In re Ava M. ( 2024 )

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IN RE AVA M.*
(AC 46676)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Flynn, Js.
Syllabus
The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
child, A. The mother first became involved with the Department of
Children and Families when F assaulted the mother’s then nineteen
month old son, M. F was ultimately convicted of assault in connection
with the incident and incarcerated. Within three months of F’s release
from prison, the mother reengaged with him despite the department’s
repeated admonishment that the mother should refrain from doing so.
After the mother gave birth to F’s child, A, she denied to the department
that she was in a relationship with F but agreed not to allow him to
have contact with A. When A was approximately four months old, the
parents were involved in an altercation and, when the mother escaped
F’s grasp and locked herself in another room to telephone the police,
F kicked in the door and then left the premises. Approximately one
year later, when M was six years old, he reported that F would hit the
mother in his presence. One week later, the police responded to a 911
call from a neighbor who had reported that a little boy was screaming
at the mother’s home because F was beating him. The neighbor further
reported to the police that she had overheard violent incidents between
the mother and F every night. A was removed from the mother’s care
shortly thereafter, pursuant to a motion for order of temporary custody
made by the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. A
neglect petition was also filed on that same date, substantially based
on the mother’s inability to provide a stable environment for A that was
free of exposure to intimate partner violence. More than one year later,
a court-ordered evaluator, C, completed a psychological evaluation of
the mother and recommended a zero tolerance policy toward the mother
having any reengagement with toxic men in her life, noting in the report
that any issue concerning the mother’s reengagement with F should be
taken very seriously and was potential proof that the mother had not
internalized her treatment and did not fully understand the impact of
intimate partner violence on A. The department conveyed a zero toler-
ance policy to the mother, but she was soon involved in another instance
of intimate partner violence with another man with whom she had a
romantic relationship. M’s father disclosed this incident to the depart-
ment and the mother pressured him to lie to the department and to
recant his disclosure. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition to
terminate the mother’s parental rights as to A. Several months later, a
friend of the mother called the police and reported that F was causing
a disturbance at the mother’s residence. F stated to the police that the
mother was his property and that he had forbidden her from being
around her friend. The mother told the responding officer that F only
occasionally spent the night at her residence and that he did not live
there. She refused to cooperate fully with the investigation, but F was
nevertheless arrested at the scene. The mother did not report this inci-
dent to the department. Several months later, police officers went to
the mother’s residence in order to serve an arrest warrant on F. The
mother and F locked themselves inside the mother’s vehicle and refused
to follow the officers’ commands to exit the vehicle. At F’s direction,
the mother attempted to evade capture but backed into the rear passen-
ger side of a police vehicle before pulling forward and parking. After
the mother and F refused to exit the vehicle, officers struck F’s car
window in order to unlock his door and remove him from the vehicle.
Both the mother and F were arrested on the scene. The mother did not
disclose the incident to the department and, at the termination trial,
she testified that she was merely giving F a ride. On the first day of the
trial, the mother’s counsel made an oral motion for posttermination
visitation if the petition for termination were to be granted. C testified
at trial that she had observed the mother and F carpooling to one of
the court-ordered evaluations despite her previous recommendation of
a zero tolerance policy toward the mother reengaging with F. In her
subsequent report, C opined that the mother lacked the capacity to
understand and to meet A’s needs, as evidenced by her reengagement
with F. After the trial, the court issued a memorandum of decision in
which it held that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify
the mother with A but that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from
such reunification efforts and that termination of the mother’s parental
rights was in A’s best interest. The court also denied the mother’s motion
for posttermination visitation. Held:
1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
erred in concluding that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from
the department’s efforts provided to her pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112
(j) (1)) to reunify her with A; although this court recognized that the
evidence in the record demonstrated that the mother was consistent in
visitation, showed significant interest in A’s life, and implemented skills
she had learned in programs during her visits, the trial court’s subordi-
nate factual findings, which the mother did not contest, provided suffi-
cient evidence to support that court’s determination that she had failed
to successfully address the primary factor that led to A’s initial commit-
ment to the petitioner’s custody, namely, her inability to provide a stable
environment for A free of exposure to intimate partner violence.
2. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in A’s best
interest; although the court found that A had a bond with the mother,
it focused on A’s need for stable, competent and reliable caretakers and
found that the mother was not willing or able to fulfill that role, as her
continued involvement with F made clear that she was unwilling or
unable to do what it took to successfully rehabilitate within a reasonable
time, that she lacked the capacity to prioritize, understand or meet the
needs of A, and that she had not brought her conduct to even the
minimal acceptable standards of parenting, even giving due credit to
her compliance with treatment, and, because the trial court’s subordinate
findings that the mother was unable to provide the stable environment
free from intimate partner violence that A needed were supported by
clear and convincing evidence in the record, this court concluded that
the trial court’s findings as to A’s best interest were not clearly erroneous.
3. This court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the
respondent mother’s motion for posttermination visitation; although the
trial court made several findings supporting posttermination visitation,
including that the mother clearly desired posttermination visitation and
sincerely believed that A would benefit from continued visitation, that
the mother’s visits with A were consistent in their timing and frequency,
and that the mother had strong emotional bonds with A, that court also
found that the mother continued to demonstrate issues in judgment that
the court found deeply concerning, including her continued engagement
with F at the risk of losing A, that the visits between the mother and
A were not overwhelmingly positive such that granting posttermination
visitation was necessary or appropriate, and that the record demon-
strated that A was tightly bonded to her foster parents in whose care
she had been for three years.
Argued November 8, 2023—officially released February 1, 2024**
Procedural History
Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Windham, Juvenile Mat-
ters, where the respondent father consented to the ter-
mination of his parental rights; thereafter, the matter
was tried to the court, Lohr, J.; judgment terminating
the respondents’ parental rights and denying the respon-
dent mother’s motion for posttermination visitation,
from which the respondent mother appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
David E. Schneider, Jr., assigned counsel, for the
appellant (respondent mother).
Jennifer C. Leavitt, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
FLYNN, J. The respondent mother, Brittany P.,1
appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating her parental rights as to her
daughter, Ava.2 On appeal, the respondent claims that
the court erred in (1) concluding that the Department
of Children and Families (department) made reasonable
efforts to reunify her with Ava and that she was unable
or unwilling to benefit from such reunification efforts,
(2) finding that termination of her parental rights was
in Ava’s best interest, and (3) denying her motion for
posttermination visitation. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the court, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our resolution of the
respondent’s claims on appeal. Violence caused the
respondent’s involvement with the department as a
result of an incident in May, 2016, wherein Ava’s father,
Michael M., assaulted the respondent’s then nineteen
month old child, M, an older half-sibling of Ava. The
respondent took M to a hospital but initially denied that
Michael M. was caring for M at the time of the incident
and told hospital staff that M had fallen in a bathtub,
which explanation the hospital staff determined was
incongruent with M’s injuries. Ultimately, Michael M.
was convicted of assault in connection with the incident
and incarcerated.
As a result of this incident, the department removed
M from the respondent’s care. M was returned to her
care in October, 2016, under protective supervision,
which supervision expired in 2017. Within three months
of Michael M.’s release from prison, the respondent
reengaged with him despite the department’s repeated
admonishment that the respondent should refrain from
doing so. The respondent, who has equivocated over
the years as to whether she believed that Michael M.
had injured M, allowed him to provide unsupervised
care for M following his release from prison.
In July, 2018, Michael M. drove the respondent to a
hospital to give birth to Ava but was not physically
present in the hospital because, after dropping the
respondent off, he overdosed on heroin in the hospital
parking lot. The respondent denied to the department
that she was in a relationship with Michael M. but agreed
not to allow him to have contact with Ava. Ava is medi-
cally complex and was subsequently diagnosed with a
laryngeal cleft, dysphagia, chronic lung disease, failure
to thrive, and asthma and requires a medical device
called a ‘‘G-tube,’’ used for feeding.
Another violent incident occurred approximately
four months after Ava’s birth. The respondent threw a
baby bottle at Michael M., who, in response, threw the
bottle at the respondent’s head, then pulled her to the
ground by her hair. When the respondent escaped his
grasp and locked herself in another room to telephone
the police, Michael M. kicked in the door and then left
the premises.
An additional incident of violence occurred in Decem-
ber, 2019. On December 20, 2019, when M was six years
old, he reported that Michael M. would hit the respon-
dent in his presence. One week later, the police
responded to a 911 call from a neighbor who had
reported that a little boy was screaming at the respon-
dent’s home because Michael M. was beating him. The
neighbor further reported to the police that she had
overheard violent incidents between the respondent
and Michael M. every night.
Ava and M were removed from the respondent’s care
on January 3, 2020, pursuant to motions for orders
of temporary custody made by the petitioner.3 Neglect
petitions were also filed on that same date. The orders
of temporary custody and the neglect petitions substan-
tially were based on the respondent’s inability to pro-
vide a stable environment for the children that was free
of exposure to intimate partner violence.
A court-ordered psychological evaluation of the
respondent was conducted on March 29, 2021, by Dr.
Suzanne Ciaramella, who noted in the evaluation that
any issue concerning the respondent’s having reen-
gaged with Michael M. should be taken ‘‘very seriously’’
and served as potential proof that the respondent had
not internalized her treatment and did not fully under-
stand the impact of intimate partner violence on Ava.
Dr. Ciaramella recommended a zero tolerance policy
toward the respondent having any reengagement with
toxic men in her life. The department conveyed a zero
tolerance policy to the respondent. Despite this state-
ment, on May 12, 2021, the respondent was in a romantic
relationship with John P. when she was involved in
another instance of intimate partner violence with him.
M’s father disclosed this incident to the department and
the respondent pressured him to lie to the department
and to recant his disclosure. On December 21, 2021, the
petitioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights as to Ava. The custody of M, who resided
with his biological father at the time of trial, was not
at issue in the court’s decision concerning the termina-
tion of parental rights petition for Ava.
Additionally, the court found that yet another inci-
dent of family violence occurred following the petition-
er’s filing of the petition to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights as to Ava. Marissa L., the respondent’s
friend, called the police on July 13, 2022, and reported
that Michael M. was causing a disturbance at the respon-
dent’s residence. Michael M., who was found in the
respondent’s apartment, stated to the police that the
respondent was ‘‘his property’’ and that he had forbid-
den her from being around Marissa L., the dispute over
which had caused their altercation. The respondent told
the responding officer that Michael M. only occasionally
spent the night at her residence and that he did not live
there. She refused to cooperate fully with the investiga-
tion, but, nonetheless, Michael M. was arrested at the
scene. The respondent did not report this incident to
the department.
The July 13, 2022 incident was followed by another
violent incident on November 4, 2022, when the police
went to the respondent’s residence in order to serve
an arrest warrant on Michael M. for two counts of viola-
tion of a protective order, among other charges. The
respondent and Michael M. locked themselves inside
the respondent’s vehicle and refused to follow officers’
commands to exit the vehicle. At Michael M.’s direction,
the respondent proceeded to drive the vehicle in an
effort to evade capture but backed into the rear passen-
ger side of a police vehicle before pulling forward and
parking. An officer unsuccessfully attempted to deesca-
late the situation, but Michael M. and the respondent
persistently refused to exit the vehicle. Thereafter, offi-
cers struck Michael M.’s car window in order to unlock
his door and remove him from the vehicle. Both the
respondent and Michael M. were arrested on the scene.
The respondent did not disclose the incident to the
department, and, at trial, she testified that she was
merely giving Michael M. a ride and that ‘‘no good deed
goes unpunished.’’
On January 9, 2023, at the start of the first day of the
two day trial regarding the termination petition, the
respondent’s counsel made an oral motion for postter-
mination visitation. The respondent’s counsel did so in
the event that the court granted the petition to terminate
the respondent’s parental rights. As pointed out by the
court in its decision, Dr. Ciaramella testified at trial
that she had observed the respondent and Michael M.
carpooling to the second court-ordered evaluation that
was conducted in late 2022, despite her previous recom-
mendation of a zero tolerance policy toward the respon-
dent reengaging with him. As also noted by the court
in its decision, in her report following this second court-
ordered evaluation, Dr. Ciaramella opined that the
respondent lacks the capacity to understand and meet
Ava’s needs as evidenced by her reengagement in a
relationship with Michael M., which situation was, in
part, the basis for why Ava previously had been
removed from the respondent’s custody. The court
issued a memorandum of decision on May 12, 2023,
in which it determined that the department had made
reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Ava
but that the respondent was unable or unwilling to
benefit from such reunification efforts and that termina-
tion of the respondent’s parental rights was in Ava’s
best interest.4 The court denied the respondent’s motion
for posttermination visitation. This appeal followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The respondent first claims that the court improperly
determined that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify her with Ava and that she was unable
or unwilling to benefit from such reunification efforts
under General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (1). Pursuant to
§ 17a-112 (j) (1), the petitioner must prove either that
the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify
or, alternatively, that the respondent parent is unwilling
or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. See In
re Gabriella A., 319 Conn. 775, 777 n.4, 127 A.3d 948(2015). Accordingly, because either showing is suffi-
cient to satisfy this statutory element, we address only
the respondent’s claim that the court improperly deter-
mined that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts made by the department. See id.‘‘[W]e review the trial court’s ultimate determination
that a respondent parent was unwilling or unable to
benefit from reunification services for evidentiary suffi-
ciency, and review the subordinate factual findings for
clear error. . . . [An appellate court does] not examine
the record to determine whether the trier of fact could
have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.
. . . [Rather] every reasonable presumption is made
in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 790.
In determining that the respondent was unable or
unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification
efforts, the court found that, ‘‘despite the many referrals
and repeated efforts of the providers from the referral
agencies, [the respondent] did not successfully address
the issues [the department] identified as primary barri-
ers to her reunification with Ava, namely, her repeated
interactions with abusive men, especially [Michael M.],
that resulted in her children and her being exposed to
[intimate partner violence], mental and physical abuse.’’
The respondent argues that the court improperly deter-
mined that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts because there was evidence that
she had engaged in services, including therapy at Per-
ception Programs, Inc., completed services such as
Therapeutic Family Time, was consistent in her visita-
tion with Ava, and was committed to working toward
reunification, that all of her drug screens were negative
for illicit substances, and that she maintained consistent
housing, employment, and income.
We recognize that the evidence in the record shows
that the department employees who worked closest
with the respondent acknowledged that she was consis-
tent in visitation, showed significant interest in Ava’s
life, including knowing about Ava’s schooling and medi-
cal needs, and implemented skills she had learned in
programs during her visits with Ava. She highlights evi-
dence of her strides and compliance with rehabilitative
services offered by the department while discounting
the uncontested subordinate factual findings of the
court supporting its ultimate determination that she
was unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification
efforts.
In evaluating whether there is sufficient evidence to
support the court’s ultimate finding that the respondent
was unable or unwilling to benefit from rehabilitation
efforts, we do not examine the record to determine
whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclu-
sion other than the one reached. See In re Gabriella
A., supra, 319 Conn. 790. Rather, we ask whether the
trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the
facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence
was sufficient to justify its ultimate conclusion, and, in
so doing, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court.
See In re Cameron W., 194 Conn. App. 633, 667, 221
A.3d 885 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 918, 222 A.3d
103 (2020).
The court’s subordinate factual findings, which the
respondent does not contest, provide sufficient support
for its determination. The court’s ultimate finding that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts was supported by substantial evi-
dence of her inability to provide a stable environment
for Ava free of exposure to intimate partner violence,
which factor was the primary reason that led to Ava’s
initial commitment to the petitioner’s custody. Despite
the department’s repeated admonishments that the
respondent refrain from reengaging with Michael M.,
she reengaged with him three months after his release
from prison for having assaulted M. Further, after giving
birth to Ava, the respondent denied being in a relation-
ship with Michael M. and agreed not to permit him to
have contact with Ava. However, despite the depart-
ment’s strong recommendation that she cease all con-
tact with Michael M., she was involved in an incident
wherein Michael M. struck her in the head with a baby
bottle and pulled her to the ground by her hair, causing
her to retreat to another room to escape and telephone
the police. She was involved in another violent incident
with Michael M. wherein a neighbor telephoned the
police and reported that she heard Michael M. beating
M and that she had heard intimate partner violence
incidents between the respondent and Michael M. every
night. The respondent, however, repeatedly had denied
to the department that she was continuing in a relation-
ship with Michael M. As a result of a court-ordered
psychological evaluation, Dr. Ciaramella noted that
‘‘[a]ny issue that comes up with respect to [the respon-
dent] reengaging with [Michael M.] should be taken
very seriously and [is] indicative of potential proof that
[the respondent] has not internalized her treatment nor
does she fully understand the impact of domestic vio-
lence or intimate partner violence on her children. This
should be a zero tolerance policy at this point given the
repeated setbacks over the years due to her continued
engagement with [Michael M.] . . . . [The department]
clearly conveyed this ‘zero tolerance’ position to [the
respondent] and was pursuing a plan of reunification
of the children with the [respondent] . . . .’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) However, in 2021, the respondent was in a
romantic relationship with John P., wherein she was
involved in another instance of intimate partner vio-
lence. The respondent then resumed her relationship
with Michael M. in 2022, after the petition to terminate
her parental rights had been filed, yet continued to
represent to the department that they were not in a
relationship, despite clear evidence to the contrary. Due
to the respondent’s repeated reengagement with
Michael M., despite his violent history toward the
respondent and M, there was sufficient evidence to
support the court’s determination that she had failed
to successfully address the issue that the department
had identified as a primary barrier to her reunification
with Ava, specifically her repeated involvement with
violent and abusive men, and in particular Michael M.,
which involvement resulted in Ava’s exposure to inti-
mate partner violence.5
II
The respondent next claims that the court erred in
finding that the termination of her parental rights was
in Ava’s best interest. We disagree.
We will not disturb a trial court’s finding that termina-
tion of parental rights is in a child’s best interest unless
that finding is clearly erroneous. See In re Davonta V.,
285 Conn. 483, 488, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). During the
dispositional phase, the trial court must determine
whether termination is in the best interest of the child.
Id., 487. According to § 17a-112 (k), in analyzing the
child’s best interest, the court is required to consider
and make written findings regarding the seven factors
delineated therein.
The respondent’s argument focuses on the fourth
statutory factor in § 17a-112 (k)6 of the child’s emotional
ties. She contends that the court erred in finding that
termination was in Ava’s best interest ‘‘[g]iven the bond
and the relationship that existed between the [respon-
dent] and [Ava] as well as the damage that would likely
ensue to [Ava] . . . .’’ She noted that Dr. Ciaramella
testified at trial that completely severing the relation-
ship between the respondent and Ava could manifest
in behavioral and emotional difficulties for Ava.7
Although the court considered and made written find-
ings with respect to all seven statutory factors as it was
required to do under § 17a-112 (k), the respondent’s
argument focuses on the fourth factor of emotional
ties. Relevant to Ava’s emotional ties, the court made
findings that Ava visits with the respondent weekly and
that the respondent has been consistent with visitation.
Specifically, in the dispositional phase, the court found,
regarding the fourth statutory factor concerning Ava’s
emotional ties, that Ava ‘‘is thriving in her foster parents’
care and bonded to them. Dr. Ciaramella, the court-
ordered evaluator, suggests, and the court agrees, that
despite Ava being bonded to [the respondent] . . . it
is time for her to have stability and permanency in her
young life.’’ Although the court found that Ava has a
bond with the respondent, the existence of such a bond
between parent and child is not dispositive of a best
interest determination. See In re Sequoia G., 205 Conn.
App. 222, 231, 256 A.3d 195, cert. denied, 338 Conn. 904,
258 A.3d 675 (2021). The court also found that Ava was
bonded with her foster parents. The court concluded
that it was time for Ava to have stability and perma-
nency.
In its analysis of Ava’s best interest, the court focused
on Ava’s need for stable, competent and reliable care-
takers. ‘‘In addition to considering the seven factors
listed in § 17a-112 (k), [t]he best interests of the child
include the child’s interests in sustained growth, devel-
opment, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his
or her] environment. . . . Furthermore, in the disposi-
tional stage, it is appropriate to consider the importance
of permanency in children’s lives.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Autumn O., 218 Conn. App. 424,
444, 292 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1025, 294 A.3d
1026 (2023). With respect to Ava’s need for stability,
the court found that the respondent was not willing or
able to fulfill that role, as she ‘‘has not brought her
conduct to even the minimal acceptable standards of
parenting, even giving due credit to her compliance
with treatment,’’ in that ‘‘[s]he remains entwined with
[Michael M.] and continues to lack insight as to the
severity of [intimate partner violence] and its effect on
[Ava]. Her actions with [Michael M.] as of late, which
the court has carefully weighed, make clear that she is
unwilling or unable to do what it takes to successfully
rehabilitate within a reasonable time in the future.’’ The
court additionally found that, as it had detailed earlier
in its decision, the respondent has not adjusted her
personal circumstances to parent Ava. The court, earlier
in its decision, had detailed that ‘‘Dr. Ciaramella suc-
cinctly opined, and the court agrees, that while [the
respondent] may not have addiction issues concerning
substances, she does exhibit tendencies that properly
could and should be framed as an addiction to unhealthy
and violent intimate partner relationships’’ and adopted
Dr. Ciaramella’s opinion that the respondent ‘‘lacks the
capacity to prioritize the needs of [Ava] and put [Ava]
first’’ and ‘‘lack[s] an understanding of [Ava’s] needs
and lack[s] the capacity to meet them as evidenced by
[her] reengagement in a relationship with [Michael M.]
which was, in part, the basis for why [Ava was] removed
previously.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Because the court’s subordinate findings that the
respondent was unable to provide the stable environ-
ment free from intimate partner violence that Ava
needed were supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence on the record before us, we conclude that the
court’s findings as to Ava’s best interest are not clearly
erroneous and we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court.
III
The respondent last claims that the court improperly
denied her motion for posttermination visitation. We
disagree.
In In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 248 A.3d 675 (2020),
our Supreme Court held, in a case separate from the
present one that involved neither Ava nor the respon-
dent, that a trial court has the authority pursuant to
General Statutes § 46b-121 (b) (1) to consider a motion
for posttermination visitation and set forth, for the first
time, the standard for trial courts to consider when
evaluating whether posttermination visitation should
be ordered within the context of a termination proceed-
ing. Id., 569–85. That standard, as codified in § 46b-121
(b) (1), is whether posttermination visitation is neces-
sary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection,
proper care, and suitable support of the child. Id., 580.
‘‘Our dedicated trial court judges, who adjudicate juve-
nile matters on a daily basis and must make decisions
that concern children’s welfare, protection, care and
support, are best equipped to determine the factors
worthy of consideration in making this finding. As
examples—which are neither exclusive nor all-inclu-
sive—a trial court may want to consider the child’s
wishes, the birth parent’s expressed interest, the fre-
quency and quality of visitation between the child and
birth parent prior to the termination of the parent’s
parental rights, the strength of the emotional bond
between the child and the birth parent, any interference
with present custodial arrangements, and any impact
on the adoption prospects for the child.’’ Id., 589–90.
The necessary or appropriate standard for deciding
motions for posttermination visitation ‘‘is purposefully
more stringent than the best interest of the child stan-
dard, as the trial court must find that posttermination
visitation is necessary or appropriate—meaning
proper—to secure the child’s welfare.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Annessa J., 343 Conn. 642,
674, 284 A.3d 562 (2022). ‘‘A more exacting standard is
required in this context, particularly in light of the rare
circumstance in which a trial court could simultane-
ously terminate parental rights and, in the same pro-
ceeding, order posttermination visitation.’’ Id. ‘‘Whether
to order posttermination visitation is . . . a question
of fact for the trial court . . . .’’ In re Ava W., supra,
336 Conn. 589. We review a trial court’s exercise of
authority under § 46b-121 (b) (1) for an abuse of discre-
tion and we review a trial court’s factual determinations
for clear error. See In re L. T., 220 Conn. App. 680, 702,
299 A.3d 1229 (2023).
In In re L. T., this court disagreed with the respon-
dent’s claim that the frequency and quality of her visita-
tion with her minor children prior to the termination
of her parental rights precluded a finding that posttermi-
nation visitation with the minor children was neither
necessary nor appropriate. Id., 701–705. In holding that
the court did not err in determining that it was neither
necessary nor appropriate for the respondent to have
posttermination visitation with the minor children, this
court reasoned that, ‘‘[a]lthough the respondent loves
the minor children and may have had frequent and
positive interactions with them, that is just one factor
that the court may consider in evaluating whether post-
termination visitation is necessary or appropriate. It
was not required to do so. Moreover, even if the court
did consider the nature of the respondent’s previous
visitation with the minor children, and agreed with her
that it was frequent and positive in nature, that determi-
nation, in itself, would not have been dispositive of the
required inquiry of whether posttermination visitation
was necessary or appropriate. In denying the respon-
dent’s motion, the court properly considered the
respondent’s inability to parent the minor children and
the harm that they have suffered as a result of her
shortcomings. The court also explained that the respon-
dent’s combative behavior with the foster parents, and
her fixation on advice that she perceives might have
come from the foster parents, demonstrate her diffi-
culty coping with visitation.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
Id., 704.
In the present case, the respondent argues that the
court made findings that supported continuing visita-
tion posttermination and that such findings are incon-
sistent with its ultimate determination to deny the
motion for posttermination visitation. The respondent
is correct that the court made several findings support-
ing posttermination visitation. Specifically, the court
stated that the respondent clearly desired posttermina-
tion visitation and sincerely believed that Ava would
benefit from continued visitation, that the respondent’s
visits with Ava were consistent in their timing and fre-
quency, that the respondent had strong emotional
bonds with Ava, that Ava appears to have an emotional
bond with the respondent, that there was no evidence
that the respondent interfered with the petitioner’s or
the foster parents’ custody of Ava and that there was
scant evidence on whether posttermination visitation
would impact the prospects of Ava being adopted.
There was testimony at trial that the respondent was
consistent in her weekly visitation with Ava that the
court credited.
In making its ultimate factual finding that posttermi-
nation visitation was not necessary or appropriate, the
court, in addition to the factors weighing in favor of
visitation, also considered that the respondent contin-
ued to demonstrate issues in judgment that the court
found ‘‘deeply concerning,’’ namely, she continued to
engage with Michael M. at the risk of losing Ava. Fur-
ther, the court noted that the visits between the respon-
dent and Ava were ‘‘not overwhelmingly positive such
that granting posttermination visitation [was] necessary
or appropriate.’’ When making findings concerning
Ava’s wishes, the court noted that, because Ava is under
five years of age, there was no direct evidence to demon-
strate her wishes but that the record demonstrated that
she was tightly bonded to her foster parents in whose
care she has been for three years and also bonded with
the respondent. The court found that it was not clear
that further work on strengthening the bond between
the respondent and Ava was such that posttermination
visitation was necessary or appropriate. Additionally,
the court stated that Dr. Ciaramella generally opined
that, although cessation of visitation could have a nega-
tive effect on Ava, the issue should be ‘‘significantly
guided . . . by Ava’s foster parents and/or providers
who may assess how stress impacts her medically.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Because the neces-
sary or appropriate standard is a more stringent stan-
dard and because the court’s determination of whether
posttermination visitation is necessary or appropriate
is a factual determination, we cannot say that the court
erred in denying the respondent’s motion for posttermi-
nation visitation.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** February 1, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1
The respondent father consented to the termination of his parental rights
with respect to Ava. Because he is not involved in this appeal, our references
in this opinion to the respondent are to the respondent mother.
2
The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the brief of
the petitioner in this appeal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c).
3
As of the time of trial, M was in the custody of his biological father in
another state.
4
The court also determined that that the respondent had failed to rehabili-
tate under General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The respondent does
not contest this determination on appeal.
5
There was evidence at trial that the respondent made allegations to the
department that two social workers, both of whom had been assigned to
her case at one time, were sexually inappropriate toward her. There was
testimony at the trial that one such social worker was on leave at the time
of the incident and no longer works for the department and that the second
social worker was removed from the respondent’s case the day after the
allegations were made and that he also no longer works for the department.
To the extent that the respondent’s brief can be read so as to allege that
the inappropriate conduct of the two social workers undermined her ability
to benefit from reunification efforts, we are not persuaded, as there is no
nexus between the acts of the social workers and her inability or unwilling-
ness to benefit from these efforts.
6
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides in relevant part that in determin-
ing whether to terminate parental rights under this section, ‘‘the court shall
consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness,
nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the
parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with
the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms
of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual
or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled
their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of
the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s
person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control
of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed
significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent
has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the
foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which
the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to
reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to
incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the mainte-
nance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other
custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been
prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by
the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the
unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of
the parent.’’
7
The court noted in the fact section of its decision that Dr. Ciaramella
had opined in her December 12, 2022 addendum to the second court-ordered
psychological evaluation that if visits with the respondent were to be stopped
or reduced it is likely that Ava may experience confusion and require extra
support as she adjusts to this change but that it is likely that she would be
able to overcome her negative emotions with a great deal of consistent
support, love, and reassurance.