State v. Robert H. ( 2020 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT H.*
    (AC 36742)
    (AC 37544)
    Lavine, Devlin and Sheldon, Js.
    Syllabus
    Convicted of two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child arising out
    of two separate acts of masturbation in the presence of the minor victim,
    and judgment revoking his probation, the defendant appealed. The defen-
    dant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
    as to one of the counts of risk of injury because the only evidence of
    the second incident was two statements that he made to the police,
    which were admitted without objection at trial. The victim had testified
    at trial concerning only one such incident. The defendant claimed that
    the common-law corpus delicti rule, or corroboration rule, precluded
    his confession from being used as the only evidence of the second
    incident because there was no substantial independent evidence tending
    to establish the trustworthiness of that confession. This court affirmed
    the conviction. The defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed
    to our Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of this court and
    remanded the case to this court with direction to consider fully the
    merits of the defendant’s corpus delicti claim in light of its decision in
    State v. Leniart (
    333 Conn. 88
    ). Held that the defendant could not prevail
    on his corpus delicti claim that his confession constituted insufficient
    evidence for the jury to conclude that he had masturbated in the presence
    of the victim on more than one occasion, as there was substantial
    evidence to corroborate the defendant’s written statement, which was
    against his penal interest, that he had masturbated at least twice in the
    presence of the victim, including that the defendant voluntarily went to
    the police and agreed in writing to a videotaped interview with officers
    and to waive his constitutional rights when he gave a signed, written
    statement to the police, the defendant’s statement closely paralleled
    the victim’s testimony regarding the defendant’s masturbation in her
    bedroom, there were seven stains containing the defendant’s DNA on
    the bottom of the victim’s bedspread and testimony was presented at
    trial that semen is water soluble and the defendant tried to wipe the
    semen with a wet cloth and the bedspread had been laundered two or
    three weeks before the police seized it.
    Argued February 20—officially released June 23, 2020
    Procedural History
    Substitute information, in the first case, charging the
    defendant with three counts of the crime of risk of
    injury to a child and two counts of the crime of sexual
    assault in the first degree, and information, in the sec-
    ond case, charging the defendant with violation of pro-
    bation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
    district of Hartford, where the first case was tried to
    the jury before Suarez, J.; verdict of guilty of two counts
    of risk of injury to a child; thereafter, the defendant
    was presented to the court in the second case on a plea
    of guilty; judgment of guilty in accordance with the
    verdict and judgment revoking probation, from which
    the defendant filed separate appeals to this court, Lav-
    ine and Sheldon, Js., with Flynn, J., dissenting, which
    affirmed the trial court’s judgments, and the defendant,
    on the granting of certification, appealed to our
    Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of this
    court and remanded the case to this court for further
    proceedings. Affirmed.
    Naomi T. Fetterman, for the appellant (defendant).
    Bruce R. Lockwood, supervisory assistant state’s
    attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Lisa Herskow-
    itz, former senior assistant state’s attorney, Gail P.
    Hardy, state’s attorney, and John F. Fahey, supervisory
    assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    LAVINE, J. This risk of injury case returns to this
    court on remand from our Supreme Court; see State v.
    Robert H., 
    333 Conn. 172
    , 175, 
    214 A.3d 343
     (2019)
    (Robert II); directing this court to consider fully the
    merits of the ‘‘corpus delicti claim’’ raised by the defen-
    dant, Robert H., in his direct appeal. See State v. Robert
    H., 
    168 Conn. App. 419
    , 422–23, 
    146 A.3d 995
     (2016)
    (Robert I), rev’d, 
    333 Conn. 172
    , 
    214 A.3d 343
     (2019).
    Our Supreme Court further directed this court to review
    the defendant’s corpus delicti claim pursuant to its deci-
    sion in State v. Leniart, 
    333 Conn. 88
    , 97, 
    215 A.3d 1104
     (2019). We have considered the defendant’s corpus
    delicti claim as directed and conclude that the judg-
    ments of conviction should be affirmed.
    The following procedural history provides the con-
    text for this opinion. In 2013, the defendant was charged
    in a long form information with two counts of sexual
    assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury
    to, or impairing the morals of, a child for a sexual
    encounter that allegedly took place between the defen-
    dant and the minor victim in the kitchen of the victim’s
    home (kitchen incident). Robert I, supra, 
    168 Conn. App. 422
    –23. He also was charged in counts four and
    five of the long form information with risk of injury to,
    or impairing the morals of, a child (risk of injury) in
    violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1).1 Counts
    four and five alleged two instances in which the defen-
    dant masturbated in the presence of the victim.2 The
    charges were tried to the jury, which found the defen-
    dant not guilty of the three charges related to the
    kitchen incident. The jury, however, found the defen-
    dant guilty of the two risk of injury charges in violation
    of § 53-21 (a) (1), arising from the defendant’s having
    masturbated twice in the presence of the victim.3 Id.,
    426. After the jury found the defendant guilty, he
    pleaded guilty to a charge of violation of probation that
    had been alleged in a separate file. The court sentenced
    the defendant on all three charges to a total effective
    sentence of twenty years of incarceration. Id., 421.
    The defendant appealed to this court, claiming that
    there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty ver-
    dict on a second charge of risk of injury for masturbat-
    ing in the presence of the victim. Id., 421. He argued
    that ‘‘the only evidence presented at trial to support the
    jury’s finding that he had masturbated in [the victim’s]
    presence on more than one occasion were two state-
    ments he made to [the] police, which were admitted
    into evidence against him without objection at trial.
    The defendant [continued] that such evidence was
    insufficient to support his conviction on a second
    charge of risk of injury because, under the corpus delicti
    rule, also referred to as the corroboration rule, there
    was not substantial independent evidence tending to
    establish the trustworthiness of his confession to a sec-
    ond act of masturbation in the [victim’s presence].’’ Id.,
    421–22. In response, the state argued that ‘‘the defen-
    dant’s [corpus delicti] claim [was] unreviewable
    because the corroboration rule is a rule of evidence
    governing the admissibility of oral and written state-
    ments, and the defendant never challenged the admissi-
    bility of his statements [to the police] at trial.’’ Id., 422.
    In deciding whether to review the defendant’s claim
    in Robert I, the majority stated that this court recently
    had held, ‘‘in State v. Leniart, 
    166 Conn. App. 142
    ,
    152–53, 
    140 A.3d 1026
     (2016) [rev’d in part, 
    333 Conn. 88
    , 
    215 A.3d 1104
     (2019)],4 that the corroboration rule
    is solely a rule of admissibility [and] agree[d] with the
    state that the defendant [could not] raise his unpre-
    served [corpus delicti] claim as part of his claim of
    insufficient evidence.’’ (Footnote added.) Robert I,
    supra, 
    168 Conn. App. 422
    . The majority, therefore, con-
    cluded that it was not necessary ‘‘to decide whether
    there was substantial independent evidence tending to
    establish the trustworthiness of the defendant’s confes-
    sion.’’ 
    Id.
     The majority considered the defendant’s
    ‘‘unobjected-to statements in the light most favorable
    to the state in evaluating his . . . claim of evidentiary
    insufficiency.’’ 
    Id.
     The majority ultimately concluded
    that the ‘‘defendant’s statements that he masturbated
    in the [victim’s presence] ‘at least twice’ provided a
    sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury reasonably to
    conclude that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
    of both counts of risk of injury of which he was con-
    victed’’; id.; and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.5
    Id., 432.
    Our Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition
    for certification to appeal limited to the question of
    whether ‘‘the Appellate Court properly conclude[d] that
    the corpus delicti rule is merely a rule of admissibility,
    in determining that there was sufficient evidence to
    sustain the defendant’s second conviction of risk of
    injury to a child . . . .’’ State v. Robert H., 
    323 Conn. 940
    , 
    151 A.3d 845
     (2016). After the appeal was argued,
    our Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision,
    answering the question by stating that ‘‘our corpus
    delicti rule is a hybrid evidentiary-substantive rule that
    implicates a defendant’s fundamental right not to be
    convicted in the absence of evidence sufficient to estab-
    lish every essential element of the charged crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, even unpre-
    served corpus delicti claims are reviewable on appeal.
    See State v. Leniart, supra, 
    333 Conn. 110
    .’’ Robert II,
    supra, 
    333 Conn. 175
    . The Supreme Court, therefore,
    reversed this court’s judgment in Robert I and
    ‘‘remand[ed] the case to [this] court for full consider-
    ation of the merits of the defendant’s corpus delicti
    claim.’’ 
    Id.
    On November 19, 2019, this court issued an order
    stating that the parties may file simultaneous supple-
    mental briefs, addressing the impact of State v. Leniart,
    supra, 
    323 Conn. 88
    , on the defendant’s appeal. In his
    supplemental brief, the defendant claims that ‘‘the evi-
    dence was insufficient to sustain a conviction on a
    second charge of risk of injury since, under the corpus
    delicti rule, there was not any evidence, much less sub-
    stantial, independent evidence, tending to establish the
    trustworthiness of his confession to a second act of
    masturbation in the presence of [the victim].’’
    Before considering the evidence before the jury, we
    set forth the applicable principles of law. A criminal
    defendant has a constitutional right not to be convicted
    of a crime ‘‘except upon sufficient proof . . . to con-
    vince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the
    existence of every element of the offense.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 
    225 Conn. 270
    , 275 n.3, 
    623 A.2d 42
     (1993). ‘‘In reviewing a suffi-
    ciency of the evidence claim, we apply a two part test.
    First we construe the evidence in the light most favor-
    able to sustaining the verdict. Second we determine
    whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences
    reasonably drawn therefrom the [fact finder] reason-
    ably could have concluded that the cumulative force
    of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt . . . . This court cannot substitute its own judg-
    ment for that of the [fact finder] if there is sufficient
    evidence to support the [fact finder’s] verdict . . . .
    We ask . . . whether there is a reasonable view of the
    evidence that supports the [fact finder’s] verdict of
    guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Watson, 
    195 Conn. App. 441
    , 445, 
    225 A.3d 686
    , cert.
    denied, 
    335 Conn. 912
    ,       A.3d      (2020).
    ‘‘[W]e do not sit as the seventh juror when we review
    the sufficiency of the evidence . . . rather, we must
    determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the
    verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including
    reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury’s
    verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miles, 
    97 Conn. App. 236
    , 240, 
    903 A.2d 675
     (2006).
    We now turn to State v. Leniart, supra, 
    333 Conn. 88
    .
    The corpus delicti rule ‘‘generally prohibits a prosecutor
    from proving the [fact of a transgression] based solely
    on a defendant’s extrajudicial statements.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 97
    . Our Supreme Court
    now has concluded that ‘‘the corpus delicti rule is a
    hybrid rule that not only governs the admissibility of
    confession evidence but also imposes a substantive
    requirement that a criminal defendant may not be con-
    victed solely on the basis of a naked, uncorroborated
    confession.’’ 
    Id., 110
    . The rule ‘‘not only governs the
    admission of confession evidence but also sets the con-
    ditions for obtaining a conviction.’’ 
    Id., 101
    .
    ‘‘[T]he general rule is that the corpus delicti cannot
    be established by the [extrajudicial] confession of the
    defendant unsupported by corroborative evidence.
    . . . There are cases which hold in effect that it must be
    established by evidence independent of the defendant’s
    confession and that without such proof evidence of the
    confession is inadmissible.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) 
    Id., 111
    ; see State v. Doucette, 
    147 Conn. 95
    ,
    98–100, 
    157 A.2d 487
     (1959), overruled in part by State
    v. Tillman, 
    152 Conn. 15
    , 20, 
    202 A.2d 494
     (1964); State
    v. LaLouche, 
    116 Conn. 691
    , 693, 
    166 A. 252
     (1933),
    overruled in part by State v. Tillman, 
    152 Conn. 15
    , 20,
    
    202 A.2d 494
     (1964).
    In keeping with the modern trend, our Supreme Court
    previously reduced the burden the corpus delicti rule
    imposes on the state in prosecuting crimes. See State
    v. Leniart, supra, 
    333 Conn. 112
    . In State v. Tillman,
    
    152 Conn. 15
    , 20, 
    202 A.2d 494
     (1964), the court
    ‘‘departed from the traditional rule that the state must
    establish, by independent evidence, both that an injury
    or loss occurred and that the loss was feloniously
    caused. . . . [T]he corpus delicti that must be estab-
    lished by independent evidence encompasses only the
    former element, namely, the specific kind of loss or
    injury embraced in the crime charged.’’ (Footnotes
    omitted.) State v. Leniart, supra, 112. The court again,
    in State v. Harris, 
    215 Conn. 189
    , 193–94, 
    575 A.2d 223
    (1990), modified the rule as it applies to ‘‘crimes, such
    as driving under the influence, that proscribe certain
    undesirable conduct but do not necessarily entail any
    particular injury or loss.’’ State v. Leniart, supra, 113.
    ‘‘[F]or crimes of that sort, the state need not establish
    the corpus delicti of the crime through extrinsic evi-
    dence . . . [it] need only introduce substantial inde-
    pendent evidence [that] would tend to establish the
    trustworthiness of the [defendant’s] statement.’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In State v. Hafford,
    
    252 Conn. 274
    , 317, 
    746 A.2d 150
    , cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 855
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 136
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 89
     (2000), our Supreme
    Court ‘‘held that this trustworthiness rule set forth in
    Harris, also known as the corroboration rule, now
    applies to all types of crimes, not only those offenses
    that prohibit conduct and do not result in a specific loss
    or injury. In other words, post-Hafford, a confession is
    now sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of any
    crime, without independent extrinsic evidence that a
    crime was committed, as long as there is sufficient
    reason to conclude that the confession is reliable.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leniart,
    supra, 113.
    To determine whether there was substantial, inde-
    pendent evidence to corroborate the defendant’s con-
    fession that he twice masturbated in the presence of
    the victim requires us to examine all of the evidence
    presented at trial.6 At the time of the alleged sexual
    abuse, the victim was a ten or eleven year old, intermedi-
    ate school student. She was thirteen years old when
    she testified at trial. She lived with her older brother
    and her mother, who was romantically involved with
    the defendant, who spent time in the victim’s home.
    The victim’s bedroom was adjacent to her mother’s
    bedroom and was connected to it by a doorway.
    During her testimony, the victim was able to recall
    two specific incidents of a sexual nature that transpired
    between her and the defendant. During one incident,
    the victim was lying on her bed watching television
    when the defendant entered her bedroom, took out his
    penis, masturbated, and ejaculated onto her bed. After
    the defendant ejaculated, he wet a cloth and ‘‘tried to
    rub [the semen] off.’’ The second incident took place
    after the first and occurred in the kitchen. During the
    kitchen incident, the victim, dressed in her pajamas,
    was bending over when the defendant approached her
    from behind and pulled down her pajama bottom. He
    placed his penis in her ‘‘butt’’ and penetrated her vagi-
    nally or anally. The victim did not tell her mother about
    the incidents that occurred between her and the defen-
    dant because she was scared. Although the victim testi-
    fied that something unusual had occurred between her
    and the defendant on more than one occasion, at trial
    she could recall only the two events just described.
    The kitchen incident took place approximately three
    weeks before the victim disclosed the defendant’s abuse
    to a school friend, K, in March, 2011. K wrote a note
    about the victim’s disclosure to one of their teachers,
    Gail Jordan, who reported the alleged abuse to a school
    counselor. The next day, the victim’s counselor, Karen
    Goldman, spoke with the victim, who shared with her
    the defendant’s sexual abuse. Because she is a man-
    dated reporter,7 Goldman reported the alleged abuse to
    the Department of Children and Families (department).
    On the day the department received the complaint, Nina
    Bentham, a department investigator, reported the com-
    plaint to Detective Beth Leger of the Bloomfield Police
    Department, with whom the department had a working
    relationship. That evening, Bentham and Leger together
    went to the victim’s home, where the defendant was
    present. Leger spoke to the victim’s mother privately
    and secured her permission to seize a fitted bedsheet
    and bedspread from the victim’s bed.
    Subsequently, the victim was examined at Connecti-
    cut Children’s Medical Center on March 10, 2011. On
    March 14, 2011, the victim also was examined by Audrey
    Courtney, a pediatric nurse practitioner at the Chil-
    dren’s Advocacy Center at St. Francis Hospital and Med-
    ical Center (children’s center). Courtney made a written
    report of her examination, which was placed into evi-
    dence. Richard Cousins, an inspector in the state divi-
    sion of criminal justice, obtained a buccal swab from
    inside the victim’s cheek for DNA testing. Erin Byrne,
    a forensic interviewer at the children’s center, also
    authored a report that was put into evidence. Byrne’s
    interview of the victim was videotaped and shown to
    the jury.
    Leger telephoned the defendant to arrange a meeting
    at the Bloomfield police station. At that meeting on
    April 7, 2011, the defendant signed a consent to search
    form giving the police permission to take a buccal swab
    from the inside of his cheek for DNA testing. Leger also
    asked the defendant to submit to another interview.
    The bedclothes Leger collected from the victim’s bed
    were transferred to the state forensic laboratory by
    Madison W. Bolden, Jr., a Bloomfield police officer.
    Jane Codraro, a forensic biologist at the state forensic
    laboratory, testified about her examination of the blue
    fitted bedsheet and the bedspread Leger removed from
    the victim’s bed. Codraro found stains on both the sheet
    and bedspread. She used a screening test known as
    acid phosphatase to detect the presence of semen on
    both the sheet and bedspread. She found no evidence
    of semen on the bedsheet, but there were approximately
    seven stains containing semen in a one and one-half
    feet square area on the bedspread at the foot of the
    bed. Codraro was able to extract cellular material from
    one of the bedspread stains that indicated the presence
    of spermatozoa. Codraro sent the cellular material to
    the DNA section of the laboratory for further testing.
    The defendant’s DNA was found in the cellular material.
    Codraro also testified that semen is water soluble and
    could be removed by washing.
    On May 17, 2011, the defendant voluntarily went to
    the West Hartford police station where he was inter-
    viewed by Leger and Frank Fallon, then a sergeant in
    the West Hartford Police Department.8 Fallon presented
    the defendant with a waiver of rights form that the
    defendant read and signed. Fallon and Leger spent
    approximately four hours interviewing the defendant
    in a room approximately eight feet by eight feet,9 but
    they did not spend the entire time discussing the vic-
    tim’s allegations.10 Both Fallon and Leger testified that
    a discussion of the victim’s allegations did not begin
    until the defendant spoke the word ‘‘enticement.’’ Leger
    testified that the defendant stated that he had been
    enticed by the victim when he was lying on her mother’s
    bed from where he could see the victim lying on her
    bed masturbating. The defendant began masturbating
    and at some point ended up near the victim’s bed mas-
    turbating until he ejaculated. He also stated that it was
    possible that the victim had touched his penis. The
    defendant steadfastly denied that he ever penetrated
    the victim. He, however, admitted that he masturbated
    twice near the victim’s bed while she was in it. The
    defendant became emotional, stating that he knew what
    he had done was wrong, and that, as an adult, he knew
    that it should not have happened.
    During the interview, Leger represented to the defen-
    dant that the police had certain evidence, namely the
    victim’s underwear containing his semen, which actu-
    ally they did not have. Leger explained that that inter-
    view technique is used by police officers to elicit a
    truthful response. The police may get a very clear objec-
    tion to the evidence because the suspect knows that it
    does not exist, or the technique may help the suspect
    to be truthful.
    At no time during the interview did the defendant
    invoke his right to remain silent, state that he wanted
    an attorney or otherwise invoke his constitutional
    rights. He appeared to Leger to be coherent, and not
    under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or medicines. At
    the conclusion of the interview, the defendant agreed
    to give Leger a written statement summarizing what he
    had stated during the interview. He dictated his state-
    ment to Leger, read it, swore to its truthfulness, and
    signed it. After he signed the statement, the defendant
    left the West Hartford police station. He was not
    under arrest.
    The final forty or so minutes of the defendant’s
    recorded interview was played for the jury. His written
    statement was read to the jury and placed into evidence.
    The defendant’s confession, which is the basis of his
    corpus delicti claim, states as follows: ‘‘I . . . do
    hereby make the following statement of my own free
    will, without fear, threats or promises of any kind, and
    knowing that the same may be used in court against
    me, and that false statements are punishable by law.
    ‘‘Either late January or February, 2011, I was visiting
    my girlfriend . . . at her apartment . . . . I was in
    [her] bedroom. [She] was in the living room and had
    smoked weed. I was lying in [her] bed and could see
    [the victim] in her bedroom, lying in her bed, with her
    hands inside her pants. She was masturbating. She knew
    that I could see her, but it was like she wanted me to
    see her.
    ‘‘After watching her masturbate for about [fifteen]
    minutes, I went to [the victim’s] room. I stood about
    two or three feet away from her bed, and with my
    clothes on, pulled my penis out and started to mastur-
    bate myself.
    ‘‘She seemed like she was happy with me doing that.
    I ejaculated in her general direction, but not on top of
    her. I don’t know if she came or not.
    ‘‘This same thing happened at least twice, where I
    masturbated in front of her in her room, and it’s proba-
    bly how my semen got on her bed or clothes. I never
    penetrated her with my penis or anything else. I think
    she might have touched my penis on one of those times,
    right after I ejaculated, which might explain any of my
    semen in her pants.
    ‘‘I’ve had a problem with resisting temptation like this
    for quite a while. I have been attending group therapy
    sessions, but don’t think that program is working for
    me. I believe I need more help than that, because I don’t
    want to continue doing these things.
    ‘‘I’ve read the above statement consisting of one page
    and it is true and correct. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
    At the conclusion of evidence, the state argued to
    the jury that the sexual assaults alleged in counts one
    and two and risk of injury alleged in count three related
    to the kitchen incident. The risk of injury counts alleged
    in counts four and five were predicated on the two
    incidents during which the defendant masturbated in
    the victim’s presence. Robert I, supra, 
    168 Conn. App. 426
    . The state specifically argued that the defendant
    had confessed to having masturbated in the victim’s
    presence on two occasions. 
    Id.
     In his closing argument,
    defense counsel argued that the victim’s story changed
    each time she told it. 
    Id.
    On appeal, the defendant claims that there was no
    substantial independent evidence to establish the trust-
    worthiness of his confession that he twice masturbated
    in the presence of the victim. Under the corroboration
    rule, the state need only ‘‘introduce substantial indepen-
    dent evidence [that] tend[s] to establish the trustworthi-
    ness of the [defendant’s] statement[s].’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. Leniart, supra, 
    333 Conn. 119
    . The substantial evidence standard is met if the
    record provides a ‘‘substantial basis of fact from which
    the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Adriani v. Commission on
    Human Rights & Opportunities, 
    220 Conn. 307
    , 315,
    
    596 A.2d 426
     (1991).
    On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude
    that it contains substantial independent evidence to
    corroborate the trustworthiness of the defendant’s con-
    fession. The defendant’s sworn written statement that
    he masturbated ‘‘at least twice’’ in the presence of the
    victim is a statement against his penal interest, which
    has been recognized as indicative of trustworthiness
    by the United States Supreme Court. See United States
    v. Harris, 
    403 U.S. 573
    , 583, 
    91 S. Ct. 2075
    , 
    29 L. Ed. 2d 723
     (1971) (admission of crime, like admission against
    proprietary interests, carries indicia of credibility). Our
    appellate courts and code of evidence reflect this rule
    of trustworthiness.
    In addressing the admissibility of a coconspirator’s
    confession to his postconviction cellmate, this court
    has looked to § 8-6 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence,
    which concerns hearsay. See State v. Collins, 
    147 Conn. App. 584
    , 590, 
    82 A.3d 1208
     (confession not against
    penal interest), cert. denied, 
    311 Conn. 929
    , 
    86 A.3d 1057
    (2014). See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6 (4) (‘‘A trustworthy
    statement against penal interest that, at the time of its
    making, so far tended to subject the declarant to crimi-
    nal liability that a reasonable person in the declarant’s
    position would not have made the statement unless
    the person believed it to be true. In determining the
    trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest,
    the court shall consider (A) the time the statement was
    made and the person to whom the statement was made,
    (B) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case,
    and (C) the extent to which the statement was against
    the declarant’s penal interest.’’).
    ‘‘The against [penal] interest exception is not limited
    to a defendant’s direct confession of guilt. . . . It
    applies as well as to statements that tend to subject
    the speaker to criminal liability. . . . The rule encom-
    passes disserving statements by a declarant that would
    have probative value in a trial against the declarant.’’
    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    State v. Bryant, 
    202 Conn. 676
    , 695, 
    523 A.2d 451
     (1987).
    In the present case, the evidence demonstrates that
    the defendant voluntarily went to the West Hartford
    Police Department, agreed in writing to a videotaped
    interview with two police officers, and again agreed in
    writing to waive his constitutional rights when he gave
    a signed, written statement to Leger, the detective
    investigating the report of the defendant’s abuse. The
    defendant attested to the truthfulness of his statement
    that he masturbated at least twice in the victim’s pres-
    ence. His statement closely parallels the victim’s testi-
    mony during which she described the defendant’s mas-
    turbating in her bedroom. The victim’s testimony lends
    credibility to the defendant’s statement that he mastur-
    bated at least twice in her presence. Seven stains were
    found on the bedspread that covered the bottom portion
    of the bed. Laboratory analysis detected the presence
    of the defendant’s DNA on the bedspread, confirming
    that the defendant had ejaculated on to the victim’s
    bed. Codraro testified that semen is water soluble. The
    victim testified that the defendant tried to wipe the
    semen from her bedspread with a wet cloth and that
    the bedspread had been laundered two or three weeks
    before Leger seized it. This evidence strongly corrobo-
    rates the defendant’s statement that he had masturbated
    in the victim’s presence at least twice.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there
    was substantial evidence to corroborate the defendant’s
    written statement that he had masturbated at least twice
    in the presence of the victim. The defendant’s corpus
    delicti claim, therefore, fails.
    The judgments are affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
    victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the
    victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained.
    See General Statutes § 54-86e.
    1
    General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who
    (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of
    sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such
    child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the
    morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to
    impair the health or morals of any such child . . . shall be guilty of . . .
    a class C felony . . . .’’
    2
    Counts four and five of the long form information are identical and allege
    in relevant part: ‘‘The said Senior Assistant State’s Attorney further accuses
    Robert [H.] of the crime of INJURY OR RISK OF INJURY TO, OR
    IMPAIRING MORALS OF A CHILD, in violation of . . . General Statutes
    § 53-21 (a) (1) and alleges that on unspecified dates between September,
    2009 and March 5, 2011, at or near [the victim’s address] . . . the defendant
    did an act likely to impair the health or morals of a child under the age of
    sixteen, identified as the person listed in State’s Exhibit 1.’’ (Emphasis in
    original.) Exhibit 1 states the name of the victim, her date of birth, and
    town of residence.
    3
    The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the
    state’s case-in-chief, at the close of evidence, and again at sentencing. The
    defendant argued that there was no evidence to support a finding that he
    masturbated in the victim’s presence a second time, as the victim had
    testified to only one such incident. He further argued that the state, therefore,
    could not establish that she was harmed or affected by the alleged second
    incident if she was not aware of it. Robert I, supra, 
    168 Conn. App. 425
    . The
    state responded by arguing that risk of injury does not require that the child
    be aware of the defendant’s acts, only that the defendant’s conduct was of
    a nature that it was likely to impair the health or morals of a child. 
    Id.,
    425–26. The court denied each of the defendant’s motions for judgment of
    acquittal, stating that there was sufficient evidence by which the jury could
    find that the defendant had masturbated in the victim’s presence on more
    than one occasion. Id., 426.
    4
    Judge Flynn dissented in part in State v. Leniart, supra, 
    166 Conn. App. 228
    . He agreed ‘‘with the majority that there was sufficient independent
    evidence that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim,
    corroborating the extrajudicial confession of the defendant, and thus by
    sufficient evidence establishing the necessary elements of the crime of
    murder . . . . [He] dissented in part because [he] did not agree that the
    corpus delicti rule was merely evidentiary in that murder case.’’ (Citation
    omitted.) Robert I, supra, 
    168 Conn. App. 433
    .
    5
    Judge Flynn wrote a dissenting opinion in Robert I as he did in Leniart.
    See footnote 4 of this opinion. In Robert I, he opined that corpus delicti
    claims implicate a defendant’s substantive due process rights and, therefore,
    are reviewable on appeal even if not preserved at trial, and that the evidence
    at trial was not sufficient to corroborate the reliability of the defendant’s
    confession as to a second incident of sexual misconduct. See Robert I,
    supra, 
    168 Conn. App. 435
    –38.
    6
    We undertake a more extensive review of the evidence than was done
    in Robert I.
    7
    Teachers and school counselors, among others, are mandated reporters
    of suspected child abuse. See General Statutes § 17a-101 (b).
    8
    Fallon testified that it is common practice for police departments in the
    Greater Hartford area to assist one another in investigations.
    9
    The defendant’s entire interview was video recorded.
    10
    Fallon testified about the training police officers undergo to investigate
    and speak with suspects in crimes of sexual abuse of young children. The
    police seek to create a comfortable environment for an individual to speak
    about sensitive allegations.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC36742, AC37544

Filed Date: 6/23/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021