Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. ( 2024 )

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 2A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
2 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
MATHEW BURR ET AL. v. GROSSMAN
CHEVROLET-NISSAN, INC.
(AC 45867)
Cradle, Seeley and Norcott, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs, B, E, and M Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant
car dealership for alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation
of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et
seq.) in connection with the purchase and sale of a plow truck. B, the
managing member of M Co., testified that, on January 21, 2015, he signed
an instalment contract on behalf of M Co. for the purchase of the plow
truck. E, who was not a member of M Co., cosigned the contract, and
B drove the truck off the lot. The plaintiffs did not submit this purported
contract as an exhibit in the trial court. A few days later, B returned to
the showroom at the request of D, one of the defendant’s salesmen, to
return the purchase documents so that corrections could be made. B
was assured that the terms of the documents would not change. B and
E claimed that they never signed any other documents in connection
with the sale of the plow truck. Both parties, however, submitted into
evidence an instalment contract dated January 26, 2015, which identified
the plow truck as the purchased vehicle and listed an increased sales
price, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer loan period than that
which the plaintiffs alleged had been quoted by D and incorporated into
the original contract. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant forged
their signatures on the January 26, 2015 contract documents. They also
alleged that the window sticker on the plow truck, known as a Monroney
sticker, did not reflect the vehicle’s true price. D died sometime after
the purchase of the plow truck and was never deposed in this action.
G, the owner of the defendant, was called to testify at the trial by the
plaintiffs. She stated that, although she did not have firsthand knowledge
of the events surrounding the transaction, she had discussed it with D
and there was no indication that there had been a deal or contract that
reflected the terms the plaintiffs claimed were set forth in the January
21, 2015 contract. She stated that two contracts were signed in connec-
tion with the sale of the plow truck, the first on January 21, 2015, and
the second on January 26, 2015; however, she claimed that both contracts
reflected the same cash price of the truck and the same amount financed.
She stated that the January 26, 2015 contract was signed because the
defendant was able to secure more favorable approval terms with a
second lender, A Co., and that D had asked the plaintiffs to return to
the defendant to rescind the January 21, 2015 contract so they could
take advantage of those terms. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 3
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
burden of proof regarding their claims of breach of contract, fraud, and
theft and that they failed to establish that the defendant engaged in
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and the plaintiffs appealed to this
court. Held:
1. The plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court misinterpreted their legal claims
was unavailing: to the extent the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court
failed to make certain factual findings or that it overlooked claims made
by the plaintiffs, this court did not agree with such claims, and the
plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification,
or a motion for articulation seeking to have the trial court address the
alleged deficiencies; moreover, in its memorandum of decision, the trial
court explicitly addressed each of the counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint,
and each of the claims B asserted at trial when the court asked him to
summarize their claims, before holding that the plaintiffs had not met
their burden of proof as to each count.
2. The plaintiffs’ arguments challenging the trial court’s credibility determina-
tions were not convincing: contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there
was no indication that the trial court did not base its credibility determi-
nations on the conduct, demeanor and attitude of the witnesses; more-
over, after finding G’s testimony credible, the trial court stated that
her testimony was supported by documentary evidence and properly
explained its determination by citing to various portions of her testimony
and the other evidence admitted at trial, and it was not the role of this
court to second-guess the trial court’s credibility determinations.
3. The plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court made findings contrary to the
evidence that undermined appellate confidence in the trial court’s fact-
finding process and required a new trial failed:
a. This court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the
trial court had erred in finding that there was no evidence to support
the plaintiffs’ claims and that the plaintiffs had signed the documents
related to the sale of the plow truck: the trial court’s finding that it
‘‘defie[d] common sense’’ that the defendant would allow the plaintiffs
to drive the truck off the defendant’s property without a deal in place was
not clearly erroneous because the court explicitly credited G’s testimony,
which supported a finding that the defendant did not engage in a yo-yo
scam and that the plaintiffs executed a contract for the purchase of a
plow truck before leaving the defendant’s premises on January 21, 2015;
moreover, in asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the evi-
dence did not support their claims because they had been forced to
return to the defendant the only copy of the alleged original contract,
the plaintiffs misapprehended the burdens of proof related to their com-
plaint, implying that the defendant had the burden of proving that the
plaintiffs had signed the documents in evidence when, in fact, the burden
was on the plaintiffs to prove that the signatures were not genuine;
furthermore, the plaintiffs did not submit any credible evidence that
their signatures on the documents in evidence had been forged, that any
Page 4A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
4 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
of the documents in evidence had been improperly fabricated or changed,
that there was ever a January 21, 2015 contract with A Co., or that any
of the defendant’s behavior amounted to a CUTPA violation, and they
offered only the testimony of B and E in support of their complaint,
which the trial court found not to be credible.
b. This court declined to review the plaintiffs’ remaining challenges to
the trial court’s findings: in making their claims that it was clearly errone-
ous for the trial court to find that it was not logical or reasonable that
E would make payments to A Co. with respect to a January 26, 2015
contract that he had never signed and that the trial court could not
reconcile the claim that someone else put E’s name, as a member of M
Co., on the January 26, 2015 documents with the fact that M Co. bought
the plow truck, the plaintiffs were questioning the trial court’s interpreta-
tion of their claims at trial, which they should have addressed by filing
a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion articulation;
moreover, the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs ratified the January
26, 2015 contract was unnecessary to its holding because the court had
already found that M Co. agreed to the contract, and, as such, the plaintiffs
could not have been aggrieved by any alleged error as to the court’s
finding; furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to preserve for appellate review
their claim that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s failure
to supplement the Monroney sticker on the plow truck to reflect that
the truck had been equipped with a plow was insignificant because, in
the trial court, they did not cite to any law or make any argument to
explain the significance of affixing an addendum to the Monroney sticker.
Argued January 16—officially released April 16, 2024
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, and tried
to the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial
referee; judgment for the defendant, from which the
plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Jack G. Steigelfest, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Michael R. McPherson, with whom, on the brief, was
Laura Pascale Zaino, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
CRADLE, J. The plaintiffs, Mathew Burr, Elmer
Blackwell, and MPK Property Maintenance, LLC (MPK),
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 5
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
in favor of the defendant, Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan,
Inc.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred
in (1) misinterpreting their legal claims, (2) relying on
the testimony of the defendant’s representative to reach
its conclusion, and (3) finding certain facts in support
of its judgment for the defendant. We affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.
The plaintiffs’ four count complaint, dated September
6, 2018, alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and
violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Following
a three day bench trial, the court, Hon. Edward S.
Domnarski, judge trial referee, set forth the following
relevant procedural and factual history in a memoran-
dum of decision dated September 12, 2022. ‘‘The plain-
tiffs’ claims arise out of MPK’s purchase, in January,
2015, of a 2015 Chevrolet Silverado truck equipped with
a snowplow (plow truck). The court heard evidence on
April 26 and 27 and May 3, 2022. The parties filed post-
trial briefs on August 15, 2022.
‘‘The complaint contains 126 paragraphs; the first
seventy-three paragraphs contain allegations related to
the plaintiffs’ purchase, from the defendant, of another
vehicle, a 2014 Chevrolet Silverado dump truck (dump
truck), in May of 2014. Although much of the testimony
and many of the exhibits related to the purchase of the
dump truck, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ claims
against the defendant relate to the purchase and sale
of the plow truck.
‘‘Burr, the managing member of MPK, testified to
the following events. On or about January 21, 2015,
1
References in this opinion to the defendant are to Grossman Chevrolet-
Nissan, Inc. References in this opinion to Grossman are to the defendant’s
representative, Linda Grossman, who testified at trial on behalf of the defen-
dant.
Page 6A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
6 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
he discussed purchase of the plow truck with Lewis
Davidson, a salesman at the defendant. The court notes
Davidson has since passed away and was never deposed
in this action. Davidson quoted Burr a price of $41,916
for the plow truck. The evidence established the plow
had previously been installed on the truck by a company
known as Dejana Truck & Utility Equipment Company,
Inc. . . . Financing for the purchase of the plow truck
was arranged by Davidson. Davidson told Burr that the
financing would be at a rate of 4.3 percent spread out
over seventy-two months. Burr signed an instalment
contract on behalf of MPK on January 21, 2015, and
drove the plow truck off the defendant’s lot. A few days
after purchasing the plow truck, Burr was asked to
return to the defendant’s showroom. Burr met with
Davidson who told Burr that he needed to return the
purchase documents to Davidson so that corrections
could be made to the documents. Burr gave his pur-
chase documents to Davidson, who assured Burr that
the terms of the purchase documents would not be
changed. In their posttrial brief, the plaintiffs refer to
the [January 21, 2015] contract returned to Davidson
as ‘Contract #1.’ The plaintiffs did not submit this pur-
ported contract as an exhibit. Burr testified he did not
return to the defendant to sign any other documents.
. . .
‘‘Blackwell, who is described as a very close family
friend, testified that he cosigned documents to help
Burr purchase the dump truck and the plow truck.2
Blackwell also testified that he went to the defendant’s
showroom on January 21, 2015, to cosign the documents
so Burr could purchase the plow truck. Blackwell also
testified that he never went back to the defendant after
January 21, 2015. It should be noted that on a retail
2
The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Blackwell cosigned the docu-
ments in his individual capacity and that Blackwell was never a member
of MPK.
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 7
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
instalment contract dated January 26, 2015 . . . Black-
well is listed as a co-buyer of the plow truck, along
with MPK.
‘‘Both the plaintiffs and the defendant have submitted
a retail instalment contract dated January 26, 2015,
which identifies the [plow truck]. . . . The contract
contains the following relevant terms. The cash price
for the vehicle, without tax, is $45,509. The amount
financed is $43,745.16, with an annual percentage rate
of 5.45 percent, payable by seventy-five monthly pay-
ments of $691.10. Burr and Blackwell both testified that
they never signed the retail instalment contract . . .
dated January 26, 2015.
‘‘It is the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant created
new purchase and financing documents for the plow
truck that were never signed by the plaintiffs. The new
financing documents stated an increased sales price for
the plow truck, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer
loan period than had been quoted by Davidson. The
plaintiffs also claim that the defendant forged the plain-
tiffs’ signatures on the documents. In addition, the plain-
tiffs claim the window sticker on the plow truck, known
as a Monroney sticker,3 did not reflect the true price
of the plow truck.
‘‘The plaintiffs did not provide a computation of their
claimed damages at the trial. In their posttrial brief, the
plaintiffs state that the improper actions of the defen-
dant imposed a higher debt burden on the plaintiffs,
which entitles them to compensatory damages for
breach of contract in the amount of $9909.
‘‘[Linda] Grossman is the owner and general manager
of the defendant. Although she did not have firsthand
3
A Monroney sticker is ‘‘the label placed on new automobiles with the
manufacturer’s suggested retail price and other consumer information, as
specified at 15 U.S.C. [§§ 1231 through 1233] (also known as the ‘Automobile
Information Disclosure Act label’).’’ 49 C.F.R. § 575.401 (c) (4) (2015).
Page 8A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
8 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
knowledge of the events surrounding the plaintiffs’ pur-
chase of the plow truck, she was familiar with the cir-
cumstances of the transaction and the numerous docu-
ments involved that were admitted as exhibits.4 . . .
Grossman testified that there is no indication that there
was a deal or contract for the defendant to sell the
plow truck for a price of $41,916 with financing at 4.3
percent interest, payable over seventy-two months.
. . .
‘‘[Grossman] testified that two retail instalment con-
tracts were prepared for [the] sale of the plow truck.
The first contract was dated January 21, 2015, in which
financing was provided by [JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association (Chase)]. . . . That contract
showed an amount financed of $43,745.16, an annual
percentage rate of 7.59 percent, eighty-four payments of
$674.95, with total payments of $56,695.80. The second
contract, dated January 26, 2015, provided for financing
by [Ally Financial, Inc. (Ally)]. . . . This second con-
tract also showed an amount financed of $43,745.16 but
had a lower annual percentage rate of 5.45 percent,
seventy-five payments of $691.10, with total payments
[of] $51,832.50—$4863.30 less. Both contracts show a
cash price of the vehicle, excluding sales tax, of $45,509.
‘‘[Grossman] also testified that after the first contract
was signed, the defendant’s business manager was able
to secure more favorable approval terms with Ally. A
representative of the defendant reached out to the plain-
tiffs to let them know of the favorable terms and asked
them to come back to the defendant to rescind or
‘unwind’ the Chase contract to take advantage of the
Ally contract terms. She understood that the Ally con-
tract was signed on January 26, 2015.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; footnotes added.)
4
Grossman testified that she spoke with Davidson about this case.
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 9
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
After considering the testimony of the parties and
reviewing the exhibits, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs ‘‘have not sustained their burden of proof
regarding their claim of breach of contract set forth in
count one. After careful consideration of the evidence
presented and the elements of fraud, the court finds
the plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof
regarding the claim of fraud set forth in count two.
The plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof
regarding their claim of theft contained in count three.
As to count four, which alleges violation of CUTPA, the
plaintiffs have failed to establish that the defendant
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’’ The
court, therefore, rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiffs first claim on appeal that the court
misinterpreted their legal claims. Specifically, the plain-
tiffs contend that the court erred by deciding claims
that they never made and by failing to decide the claims
they did make. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In the first
125 paragraphs of their complaint, the plaintiffs made
allegations as to the events surrounding their purchase
of the dump truck and the plow truck and then incorpo-
rated those allegations by reference in their counts of
breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation of CUTPA.
Paragraph 126 of each count in the complaint alleges
that, as a result of the defendant’s behavior, the plain-
tiffs suffered financial harm. At the conclusion of trial,
after the plaintiffs had presented numerous exhibits
and offered the testimony of Grossman, Blackwell, and
Burr, the court asked Burr, who was on the stand, to
summarize the plaintiffs’ claims. Burr testified that the
defendant had improperly (1) signed Blackwell’s name
Page 10A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
10 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
to MPK’s articles of organization in order to get the
plaintiffs a loan that should not have been approved,
(2) failed to include the price of the plow on the plow
truck’s Monroney sticker, and (3) manipulated the
plaintiffs’ signatures to create a January 26, 2015 con-
tract that the plaintiffs had never signed. The plaintiffs’
posttrial brief largely reflected these claims and further
alleged that, ‘‘on January 21, 2015, the plaintiffs agreed
to purchase the plow truck for specific terms and condi-
tions’’ and that the defendant ‘‘destroyed [the January
21, 2015 contract] and manufactured a new one . . .
showing a later purchase date of January 26, 2015,’’
with ‘‘a higher price . . . a higher interest rate . . .
and a longer loan period . . . .’’ In their posttrial brief,
the plaintiffs, for the first time, provided legal citations
to specify which laws they accused the defendant of
violating.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that
it could not ‘‘reconcile [the claim that Blackwell had
no authority to sign documents on behalf of MPK] with
the fact that MPK bought a truck from the defendant,
drove it off the lot, made all of the payments due to
Ally under the financing arranged by the defendant, and
still is in possession of the plow truck. If Blackwell was
not authorized to buy the plow truck, there was no
reason for MPK to keep and pay for the plow truck.’’
As to the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the Monroney
sticker, the court found that ‘‘[i]t is not logical for the
plaintiffs to think they were getting [the plow] for free.
The plaintiffs and the defendant agreed on a price for
the plow truck, which included a snowplow. The court
cannot attach significance to the fact an addendum that
showed the price of the plow may or may not have
been a part of the [Monroney] sticker.’’ Regarding the
plaintiffs’ claim that they did not sign the January 21
and 26, 2015 contracts in evidence, the court found that
‘‘[i]t defies common sense that the defendant would
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 11
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
allow Burr to drive the truck away without a signed
deal being in place.’’
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court ‘‘never
decided the actual issues presented by the pleadings
and evidence.’’ The plaintiffs specifically contend that
the court failed to make findings as to whether (1)
‘‘[the] documents [in question] were or were not signed
by . . . Burr and . . . Blackwell,’’ (2) the defendant
‘‘altered [MPK’s articles of organization],’’ and (3) the
Monroney sticker reflected the price of the truck with
the plow. The plaintiffs also claim on appeal that the
trial court, in some instances, ‘‘ignore[d] the plaintiffs’
actual claim . . . and substitute[d] a wholly invented
scenario . . . .’’ Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that
certain of the court’s findings respond to a claim that
the plaintiffs did not make—i.e., that they never entered
into a contract to buy the plow truck—instead of to
their actual claim that the terms under which they pur-
chased the plow truck had been illegally altered.5 The
defendant, in its appellate brief, suggests that the plain-
tiffs should have filed a motion to reargue and then a
motion for articulation if the court had not addressed
their causes of action. We agree with the defendant.
‘‘It is well established that a party cannot obtain
appellate review of a claim challenging a finding or
5
To support this claim, the plaintiffs point to the court’s findings that
‘‘ ‘[i]t defies common sense that the defendant would allow Burr to drive
the truck away without a signed deal being in place’ ’’ and that ‘‘MPK kept
and paid for the plow truck it bought . . . .’’ They explain that ‘‘the plaintiffs
never claimed that [the defendant] allowed . . . Burr to drive the truck off
the lot without a signed deal in place. To the contrary, the plaintiffs explicitly
alleged that MPK had entered into a contract to purchase the plow truck
before driving the truck off the lot. . . . [T]heir disagreement was over
the terms of that deal.’’ (Citation omitted.) Further, they argue that the
observation that MPK kept and paid for the truck ‘‘does not remotely refute
the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the terms under which MPK bought
the plow truck or the allegations that the defendant substituted forged
documentation in place of the original terms.’’
Page 12A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
12 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
determination that the court did not make. It is the
responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate
record for review. . . . It is well established that [a]n
articulation is appropriate where the trial court’s deci-
sion contains some ambiguity or deficiency reasonably
susceptible of clarification. . . . [P]roper utilization of
the motion for articulation serves to dispel any . . .
ambiguity by clarifying the factual and legal basis upon
which the trial court rendered its decision, thereby
sharpening the issues on appeal. . . . Our role is not
to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based
on a complete factual record developed by a trial court.
. . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclu-
sions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision
made by us respecting [the appellant’s claims] would
be entirely speculative. . . . It is, therefore, the respon-
sibility of the appellant to move for an articulation or
rectification of the record where the trial court has
failed to state the basis of a decision . . . to clarify
the legal basis of a ruling . . . or to ask the trial judge
to rule on an overlooked matter.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
D2E Holdings, LLC v. Corp. for Urban Home Owner-
ship of New Haven, 212 Conn. App. 694, 712–13, 277
A.3d 261, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 904, 282 A.3d 981(2022).
Here, to the extent the plaintiffs claim that the court
failed to make certain factual findings or that it over-
looked claims made by the plaintiffs, a determination
we do not make, the plaintiffs failed to file a motion
to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion for
articulation seeking to have the trial court address those
alleged deficiencies. ‘‘If the defendant believed that the
trial court overlooked individualized proof required for
any particular element of any particular cause of action
that was of such consequence that it outweighed those
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 13
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
cited by the trial court, it was free to seek an articula-
tion.’’ Standard Petroleum Co. v. Faugno Acquisition,
LLC, 330 Conn. 40, 66, 191 A.3d 147 (2018).
Moreover, we note that the court, in its memorandum
of decision, explicitly addressed each of the counts of
the plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had
not met their burden of proof as to each count. The
court also addressed each of the claims Burr asserted
when the court had asked him to summarize the plain-
tiffs’ claims at trial. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim
that the court misinterpreted their legal claims is
unavailing.
II
The plaintiffs next claim that the court ‘‘erred in rely-
ing upon the testimony of . . . Grossman to defeat
[their] claims and to impugn the testimony of . . . Burr
and . . . Blackwell.’’ They argue that there are limits
to this court’s deference to a trial court’s credibility
determinations and that the bases upon which the court
found Grossman credible were improper.6 We are not
persuaded.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In its memo-
randum of decision, the court stated that, ‘‘[a]s is often
the case, the outcome of this trial is determined by the
credibility of the witnesses that testified.’’ The court
further stated: ‘‘Having considered the testimony of the
parties, and after reviewing the exhibits, the court finds
. . . Grossman’s testimony regarding the events sur-
rounding the sale of the plow truck to be credible. Her
version of events is supported by the exhibits related
to the transaction. . . .
‘‘The terms of the January 26, 2015 contract with
Ally does have more favorable financing terms than the
6
We note that Grossman’s testimony was offered by the plaintiffs.
Page 14A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
14 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
January 21, 2015 contract with Chase. [Grossman’s]
testimony that the [defendant] wanted to save an estab-
lished customer money by way of reduced financing
charges is credible. It is undisputed that Ally provided
the financing for the plow truck. The plaintiffs made
payments to Ally pursuant to the contract and, in fact,
have paid Ally in full.
‘‘The court takes no pleasure in stating that it finds
Burr’s testimony regarding the terms of the sale and
financing is not credible. . . . [T]here is a lack of docu-
mentation to support Burr’s testimony as to the sales
price of the truck and the financing terms. The only
document that supports the plaintiffs’ version of events
is [an] Ally offer to the defendant for financing [that
states the pricing and financing terms the plaintiffs
argue applied to the deal]. [Grossman] has credibly
explained how this offer is between the [defendant]
and Ally and was not an offer or agreement between
Ally and the plaintiffs. . . .
‘‘Blackwell repeatedly testified that he did not sign
the documents related to the January 26, 2015 transac-
tion. The court does not find Blackwell’s testimony to be
credible. The documents appear to bear his signature.
When asked if he could identify his signature on the
documents at his deposition, and at trial, Blackwell
gave evasive and contradictory answers. The court was
struck by the fact that Blackwell testified that, before he
could identify his signature on a document, he needed
to know the date of the document and the contents of
the document.’’ (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improp-
erly made its credibility determinations by comparing
the testimony of the witnesses to the documentary evi-
dence instead of on the basis of an assessment of the
demeanor of the witnesses. ‘‘[A]s a reviewing court
[w]e must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of the
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 15
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis
of its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor
and attitude. . . . The weight to be given to the evi-
dence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within
the determination of the trier of fact.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) McLeod v. A Better Way Wholesale
Autos, Inc., 177 Conn. App. 423, 450, 172 A.3d 802(2017). ‘‘[I]t is the sole province of the trial court, as
the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. . . . The court’s determination that [a par-
ty’s] witnesses were credible is beyond the scope of
this court’s review.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fishbein v.
Menchetti, 165 Conn. App. 131, 136, 138 A.3d 1061(2016).
Here, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there is
no indication that the court did not base its credibility
determinations on the conduct, demeanor and attitude
of the witnesses. After stating that it found Grossman’s
testimony credible, the court simply stated that it was
supported by the documentary evidence. The court then
properly explained that determination by citing to vari-
ous portions of Grossman’s testimony and the other
evidence admitted at trial. Although the plaintiffs argue
that the court should have rejected Grossman’s testi-
mony as not credible and, thus, come to a different
conclusion on the basis of the evidence admitted, it is
not the role of this court to second-guess a fact finder’s
credibility determinations, nor do we ‘‘review the evi-
dence to determine whether a conclusion different from
the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Osborn v. Waterbury, 197
Conn. App. 476, 482, 232 A.3d 134 (2020), cert. denied,
336 Conn. 903, 242 A.3d 1010 (2021). Accordingly, we
are not convinced by the plaintiffs’ arguments challeng-
ing the court’s credibility determinations.
III
We now turn to the plaintiffs’ claim that the court
‘‘erred in making findings contrary to the evidence’’ and
Page 16A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
16 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
that those findings, ‘‘[t]aken independently or together
. . . undermine appellate confidence in the trial court’s
fact-finding process and require a new trial.’’ We dis-
agree.
‘‘The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court
unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We
cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the
witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Service, LLC v.
Capone, 221 Conn. App. 256, 279–80, 301 A.3d 1111,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023), and
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023). The
plaintiffs challenge several of the court’s findings on
appeal. We address them in turn.
A
Only two of the plaintiffs’ challenges to the court’s
findings are reviewable.7 First, the plaintiffs contend
that the trial court’s finding that it ‘‘ ‘defies common
sense’ ’’ that the defendant would allow the plaintiffs
to drive the truck away without a deal in place was
‘‘wholly unsupported by the evidence’’ because
‘‘allowing a customer to drive off with the car is the
first step in a yo-yo scam—there is nothing about it
that defies common sense.’’8 Taking this claim at face
7
We address the plaintiffs’ unreviewable claims in part III B of this opinion.
8
The plaintiffs explain yo-yo scams in their posttrial and appellate briefs.
‘‘In a yo-yo scam, the consumer drives off with the car before financing is
finalized, often with the dealer’s assurances that everything will be fine and
that there is just a little final paperwork to be received from the lender. A
few days later, however, the dealer then contacts the consumer to say that
the loan was not approved, so the consumer will have to return the car
unless the consumer will agree to different and more onerous loan terms.
Sometimes this is because the original loan was not in fact approved by
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 17
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
value, we conclude that the court’s finding is not clearly
erroneous. A yo-yo scam likely works because it defies
common sense that a dealer would allow a purchaser
to drive away before a deal has been struck. Moreover,
this claim fails because the court explicitly credited
Grossman’s testimony, which supports a finding that
the defendant did not engage in a yo-yo scam and that
the plaintiffs executed a contract for the purchase of
the plow truck before leaving the defendant’s premises
on January 21, 2015.
Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in
finding that the evidence did not support their claims
because they had been forced to return to the defendant
the only copy of the alleged original contract. Similarly,
they claim that ‘‘there was no basis for the trial court
to reach the . . . conclusion . . . that the [plaintiffs’]
signatures were genuine,’’ asserting that ‘‘[t]here was
no evidence before the trial court that . . . Blackwell
or . . . Burr signed the [January 26, 2015] agreement
form or any documents related to it.’’
As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs misapprehend
the burdens of proof related to the counts of their com-
plaint. They imply here that the defendant had the bur-
den of proving that the plaintiffs had signed the docu-
ments in evidence. The cases they cite in support of
the assertion that a signature on a document is not
proof of the signature’s authenticity, however, relate
to the authentication of documents for admission as
evidence. See United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 82,
85 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that certain documents were
improperly admitted into evidence in criminal money
laundering case, in part, because government had not
offered direct or circumstantial evidence that defendant
the lender, but it can also simply be an opportunity for the dealer to increase
its markup.’’ (Footnote omitted.) A. Levitin, ‘‘The Fast and the Usurious:
Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses,’’ 108 Geo. L.J. 1257, 1304 (2020).
Page 18A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
18 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
had completed those forms); State v. Jones, 8 Conn.
App. 177, 183–84, 184 n.5, 512 A.2d 932 (1986) (stating,
in response to defendant’s claim that handwriting exem-
plars were not properly authenticated, that ‘‘the admis-
sion of the document, did not, in and of itself, establish
the authenticity of the defendant’s signatures on the
documents’’). The plaintiffs do not argue on appeal that
the court improperly admitted the contracts as evi-
dence. Where, as here, the plaintiffs accuse the defen-
dant of fraud, the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove
that the signatures were not genuine. See Wieselman
v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591, 595 n.7, 930 A.2d 768(‘‘[i]n common-law fraud cases, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evi-
dence’’), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245(2007). Similarly, the plaintiffs bore the burden of prov-
ing that there had been a January 21, 2015 contract
with Ally. See Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App.
306, 330–31, 285 A.3d 59 (2022) (‘‘[i]t is well settled
that the party seeking to establish the existence of an
enforceable contract bears the burden of proving a
meeting of the minds between the parties’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903,
287 A.3d 601 (2023).
Here, the plaintiffs submitted no credible evidence
that (1) their signatures on the documents in evidence
had been forged, (2) that any of the documents in evi-
dence had been improperly fabricated or changed, (3)
that there was ever a January 21, 2015 contract with
Ally, or (4) that any of the defendant’s behavior
amounted to a CUTPA violation. In support of the four
counts in their complaint, the plaintiffs offered only the
testimony of Burr and Blackwell, which the court found
not to be credible. Therefore, we are not left with a
definite and firm conviction that the court erred in
finding that there was no evidence to support the plain-
tiffs’ claims and that they had signed the documents
related to the sale of the plow truck.
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 19
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
B
We decline to address the plaintiffs’ remaining three
challenges to the findings of the court. First, the plain-
tiffs claim that it was clearly erroneous for the court to
find that it was not logical or reasonable that Blackwell
would make payments to Ally with respect to a January
26, 2015 contract he never signed and, similarly, that
the court could not reconcile the claim that someone
else put Blackwell’s name, as a member of MPK, on
the January 26, 2015 documents with the fact that MPK
bought the plow truck. The plaintiffs explain that
‘‘[t]here is no dispute [that] the plaintiffs bought the
plow truck, drove it off the lot and made payments on
it . . . .’’ In making this claim on appeal, the plaintiffs
question the court’s interpretation of their claims at
trial. In part I of this opinion, we disposed of the same
claim. Thus, we will not review it further here.
Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in
finding that they ratified the January 26, 2015 contract.
At trial, the plaintiffs asserted that Blackwell never had
been a member of MPK despite the appearance of his
name on a copy of MPK’s articles of organization used
in the loan application process and the word ‘‘member’’
written next to his signature on contracts in evidence.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that,
‘‘[w]hatever the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim regarding
Blackwell’s authority to purchase the truck on behalf
of MPK, the claim is rendered moot by MPK’s implied
ratification of the transaction by keeping and paying
for the vehicle.’’
The defendant, in its appellate brief, asserts that the
court’s finding as to ratification was not necessary to
its holding and was, therefore, dictum. We agree with
the defendant. ‘‘A party is not aggrieved by a court’s
statements that are considered dicta.’’ Healey v. Man-
tell, 216 Conn. App. 514, 525, 285 A.3d 823 (2022). ‘‘Dic-
tum includes those discussions that are merely passing
Page 20A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024
20 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
commentary . . . those that go beyond the facts at
issue . . . and those that are unnecessary to the hold-
ing in the case. . . . [I]t is not dictum [however] when
a court . . . intentionally takes up, discusses, and
decides a question germane to, though not necessarily
decisive of, the controversy . . . . Rather, such action
constitutes an act of the court [that] it will thereafter
recognize as a binding decision.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357, 376–
77, 984 A.2d 705 (2009). Here, the court’s finding that
the plaintiffs ratified the January 26, 2015 contract was
unnecessary to its holding because the court had
already found that MPK agreed to the January 26, 2015
contract. Thus, the plaintiffs could not have been
aggrieved by any alleged error as to the court’s finding
of ratification, and we decline to review their claim to
that effect.
Last, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in finding
‘‘that the [defendant’s] failure to supplement the Monro-
ney sticker is insignificant.’’ They argue that they had
‘‘offered evidence that the Monroney sticker on the
[plow truck] did not in fact show the suggested retail
price of the vehicle because the [plow truck] had been
equipped with a plow that added approximately $5000
to its cost.’’ Although, in their appellate brief, the plain-
tiffs provide legal citations that allegedly support their
contention that a failure to supplement the Monroney
sticker constitutes a violation of CUTPA, the plaintiffs
cited no such law and made no such argument before
the trial court. ‘‘Our rules of practice provide that we
are not bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly
raised at trial or arose subsequent to the trial. Practice
Book § 60-5. . . . A claim is distinctly raised if it is so
stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise
matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A & R
Enterprises, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., 202 Conn.
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21A
224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 21
Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
App. 224, 229, 244 A.3d 660, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 921,
246 A.3d 2 (2021). In light of the plaintiffs’ failure in
the trial court to cite any law or to make any argument
that would have explained the significance of affixing
an addendum to the Monroney sticker, this claim is not
preserved for appellate review and we decline to review
it. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ claims fail.9
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
9
The defendant, in its appellate brief, asserts as an alternative ground for
affirmance that the plaintiffs’ fraud, theft, and CUTPA claims are barred by
the applicable three year statutes of limitations. We need not address that
alternative argument in light of our affirmance of the trial court’s decision
on other grounds.