[i]mportantly, the court never opined that [the foster
    mother] could meet the children’s needs or that [the
    foster mother] ought to be the person to meet their
    needs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id. There- fore,
    our Supreme Court held that the trial court did
    not improperly compare the respondent mother with
    the foster mother.
    Id., 657. Here,
    we conclude that the trial court’s comparison
    between the foster parent and the respondent and the
    mother was not improper. Similar to the challenged
    decision of the trial court in In re James O., the trial
    court in the present case used the comparison between
    the foster parent and the biological parents to highlight
    Corey’s emotional and development needs as outlined
    by Keniston.27 In her reports, Keniston repeatedly high-
    lighted that several of the TFT program’s goals were
    to ‘‘create a physical and emotional environment’’ for
    Corey, and to ‘‘establish developmentally appropriate
    routines that improve attachment . . . .’’ Therefore,
    the reference to the lack of affect Corey showed with
    the mother, compared to the warmth and attachment
    he showed with the foster parent, was used not to opine
    that the foster parent ought to be the person to meet
    Corey’s needs but, rather, was made on the basis of
    what the TFT professionals determined were Corey’s
    specific needs. Further, the court’s comparison should
    not be viewed in isolation because the court’s analysis,
    as a whole, focused on Corey’s needs and the biological
    parents’ inability to meet those needs. For example, the
    court also referenced that, on the basis of Randall’s
    report, ‘‘[h]ands-on parenting was also necessary, with
    a focus for [the] mother on attachment’’ but that Randall
    ‘‘did not feel [that] either parent was invested in the
    extra work it takes to create an attachment.’’ Accord-
    ingly, we conclude that the court’s comparison between
    the foster parent and the biological parents was not
    improper.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
    (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
    appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
    for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
    order of the Appellate Court.
    ** June 8, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
    is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
    1
    General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
    Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by
    clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and
    Families has made reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the
    parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b . . . (2) termi-
    nation is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has
    been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected, abused or
    uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has
    been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to
    the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree
    of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reason-
    able time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could
    assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . .’’
    2
    The court’s judgment with respect to the termination of the mother’s
    parental rights is not before us on appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion
    to the father as the respondent. Pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, the
    attorney for Corey has adopted the brief filed by the petitioner and has
    requested that this court affirm the judgment of the trial court as consistent
    with his client’s best interest.
    3
    The record reflects that, eventually, the relatives were no longer able
    to provide a home for Corey that satisfied applicable licensing requirements,
    and, therefore, he subsequently was placed in his current foster home in
    March, 2018.
    4
    The record does not reflect why the initial agreement that the parents
    and Corey reside with the relatives was not implemented.
    5
    Specifically, Randall testified that the respondent and the mother ‘‘really
    need to work extra hard at building that kind of attachment relationship
    with [Corey], and the failure to even make eye contact for most of the
    session really suggests that that relationship is not there for them and that
    they’re not doing a lot to foster that.’’
    6
    Randall testified that the respondent and the mother ‘‘are not able to
    provide the kind of care that Corey would need in his home, that he would
    continue to be at risk due to the possibility of emotional volatility within
    the home, conflicts within the home between the parents.’’
    7
    The respondent’s specific steps, in relevant part, were: ‘‘Keep all appoint-
    ments set by or with [the department]. Cooperate with [the department’s]
    home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the [child’s] court-
    appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem. Let [the department], your
    attorney and the attorney for the [child] know where you and the child(ren)
    are at all times. Take part in counseling and make progress toward the
    identified treatment goals: [p]arenting . . . [i]ndividual . . . . Accept in-
    home support services referred by [the department] and cooperate with
    them . . . . Submit to random drug testing; the time and method of the
    testing will be up to [the department] to decide. [Do] [n]ot use illegal drugs
    or abuse alcohol or medicine. Cooperate with service providers recom-
    mended for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support ser-
    vices and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment . . . . Cooperate with
    [court-ordered] evaluations or testing. Sign releases allowing [the depart-
    ment] to communicate with service providers to check on your attendance,
    cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future
    proceedings with this court. Sign the release[s] within [thirty] days. Sign
    releases allowing your child’s attorney and guardian ad litem to review your
    child’s medical, psychological, psychiatric and/or educational records. Get
    and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income. Immediately let [the
    department] know about any changes in the [makeup] of the household to
    make sure that the change does not hurt the health and safety of the [child]
    . . . . [Do] [n]ot get involved with the criminal justice system. Cooperate
    with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and follow your condi-
    tions of probation or parole. . . . Take care of the [child’s] physical, educa-
    tional, medical, or emotional needs, including keeping the [child’s] appoint-
    ments with his/her/their medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational
    providers. . . . Keep the [child] in the [s]tate of Connecticut while this case
    is going on unless you get permission from [the department] or the court
    to take them out of state. You must get permission first. Visit the [child] as
    often as [the department] permits. Within thirty (30) days of this order, and
    at any time after that, tell [the department] in writing the name, address,
    family relationship, and birth date of any person(s) who you would like the
    department to investigate and consider as a placement resource for the
    [child]. Tell [the department] the names and addresses of the grandparents
    of the [child].’’
    The respondent signed these steps and agreed to comply with them.
    8
    There was evidence before the court that the respondent works from
    approximately 7:30 a.m. until 6 or 7 p.m., Monday through Friday; 8 a.m. to
    5 p.m. on Saturdays; and 9 a.m. until 4 p.m. on Sundays.
    9
    ‘‘The goal of TFT is to provide an intervention between the child and
    his parents so that the child can benefit as much as possible from the
    contact. TFT provides direct consultation and assessment, works directly
    with parents on parenting skills, and works towards improving parent/child
    interactions and promotes attachments.’’
    10
    There was evidence before the court that, at one of the TFT visits, the
    respondent stated to Keniston, ‘‘I love [Corey], but I regret having him.’’
    11
    There was evidence before the court that the mother’s post-traumatic
    stress disorder had contributed to her prior feelings of wanting to shake
    one of her other children when she was unable to comfort him.
    12
    The evidence reflects that the date of case closure was June 18, 2018,
    and that closure was recommended by Keniston.
    13
    Although, in its memorandum of decision, the court referred to the
    exposure to smoke particles through fabrics as secondhand smoke, this
    type of exposure is known as thirdhand smoke. ‘‘Thirdhand smoke is residual
    nicotine and other chemicals left on indoor surfaces by tobacco smoke.
    People are exposed to these chemicals by touching contaminated surfaces
    or breathing in the off-gassing from these surfaces.’’ J. Taylor Hays, M.D.,
    Mayo Clinic, ‘‘What is thirdhand smoke, and why is it a concern?’’ (July 13,
    2017), available at https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/adult-health/
    expert-answers/third-hand-smoke/faq-20057791 (last visited June 8, 2020).
    14
    There is evidence that on May 11, 2018, at an administrative case review
    meeting at TFT at which the respondent, but not the mother, was present,
    Cassandra Bunkley, the administrative case review facilitator, explained to
    the respondent that the foster parents had reported that they had to adminis-
    ter breathing treatment to Corey after he returned from visits with the
    parents. The respondent indicated that the parents did not smoke during
    visits, but Bunkley explained that the lingering smell of smoke in clothes
    and hair can trigger an infant’s asthma. It was then decided that the parents
    would not smoke three hours prior to their visits and would change their
    clothes. Keniston again discussed the effects of thirdhand smoke during
    appointments on June 4, June 11 and June 18, 2018. In Hooper’s addendum
    to the department’s social study in support of its petition for termination
    of parental rights, dated April 9, 2019, she also noted that, although both
    parents maintained that they had quit smoking, Corey continued to have
    asthma attacks after visits.
    15
    General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where
    termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether
    to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and
    shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent
    of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child
    by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)
    whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable
    efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe
    Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any
    applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or
    agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled
    their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of
    the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s
    person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control
    of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed
    significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent
    has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
    make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the
    foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which
    the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to
    reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to
    incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the mainte-
    nance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other
    custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been
    prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by
    the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the
    unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of
    the parent.’’
    16
    The preliminary specific steps set on October 4, 2017, the date of the
    issuance of the ex parte order of temporary custody, were required pursuant
    to General Statutes § 46b-129 (c) (6) and Practice Book § 33a-7 (a) (8). The
    final specific steps were issued on March 6, 2018, at the time of the neglect
    adjudication and commitment.
    17
    Specifically, the respondent argues for the first time, on appeal, that
    the department should have provided him with behavioral treatment, such
    as cognitive behavioral therapy or motivational interviewing, and medica-
    tion, such as nicotine replacement therapy, Bupropion, Varenicline, or anti-
    depressants.
    18
    As part of his argument, the respondent cites to numerous resources
    emphasizing the addictive nature of nicotine. The record reflects that these
    resources were not admitted into evidence before the trial court, they are
    not part of the record and, thus, on appeal, we do not consider them. ‘‘[W]e
    cannot consider evidence not available to the trial court to find adjudicative
    facts for the first time on appeal. . . . It is well established that this court
    does not find facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Amato v. Hart-
    D’Amato, 
    169 Conn. App. 669
    , 685, 
    152 A.3d 546
    (2016). Even if we were
    to consider the resources cited by the respondent, his argument still fails
    to address the department’s repeated attempts to address his and the moth-
    er’s smoking.
    19
    No such requirement of the department for smoking cessation services
    was set forth in the specific steps, and the respondent signed both forms,
    indicating he understood that he ‘‘should contact my lawyer and/or [the
    department] worker if I need help in reaching any of these steps.’’
    20
    The record reflects that the studies cited by the respondent were not
    admitted as exhibits before the trial court, they were not part of the record,
    and, therefore, we cannot consider them on appeal. ‘‘[W]e cannot consider
    evidence not available to the trial court to find adjudicative facts for the
    first time on appeal. . . . It is well established that this court does not find
    facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Amato v. Hart-D’Amato, 
    169 Conn. App. 669
    , 685, 
    152 A.3d 546
    (2016).
    21
    In her updated evaluation, which was in evidence, Randall diagnosed
    the respondent with major depressive disorder, in remission.
    22
    There was evidence that, in response to the respondent’s statement that
    he was working to create a care plan for Corey, Keniston questioned how
    realistic it would be for Corey to live in a household where he cannot be
    alone with the mother and whether that arrangement would be beneficial
    for Corey. The respondent also told Keniston that he did not have any
    concern if the mother was left alone with Corey.
    23
    As part of the mother’s psychiatric treatment with Sound Community
    Services, she reported, ‘‘I go from calm, cool to I want to kill you status. I
    get triggered when my husband asks me [twenty] questions or someone
    mentions my kids.’’ She also reported that her ‘‘mood is highly and quickly
    changeable . . . varying from calm to enraged over a matter of hours.’’
    24
    See footnote 14 of this opinion.
    25
    To the extent that the respondent claims that the report from Palazzo
    constituted ‘‘wholly unreliable hearsay evidence,’’ he failed to object to its
    admission on that, or any other ground, at trial.
    26
    We should note, however, that in the dispositional phase, pursuant to
    § 17a-112 (k) (4), one of the seven findings on which the court must opine
    is ‘‘the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s
    parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exer-
    cised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and
    with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties . . . .’’ At the
    time of trial, Corey had been living with his foster parents for more than
    one year.
    27
    This evidence also established that Corey is not a child incapable of
    forming an attachment to a caregiver.