Williams v. Commissioner of Correction ( 2023 )


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    CHARLES WILLIAMS v. COMMISSIONER
    OF CORRECTION
    (AC 45442)
    Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Vertefeuille, Js.
    Syllabus
    The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of unlawful restraint
    in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia,
    that he had been deprived of his right to due process in violation of
    Brady v. Maryland (
    373 U.S. 83
    ) when the state failed to disclose to
    him at his criminal trial a written, sworn statement the victim had given
    to the police in which she did not mention the incident that led to the
    petitioner’s conviction. The petitioner allegedly had sexually assaulted
    the victim and, two weeks later, allegedly punched her in the face.
    Approximately two months after those incidents, the victim reported
    to the police the incident in which the petitioner allegedly punched her.
    At that time, she also gave the police the five page statement in which
    she identified the petitioner as her assailant and detailed the history of
    their relationship but did not mention the alleged sexual assault, which
    she did not report to the police until five months later. The petitioner
    was charged in connection with the first incident with two counts of
    sexual assault in the first degree and one count of unlawful restraint.
    A jury found him not guilty of the sexual assault charges. In his habeas
    petition, the petitioner claimed that the victim’s undisclosed statement
    was material to his defense because the state’s case against him rested
    entirely on the victim’s testimony and credibility, the statement repre-
    sented a comprehensive history of their relationship, and the not guilty
    verdicts on the sexual assault charges indicated that the jury had rejected
    portions of the victim’s testimony. The habeas court rejected the petition-
    er’s claim that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose the victim’s
    statement. The court determined, and the respondent, the Commissioner
    of Correction, did not challenge on appeal, that the prosecution had
    suppressed the statement and that it was favorable to the petitioner.
    The court further determined, however, that the petitioner failed to
    establish that the statement was material to his defense, reasoning that
    the statement would have been cumulative of information that was
    available to the petitioner at his criminal trial and would not have
    resulted in a different outcome. The court therefore denied the habeas
    petition and denied the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal,
    and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held:
    1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner certifica-
    tion to appeal; the petitioner’s Brady claim involved issues that were
    debatable among jurists of reason and that could have been resolved
    in a different manner.
    2. The habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner failed to
    demonstrate that the victim’s statement to the police was material under
    Brady: the state’s case against the petitioner hinged entirely on the
    victim’s testimony, which the statement could have significantly under-
    mined had it been disclosed to the defense, as the statement was qualita-
    tively different from and thus not cumulative of other impeachment
    material that was available to the defense in that it described incidents
    of abuse the petitioner had perpetrated on the victim during a six year
    period both prior to and after the alleged sexual assault, the defense
    had no similar statement during the criminal trial that set forth a compre-
    hensive history of the victim’s relationship with the petitioner, and,
    although the defense had other exhibits that detailed other specific
    incidents of abuse the victim had reported to the police, the utility of
    those exhibits to attack the victim’s failure to report the sexual assault
    incident was less than the utility of the undisclosed statement; moreover,
    the petitioner’s ability to attack the victim’s credibility on other grounds
    did not undermine the importance of her omission of the sexual assault
    incident from her undisclosed statement, as, contrary to the respondent’s
    assertion that the victim’s statement was not material because the peti-
    tioner’s counsel had argued to the jury that the victim’s accusations
    were not credible, counsel’s argument would have been materially
    enhanced had the jury known of the undisclosed statement; furthermore,
    despite the respondent’s claim that the undisclosed statement was as
    inculpatory as it was exculpatory, the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel
    testified that he would have cross-examined the victim only about her
    omission of the sexual assault incident had the victim’s statement been
    disclosed to the defense; additionally, the jury’s actions supported the
    conclusion that a reasonable probability existed that disclosure of the
    statement could have led to a different outcome for the petitioner, as
    the not guilty verdicts on the sexual assault charges indicated the jury’s
    doubt about the victim’s credibility, and the jury’s note to the court
    during its deliberations asking whether unlawful restraint had to be
    related to the sexual assault charges indicated that the jury analyzed
    the victim’s testimony closely as to each charge.
    Argued April 26—officially released August 22, 2023
    Procedural History
    Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
    brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
    Tolland and tried to the court, Chaplin, J.; judgment
    denying the petition; thereafter, the court denied the
    petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner
    appealed to this court; subsequently, the court,
    Chaplin, J., issued an articulation of its decision.
    Reversed; judgment directed.
    Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant
    (petitioner).
    Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state’s attorney, with
    whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s
    attorney, Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistant state’s attor-
    ney, and Juliana Waltersdorf, assistant state’s attorney,
    for the appellee (respondent).
    Opinion
    BRIGHT, C. J. The petitioner, Charles Williams,
    appeals following the denial of his petition for certifica-
    tion to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying
    his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the
    petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its
    discretion in denying his petition for certification to
    appeal, (2) improperly concluded that certain undis-
    closed impeachment evidence was not material under
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 87, 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L. Ed. 2d 215
     (1963), and (3) improperly concluded
    that the petitioner failed to prove that his trial counsel
    provided ineffective assistance. We agree with the peti-
    tioner’s first two claims, and, accordingly, we reverse
    the judgment of the habeas court.1
    On the basis of the evidence presented at the petition-
    er’s criminal trial, the jury reasonably could have found
    the following facts, as set forth by this court in the
    petitioner’s direct appeal. ‘‘The victim2 and the [peti-
    tioner] met in 2001 and began dating in 2007. Over
    time, the [petitioner] became physically, verbally, and
    emotionally abusive. On some occasions, the victim
    reported the [petitioner’s] abuse to the police, friends,
    or family, but, on other occasions, she did not report
    the abuse because she learned that she ‘had to kind of
    pick [her] battles’ with the [petitioner]. In April, 2012,
    the victim decided to end her relationship with the
    [petitioner]. The [petitioner] was upset and began stalk-
    ing the victim. During this period, the victim and the
    [petitioner] filed police reports against each other, and,
    as a result of one of the [petitioner’s] complaints, the
    victim was criminally charged.3
    ‘‘The victim thereafter moved from Bloomfield to
    Hartford and changed her phone number on several
    occasions. Nevertheless, the [petitioner] continued to
    come to the victim’s house and call her even though
    the victim told him that she did not want to be in a
    relationship with him and that she wanted him to stop
    contacting her. When confronting the victim, the [peti-
    tioner] would often threaten to call the police and make
    false reports so that she would be taken away from her
    family. During this period, the victim acquiesced on
    several occasions to having sexual intercourse with the
    [petitioner] because she knew that he would leave her
    house afterward.
    ‘‘On February 14, 2013, the victim was at home with
    her infant grandson (February 14 incident). The victim
    put her grandson down for his nap in her bedroom at
    10 a.m. Sometime thereafter, while the victim’s grand-
    son was still napping, the [petitioner] arrived at her
    house and began yelling at her because he believed that
    she was sleeping with other men. The victim asked the
    [petitioner] to leave her house, but he continued to yell
    at her. The victim told the [petitioner] that she was not
    sleeping with anyone else and asked him to speak more
    quietly because her grandson was taking his nap. The
    [petitioner] demanded sexual intercourse and threat-
    ened to file a false police report against the victim if
    she did not have sexual intercourse with him.
    ‘‘As the [petitioner] advanced on her, the victim
    backed away from the [petitioner] and into her bed-
    room. Following her into the bedroom, the [petitioner]
    pulled a knife out of his pocket and told the victim to
    ‘stop acting up.’ The victim again asked the [petitioner]
    to leave, but the [petitioner] told the victim to perform
    oral sex on him because it was Valentine’s Day. When
    the victim continued to refuse, the [petitioner] grabbed
    the victim by her hair and threw her down on the bed,
    and the victim fell onto the floor.
    ‘‘The victim began performing oral sex on the [peti-
    tioner]. When the victim began crying, the [petitioner]
    became angry and ordered her to stop crying because
    she was ‘making [him] soft.’ When the victim continued
    to cry, the [petitioner] threw her on the bed, pulled
    down her pants, and vaginally penetrated her from
    behind while holding her down on the bed by her arms.
    When the victim heard her grandson crying, she asked
    the [petitioner] to stop, but he continued to penetrate
    her until he ejaculated. The [petitioner] complained that
    the victim ‘ruined his sex’ and then left her house.
    ‘‘On February 28, 2013, the [petitioner] returned to
    the victim’s house while she was there with her daugh-
    ters and grandsons (February 28 incident). The [peti-
    tioner] demanded to know her new phone number and
    with whom she was having sexual intercourse. The
    situation escalated and the [petitioner] punched the
    victim in the face, breaking her nose. Thereafter, the
    [petitioner] left her house. The victim did not want to
    report the incident to the police, but one of her daugh-
    ters called the police that same day. Although the victim
    spoke to the investigating officer and identified her
    assailant as a former boyfriend, she refused to provide
    the [petitioner’s] name at that time because she was
    afraid of him.
    ‘‘Following the February 28 incident, the victim began
    living in domestic violence shelters and stopped going
    to her house and telling people where she was living
    in an attempt to get away from the [petitioner]. During
    this period, the victim received medical and psychologi-
    cal treatment. Assisted by the psychological treatment
    she was receiving, in April, 2013, the victim decided to
    identify the [petitioner] as her assailant in the February
    28 incident. In September, 2013, the victim further
    reported the February 14 incident to the police.
    ‘‘The [petitioner] was arrested in connection with the
    February 14 incident and charged with two counts of
    sexual assault in the first degree and one count of
    unlawful restraint in the first degree. While the [peti-
    tioner] was incarcerated and awaiting trial, he fre-
    quently spoke about his case with Elon Henry, a fellow
    inmate with whom he was previously acquainted. On
    December 5, 2014, three days before the [petitioner’s]
    trial was scheduled to commence, the [petitioner] told
    Henry that ‘this girl [i.e., the victim] got me going
    through it right now. I’m a kill this girl . . . with my
    bare hands, and if I don’t kill her I’m a get close and
    I’m a make her give me head for like an hour this time.’
    The threatening manner in which the [petitioner] spoke
    concerned Henry, and he reported the [petitioner’s]
    statement to a correctional officer that evening.
    ‘‘Trial commenced on December 8, 2014. The [peti-
    tioner] presented an alibi defense, supported by his
    own testimony and the testimony of his mother, his
    sister, his nephew, and his girlfriend’s cousin. The jury
    found the [petitioner] guilty of unlawful restraint in the
    first degree but not guilty of the two counts of sexual
    assault in the first degree. Following the jury verdict, the
    [petitioner] pleaded guilty to being a persistent serious
    felony offender. The [petitioner] was sentenced to ten
    years [of] imprisonment.’’ (Footnotes omitted; footnote
    added; footnote in original.) State v. Williams, 
    172 Conn. App. 820
    , 823–26, 
    162 A.3d 84
    , cert. denied, 
    326 Conn. 913
    , 
    173 A.3d 389
     (2017). Attorneys Walter Ban-
    sley and Jennifer Smith represented the petitioner in
    the criminal proceedings.
    Following his conviction, the petitioner filed the oper-
    ative amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
    this matter on August 16, 2019. The petitioner claimed
    that the state had violated Brady v. Maryland, 
    supra,
    373 U.S. 87
    , by failing to disclose material impeachment
    evidence, which included a statement that the victim
    made to the police on April 24, 2013, detailing the history
    of her relationship with the petitioner (exhibit 2j), and
    a police report concerning an alleged burglary of the
    victim’s home by the petitioner on February 22, 2013
    (exhibit 2k). Additionally, the petitioner claimed that
    Bansley4 had rendered ineffective assistance during the
    criminal trial by failing to cross-examine the victim
    about the information in a police report pertaining to
    the February 28 incident (exhibit 2p).5 The respondent,
    the Commissioner of Correction, filed a return on
    August 23, 2019, asserting a lack of sufficient informa-
    tion to admit or deny the petitioner’s claims.6
    The habeas court, Chaplin, J., held a two day trial
    on the petition on March 10, 2020, and December 3,
    2021, at which the petitioner presented the testimony
    of the victim, Bansley, and Detectives Phillip Fuschino
    and Cheryl Gogins of the Hartford Police Department.
    The petitioner submitted twenty-two exhibits, and the
    respondent submitted one exhibit, all of which the court
    admitted into evidence and considered in its decision.
    At the habeas trial, Bansley testified that his primary
    strategy of defense in the petitioner’s case was to estab-
    lish that the victim ‘‘was a liar’’ and ‘‘to impeach her
    with everything [he] could.’’
    On March 4, 2022, the court issued a memorandum
    of decision in which it denied the petitioner’s Brady
    claim, finding that, although the subject police report
    was suppressed and the information therein was favor-
    able to the petitioner, it was not material because it
    was ‘‘cumulative of the information available to the
    petitioner at trial . . . .’’7 In addition, the court rejected
    the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
    On March 9, 2022, the petitioner filed a petition for
    certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judg-
    ment, which the habeas court denied. This appeal fol-
    lowed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The petitioner first claims that the habeas court
    abused its discretion by denying his petition for certifi-
    cation to appeal. We agree.
    We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
    review. ‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition
    for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appel-
    late review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas
    corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunci-
    ated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden, 
    229 Conn. 178
    , 
    640 A.2d 601
     (1994), and adopted in Simms
    v. Warden, 
    230 Conn. 608
    , 612, 
    646 A.2d 126
     (1994).
    First, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that the denial
    of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of
    discretion. . . . Second, if the petitioner can show an
    abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the deci-
    sion of the habeas court should be reversed on the
    merits. . . . To prove that the denial of his petition for
    certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discre-
    tion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolu-
    tion of the underlying claim involves issues that] are
    debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could
    resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the
    questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to
    proceed further. . . .
    ‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused
    its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for
    certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
    the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether
    the habeas court reasonably determined that the peti-
    tioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review
    the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of
    ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more
    of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme
    Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas
    court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    181 Conn. App. 572
    , 577–78, 
    187 A.3d 543
    , cert. denied, 
    329 Conn. 909
    , 
    186 A.3d 13
     (2018).
    As discussed in part II of this opinion, because the
    petitioner’s Brady claim involves issues that are debat-
    able among jurists of reason and that could have been
    resolved by a court in a different manner, we conclude
    that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying
    the petition for certification to appeal. See, e.g., Doan
    v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    193 Conn. App. 263
    ,
    272–73, 
    219 A.3d 462
    , cert. denied, 
    333 Conn. 944
    , 
    219 A.3d 374
     (2019). Accordingly, we turn to the merits of
    the petitioner’s Brady claim.
    II
    On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
    improperly concluded that a sworn statement that the
    victim gave to the police on April 24, 2013, as memorial-
    ized in habeas exhibit 2j, was not material under Brady
    v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 87
    . We agree.
    We begin with the standard of review and legal princi-
    ples that apply to Brady claims. ‘‘Whether the petitioner
    was deprived of his due process rights due to a Brady
    violation is a question of law, to which we grant plenary
    review. . . . Additionally, a trial court’s determination
    as to materiality under Brady presents a mixed question
    of law and fact subject to plenary review . . . . We
    will not disturb a habeas court’s findings with respect
    to the underlying historical facts or whether the evi-
    dence was suppressed unless the findings are clearly
    erroneous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    170 Conn. App. 654
    , 689, 
    155 A.3d 772
    , cert. denied, 
    325 Conn. 901
    , 
    157 A.3d 1146
     (2017).
    In Brady v. Maryland, 
    supra,
     
    373 U.S. 87
    , the United
    States Supreme Court held that ‘‘the suppression by the
    prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
    request violates due process where the evidence is
    material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
    of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’’ The
    prosecution’s duty to disclose under Brady applies not
    only to exculpatory evidence but also to impeachment
    evidence, which is evidence ‘‘having the potential to
    alter the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a signifi-
    cant prosecution witness.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    309 Conn. 359
    , 370, 
    71 A.3d 512
     (2013). To prove a Brady
    violation, ‘‘the petitioner must establish: (1) that the
    state suppressed evidence (2) that was favorable to the
    defense and (3) material either to guilt or to punish-
    ment. . . . If the petitioner fails to meet his burden as
    to one of the three prongs of the Brady test, then we
    must conclude that a Brady violation has not occurred.’’
    (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    170 Conn. App. 687
    –88.
    In the present case, because the habeas court found,
    and the respondent does not challenge on appeal, that
    exhibit 2j was suppressed and was favorable to the
    defense, the dispositive issue is whether that evidence
    was material. ‘‘The test for materiality is whether the
    suppressed evidence in the context of the entire record
    creates a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
    been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceed-
    ing would have been different. . . . [T]he mere possi-
    bility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have
    helped the defense or might have affected the outcome
    of the trial, however, does not establish materiality in
    the constitutional sense. . . . The question [of materi-
    ality] is not whether the defendant would more likely
    than not have received a different verdict with the evi-
    dence, but whether in its absence he received a fair
    trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy
    of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different
    result is accordingly shown when the government’s evi-
    dentiary suppression undermines confidence in the out-
    come of the trial.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in origi-
    nal; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 688.
    ‘‘[W]here there is no reasonable probability that disclo-
    sure of the exculpatory evidence would have affected
    the outcome, there is no constitutional violation under
    Brady.’’ State v. McIntyre, 
    242 Conn. 318
    , 324, 
    699 A.2d 911
     (1997).
    In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court
    concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish
    that the evidence was material to his defense. In particu-
    lar, the court reasoned ‘‘that, at the time of the underly-
    ing [criminal] trial, the defense was aware of [the vic-
    tim’s] delayed disclosure, the fact that she had
    numerous contacts with police between February 14,
    2013, and September 20, 2013, and that she did not
    report the February 14 [incident] prior to September
    20, 2013. The court also [found] that Attorney Bansley
    was aware of [the victim’s] failure to provide corrobo-
    rating evidence, including surveillance footage, for at
    least one alleged incident. . . . Attorney Bansley testi-
    fied credibly that he strategically exercise[d] caution
    in formulating questions as a result of his targeted
    approach to questions to avoid using information that
    he [deemed] too prejudicial or information that would
    [have opened] a door to uncharged misconduct of the
    petitioner being introduced at trial. Specifically, Attor-
    ney Bansley testified credibly that he would have
    avoided highlighting the fact that [the victim] did not
    call the police [after other incidents of misconduct].
    The information in [exhibit 2j] would have added fodder
    for his execution of the trial strategy, but there was no
    evidence presented at [the habeas] trial demonstrating
    that he would have employed it directly by way of
    specific questions to [the victim], nor was there evi-
    dence to demonstrate any direct benefit such questions
    would have had for the defense to the unlawful restraint
    charge and, thereby, the verdict.’’ Thus, the court deter-
    mined that the suppressed evidence ‘‘would have been
    cumulative of the information available to the petitioner
    at trial, including the information [that] Attorney Ban-
    sley utilized to impeach [the victim’s] credibility . . . .’’
    Accordingly, the court was not persuaded ‘‘that the
    appropriate and timely disclosure of the subject report
    would have resulted in a different outcome for the peti-
    tioner at trial.’’
    On appeal, the petitioner argues that the impeach-
    ment value of exhibit 2j ‘‘cannot be considered immate-
    rial’’ because the state’s case rested entirely on the
    victim’s testimony and, hence, her credibility. He fur-
    ther argues that exhibit 2j was ‘‘qualitatively’’ different
    from the other impeachment evidence available to the
    petitioner during his criminal trial because it repre-
    sented a comprehensive history of the victim’s relation-
    ship with the petitioner, whereas the other police
    reports available to him during his criminal trial related
    to specific, discrete allegations of criminal conduct.
    According to the petitioner, although it might have been
    reasonable for the victim not to have mentioned the
    February 14 incident when reporting other discrete alle-
    gations, one would have expected her to include it in
    a comprehensive chronology of her relationship with
    the petitioner. Finally, the petitioner argues that exhibit
    2j was material because the jury’s not guilty verdicts
    on the sexual assault charges indicated that ‘‘the jury
    had already rejected vast portions of [the victim’s] testi-
    mony. Moreover, the jury’s requests for further instruc-
    tion on the charge of unlawful restraint were indicative
    of a degree of uncertainty on that charge as well.’’
    In response, the respondent argues that exhibit 2j
    was not material because it was cumulative of other
    evidence of the victim’s delayed reporting of the Febru-
    ary 14 incident. According to the respondent, Bansley’s
    cross-examination of the victim ‘‘gave the jury an array
    of reasons to distrust the report once she eventually
    made it, eclipsing any potential impact of additional
    evidence that she did not promptly report it,’’ and
    exhibit 2j contained details of the petitioner’s previous
    offenses against the victim such that ‘‘the prejudice
    from it might well have counterbalanced any benefit.’’
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The state’s
    evidence against the petitioner at his criminal trial con-
    sisted principally of the victim’s testimony. There were
    no other witnesses to the February 14 incident and no
    corroborating physical evidence. Furthermore, although
    the victim testified that the incident was recorded on
    a home surveillance system, she never provided the
    police with a copy of the video recording from that
    day. The only other evidence the state presented of
    the petitioner’s guilt was the brief testimony of two
    witnesses, Janice Keeman and Henry.8 Keeman, a social
    worker at Middlesex Hospital in Middletown, testified
    as a constancy of accusation witness that the victim
    reported to her on March 20, 2013, that her former
    boyfriend had sexually assaulted her on February 14,
    2013. Henry, a prison inmate serving a sentence for
    conspiracy to commit robbery, testified to a conversa-
    tion he had with the petitioner when they were housed
    near each other in the Cheshire Correctional Institution
    on December 5, 2014, just days prior to the petitioner’s
    criminal trial. Henry testified that the petitioner dis-
    cussed his pending sexual assault case with him and
    told Henry that he was going to kill the victim with his
    bare hands or make her perform oral sex on him ‘‘for
    like an hour this time.’’
    The petitioner presented an alibi defense through five
    witnesses, including himself, his mother, his sister, his
    nephew, and his girlfriend’s cousin. The petitioner testi-
    fied that he was with his son all day, took his nephew
    to a shopping mall, and took his mother to and from a
    hospital on February 14, 2013. Each of his witnesses
    testified to seeing the petitioner at various times that
    day, which times conflicted with the victim’s testimony
    as to when the petitioner was at her home, sexually
    assaulting her.
    During its initial closing argument, the state relied
    exclusively on the victim’s testimony and the constancy
    of accusation testimony from Keeman, contrasting the
    credibility of their testimony with that of the defense
    witnesses. In its rebuttal closing argument, the state
    again relied heavily on the victim’s testimony and briefly
    discussed what it described as the ‘‘key statement’’ in
    Henry’s testimony that the petitioner told Henry that
    he was going to make the victim perform oral sex on
    him ‘‘for an hour this time, this time.’’
    During its deliberations, the jury delivered two notes
    to the court. First, on December 15, 2014, at 4:32 p.m.
    the jury foreperson wrote: ‘‘We are at a deadlock at
    this point. We need more explanation on reasonable
    doubt.’’ The next morning, the court read again the
    instruction it gave on reasonable doubt as part of its
    charge to the jury, and the jury resumed deliberations.
    Later that morning, the jury delivered a second note to
    the court, asking two questions. It read: ‘‘One, could we
    have clarification on count three and whether ‘restraint’
    applies to what allegedly happened in count one and
    count two? The second request is, two, could we hear
    [the victim’s] testimony of the February 28th assault?’’
    As to the first part of the note, the court first told the
    jury that it must consider the elements of each charge
    separately in reaching a verdict. The court then
    explained: ‘‘the restraint, quote/unquote, doesn’t neces-
    sarily have to apply to count one and count two. It may.
    Those particular counts may have a component of that,
    but it doesn’t necessarily . . . have to apply to count
    one and count two. Again, each count needs to be evalu-
    ated separately based on whatever evidence you’ve
    heard, and you may use some evidence for one, some,
    or all of the counts.’’ The court then played back for
    the jury the victim’s testimony regarding the February
    28, 2013 incident. The jury thereafter resumed its delib-
    erations and returned its verdict at approximately 12:05
    p.m. As previously noted, the jury found the petitioner
    not guilty of the two sexual assault charges in counts
    one and two and guilty of unlawful restraint in the first
    degree as charged in count three.
    It is against this backdrop that we must consider the
    materiality of habeas exhibit 2j. Exhibit 2j is a five
    page sworn statement that the victim gave to Detective
    Phillip Fuschino of the Hartford Police Department on
    April 24, 2013, detailing various incidents of abusive
    behavior perpetrated on her by the petitioner during and
    after their dating relationship. The statement describes
    several incidents between 2007, when their dating rela-
    tionship began, and 2013, several months after their
    relationship ended, in which the petitioner allegedly
    assaulted and/or threatened the victim, including an
    alleged violent encounter on February 22, 2013. Exhibit
    2j makes no mention of the February 14 incident.
    Accordingly, because the state failed to disclose exhibit
    2j, the defense did not know that the victim had pro-
    vided a sworn statement to the police on April 24, 2013,
    in which she detailed several incidents involving the
    petitioner, both before and after February 14, 2013, but
    failed to mention the February 14 incident.
    On direct examination at the underlying criminal trial,
    the victim testified as follows regarding her reporting
    of the February 14 incident:
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And did you report [the February
    14] incident between you and [the petitioner] to the
    police right away?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: No.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And why not?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Because I was afraid of him.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You were afraid of him? Any other
    reason you chose why not to report—
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Because I was afraid that he was going
    to do what he said and put a false statement—make a
    false case against me.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Did you tell anybody about [the
    February 14 incident] right away?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: No.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And why not?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: I was . . . so ashamed of what had
    happened. I just—I didn’t—I felt like it was just, you
    know, my secret. Like, I didn’t want nobody to know
    what he did to me.
    ***
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Now, you had said up to this point
    that you weren’t going to call the police anymore on
    him and that you were scared. Why did you change
    your mind and go to the police in April of 2013 and tell
    the police about the [February 28 incident]?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Basically, because I was getting treat-
    ment and I was seeing a therapist and they were helping
    me to, like, cope with the stuff that [the petitioner] had
    [done] to me. And they were like, you need to tell the
    police what he did. They were encouraging me that I
    need to tell the things that he had [done] to me.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Was the fact that you weren’t liv-
    ing in Hartford—did that have anything to do with it
    anymore?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Yeah. It’s like I felt safer, you know,
    where I was at.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Now, after you told the police
    about the [February 28] assault where he punched you
    in the face and broke your nose, did you continue to
    get treatment?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Yes.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And to this day, are you still get-
    ting treatment?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Yes. . . .
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: . . . Why did it take you another
    seven months from the date of the sexual assault to
    go to the police and tell them about [the February 14
    incident]?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Because at the time when I was in
    Hartford, I was in the middle of it, but when I was out
    of it and I was getting treatment and I was put on
    medication and I was being encouraged by my therapist
    and the people around me to tell what he did to me
    and it just—I don’t know. It just took time.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: What medication were you on?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Lexapro.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And what’s that for?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: PTSD.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Does it treat—what sort of symp-
    toms do you have?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Anxiety.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Anxiety. So, it treats your anxiety?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Yeah.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So, explain the difference as to
    why you were able to tell the police within two months
    of an assault where someone punches you in the face,
    breaks your nose—you were able to tell them about
    that within two months.
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Right.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. But then it takes you
    another five months to tell [the police] about what had
    happened a week and a half earlier, which is the sexual
    assault that you just described.
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Right. And that was because, you
    know, in retrospect I look at it. I needed therapy. I
    needed to feel safe. I needed to feel that if I did tell,
    that, you know, I would be safe. So, through the medica-
    tion and the therapy, you know, it just—it just—it took
    time. It took time. It wasn’t something that I just
    wanted—I didn’t want to talk about it.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And in those months after, those
    seven months after the assault that you described, you
    said that you were getting therapy and taking medica-
    tion. Did [the petitioner] bother you in that—those—
    that seven months?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: No.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Were you still out of Hartford in
    a safe place?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Yes.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And you weren’t letting people
    know where you lived?
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Right. Nobody knows where I live.
    ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So, [the petitioner] wasn’t both-
    ering you. You were taking medication and getting ther-
    apy.
    ‘‘[The Victim]: Yes.’’
    Bansley’s cross-examination of the victim as to her
    delayed reporting of the February 14 incident was lim-
    ited to suggesting that her report of that incident on
    September 20, 2013, was tied to her efforts to secure
    a favorable disposition of the charges then pending
    against her. Bansley did not question the victim about
    other contacts she had with the police about the peti-
    tioner between February 14 and September 20, 2013.
    Nevertheless, Bansley did have in his possession during
    the criminal trial a police report authored by Gogins,
    habeas exhibit 2p, which detailed four communications
    from the victim in May and June, 2013, alleging that
    the petitioner had made threatening comments directed
    toward the victim or her daughter.
    At the outset, we note that our analysis of the petition-
    er’s claim is significantly influenced by the fact that the
    victim’s testimony was crucial to the state’s case. We
    agree with the petitioner, and the respondent does not
    argue otherwise in his appellate brief, that the state’s
    case against the petitioner, especially as to the charge
    of unlawful restraint, relied entirely on the testimony
    of the victim. The only other evidence the state pre-
    sented of the petitioner’s commission of the charged
    crimes was the testimony of Keeman and Henry. Kee-
    man testified only as a constancy of accusation witness
    as to the sexual assault charges. Similarly, the state
    relied on Henry’s testimony only to the extent that the
    petitioner’s statement about making the victim perform
    oral sex on him for one hour the next time he encoun-
    tered her constituted an implied admission that he was
    guilty of having forced her to do so on February 14, 2013.
    The state relied on neither witness for the unlawful
    restraint conviction.
    The importance of the victim’s testimony is further
    demonstrated by both parties’ closing arguments at the
    petitioner’s criminal trial. As Bansley explained to the
    jury, ‘‘the only evidence you have with respect to Febru-
    ary 14, 2013, is [the victim]. She is the only one that
    could get up here and testify about that, aside from the
    obvious rebuttal from [the petitioner] saying that this
    never happened. But it is not corroborated by anything.
    There is no physical evidence, forensic evidence,
    nobody else was there to come in and say I saw it,
    it happened. It’s just her word.’’ Similarly, the state
    exclusively relied on the victim’s testimony to establish
    each element of the crime of unlawful restraint in the
    first degree, explaining to the jury, for example, that it
    was ‘‘obvious by [the victim’s] testimony’’ that she had
    not consented to the petitioner’s conduct.
    That the petitioner’s conviction was based entirely
    on the victim’s testimony was confirmed by this court
    in the petitioner’s direct appeal from his conviction.
    In State v. Williams, 
    supra,
     
    172 Conn. App. 826
    , the
    petitioner claimed, inter alia, that there was insufficient
    evidence to convict him of unlawful restraint in the first
    degree. In rejecting the petitioner’s claim, this court
    stated: ‘‘The dispositive question before this court is
    whether the victim’s testimony provided the jury with
    a reasonable basis on which it could conclude that the
    state proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
    elements of [General Statutes] § 53a-95 (a) and, thus,
    provided the jury with a sufficient basis on which it
    could find the defendant guilty of that charge.’’ (Empha-
    sis added.) Id., 829.9
    Our Supreme Court ‘‘has stated many times that when
    the prosecution’s case hinges entirely on the testimony
    of certain witnesses, information affecting their credi-
    bility is material.’’ State v. White, 
    229 Conn. 125
    , 136–37,
    
    640 A.2d 572
     (1994); see also Demers v. State, 
    209 Conn. 143
    , 161–62, 
    547 A.2d 28
     (1988) (‘‘where, as here, a
    conviction depends entirely [on] the testimony of cer-
    tain witnesses . . . information affecting their credi-
    bility is material in the constitutional sense . . . since
    if they are not believed a reasonable doubt of guilt
    would be created’’ (citation omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted)); Elsey v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    126 Conn. App. 144
    , 158, 
    10 A.3d 578
     (‘‘[i]t is well estab-
    lished that impeachment evidence may be crucial to a
    defense, especially when the state’s case hinges entirely
    upon the credibility of certain key witnesses’’ (internal
    quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 
    300 Conn. 922
    ,
    
    14 A.3d 1007
     (2011). ‘‘The purpose of requiring the state
    to disclose impeachment evidence to a criminal defen-
    dant is to ensure that the jury knows the facts that
    might motivate a witness in giving testimony . . . . In
    determining whether impeachment evidence is mate-
    rial, the question is not whether the verdict might have
    been different without any of [the witness’] testimony,
    but whether the verdict might have been different if
    [the witness’] testimony [was] further impeached by
    disclosure of the [impeachment material]. . . . The
    fact that the witness’ testimony is corroborated by addi-
    tional evidence supporting a guilty verdict also may
    be considered in determining whether the suppressed
    impeachment evidence was material.’’ (Citations omit-
    ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Floyd,
    
    253 Conn. 700
    , 744, 
    756 A.2d 799
     (2000).
    Furthermore, withheld impeachment evidence may
    not be material when the witness’ ‘‘credibility and
    motives for testifying already had been impeached via
    defense counsel’s comprehensive and skillful cross-
    examination . . . [and the witness’] testimony, while
    significant, was not dispositive . . . .’’ State v. Ortiz,
    
    280 Conn. 686
    , 722, 
    911 A.2d 1055
     (2006). ‘‘[T]he seminal
    test remains whether there exists a reasonable [proba-
    bility] that the outcome of the proceeding would have
    been different had the evidence been disclosed to the
    defense. . . . If the evidence in question would not
    have provided the [petitioner] with any significant
    impeachment material that was not already available
    and used by him . . . it is immaterial under Brady.
    This is true even if the [evidence’s] cumulative effect
    may have lent some additional support to the [petition-
    er’s] attack on [a witness].’’ (Citations omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Peeler v. Commissioner,
    supra, 
    170 Conn. App. 691
    .
    Thus, the question before us is whether any use of
    exhibit 2j by the petitioner at his criminal trial would
    have been cumulative of his other attacks on the vic-
    tim’s credibility. Put another way, would the use of
    exhibit 2j have placed the evidence before the jury in
    such a different light that the state’s failure to disclose
    exhibit 2j undermines our confidence in the outcome
    of the trial? We conclude, for the reasons argued by
    the petitioner, that the answer is yes.
    First, as noted previously, the state’s case against the
    petitioner relied entirely on the testimony of the victim.
    In almost every case in which either our Supreme Court
    or this court has found undisclosed impeachment evi-
    dence to be cumulative, and therefore not material,
    there was other evidence of the defendant’s guilt. See,
    e.g., Marquez v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    330 Conn. 575
    , 596, 
    198 A.3d 562
     (2019) (‘‘[t]here was ample
    evidence presented at trial to show not only that the
    petitioner actively participated in the robbery, but that
    he also fired the shots that killed [the victim]’’); State
    v. Ortiz, 
    supra,
     
    280 Conn. 722
    –23 (impeached witness’
    testimony ‘‘while significant, was not dispositive; the
    defendant’s own statement to the police, admitted into
    evidence . . . as well as the gloves and matching wal-
    kie-talkie found in his car at the scene of the crime,
    further inculpate him in the planning of, and participa-
    tion in, the attack on the victim, thus bolstering our
    confidence in the jury’s verdict’’ (citation omitted));
    State v. Wilcox, 
    254 Conn. 441
    , 459, 
    758 A.2d 824
     (2000)
    (‘‘the testimony of a number of witnesses corroborated
    the victim’s testimony that the defendant had kidnapped
    and physically and sexually assaulted her’’), overruled
    in part on other grounds by Hinds v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    321 Conn. 56
    , 
    136 A.3d 596
     (2016); State
    v. Floyd, 
    supra,
     
    253 Conn. 746
     (‘‘Because the jury was
    apprised of [the witness’] motivation for testifying
    falsely for the state, the impeachment value of the sup-
    pressed evidence merely would have been incremental.
    Furthermore, [the witness’] testimony was corrobo-
    rated by the other two eyewitnesses, lending additional
    credibility to his testimony.’’); State v. Esposito, 
    235 Conn. 802
    , 819, 
    670 A.2d 301
     (1996) (there was ‘‘signifi-
    cant’’ other evidence that defendant was at scene of
    murder); State v. Gant, 
    231 Conn. 43
    , 53, 
    646 A.2d 835
    (1994) (‘‘abundant’’ other evidence supported court’s
    probable cause finding), cert. denied, 
    514 U.S. 1038
    , 
    115 S. Ct. 1404
    , 
    131 L. Ed. 2d 291
     (1995); State v. Bryan,
    
    193 Conn. App. 285
    , 318, 
    219 A.3d 477
     (‘‘[e]ven if the
    defendant could have used the records to impeach [the
    witness’] credibility, there was overwhelming evidence
    adduced at trial supporting the defendant’s convic-
    tion’’), cert. denied, 
    334 Conn. 906
    , 
    220 A.3d 37
     (2019);
    Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    170 Conn. App. 692
     (‘‘[A]lthough [the impeached witness’] testi-
    mony was significant, it was not dispositive. The other
    evidence inculpating the petitioner in the . . . murders
    further bolsters our confidence in the jury’s verdict.’’);
    State v. Falcon, 
    90 Conn. App. 111
    , 123, 
    876 A.2d 547
    (‘‘in determining whether the late disclosure [of the
    impeachment evidence] deprived the defendant of a
    fair trial, we are mindful of the undisputed evidence
    of the victim’s identification of the defendant’’), cert.
    denied, 
    275 Conn. 926
    , 
    883 A.2d 1248
     (2005).10 Given the
    lack of other corroborating evidence of the petitioner’s
    guilt in the present case, whether the undisclosed evi-
    dence truly was cumulative of other information avail-
    able to the petitioner becomes much more important.
    Second, we agree with the petitioner that exhibit
    2j was qualitatively different from other impeachment
    material available to the defense and, therefore, was
    not cumulative. It is true, as the respondent argues,
    that Bansley attacked the victim’s credibility on several
    grounds during cross-examination. He pointed out the
    victim’s motives to fabricate the accusation, inconsis-
    tencies between her September 20, 2013 statement to
    the police and her testimony at trial—particularly as to
    the time at which the crimes occurred—and the fact that
    she never produced a video recording of the incident,
    despite claiming one existed and despite producing
    such a video of an event which occurred days earlier
    involving her daughter and her daughter’s former boy-
    friend. Furthermore, the jury was aware from the vic-
    tim’s direct examination that she had not reported the
    February 14 incident to the police until September 20,
    2013, even though she reported the February 28 incident
    in April, 2013, and regularly called the police about
    incidents between her and the petitioner as early as
    2008. Bansley used this fact during his closing argument
    to argue that it was not credible that the victim would
    regularly, over a course of years, call the police to report
    relatively minor offenses but not timely report a violent
    sexual assault. We also acknowledge that the defense
    had other evidence in its possession, such as habeas
    court exhibits 2p and 2r, demonstrating that the victim
    continued to contact the police and to report various
    instances of misconduct by the petitioner between April
    and August, 2013, without mentioning the February 14
    incident. Those exhibits show that the victim had met
    with Detective Gogins on April 16, 2013, to discuss the
    February 28 incident—reported in May, 2013—that the
    petitioner allegedly ‘‘put another fake charge against
    [her] daughter’’ and threatened to ‘‘get [her] on a home
    invasion,’’; and reported in June, 2013, that the peti-
    tioner allegedly had sent a threatening letter to her
    daughter and slashed her cousin’s tires.
    If exhibit 2j was a discrete report of another crime
    committed against the victim by the petitioner on Febru-
    ary 22, 2013, we would agree that it would be cumulative
    of the other evidence available to the defense. In partic-
    ular, it would have been similar to the victim’s report
    of the February 28 incident, which, like the statement
    in exhibit 2j, was given to the police in April, 2013.
    Exhibit 2j, though, is much more than that. It is a five
    page sworn statement comprised of seventeen para-
    graphs describing various incidents of abuse perpe-
    trated on the victim by the petitioner between 2007 and
    February 22, 2013. Only the final two paragraphs of the
    statement refer to the February 22, 2013 incident, which
    was a burglary that involved the petitioner having
    threatened the victim with a knife. The remaining para-
    graphs of the statement describe in varying detail inci-
    dents in which the petitioner assaulted the victim, ver-
    bally abused her, threatened her, damaged her property,
    harassed her, and stalked her over the course of six
    years. Yet, the victim made no mention of the February
    14 incident. During the petitioner’s criminal trial, the
    defense had no similar statement from the victim setting
    forth a comprehensive chronology of the petitioner’s
    abuse of her. In particular, in exhibits 2p and 2r, which
    the defense did have during the criminal trial, the victim
    reported only specific events. Consequently, it would
    have been much easier for the jury to understand why
    the victim failed to mention the February 14 incident
    when reporting those discrete incidents. Therefore, the
    utility of those exhibits to attack the victim’s failure to
    report the February 14 incident was far less than that
    of exhibit 2j.
    Furthermore, the fact that Bansley was able to attack
    the victim’s credibility on other grounds, including
    inconsistencies in her accounts of the incident and her
    motivations for making the accusation, does not under-
    mine the importance of the victim’s omission of the
    February 14 incident from her sworn statement
    reflected in exhibit 2j. ‘‘[A] prior critical omission can
    serve to impeach a witness, but only when the informa-
    tion was omitted under circumstances in which one
    would expect it to be provided.’’ State v. Esposito,
    
    supra,
     
    235 Conn. 818
    . The recounting of the entire his-
    tory of the petitioner’s assaultive and controlling behav-
    ior against her in a sworn statement given in April, 2013,
    is precisely a circumstance in which one would expect
    the victim to report the February 14 incident. This is
    especially true because the victim, in exhibit 2j,
    reported acts the petitioner had committed both before
    and after February 14, 2013.
    We also disagree with the respondent’s argument that
    exhibit 2j was immaterial because Bansley had stated
    in his closing argument that the victim’s accusations
    regarding the February 14 incident were not credible
    in light of the fact that she regularly called the police
    about other incidents and did not timely report this one.
    This argument ignores the probative force of exhibit 2j
    as a sworn statement given to the police within two
    months of the incident that purports to recount a history
    of criminal conduct by the petitioner. We conclude that,
    had the jury known of exhibit 2j, Bansley’s closing argu-
    ment regarding the credibility of the victim’s accusa-
    tions would have been materially enhanced.
    We also are unpersuaded by the respondent’s argu-
    ment that exhibit 2j was not material because it was
    as inculpatory as it was exculpatory because it included
    descriptions of numerous incidents of uncharged mis-
    conduct by the petitioner. For this same reason, the
    habeas court and the respondent suggest that there was
    a possibility that Bansley may not have used exhibit
    2j because, in addition to impeachment evidence, it
    contains information prejudicial to the petitioner. In
    particular, the habeas court and the respondent rely on
    Bansley’s testimony at the habeas trial that he ‘‘would
    not want to highlight’’ that the victim repeatedly did
    not call the police or that he would avoid lines of ques-
    tioning that might disclose the client’s uncharged mis-
    conduct to the jury. Nonetheless, Bansley also testified
    that he could and would have cross-examined the victim
    only about the fact that she had omitted the February
    14 incident from her statement in exhibit 2j.11 In
    assessing how the defense would have used exhibit 2j
    at trial generally, ‘‘we are cognizant of what adverse
    effect the nondisclosure may have had on the [petition-
    er’s] preparation or presentation of [his] case and that
    we should act with an awareness of the difficulty of
    reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that
    the defense and the [trial] . . . would have [otherwise]
    taken . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
    v. White, 
    supra,
     
    229 Conn. 137
    . To be sure, exhibit 2j
    documents several instances of uncharged misconduct
    by the petitioner and showcases the victim’s tendency
    to avoid calling the police to report the petitioner’s
    abuse. Although we cannot predict with certainty how
    the defense would have used exhibit 2j, we also cannot
    discount the very real possibility that an experienced
    trial lawyer like Bansley would have used it in a manner
    that did not create an additional risk of prejudice to
    the petitioner. Indeed, by simply referring to the time
    line of events but not discussing the nature of the inci-
    dents documented in exhibit 2j, Bansley could have
    used the undisclosed information effectively to impeach
    the victim while keeping the details of the allegations
    contained in exhibit 2j from the jury. Moreover, even
    if the details of the uncharged misconduct were dis-
    closed to the jury, the prejudice to the petitioner would
    have been minimal given the victim’s direct testimony.
    As noted previously in this opinion, the victim testified
    about other abuse inflicted on her by the petitioner,
    both before and after the February 14 incident, includ-
    ing the February 28 incident, during which the peti-
    tioner had broken the victim’s nose.12 Consequently,
    it is unlikely that the other instances of misconduct
    mentioned in exhibit 2j would create additional preju-
    dice sufficient to outweigh the impeachment value of
    that information.
    Finally, we agree with the petitioner that the actions
    of the jury support a conclusion that there is a reason-
    able probability that the disclosure of exhibit 2j could
    have led to a different outcome. The not guilty verdicts
    delivered by the jury on counts one and two suggest
    that the jury had doubts about the victim’s credibility, as
    she testified in detail about how she was twice violently
    sexually assaulted by the petitioner. Furthermore, her
    testimony regarding the sexual assaults was corrobo-
    rated to some extent by Keeman and Henry. Neverthe-
    less, the jury was not persuaded, beyond a reasonable
    doubt, by the victim’s testimony that the petitioner had
    sexually assaulted her. At the same time, given that
    the petitioner’s defense was that he was elsewhere on
    February 14, 2013, the jury, by finding him guilty of
    unlawful restraint based solely on the victim’s testi-
    mony, necessarily believed some of her testimony. Fur-
    thermore, the jury, during its deliberations, asked the
    court if the unlawful restraint had to be related to the
    alleged sexual assaults. This question and the resulting
    split verdict indicate that the jury was analyzing the
    victim’s testimony closely with respect to each charge.
    We cannot discount the real probability that, had the
    defense had exhibit 2j and been able to use it to further
    undermine the victim’s credibility, the jury would have
    concluded that the victim’s testimony regarding the
    unlawful restraint also was not credible.
    For the foregoing reasons, we disagree with the
    habeas court’s conclusion that the petitioner did not
    meet his burden of demonstrating that exhibit 2j was
    material under Brady. We conclude that, because the
    petitioner’s unlawful restraint conviction hinged entirely
    on the victim’s testimony, and because exhibit 2j could
    have significantly undermined the victim’s testimony
    on a critical issue in the case, there is a reasonable
    probability that, had the state disclosed exhibit 2j, the
    outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial would have
    been different. We therefore conclude that the habeas
    court improperly determined that exhibit 2j was not
    material under Brady.13
    The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
    with direction to grant the petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus, to vacate the petitioner’s underlying convic-
    tions of unlawful restraint in the first degree and being
    a persistent dangerous felony offender, and to order a
    new trial.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    In light of our conclusion in part II of this opinion that the petitioner is
    entitled to a new criminal trial because habeas exhibit 2j was not disclosed
    by the state prior to his criminal trial, is favorable to the petitioner, and is
    material under Brady, we do not consider the petitioner’s ineffective assis-
    tance of counsel claim.
    2
    In accordance with federal law; see 
    18 U.S.C. § 2265
     (d) (3) (2018), as
    amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
    
    Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106
    , 
    136 Stat. 49
    , 851; we decline to identify any person
    protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
    order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
    whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
    3
    ‘‘In November, 2013, the state entered a nolle prosequi in the victim’s
    case after a witness admitted to filing a false incident report and pleaded
    guilty to making a false statement.’’ State v. Williams, 
    172 Conn. App. 820
    ,
    823 n.2, 
    162 A.3d 84
    , cert. denied, 
    326 Conn. 913
    , 
    173 A.3d 389
     (2017).
    4
    In the operative petition, the petitioner alleged that both of his trial
    attorneys, Bansley and Smith, had rendered ineffective assistance, but on
    appeal he pursues this claim only as to Bansley.
    5
    The petitioner also alleged that his conviction and incarceration consti-
    tuted due process violations, but he has abandoned these claims on appeal.
    6
    The respondent also alleged, as to the petitioner’s due process claims,
    that the petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
    granted and that the claims were procedurally defaulted. The petitioner
    filed a reply on August 27, 2019, denying the respondent’s allegations.
    7
    On September 14, 2022, the petitioner filed a motion for articulation
    asking the habeas court ‘‘to articulate whether it considered the petitioner’s
    exhibit 2k’’ in its Brady analysis and, if so, to articulate the effect of exhibit
    2k on its conclusion that the withheld evidence was not material. The
    petitioner stated that, although the habeas court discussed exhibit 2j in its
    memorandum of decision, the court ‘‘did not mention’’ exhibit 2k.] The
    habeas court granted the petitioner’s motion for articulation as to both
    requests, stating that it had considered exhibit 2k in making its decision
    and explained that it ‘‘directly address[ed]’’ exhibit 2k when it referred to
    the petitioner’s seeking ‘‘to introduce evidence that ‘[the victim] failed to
    provide surveillance footage for a second incident to further discredit her
    testimony.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.)
    8
    The state called four other witnesses, all of whom testified briefly in
    response to Bansley’s cross-examination of the victim in which he challenged
    her credibility and inquired about her motivation to lie.
    9
    The state, in its appellate brief in State v. Williams, 
    supra,
     
    172 Conn. App. 820
    , relied solely on the victim’s testimony as the evidentiary basis for
    the petitioner’s unlawful restraint conviction. See State v. Williams, Conn.
    Appellate Court Briefs & Appendices, February Term, 2017, Appellee’s Brief
    pp. 1–7.
    10
    We are aware of only one case in which undisclosed impeachment
    evidence was found to be cumulative, and therefore not material, in the
    absence of additional evidence of a defendant’s guilt. See Morant v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, 
    117 Conn. App. 279
    , 300, 
    979 A.2d 507
    , cert. denied,
    
    294 Conn. 906
    , 
    982 A.2d 1080
     (2009). In that case, however, ‘‘any effect the
    [impeachment] evidence would have had . . . would have been neutralized
    by the testimony’’ of another witness who did not testify at trial but did
    testify at an earlier suppression hearing. Id., 297. This court found that it
    was ‘‘clear that the state would have been able to rehabilitate the evidence
    that the petitioner claim[ed]’’ was material under Brady by calling that
    witness at the petitioner’s criminal trial. Id.
    11
    In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court stated that ‘‘there was
    no evidence presented at trial demonstrating that [Bansley] would have
    employed [the information in exhibit 2j] directly by way of specific questions
    to [the victim], nor was there evidence to demonstrate any direct benefit
    such questions would have had for the defense to the unlawful restraint
    charge and, thereby, the verdict.’’ The following exchange at the habeas
    trial between Bansley and Attorney Nicole P. Britt, the petitioner’s habeas
    counsel, belies that conclusion:
    ‘‘[Attorney Britt]: Would you ask about statements that [the victim] made
    before she reported the sexual assault that didn’t include the sexual assault?
    ‘‘[Attorney Bansley]: Not necessarily. That, you know, that could easily
    open a door to a whole line of things that kind of a, a battered wife syndrome
    type thing, so it just depends, unfortunately.
    ‘‘[Attorney Britt]: Was part of your defense—you said earlier that part of
    your strategy was credibility?
    ‘‘[Attorney Bansley]: Absolutely.
    ‘‘[Attorney Britt]: Would cross-examining [the victim] about statements
    that she made before she reported the sexual assault where she never
    mentions the sexual assault go to credibility?
    ‘‘[Attorney Bansley]: Not necessarily. If I asked her that the statement
    you showed me said, in 2008, in 2009, in 2010, but I didn’t call the cops, I
    didn’t call the cops, I didn’t call the cops, I would not want to highlight that.
    ‘‘[Attorney Britt]: Would—could you still cross-examine her just about
    the fact that she never brought up the sexual assault on—in her April 24,
    2013 statement?
    ‘‘[Attorney Bansley]: Absolutely.
    ‘‘[Attorney Britt]: Would you have done that?
    ‘‘[Attorney Bansley]: I would have.’’
    Similarly, Smith testified that exhibit 2j would have been important to
    the petitioner’s defense and ‘‘[a]bsolutely’’ useful in the cross-examination
    of the victim.
    12
    At the petitioner’s criminal trial, the victim generally testified that the
    petitioner subjected her to verbal, physical, and emotional abuse..
    13
    In light of our conclusion regarding exhibit 2j, we need not address the
    petitioner’s claim that the state’s failure to disclose habeas exhibit 2k also
    was material.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC45442

Filed Date: 11/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2023